The New York and California Experiments with Academic Control

Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter, 1951), pp. 293-303
Published by: University of Chicago Law Review
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 COMMENTS 293
Sucha provisionstatesan equitable,simple,legallyeleganttestforliability.
It findsa rightful
place in a code that is trulyCommercial:one designedto
servecommerce.

THE NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA EXPERIMENTS

WITH ACADEMIC CONTROL
Sinceina democracy
all menarerulers,
all men
musthavetheeducation thatrulers
oughtto have.
-ROBERT M. HUTCHINSr

The anti-radicalfeelingfollowingthe firstworldwar reachedthe schools

throughsuch measuresas the Lusk Law2 and thenquicklysubsided.In the
longperiodfromthe earlytwentiesto the presenttimethe centralissues of
academicfreedomseemedto centeraroundcauses celebresinvolvingindividu-
als. Now,withsuchmeasuresas theFeinbergLaw in New Yorkand theloyalty
oath requirement at the Universityof California,the problemis broadening
again. The re-evaluationof government personnelin termsof loyalty3has
spreadto thepersonnelofstateschools.Corruption oftheyouthjoins sedition
and espionageas an immediatethreatto theAmericanwayoflife.The private
schoolhas beendealt withby informal pressure4partlybecausetheloyaltyof
government personnelis theprimaryconcernoftheday and partlybecausethe
freedomthe state has in choosingits employees5 avoids,legallyat least, the
problemsoffreespeechinvolvedin preventing privateinstitutions
fromteach-
ing disapproveddoctrinesor hiringdisapprovedpersonnel.6 As international
tensionmounts,theproblemof balancingthe traditional Americanfreedoms
1Hutchins,T. S. Eliot on Education, i Measure (Winter,I950).
5
2The Lusk Law, N.Y. Laws (I92I) c.
667,requiredthelicensingofprivateeducationalinsti-
tutionsand forbadethe licensingof institutionsteachingthe violentoverthrowof the govern-
ment.It was primarilyaimed at the Rand School, a socialistschool. The law was repealed
aftera year.N.Y. Laws (I923) c. 799. Consult Chafee,Free Speechin the United States, c. 8
(The Rand School Case) (I941), fora completediscussionof the case.
3 Consult Emersonand Helfeld,Loyalty among Government
Employees,58 Yale L.J. i
(1948).
4 Some legislatureshave rattledthe investigativeswordat privateschools,as did a com-
mitteeoftheIllinoislegislaturewhichconductedan investigation ofthe Universityof Chicago.
The committeesent an investigatorand later held hearings. It made no definiteassertions
about the Universityof Chicago althoughit did undertaketo show that some of the faculty
membersweremembersof "communistfronts."ConsultSpecial Reportof SeditiousActivities
Investigation,State of Illinois (1949); Report of the SeditiousActivitiesCommission,State
of Illinois(I949). The Testimonyof ChancellorHutchins,at I7 et seq. of the Special Report,
is particularlynoteworthy.
s Consultnote 49 infra.
6 Thus even the Internal
SecurityAct, popularlyknownas the McCarren Act, requires
of privatecommunistorganizationsand the labeling of communistpropa-
only registration
ganda. H.R. 9490, 8i Cong. 2d Sess. (Pub. L. No. 83I, I950).

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294 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

and theneedforcontrolofsubversive activitiesbecomesmoredifficult. Since

thesefreedomsincludeacademicfreedom, itis worthwhileto inspectthemean-
ingofthatphrase.
Academicfreedom hasthreeintelligible,
ifnotentirelyharmonious meanings:
it maymeanthefreedom ofthegoverning body of theschoolto choosecurricu-
lum,personnel,and studentbody;7it maymeanthefreedom ofan individual
teacherto express,
in histeaching,
personalopinions aboutcontroversiesin his
it
field;8 may mean the freedomof theteacher to conducthimself outsidethe
classroomas any othercitizenmight.9 It is with theteacher,ratherthanhis
7In thecaseofstateschools
therearenotableconstitutional Astocurriculum,
limitations.
usual subjectmattermaynotbe arbitrarily
excluded.Meyersv. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390 (I923)
(prohibitionagainstteaching German inelementary publicorprivate,
schools, heldunconsti-
tutional).As to teachers,
stateschoolsystems maynotestablish discriminatorywagescales
infavorofcertified whiteteachersas againstcertified
Negroteachers.Alston
v. SchoolBoard,
112 F. 2d 992 (C.A.4th,1940). Astostudents,wherewhitestudentsaregivenstateeducation,
Negrostudents mustbe givenequivalent education.Sweattv. Painter,
339U.S. 629(1950).
Wherethestatechoosestomeetthisobligation byadmittingNegrostudents to a schoolwith
whitestudents thestatemustaccordthemthesame(i.e.,nonsegregated)treatment. McLaurin
v. OklahomaState Board ofRegents,339 U.S. 637 (I950).
8"Academic freedomis thefreedomoftheteacherorresearch worker inhigherinstitutions
oflearning to investigateand discusstheproblems ofhis science. .. withoutinterference
frompoliticalorecclesiastical orfrom
authority theadministrativeofficials in
oftheinstitution
whichheis employed, unlesshismethods arefoundbyqualified bodiesofhisownprofession
to be clearlyincompetent orcontraryto professional
ethics."i Encyclopedia oftheSocial
Sciences384 (I930).
9Merelawfulness is probablynotan adequatetest.As a teacheroccupiesa specialplace
inthecommunity andexertshisinfluencebyexample,as wellas byimpartingformal knowl-
edge,it maybe reasonable toseta higherstandardofbehaviorthanmereobservance ofthe
penalstatutes.
"TheBoardofExaminers hastherighttoexpectofapplicants forlicenses
to
teacha nicesenseofhonor whichisas unlike
merehonestyas thefineDamascusbladeis unlike
a farmingimplement. It hasa righttoexpectfromthema strong anddelicate
senseofmoral
values." Epstein v. Board of Education,I62 N.Y. Misc. 7I8, 72I, 295 N.Y. Supp. 796, 8oi
(1936).Therearea number ofproblems raisedbysucha position. Sincefewmenwouldassert or
admitthattheyarelacking ina senseofhonor thequestion remains: Whatstandard ofconduct
beyondmerelawfulness shouldbe setforteachers? Thedanger oftherequirement of"a nice
senseofhonor"is wellillustrated bythepassagefollowing thequoteabove:"Thecontention
ofthepetitioner is,however, thattherefusal onthisground is feigned and notgenuine, that
it is a subterfugemerely andusedto cloakthetruereason, namely, dissatisfaction
withher
economic andpolitical opinions."
The I940 statement of theAmerican Association of University Professors on academic
freedom says in part:
"a. The teacher is entitledto fullfreedom in research andin thepublication ofresults,
subjecttotheadequateperformances ofhisotheracademic duties;butresearch forpecuniary
return shouldbe basedonan understanding withauthoritiesoftheinstitution.
"b. The teacher is entitled
to freedom in theclassroom in discussing hissubject,buthe
shouldbe careful notto introduce intohisteaching controversial matter whichhas no rela-
tionto hissubject.Limitations ofacademic freedom becauseofreligious orotheraimofthe
institution shouldbe clearlystatedin writing at thetimeoftheappointment.
"c. Thecollege oruniversity teacherisa citizen,a member ofa learned profession,andan
officer ofan educational institution.
Whenhe speaksorwrites as a citizen,
he shouldbe free
from institutional
censorship ordiscipline,buthisspecialposition inthecommunity imposes
specialobligations. Asa manoflearning andan educational officer,heshouldremember that
thepublicmayjudgehisprofession andhisinstitution byhisutterances. Hencehe shouldat

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 COMMENTS 295
teaching,that the New York and Californiaactionsdeal. Two cases which
centeredaround individualteachers,and which,dramaticallyat least, were
highpointsin theacademicfreedom of theperiodfromtheearly
controversies
twentiesto todaymaytherefore serveas an appropriateintroduction to thedis-
cussionof theCaliforniaand New York actions.
JohnScopes,a Tennesseepublicschoolteacher,was broughtto trialundera
statute'0makingit criminalto teach any theorywhichdenied the storyof
divinecreationand assertedinsteadthatman was descendedfromlowerani-
mals. At the trialof the case, WilliamJennings Bryanand ClarenceDarrow
battledoverthemeritsof"evolution."It was a greatspectacle,"I but thelegal
issueswereobscured.In reversing theverdictofguiltyon a technicality,'2 the
Supreme Court ofTennessee took the unusualstepof saying thatsince Scopes
was no longerworking forthestatea nolleprossewas desirable.But thecourt
had something to say on themeritsas well.
The courtassertedthatScopescouldnotcomplainof a deprivation ofrights
withoutdue processoflaw forhispositionwas merelythatofan employeewho
had onlythechoicebetweenworkingon thetermsoffered to himor not at all.
"He had no rightto servethe state excepton such termsas the state pre-
scribed .... [T]hestatutebeforeus is notan exerciseofthepolicepower,... it
is an act ofthestateas a corporation,a proprietor,
an employer.... In dealing
withitsownemployeesengagedon itsownwork,thestateis nothamperedby
thelimitations ofSection8 Articlei oftheTennesseeConstitution or the I4th
Amendment to the Constitutionof the UnitedStates."13This assertionwas to
be made by othercourtsat a laterdate.
BertrandRussellwasappointedin I940 to thepostofProfessor ofPhilosophy
in the CityCollegeof New York.He was to teachadvancedlogic,thephilos-
ophyof mathematics, and the relationof philosophyto the sciences.'4A tax-
payersued forand obtainedan orderdeclaringthe appointment of Professor
Russellvoid and prohibiting thecity'sBoard ofHigherEducationfromhiring
him in any capacity.-IThougha numberof groundswere offered, the case

all timesbeaccurate,
shouldexercise
appropriate shouldshowrespect
restraint, fortheopinions
ofothers, andshouldmakeeveryeffort
toindicate
thatheis notan institutional
spokesman."
35 A.A.U.P. Bulletin67 (I949).
10Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) ?
2344.
," A transcript
of the trialwas publishedas The World'sMost Famous Court Trial (1925).
12 The court
heldthatthetrialjudgehad exceededhisconstitutionalpowersin settinga
fineofover$50.Scopesv. State,i54 Tenn.105, 289 S.W. 363 (I927).
3Ibid.,at i I and 364.
14Minutes oftheProceedings
oftheBoardofHigherEducationoftheCityofNew York,
Marchi8th, I940.
Is Kay v. Board of HigherEducation,I73 N.Y. Misc. 943, i8 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (I940), unani-
mouslyaffirmed
without
opinion259 App.Div. 879,20 N.Y.S. 2d Ioi6 (I940). A thorough

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296 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW

restedon theallegedimmorality ofRussell.His opinionson premaritaland ex-

tramarital sexualrelationswerecitedas urgingviolationof thestate'spenal
laws,althoughtheymayas easilybe readas urgingtheirmodification. State-
mentsofProfessor Russellwhichmightwellhavecomefrom medicaltextbooks
werescoredas obscene.16 "Mindfuloftheaphorism:'As a manthinketh in his
heart,so he is,'" thecourtheldthattheBoardinappointing ProfessorRussell
was "in effectestablishinga chairofindecencyand in so doinghas actedarbi-
trarily,capriciously,and in directviolationof thepublichealth,safetyand
morals ."..17
Fromthesetwoindividualcases thesceneshiftsto thecurrent attemptto
the
deal withwhatis considered widespread the
problemof subversive teacher.
Thoughtfulattention has beengiventheproblemofwhether theknowncom-
munistshouldbe allowedto teach.18 Whetherthecommunist teacheris thought
to be merelyan espouserofan unpopularbeliefand to be kepton handforthe
healthofdemocratic processes,or is thoughtto be an agentofa conspiratorial
partyboundby oath to lie, cheatand steal to further thedestruction of our
democracy, theproblemsraisedby theNew York and Californiaactionsre-
main.Bothactionsareattemptsto checkthecorruption oftheyouthbymeth-
ods whichcan be easilyappliedto thelargegroupofteachersin a uniform, al-
mostmechanical way.Bothactionsavoidthemethods ofthecriminallaw'9and
adoptan indirect approachto thedesiredend.

I
New York statutesprohibittheemployment ofpersonswhoadvocatethe
overthrowof the governmentby illegal Thoughthesestatuteshave
means.20
in
neverbeenchallenged court, there wouldseem to be no valid objectionto
them;theirlanguagecloselyfollowsthe state and federalseditionstatutes
whichhave beenupheld.2IThe statemayproperly discharge one guiltyofim-

noteexamining all thelegalquestionsand sharplycriticizingtheoutcomeappearedin 53 Harv.

L. Rev. 1192 (1940). A less technicalbut morebasic essay on thecase appearsas chapter21,
The BertrandRussellCase, in Cohen,Faithofa Liberal (I946).
I6 For exampleat 173 N.Y. Misc. 943, 952, i8 N.Y.S. 2d 82I, 830 (I940), a passage on

masturbation is quoted as an exampleof ProfessorRussell's "obscenity."It shouldbe com-

paredwiththe statementon masturbation in English& Pearson,The CommonNeurosesof
Childrenand AdultsI73 (I937).
'7 I73 N.Y. Misc.943, 953,i8 N.Y.S. 2d 82i, 831 (I940).
18Consult Hook, Academic Freedomand Communism,2 The People Shall Judge 705
(1949) (yes); Meiklejohn,Professorson Probation,ibid.,at 7I5 (no).
19Consulttextinfraat page 302.
20 N.Y. Education Law
(McKinney,1947) ? 3021; N.Y. Civil Service Law (McKinney,
1946) ? i2-a.
2"Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Dunne v. United States, I38 F. 2d 137
(C.A. 8th, I943), cert.den. 320 U.S. 790 (1943), rehearingdeniedibid., at 814,second peti-
tionforrehearingdeniedibid.,at 8I5.

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 COMMENTS 297

properconductof a criminalnatureeven whenthe evidenceis such that the

districtattorneyasks thattheindictment or evenwherethejury
be dropped,22
findsa verdict of not guilty.23
Apparently determining thatthesemeasureswereinadequate,theNew York
legislature,after finding that therewas "commonreport"that subversives
had infiltrated enactedthe FeinbergLaw at
into the state'spublic schools,24
theI949 session.25 The law directstheBoard ofRegentsto promulgate and en-
forceregulations forthe removalof such subversivesand to preparea list of
organizations whichare subversivein thattheyadvocatetheoverthrow of the
government by illegalmethods proscribedin the earlierstatutes.
Membership
in any listedorganizationis made primafacieevidenceof disqualification for
employment in thepublicschoolsofthestate.The litigationso farhas seenthe
New Yorksupremecourtholdingthestatuteunconstitutional and theappellate
divisionreversing and holdingthelaw constitutional.26
The newlaw willprob-
" In a recentNew Yorkcase thepetitioner was indicted forsodomyand theindictment
dropped at therequestofthedistrict Thecourtuphelda dismissal,
attorney. aftera hearing,
on thesamecharges. Bermanv. Gilroy, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 52I (1950).
23TheNewYorkcourthasupheldthedischarge ofa petitioner ofrape.Peoplev.
acquitted
Dep'tofHealth,I44 App.Div. 628, 129 N.Y.S. 255 (1911).
24"The legislature
herebyfindsanddeclaresthatthereis common report thatmembers of
subversivegroups,andparticularlyofthecommunist partyandcertain ofitsaffiliated
organi-
intopublicemployment
zations,haveinfiltrated in thepublicschoolsoftheState.Thishas
occurredandcontinues despitetheexistenceofstatutesdesigned to prevent theappointment
toortheretention inemployment inpublicoffice
andparticularly inthepublicschoolsofthe
stateofmembers ofanyorganization whichteachesoradvocatesthatthegovernment ofthe
UnitedStatesor ofanystateor ofanypoliticalsubdivision thereofshallbe overthrown by
forceorviolenceorbyanyunlawful means.Theconsequence ofanysuchinfiltration intothe
publicschoolsis thatsubversivepropaganda can be disseminated amongchildren of tender
yearsby thosewhoteachthemand to whomthechildren lookforguidance, authorityand
The legislature
leadership. findsthatmembers ofsuchgroupsfrequently use theiroffice
or
positionto advocateand teachsubversive doctrines.The legislature findsthatmembers of
suchgroupsare frequently boundby oath,agreement, pledge,or understanding to follow,
advocateandteacha prescribedpartylineorgroupdogmaordoctrine without regardto truth
or freeinquiry.The Legislaturefindsthatsuchdissemination of propagandamay be and
frequentlyis sufficiently
subtleto escapedetection in the classroom. . .." Declarationof
PolicyinnotetoN.Y. Education Law (McKinney, Supp.,I950) ? 3022.
25N.Y. EducationLaw (McKinney,Supp., I95o) ? 3022.
26Two companion cases,Thompson v. Wallin(Case #i), and L'Hommedieu v. Boardof
Regents(Case #2) decidedtogether at i96 N.Y. Misc.686,93 N.Y.S. 2d 274 (I949), found
theFeinberg Law was unconstitutional in thatit was a billofattainder,
in thatit failedto
establisha definite
standard ofproscribed conduct,andin thatitfailedto meettheminimum
requirement of due processas appliedto administrative agencies.The AppellateDivision
reversed thefirstcase brought on behalfof theCommunist Partyon thegrounds thatthe
preamble of a statuteis notpartof it, and cannotattaintanyone,and thatwhenand if
listedtheyhavea rightofjudicialreviewif denieddue process.Thompsonv. Wallin,276
App. Div. 463,95 N.Y.S. 2d 784 (1950).The appellatedivisionreversed thesecondcase,
brought onbehalfoffivepersons presentlyemployed intheNewYorkCityschoolsystemand
one retiredteacher, on thesamebasisand theadditionalgroundsthattheState maypre-
scribequalifications
foritsemployees, and thattheFeinberg Law doesnotabridgeanyof the

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298 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW

ablycomebeforethecourtofappealsat thisterm.27
The FeinbergLaw raisestheproblemof"guiltby association."28 The term
may ofcoursebe nothingbut a clicheof disapproval.It may,however, mean
the use of an individual'sassociations, entirelyapartfromanything else the
individualhas doneorsaid,as proofof"disloyalty."29 Allofan individual's ac-
tions,including his associations,may be relevant to judgments about his char-
acterorthedoctrines he advocates,and wherean attemptis beingmadeto de-
termine qualification fora positionoftrust,thereis no reasonto excludethem.
The Feinberg Law, however, givesauthority forgoingwellbeyondmembership
in associations,along with other in
matters, determining fitnessfora position
of trust.It sets a standard farmore restrictive than the President'sLoyalty
Order,30 whichmerelyprovidedthatmembership in an organization listedas
subversive by theAttorney Generalwas oneofsixelements to be considered in
determining theloyaltyof an employee.The FeinbergLaw ignoresthewell-
recognized factthatmenbelonging toa politicalpartydo notnecessarily adhere
to everyone of its aims. In short,thelaw changestheaphorismused in the
Russelldecisionto read: "As a man'sassociatesthink,so themanis."
Membershipin a proscribedorganization is primafacie evidenceof dis-
qualificationforemployment as a teacher.How maya teacherdefendhimself?
He may denythat the organization31 advocatesthe illegaloverthrow of the
government. This,substantially, puts on the individual teacher the burden of
disproving whatthegovernment tookelevenmonthsto provein therelatively

Asdirect
freedoms.
constitutional forthestatute's
authority thecourtcited
constitutionality,
UnitedPublicWorkers v. Mitchell,330 U.S. 75 (1947), whichupheldtheHatchActpro-
visions federal
forbidding employeestotakean activepartinpolitical L'Homme-
campaigns.
dieuv. Boardof Regents,276 App.Div. 494,95 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (1950).
a taxpayer's
In thesecondroundoflitigation, suit,thesupreme courtheldtheFeinberg
in thatit provided
Law unconstitutional forguiltbyassociation anddenialofdueprocess.
Ledermanv. Board ofEducation,i96 N.Y. Misc. 873,95 N.Y.S. 2d II4 (1949). The appellate
division
reversedon thesamegrounds as in theothercases,and on thegrounds thatthe
FeinbergLaw did notprovideforguiltby association, sincean employee might defendby
denyingmembership, denyingtheorganization advocatestheoverthrow of thegovernment
or denying
by violence, thathe had knowledge of suchadvocacy.Lederman v. Boardof
Education,276App.Div. 527,96 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (1950). As a resultof theseactionsthe
BoardofRegents hasbeenstayedfrommaking anydetermination undertheFeinberg Law.
Consultnote,35 Corn.L. Q. 824 (I950), fordetaileddiscussionofthelitigation.
27LetterfromtheAttorney General datedOctober 6th,1950.
28Consulttheperceptive comment Guiltby Association: ThreeWordsin Searchof a
Meaning,I7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I48 (1949).
29Ibid., at I57 et seq.
30 I2 Fed. RegisterI935 (I947). ConsultDurr,The LoyaltyOrder'sChallenge to the
Constitution,i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 298 (1949).
3' Astotheright ofproscribed organizations,consult Joint-Anti-FascistRefugee Committee
v. Clark,177 F. 2d 79 (App.D.C., I949) (no justiciable controversy), and Designation of
Organizations as Subversive,48 Col. L. Rev. I051 (I948), on theparallelfederalquestion.

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 COMMENTS 299
clearcase oftheCommunist Party.32His rightto appeal to thecourtsforreview
of the administrative findingin thismatteris questionable.33 He may deny
or
membership plead resignation good in faith. The ruleof evidencerunsfrom
tendays afterthepublicationofthelistings,but thepresumption runsdespite
resignation beforethattimein theabsenceofa showingofgoodfaith.34 If good
the
faithmeansmerelyaccepting Regents'determination to as the organiza-
tion'scharacterthelaw operatesto depriveorganizations of members.35Or it
operatesto inform stupidteachersoftheaimsoftheorganizations theybelong
to. If it meansgoodfaithin thathe no longersubscribesto thedoctrinesof the
organization, it raisestheguiltby associationproblemin an acute formforthe
teacherwhowishesto defendhimself in thelast,alternativeway: he maydeny
thathis membership in theorganization was such that it showsany personal
advocacy of the illegal overthrowof the government. The possibilityof a
teacherjoininga proscribed organization forotherreasons,suchas supportof
limitedlocal objectives,or in thehopeofalteringtheaimsoftheorganization,
is neatlydisposedof by the AttorneyGeneral."As the Courtpointedout in
NationalMaritimeUnionv. Herzog,78 F. Supp. at page 170, aff'd334 U.S. 854
'ifa memberofsuch[a] groupis ignorantofitsaims,hisignoranceis enoughto
disqualifyhimfora responsible post. If he is awareof theaims his enmityto
themis too weak to compelhimto foregoassociationwitha grouppursuing
thoseaims.',36 If a teacheris a memberofa proscribed organizationthereare
twosimpleand exhaustivepossibilities:he is a foolor a knave.This beingso,
membership in a proscribedorganizationmustdisqualifythe teacher.If the
doctrineofguiltbyassociationdoesnotproveto be partoftheFeinbergLaw, it
willbe becausetheBoard of Regentsinterprets thelaw in a mannerradically
different fromthatof theAttorneyGeneral.
The AppellateDivisionassertedthat theprimafacieprovisionof the law
was merelya changein an evidentiary procedureand thatno one had a vested
rightin a ruleof evidence.This is hornbooklaw, but it does notfollowthat a
ruleofevidencemayabridgethebasic requirement ofdue processoflaw in re-
gard to a fairhearingby administrative agencies.If the questionis, as the
Statesays,"personaladvocacy,"theassociationmerelybeingpresumptive evi-
dencethereof, it is difficult
to see howan individualmighthave a fairhearing
on thepersonal"guilt" questionunderthelaw or at least underthe interpre-
tationof thelaw givenby theAttorneyGeneral.
32 Consult
Judge Medina's charge to the jury in the Communistcase, United States v.
Foster,9 F.R.D. 367, 373 (I949).
33 See Friedmanv. Schwellenbach,159 F. 2d 22 (App. D.C.,
1946), cert.den. 330 U.S. 838
(I947).
34Regents Rules on SubversiveActivities? The law itselfmentionsonly mem-
255(2).
bership.
35 This wouldseem to raise a freespeech
question.But see AmericanCommunicationAss'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
36Thompsonv. Wallin,New York Courtof Appeals
(I950), respondent'sbriefat 77.

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300 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW

II
The University ofCalifornia has forovera yearbeentornby controversy37
overvarious"loyalty"oathsandcontractclauses38 thathavebeenaddedto the
constitutionally requiredoath39as a conditionof employment. In Aprilthe
BoardofRegentsadopteda compromise wherebynonsigners mightappearbe-
foretheFacultyCommittee on Privilegeand Tenureas an alternative to sign-
ingtheoath.40The Regents,however, reserved finaljudgmentin suchcasesto
themselves.4' In Julythe Regentsfollowedthe recommendation of the Com-
mitteeandreappointed fortynonsigners. Theydidnotreappoint157nonfaculty
employees (belowtherankofinstructor ornonacademic). Thismaybe attribut-
ed inpartto thenormallaborturnover.42 In AugusttheRegentsreversed their
actionon the "approved"nonsigners, whobecauseoffivesigningsand three
resignations wereonly32 in number, and orderedthemto sign.43 Thereupona
of
group twenty"approved"nonsigners the
petitioned third courtof
district
appeals fora writof mandate the
ordering Regents to issue them letters of
appointment.44
The petitioners urgedthattheirpositionswerepublicoffices, and therefore
theirappointments at theJulymeeting wereirrevocable.45 WhiletheCalifornia
law is to theeffect thatappointments to publicofficesare irrevocable,46
there
is no holdingas to whether professors are publicofficers.In viewof thefact
that the University of Californiais a constitutional department of govern-
ment47 and thatitsmostvitalfunctions areperformed by thefaculty, it would
seemthebetterruleto holdthatfacultymembers arepublicofficers.
37Consult TheYearoftheOath(I95o).
Stewart,
38 Typicalofthevariousoathsandcontract clausesis: "Havingtakentheconstitutional
oathofoffice ofpublicofficials
required oftheStateofCalifornia,I hereby formallyacknowl-
edgemyacceptance oftheposition andsalarynamed, andalsostatethatI amnota member
of theCommunist Partyor anyotherorganization whichadvocatestheoverthrow of the
Government byforceor violence, and thatI haveno commitments in conflictwithmyre-
withrespectto impartial
sponsibilities and freepursuit
scholarship of truth.I understand
thattheforegoingstatementis a conditionofmyemployment anda consideration ofpayment
ofmysalary."Resolution oftheRegents oftheUniversity ofCalifornia,April2ist, 1950.
39Calif.Const.ArtXX, ? 3.
oftheRegents
4? Resolution oftheUniversityofCalifornia,April2ist, 1950.
4' Ibid.
43Minutes
oftheRegents' ofJuly2Ist, I950;Stewart,
Meeting TheYearoftheOathI39
(i950).
43Minutesof theRegents' ofAugust25th,I950.
Meeting
44PetitionforWritofMandate,DistrictCourtofAppeals,ThirdDistrict,
StateofCali-
No. 7946(I950).
fornia,
in SupportofPetition
4sPointsand Authorities forWritofMandate,DistrictCourtof
Appeals,ThirdDistrict, No. 7946,at 8 (i95o).
StateofCalifornia,
46MacAlisterv. Baker,139Cal. App.183,33 P. 2d 469 (1934).
47Calif.Const.ArtXX, ? 3.

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 COMMENTS 30I
The relativelysmallnumberofcases expounding48 thisviewmaywellbe due
to thetendencyto decidethesecases on thequestionof "the rightto workfor
the state." If the Californiaprofessors are not public officers, theyhave no
contractualrightto be employed,whatevertheunderstanding may have been
as to the "morally"bindingeffectof the recommendations of the Committee
on Privilegeand Tenure.Only afteracceptanceof theirappointment would
theyhave an ordinarycontractualclaim.The state,likeany otheremployer,
may withinconstitutionaland statutorylimitsemploywhom it pleases.49
Whetherthe Regentshave gonebeyondtheselimitsdependsin largepart on
thepositiontakenon thesecondpointthepetitionraises.
The petitioners urgedas theirsecondpoint that the CaliforniaConstitu-
tionprovidesan oathforpublicofficers and personsexecuting publictrustsand
forbidsall otheroathsor tests.50The newlyrequiredoaths,in wordswhichthe
United States SupremeCourt used in a similarconnection,"presumes...
guilt"and deniestherightto "teach unlessthepresumption be firstremoved
by theirexpurgatory oath-in other words . .. [it] assume[s]the guilt and
adjudge[s]punishmentconditionally."51 In the absence of any showingof
is
disloyaltyit notsurprising thatmembersof thefacultyofthe Universityof
Californiabitterlyresentpresumptions that the facultyis composedof con-
spiratorialand seditiouspersons.Whatis thepurposeofestablishing constitu-
tionaloaths as exclusive?In regardto a similarprovisiona New York court
said thepurposewas "to preventthesubjectionof an official to any ordeal to
ascertainhispolitical,religious
orsocialviews."52 The petitioners have takenthe
constitutionaloathandconsider itadequate.Even iftheconstitutional oathwere
notexclusivein termsit wouldhave to be interpreted to be so.s3The Supreme
48 Oneofthefewsquareholdings
to thiseffect
is Easonv. Majors,inI Neb. 288,x96N.W.
I33 (1923).
49Whileitis truethatnoonehasa constitutional righttoa job it is alsotruethateveryone
has a legallyenforceable interest
in notbeingunconstitutionally barredfroma job, publicor
private.Aliensmaynotunderthepolicepowerof thestatesbe arbitrarily excludedfrom
privateemployment by statuteevenwhereit is nota totalexclusion, Truaxv. Raich,239
U.S. 33 (1915), thoughcitizensmaybe givenpreference by the stateas employer, Heim
v. McCall,239 U.S. I75 (I915); Cranev. New York,239 U.S. i95 (I9I5). The state in
itscapacityas employer maynotconstitutionally establishdiscriminatory salaryscaleson the
basisofrace,Alstonv. SchoolBoard,I 2 F. 2d 992 (C.A. 4th,1940). Federalemployees have
a legalinterestin theirjobssuchthata legislative act deprivingthemoftheirjobs by name
is punishment withintheconstitutional prohibition againstbillsofattainder, UnitedStates
v. Lovett,328 U.S. 303 (I946). The properstatement of the matterseems to be one of
JusticeCardozo:"It is truethattheindividual, thougha citizen,has no legalrightin any
particularinstance to be selected
as a contractor bythegovernment. It doesnotfollow, how-
ever,thathe maybe declareddisqualified . .. unlesstheproscription bearsomerelationto
theadvancement ofthepublicwelfare." Peoplev. Crane,214 N.Y. 154, i6o, io8 N.E. 427, 43I
(19I5).
soCalif. Const. Art.XX, ? 3.
s"Cummings v. Missouri,4 Wall.(U.S.) 277,325(x866).
s5Rogersv. Buffalo, 3 N.Y. Supp.67I, 674 (i888).
s3 i Storyon theConstitution ? 625 (1891).

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302 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW

CourtofNew Jerseyrecently struckdownas unconstitutional a loyaltyoath

whichhad beenadded to a constitutional oath not exclusivein termson the
groundthata powerto add to therequiredoathwouldin effect be a powerto
amendtheconstitution.54 Whathas beensaid abouttheoathappliesas wellto
the contractclauseswhichwerefranksubstitutes. The traditional American
wariness ofoathslendsstrong support to the petitioners'view as to theadequacy
ofthelongestablished constitutional oath.
Again,as inNewYork,thetradition ofindividualculpability givesway,this
a
timeto presumption of guiltto be purgedaway by an oath. Sincenotone
chargeofdisloyalty has beenleveledat an individualfacultymembertheonly
clearcutresultsoftheloyaltyoathhavebeenthedropping of48 coursesat the
University thisautumn55 and therecommendation ofa learnedsocietythatits
members refuseemployment at theUniversity ofCalifornia untilthesituation
Whatevermeritstheoathmayultimately
is clarified.56 proveto have,57 it can
hardlybe defendedas havinga beneficial effect on theUniversity in its short
termapplication.
III
The actionstakenin regardto teachers'loyaltyin NewYorkand California
posea graveproblem.The concreteresultsin NewYorkarenotclear.In Cali-
fornia, theUniversity's curriculum has suffered. To theextentthatsuchloyalty
probingis nationwide, it sets a potentially moredangerouspatternthanthe
relatively isolatedcontextsoftheScopesand Russellcases.
If thelegislaturesofNew Yorkand California had takenthedirectrouteof
making itunlawful forcommunists orfellow travelers to teach,thestandards of
to
proofrequired disqualify a teacher would be more rigid.However,solving
theissuein sucha mannerwouldraisemoreseriousproblems. The prohibition
against bills of attainder would seem to preclude them from namingthe or-
ganizations to which no teacher could lawfullybelong. To have madethepre-
sumption an
of"guilt"operateas irrebuttable one, with the proscribed organi-
zationsand affiliations to be determined by an administrative agency,would
have setup an absolutedoctrineofguiltby association, eventhoughit would
haveavoidedthebillofattainder objection.It wouldalsomeana morestringent
restriction on the traditional freedom of speech.This thelegislatures are ap-
parentlyunwillingto do. Thus the paradoxremains:to avoid the buckshot
approachadoptedin New Yorkand California meanscompleteacceptanceof
doctrines abhorrent to democratic ideals.
One mustassumethatthevastmajorityofteachersareloyal.One mustas-
s4Imbriev. Marsh,3 N.J. 578, 7I A. 2d 352 (1950).
5sN.Y. Times,p. i, col. 2 (Sept.I9, 1950).
56TheAmerican Psychological Association hastakenthisaction.N.Y. Times,p. I9,col.2
(Sept.9, g50o).
57The ultimatemeritsofloyaltyoathsin California willprobably
be decidedon quite
different
grounds as theStateofCaliforniahas enacteda lawrequiring oathofall
a loyalty
N.Y. Times,p. 23,col.2 (Oct.4, 1950).
stateemployees.

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 COMMENTS 303
sumethattheyare in thebestpositionto detectdisloyalty,and thattheywill
be alert to the dangerof seditiouspersonsin the schools.It is moreforthe
regents,thecourts,and thelegislatures, withwhomtheultimatesafeguarding
oflibertyrests,toguardagainsttheschoolsbecomingforums forpartisanpoliti-
cal maneuvering.
If it is thecommonreportthatour schoolsare infiltrated with"subversive
persons" it is also the common reportthat the schoolsface a crisisin giving
Americansthe educationtheymusthave. If theyare to meetthat crisis,not
only the physicalproblemsof buildingsand financemustbe solved,but the
problemofpersonnel mustbe conquered.A patternofconstanttestingofteach-
ersforpoliticalinnocuousness is hardlylikelyto drawthesortof teacherwho
wouldimbuechildrenwitha vigorouslove ofjustice,democraticprinciples, or
country.
Socrates,answering thecommonreportthathe was a subversiveand a cor-
rupterofyouth,said ofone ofhis accusers:"He says thatI am a doerof evil
and corrupttheyouth,but I say to menofAthens,thatMeletusis a doer of
evil in thathe pretendsto be in earnestwhenhe is onlyin jest and is so eager
to bringmento trialfroma pretendedzeal and interestin mattersin whichhe
reallyneverhad thesmallestinterest."58

RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES AND THE NATIONAL

RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
In twocases decidedin the springof I950o, the SupremeCourt,by a new
construction of the 1934amendments to theRailwayLabor Act (RLA),2 con-
ferredupon the NationalRailroadAdjustmentBoard (NRAB) exclusivepri-
maryjurisdiction of disputesinvolvingthe interpretationand applicationof
collective-bargainingagreements in the railroadindustry.The effectof these
decisionsis to denypartiesto the disputesinitialresortto state and federal
courts,and to limitjudicialconsideration ofthesecontroversies
mainlyto suits
in federalcourtsfortheenforcement ofNRAB awards. This holdinginvitesa
closerscrutiny oftheNRAB's internaloperationand itsrelationto thesystem
of collectivebargaining in therailroadindustry.

I
The courtshave come to regardcollective-bargaining
agreementsas con-
tractswhichmaybe enforcedbyanyemployeewhoiscoveredbythem,3 regard-
s8Plato,Apology,
WorksofPlato67 (Mod.Lib. ed., I928).
Slocumv. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Orderof Ry. Conductors
v.
SouthernR. Co.,339U.S. 255 (I950).
2
44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended,48 Stat. Ix85 (I934), 45 U.S.C.A. ? I5i (X943).
withthesuitto enforce
3 An earlydifficulty a collective-bargaining as
a con-
agreement
tractwasfoundbysomecourtsinthelackofconsideration
fromtheindividual who
employee

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