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Battery Notes, Principles, Cases and Authority
Battery Notes, Principles, Cases and Authority
5. LACK OF CONSENT
From the cases, we can see that this element is not a 'directional.'
Point is an issue of "causation”. The defendants conduct must have
caused the basis in the case of battery that would be the physical
contact.
However, the orthodox view remains that trespass and the torts
deriving from it, e.g. battery, can be committed by intentional or
unintentional conduct.
Does the intention (state of mind) for trespass relate to the contact or
injury?
Additional Cases:
STANLEY V POWELL
FOWLER V LANNING
HOLMES V MATHER
4. THERE MUST BE PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE PERSON OF THE
PLAINTIFF.
a) R V COTES WORTH
b) DUMBELL V ROBERTS
c) FAGAN V METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER
d) AGBOVI V SETORDZIE
e) COLE V TURNER
f) MILLER V ATTORNEY GENERAL
But how about removing his hat or throwing water on his clothes? The
case in point is PURSELL V HORN
5. LACK OF CONSENT
The plaintiff must prove that he or she did not consent to the contact.
This can be proved in three ways:
(Football, boxing etc. but not boxing during football — but man
nodding during a header will be, covered).
A good example is —
a) CHRISTOPHERSON V BARE
b) NASH V SHEEN
COLE V TURNER
HOLT CJ; "if two or more meet in a narrow passage and without any
violence or design of harm, one touches the other gently, no battery.
But if one in a desire to gain advantage shoves another aside in an
inordinate and violent manner, this is a trespass."
III.) PRIVILEGED CONTACT
WIFFIN V KINCARD
Questions "Come and kill me today" says a wife to her husband who
then administers a slap to her face: Does this amount to consent?
DIRECT ACT OF THE DEFENDANT
Defendant liable because, the act causing the injury was the direct act
of the defendant. The act of the other two was not sufficient enough to
break the chain of causation since they acted out of intuition.
The two persons did not with or in combination with the defendant,
and their removal of the squib for fear of danger to themselves was
seems to be a continuation of the first act of the defendant until the
explosion of the squib.
LEAME V BRAY (1803)
The defendant whilst driving on the wrong side of the road at night
accidentally caused his carriage to collide with that of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff jumped out for his life and as a result injured his collarbone.
Plaintiff sued for trespass but the defendant argued that since the
accident happened out of negligence and not willfully the proper action
was in case and not trespass.
"it is a settled distinction that where the immediate act itself occasions
a prejudice or is an injury to the plaintiff's person, land etc. trespass vi
et armis will lie: where the act itself is not an injury but a consequence
from that act is prejudicial to the plaintiffs person goods etc., trespass
will not lie ... If the injury be committed by the immediate act
complained of, the action must be trespass; if the injury be merely
consequential upon act, an action upon the case is the proper
remedy."
MILLER V A-G
Plaintiff suffered head and brain injuries as a result of being shot by the
defendant, a police officer. The defendant suspected the plaintiff to be
a thief and shot at him in the head when the plaintiff ignored the calls
on him to stop.
ABBAN J
The defendant rode his ship against that of the plaintiff and caused
injury to it thereby. The defendant had apparently tried to steer clear of
the plaintiff’s ship but run into it (according to the report either through
negligence or ignorance or lack of skill). It was argued that, unless the
plaintiff could show that the defendant intended to bring his ship into
the plaintiffs and did so willfully, the action in trespass must fail. Lord
Ellenborough:
GIBBONS V PEPPER
Defendant rode a horse which took fright and took off with him running
over and injuring the plaintiff in the process. The defendant argued
that he could not stop the horse but had shouted to those on the path
to give way but the plaintiff had refused to do so.
If A rides upon a horse and B whips the horse so that it runs away with
A and struck C , B who whipped the horse is liable and not A. Also if A
takes the hand of B and strikes C, A is the trespasser and not B.
STATE OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT
LETANG V COOPER
The plaintiff’s action was not trespass but rather negligence since the
act that caused the injury was unintentional but reckless. The plaintiff
was however statute barred under the Limitation of Actions Act.
LORD DENNING
The truth is that the distinction between trespass and case is obsolete.
We have a different sub-division altogether. Instead of dividing actions
for personal injuries into trespass (direct damage) or case
(consequential damage), we divide the causes of action now according
as the defendant did the injury intentionally or unintentionally. If one
man intentionally applies force directly to another, the plaintiff has a
cause of action in assault and battery, or, if you so please to describe it,
in trespass to the person. If he does not inflict injury intentionally, but
only unintentionally, the plaintiff has no cause of action today in
trespass. His only cause of action is in negligence, and then only on
proof of want of reasonable care. If the plaintiff cannot prove want of
reasonable care, he may have no cause of action at all. If the basis of
your complaint is that the defendant had acted negligently, the
foundation for your action is the tort of negligence by establishing that
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, there was a breach
of that duty of care and injury arose out of it.
LORD DIPLOCK
HOLMES V MATHER
The defendant’s horses were so startled by the barking of dogs and run
away such that the defendant’s servant could not stop but did his best
to guide the horses safely. The plaintiff got run over and injured. He
sued for trespass.
Per Bramwell B:
"If the act that does an injury is an act of direct force vi et armis,
trespass is the proper remedy (if there is any remedy) where the act is
wrongful, either as being willful or as being the result of negligence...
where the act is not wrongful for either of these reasons, no action is
maintainable, though trespass would be the proper form of action if it
were wrongful."
STANLEY V POWELL
The defendant was not liable as the act was not intentional and the
plaintiff could not prove negligence on the part of the defendant.
During a shooting party, the defendant shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s
statement of claim for an action in trespass only stated that the
defendant shot him. The defendant argued that since the plaintiff did
not allege that the shooting was intentional or negligent, there was no
cause of action against him.
There was no cause of action since the plaintiff failed to allege whether
the shooting was intentional or negligently was not liable.
Trespass to the person does not lie if the injury to the plaintiff was
caused unintentionally and without negligence. And in the cause of
action for trespass, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.
The defendant was liable since he knew the nature and quality of his
act.
The use of missile to cause injury was battery. Although the defendants
did not deliberately set out to kill and injure the victims, they were
liable in trespass for having acted recklessly.
WILSON V PRINGLE
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant jumped him whilst the
defendant alleged that he had only pulled the plaintiff’s bag out of
horseplay. The defendant argued that for the plaintiff to succeed, he
must prove that the defendant intended to cause injury.
Intention to cause injury is not an element of trespass but rather is the
intention to make contact which is an element.
In the action of trespass, the plaintiff must only prove that the
defendant did the act intentionally, and not that the defendant
intended that his act cause injury. It is the act and not the injury which
must be intentional. Therefore the hostile touching of another is
battery and the physical application of force regardless of intention is
enough to constitute trespass to the person.
A soldier fired a baton round which struck and injured the plaintiff. The
plaintiff sued in assault and battery. It was not disputed that the baton
round was fired deliberately but the defendant argued that he was not
liable since it had not been fired with the intent of hitting the plaintiff.
The defendant would be liable if the baton round was fired to strike
someone although the plaintiff was not the intended person.
In an action for battery, it is not necessary to show that the plaintiff was
the intended target of the act. It is enough to show that the defendant
intended that the force be applied to another person.
The defendant accidentally drove his car onto a police constable’s foot
but the defendant also ignored the police constable’s pleas to get the
car off his foot.
That although the initial act was not intentional, the act of leaving the
car on the constable’s foot was intentional and as such the defendant
was held liable for battery
In the case of battery, injury should result either from personal contact
or through the medium of an instrument controlled by the defendant.
In the case, it was therefore held that the car being controlled by the
defendant was a medium through which the battery was committed.
R V COTESWORTH
The injury caused should arise from the direct physical contact or
through an instrument controlled by the defendant.
PURSELL V HORN
An action was brought for trespass against the defendant for assaulting
the plaintiff, and throwing water upon him, and also wetting and
damaging his clothes. The declaration stated that the defendant
Elizabeth, on, &c, assaulted the plaintiff, "and then cast and threw
divers large quantities of boiling water on the plaintiff, and also then
wetted, damaged, and spoiled the clothes and wearing apparel, to wit,
one great coat," and the value "which the plaintiff then wore: "by
means of which he was hurt, scalded, &c, and forced to expend money
in endeavouring to cure himself."
HOOPER V REEVE
The defendant drove his gig into the carriage in which the plaintiff’s
wife was sitting. It overturned and injured her. The plaintiff sued for
trespass but the defendant argued that the action was for case and not
trespass.
It was in action of battery by husband and wife, for a battery upon the
husband and wife, ad dampnum ipsorum.
The defendant struck a woman whilst she was holding her child. As a
result, the child fell on the ground and was injured. He was charged
with assaulting the child and accordingly convicted. He appealed on the
ground that he had no direct physical contact with the child either
through his body or a medium.
The injuries to the child resulted from the direct physical contact of the
defendant and there was physical contact through the body of the
mother of the child which was hit by the defendant. Here, the
movement of the mother which caused the child to fall was entirely and
immediately the result of the appellant’s action in punching her.
RVH
DUMBELL V ROBERTS
The plaintiff while on his way home in his employer's uniform, was
stopped by two defendants (police constables) and questioned
concerning a bag containing some soap flakes he was carrying. Soap
flakes were rationed goods during the war. The constables were
dissatisfied with the plaintiffs answers; they arrested and detained him,
but made no inquiries as to his name or address as required by law.
They also took his fingerprints without his consent. The plaintiff sued
for false imprisonment.
In an action for false imprisonment, Scott L.J held that the taking of the
fingerprints of a person before he is committed to stand trial or
convicted is trespass if it is done without the consent of the person and
following upon an unjustifiable arrest, it may become an element in the
false imprisonment and then if found, if found on the facts to be the
consequence of the arrest, it may be properly be taken into account on
the assessment of damages.
GUARRO V US
The defendant touched the private parts of the police officer who was
not in uniform. He argued that a non-violent sexual touching did not
amount to battery.
The defendant’s act constituted battery but since the complainant had
appeared to have consented to the act, it was not battery.
The defendant had told the police officer who was going to examine
him that he had no pins or needles or sharp object in his pocket. But
when the police officer dipped his hands into the plaintiff’s pocket, he
was pierced by a needle. The defendant argued that since he had not
acted, he was not liable.
Since the defendant exposed the officer to the risk of injury which
materialized, he was liable for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
LACK OF CONSENT
DONNELLY V JACKMAN
The police officer suspected the defendant of having committed an
offence. He tried to stop him to question him but the defendant
ignored him. The police officer then touched the shoulder of the
defendant with the intention of stopping him, whereupon the
defendant struck the officer with force.
The defendant was liable for assault on an officer executing his duty.
Where a police officer acts in his duty, he is not liable for trespass
although he might touch the body of another and provided that the
touch was reasonable for the execution of his work.
Since the police officer had committed the assault on the defendant
before putting him under lawful arrest, he was acting outside his duty.
He therefore committed the assault first on the defendant and the
defendant was not liable.
Where a police officer works outside the realms of his duty, he will be
liable for trespass.
CONSENT
NASH V SHEEN
Held: dye was applied without the plaintiff's express consent; the
consent which was given was for a permanent wave. So there was a
battery.
NON-MARINE UNDERWRITERS, LLOYDS OF LONDON V SCALERA
The plaintiffs sued the defendants for sexual battery committed on her
by the defendants. The question arose as to who bears the burden of
proving consent or lack of consent.
The defendant was not liable in battery since the plaintiff had
consented.
R V BARNES
The defendant tackled the victim in an amateur football match and the
victim suffered serious injuries. The prosecution alleged that the force
used had gone beyond what was legitimately required for the game
and thus the defendant should be held liable.
The defendant was not liable as the jury could not determine what
“legitimate force” for the sports was.
A person engaged in sports may be liable for assault or battery if he
used force that goes beyond the threshold of the game. The threshold
required for a game is determined on a case by case basis and may
depend on the type of game, the nature of the act, the extent of the
risk of injury and the state of mind of the defendant. The level is
therefore an objective one and does not depend on the views of the
individual players. If the act goes beyond what a reasonable player can
be regarded as having accepted by taking part in the sport, then the
conduct if the defendant will not be covered by the defence.
R V TABASSUM
The women had consented to the nature of the act and not the quality
of the act and as such, the defendant was held liable.
True consent requires consent to both the nature and quality of the act.
Consent given on a mistaken belief is void.
R V RICHARDSON
The defendant was a registered dentist who had been suspended. But
he continued to give treatment to people who did not know that he
had been suspended. He was charged with assault occasioning actual
bodily harm. He was convicted on the account that the consent given
was vitiated by his fraud. He appealed.
Since the fraud related to his qualifications rather than his identity or
the nature and quality of the act, the consent was not vitiated. In
summary, whether there is consent to actions on the part of the person
in the mistaken belief that he was other than the person whom he truly
was, in which case there is assault. Short of this, there is no assault.
PRIVILEGED CONTACT.
WIFFIN V KINCARD
The Court were clearly of opinion that the touch given by the
constable's staff, in order to engage the Plaintiff's attention, did not
amount to a battery ; but there was some doubt whether the taking by
the collar did not, Sir J. Mansfield Ch. J. saying, that taking the Plaintiff
by the collar without any improper violence, though an imprisonment,
was no battery, which is a beating; and Chambre J. saying that
imposition of hands, in order to imprison, is a battery. The Court
agreed, however, that whether the evidence amounted to proof of a
battery or not, it would not prevent the Judge from certifying with
respect to the imprisonment that the Plaintiff was not entitled to full
costs for the assault and battery,
The touch in order to engage the plaintiff’s attention was not battery.
COWARD V BADDELEY
The plaintiff sued for assault and false imprisonment. The defendant
justified his action on the ground that he was first assaulted by the
plaintiff. The facts show that the defendant was engaged in
extinguishing a fire. The plaintiff told him he was doing it badly. The
defendant told him to mind his own business. The plaintiff then put his
hand on the defendant's shoulders, turned him round to show him how
the hose should be managed. Thereupon defendant gave plaintiff into
custody. The jury was told that in the circumstances, the defendant's
arrest of the plaintiff were unjustified unless plaintiffs act had been
hostile. This direction was held to be correct. It was also held that there
was absence of intent for criminal assault such as to justify an arrest:
the court expressed the view that perhaps the plaintiff could be liable
for battery because the defendant could not be said to have consented
to the way he was handled by the plaintiff.
The defendant was liable since the plaintiff did not touch him in a
hostile manner.
AGBOVI V SETORDZI
The plaintiff reported himself for an offence. However the plaintiff was
put in custody and beaten up by police officers.
The court held that it constituted battery and found for the plaintiff.
A police officer took hold of a woman’s arm to stop her walking off
during questioning. The woman scratched the police officer.
Since the police officer was not exercising his power of arrest at the
time of the incident, and since he had exceeded the acceptable physical
contact required, his act constituted battery on the defendant which
justified her actions.
RE F
A mentally ill woman who had become sexually active was incapable of
giving a valid consent for sterilization. Doctors sought a declaration for
her to be sterilized.
Trespass will not lie if the doctors have a lawful excuse to operate on
the person. That means that medical treatment in the best interest of
the patient who cannot give or refuse consent is not battery provided it
is done in the best interest of the patient.
There are however cases where adult patients cannot give or refuse
their consent to an operation or other treatment as a result of
unconsciousness or comatose or a person of unsound mind or mental
disability. The common law would be seriously defective if it failed to
provide a solution to the problem created by such inability to consent.
Therefore the solution to the problem which the common law provides
is that a doctor can lawfully operate on or give other treatment to adult
patients who are incapable of giving their consent provided that the
operation or other treatment concerned is in the best interests of the
patient. The operation or treatment will be in their best interest if and
only if it is carried out in order to save their lives and to ensure their
improvement or to prevent deterioration in their physical or mental
health.
INNES V WYLIE
The plaintiff being a member of a society tried to enter a room for their
meeting and dinner and upon the orders of the defendant, the police
man stopped the plaintiff from entering the room by standing in the
doorway. The policeman gave evidence that the plaintiff pushed his
way into the room and he prevented him. The plaintiff alleged that the
policeman pushed him back when he tried to enter the room.
"You will say, whether, on the evdence, you think the policeman
committed an assault on the plaintiff, or was merely passive. If the
policeman was entirely passive like a door or a wall put to prevent the
plaintiff from entering the room, and simply obstructing the entrance of
the plaintiff, no assault has been committed on the plaintiff and your
verdict will be for the defendant. The question is did the policeman
take any active measures to prevent the plaintiff from entering the
room, or did he stand in the doorway passive, and not move at all."
They found for the plaintiff. So presumably they found that the
policeman had taken active measures to block the plaintiffs way.
Since the policeman acted and was not merely passive, he was liable for
assault on the plaintiff.
Trespass requires a positive act from the defendant. A person does not
commit trespass if he is only passive and does not act. If the policeman
was entirely passive like the wall or door put to prevent the plaintiff
from entering the room, and simply obstructing the entrance of the
plaintiff, no assault had been committed.
The chief of the village sent for the plaintiff but he refused to go. The
chief then ordered for the deportation of the plaintiff and a group of
men jointly seized the plaintiff and forced the plaintiff out of town.
XA V YA
The plaintiff alleged that as a child he had been assaulted several times
by his father. He brought an action against his mother as a joint
tortfeasor. He alleged that his mother’s action was part of a concerted
action towards a common end. He also alleged that his mother also
assaulted him.
SHALE V GALE
The defendant was asked by some people to show them the house of X.
she mistakenly pointed to the house of Y and the house and assaulted
the occupant of the house resulting in his death. The relatives of the
deceased sued the defendant on the ground that she was a joint tort
feasor to the fatal battery committed on the deceased.
The defendant was a tortfeasor though not liable for the knife attack
inflicted on the deceased.