INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

MODULE – I: SYNOPSIS

a) Meaning of Interpretation / Construction of Statute

INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE:

Definition and Meaning:

Interpretation:

According to Webster’s New World Dictionary the word Interpretation as

“the act or result of Interpreting; Explanation, Meaning, Translation, Exposition,
and word construction is understood as the act or process of construing, the way
in which something is constructed; manner or method of building.

Statutory is defined as fixed, authorized or established by statute.

According to ‘Salmond’, the interpretation happens or necessary only in

enacted law not in case of customary or case laws. He defines it as a process by
which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of legislature through the medium
of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.

Difference between Construction and Interpretation

According to Cooley:
Interpretation: an art o finding out the true sense of any form of words, i.e., the
sense which their author intended to convey and of enabling others to derive
from them the same idea which the author intended to convey.
Construction: is a process of drawing conclusion, respecting subjects what lie
beyond the direct expressions of the text from the elements known from and
given in the text conclusions which are in the spirit though not within letter of
law.

As observed by WHITE, J

Both mean to have same significance. It may be understood that the two
expressions are to be used as synonymous.

Objective of Interpretation:

All the enacted laws are drafted by legal experts, still very often the courts
and lawyers must unfold the meanings of ambiguous words, expressions and
resolve inconsistencies.

Interpretation as function of Judiciary

There are three organs of state (a) Legislature (b) Executive (c) Judiciary.
Legislature makes laws, executive enacts laws and judiciary interpreter laws. It is
rather the functional aspects of the law.

Judiciary is the organ which puts the law in operation or puts the law in use.
When law is put in use then could be possibility of absurdity hardship or
inconvenience, ambiguity which makes the law futile. Hence to put the law in use
or get into functional role the judiciary must put efforts to remove the absurdity,
hardship, ambiguity and inconvenience having the rules of interpretation and this
is called construction / interpretation.

The function of interpretation or construction is guided by the Maxim.

jus dicere et non jus dare i.e., to declare the law and not to give it. i.e.,
office of judges is not to make the law but to declare the law.
INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE

A statute is an edict (Proclamation by sovereign state or government

official) the most accepted mode of interpretation or construing the statute is to
adopt the interpretation or construction according “to the intent of them that
make it”.

It is the duty of Judicature is to act upon the true intention of the

legislature. This is guided by the Maxim. Sententia legis i.e., true intention of
legislature.

Intention of the legislature always serves as reference to the meaning of

words used by legislature which are objectively determined. It is nowhere seen
expressly provided; it must be assessed by the guiding rules of interpretation.

According to Salmond the duty of the judicature is to discover and to act

upon the true intention of the legislature under the Maxim, ‘sententia legis’ or
mens. (Essence of law lies in the Spirit of law)

As essence of the law lies in the spirit, not in its letter, but letter is the only
way in which intentions are expressed. The words are external manifestation of
intention that it involves. When there is possibility of one or more interpretation
of statute, courts must adopt that interpretation which reflects the ‘true intention
of legislature’ which can also be considered legal meaning statutory provisions.
The intention of legislature shall have two aspects: -

(i) ‘Meaning’’: That which tell what the words mean.

(ii) ‘Purpose and Object’: That which includes purpose and object of
enacting the statute.

As already understood intention of legislature is not found, it is assessed

from the statute with a combination of meaning of the words and light of purpose
or objects.

Guiding lines to frame intention of legislature are: -

1. The context (pare material i.e., external aid to interpretation)

2. The subject matter
3. The effects and consequences
4. The spirit or reason of the law

Intention of legislature is assessed either in express words or by necessary

implication in keeping mind the purpose or object of the statute.

According to Iyer. J, A mechanical interpretation of the words and

application of legislature intent devoid of concept will make most of the remedial
and beneficent legislation futile (ineffective).

Judiciary would mould or creatively interpret legislation as they are

finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation.
Supposed intention: - limitation: -

It is very well accepted that through the text and then with the context the
intention is understood, but in any case, courts cannot, think of any thing which
the legislation has not provided. If the courts understand anything beyond what
the legislation provided, then it is understood as supposed intention which the
court has arrived at on his own by overviewing the legislative parameters or
subjects involved in legislation by the legislature.

It is a universally accepted truth that ‘no facts of the case are same’ but
there would be similarity in the facts of the case. While applying the same law in
different cases on similarity courts cannot or need not proceed with a supposed
intention.

Supreme courts guidelines for interpretation (or) Settled principles of

interpretation.

1. The court must start with the presumption that legislature did not make a
mistake.
2. The court must adopt a construction which will carryout the obvious
intention of the legislature.
3. Of there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the
court must as much as possible, by literal reading produce on intelligible
result. When the provision becomes unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with other parts of statute then only
 words may be added, altered or modified, there by to connect or make up
the deficiency.

Contextual interpretation ut res Magis Valeat Quam Pareat

According to this Maxim, in order to make the statute workable, the court
should take recourse to such principles of interpretation of statutes as may be
necessary.

The court will reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention
of legislature.

The contextual interpretation is based on above Maxim. By the above

Maxim light is focused on contextual analysis. Which is one of most acceptable
and applicable interpretation.

The above Maxim guides the courts to avoid the construction which would
fail to receive the manifest purpose of the legislation.

Example:
Avtar Singh Vs. State of Punjab:
In this case Appellant was convicted for theft of Electricity under Section 39
of Electricity Act, 1910 but he contended that he could not be convicted because
the process against him was not started as per the direction of Section 50 of the
Act. But the respondent contended that punishment under IPC must be imposed.
Supreme Court applied the principle of ‘ut res magis valeat quam’ it held that as
crime is not the code, but against the act (Section 39 of Electricity Act, 1910), the
requirement under Section 50 must be followed.

When accused is found guilty under Section 39 accused shall be punished

under Section 379 of IPC , but there should be an initiated as per section 50 of the
same Act. Supreme Court applied the principle of ‘ut res magis valeat quam’ it
held that as crime is not according to the code, but against the act (Section 39 of
Electricity Act, 1910), the requirement under Section 50 must be followed cannot
be tried under IPC as theft of electricity cannot be movable property.

Contextual Rule:
This rule is analyzed under the quotation: “Statute must be read as a whole
in its context”.

If any provision of statute needs to be interpreted or meaning is to be

ascertained, it is most accepted to read the provision in its context.

Context is generally understood as “set of circumstance or facts that

surround a particular event, situation etc”.

Context in interpretation of statutes means and includes

1. Statutes as a whole
 2. Previous state of the law
3. Other statutes in “Pari Materia”
4. General scope of the statute
5. The mischief that it was intended to remedy

While finding the intention of legislature the contextual analysis has a

prime role. Thus, it is firmly established that the intention of legislature must be
found by reading the statute. (statute must be read as whole in its Context) This
rule is referred to as an ‘ELEMENTARY RULE’ – by viscount Simonds.

a ‘Compelling Rule’ – by Lord Somervell of Harrow.

a ‘Settled Rule’ – by B.K. Mukherjee. J

Lord Halsbury affirms that you must look at the whole instrument in as
much as there may be inaccuracy and inconsistency, you must ascertain what is
the meaning of the instrument taken in order to give effect.

Rule of “Ex Visceribus Actus”:

It is provided that every part of the statute shall be constructed in four
corners, Sir Rupert cross opined dictionary interpretation without contextual
consideration is not a proper or legitimate way interpretation rather it is a
limitation to the interpretation itself.

Importance of Contextual Interpretation:

 1. In contextual interpretation the roots of the past, the foliage (bark) of the
present and the seeds of future cannot be lost right of.
2. Interpretation should not be detained in verbalism (dictionary) and let
words lose their thrust (relevancy) when it is read in vacuum not covering
the context or not letting context to be considered, as context would
provide key to the meaning of the word, sense it should carry.
Context acts as a light to fix meaning to the words provided when statute is
read as a whole in its context.

Same word different meaning:

The same word may men one thing in one context and another in a
different context. Same word used in different section of a statute or even when
used at different places in the same section of a statute may bear different
meanings.

Example: Section 202 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act 1955

exempts “buildings and lands vesting in the Corporation” from property tax.

Section 204 provides that the property tax shall be leviable primarily from
the occupier if he holds the premises directly from the corporation.

Question for Interpretation:

Whether the Corporation property which was in possession of allottees
under hire purchase agreements was exempt from tax. The court held reading
both the sections together that such property was not exempt, and the
exemption was limited to those cases where property vested in the corporation
both in title and possession as otherwise Section 204 would become inoperative.

Section 3(a)(b)(c) of PUNJAB Rent restriction Act, 1949

Also, Section 3(a)(ii) that a landlord could obtain possession in the case of
rented land if
(a) “He requires it for his own use.
(b) He is not occupying in the urban area for the purpose of his business any
other such rented land.
(c) He has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the
commencement of the Act in the urban area concerned”.

Question for interpretation:

The High Court of Punjab held that the words “for his own use” in clause (a)
permitted the landlord to claim eviction “for his own use” in clause (a) permitted
the landlord to claim eviction “for his own use”. Irrespective of the nature of the
use.

Interpretation by Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision and held as
follows:
All the three clauses were to be read together and clause (a) was restricted
to business use as were clauses (b) and (c).
 It was printed out that if this restricted meaning were not given to the word
“for his own use” in clause (a) the (b) (c) i.e., two clauses would become
inapplicable.

Plain meaning rule:

The plain meaning rule is based on Maxim “Absoluta Sententia Expositore
Non Indiget”. (Plain words need no explanation).

It means that language that is unequivocal and unambiguous does not

require an interpreter, in other words, plain words need no explanation.

When the language of a statute is plain, words are clear and unambiguous
and give only one meaning then effect should be given to that plain meaning only
and one should not go in for the construction of statute.

If the meaning plain effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences

i.e., they are reasonably leading to only one meaning, the courts are bound to
adopt that meaning irrespective of consequences.

When the words used in the statute is unambiguous, plain and allows for
only one meaning, here the question of construction of statute do not arise as
“Act speaks for itself”.
 Court shall not create an ambiguity and then look for some principle of
interpretation as in such situation words themselves best declare the intention of
law gives.

Example : Lord Atkin gave effect to the words “any person” in Section 162
of the code of criminal procedure, included “any person” who may thereafter be
accused.

He also opined that “when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty
of courts to busy themselves with supposed intention. It therefore appears un
admissible to consider the advantage or disadvantages of applying the plain
meaning whether in interest of the prosecution or accused.

Example: Section 12 of Limitation Act of 1963: There was a difference of

opinion under old Limitation Act whether time taken by the office in drawing up a
decree or order before making of application for the copy of the decree or order
could be included in the time requisite for obtaining the copy and thus excluded
in computing the period of limitation for appeal, revision it under Section 12 of
the Act.

The law commission recommended that this period should not be excluded
in computing limitation.
 Explanation to above is provided as follows : “In computing under this
section (a) time required for obtaining a copy of decree or an order (b) any time
taken by the court in arriving at copy of decree or order should not be excluded.

The Bombay and Orissa High Courts held that the words “shall not be
excluded” meant that the time covered by the explanation would be included in
the computing time requisite for obtaining the copy and thus excluded from
computing the period of limitation.

Supreme Court reversed above view held that the words “shall not be
excluded” in the explanation meant that the time covered by the explanation
“shall not be excluded” in computing the period of limitation and not that it shall
not be in time requisite for obtaining copy.

The court observed that it was that by its conclusion it put the object of
explanation effectually.

Guiding Rules:
“Language of statute should be read as it is”.
The intention of legislature must be gathered (derived from the words used
i.e., language used while doing to, it should be focused to understand what has
been said and what has not been said.

This rule also has some limitation or exceptions.

a. Avoiding addition or substitution of words: Courts while interpreting the
provisions cannot add any phrase or word it cannot even substitute any
word or phrase.

According to Privy Council “we cannot aid legislature’s defective phrasing of

an act; we cannot add or amend and by construction make up deficiencies
which are left there.

Even when the words used in statute ambiguous, absurd uncertain the
court may limit the meaning of words used in the statute, but it cannot
substitute the word as court cannot reframe the legislation for the very
good reason that it has no power to legislate, and that rules of
interpretation, do not permit us to do unless the section stands in
meaningless or of doubtful meaning.
Section 96(2) of the motor vehicle Act , 1939 is exhaustive of the defences
open to an insurer, the supreme court refused to add word “also” after the
words “on any of the following grounds” and observed ; “This rules of
interpretation , do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is
meaningless or of doubtful meaning”.

b. Casus Omissus: The term means an ‘omitted case’. The meaning which
should have been provided is not provided for in a statute same cannot be
 supplied by courts as it will be understood as to legislate and not
construction.

Example: Section 18(1) of the West Bengal premises Rent Control

(temporary provisions) Act, 1950, which provided power to the court to
rescind or vary any decree for recovery of possession was held not to cover
a power to rescind or vary an order for possession passed under Section 43
of the presidency small courts Acts 1882. It was held in the court even if
there is casus omissus court cannot provide terms or words.

c. Exact meaning preferred to loose meaning: The general presumption in law

is that words used are ‘correct’, exact, not loose and inexact.

The word contiguous has exact meaning to say that it is ‘touching’ and
loose meaning to confer the meaning ‘neighboring’. Here exact meaning is
accepted than loose meaning.

According to this rule the secondary meaning i.e., less common meaning of
a word should not be confusedly used with its loose meaning.

If the purpose of statute directs towards adopting secondary meaning, then

it is accepted as “preferred meaning” as well as exact meaning.

Example: ‘Obtain’ in its primary sense means to some request or effort to

acquire or get some thing.
 ‘Obtain’ in its secondary sense means to acquire or get without any
qualification.

If in the statute uses the ‘obtain’ in secondary sense having regard to need
i.e., if the provision does not provide for any qualification of the applicant,
then secondary meaning is most applicable bit this does not mean more
emphasis is laid to use a secondary means or adopted loose meaning to a
exact meaning.

d. Technical words in technical sense: In a legislation relating to a particular

trade, business, profession, art or science, there are words having a special
meaning in that context are understood in that sense. Such a special
meaning is called the technical meaning compared to more common
meaning that the word may have.

Taxing statute –Goods defined in connotation of words and expressions

describing in ‘dealer in a ‘tariff schedule’. Terms like dealer and consumer
as defined under consumer production Act 1984. True test for such
classification is not functional rather it is commercial identity.

Example: The term ‘refined oil’ in excise duty. It was held that purification
of raw oil in the process of manufacture of ‘vanaspati’ where deodorization
is done after hydrogenation does not at any stage transform the oil into
refined oil as known to the consumers and commercial community because
 in commercial world oil is always deodorized before it is marketed as
refined oil.

Here Supreme Court adopted the meaning of refined oil as provided by the
‘Indian Standards Institutions’.

Legal sense of words:

When words get technical meaning by their consistent use by the
legislature in a particular sense or because of their authoritative construction by
superior courts, they are understood in that sense. It acquires special connotation
in law, then dictionaries also not helpful interpretation of that word.

But it is always by the context that a word gets a legal sense. When used in
general terms not as special word then it will always bear a general meaning and
not technical meaning as legal sense of words. In construing the Acts of
parliament, it is general rule that words must be taken in their legal sense unless
the contrary intention appears.
Judgment and Final order have acquired a technical meaning, judgement means
“the declaration or final determination of the Rights of the parties in the matter
brought the court “, Final order means “an order which finally determines the
Rights of the parties and brings the case to end.”

Example: Item 2 of Schedule III to the payment, Bonus Act, 1965 the words
‘working funds’, when used in the context of a banking company must be
understood in a technical sense which they have acquired in that context. Same
term ‘working funds’ were referred in Sen award of 1949 and shastri award of
1953 . It was therefore, construed that the words ‘working funds’ mean paid up
capital, reserves and average of the deposits for 52 weeks each year for which
weekly return of deposits are submitted to RBI.

(d) Departure from the rule: While performing interpretative functions court
has the discretion to correct obvious drafting errors, while doing so court
will ‘add words’ or ‘omit words’ or ‘substitute words’

There are few guidelines were doing so

(i) Intended purpose of the statute or provision in question.
(ii) By inadvertence the draftsman and parliament fail to give effect to that
purpose in provision in question.
(iii) Words used in the parliament would have been in error in Bill.

Thus in the light of above and to get the intention of legislature by reading the
statute as it is and as a whole, there a few addition allowed and substitute of
words and rejection allowed accordingly.

1. Addition of words when permissible: By reading the language as it is if court

find that it is necessary to add another word which draftsmen has omitted
then to give full effect to the statute an addition of words are allowed or
permitted.
 Example: words “any debt due before the commencement of this act to any
banking company” as occurring in section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists
Debt Relief Act, 1970 were construed by the Supreme Court to mean “any
debt due at and before the commencement of this act.

2. Rejection of words when permissible : At time intention of the legislature is

clear but unskillfulness of the draftsmen put many words which are not
necessary sometimes redundant holding back the intention of the
legislature and running the legislature to futility.

Under there situation courts shall move towards rejecting the surplus
words to make the statute effective and workable.
Example: There was a Colonial ordinance in question. Any natural born
subject of Great Britain and Ireland resident within this district may
exercise all and singular the rights which such natural born could or might
exercise according to the laws of customs of England regarding disposal by
last will or testament of property, both real and personal situated in the
district, to all intents and purposed ‘as if such natural born subject resided
in England’.

Intention of legislature was plain from the title and preamble that the
ordinance was passed to enable the British subject’s resident in Natal
where the Roman law was in practice, to make bequests according to
English law
 It was held the difficulty arise because of last nine words and same may be
rejected for better use of ordinance or to put the ordinance to operation.

3. Treating words or provisions as superfluous: Sometimes legislature out of

abundant caution use superfluous words or tautologic expression and it is
quite common in ‘Act of Parliament’. This point is band on Maxim.

“Expressio uniusest exclusio alterious” which say that what is expressly are
exemption and on repetition cannot lay a foundation for an argument. It is
also understood as such superfluous provisions cannot lay the foundation
for an argument.
Mischief Rule: (Re-Heydons Rule)
Re-Heydon’s case:
It is landmark case as it was the first case to use what would come to be
called the “Mischief Rule” for interpretation of statutes. The mischief rules
require judges to look over four tasks to ensure that gaps within the law are
covered.

This is a construction of leases, life estates and statutes.

(a) A religious college gave a tenancy in a manor also called ‘Ottery’ to man
named as ‘Ware’ and his son.
(b) Tenancy was established by ‘copyhold’ can ancient device for giving a
parcel of a manor to a tenant usually in return for agricultural services.
(c) It was a long running lease with special privileges for each party.
(d) Ware and his son held their copyhold to have for their lives, subject to will
of the lord and the custom particular to that manor.
(e) The wares copyhold was in a parcel also occupied by some tenants at will.
(f) Later the college leased the same parcel to another man named Heydon for
a period of 80 years in return of rents equal to traditional rent for the
components of the parcel.
(g) Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, the parliament
enacted the statute “Act of Dissolution”. Then had the effect of dissolving
many religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost its lands and
rents to Henry VIII.
 But the act provided an exception that all wants for a term of life, made
more than a year prior to the enactment of the statute.

The court of exchequer found that the grant to the wares was protected by
the relevant provisions of the “Act of Dissolution”, but that the lease to Heydon
was void.

Importance of the case:

The ruling was based on an important discussion of relationship of a statute
to the pre-existing ‘common case’.

Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the statute was limited to
curing that defect.

Judges are supposed to construe statutes by seeking the true intent of the
makers of the Act, which is mostly ‘pro bono publico’ or intent for the public
good.

Lord Coke further described the process through which the court must
interpret legislation.

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide?
 3. What remedy the parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of commonwealth?
4. The true reason of the remedy.
Objective of Mischief Rule:
The office of all the judges is always to make such construction to ‘suppress
the mischief’ and advance the remedy.
To provide cure and remedy according to the true intent of makers of the
Act i.e.,‘pro bono publico’. The rule laid down in Heydon’s case has now
attained the status of a classic and known as the mischief rule.

The rule enables consideration of four matters in construing an act:

1. What was the law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief or defect for which law did not provide?
3. What is the remedy that the Act has provided?
4. What is the reason of the remedy?

If the legislation is made with the intention to provide relief against certain
mischief and court must adopt that construction which shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. The court should not deny such relief.

CASE:
Bengal Immunity Co’s case:
This is a very important case on mischief rule decided by Supreme Court of
India under the guidelines of Re- Heydon’s case decided way back 1584.
Bengal Immunity Co. Vs. State of Bihar. AIR. 1955 SC 661
The appellant company was into business of manufacturing and selling
various vaccines, biological products and medicines. It registered office is at
Calcutta and it laboratory and factory at Barangpur in the district of 24 peraganas
in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal finance (Sales tax)
and its registered number is S.L.683A, the products have extensive sales through
out the Union of India and abroad.

The goods are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer orby air against the
orders accepted by appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company
neither had any agent or managers in Bihar nor any office, go down or laboratory
in that state.

The respondents called the appellant with a notice under Bihar Sales Tax
Act 1947 to pay the tax and get registered under Bihar Sales Tax Act.
The appellant denied the tax liability that they did not collect any tax from any
buyer or customer or any person of that state. It denied the liability that the Co.
was not resident in Bihar.It was heard in Bihar High Court and ordered the
appellant to comply the notice of the respondents. But on the next issued a
certificate under article 132(1) of the constitution, that the case involved
substantial question of laws as to the interpretation of constitution i.e., Article
286 of the Constitution.

It was interpreted in Supreme Court by S.R. Das, C.J., stated that Article 286
of the constitution provided free inter-state trade commerce and to avoid
Multiple taxation under 286(1)(a) has treated the trade transaction among states
as domestic trade which prohibits imposition of tax for same transaction in two
places or to avoid ‘Multiple taxation’.
Hence judge stated that it was to cure this mischief or multiple taxation and
to pressure the free flow of inter-state trade or commerce in Union of India
regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the
constitution makers adopted in Article 286 in the constitution. This interpretation
is based on the mischief rule of interpretation.
Rule of Literal Construction or Golden Rule of interpretation:
This is first principle of interpretation. This rule is based on maxim.

“Generalia verba sent generalita intelligenda”

According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their
ordinary and natural meaning and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous
effect should be given to a provision of a statute what even may be the
consequences.
When words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, rule of literal
construction is to be applied and then to restore to other principles of
interpretation is not needed. It is applicable both to the private as well as public
law.
According to the maxim general words are to be understood with general
meaning unless the contrary meaning is attached there with in the interpretation
clause being a part of the statute.
This can be understood under following headings:-
1. Natural and grammatical meaning: The words used in the statute are to be
understood in their natural ordinary or popular sense and phrases and
sentences are to be constructed according to their grammatical meaning
without absurdity.
But if it is absurd, related to the context and if contrary meaning is
prevailing then there may be adoption of other methods for interpretation
of the statutes.
According to Viscount Simonds, the Golden Rule is that the words of a
statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.
Natural and ordinary meaning of the words should not be departed from
unless it is required from the legal context.
Pentiah Vs. Veeranellappa:
Respondents were elected members of a municipal committee under the
Hyderabad Municipal and Town Communities Act, 1951. It was repealed by
the Hyderabad district Municipal and Town Committees Act, 1956.
The Act of 1956 provided that the committee constituted under previous
Act would continue till the first meeting of newly constituted committee
under the new Act of 1956.The old committee continued for more than
three years because no elections were held .Three years was the maximum
period for a committee under the Act of 1951. The appellant wanted to
have a writ of quo warranto. Supreme Court held that if more than one
construction were possible then the one which was narrower and failed to
achieve the object of the Act should not be adopted. The Act should be so
interpreted as to avoid absurdity.
 In this case committee constituted under the old Act continued even after
expiry of 3 maximum period because new committee was not constituted
under the new Act, accordingly members of committee automatically stop
to be members after the expiry of period of three years.

2. Explanation of Rule: The words in the statute are to be understood first in

their natural, ordinary or popular sense according to the context and
subject matter. They all are used interchangeably convey to mean the same
idea. If the natural and ordinary meaning indicate meaning which is
opposed to intention of the legislature then court may resort to other
possible meaning of the word or phrase which may convey the true
intention of legislature.

Example: The commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore Vs. Jaswant Singh
Charan Singh. The Supreme Court in construing the Coal in a Sales Tax Act
‘applied the popular meaning test’. “What would be the meaning which
persons dealing with Coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give
to that word”. Answering this test, it was held that Coal will include
Charcoal as well not only Coal obtained as a mineral.

In colliery control order it was said that the word ‘Coal’ will be understood
in its technical or scientific sense and will include a mineral product but in
the context of Sales Tax Act ‘Coal will include in the natural ordinary,
popular sense the Coal used as a fuel’.
 Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., V. Collector of Central Excise.
It was held that toilet soap was a ‘Household’ soap not a soap of ‘other
sorts’ in schedule 1 of the central excises and Salt Act of 1944. Accordingly,
if anyone goes to market and asks for toilet soap, he must ask only for
household bathing purpose and not for industrial or other sorts. Even the
people dealing with it would supply it for household purpose.
3. Exact meaning preferred to lose meaning.
4. Technical words in technical sense.

Strict construction:
Interpretation only with clear words, there is not room for necessary
implication. Here the statute must be read according to the natural construction
of its words but giving no way for implied meaning having regard to context or
purpose of the statute. It is also understood as most narrow construction
sheerly on the verbal or grammatical meaning. Here nothing is to be read in,
nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.

Following statutes must be strictly construed:

1. Expropriatory Legislation (public utility laws) Laws under Industrial disputes
Acts.
2. Denuding statutes (Taxing Statutes).

The legislations which are capturing attaching, depriving the citizen it is

understood as Expropriatory legislation .Taking over of private property or assets
by the government for compensation only when it is for a public purpose. It
includes government’s action of taking over property against the owners wishes,
theoretically to be used for the benefit of the public at a large Denuding statutes
are those statutes that takes away rights of persons.
For Example:
In cases of Taxing statutes, the subject is not to be taxed without clear
words for that purpose. Income categories are provided, types of income are
defined and exception to taxing is also clearly provided. Here tax department has
no discretion to extend the categories and income liability. Only if the person is
found to have assessed the income accordingly falling into the category only then
he is taxable not otherwise.
A person is taxable only by words used in the statutes not by any other
implied clauses or necessary implication.

Equitable consideration and taxing statute:

Equitable considerations are not relevant in construing a taxing statute. The
court must squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. The taxing
statute must be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; while it
cannot imply any thing which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the
statute to supply any assumed deficiency.
Taxing statute before taxing a person it must be shown that he falls with
the slope and ambit of the charging sections by clear words used in the section.
If the legislature fails to express or make a person taxable and taxpayers
escapes by not being brought within the letter of the law, no question if
unjustness as such arises.
 In determining eligibility to tax there is no room for equity in hardship and
it is for legislature to determine the same. When the statutory provision is
reasonably leads to only one interpretation then, the question of strict
construction does not prevail. When intention to levy the tax is clearly shown by
the words used by parliament there shall no speculation as to what the fairest
and most equitable mode of could be levying that tax.

Beneficent construction:
Any construction which strains the words to include those which are plainly
omitted from the natural meaning should not be adopted. Sometimes when
the usual meaning of the words does not convey the object or intention of the
legislature, meaning of words may be extended to achieve the object or intention
of legislature and it is accepted. There are certain legislations the object of which
is to benefit a particular class of persons, if any such provisions are ambiguous
and capable of two meaning, the one which preserves the benefit is to be
adopted and let go the other. To adopt the interpretation which would at best
confer the benefit and leave the other interpretation is beneficent construction.

This rule is applicable while construction

1. Welfare legislations.
2. Any provisions relating to weaker and stronger contracting parties.

Objectives of beneficent construction its slope:

1. To promote public good and prevent misuse of power
2. To promote justice equity.
 3. Statute should be interpreted to avoid possible hardship.
4. To interpret beneficial provisions which are provided for general
betterment in social interest and court should adopt a constructive
approach to achieve the intentions of legislature.
5. To adopt such construction which best provides policy of legislation to
extend the benefit not which curtails cuts the benefits are not avoided from
applying this rule of construction.
6. On no ambiguity in the statute, if the provisions are plain, and goes not give
in to any doubt, the rule of benevolent construction cannot be applied. If
there is no doubt regarding the meaning or word used in the provision of
any Act, it is permissible for courts apply the rule of beneficent construction
to get the object of the Act.
It is always duty of the court to give a broad interpretation always to keep
in view the purpose of legislature to avoid any arbitrary action, but always
beneficial statutes should not be construed restrictively rather widest possible
interpretation is to be adopted.
On two possible views or in case of doubt beneficial legislation is to be
interpreted in favour of beneficiaries. Example: Indian Trust Act. (Labour Law)

Limitations on the powers of the courts in application of beneficent legislation:

If the court finds that it would be doing justice within the parameters of law
by applying beneficial construction or benevolent construction, then it can be
applied. But there are limitations on the powers of courts:
 Judicial decisions (precedents) have been laid down to say as to where and
when this rule of construction is required to be applied or not to be applied.

1. Where the court finds that by application of the rule f benevolent

construction it would be re-legislating a provision of statute either by
substituting, adding or altering the words used in the provision. Under
these circumstances it can be applied.
2. When the words used in a statute are capable of only one meaning, under
such circumstances, the courts have been hesitant to apply the rule of
benevolent construction. But if it is found that words used in the statute
give rise to more than one meaning, court in such do not ignore the
statutory requirement.

CASE:
1. Manohar Lal Vs. State of Punjab:
Section 7 o the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1949 which provided that the
shops and establishments which come under the slope of the Act shall remain
closed one day in a week and was a reasonable restriction on the fundamental
right, and not ‘violation of Article 19(1)(9)’ of the Constitution. This was
understood as a necessary for ensuring health and efficiency of workers. Even
when business is being conducted by the owner and his family members, the
provisions would apply to them also in the same manner and for same method.
 Section 7 is construed in the pursuance of object of the provision i.e., to
ensure the health and efficiency of workers. This it is not in violation of Article
19(1)(a) of Constitution.

2. Municipal Council of Rajpur Vs. State of M.P:

Section 3(1) of the Motor vehicles Act 1939 defined “private Carrier” as an
owner of a transport vehicle other than public carrier who used that vehicle solely
for the carriage of goods which were his property. Section 2(g) of the Motor
Transport workers Act defined Motor transport undertaking as a transport
undertaking engaged in carrying passengers and goods for hire or reward and
includes a private carrier.In this case the appellants were the owner of the same
transport vehicles a few of vehicles were used for removing night soil and garbage
etc., while others were used for removing sick and wounded to the hospitals.

Question arose for interpretation:

Whether appellants were private carriers within meaning section 3(1) of
M.V. Act 1939 and therefore, were required to be registered under section 3(g) of
the Motor Transport workers Act as Motor Transport undertakings.
Supreme Court included the appellant into Category of private carriers and
subjected its registration under Motor Transport Undertakings. Supreme Court
stretched the language to the extent of holding night soil or garbage or sick or
wounded to be goods and the property of the appellant. Supreme Court based its
interpretation that the Motor Transport Workers had to be construed
beneficially.
Unichoyi Vs. State of Kerala:
In this case, the validity of the minimum wages Act 1948 was challenged.
The question was whether this act under which the state Government is
empowered to fix minimum wages in an industry is violation of Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India as the Act did not define what minimum wage is and
made no provision for taking the capacity of the employer to pay into
consideration .The Supreme Court found that Act to be valid and held that the Act
being a beneficial legislation, it must be construed in favour of the workers. It
further said that fixing the wage is must otherwise population in underdeveloped
country, face problem of unemployment, it will make then work even on
starvation wages and it should not be allowed to happen.
Harmonious Construction:
General presumption of legislation is that it would ever intend to contradict
itself (provisions). It does not provide two repugnant provisions in the same
statute. The Act must be read as a whole, and its provisions must be harmonized
to make in effective.
Rule of Harmonious Construction:
When two or more provisions of the same statutes are repugnant, the
court tries to construe these provisions in such a way to give full effect to both by
harmonizing them with each other. The court may do it by two ways:
1. Two or more conflicting provision used in separate situation.
2. Or by holding one provision providing for an exception of the general rule
contained therein.
 It is in-fact very difficult to determine whether separate provisions of the
same statute are overlapping or a mutually exclusive, but then court tries to
harmonize and construe them. Though it is generally accepted that all the
provisions in the statutes must be workable one provision cannot be interpreted
to defeat another provision of the same statute. This rule can be applied in
interpreting statutory rules, subordinate legislation. When there are two
inconsistent sections of the same Act, harmonious construction should be
adopted to relieve the clash.
Harmonious construction is used for avoiding an interpretation which will
turn them ineffective, otiose or surplusage or incongruous (inappropriate) results.
CASE:
Raj Krishna Vs. Binod:
There was conflict between sections: Section 33(2) and Section 123(8) of
the representation of people Act, as per Section33(2) a government servant may
nominate or second a candidate seeking election. Section 123(8), a government
servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in election in any manner except by
asking his vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a government servant was entitled to
nominate or second a candidate seeking election to the state Legislature
Assembly.
This interpretation could be adopted if power on a government servant is
provided with voting as well as of proposing and seconding a candidate and
forbidding him from assisting a candidate in any other manner.
Objective of harmonious construction:
 The main objective of harmonious construction is to avoid inconsistency
and repugnancy. It is the duty of courts to avoid ‘a head on clash” between the
two section of the same act it should always achieve to harmonize. It should
not be lightly assumed that ‘parliament had given with one hand what it took
away with the others. According to Venkataraman Aiyar, when there are in an
enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other they
should be interpreted possibility to give effect to both the provisions. This is
understood as harmonious construction.
The construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “useless number”
or “dead letter” is not harmonize is not to destroy.This rule of interpretation is
guided by “Generalia specialibus non derogant and Generalibus specialia
derogant”. General words do not derogate from special provisions or special
provisions will control general provisions. This rule is adopted in approach to
ding which among the two apparently conflicting provisions is more general and
which is more specific and to construe more general one and to exclude the more
specific. At the same time if special provisions are made on a certain matter that
matter is excluded from the general provision. When there is a conflict
between a special Act and general Act, the provisions of the special Act prevail.
CASE:
In Ravichandran. K Vs. Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd.,
The case was in regarding to hold the benefit of accommodation on a
supernumerary post provided under section 47 of the person with disabilities Act
of 1915, it could only be availed if disability was acquired during course of
employment.’ This requirement of the general workmen’s compensation Act 1923
would not apply special disability statute.
Amarendra Pratap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapathi
Supreme Court held that the general provision relating to adverse
possession would not apply to tribunals due to the explicit prohibition contained
in special law.
Purposive construction:
It is required to give full effect to the purport (purpose) and object of the
Act for which statute must be read entirely to give a result of purposive
construction. Purposive construction promotes the object of the enactment
within the limitations placed in the legislation, the exclusions are placed which
acts as an exception to the operation of law. Purposive construction is applied to
achieve the true intent of the statute or the law maker. In purposive construction
more emphasis provided for achieving the purpose and to avoid the abuse, as
every law is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate only on
technicalities. Even though the duty of court is to provide justice i.e., (expound
the law) and not to legislate, legislature cannot be called to sit and resolve the
difficulties in implementation to its intention and the spirit of the law. In such
cases it is the duty of the court to shape or mould or creatively interpret the
legislation by liberally interpretation. Here the duty of court is to advance the
cause of the statute and not to defeat it.
Ostensible Purpose: (Appearing Purpose) When the court is not able to find the
meaning by plain ordinary grammatical meaning, or cannot use them as best
guide, in order to find out the legislative intent (real purpose) court can accept
ostensible purpose. In such situation court must have functional approach to look
behind the words of an enactment and to take other factors into consideration to
give effect to the legislative intent. Interpretation must be to hold the
constitutionality of statute with two interpretations are possible, here provision
should be construed in the context of the object, but construction should not be
beyond the scope of the provision of the Act. Purposive construction need not be
applied where there is amendment from time to time to suit the needs of the
changing situation and which has not remained statute. In such situation literal
construction is applicable. Where literal construction or plain meaning may cause
hardship futility absurdity or uncertainty purposive construction may be
preferred. Purposive construction can be applied to penal statutes to avoid
lacuna and to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
Example: In Section 48-AA of advocate Act, 1961 the expression “sixty days
from the date of that order”, prescribes the period of limitation for invoking the
power to review. This does not have anything to with the actual exercise of power
by the Bar Council.Only reasonable construction of this provision was that merely
by lapse of 60 days form the date of order sought to be reviewed, the Bar Council
of India or any of its committees did not deprive (divest) its power to review
jurisdiction. Because of purposive construction, the remedy of review was made
meaningful, practical and effective and application filed by petitioner for invoking
review jurisdiction was held to be valid within the limitations.