DCF Amended Complaint March 23

Case 4:22-cv-00222-AW-MAF Document 43 Filed 03/24/23 Page 1 of 43
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
TANIYAH CRUTCH-WILLIAMS,
RODNEY JR. WILLIAMS,
CHARLOTTE WILLIAMS,
RODNEY SR. WILLIAMS,
CHRISTINE ROGERS, DANNY ROGERS,
DELAILA PINO LASALLE,
KENNETH NUNEZ ARROYO,
ESMERALDA ARROYO,
KEILA GARDNER, MARVIN GARDNER,
TRELANE JACKSON,
LEON ZETAR, SHARON ZETAR,
ALTHEA HOUSTON, CURT HOUSTON,
JILL LIPTON,
MINORS 2-8 and 10-13 by and through their Next Friends.
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 2022 CV 222
SHEVAUN HARRIS, as Secretary of the

Florida Department of Children and Families;
JOSEPH LADAPO, M.D., as the Executive
Director of the Florida Department of Health;
PATRICIA ARMSTRONG, as the Bureau Chief
of the Florida Department of Health Child
Protection Team; and
DENNIS MOORE, as Executive Director of the
Florida Guardian ad Litem Program,
Defendants.
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PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT1
Plaintiffs, Taniyah Crutch-Williams, Rodney Jr. Williams, Charlotte
Williams, Rodney Sr. Williams, Christine Rogers, Danny Rogers, Delaila
Pino LaSalle, Kenneth Nunez Arroyo, Esmeralda Arroyo, Keila Gardner,
Marvin Gardner, Trelane Jackson, Leon Zetar, Sharon Zetar, Althea
Houston, Curt Houston, Jill Lipton2, and Minors #s 2-8 and 10-13 by and
through their next friends (as set forth below), file this civil action against
Defendants, SHEVAUN HARRIS, as Secretary of the Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”), JOSEPH LADAPO, M.D., as the Executive
Director of the Florida Department of Health, (“DOH”), PATRICIA
ARMSTRONG, as the Bureau Chief of the Florida Department of Health
Children’s Medical Services and the Child Protection Team (“CMS” or
“CPT”), and DENNIS MOORE, as Executive Director of the Florida
Guardian ad Litem Program (“GAL”) within the Statewide GAL Office, and
in support of their pleading, Plaintiffs allege:
1 On February 24, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. No. 40).
The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend by March 10, 2023, (Doc. No. 40), and that
deadline was subsequently extended to March 24, 2023. (Doc. No. 42). By filing the
Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs are not intending to waive any rights or claims of
error related to the Court’s rulings on the motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 27 & 28).
2
Pseudonyms are used throughout this pleading both to protect the privacy rights of the
parties, including minors, and to avoid potential retaliation by Defendants.
2
I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. This case is about protecting families by ending customs and
policies that deprive and threaten to deprive Plaintiffs of rights secured by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2. Defendants have customs and policies of separating siblings in
foster care; not scheduling regular and meaningful visitation among siblings
who are separated by Defendants; not placing children in foster care with
adult relative caregivers; and ignoring the recommendations and
preferences of biological parents, whose rights have not been terminated,
about the placement of their children with siblings and adult relative
caregivers.
3. The rights at issue are secured by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Specifically, Defendants’ customs and policies
deprive Plaintiffs or threaten to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights of
association and cohabitation with family members when Defendants
remove children from their homes and place them in foster care. When
balanced against the fundamental rights at issue, Defendants’ customs and
policies cannot survive strict scrutiny. See generally City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
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490 U.S. 19 (1989); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); United States v. Del
Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d
1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quinn, 698 F.3d 651, 651 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d
991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006).
4. As a result, a declaratory judgment should be entered declaring
that it is unconstitutional and a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights to have practices, customs, and policies of: separating siblings who are
removed from their homes by Defendants and placed into foster care; not
scheduling regular visitation among siblings who are separated by
Defendants; not placing children in foster care with adult relative caregivers;
and ignoring the recommendations and preferences of biological parents,
whose rights have not been terminated, about the placement of their children
with siblings and adult relative caregivers.
5. In addition, a preliminary injunction should be entered until a
permanent injunction requires Defendants to discontinue its customs and
policies, as set forth above, and to properly train and supervise case workers
responsible for: placing siblings in foster care together; scheduling regular

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visitation among siblings who are not placed together; placing children in
Defendants’ custody with adult relative caregivers; and discussing
biological parents’ recommendations and preferences when their child(ren)
is/are taken by Defendants and placed into foster care. 3
II.
THE PARTIES
A. The Plaintiffs
6. Plaintiffs are individuals whose rights have been deprived or who are
threatened by the deprivation of rights as the result of Defendants’ customs
and policies; or individuals who bring claims in representative capacities on
behalf of minors whose rights have been deprived or are at risk of being
deprived by Defendants’ customs and policies.
3 Some courts analyze the constitutional rights raised by this complaint under the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g. Aristotle P. v.
Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-1010 (N.D. IL 1989). For purposes of both FRCP 8 (a) &
(e), Plaintiffs put Defendants on notice that they intend to pursue their claims under
either the First or Fourteenth Amendment or both should this Court determine that its
analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims would differ in any meaningful way under those
Amendments. Some courts have determined the analysis of the claims raised in this
pleading would be the same under either the First or Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g.
Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 298 (N.D. GA 2003) (Plaintiffs stated claims
under First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments; “[t]he constitutional right to family
integrity encompasses the right of children in foster care to have meaningful contact with
their siblings and parents.”); Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142, 163-64
(D. Mass. 2011).
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7. In general, Plaintiffs are children in Defendants’ custody or children
who are at imminent risk of being in Defendants’ custody; or adults with
family members who are children in Defendants’ custody or who are at
imminent risk of being in Defendants’ custody. Individuals in state custody
have constitutional rights inter alia to conditions of confinement which bear
a reasonable relationship to the purpose of their custody. Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of the child welfare system is to
promote the well-being, permanency, and safety of children and families by
helping families create nurturing and loving family environments without
infringing on parental rights.
8. The Plaintiffs include members of the Williams family. Taniyah
Crutch-Williams and Rodney Jr. Williams are residents of Clay County,
Florida.
9. Taniyah and Rodney Jr. are the biological parents of three children:
Minor #1 – Ra. Williams; Minor #2 – Ro. Williams; and Minor #3 – Ta.
Williams.
10. Taniyah and Rodney Jr. bring individual and representative claims.
Taniyah and Rodney Jr. have all parental rights to Minor #3. Taniyah and
Rodney Jr.’s parental rights were terminated as to Minors #1 and #2.

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11. Minor #1 was adopted by a family with connections to Florida’s foster
care system. Kids First of Florida, Inc. contracted with DCF to provide case
management services for children taken into Defendants’ custody. Minors
#s 1 & 2 were two of those children.
12. A board member (the husband) and agent (the wife) of KFF adopted
Minor #1 and attempted to adopt Minor #2.
13. Minor #2 was taken into Defendants’ custody based on allegations of
abuse or neglect related to Minor #1. There were no allegations of abuse or
neglect involving Minor #2.
14. Minor #2 was adopted by Charlotte and Rodney Sr. Williams.
15. Defendants attempted to take Minor #3 into their custody based on
allegations of abuse related to Minor #1. However, Defendants were
unsuccessful and Minor #3 remained and remains in the custody of his
biological parents, Taniyah and Rodney Jr.
16. Taniyah and Rodney Jr.’s individual claims are related to their
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. There
is an imminent risk that Minor #3 will be taken by Defendants or that
Defendants will attempt to take custody of Minor #3. Defendants have a
custom or policy of taking siblings from their parents when there are
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allegations of abuse or neglect related to a sibling. Defendants have
threatened or attempted to take custody of Minor #3 based on historic
allegations of abuse or neglect of Minor #1.
17. Taniyah and Rodney Jr.’s representative claims are related to Minor
#3’s fundamental right to visitation with his siblings, Minors #1 & #2.
18. Charlotte and Rodney Sr. Williams, who reside in Clay County,
Florida, have representative claims on behalf of Minor #2. Charlotte and
Rodney Sr. adopted Minor #2. Charlotte and Rodney’s representative claims
are related to Minor #2’s fundamental right to visitation with his siblings,
Minors #s 1 & 3.
19. Christine and Danny Rogers have representative claims on behalf of
Minor #4 - Ar. Doe. Christine and Danny Rogers adopted Minor #4, who has
a sibling in care (John Doe). Christine and Danny Rogers’ representative
claims are related to Minor #4’s fundamental right to visitation with her
sibling.
20. The Arroyo family includes Delaila Pino LaSalle, Kenneth Nunez
Arroyo, and Esmeralda Arroyo. Delaila and Kenneth reside in Palm Beach
County, Florida and are the biological parents of Minors #s 5-7, Ad. and Ax.
Pino LaSalle, and El. Pino. Esmeralda is the paternal grandmother of Minors
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#s 5 – 7 and she resides in Lee County, Florida. All three children are in
Defendants’ custody. Delaila and Kenneth have parental rights to Minors #s
5-7. Delaila and Kenneth recommended and continue to recommend that
Minors #s 5-7 be placed with and adopted by Esmeralda, if the children
cannot be returned home. Esmeralda, in turn, wants to adopt Minors #s 5-7.
Esmeralda is an appropriate adult relative caregiver.
21. Delaila and Kenneth’s individual claims are related to their
fundamental right to control the care and custody of their children. Delaila
and Kenneth have requested of Defendants that their children be placed
together with an adult relative caregiver. Defendants have refused and
continue to refuse to respect the parents’ requests. Delaila and Kenneth have
requested that, until their children can be reunified, regular sibling visitation
be granted. However, to date, Defendants have refused and continue to
refuse this request by the biological parents.
22. Delaila and Kenneth’s representative claims are related to Minors #s
5-7’s fundamental rights to cohabitate together as siblings, to regularly visit
one another as siblings, and to cohabitate with a relative adult caregiver.
Minors #s 5 & 6 are in Defendants’ custody and placed together with a non-
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relative caregiver. Minor #7 is also in Defendants’ custody but placed with
a different non-relative caregiver.
23. Keila and Marvin Gardner reside in Tennessee and bring
representative claims on behalf of their maternal grandchild, Minor # 8 - Mi.
Gardner. Minor #8 has eight siblings who either have been adopted by
relative adult caregivers or are in the custody of their biological parents.
Minor #8 does not reside or have scheduled visitation with any one of his
eight siblings. Keila and Marvin’s representative claims are related to Minor
#8’s fundamental rights to visitation with his siblings and cohabitation with
an adult relative caregiver. Defendants have taken custody of Minor #8.
Keila and Marvin desire and intend to adopt Minor #8, if Minor #8 cannot
be returned home. Keila and Marvin are appropriate adult relative
caregivers.
24. Trelane Jackson brings representative claims on behalf of her maternal
grandchild, Minor #9 – DK, and she resides in Putnam County, Florida.
Trelane Jackson’s representative claim is related to Minor #9’s fundamental
right to cohabitation with an adult relative caregiver. Trelane Jackson’s
individual claim is related to her fundamental right to cohabitation with her
grandson. Defendants have taken custody of Minor #9, who is not currently
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residing with an adult relative caregiver. Defendants placed Minor #9 into
foster care with a stranger to the family. Defendants placed Minor #9 with a
foster care system insider. Defendants placed Minor #9 with the President
of the Florida Foster / Adoptive Parent Association (“FAPA”), a DCF
contractor. Trelane is an appropriate adult relative caregiver.
25. Leon and Sharon Zetar bring individual claims related to the
placement of Minor #10 – Le. Zetar with an adult relative caregiver. Leon
and Sharon also bring representative claims related to Minor #10’s
fundamental right to cohabitation with an adult relative caregiver.
Defendants have taken custody of Minor #10, who is not residing with an
adult relative caregiver despite her biological father’s recommendation.
Leon recommended and continues to recommend that Minor #10 be placed
with and adopted by Sharon if his daughter is unable to return home. Leon
is Minor #10’s biological father and Leon has all paternal rights to Minor
#10. Sharon is Minor #10’s paternal aunt and desires that Minor #10 be
placed with her, unless and until the minor can be returned home. If Minor
# 10 cannot be returned home, then Sharon’s intention is to adopt Minor #10.
Sharon is an appropriate adult relative caregiver.
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26. Althea and Curt Houston bring representative claims on behalf of their
maternal grandchildren, Na. Kreps – Minor #11 and Ni. Kreps – Minor #12.
Althea and Curt reside in Hillsborough County, Florida. Defendants have
taken custody of Minors #s 11 & 12, who do not reside with an adult relative
caregiver.
27. Althea and Curt’s representative claims are related to Minors #s 11 &
12’s fundamental rights to cohabitation with an adult relative caregiver.
28. Althea and Curt’s claims are related to their fundamental rights to
cohabitation with their grandchildren. Althea and Curt are appropriate
adult relative caregivers.
29. Jill Lipton brings a representative claim on behalf of her biological
daughter, Minor #13 – Is. Lipton. Jill and Minor #13 reside in Pasco County,
Florida. Minor #13 has two older siblings that Defendants have taken
custody of previously or have threatened to take custody of previously.
When Minor #13’s sibling was taken by Defendants, regular sibling
visitation was not scheduled and her sibling was not placed with an adult
relative caregiver.
30. Jill’s individual claim is related to her fundamental right to the care,
custody, and control of her children. There is an imminent risk that Minor
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#13 will be taken by Defendants or that Defendants will attempt to take
custody of Minor #13. Defendants have a custom or policy of taking siblings
from their parents when there are allegations of abuse or neglect related to a
sibling. There is an imminent risk that Defendants will attempt to take
custody of Minor #13 based on historic allegations of abuse or neglect of
Minor #13’s siblings.
B. The Defendants
31. Shevaun Harris is the Secretary of DCF.
32. Joseph Ladapo, M.D. is the Executive Director of the DOH.
33. Patricia Armstrong is the Bureau Chief of CMS or CPT.
34. Dennis Moore is Executive Director of the Florida GAL program.
35. Defendants are sued in their official capacities.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
36. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§1331 and 1343 in that
this is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress the Defendants’
deprivation under color of law of the federal rights, privileges and
immunities secured to the relatives and children involved in the Florida
foster system by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The federal
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rights sought to be redressed are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court also has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, as Plaintiffs seek
declaratory and injunctive relief related to: (1) the separation of siblings in
care; (2) regularly scheduled visitation when siblings are separated in care;
and (3) the separation of children in care from their relatives.
37. Venue lies in Leon County, Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), as
Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of their relationship with the Defendants, who
operate the Florida foster care system throughout the state; and a majority
of the Defendants, if not all of the Defendants, have their principal place of
business in Leon County, Florida, which is located in the Northern District
of Florida, Tallahassee Division.
IV.
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS: An Overview
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in relevant part, “Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
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Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…”
39. In this case, Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief against
Defendants. Each deprivation of rights alleged herein is redressable through
prospective injunctive relief and / or a declaratory judgment. Each claim
asserted infra is against each one of the Defendants because Defendants’
practices, customs, and polices have deprived, deprive, and will continue to
deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
40. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to
enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Such
relationships may take various forms, including the most intimate. See Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–504 (1977) (plurality opinion). The
Supreme Court has not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this
type of constitutional protection. The intimate relationships the Supreme
Court has accorded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–386 (1978); the begetting and bearing of children,
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684–686 (1977); child
rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925);
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and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503–504.
See also Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987); McCabe v. C.E. Sharrett, 12 F. 3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
41. The First Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose “deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619–620 (1984).
42. The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment implies “a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 907–909 (1982). For this reason, “[i]mpediments to the exercise of one's
right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected
by the First Amendment....” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80, n. 4
(1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).

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43. The First Amendment protects two categories of association: intimate
association and expressive association. Moore v. Tolbert, 490 Fed.Appx. 200,
203 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The right to intimate association derives
from the fundamental right to personal liberty and guarantees that
individuals can enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships. Id. The right to expressive association arises out of activities
explicitly identified in the First Amendment and therefore guarantees the
right of individuals to associate for purposes of speaking, assembling,
petitioning for the redress of grievances, and exercising religion. Robert, 468
U.S. at 618. The intimate and expressive features of constitutionally
protected association may coincide. McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1563.
44. A plaintiff who challenges a custom or policy on the grounds that it
violates the right to intimate association must establish that the custom or
policy infringes upon a protected personal relationship. McCabe, 12 F.3d at
1563. On one end of the spectrum are those clearly protected personal
relationships which are “the most intimate” of human associations (i.e.,
those that attend the creation and sustenance of the family – marriage,
childbirth, raising and educating children, and cohabitation with relatives).
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.

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45. The right of intimate association is the freedom to choose to enter into
and maintain certain intimate human relationships, and it is protected from
undue government intrusion as a fundamental aspect of personal liberty.
Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1212 (11th Cir. 2017). This constitutional
protection encompasses cohabitating with one’s relatives. Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 619. A custom or policy that directly and substantially interferes with
family living arrangements burdens this fundamental right. Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
46. When government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, courts must carefully examine the importance of the
government interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged custom or practice. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
47. Decisions concerning the placement of siblings together, regularly
scheduled visitation among siblings, and the placement of children with
adult relative caregivers are protected as a part of parents’ fundamental
rights to control the care and custody of their children. Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (“The fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
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parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.
1977).
48. A local government entity is liable under Section 1983 when action
pursuant to a policy causes a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t. of
Soc. Serves., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). That includes a policy of inaction when
such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The custom or policy of inaction
must be the result of a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of
action among various alternatives by officials responsible for establishing
policy for the subject matter at issue. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 483084 (1986) (plurality opinion).
49. A local government entity’s failure to train its employees can also
create Section 1983 liability when the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees are likely
to come into contact. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89.
50. In that event, the deficiencies in the training program must be closely
related to the alleged injury. In other words, the plaintiff must show her
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injury would have been avoided had the government entity properly trained
its employees. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-91.
51. In this case, Plaintiffs were deprived of their constitutional rights by
Defendants, who have customs or policies which are deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights of cohabitation and association with
relatives.
52. Defendants’ customs or policies were and are the moving forces
behind the constitutional violations alleged herein.
53. Defendants were acting at all applicable times under color of state law.
54. Whether Defendants had a custom or policy of deliberate indifference
is generally a question of fact. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
55. Defendants were and are aware that children taken into custody were
not and are not placed with their siblings and / or adult relative caregivers.
That custom and policy is widespread throughout the Florida foster care
system.
56. In instances where siblings in care are not placed together, Defendants
were and are aware that siblings are not afforded visitation with one
another. That custom and policy is widespread throughout the Florida foster
care system.
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57. Defendants, fully aware of those widespread and ongoing customs
and practices, failed and continue to fail to properly train and supervise
employees responsible for placing siblings in custody together and, when
siblings are not placed together, for affording siblings regular and
meaningful visitation with one another.
employees responsible for placing children with adult relative caregivers.
employees responsible for working with parents whose rights have not been
terminated on their preferences for placing children with adult relative
caregivers.
60. Defendants failed to implement and maintain proper procedures
which would require, prior to placing siblings in separate foster homes,
efforts to place siblings together.
which would require, after siblings are placed in separate foster homes,
efforts to afford siblings regular and meaningful visitation with one another.
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which would require, prior to placing children in non-relative foster homes,
efforts to place children with relative adult caregivers.
which would require, prior to placing children in non-relative foster homes,
efforts to place children with adult relative caregivers as recommended by
the child’s parent(s).
64. Defendants have a custom or policy of taking custody of children
without taking proper efforts to place siblings together.
65. Defendants have a custom or policy of separating siblings in foster care
without visitation.
without taking proper efforts to place children with adult relative caregivers.
without taking proper efforts to place children with adult relative caregivers
in accordance with the parent or parents’ recommendation(s).
68. As the result of Defendants’ customs and policies, Defendants did not
bother to place siblings together, to afford siblings visitation, to place
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children with adult relative caregivers, or to consider placement
recommendations from the parent(s).
69. Because children are taken into custody and children are unable to take
care of themselves or advocate for themselves, training and supervision of
case workers is of paramount importance. When proper steps are not taken
to place siblings together, to allow sibling visitation, to place children with
adult relative caregivers, or to consider placement recommendations made
by the parents the consequences are dire. Siblings in care are separated,
without visitation, and children are not placed with adult relative caregivers.
The resulting historic constitutional deprivations have caused irreparable
harm. Brothers and sisters have been torn apart. Children have been placed
with strangers when appropriate adult relative caregivers are available. The
risk of ongoing deprivations far outweighs the burden on Defendants of
properly training and supervising their employees and correcting
Defendants’ historic and ongoing customs and practices.
70. Despite the knowledge of historic deprivations and the knowledge of
impending and ongoing constitutional deprivations, Defendants have
chosen to ignore the problem, thereby displaying an official custom or
practice which was and is deliberately indifferent to the rights of minor

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siblings in care, the rights of adult relative caregivers, and the rights of
parents, whose rights have not been terminated, all of whom have and / or
are likely to come into contact with Florida’s foster care system.
71. Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to determine their own familial
residential arrangements without governmental interference. Times of
adversity, like that which occurs when a child is placed into Defendants’
custody, require that extended family come together to maintain or rebuild
a secure home life.
72. Plaintiffs are siblings who desire to live together, children who desire
to live with adult relative caregivers, adult relative caregivers who desire to
reside with or adopt children taken by Defendants and in Defendants’
custody, and parents whose rights have not been terminated and have
preferences and recommendations for placement of their children with adult
relative caregivers.
73. Plaintiffs have standing to bring the constitutional claims in this
complaint. At the pleading stage, “general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to
dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim.” 31 Foster Parents v. Bush, 329 F.3d
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1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)) (citations and internal marks omitted). See also Florida Action
Committee, Inc. v. Seminole County, 212 F. Supp.3d 1213, 1220 (M.D. Flo. 2016)
(At the pleading stage, the burden of establishing standing is not particularly
onerous and will be satisfied by general allegations of injury resulting from
Defendants’ conduct.).
74. Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer injuries in fact. A
causal connection exists between Plaintiffs’ injuries and Defendants’
conduct. Plaintiffs’ injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision in this
case.
75. Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by absolute immunity, the Eleventh
Amendment, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, Younger Abstention, or any other
similar defense.
76. Absolute immunity is inapplicable because none of the Plaintiffs were
prosecuted in any state court proceedings related to the rights or
deprivations alleged herein. Therefore, none of the Plaintiffs “lost” in any
state court proceedings related to any of the rights or deprivations alleged
herein. For this same reason, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Roe
v. State of Ala. By and Through Evans, 43 F.3d 574, 579-580 (11th Cir. 1995)
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(“because the plaintiffs are not parties to the circuit court action, the
plaintiffs had no opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in the circuit
court …”); Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) “The
Rooker bar can only apply to issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable
opportunity to raise.”). In addition, Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to
review, reverse, or invalidate any final state court decisions. Defendants’
practices, customs, and polices injured, continue to injure, or threaten to
injure Plaintiffs.
77. The Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable because Plaintiffs seek
prospective injunctive relief to enjoin state officials from ongoing violations
of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989); Doe 1-13 v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (11th Cir. 1998).
78. In addition, Younger abstention has no place in this case because inter
alia there are no ongoing dependency proceedings in which the minors or
adult relative caregivers could have raised any of the constitutional
deprivations alleged herein. § 39.501 et seq., Fla. Stat. (2013).
V.
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS: Causes of Action
Count I
26
Plaintiffs: Taniyah Crutch – Williams and Rodney Jr. Williams as next

friends of Minor #3
Section 1983: First Amendment Right of Association (sibling visitation)
79. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Taniyah and
Rodney Jr. as next friends of Minor #3 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.
80. There is no adequate remedy at law.
81. Irreparable injury will continue to occur without this Court’s
intervention.
82. The ongoing deprivations of constitutional rights outweighs any
potential harm to Defendants by enjoining the practices, customs, and
policies described herein.
83. Appropriate injunctive relief in this case would promote justice and
the public interest.
Count II
Plaintiffs: Charlotte and Rodney Sr. Williams as next friends of Minor #2
84. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Charlotte and
Rodney Sr. as next friends of Minor #2 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.

27
intervention.
88. Appropriate injunctive relief in this case would promote justice,
further the public interest, and prevent irreversible harm.
Count III
Plaintiffs: Taniyah and Rodney Jr. Williams as next friends of Minor #3
Section 1983: First Amendment Right of Association (cohabitation with
adult relative caregivers)
89. There is a real and immediate threat that Minor #3 will be taken into
custody by Defendants.
90. Based on the threatened deprivation of rights alleged herein, Taniyah
and Rodney Jr. as next friends of Minor #3 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.
intervention.
28
Count IV
Plaintiffs: Taniyah and Rodney Jr. Williams
Section 1983: First Amendment Right of Association (parental control over
custody and care)
96. Based on the threatened deprivation of rights alleged herein, Taniyah
and Rodney Jr. seek prospective injunctive relief against Defendants.
intervention.
29
Count V
Plaintiffs: Danny and Christine Rogers as next friends of Minor #4
101. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Danny and
Christine as next friends of Minor #4 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.
intervention.
Count VI
Plaintiffs: Delaila Pino LaSalle and Kenneth Nunez Arroyo as next friends
of Minors #s 5-7
Section 1983: First Amendment Right of Association (sibling cohabitation)
30
106. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Delaila and
Kenneth as next friends of Minors #s 5-7 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.
intervention.
Count VII
of Minor #7
111. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Delaila and
Kenneth as next friends of Minors #7 seek prospective injunctive relief
against Defendants.
31
intervention.
Count VIII
Plaintiff: Esmeralda Arroyo
116. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Esmeralda seeks
prospective injunctive relief against Defendants.
intervention.
32
Count IX
of Minors #5-7
121. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Delaila and Kenneth
seek prospective injunctive relief against Defendants.
intervention.
Count X
Plaintiffs: Delaila Pino LaSalle and Kenneth Nunez Arroyo
custody and care)
33
126. Delaila and Kenneth seek prospective injunctive relief against
Defendants.
intervention.
Count XI
Plaintiffs: Keila and Marvin Gardner as next friends of Minor #8
131. Based on the deprivations of rights alleged herein, Keila and Marvin
as next friends of Minor #8 seek prospective injunctive relief against
Defendants.
intervention.
34
Count XII
Plaintiffs: Keila and Marvin Gardner
136. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Keila and Marvin
seek prospective injunctive relief against Defendants.
intervention.
Count XIII
Plaintiffs: Trelane Gardner
35

adult relative caregiver)
141. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Trelane seeks
intervention.
Count XIV
Plaintiffs: Sharon Zetar
adult relative caregiver)
146. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Sharon seeks
intervention.
36
Count XV
Plaintiffs: Leon Zetar
custody and care)
151. Leon seeks prospective injunctive relief against Defendants.
intervention.
Count XVI
Plaintiffs: Leon Zetar as next friend of Minor #10
37
156. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Leon seeks
intervention.
Count XVII
Plaintiffs: Althea and Curt Houston as next friend of Minors #s 11 & 12
161. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Althea and Curt seek
intervention.
38
Count XVIII
Plaintiffs: Althea and Curt Houston
166. Based on the deprivation of rights alleged herein, Althea and Curt seek
intervention.
Count IXX
Plaintiff: Jill Lipton as next friend of Minor #13
39

172. Based on the threatened deprivation of rights alleged herein, Jill as
next friend of Minor #13 seeks prospective injunctive relief against
Defendants.
intervention.
175. The threatened deprivations of constitutional rights outweighs any
Count XX
Plaintiff: Jill Lipton
custody and care)
40
178. Based on the threatened deprivation of rights alleged herein, Jill seeks
intervention.
181. The threatened deprivations of constitutional rights outweighs any
Count XXI
Plaintiffs
Declaratory Judgment: Defendants’ Practices, Customs, and Policies
Violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights
183. Defendants enforce and maintain practices, customs, and policies
regarding sibling placement, sibling visitation, adult relative caregiver
placement, and parental control notwithstanding their knowledge that their
practices, customs, and policies cause severe harm to minors in their custody
and Plaintiffs who are deprived or are threatened with deprivations of
fundamental constitutional rights.
41
184. Defendants have been and continue to be deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiffs’ rights.
185. A declaration that Defendants’ practices, customs, and policies violate
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will end widespread, historic, and ongoing
deprivations of rights.
WHEREORE Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants and pray
for the following relief:
a. Prospective injunctive relief, in the form of a preliminary and
permanent injunction against Defendants.
b. A declaratory judgment that the practices, customs, and policies
complained of in this Second Amended Complaint are
unconstitutional.
c. The entry of an order assessing Plaintiffs’ costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S. C. §
1988. And,
d. Such other and further relief for Plaintiffs as the Court deems
equitable and just.
Dated this 24th day of March, 2023.

/s/ Karen Gievers
42
Karen Gievers, Esq.

Florida Bar No.: 262005
P.O. Box 16459
Tallahassee, Florida 32317
PH: 850.570.0425
[email protected]
/s/ Octavia Brown

Octavia Brown, Esq.
Community Law for Families
and Children, PLLC
Valentina Villalobos, Esq.
Community Law for Families and
Children, PLLC
3104 N. Armenia Avenue, STE 2
Tampa, Florida 33607
PH: 813.822.3522
FAX: 863.250.8228
[email protected]
And
/s/ Aaron Rapier

Aaron Rapier, Esq.
Rapier Law Firm
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Illinois Bar No. 6270472
1770 Park Street, Suite 200
Napierville, Illinois 60563
PH: 630.853.9224
[email protected]
Trial Attorneys for Plaintiffs
43

DCF Amended Complaint March 23

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DCF Amended Complaint March 23

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Case 4:22-cv-00222-AW-MAF Document 43 Filed 03/24/23 Page 1 of 43

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

v. Case No. 2022 CV 222

SHEVAUN HARRIS, as Secretary of the

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT1

Plaintiffs, Taniyah Crutch-Williams, Rodney Jr. Williams, Charlotte

Williams, Rodney Sr. Williams, Christine Rogers, Danny Rogers, Delaila

Pino LaSalle, Kenneth Nunez Arroyo, Esmeralda Arroyo, Keila Gardner,

Marvin Gardner, Trelane Jackson, Leon Zetar, Sharon Zetar, Althea

Defendants, SHEVAUN HARRIS, as Secretary of the Department of

Children and Families (“DCF”), JOSEPH LADAPO, M.D., as the Executive

Director of the Florida Department of Health, (“DOH”), PATRICIA

ARMSTRONG, as the Bureau Chief of the Florida Department of Health

Children’s Medical Services and the Child Protection Team (“CMS” or

“CPT”), and DENNIS MOORE, as Executive Director of the Florida

in support of their pleading, Plaintiffs allege:

1. This case is about protecting families by ending customs and

policies that deprive and threaten to deprive Plaintiffs of rights secured by

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. Defendants have customs and policies of separating siblings in

adult relative caregivers; and ignoring the recommendations and

preferences of biological parents, whose rights have not been terminated,

3. The rights at issue are secured by the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Specifically, Defendants’ customs and policies

deprive Plaintiffs or threaten to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights of

association and cohabitation with family members when Defendants

balanced against the fundamental rights at issue, Defendants’ customs and

991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006).

4. As a result, a declaratory judgment should be entered declaring

that it is unconstitutional and a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment

scheduling regular visitation among siblings who are separated by

and ignoring the recommendations and preferences of biological parents,

with siblings and adult relative caregivers.

5. In addition, a preliminary injunction should be entered until a

permanent injunction requires Defendants to discontinue its customs and

responsible for: placing siblings in foster care together; scheduling regular

Defendants’ custody with adult relative caregivers; and discussing

biological parents’ recommendations and preferences when their child(ren)

is/are taken by Defendants and placed into foster care. 3

threatened by the deprivation of rights as the result of Defendants’ customs

and policies; or individuals who bring claims in representative capacities on

deprived by Defendants’ customs and policies.

7. In general, Plaintiffs are children in Defendants’ custody or children

who are at imminent risk of being in Defendants’ custody; or adults with

family members who are children in Defendants’ custody or who are at

imminent risk of being in Defendants’ custody. Individuals in state custody

have constitutional rights inter alia to conditions of confinement which bear

a reasonable relationship to the purpose of their custody. Jackson v. Indiana,

promote the well-being, permanency, and safety of children and families by

helping families create nurturing and loving family environments without

infringing on parental rights.

8. The Plaintiffs include members of the Williams family. Taniyah

Crutch-Williams and Rodney Jr. Williams are residents of Clay County,

Minor #1 – Ra. Williams; Minor #2 – Ro. Williams; and Minor #3 – Ta.

Rodney Jr.’s parental rights were terminated as to Minors #1 and #2.

11. Minor #1 was adopted by a family with connections to Florida’s foster

management services for children taken into Defendants’ custody. Minors

#s 1 & 2 were two of those children.

Minor #1 and attempted to adopt Minor #2.

13. Minor #2 was taken into Defendants’ custody based on allegations of

abuse or neglect related to Minor #1. There were no allegations of abuse or

neglect involving Minor #2.

14. Minor #2 was adopted by Charlotte and Rodney Sr. Williams.