EN BANC

G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMY LIM Y

MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision2  of Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073
and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim)  guilty of violating
Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),  committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any
dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the
substance recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y  Nave (Gorres), was also
indicted for illegal sale of shabu,  committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for
sale, and give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as
Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same
to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting
of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously
marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.4

In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty.5 They were detained in the city
jail during the joint trial of the cases.6
The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin,
IO2 Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both
accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

Version of the Prosecution

Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at
Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).  Based on a report
of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of
prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed
by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation.
During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team
leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-
buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its
serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest
police station, and other related documents.

Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before
10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and
the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while
IO1 Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and
positioned themselves in the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer
and stopped in front of a house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang
Romy.  " Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa
while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu  buyer, Lim
nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as
instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took
one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu  and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn,
IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan,
which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members,
immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were
standing near the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened.
IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who
were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to
put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the
Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both.

When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his
pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust
money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could
see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or
illegal drug was seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of
white substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic
sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two
plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative
from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused
and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug
evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for
the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the
confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of
an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence
seized were taken.

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug
specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the
sachets of shabu  from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a
Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7 personally received the letter-
requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and
conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination, only
Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry
Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white
crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of shabu  after a chromatographic
examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry
Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane
containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence
custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's
office during the inquest.

Version of the Defense

Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina,
Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was
watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate,
he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was already forced
opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the
house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest,
slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he
invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that
he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open.
Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what
was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. The men let him and Gorres sit on a
bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the
PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim
admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets
of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was
not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously
arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres
acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither
do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.

Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in
Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The following day, she
returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She
took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which
the court admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale
of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a
conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY  LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found

GUILTY of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen
[13] years, and to pay Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of Fine;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found
GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].

3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby

ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE GORRES y
Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from detention unless he is being
charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration.8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight
of evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and
uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was
able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and
the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple,
straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible
manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions
that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and
no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or
resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of
evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to
preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not
strong enough to support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim
because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained. It also noted
Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM   196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was
"NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial
court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a
dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid
buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal possession of a
dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not present any proof or
justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was
unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and
integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not
compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on every link in
the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from the time the seized
items were first discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in
evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA did not
appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers
were inspired by an improper motive. Instead. the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty was applied.

Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a
Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough and substantial discussions of the
issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that
the case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the
procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165.10 
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements the law, defines chain of custody as-
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made
in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.11  
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.12  To establish a chain of custody
sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational
basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.13  In
other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from
which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the
government claims it to be.14  Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-
established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not
readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination,
courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item
with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.15 This was
adopted in Mallillin v. People,16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain
of custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the
investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.18

Seizure and marking of the illegal

drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Sec. 21.  Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other
modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
phyical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No.
10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence
acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the
ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and
also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance
with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media
representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines, especially in
more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected barangay officials
themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended. "22 In addition, "[t]he
requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very limiting.
Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."23

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial
number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the
prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain
adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its]
standard implementation."24  In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and
powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have
the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law
enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to
comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory
and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We

did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons
required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the
preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where
the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where
the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal
drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective
measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it
more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to
technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the
seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforement officers could
justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend
the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people
or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should
not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a
public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official
is afraid or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated
items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security
of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized
are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who
have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not
one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him
the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked
the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the
marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27  To ensure that they were
not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one
that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-
RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the
DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items.29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:30

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive
duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial
proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations
from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be
adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on
evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do
not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn
affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of
the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal
drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or
alteration of evidence.31
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to
reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2)their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any
person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves
were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the
threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and
urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be
proven. People v. Ramos33requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render
the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the
Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in
contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is
to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent
actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non- compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest -
to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with
the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are
compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials
arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it
unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the
inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and
there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort
to contact them.36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the
barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the confidential
information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was
no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-
bust team to secure the presence of a barangay official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO: 
 
xxxx
Q  x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official
to witness the operation?
A  There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information.38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his
Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a
DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an
earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They
also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the
representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten
(10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in the house.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved
applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation
but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national
penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or
those by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to
a lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and
the arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to
illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest
proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody
Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in
the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the
steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated
items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA
pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be
presented.39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from
the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related
cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state

their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers

must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have
taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn

statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further
preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable
cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant
of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance
with Section 5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013
Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y  Miranda guilty
of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and
Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, for immediate implementation. The said
Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
as well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police, the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office
of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all
trial courts, including the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe,  Tijam, Reyes, A., Jr.,
Gesmundo, and Reyes, Jr. J., JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., On wellness leave
Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., See separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action.

September 21, 2018

N O T I C E  O F  J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on September 26, 2018 at 4:05 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
 On wellness leave.

**
 No part.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo B. Martin, with Associate Justices Romulo V.
Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-19; CA rollo, pp. 86-102.

2
 Records, pp. 117-125; CA rollo, pp. 32-40.

3
 Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 3-4.

4
 Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1074), pp. 3-4.

5
 Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 19-20; records (Criminal Case No. 2010-
1074), pp. 20-22.

6
Id. at 2.

7
 Spelled as "Bajar" in the Request for Laboratory Examination on Drug Evidence (See
Records of Criminal Case No. 2010-1073 [pp. 9-10] and Criminal Case No. 2010-1074
[p. 9A]).
8
 Records (Criminal Case No. 2010-1073), pp. 124-125; CA rollo, pp. 39-40.

9
 Rollo, pp. 26-35.

10
 R.A. No. 9165 took effect on July 4, 2002 (See People v. De la Cruz, 591 Phil. 259,
272 [2008]).

11
 See People v. Badilla,  794 Phil. 263, 278 (2016); People v. Arenas, 791 Phil. 601,
610 (2016); and Saraum v. People,  779 Phil. 122, 132 (2016).

12
  United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73 (2010).

13
  United States v. Rawlins, supra note 12, as cited in United States v. Mehmood, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 19232 (2018); United States v. De Jesus-Concepcion, 652 Fed. Appx.
134 (2016); United States v. Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35215 (2015);
and United States v. Mark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95130 (2012).

14
 See United States v. Rawlins, supra note 12, as cited in United States v. Mark,
supra note 13.

15
 See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (1989), as cited in United States v.
Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (2011); United States v. Solis, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1182
(1999); United States v. Anderson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9193 (1994); United States
v. Hogg, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13732 (1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983
F.2d 1563 (1993); United States v. Johnson,  977 F.2d 1360 (1992); and United States
v. Clonts,966 F.2d 1366 (1992).

16
  Mallillin v. People,  576 Phil.576 (2008).

17
  Mallillin v. People, supra, at 587, as cited in People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 208643,
December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 203, 228-229; People v. Badilla, supra note 11, at
280; Saraum v. People, supra note 11, at 132-133; People v. Dalawis, 772 Phil. 406,
417-418 (2015); and People v. Flores, 765 Phil. 535, 541-542 (2015). It appears
that Mallillin  was erroneously cited as "Lopez v. People"   inPeople v. De la Cruz, 589
Phil. 259 (2008), People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214 (2008), People v. Garcia,599 Phil.
416 (2009), People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2009), and People v. Abelarde,G.R.
No. 215713, January 22, 2018.

18
People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018; People v.
Amaro, 786 Phil. 139, 148 (2016); and People v. Enad, 780 Phil. 346, 358 (2016).

19
 See People v. Sic-Open, 795 Phil. 859, 872 (2016); People v. Badilla, supra note 11,
at 275 276; People v. De la Cruz, 783 Phil. 620, 632 (2016); People v. Asislo,  778 Phil.
509, 516 (2016); People v. Dalawis, supra note 17, at 416; and People v. Flores,
supra note 17, at 540.

20
  People v. Sic-Open, supra note 19, at 873; People v. Badilla, supra  note 11, at
276; People v. De la Cruz, supra note 19, at 633; People v. Asislo, supra note 19, at
516-517; People v. Dalawis, supra  note 17, at 417; and People v. Flores, supra  note
17, at 541.

21
 Senate Journal. Session No. 80. 16th Congress, 1st Regular Session. June 4, 2014. p.
348.

22
  Id

23
Id.

24
Id at 349.

25
Id. at 349-350.

26
 See People v. Mola,  G.R. No. 226481, April l8, 2018.

27
 TSN, June 2, 2011, pp. 25-28.

28
Id. at 17-19.

29
 Under the original provision of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and
confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct
a physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and
(4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. As amended by R.A. No. 10640, it is now mandated that
the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official
and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (See People v.
Ocampo, G.R. No. 232300, August, 2018; People v. Allingag, G.R. No. 233477, July 30,
2018; People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, supra note 18; People v. Reyes,G.R. No.
219953, Apri123, 2018; and People v. Mola, supra note 26).
30
Supra note 18.

31
 See also People v. Reyes, supra  note 29 and People v. Mota, supra note 26.

32
People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, supra note 18. See also People v. Reyes,
supra note 29. and People v. Mola, supra  note 26.

33
 G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018. (Citations omitted).

34
 See also People v. Crespo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018 and People v.
Sanchez,   G.R. No. 231383, March 7, 2018. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

35
 TSN, June 2, 2011, p.l9.

36
 TSN, August 5, 2011, p. 13.
37
Id.  at 15.

38
Id.  at 14-15.

39
 See People v. Alvarado, G.R. No. 234048, April 23, 2018 and People v.
Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23,2017.

40
 SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court.  -Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

CONCURRING OPINION 

LEONEN, J.:

The failure of law enforcement officers to comply with the chain of custody
requirements spelled out in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended, coupled with a failure
to show justifiable grounds for their non compliance engenders reasonable doubt on the
guilt of persons from whom illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia were supposedly
seized. Acquittal must then ensue. This is especially true in arrests and seizures
occasioned by buy-bust operations, which, by definition, are preplanned, deliberately
arranged or calculated operations.

Asserting proper compliance with chain of custody requirements and the ensuing
acquittal of an accused due to the law enforcement officers' unjustified non-compliance-
is not a matter of calibrating jurisprudence. It is merely a matter of applying the clear
text of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

I concur that the accused-appellant, Romy Lim, must be acquitted on account of

reasonable doubt.

I
Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133,
Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite quantum of proof:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty.

Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not
demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from
benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises
from a constitutional imperative:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused,
relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the
defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in
the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to
be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the
constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution."
Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course,
that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.
This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled
to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree
of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for
the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must
rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The
burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the
accused to prove his innocence.1

II

The requisites that must be satisfied to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are settled.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti  or the illicit drug as evidence.2 (Emphasis in
the original, citation omitted )
On the second element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, spells out requirements for the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Section 21 (1) to (3) stipulate requirements concerning custody prior to
the filing of a criminal case:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
of the seized items and photograph the same  in the  presenceof the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,  with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or tile media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally,  That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject
iterm/s: Provided,  That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally
issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon
completion of the said examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied )

People v. Nandi3  thus, summarized that four (4) links "should be established in the
chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,  the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third,  the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."4
People v. Morales y  Midarasa5 explained that "failure to comply with Paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the
prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti[.]"6 It "produce[s] doubts as to
the origins of the [seized paraphernalia]."7

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.

Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics

may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through
methods that exceed human sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units
and screening devices) are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs.
The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration
and substitution. It also makes conducive the planting of evidence. In Mallillin v.
People8
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as
in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could
have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by
accident or otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied,  a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of
the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.9 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Holgado, et al.,10 recognized that:
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement ... ensures the integrity of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the
quantity (e.g.,  weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the
substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth,
the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in
possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses
opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. "11
When the identity of corpus delicti  is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21,
the second element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It
follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People v. 
Lorenzo:12
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if  there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.13 (Emphasis supplied )
III

As against the objective requirements imposed by statute, guarantees coming from the
prosecution concerning the identity and integrity of seized items are naturally designed
to advance the prosecution's own cause. These guarantees conveniently aim to knock
two targets with one blow. First, they insist on a showing of corpus delicti divorced
from statutory impositions and based on standards entirely the prosecution's own.
Second, they justify non-compliance by summarily pleading their own assurance. These
self-serving assertions cannot justify a conviction.

Even the customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties

cannot suffice. People v. Kamad14 explained that the presumption of regularity applies
only when officers have shown compliance with "the standard conduct of official duty
required by law[.] "15 It is not a justification for dispensing with such compliance:
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the
seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of
an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof The presumption applies when
nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face,
the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts
were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the
seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious
doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the
gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which
the accused must be acquitted.

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with
moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the
perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence
that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case,
the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a
ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.16 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted )
Jurisprudence has thus been definite on the consequence of non compliance. This Court
has categorically stated that whatever presumption there is concerning the regularity of
the manner by which officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items is
"negate[d]":17
In People v. Orteza, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the conviction of the
therein accused for failure of the police officers to observe the procedure laid down
under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law, thus:
First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with
the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, 
i.e.,  any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried
and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt
whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.

....
IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the
object evidence-shabu was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity
accorded to acts undertaken by police officers  in the pursuit of their official
duties.18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less thari strict compliance.
Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised.
Precisely, deviations from it leave open the door for tampering, substitution and
planting of evidence.

Even the performance of acts which approximate compliance but do not strictly comply

with the Section 21 has been considered insufficient. People v. Magat,19 for example,
emphasized the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized: "Marking
of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear
and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165":20
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of the R.A. No. 9165, shows that
this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper
procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the
Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979 amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.

In People v. Laxa,  the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the appellant. One
policeman even admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for
the first time in the police headquarters. The Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti.

Similarly, in People v. Kimura, the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the

alleged seized marijuana on the night the accused were arrested and to observe the
procedure in the seizure and custody of the drug as embodied in the aforementioned
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Consequently, we held that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

In Zaragga v. People, involving a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the police failed to place
markings on the alleged seized shabu immediately after the accused were
apprehended. The buy-bust team also failed to prepare an inventory of the seized drugs
which accused had to sign, as required by the same Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 3, Series of 1979. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.
In all the foregoing cited cases, the Court acquitted the appellants due to the failure of
law enforcers to observe the procedures prescribed in Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974,
which are similar to the procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Marking of the
seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and
unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic
sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not
indubitably shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized
drugs in the presence of appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to
whether the substances seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to
laboratory examination and presented in court.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as
in fact they have to be subjected to scientific analysis to determine their composition
and nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the jurisprudential safeguards in
the present law in an unequivocal language to prevent any tampering, alteration or
substitution, by accident or otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused
to be presumed innocent, can do no less than apply the present law which prescribes a
more stringent standard in handling evidence than that applied to criminal cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable.

R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon  file law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of
custody of the seized drugs to ensure the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thru proper
exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, the identity of the seized drugs is
insulated from doubt from their confiscation up to their presentation in
court .21 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

IV

The precision required in the custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia is affirmed
by the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640.

The differences between Section 21(1) as originally stated and as amended are shown
below:

    
Republic Act No. 9165   Republic Act No . 10640  
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
Instruments/Paraphernalia  and/or Laboratory and Essential Chemicals,
Equipment.  Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - 
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous The PDEA shall take charge and have
drugs, controlled precursors and essential custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, precursors and essential chemicals, as well
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
in the following manner:  laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody disposition in the following manner:
and control of the drugs
(1) The apprehending team having initial
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,  custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and
physically inventory  essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
and photograph the same  laboratory equipment  

in the presence of the accused or the person/s shall, immediately after seizure and
from whom such items were confiscated and/or confiscation,  
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, 
conduct a physical inventory of the seized
a representative from the media and the items  
Department of Justice (DOJ),  and any elected
public official  and photograph the same 

who shall be required to sign the copies of the in the presence of the accused or the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;   person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and /or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, 

with an elected public official and a

representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media 

who shall be required to sign the copies of

the inventory and be given a copy thereof; 

Provided, That the physical inventory and

photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure; 

Provided, finally, That noncompliance of

these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the
 evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.  

Section 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by Republic Act No.
10640.

It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No.
9165, the use of the conjunctive 'and' indicated that Section 21 required the presence
of all of the following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":

First, a representative from the media;

Second, representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and

Third, any elected public official.

As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive 'or' (i.e.,
"with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or  the media"). Thus, a representative from the media and a representative
from the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.

Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a specification of locations where the physical
inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted (n.b., it uses the mandatory
"shall"). It now includes the following proviso:22
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,  in case of warrantless
seizures. (Emphasis supplied )
Lescano v. People23 summarizes Section 21(1)'s requirements:
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2)
actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and
where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure
and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a
search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and
photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served.
In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable."

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the
physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the
person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and
third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however,
alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s
from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her
representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National
Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place.24

Set against the strict requirements of Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165,25 this
case screams of glaring infringements.

"the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same"

The prosecution's witnesses gave contradicting testimonies on the place where the
physical inventory was conducted. Intelligence Officer 1 Albert Orellan (Officer Orellan),
the arresting officer, testified that he marked the seized items in the house of Romy
Lim:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] ) 
Q How did you know that the one bought and the one searched were not interchanged?
A I marked the item I recovered from Romy Lim, Sir.
Q  Where did you mark it Mr. Witness, in what place? 
A At their house, Sir.26 (Emphasis supplied )

Meanwhile, Intelligence Officer 1 Nestle N. Carin (Officer Carin), the poseur-buyer, and
Intelligence Officer 2 Vincent Cecil Orcales (Officer Orcales), the team leader of the
buy-bust operation, both testified that the inventory and marking happened in their
office.
Because I was present, sir.
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin] )
Q You said that Romy Lim handed the sachet of shabu to you, what happened to that sachet of
shabu, Ms. Witness?
A I turned over it (sic) to IOl Orellan during the inventory.
Q Where did he conduct the inventory?
A At our office.
Q Where?
A At the PDEA Office, sir.
Q ... How did you know that?
A Because I was there sir, during the inventory.
Q Then, what did he do with the sachet of shabu Ms. Witness? 
A He put a marking.
Q How did you know?
A Because I was present, sir.[27 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (To the witness [Officer Orcales] )
Q How did Agent Orellan handle the evidence? The drugs he recovered and the buy-bust
item? And what did he do with it?
A  He made an inventory. 
 Q  How about the marking? 
A  He made markings on it.
Q  How did you know? 
A I supervised them.
Q And where did Agent Orellan made the inventory? 
A In the office.28  (Emphasis supplied)

Surprisingly, Officer Carin's testimony was corroborated by Officer Orellan in his

Affidavit when he narrated that they "brought the arrested suspects in [their] office and
conducted inventory."29

The taking of pictures was likewise not made immediately after seizure and
confiscation. In their separate testimonies, Officers Orellan and Carin stated:
Pros. Vicente: (continuing to the witness (Officer Orellan]) 
Q  What else did you do at the office, Mr. Witness, did you take pictures?
A  We asked them of their real identity Sir the two of them, and then we took pictures together
with the evidence seized from them.
Court:
These pictures IO1 Orellan were taken at the office?
A  Yes,  Your Honor.
Court:
No pictures at the house of the accused?
A None,  Your Honor.30 (Emphasis supplied)
ACP VICENTE, JR.: (continuing to the witness [Officer Carin])
. . . . 
Q Aside from markings what else did you do at the office?
A I took pictures during the inventory .31  (Emphasis supplied)
Although Officer Orcales testified that he took pictures "[i]in the house and also in the
office, "32 the only pictures in the records of the case were those taken in the PDEA
office.33

During cross-examination, Officer Carin reiterated that the inventory and the taking of
photographs were done in their office and not in Romy Lim's house.34

"in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ),  and  any elected public official

Moreover, not one of the third persons required by Section 21(1) prior to its
amendment-"a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and  any elected public official"-was present during the physical inventory and
taking of photographs. Instead, only accused-appellant Romy Lim and accused Eldie
Gorres were present.

"who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof'

Since not one of the three required personalities were present during the operation, the
inventory was not signed. Even the two accused were not given a chance to sign the
shabu sachets that were allegedly found in their possession:
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan]) 
Q In this Inventory, no signature ofthe two accused?  
A The accused did not sign, Sir.
Q Not also sign[ed] by a man from the DOJ? 
A Yes, Sir.
Q Also from the media? 
A None, Sir.
Q  Also by an elected official? 
A None, Sir.35

These infringements are fatal errors. The police operatives' conduct failed to dispel all
reasonable doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly obtained from accused-
appellant. The buy-bust team failed to account for the handling and safeguarding of the
shabu from the moment it was purportedly taken from accused-appellant.

What is critical, however, is not the conduct of an inventory per se. Rather, it is the
certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused are the exact same items
ultimately adduced as evidence before courts. People v. Nandi36 requires the ensuring of
four (4) links in the custody of seized items: from the accused to the apprehending
officers; from the apprehending officers to investigating officers; from investigating
officers to forensic chemists; and, from forensic chemists to courts. The endpoints in
each link (e.g.,  the accused and the apprehending officer in the first link, the forensic
chemist and the court in the fourth link) are preordained. What is precarious is not each
of these end points but the transitions or transfers of seized items from one point to
another.

Section 21(1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof.
Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where
the seizure was done (or at a location as practicably close to it) minimizes, if not
eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence. The presence of the
accused (or a representative) and of third-party witnesses, coupled with their
attestations on the written inventory, ensures that the items delivered to the
investigating officer are the items which have actually been inventoried.

The prosecution's case could have benefitted from the presence of the third-party
witnesses required by Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Indeed, the requirement that the inventory and photographing be done "immediately
after the seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that the required witnesses must
also be present during the seizure or confiscation. People v. Mendoza37 confirms this
and characterized the presence of these witnesses as an "insulating presence [against]
the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination ":38
The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the
requirements of Section 21(1) ... were dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned.
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of
the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence
that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence
herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.39
In blatant disregard of statutory requirements, not one of the three (3) insulating
witnesses required by Section 21(1) was shown to be present during the arrest,
seizure, physical inventory and taking of pictures.

The Court should not lose sight of how accused-appellant's apprehension was
supposedly occasioned by a buy-bust operation. This operation was allegedly prompted
by anterior information supplied by an unidentified confidential informant.40 Acting on
the information, Regional Director Lt. Col. Edwin Layese supposedly organized a ten-
person buy-bust team41 and briefed them on the operation. Thereafter, the team claims
to have managed to prepare the P500.00 bill buy-bust money, a Coordination Form,
and other documents.42 All these happened from the time they were informed by their
confidential informant at 8:00pm up to the time they were dispatched for the operation
at around 9:45 pm.43

While the team managed to secure preliminaries, it utterly failed at observing Section
21(1)'s requirements. Certainly, if the buy-bust team was so fastidious at preparatory
tasks, it should have been just as diligent with observing specific statutory demands
that our legal system has long considered to be critical in securing convictions. It could
not have been bothered to even have one third-party witness present.

With the buy-bust team's almost two-hour briefing period and the preparation of the
necessary documents, the prosecution appears to have been diligently prepared. How
the buy-bust team can be so lax in actually carrying out its calculated operation can
only raise suspicions. That diligence is the most consummate reason for not condoning
the buy-bust team's inadequacies.

The prosecution likewise failed to account for the third link-from the investigating
officers to the forensic chemists. Officer Orellan testified that he did not know the
person who received the seized items from him in the crime laboratory.
Atty. Demecillo: (continuing to the witness [Officer Orellan] ) 
Q  Who was the person who received the drugs you delivered in the crime lab?
A  I cannot exactly remember who was that officer who received that request Sir but I am sure
that he is one of the personnel of the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q You know Forensic Chemist Charity Peralta Caceres?
A  I only heard her name to be one of the forensic chemists in the crime lab, Sir.
Q  Usually you have not seen her?
A I saw her but we were not friends, Sir.
Q  But that evening of October 20, she was not the very person who received the sachet of
shabu for examination?
A  Only the receiving clerk, Sir.
Q Not personally Caceres? 
A No, Sir.
Q  After delivering these sachets of shabu, you went home? 
A I went back to our office, Sir.
Q  From there, you did not know anymore what happened to the sachet of shabu you delivered
 for examination?
A I don't know, Sir.44
His statements were corroborated by the testimony of Officer Orcales who stated that
he was with Officer Orellan when the latter gave the seized items to the crime
laboratory personnel. He confirmed that the person who received it was not Chemist
Caceres and that he did not know who it was.45

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may
not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant.
The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-appellant.

VI

Section 21(1), as amended, now also includes a proviso that leaves room for
noncompliance under "justifiable grounds":
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds,  as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
This proviso was taken from the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value ofthe seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution
must identify and prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show that, despite non-
compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the prosecution must establish that
positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The prosecution cannot rely
on broad justifications and sweeping guarantees that the integrity and evidentiary value
of seized items were preserved.

The prosecution presented the following reasons of the buy-bust team as "justifiable
grounds" why they failed to have the required witnesses present during their operation:
First, the operation was conducted late at night; Second, it was raining during their
operation; Third, it was unsafe for the team "to wait at Lim's house "46; Fourth, they
exerted effort to contact the barangay officials and a media representative to no
avail.47 The Ponencia added that "[t]he time constraints and the urgency of the police
action understandably prevented the law enforcers from ensuring the attendance of the
required witnesses, who were not improbably at a more pressing engagement when
their presence was requested. "48 According to the Ponencia, "there was no genuine and
sufficient attempt to comply with the law. "49

I join Justice Diosdado Peralta m finding these explanations inadequate.

First, the testimony of team-leader Officer Orcales negates any allegation of effort that
the buy-bust team made to secure the presence of a barangay official in their
operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO: (To the witness [Officer Orcales])
      
. . . . 
Q Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official to
witness the operation?
A  There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.
Q  Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information.50

Assuming that the buy-bust team has reason not to trust the barangay officials, they
could have contacted any other elected official. The presence of barangay officials is not
particularly required. What Section 21(1) requires is the presence of any  elected
officiaL

Second, the prosecution failed to explain why they did not contact a representative of
the Department of Justice. Officer Orellan, in his Affidavit, mentioned that they only
tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media.51 The testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses were bereft of any statement that could show that they tried to
contact a representative of the Department of Justice-one of the three required
witnesses.

Third, the buy-bust team did not specifically state the kind of effort they made in trying
to contact the required witnesses. A general statement that they exerted earnest effort
to coordinate with them is not enough. They should narrate the steps they carried out
in getting the presence of a Department of Justice representative, a media
representative, and an elected official. Otherwise, it will be easy to abuse non-
compliance with Section 21(1) since a sweeping statement of "earnest effort" is enough
justify non-compliance.

Fourth, the prosecution failed to state the basis why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in
waiting for the representatives in Lim's house. To reiterate, they were composed of at
least ten members. They outnumber the two accused, who were the only persons in the
house. They were able to control the accused's movement when they ordered them "to
put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor."52 Moreover, when frisked, the
agents did not find any concealed weapon in the body of the two accused. How the
PDEA agents could have felt "unsafe" in this situation is questionable, at the very least.

Finally, there was no urgency involved and, certainly, the team was not under any time
limit in conducting the buy-bust operation and in apprehending the accused-appellant.
As pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Reflections, there could
have been no urgency or time constraint considering that the supposed sale of drugs
happened at Lim's house.53 The team knew exactly where the sale happens. They could
have conducted their operation in another day-not late at night or when it was raining-
and with the presence of the required witnesses. This could have also allowed them to
conduct surveillance to confirm the information they received that accused-appellant
was indeed selling illegal drugs.
As farcical as the buy-bust team's excuses are, it would be equally farcical for us to
condone it.

VII

The prosecution offers nothing more than sweeping excuses and self serving
assurances. It would have itself profit from the buy-bust team's own inadequacies. We
cannot be a party to this profligacy.

Rather than rely on the courts' licentious tolerance and bank on favorable
accommodations, our police officers should be exemplary. They should adhere to the
highest standards, consistently deliver commendable results, and remain beyond
reproach. Section 21's requirements are but a bare minimum. Police officers should be
more than adept at satisfying them.

At stake are some of the most sacrosanct pillars of our constitutional order and justice
system: due process, the right to be presumed innocent, the threshold of proof beyond
reasonable doubt and the duty of the prosecution to build its case upon its own merits.
We cannot let these ideals fall by the wayside, jettisoned in favor of considerations of
convenience and to facilitate piecemeal convictions for ostensible wrongdoing.

Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt hearkens to our individual consciences. I

cannot accept that the severe consequences arising from criminal conviction will be
meted upon persons whose guilt could have clearly been established by police officers'
mere adherence to a bare minimum. Certainly, it is not too much to ask that our law
enforcement officers observe what the law mandates. The steps we now require
outlined in the able ponencia of my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado Peralta is
definitely a step forward.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the Decision dated February 23, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Romy Lim y Miranda must be ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Endnotes:

1
 Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 213-214 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division], citing CONST,  I (1987), Art. III, Sec. 1; CONST, (1987), Art. III, Sec.
14(2); People of the Philippines v. Solayao,  330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996) [Per J. Romero,
Second Division]; and Basilio v. People of the Philippines, 591 Phil. 508, 521-522
(2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

2
 People v. Morales y  Midarasa, 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per. J  Del Castillo, Second
Division].

3
 639 Phil. 134 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

4
 Id. at 144-145, citing People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289,304 (2010) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
5
 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

6
 Id. at 229.

7
 People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156, 170 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division], as cited
in People v. Orteza, 555 Phil. 700, 708 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

8
 576 Phil.576 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

9
 Id. at 588-589.

10
 741 Phil. 8 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

11
 Id. at 93.

12
 633 Phil. 393 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].

13
 Id. at 403.

14
 624 Phil. 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

15
 Id. at 311.

16
 Id.

17
  People v. Navarrete, 665 Phil. 738, 749 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third
Division]. See also People v. Ulat, 674 Phil. 484, 500 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-De
Castro, First Division].

18
People v. Navarrete, 665 Phil.738, 748-749 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third
Division].

19
 588 Phil. 95 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
20
 Id. at 405.

21
 Id at 403-406.

22
 This is not entirely novel. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165 already I stated it. Nevertheless, even if it has been previously stated
elsewhere, it now takes on a greater significance . It is no longer expressed merely in
an administrative rule, but in a statute.

23
 778 Phil. 60 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

24
 Id. at 475.

25
 The buy-bust operation was conducted in 2010.
26
 TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 17-18.

27
 TSN dated July 22, 2011, pp. 10-12.

28
 TSN dated August 5, 20ll, p.l3.

29
 RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 5, Affidavit of Arresting Officer.

30
 TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 21-30.

31
 TSN dated July 22, 2011, pp. 10-l2.

32
 TSN dated August 5, 2011, p. 13.

33
 RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 18, and RTC records (Crim. Case No.
2010-1074), p. 16.

34
 TSN dated August 5, 2011, p. 17.

35
 TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 28-29.

36
 639 Phil. 134, 144 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

37
  People v. Mendoza,  736 Phil. 749 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

38
 Id. at 764.

39
 Id.

40
Ponencia, p. 3.

41
 Id.; TSN dated June 2, 2011, p. 8. In Officer Orellan's testimony, he stated that aside
from himself, the buy-bust team was composed of "Regional Director Layese, Deputy
Director Atila, ... IO1 Carin, IO2 Alfaro, IOl Genita , IO1 Avila, IO2 Orcales, IA2 Pica ,
IO1 Cardona[.]"

42
 Id.

43
 Id.

44
 TSN dated June 2, 2011, pp. 36-37.

45
 TSN dated August 5, 20ll, p.l6.

46
  Ponencia,  p. 14.

47
 Id.

48
 Id.
49
 Id.

50
 TSN dated August 5, 2011, pp. 14-15.

51
 RTC records (Crim. Case No. 2010-1073), p. 5, Affidavit of Arresting Officer.

52
  Ponencia,  p. 3.

53
 J. Caguioa's Reflections, p. 2.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur.

I agree with the ponencia that accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) should be

acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken link in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs supposedly seized from him.

The facts are simple:

On October 19, 2010, at around 8:00 p.m., Intelligence Officer 1 Albert Orellan (IO1
Orellan) and his team were at the Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) when they received information from a confidential informant (CI) that
Lim had engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in his house at Zone 7, Cabina,
Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. The team immediately prepared to conduct a buy-bust
operation and coordinated with the nearest police station. They then left to conduct the
buy-bust operation and reached the target area at around 10:00 p.m., or two hours
after they received the information from the CI.

Upon reaching the target area, the poseur-buyer and the CI knocked at the door of
Lim's house. Eldie Gorres (Gorres), Lim's stepson, came out and invited them to enter.
Inside the house, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television while the
supposed sale of shabu happened between Gorres and the poseur-buyer. After the
supposed consummation of the sale, the police officers barged into the house and
arrested Lim and Gorres. The two were then prosecuted for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.

At the outset, it is important to stress that jurisprudence is well-settled that in all

prosecutions for violation ofR.A. 9165, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous
drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs, they being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.1 What is material is
the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti.2  Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and
establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed.3
In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti  that the
procedure provided in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is followed. The said section provides:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted
to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24)
hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
Furthermore, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. 9165 (IRR) filled in the details as to where the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items could be done: i.e., at the place of seizure, at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, thus:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a)  The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
 immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation in
the presence of the accused, with (l) an elected public official, (2) a representative of
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In buy-bust situations, or warrantless arrests, the physical inventory and photographing

are allowed to be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. But even in these alternative
places, such inventory and photographing are still required to be done in the presence
of the accused and the aforementioned witnesses.

I submit that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be
made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not
practicable can the inventory and photographing then be done as soon as the
apprehending team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office. There can
be no other meaning to the plain import of this requirement. By the same token,
however, this also means that the required witnesses should already be physically
present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. Simply put, the apprehending team has enough time and opportunity to bring
with them said witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing are allowed to be done
"at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures," this does not dispense with
the requirement of having all the required witnesses to be physically present at the
time or near the place of apprehension. The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest -
or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" - that the presence of the three
witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting
evidence.

The presence of the witnesses at the place and time of arrest and seizure is required
because " [w]hile buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that x x x by the very
nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures x x x the ease
with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands
of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great."4

In this connection, it is well to point out that recent jurisprudence is clear that
the procedure enshrined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.5 For indeed,
however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal
drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.

Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,6 without the insulating presence
of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination
of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachets that were
evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused.7

Thus, it is compliance with this most fhndamental requirement - the presence of the
"insulating" witnesses - that the pernicious practice of planting of evidence is greatly
minimized if not foreclosed altogether. Stated otherwise, this is the first and foremost
requirement provided by Section 21 to ensure the preservation of the "integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs" in a buy-bust situation whose nature, as already
explained, is that it is a planned operation.

To reiterate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation
of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless
arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the
arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of
the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
representative of the DOJ, the media representative, and the elected public official,
when they could easily do so - and "calling them in" to the police station to witness the
inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already
been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses
prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs. I thuencourage the Court to send a
strong message that faithful compliance with this most important requirement bringing
them to a place near the intended place of arrest - should be strictly complied with.

In this regard, showing how the drugs transferred hands from the accused to the
poseur-buyer, from the poseur-buyer to the investigator and from the investigator to
the crime laboratory - much like in this case - without showing compliance with the
inventory and photographing as witnessed by the three required witnesses is not
enough to ensure the integrity of the seized drugs. Indeed, without such witnessing,
the drugs could already have been planted - an d the marking, and the transfer from
one to another (as usually testified to by the apprehending officers) only proves the
chain of custody of planted drugs.

I am not unaware that there is now a saving clause in Section 21, introduced by R.A.
10640, which is the portion that states: "noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."

The requirements referred to that need not be complied with if there are justifiable
grounds are only in respect of the conduct of the physical inventory and the
photographing in the presence of the accused, with an elected public official, and a
representative of the DOJ, and the media who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Again, the plain language of this last proviso in Section 21 of R.A. 10640 simply means
that the failure of the apprehending officer/team to physically inventory and photograph
the drugs at the place of arrest and/or to have the DOJ or media representative and
elected public official witness the same can be excused (i.e.,  these shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items) so long as there are justifiable
grounds for not complying with these requirements and "as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team."

Thus, it has been held that, as a general rule, strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 is mandatory.8 The Court may allow noncompliance with the requirement
only in exceptional cases,9 where the following requisites are present: (1) the existence
of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.10 If these two elements are present, the seizures and custody over
the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

It has also been emphasized that for the saving clause to be triggered, the prosecution
must first recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and justify the
same.11 Breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21 committed by the police
officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti  had been compromised.12

In cases involving procedural lapses of the police officers, proving the identity of
the corpus delicti despite noncompliance with Section 21 requires the saving clause to
be successfully triggered.

For this purpose, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged requirement:
first, credibly justify the noncompliance, and second, show that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved. 13 This
interpretation on when the saving clause is triggered is not novel. In Valencia v.
People,14 the Court held:
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, the
prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified
by the State's agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should
they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the
reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would
merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting
officers at their own convenience.15 (Citations omitted)
In the case of People v. Barte,16 the Court pronounced that the State has the duty to
credibly explain the noncompliance of the provisions of Section 21:
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody
in the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the
obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus
delicti is doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.17
In People v. Ismael,18  the accused was acquitted because "the prosecution failed to:
(1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys; (2) prove
the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs; and (4) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were
not complied with."19

Likewise, in People v. Reyes20:

Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a
saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every case of noncompliance
with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably
prejudice the Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the application of
this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or
lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be
the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did not concede
such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or explanation for
them. The failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion
about the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. With the chain of
custody having been compromised, the accused deserves acquittal. x x x21  (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Conformably with these disquisitions, I thus express my full support over the institution
by the ponencia  of the following mandatory policies before a case for violation of R.A.
9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, may be filed:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers

must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing

officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the
steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn

statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file
 the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for
further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence
of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court
may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order
(or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable
cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.22

To my mind, the Court, through the said policies, actually achieves two laudable
objectives, namely: (1) ensuring that the cases filed before the courts are not poorly
prepared, thus ultimately leading to the decongestion of court dockets, and (2) further
protection of the citizens from fabricated suits.

In connection with the case at hand, I therefore fully concur with the ponencia  as it
acquits Lim of the crime charged. In particular, I wholly agree with the ponencia  as it
holds that the explanations put forth by the apprehending team -that it was late at
night, it was raining, and that there were simply no available elected official and
representatives from the media and DOJ despite their unsubstantiated claim that they
exerted efforts to contact them - are simply unacceptable.

As the ponencia itself pointed out, "[i]t must be alleged and proved that the presence
of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug
seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:"23
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2)
their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by
an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought
to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who
face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints nd
urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.24
Verily, none of the above reasons - or any such justifications similar to the
aforementioned - wa s present in this case.

It is important to note that (1) the report of the CI came in around 8:00 p.m.; (2) the
police officers immediately arranged a buy-bust operation; and (3) they arrived at Lim's
house at about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. While the vigor exerted by the police
officers was commendable, it must be pointed out that Lim was supposedly selling
drugs at his house. In fact, Lim "was sitting on the sofa while watching the television"
when the CI and the poseur-buyer arrived. There was thus no issue with regard to
urgency and time constraints, as Lim was not a flight risk nor was his supposed
commission of the crime bound to a limited period oftime. To reiterate, Lim was
supposedly continuously committing the crime at his own residence. The police
officers could have, for instance, proceeded with the operation the following day when
the presence of the three witnesses - as required by law - could have been obtained.
At this point, it is imperative to discuss that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers could not justify the police officers'
noncompliance with the requirements of law. Verily, the said presumption could not
supply the acts which were not done by the police officers. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties is simply that - a presumption - which can be
overturned if evidence is presented to prove that the public officers were not properly
performing their duty or they were inspired by improper motive.25  It is not uncommon,
therefore that cases will rely on the presumption when there is no showing of improper
motive on the part of the police.

To my mind, however, notwithstanding a lack of showing of improper motive, the

presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty.26  As applied to drugs cases, I believe that the presumption shall only arise when
there is a showing that the apprehending officer/team followed the requirements of
Section 21, or when the saving clause is successfully triggered.

Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is
fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs
ofirregularity.27  In People v. Enriquez,28 the Court held:
x x x [A]ny divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of
the said conditions, the non compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts
reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.29 (Emphasis supplied )
Thus, in case of noncompliance with Section 21, the Court cannot rely on the
presumption of regularity to say that the guilt of the accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt. The discussion in People v. Sanchez30is instructive:
The court apparently banked also on the presumption of regularity in the performance
that a police officer like SPO2 Sevilla enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity
and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony. Admittedly, the defense
did not adduce any evidence showing that SPO2 Sevilla had any motive to falsify. The
regularity of the performance of his duties, however, leaves much to be desired given
the lapses in his handling of the allegedly confiscated drugs as heretofore shown.

An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People,  is to negate the presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. There can be no ifs and buts regarding this consequence considering the
effect of the evidentiary presumption of regularity on the constitutional presumption of
innocence.31  (Citation omitted)
What further militates against according the police the presumption of regularity is the
fact that even the pertinent internal guidelines of the police (some as early as 1999,
predating R.A. 9165) require photographing and inventory during the conduct of a buy-
bust operation.

Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual32 (PNPDEM), the
conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:

ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

xxxx

V. SPECIFIC RULES

x x xx

B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led )

1. Buy-Bust Operation in the conduct ofbuy-bust operation, the following are the
procedures to be observed:

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed[;]

c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be made;

d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided[;]

e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance:

f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t]
hold of the same and his palm/s contaminated with the powder before giving the pre-
arranged signal and arresting the suspects;

g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements must

clearly and actually observe the negotiation/transaction between suspect and the
poseur-buyer;

h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of
deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or in a place within arms[']
reach;

i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other
concealed evidence or deadly weapon;

j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having been
secured with handcuffs;

k. Take actual inventorv of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or

physical counting, as the case may be;

I. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidence for issuance to the

possessor (suspect) thereof;

m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian
must mark the evidence with their initials and also indicate the date, time and place
the evidence was confiscated/seized;

n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the

inventory, especially during weighing, and if possible under existing
conditions, the registered weight of the evidence on the scale must be focused
by the camera; and

o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence
bag or in appropriate container and thereafter deliver the same to the PNP CLG for
laboratory examination. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Chapter 4, Rule 37 of the 2013 Revised Philippine National Police (PNP) Operational
Procedures33 applicable during the pre-amendment of Section 21 provides:

37.3 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Evidence

a. In the handling, custody and disposition of evidence, the provision of

Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR shall be strictly observed.

b. The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
personls from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

c. The physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place

where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

d. Photographs of the pieces of evidence must be taken upon discovery

without moving or altering its position in the place where it was situated,
kept or hidden, including the process of recording the inventory and the
weighing of dangerous drugs, and if possible under existing conditions,
with the registered weight of the evidence on the scale focused by the
camera, in the presence of persons required, as provided under Section
21, Art II, RA 9165. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, the Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation and Investigation34 
(2014 AIDSOTF Manual) similarly requires strict compliance with the provisions:
Section 2-6 Handling, Custody and Disposition of Drug and Non-Drug Evidence

2.33 During handling, custody and disposition of evidence, provisions of

Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR as amended by RA 10640 shall be strictly
observed.

2.34 Photographs of pieces of evidence must be taken immediately upon discovery of

such, without moving or altering its original position including the process of recording
the inventory and the weighing of illegal drugs in the presence of required witnesses, as
stipulated in Section 21, Art II, RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. xxxx
a. Drug Evidence.
   
1) Upon seizure or confiscation of illegal drugs or CPECs, laboratory equipment, apparatus
and paraphernalia, the operating Unit's Seizing Officer/Inventory Officer must conduct
 
the physical inventory, markings and photograph the same in the place of operation in
the presence of:
   
(a) The suspect/s or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized
   
or his/her representative or counsel;
   
    (b) With an elected Public Official; and
   
(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix their
   
signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.
       
2) For seized or recovered drugs covered by Search Warrants, the inventory must be
 
conducted in the place where the Search Warrant was served.
       
3) For warrantless seizures like buy-bust operations, inventory and taking of photographs
  should be done at the nearest Police Station or Office of the apprehending Officer or
Team.
 
4) If  procedures during the inventory were not properly observed, as stipulated in
Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640, law enforcers must make a
  justification in writing for non-observance of the same to prove that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Under Sections Section 3-1(3.1)(b)(6) and (3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF

Manual, strict compliance is similarly demanded from police officers, thus:

6)  During the actual physical inventory, the Seizing Officer must mark, and photograph the
seized/recovered pieces of evidence in accordance with the provision of Section 21 of RA
9165 as amended by RA 10640 in the presence of: 
(a) The suspect or person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her
representative or counsel;
(b) With an elected Public Official; and
(c) Any representatives from the Department of Justice or Media who shall affix their
signatures and who shall be given copies of the inventory.
   
(Note: The presence of the above-mentioned witnesses shall only be required during the
  physical inventory of the confiscated items. If in case, witnesses mentioned above are
absent, same should be recorded in the report.
   
7) In warrantless searches and seizures like buy-bust operations, the inventory and taking of
 photographs shall be made at the nearest Police Station or Office of the Apprehending
Officer or Team whichever is practicable, however, concerned police personnel must
execute a written explanation to justify, non-compliance of the prescribed rules on inventory
under Section 21, RA 9165 as amended by RA 10640. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied )

The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui 35 that it will not presume to set an a
priori basis of what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry
out in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures, it
strains credulity why the police officers could not have (1) ensured the presence ofthe
required witnesses, or at the very least (2) marked, photographed, and physically
inventoried the seized items pursuant to the provisions of their own operational
procedures.36

To my mind, therefore, while no a priori basis for the conduct of a valid buy-bust
operation is set, the noncompliance of the police with their own
procedures implicates (1) the operation of the saving clause and (2) the appreciation
of the presumption of regularity.

With this in mind, anything short of observance and compliance by the PDEA and police
authorities with the positive requirements of the law, and even with their own internal
procedures, means that they have not performed their duties. If they did, then it would
not be difficult for the prosecution to acknowledge the lapses and justify the same - it
needs merely to present the justification in writing required to be executed by the
police under Sections 2-6(2.33)(a)(4) and 3-1(3.1)(b)(7) of the 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.
After which, the court can proceed to determine whether the prosecution had credibly
explained the noncompliance so as to comply with the first prong of the saving
mechanism. I submit that without a justification being offered, the finding that the
integrity and probative weight of the seized items are preserved can only satisfy the
second prong and will not trigger the saving clause.

It then becomes error to fill the lacuna in the prosecution's evidence with the
presumption of regularity, when there clearly is no established fact from which the
presumption may arise. As such, the evidence of the State has not overturned the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.37

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the instant appeal and REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2017 finding accused-
appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Endnotes:

1
 People v. Magat,  588 Phil.395, 402 (2008).

2
 People v. Dumangay, 581 Phil.730, 739 (2008).

3
 Id.
4
 People v. Santos, Jr., 562 Phil. 458, 471 (2007).

5
 People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018, p. 11; People v. Ana, G.R. No.
230070, March 14, 2018, p. 7; People v. Lumaya, G.R. No. 231983, March 7, 2018, p.
12; People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, p. 9; People v.
Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018, p. 9; People v. Guieb, G.R. No.
233100, February 14,2018, p. 9; People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31,2018, p.
11; People v. Miranda,  G.R. No. 229671, January 31,2018, p. 11; People v. Jugo, G.R.
No. 231792, January 29, 2018, p. 9; People v. Mamangon,  G.R. No. 229102, January
29, 2018, p. 9; People v. Calibod,  G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017, p. 9; People
v. Ching, G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017, p. 10; People v. Geronimo,  G.R. No.
225500, September 11,2017, p. 9; People v. Macapundag,  G.R. No. 225965, March 13,
2017, 820 SCRA 204, 215; Gamboa v. People,  799 Phil. 584, 597 (2016); see
also People v. Dela Victoria,  G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018, p. 10; People v.
Bintaib,  G.R. No. 217805, April 2, 2018; People v. Segundo,  G.R. No. 205614, July 26,
2017, p. 17.

6
 736 Phil. 749 (2014).

7
 Id. at 764.

8
 See People v. Cayas, 789 Phil. 70,79 (2016); People v. Havana, 776 Phil. 462,475
(2016).

9
 See id. at 80.

10
 R.A. 9165, Sec. 21(1), as amended by R.A. 10640.

11
 See People v. Alagarme,  754 Phil. 449,461 (2015).

12
 See People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 343, 352 (2015).

13
 See People v. Capuno,  655 Phil.226, 240-241 (2011); People v. Garcia,  599 Phil.416,
432-433 (2009); People v. Reyes,  G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016, 806 SCRA 513,
536-537.

14
 725 Phil.268 (2014 ),

15
 Id. at 286.

16
 G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 10.

17
 Id. at 13.

18
 G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, 818 SCRA 122.

19
 Id. at 142; underscoring supplied.

20
 Supra note 13.
21
 Id. at 536.

22
  Ponencia,  pp. 15-16.

23
 Id. at 13; emphasis omitted.

24
 Id., citing People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, p. 17.

25
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m) provides: "That official duty has been
regularly performed."

26
  People v. Mendoza,  supra note 6, at 770.

27
 Id.

28
 718 Phil. 352 (2013).

29
 Id. at 366.

30
 590 Phil.214 (2008).

31
 Id. at 242 243.

32
 PNPM-D-0-3-1-99 [NG], the precursor anti-illegal drug operations manual prior to the
2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.

33
 PNP Handbook, PNPM-00-DS-3-2-13, December 2013.

34
  PNP Manual, PNPM-D-0-2-14 (DO), September 20l4.

35
 393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).

36
 Note also that the same PNPDEM lays down the guidelines for preparation in buy-bust
operations, including the preparation of inventory and photographing equipment, save
only from the a priori basis consideration above.

37
 See People v. Barte, supra note 16, at 22.

37
 See People v. Barte, supra note 16, at 22.