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November 17, 2010 Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
reversing Justice Nario’s order of dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
Topic: Right to Speedy Trial 25939 because such reversal violated petitioners’ constitutional right
Summary: against double jeopardy.
Facts: Issue:
Petron Corporation received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by assignment WON, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
from 18 private firms registered with the Board of Investments. Petron used AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities. DOF approved the request PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
of Petron through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM) addressed Held:
to the Collection Program Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
BIR accepted the TCCs as payment for the excise tax liabilities of Petron. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is
However, the Office of the Ombudsman found that transactions involving orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how
the TCCs were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement. long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
Ombudsman found probable cause against Jacob and 4 other accused for deliberate. We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that
perpetrating the so-called “tax credit scam.” Sandiganbayan issued an Order Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the
giving the prosecution a period of sixty (60) days. Sixty (60) days passed but circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its
the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report. right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.
from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
In the Petition at bar, Criminal Case were filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner
In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and Jacob was arraigned on June 1, 2000, while petitioner Legarda was
consistently invoked their right to speedy trial and moved for the dismissal arraigned on May 18, 2001; with both petitioners pleading not guilty. Since
of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however, the then, there had been no other significant development in the cases since
[Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or postponement of
after another. The sixty days granted to the prosecution became more than the scheduled hearings as it awaits the result of the reinvestigation of the
four hundred days—still, there was no resolution in sight. Office of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of said
cases during the hearing on August 20, 2001. Thus, the criminal cases had
Justice Nario, after 6 months, issued the verbal order of dismissal, the been pending for about a year and four months by the time they were
[Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division] issued an Order setting aside said dismissed by Justice Nario.
verbal order.
An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the prosecution’s favor and guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.
denied all the motions filed by the accused. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to assure
that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a
court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. In determining whether
the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which,
after all, do not exist in a vacuum. In determining whether the accused has
been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant.