Professional Documents
Culture Documents
First Division (G.R. No. 229440. July 14, 2021)
First Division (G.R. No. 229440. July 14, 2021)
FIRST DIVISION
CAGUIOA, J:
The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy.[1] — Chief
Justice Paras
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] (Petition) under Rule 45
assailing the Decision[3] dated August 22, 2016, and Resolution[4] dated January 18, 2017
issued by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102710.
The Facts
The instant case involves a civil action for libel filed by herein respondent Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile (Enrile) against petitioners Philippine Daily Inquirer (Inquirer), Donna Cueto
(Cueto), Artemio T. Engracia, Jr. (Engracia, Jr.), and Abelardo Ulanday (Ulanday)
(collectively, petitioners), Dona Pazzibugan (Pazzibugan) and Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc
(Jimenez-Magsanoc). Inquirer is a corporation, organized under the laws of the Philippines,
engaged in the publishing of newspapers. Cueto and Pazzibugan were the authors of the
article titled "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" which contained allegedly defamatory
statements against Enrile, while Ulanday, Engracia, Jr., and Jimenez-Magsanoc served as
Inquirer's Associate Editor, News Editor, and Editor-in-Chief, respectively.
On December 4, 2001, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on its front page
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a news article with the heading: "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" co-
written by [Cueto] and [Pazzibugan].
xxxx
After reading the news article, [Enrile], through his counsel[,] wrote to
Commissioner Yorac to confirm whether she uttered the defamatory words
attributed against her.
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December 2, 2001 was a Sunday and there was no one in the office.
This should have cautioned your reporter to verify the character of
the statement; with me or the Commissioners.
[Enrile] repeatedly demanded that the news article be corrected but his demands
proved futile as no correction was made. Left with no recourse, he filed a
Complaint for Damages against Defendants-Appellants alleging that the news
article imputed upon him defamatory acts of (a) having benefited from [the]
coco levy fund, (b) accumulating ill-gotten wealth, and (c) being a Marcos
crony.
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Further, Cueto testified during the trial regarding the circumstances of the writing of the
article. The content of her testimony, as summarized by Branch 139, Regional Trial Court
of Makati (RTC) is as follows:
At the time of writing the said news reports, she has had no commercial,
personal and social business with plaintiff Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. When she
was writing the article, she was not even thinking of [Enrile] as her only
concern was about the coconut levy settlement and that she needs to meet the
deadline. She wrote the subject news report because the issue is a matter of
public interest and as a journalist, she has the responsibility to write it, being the
one assigned to PCGG. Thereafter, one of her editors called her up seeking
clarification on the matter because Commissioner Yorac was denying that she
made those statements and because [Enrile] was threatening to file a libel suit.
After hearing this, she was surprised because she thought all the while that
Commissioner Carranza had the go signal of Commissioner Yorac. She then
confronted Commissioner Carranza and asked him why did this happen. He told
her not to worry and that he was going to make a sworn affidavit. He assured
her that there would be no problem and the case will be later on dismissed
because it was privileged communication. She recorded this conversation with
Commissioner Carranza, who knew he was being recorded because the tape
recorder was in front of him. As far as he knows, the said press statement was
used by Estrella Torres of Today newspaper and Sheila Crisostomo of The
Philippine Star.
xxxx
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the latter didn't return to the PCGG office; that she did not call Commissioner
Avena because she was told that the latter was not involved in the coconut levy
settlement; that it was Commissioner Carranza who requested her to
immediately release the said press statement and that what she verifies in
writing a news report is whether the facts came from a certain government
official and not the contents thereof.
She likewise testified that in practice, they usually rely on the statements or
announcements given by a government official if the news report is not an
investigative item; that she did not verify the truth of the statement that [Enrile]
"has plundered loot" or that he benefited from the coconut levy fund because
her basis was the PCGG statement; that she had no reason to doubt the PCGG
press statement because it was handed to her by Commissioner Carranza; that
her editor asked her if they can attribute the statement to Commissioner Yorac
and in turn, she asked Commissioner Carranza if she can use the name of
Commissioner Yorac instead of PCGG; that she did not interview [Enrile]
before and after writing the subject article; that [Inquirer] later published an
article saying that the PCGG's statement that was used in the subject article was
not Yorac's words but that it came from a high government official and that she
was not sure if there was an apology in the article that was subsequently printed.
[7]
In a Decision[8] dated October 30, 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Enrile. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision was as follows:
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xxxx
The RTC held that the article in question did defame Enrile by imputing to him the
following acts: (a) having benefitted from the coco levy funds; (b) accumulating ill-gotten
wealth and (c) committing the crime of plunder.[10] The RTC added that the publication of
the subject article was undoubtedly malicious, for the newspaper attributed the words to the
late PCGG Chairperson Haydee Yorac (Yorac) who, in turn, denied making the said
statements. The RTC explained that Inquirer and its officials were shown to have "acted
with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the articles they published, when, aside
from falsely attributing statements to Chairperson Yorac, they also failed to show that the
press statement was indeed the official PCGG statement and thus, can be the basis of the
said news report."[11]
The RTC thus made Cueto, Ulanday, Engracia Jr., and Jimenez-Magsanoc liable to Enrile
for the damages caused by the alleged libelous article. The RTC, however, absolved
Pazzibugan from liability for it was proven that her contributions to the article did not
include the portions of the article that contained supposedly defamatory statements.[12]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[13] of the Decision, but the same was denied
by the RTC through an Order[14] dated April 25, 2014. They thus filed an appeal with the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision[15] dated August 22, 2016, the CA upheld the RTC's findings but
modified the award of damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
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SO ORDERED.[16]
The CA held that the statements uttered in the article clearly imputed upon Enrile the
following disparaging remarks: "plunderer," "looter," "possessor of ill-gotten wealth" and
"Marcos crony."[17] The CA thus concluded:
In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but
what the words used by him mean.
For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that the subject news article is
defamatory for it imputed upon [Enrile] a discreditable act and condition
thereby exposing him to public contempt and ridicule.[18]
The CA added that the news article was published with malice, for it was shown "to have
been written and published with the knowledge that they are false.”[19] The CA explained
that Inquirer failed to show that it knew that the statements containing serious criminal
imputations were indeed issued by either the PCGG or Yorac. This was so because Inquirer
and its officials admitted that the reporter did not confirm with PCGG or Yorac if the
statement was indeed issued by them.[20] The CA then concluded that the publication of
the news article was indeed attended with actual malice as shown by petitioners' "reckless
disregard to ascertain its falsity or truthfulness."[21]
Petitioners thereafter sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was denied by
the CA through a Resolution[22] dated January 18, 2017.
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On March 13, 2017, petitioners thus filed with this Court the instant Petition under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Enrile filed his Comment[23] on October 18, 2017, while petitioners
filed their Reply[24] on February 12, 2018.
Issue
The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's
finding that the questioned article was libelous.
At the outset, the Court dispels Enrile's contention that the Petition was grounded on
factual issues, which therefore takes it out of the ambit of a petition for review under Rule
45.[25] There is no factual issue disputed in the case. A careful perusal of the Petition
would reveal that the question put forth by petitioners is whether the facts, as herein
established, are sufficient to conclude that there was malice in the publication of the
questioned article. The determination of whether there is malice is certainly a question of
law, and is thus proper in a petition for review under Rule 45.
As to the merits, libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."[26] Consequently, the following elements
constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication
of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.[27]
To determine whether Inquirer and the rest of petitioners did commit libel against Enrile, it
is thus necessary to ascertain whether the foregoing elements were present in the
publishing of the subject article.
The presence of the second and third elements are not in dispute; the article in question was
admittedly published by Inquirer in its newspapers, and Enrile was undoubtedly mentioned
in the article. Hence, the Court's analysis will only focus on the presence of the first and
fourth elements of libel, namely, (1) the imputation of a discreditable act or condition; and
(2) the existence of malice.
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In her public statement since the controversy on the settlement erupted last
week, Yorac said the settlement would allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited
from the coco levy fund, particularly businessman Eduardo "Danding"
Cojuangco, Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat and former Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot."
xxxx
The present terms of the compromise agreement brokered by Dante Ang for an
unknown client will neither provide economic relief for millions of coconut
farmer nor attain the equally important policy of recovering ill-gotten wealth
from the Marcoses, Danding Cojuangco, Clara Lobregat, Juan Ponce Enrile and
the Accra lawyers who helped them plunder the coco levy fund, Yorac said.[28]
Enrile claims that the subject article "imputed [upon him] the crime of plunder, and several
vices or defects, including the [acts of having benefited from the coco levy funds,
accumulating ill-gotten wealth, and being a Marcos crony]."[29] The RTC ruled in favor of
Enrile as it said:
A careful reading of the relevant portions of the subject article shows that it
called several persons, included [Enrile], a "Marcos crony"; that it stated that
such persons benefited from the coco levy fund; that the proposed settlement
will allow said persons [to] "keep their plundered loot" and that [the] terms of
the compromise agreement will not attain the policy of recovering ill-gotten
wealth from said persons and that such persons "helped them plunder coco levy
fund".
Clearly, the subject articles contain defamatory imputations as they all exposed
[Enrile] to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a discreditable
act (the act of plundering or benefitting from plunder of the coco levy fund) and
condition (him labeled as a Marcos crony).[30]
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The CA agreed with the RTC, and it stated that "the subject news article indeed imputes
upon [Enrile] several reprehensible acts allegedly committed by him and portrayed him as
a 'plunderer', 'looter', 'possessor of ill-gotten wealth' and 'Marcos crony'."[31]
It is settled that "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense."[32]
In the case of Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo[33] (Domingo), the Court dealt
with an article made by a reporter who received a letter from the employees of a
government agency, wherein the authors of the letter alleged that their Regional Director
was guilty of "mismanagement," "nepotism," "gross inefficiency," "improper decorum,"
and causing "low morale." The specifics of the accusations — which were also the subject
of complaints filed before different government agencies like the Civil Service
Commission and the Ombudsman — were contained in the letter and were echoed in the
article. The Regional Director thus filed a complaint, and an Information for libel was
subsequently filed against the reporter. While the trial court and the CA convicted the
reporter, the latter was acquitted by the Court because it found that the article itself was not
defamatory as it merely relayed what was stated in the letter received by the reporter. The
Court explained:
The Court cannot sustain the findings of the RTC and the CA that this article
was libelous. Viewed in its entirety, the article withholds the finding that it
impeaches the virtue, credit, and reputation of Domingo. The article was but a
fair and true report by Batuigas based on the documents received by him and
thus exempts him from criminal liability x x x[.]
xxxx
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The factual circumstances of Domingo are similar to the case at bar. A closer look at the
article involved in this case reveals that it was not Cueto, the author of the article, who was
asserting that Enrile was a "plunderer" or a "Marcos crony." In both of the paragraphs
complained of, the author was merely repeating a supposed statement from PCGG
Chairperson Yorac. It is true that Yorac subsequently disclaimed ownership of any of such
statements, but the foregoing fact did not thereby make the defamatory imputations
automatically from Inquirer or Cueto.
Both the RTC and the CA committed the error of discontinuing its analysis on whether the
article imputed defamatory remarks against Enrile. Courts, in deciding libel cases, should
always bear in mind that "[w]hether or not it is libelous depends upon the scope, spirit and
motive of the publication taken in its entirety."[35] To reiterate, and as the CA itself noted,
in determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense.[36]
Here, both courts did not consider that the article, read in its entirety, clearly just reports
the statements supposedly made by Yorac. More importantly, both courts failed to view the
article from the perspective of the reader, doing which would have led them to the
conclusion that the article merely impresses on the reader that "Yorac said the following"
instead of "Enrile is a plunderer and a Marcos crony."
To reiterate, the fact that Inquirer failed to verify if the statements were indeed made by
Yorac did not make the imputations in the article as its own. To stress, the perspective of
the reader — or how the words are used in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural
and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing or reading
them — remain the judicial guiaepost in determining whether an utterance is libelous.
Applying the foregoing in this case, the subject article was a mere replication — a plain
report that "a person said this" — albeit inadvertently attributed to the wrong person.
Hence, it is certainly not libelous.
In jurisprudence, it is provided that "malice" connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
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intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[37] It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[38]
Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven.[39] There are two types of malice
— malice in law and malice in fact. Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses
with the proof of malice when words that raise the presumption are shown to have been
uttered.[40] It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice.[41] On
the other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure.[42] It
may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called
express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.[43]
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious.[44] This is malice in law. The presumption of
malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.[45]
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged
communications.[46] A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or
qualifiedly privileged.[47] Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.[48] An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.
VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.[49] Upon the other hand,
qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive.[50]
The enumeration under Art. 354 above, however, is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
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likewise privileged.[51] Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair reports
on matters of public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged
communications, and are thus included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications.[52]
In the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals[53] (Borjal) the Court noted that there are
additional exceptions covered by qualifiedly privileged communications, apart from the
two enumerated under the Revised Penal Code, because
[t]he rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal
code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
speech and of the press x x x [which] constitutional right cannot be abolished by
the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute
punishing libels.[54]
In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,[59] the Court explained the rationale for the foregoing rule.
It held that:
[a] rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such
allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, it
would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as
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The subject matter of the article is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. As the RTC
itself correctly observed, "these are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, talcing into account the public character of the funds involved."[61] The Court
itself, in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic,[62] characterized the coco
levy funds as "special public funds."[63]
Notably, Enrile was also the respondent in abovementioned case of Ayer, where the Court
ultimately concluded that Enrile continues to be a public figure as he "sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the Philippines."[66]
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that respondent Enrile would not qualify as a
public figure, it would not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a
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From the foregoing, it could be indisputably inferred, therefore, that the presumption of
existence of malice does not arise for the article, as the same is considered a "fair report on
matters of public interest" — and thus a qualifiedly privileged communication.
While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character
of a communication destroys the presumption of malice.[70] The onus of proving actual
malice then lies on Enrile.[71]
The Court, however, holds that Enrile failed to discharge the said burden.
The CA declared that the subject article was published with actual malice because,
although it is a qualifiedly privileged communication, it was supposedly shown "to have
been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of
whether they are false or not."[72] The CA elucidated:
In this case, while it is undisputed that the questioned news article deals with
matters of public interest, the relevant portion of which were shown to have
been written and published with the knowledge that they are false.
xxxx
Although Defendants-Appellants claim that the news article was based from a
PCGG statement, they failed to prove that it was indeed an official statement of
the PCGG.
As keenly observed by the trial court, the alleged PCGG statement does not
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even bear the official letterhead of the PCGG. Upon further scrutiny, it is
apparent that it was not signed by any official of the PCGG and the purported
date of its issuance was a non-working day. Clearly the presence of these
irregularities should have raised serious doubts on Defendants-Appellants and
impelled them to verify the truth of the statement.
It was error for the CA to conclude that the article was published with the knowledge that
they were false. To recall, the article was published on December 4, 2001, while the letters
of Chairperson Yorac disclaiming ownership of the statements were executed only on
December 6, 2001. In the aforementioned case of Domingo, the reporter published the
article regarding the complaints against the Regional Director when the complaints had
already been dismissed by the different government agencies. The article was published,
however, prior to the time that the reporter was informed of the dismissal of the charges.
According to the Court, there was no malice even if the charges had already been
dismissed at the time of the publication of the article. The Court explained that "even
assuming that the contents of the articles were false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove actual malice."[74]
Such ruling of the Court also applies in the case at bar. Again, what constitutes malice is
not the fact that the articles contain matters which are false. For there to be malice, it must
be that the articles were published with the knowledge that the matters in the article were
false. It could not be said, however, that at the time of the article's publication on December
4, 2001 that petitioners already knew that the statement did not, in fact, come from Yorac.
In this connection, the CA likewise erred in holding that the article was published "with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The CA blames the newspaper for failing
to prove that the statements were indeed from the PCGG, and for showing no attempt to
counter-check its veracity.
In Villanueva, a news article was published, the contents of which later on turned out to be
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false. One of the reporters therein explained that he obtained the news from a fellow
reporter and he believed the same, so he no longer exerted any effort in verifying the same.
In finding that there was no "reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," the Court
held:
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to
be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual
malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free
expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the
press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some
room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them
much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy.
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reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a
"high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." Petitioner, in this case,
presented no proof that respondents entertained such awareness. Failure to
present respondents' informant before the court should not be taken against
them.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements of the Court to the case at hand, it could thus be
reasonably concluded that the article was not published "with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."
Villanueva teaches us that the failure of news outlets to counter-check or verify their
reports, which may later on turn out to be false, does not per se make the publication of
such reports done with malice. To reiterate Villanueva, "a reporter may rely on information
given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter
does not entertain a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.'"[77]
In this case, the source of the statements initially believed to be issued by Chairperson
Yorac was another PCGG Commissioner, Mr. Ruben Carranza. This is undisputed, as the
parties stipulated on this fact in the pretrial:
ATTY. At any rate your Honor, just to expedite the proceedings, we are
MEDINA: willing to stipulate and admit to the fact that Commissioner
Caranza in fact submitted a piece of paper, copy of which was
marked as Exhibit "1", to the witness your Honor.
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To the mind of the Court, the reporter, Cueto, could not have had a "high degree of
awareness" that the statement contained falsities when the same was handed to her by no
less than a PCGG Commissioner. In simple terms, why would anyone doubt a PCGG
Commissioner who attests that a certain statement was PCGG's or made by the PCGG
Chairperson?
This is not to say that there were no shortcomings on the part of Inquirer or the reporters
and editors involved. Lest it be misconstrued, the Court is not tolerating, much less
sanctioning, irresponsible journalism. However, the case before the Court is a claim for
damages arising from a supposed libel. Thus, the fundamental question before the Court is:
Did the petitioners commit libel? The answer to the same is in the negative. Again, in
Villanueva, the Court held:
xxxx
Damages, in our view, could not simply arise from an inaccurate or false
statement without irrefutable proof of actual malice as element of the
assailed publication.[79] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite
accurate, on its own, is insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel
cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
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response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such
remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity thereof.
The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza's
allegation of a sexual harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the
article: it was a straightforward narration, without any comment from the
reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz.[81] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is likewise no proof that the publication of the subject article was
made to harass, vex, or humiliate Enrile. Also, as previously discussed, the article was a
straightforward narration: a plain report that "a person said this," although it was
erroneously attributed to a person who did not utter the statements.
It bears emphasis that the Court, in this case, is asked to rule on the established facts, with
the prevailing laws and doctrines on libel as its legal backdrop. From the foregoing
principles discussed above, the Court therefore holds that the petitioners in this case did not
commit libel.
A final note
This is not the first time that the Court has been asked to strike a balance between freedom
of the press and the limits thereof in relation to libel. Indeed, as the Court, in Borjal, noted:
Never in jurisprudential history has any freedom of man undergone radical doctrinal
metamorphoses than his right to freely and openly express his views.[82]
While the Court, once again, through this case, finds the scales of justice tilted in favor of
the freedom of the press, the Court perceives nevertheless that the time is ripe to remind
media practitioners of the importance of their adherence to the ethical standards demanded
by their profession. The Court thus reiterates its reminder in Borjal:
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destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable
Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to
recognize that there can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly
comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought
and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of
others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the
press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-
censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, "
[W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become
a powerful instrument of injustice."
In this connection, the Court declares its continued recognition of the right of every citizen
to enjoy a good name and reputation.[84] The Court, however, is equally cognizant of the
important role that the continuing guarantee of the freedom of the press serves to our
nation.
As the words of Justice Malcolm, in the early case of U.S. v. Bustos[85] remind us:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the
individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism
be born for the common good.[86]
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SO ORDERED.
[3]
Id. at 44-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this
Court) with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring.
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[21] Id. at 56
[26]Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009, 588 SCRA 1,
11-12.
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[32] Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, 813 Phil. 37, 56 (2017).
[33] Id.
[37]Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., G.R. No. 184315, November 25,
2009, 605 SCRA 684.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[46] Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
[47] Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1, 21.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
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[50] Id.
[51] Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
[55] Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
[56](1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral, or social duty; (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions; (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest; and (4) fair reports on
matters of public interest.
[59] G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999, 314 SCRA 460.
[64] G.R. No. 82380, 82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
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[68] Id.
[69] Id.
[71] Id.
[72] Rollo, p. 54, citing Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, supra note 26.
[74] Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, supra note 32, at 67.
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