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A Scale to Assess Attitudes toward Euthanasia

Article  in  OMEGA--Journal of Death and Dying · February 2005

DOI: 10.2190/FGHE-YXHX-QJEA-MTM0 · Source: PubMed

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OMEGA, Vol. 51(3) 229-237, 2005

A SCALE TO ASSESS ATTITUDES TOWARD

EUTHANASIA

JASON WASSERMAN, MA
JEFFREY MICHAEL CLAIR, PH.D.

FERRIS J. RITCHEY, PH.D.

University of Alabama at Birmingham

ABSTRACT

The topic of euthanasia has been a matter of public debate for several decades.
Although empirical research should inform policy, scale measurement is
lacking. After analyzing shortcomings of previous work, we offer a systemat-
ically designed scale to measure attitudes toward euthanasia. We attempt to
encompass previously unspecified dimensions of the phenomenon that
are central to the euthanasia debate. The results of our pretest show that
our attitude towards euthanasia (ATE) scale is both reliable and valid. We
delineate active and passive euthanasia, no chance for recovery and severe
pain, and patient’s autonomy and doctor’s authority. We argue that isolating
these factors provides a more robust scale capable of better analyzing sample
variance. Internal consistency is established with Cronbach’s alpha = .871.
Construct external consistency is established by correlating the scale with
other predictors such as race and spirituality.

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The topic of euthanasia has been a matter of public debate for several decades.
As the population has aged and life-support technology has evolved, euthanasia
has become of more immediate public concern. Empirical research has become
increasingly important as policy reform moves to the forefront. This is exem-
plified by a number of high profile cases, such as the enacting of legislation

229
Ó 2005, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc.
230 / WASSERMAN, CLAIR AND RITCHEY

permitting physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in Oregon, and in policies of other

countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. Recent events suggest that
euthanasia will retain an important place in the political landscape, as evidenced
by the Bush administration asking the Supreme Court for judicial review of
Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act” and the Terry Schiavo case that galvanized
both supporters and critics. Since the road to policy reform should be paved
with empirical research, dependable measures are needed. Our contribution to
the literature here is to offer a systematically designed scale that measures atti-
tudes toward euthanasia, specifying more distinct factors than have previously
been reported.
The bulk of the previous research on attitudes toward euthanasia uses data
collected from various years of the NORC General Social Surveys and
predominantly the 1977 survey (DeCesare, 2000; Finlay, 1985; Jorgenson &
Neubecker, 1980; Rao, Staten, & Rao, 1988; Singh, 1979). In these surveys,
support for euthanasia was measured using only two items. The NORC questions
are: 1) When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors
should be allowed by law to end the patient’s life by some means if the patient and
his family request it? and 2) Would you approve of ending a patient’s life if a board
of directors appointed by the court agreed that the patient could not be cured?
A number of difficulties exist with the NORC data in that each question
includes multiple objects of evaluation that can generate multiple possible points
of contention for a respondent. For example, an individual could score low on the
first question because they object to one or more of the following: 1) euthanasia,
in general; 2) euthanasia in cases of no recovery, but where the patient is not
suffering; 3) euthanasia as a practice of doctors, but perhaps not by family
members or patients themselves; 4) laws permitting euthanasia, but without moral
objection to the practice itself; 5) euthanasia in instances of family request, but
not where requested by patient; and 6) euthanasia in instances of patient request,
but where not requested by the family. NORC question one also takes as its
paradigm a case of disease, but not injury. Furthermore, the phrase “by some
means” convolutes the distinction between passive and active euthanasia, which
is problematic since there is a traditionally recognized distinction between the
two. The second NORC question does not clarify any of these issues, simply
addressing concerns about the certainty of a “no recovery” diagnosis.
The two NORC questions, given the number of different points at which a
respondent can disapprove, may indeed underestimate support. If a respondent
disagrees with any one of the standards enmeshed in the item, they may report low
support for the question as a whole despite, in general, approving of euthanasia.
This is the problem of a double-barrel question inflated by the inclusion of several
implied contingencies.
Domino, Kempton, and Cavender (1996) were sensitive to the methodological
shortcomings of previous studies and developed a reliable scale for assessing
attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide. They note difficulties in interpreting
 ATTITUDES TOWARD EUTHANASIA SCALE / 231

results across various studies due to the use of a variety of terms (e.g., euthanasia,
physician assisted suicide, etc.; Domino et al., 1996). In their scale, they chose
to use “physician assisted suicide.” Physician assisted suicide represents only
one type of euthanasia. The situation implied by the term is one where a doctor
actively assists in the death of the patient, most typically by prescribing or
administering a lethal drug. But while this is certainly a more controversial form
of euthanasia, other variations of euthanasia also are debated. Passive euthanasia
typically refers to the removal of life-sustaining technology. While the American
Medical Association deems this an ethical practice and lawmakers in the United
States have tended to concur, passive euthanasia still is contested, particularly
by religious groups. Recent events surrounding the removal of life-support in
the Schiavo case highlight that even passive versions of euthanasia are far from
settled in the public eye. Thus, a scale which encompasses broad parameters of
euthanasia would be a step forward in assessing attitudes towards the practice
among the public. Moreover, terms such as euthanasia and assisted suicide have
been manipulated in political rhetoric (Domino, 2003). While these terms carry
a variety of connotations among various public stakeholders, it is possible to
develop a scale that avoids using them.
The scale produced by Domino et al. (1996) is methodologically rigorous. It
focuses, however, on physician assisted suicide and does not encompass certain
salient features of the broader euthanasia debate. Physician assisted suicide is
defined by action on the part of the physician, but passive versions of euthanasia
also are relevant. Furthermore, the items in the Domino et al. scale make no
reference to the suffering of a patient, only to situations of no recovery. Circum-
stances of severe pain are particularly salient in the public debates and scholarly
discussions about the morality of terminating the life of a patient.
Finally, while Domino (2003) is sensitive to the active/passive distinction, the
use of physician assisted suicide as a paradigm convolutes this key distinction.
While respondents are instructed on the issue of action and inaction in Domino’s
(2003) study, the questions used to delineate active and passive versions of
physician assisted suicide do not adequately capture the distinction. In Domino
et al. (1996) the questions are: 1) It would be OK to prescribe a lethal dose of a
substance for a patient, if the patient requested it; and 2) It would be OK for
a physician to actually administer a lethal dose of a substance to a patient who
requested it. Contrary to what one would expect, Domino (2003) found a slightly
higher proportion agreeing with the “administer” item (51%) than the “prescribe”
item (43%). The absence of significantly lower levels of support for the relatively
passive construction is likely the product of nesting the item in a scale whose
paradigm (physician assisted suicide) is inherently active.
Typically, situations of passive euthanasia are those where a patient is dis-
connected from life-sustaining machines and allowed to die. Active euthanasia
most often concerns situations where patients are given enough medicine to
end their lives. Using “prescribe” to represent situations of non-action (passivity)
232 / WASSERMAN, CLAIR AND RITCHEY

is confusing since it is an active term. To “remove” life support and “allow to

die” are passive constructions since they refer to ceasing action and non-action.
While some studies have not found differences in active and passive euthanasia
(e.g., Adams, Bueche, & Schvaneveldt, 1978), Weiss (1996) found significantly
higher levels of support for passive euthanasia. Similarly, as we will discuss
below, we found significantly higher levels of support for passive versions in our
study population. This suggests that distinguishing between active and passive
euthanasia is appropriate and could be informative.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We find three considerations necessary for the development of an appro-
priate scale of attitude toward euthanasia. First, the euthanasia debate has long
been characterized by a split between active and passive euthanasia (Rachels,
1975). We believe that public attitudes have, to some degree, been shaped by
the policies of the American Medical Association (AMA) and various state
laws. For example, the AMA finds passive euthanasia permissible, whereas
active euthanasia is not (American Medical Association, 2004). Therefore, a
scale that properly delineates between active and passive euthanasia may show
differences between the two despite the lack of variation found in previous
work (Adams et al., 1978).
There are a number of other possible standards on which someone could
approve or disapprove of euthanasia. The two most commonly recognized reasons
for the termination of the life of a patient are situations of severe pain and those
of no possible recovery. No possible recovery is referenced in the first NORC
question, but severe pain is not. Pain is at the center of current debate and should
presumably register among the public as an important consideration.
Finally, the issue of decision-making has been of paramount importance in
public and academic debates. Discourse on this issue is dichotomized on two
factors: patient’s autonomy and doctor’s authority. The first of the two NORC
questions addresses patient request, but doctor authority is not included. Although
question 2 ambiguously refers to a board of directors making a medical diagnosis,
this addresses concerns about the accuracy of the diagnosis rather than proper
jurisdiction over decision-making.

ATTITUDES TOWARD EUTHANASIA (ATE) SCALE

Table 1 presents the items of our ATE scale and indicates conceptual dimen-
sions tapped by each item. No dimension discussed above can be completely
isolated from the others. For example, there is not a circumstance where
euthanasia is performed by patient request, but where there is no standard for
the decision (most commonly severe pain or no recovery) or where the method
is not either passive or active. Therefore, the questions in the ATE scale represent
 ATTITUDES TOWARD EUTHANASIA SCALE / 233

Table 1. Atttiudes toward Euthanasia (ATE) Scale—

Items and Dimensions

Item Dimensiona

1. If a patient in severe pain requests it, a doctor should SP / PR / PASSIVE

remove life support and allow that patient to die.

2. It is okay for a doctor to administer enough medicine NR / DA / ACTIVE

to end a patient’s life if the doctor does not believe
that they will recover.

3. If a patient in severe pain requests it, a doctor should SP / PR / ACTIVE

prescribe that patient enough medicine to end their
life.

4. It is okay for a doctor to remove life-support and let NR / DA / PASSIVE

a patient die if the doctor does not believe the patient
will recover.

5. It is okay for a doctor to administer enough SP / DA / ACTIVE

medicine to a suffering patient to end that patient’s
life if the doctor thinks that the patient’s pain is too
severe.

6. Even if a doctor does not think that a patient will NR

recover, it would be wrong for the doctor to end the
life of a patient.b

7. It is okay for a doctor to remove a patient’s SP / DA / PASSIVE

life-support and let them die if the doctor thinks that
the patient’s pain is too severe.

8. If a dying patient requests it, a doctor should NR / PR / ACTIVE

prescribe enough medicine to end their life.

9. Even if a doctor knows that a patient is in severe, SP

uncontrollable pain, it would be wrong for the doctor
to end the life of that patient.b

10. If a dying patient requests it, a doctor should remove NR / PR / PASSIVE

their life support and allow them to die.
aSP = severe pain, NR = no recovery, PR = patient requests, DA = doctor’s authority,
ACTIVE = active euthanasia, PASSIVE = passive euthanasia.
bIndicates items that need to be reverse coded.
234 / WASSERMAN, CLAIR AND RITCHEY

the variety of possible combinations of these dimensions. Questions six and nine
are phrased negatively and require reverse coding. For these questions, the method
(active or passive) is not specified. The purpose of these questions is to provide
a check on response set bias, the situation where a respondent simply checks
responses without reading questions. If a respondent scores high on all other
items, they should score low on the reversed items. Questions 1 and 3 deal with
circumstances of severe pain where the patient has requested to die, but in
question 1 the method is passive whereas in question 3 it is active. Similarly,
questions 8 and 11 deal with circumstances of no recovery where the patient has
requested to die. For these questions, the method is active in 8 and passive in 11.
Questions 5 and 7 deal with circumstances where the doctor thinks the patient’s
pain is too severe, but make no reference to the patient’s desires. Here too,
question 5 is active and question 7 is passive. Similarly, questions 2 and 4 deal
with circumstances where a doctor believes there is no chance of recovery, but
make no reference to the patient’s desires. The method is active in question 2
and passive in question 4.
Our scale was pretested in several introductory sociology classes at a large,
urban university in the southeastern United States. Using the 10-item scale, we
conducted both a pretest (n = 47) and then tested the same scale in a larger sample
(n = 176) drawn from the same population but containing no respondents from the
first sample. For both, we used the Likert scale response categories of: 1) strongly
disagree, 2) disagree, 3) undecided, 4) agree, and 5) strongly agree. Demographic
characteristics for the pretest (n = 47) showed the sample was disproportionately
female and largely comprised of first- and second-year students. Roughly half of
the students were African American, while the other half were white. This sample
had a mean age of 20.7, slightly younger than the mean age for students at the
university. Demographics from the larger sample (n = 176) reflected a similar
composition, but with a mean age of 21.7, which is still slightly younger than the
mean age of students at the university. While particular sample characteristics
might affect the mean level of support for the sample relative to other populations,
we do not expect they will affect assessment of the internal reliability of the scale
or the correlation of attitudes toward euthanasia and other variables such as
spirituality measured within the samples. Admittedly, additional pretesting in
random samples would buttress these conclusions.
In a preliminary pretest (n = 47) the scale exhibited a Cronbach’s alpha of
.914 with item to scale correlations ranging from .578 to .821. Research into
survey methodology suggests that pretest samples range from 25 to 75 partici-
pants and those participants be slightly more educated than the general public
(Converse & Presser, 1986). Our population of university students fits this
standard. In a larger sample from the same population (n = 176) the scale had a
Cronbach’s alpha .871 with item-to-scale correlations ranging from .481 to.670.
No item could have been deleted to improve the internal reliability of the scale
in either trial.
 ATTITUDES TOWARD EUTHANASIA SCALE / 235

A confirmatory factor analysis extracted two components in both trials. The

first component was clearly dominant. In the prestest (n = 47), component one
had an initial eigenvalue of 5.73 and explained close to 60% of the variance.
Proportions for scale items on component one ranged from .634 to .810. In the
follow up study (n = 176) component one had an initial eigenvalue of 4.81 and
explained close to 50% of the variance. Proportions for scale items on component
one in this trial ranged from .516 to .793. Essentially, the factor analysis confirms
that the items all tend to correlate with a single underlying concept. While no
statistic can ever confirm substantive interpretation, together with face validity,
we feel the scale does, in fact, measure attitudes toward euthanasia.
External reliability and validity are less concrete issues. However, there is
evidence that our scale is actually measuring what it is intended to measure. In
a study on racial differences on attitudes toward euthanasia, the ATE scale
correlated with several variables in the expected direction (Wasserman, Clair,
& Ritchey, 2005). Consistent with previous research, African Americans were
less supportive of euthanasia than whites (r = –.155; p < .05; Adams et al., 1978;
Caralis, Davis, Wright, & Marcial 1993; DeCesare, 2000; Jorgenson &
Neubecker, 1980; Litchenstein, Alcser, Corning, Bachman, & Doukas, 1997;
Rao, et al., 1988; Singh, 1979; Wade & Anglin, 1987). Also, whereas Domino
(2003) found no correlation between “degree of religious involvement” and PAS
scores, our research does find a correlation between ATE and “spiritual meaning
of health and illness.” Respondents scoring high on measures of spirituality
tended to score low on support for euthanasia (r = –.399; p < .001). This, too, is
consistent with previous research on the relationship of support for euthanasia and
spirituality/religiosity (DeCesare, 2000; Finlay, 1985; Jorgenson & Neubecker,
1980; Lichenstein et al., 1997; Rao et al., 1988; Singh, 1979; Wade & Anglin,
1987; Weiss, 1996).
Further, while other research has failed to find empirical evidence for the
distinction between active and passive euthanasia, our scale finds higher levels
of support for passive euthanasia, which is consistent with expectation (Adams
et al., 1978; Domino, 2003). Within the scale, four items specifically reference
passive euthanasia and four parallel questions reference active euthanasia. For
the active subscale, the mean score is 9.18, which is significantly lower than
the mean for the passive subscale (p < .001), which is 10.44. We feel that the
ability of our scale to distinguish active and passive dimensions represents a
significant contribution to the literature, although one that needs to be replicated
in further research.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our scale does not capture every possible variation in circumstance on which
a respondent might approve or disapprove of euthanasia. For example, no ques-
tion makes specific reference to family members performing euthanasia. Some
236 / WASSERMAN, CLAIR AND RITCHEY

questions make no reference to doctors at all, leaving room for those who support
euthanasia, but not as an act of medicine. But our scale may not adequately
capture this variation, particularly if those questions are listed in close proximity
with other items that deal with the medical arena. While our scale is certainly
not all-inclusive, we attempt to systematically incorporate the most prominent
features of discussion on euthanasia. In this regard, we feel that it is an incremental
improvement to previous work.
Further validation of the measure can be accomplished by its incorporation into
empirical research. Those studying euthanasia might correlate this measure with
variables such as spirituality/religiosity measures, gender, age, health status, or
any number of attitudinal variables. While some of these variables have been
tested in previous research, this new measure could potentially yield different
results. Finally, additional pretesting is needed for other populations to establish
its broader applications.
Studying attitudes toward euthanasia is increasingly relevant as the issue
becomes of more immediate concern for public policy. Previous research has
largely been limited by insufficiently operationalized variables. As a system-
atically designed measurement instrument that is both statistically reliable and
substantively valid, we hope our 10-item ATE scale rectifies some operational
problems. Future scale development on attitudes toward euthanasia might benefit
from comparing our ATE scale to other measures, particularly the scale by
Domino et al. (1996). Empirical research might benefit from using the ATE scale
to identify correlates of support for euthanasia and thereby focus policy efforts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would especially like to thank Kenneth J. Doka, Michael Flannery,
and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions
of this article.

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Direct reprint requests to:

Jason Wasserman, MA
Department of Sociology
University of Alabama at Birmingham
1212 University Boulevard
237 Ullman Building
Birmingham, AL 35294-3350
e-mail: [email protected]
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