Professional Documents
Culture Documents
University of Chicago Law Review Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To The University of Chicago Law Review
University of Chicago Law Review Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To The University of Chicago Law Review
Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter, 1951), pp. 293-303
Published by: University of Chicago Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1597682
Accessed: 13-01-2016 17:28 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1597682?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
University of Chicago Law Review is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The University of
Chicago Law Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 293
Sucha provisionstatesan equitable,simple,legallyeleganttestforliability.
It findsa rightful
place in a code that is trulyCommercial:one designedto
servecommerce.
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
294 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 295
teaching,that the New York and Californiaactionsdeal. Two cases which
centeredaround individualteachers,and which,dramaticallyat least, were
highpointsin theacademicfreedom of theperiodfromtheearly
controversies
twentiesto todaymaytherefore serveas an appropriateintroduction to thedis-
cussionof theCaliforniaand New York actions.
JohnScopes,a Tennesseepublicschoolteacher,was broughtto trialundera
statute'0makingit criminalto teach any theorywhichdenied the storyof
divinecreationand assertedinsteadthatman was descendedfromlowerani-
mals. At the trialof the case, WilliamJennings Bryanand ClarenceDarrow
battledoverthemeritsof"evolution."It was a greatspectacle,"I but thelegal
issueswereobscured.In reversing theverdictofguiltyon a technicality,'2 the
Supreme Court ofTennessee took the unusualstepof saying thatsince Scopes
was no longerworking forthestatea nolleprossewas desirable.But thecourt
had something to say on themeritsas well.
The courtassertedthatScopescouldnotcomplainof a deprivation ofrights
withoutdue processoflaw forhispositionwas merelythatofan employeewho
had onlythechoicebetweenworkingon thetermsoffered to himor not at all.
"He had no rightto servethe state excepton such termsas the state pre-
scribed .... [T]hestatutebeforeus is notan exerciseofthepolicepower,... it
is an act ofthestateas a corporation,a proprietor,
an employer.... In dealing
withitsownemployeesengagedon itsownwork,thestateis nothamperedby
thelimitations ofSection8 Articlei oftheTennesseeConstitution or the I4th
Amendment to the Constitutionof the UnitedStates."13This assertionwas to
be made by othercourtsat a laterdate.
BertrandRussellwasappointedin I940 to thepostofProfessor ofPhilosophy
in the CityCollegeof New York.He was to teachadvancedlogic,thephilos-
ophyof mathematics, and the relationof philosophyto the sciences.'4A tax-
payersued forand obtainedan orderdeclaringthe appointment of Professor
Russellvoid and prohibiting thecity'sBoard ofHigherEducationfromhiring
him in any capacity.-IThougha numberof groundswere offered, the case
all timesbeaccurate,
shouldexercise
appropriate shouldshowrespect
restraint, fortheopinions
ofothers, andshouldmakeeveryeffort
toindicate
thatheis notan institutional
spokesman."
35 A.A.U.P. Bulletin67 (I949).
10Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) ?
2344.
," A transcript
of the trialwas publishedas The World'sMost Famous Court Trial (1925).
12 The court
heldthatthetrialjudgehad exceededhisconstitutionalpowersin settinga
fineofover$50.Scopesv. State,i54 Tenn.105, 289 S.W. 363 (I927).
3Ibid.,at i I and 364.
14Minutes oftheProceedings
oftheBoardofHigherEducationoftheCityofNew York,
Marchi8th, I940.
Is Kay v. Board of HigherEducation,I73 N.Y. Misc. 943, i8 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (I940), unani-
mouslyaffirmed
without
opinion259 App.Div. 879,20 N.Y.S. 2d Ioi6 (I940). A thorough
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
296 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
I
New York statutesprohibittheemployment ofpersonswhoadvocatethe
overthrowof the governmentby illegal Thoughthesestatuteshave
means.20
in
neverbeenchallenged court, there wouldseem to be no valid objectionto
them;theirlanguagecloselyfollowsthe state and federalseditionstatutes
whichhave beenupheld.2IThe statemayproperly discharge one guiltyofim-
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 297
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
298 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
ablycomebeforethecourtofappealsat thisterm.27
The FeinbergLaw raisestheproblemof"guiltby association."28 The term
may ofcoursebe nothingbut a clicheof disapproval.It may,however, mean
the use of an individual'sassociations, entirelyapartfromanything else the
individualhas doneorsaid,as proofof"disloyalty."29 Allofan individual's ac-
tions,including his associations,may be relevant to judgments about his char-
acterorthedoctrines he advocates,and wherean attemptis beingmadeto de-
termine qualification fora positionoftrust,thereis no reasonto excludethem.
The Feinberg Law, however, givesauthority forgoingwellbeyondmembership
in associations,along with other in
matters, determining fitnessfora position
of trust.It sets a standard farmore restrictive than the President'sLoyalty
Order,30 whichmerelyprovidedthatmembership in an organization listedas
subversive by theAttorney Generalwas oneofsixelements to be considered in
determining theloyaltyof an employee.The FeinbergLaw ignoresthewell-
recognized factthatmenbelonging toa politicalpartydo notnecessarily adhere
to everyone of its aims. In short,thelaw changestheaphorismused in the
Russelldecisionto read: "As a man'sassociatesthink,so themanis."
Membershipin a proscribedorganization is primafacie evidenceof dis-
qualificationforemployment as a teacher.How maya teacherdefendhimself?
He may denythat the organization31 advocatesthe illegaloverthrow of the
government. This,substantially, puts on the individual teacher the burden of
disproving whatthegovernment tookelevenmonthsto provein therelatively
Asdirect
freedoms.
constitutional forthestatute's
authority thecourtcited
constitutionality,
UnitedPublicWorkers v. Mitchell,330 U.S. 75 (1947), whichupheldtheHatchActpro-
visions federal
forbidding employeestotakean activepartinpolitical L'Homme-
campaigns.
dieuv. Boardof Regents,276 App.Div. 494,95 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (1950).
a taxpayer's
In thesecondroundoflitigation, suit,thesupreme courtheldtheFeinberg
in thatit provided
Law unconstitutional forguiltbyassociation anddenialofdueprocess.
Ledermanv. Board ofEducation,i96 N.Y. Misc. 873,95 N.Y.S. 2d II4 (1949). The appellate
division
reversedon thesamegrounds as in theothercases,and on thegrounds thatthe
FeinbergLaw did notprovideforguiltby association, sincean employee might defendby
denyingmembership, denyingtheorganization advocatestheoverthrow of thegovernment
or denying
by violence, thathe had knowledge of suchadvocacy.Lederman v. Boardof
Education,276App.Div. 527,96 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (1950). As a resultof theseactionsthe
BoardofRegents hasbeenstayedfrommaking anydetermination undertheFeinberg Law.
Consultnote,35 Corn.L. Q. 824 (I950), fordetaileddiscussionofthelitigation.
27LetterfromtheAttorney General datedOctober 6th,1950.
28Consulttheperceptive comment Guiltby Association: ThreeWordsin Searchof a
Meaning,I7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I48 (1949).
29Ibid., at I57 et seq.
30 I2 Fed. RegisterI935 (I947). ConsultDurr,The LoyaltyOrder'sChallenge to the
Constitution,i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 298 (1949).
3' Astotheright ofproscribed organizations,consult Joint-Anti-FascistRefugee Committee
v. Clark,177 F. 2d 79 (App.D.C., I949) (no justiciable controversy), and Designation of
Organizations as Subversive,48 Col. L. Rev. I051 (I948), on theparallelfederalquestion.
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 299
clearcase oftheCommunist Party.32His rightto appeal to thecourtsforreview
of the administrative findingin thismatteris questionable.33 He may deny
or
membership plead resignation good in faith. The ruleof evidencerunsfrom
tendays afterthepublicationofthelistings,but thepresumption runsdespite
resignation beforethattimein theabsenceofa showingofgoodfaith.34 If good
the
faithmeansmerelyaccepting Regents'determination to as the organiza-
tion'scharacterthelaw operatesto depriveorganizations of members.35Or it
operatesto inform stupidteachersoftheaimsoftheorganizations theybelong
to. If it meansgoodfaithin thathe no longersubscribesto thedoctrinesof the
organization, it raisestheguiltby associationproblemin an acute formforthe
teacherwhowishesto defendhimself in thelast,alternativeway: he maydeny
thathis membership in theorganization was such that it showsany personal
advocacy of the illegal overthrowof the government. The possibilityof a
teacherjoininga proscribed organization forotherreasons,suchas supportof
limitedlocal objectives,or in thehopeofalteringtheaimsoftheorganization,
is neatlydisposedof by the AttorneyGeneral."As the Courtpointedout in
NationalMaritimeUnionv. Herzog,78 F. Supp. at page 170, aff'd334 U.S. 854
'ifa memberofsuch[a] groupis ignorantofitsaims,hisignoranceis enoughto
disqualifyhimfora responsible post. If he is awareof theaims his enmityto
themis too weak to compelhimto foregoassociationwitha grouppursuing
thoseaims.',36 If a teacheris a memberofa proscribed organizationthereare
twosimpleand exhaustivepossibilities:he is a foolor a knave.This beingso,
membership in a proscribedorganizationmustdisqualifythe teacher.If the
doctrineofguiltbyassociationdoesnotproveto be partoftheFeinbergLaw, it
willbe becausetheBoard of Regentsinterprets thelaw in a mannerradically
different fromthatof theAttorneyGeneral.
The AppellateDivisionassertedthat theprimafacieprovisionof the law
was merelya changein an evidentiary procedureand thatno one had a vested
rightin a ruleof evidence.This is hornbooklaw, but it does notfollowthat a
ruleofevidencemayabridgethebasic requirement ofdue processoflaw in re-
gard to a fairhearingby administrative agencies.If the questionis, as the
Statesays,"personaladvocacy,"theassociationmerelybeingpresumptive evi-
dencethereof, it is difficult
to see howan individualmighthave a fairhearing
on thepersonal"guilt" questionunderthelaw or at least underthe interpre-
tationof thelaw givenby theAttorneyGeneral.
32 Consult
Judge Medina's charge to the jury in the Communistcase, United States v.
Foster,9 F.R.D. 367, 373 (I949).
33 See Friedmanv. Schwellenbach,159 F. 2d 22 (App. D.C.,
1946), cert.den. 330 U.S. 838
(I947).
34Regents Rules on SubversiveActivities? The law itselfmentionsonly mem-
255(2).
bership.
35 This wouldseem to raise a freespeech
question.But see AmericanCommunicationAss'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
36Thompsonv. Wallin,New York Courtof Appeals
(I950), respondent'sbriefat 77.
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
300 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
II
The University ofCalifornia has forovera yearbeentornby controversy37
overvarious"loyalty"oathsandcontractclauses38 thathavebeenaddedto the
constitutionally requiredoath39as a conditionof employment. In Aprilthe
BoardofRegentsadopteda compromise wherebynonsigners mightappearbe-
foretheFacultyCommittee on Privilegeand Tenureas an alternative to sign-
ingtheoath.40The Regents,however, reserved finaljudgmentin suchcasesto
themselves.4' In Julythe Regentsfollowedthe recommendation of the Com-
mitteeandreappointed fortynonsigners. Theydidnotreappoint157nonfaculty
employees (belowtherankofinstructor ornonacademic). Thismaybe attribut-
ed inpartto thenormallaborturnover.42 In AugusttheRegentsreversed their
actionon the "approved"nonsigners, whobecauseoffivesigningsand three
resignations wereonly32 in number, and orderedthemto sign.43 Thereupona
of
group twenty"approved"nonsigners the
petitioned third courtof
district
appeals fora writof mandate the
ordering Regents to issue them letters of
appointment.44
The petitioners urgedthattheirpositionswerepublicoffices, and therefore
theirappointments at theJulymeeting wereirrevocable.45 WhiletheCalifornia
law is to theeffect thatappointments to publicofficesare irrevocable,46
there
is no holdingas to whether professors are publicofficers.In viewof thefact
that the University of Californiais a constitutional department of govern-
ment47 and thatitsmostvitalfunctions areperformed by thefaculty, it would
seemthebetterruleto holdthatfacultymembers arepublicofficers.
37Consult TheYearoftheOath(I95o).
Stewart,
38 Typicalofthevariousoathsandcontract clausesis: "Havingtakentheconstitutional
oathofoffice ofpublicofficials
required oftheStateofCalifornia,I hereby formallyacknowl-
edgemyacceptance oftheposition andsalarynamed, andalsostatethatI amnota member
of theCommunist Partyor anyotherorganization whichadvocatestheoverthrow of the
Government byforceor violence, and thatI haveno commitments in conflictwithmyre-
withrespectto impartial
sponsibilities and freepursuit
scholarship of truth.I understand
thattheforegoingstatementis a conditionofmyemployment anda consideration ofpayment
ofmysalary."Resolution oftheRegents oftheUniversity ofCalifornia,April2ist, 1950.
39Calif.Const.ArtXX, ? 3.
oftheRegents
4? Resolution oftheUniversityofCalifornia,April2ist, 1950.
4' Ibid.
43Minutes
oftheRegents' ofJuly2Ist, I950;Stewart,
Meeting TheYearoftheOathI39
(i950).
43Minutesof theRegents' ofAugust25th,I950.
Meeting
44PetitionforWritofMandate,DistrictCourtofAppeals,ThirdDistrict,
StateofCali-
No. 7946(I950).
fornia,
in SupportofPetition
4sPointsand Authorities forWritofMandate,DistrictCourtof
Appeals,ThirdDistrict, No. 7946,at 8 (i95o).
StateofCalifornia,
46MacAlisterv. Baker,139Cal. App.183,33 P. 2d 469 (1934).
47Calif.Const.ArtXX, ? 3.
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 30I
The relativelysmallnumberofcases expounding48 thisviewmaywellbe due
to thetendencyto decidethesecases on thequestionof "the rightto workfor
the state." If the Californiaprofessors are not public officers, theyhave no
contractualrightto be employed,whatevertheunderstanding may have been
as to the "morally"bindingeffectof the recommendations of the Committee
on Privilegeand Tenure.Only afteracceptanceof theirappointment would
theyhave an ordinarycontractualclaim.The state,likeany otheremployer,
may withinconstitutionaland statutorylimitsemploywhom it pleases.49
Whetherthe Regentshave gonebeyondtheselimitsdependsin largepart on
thepositiontakenon thesecondpointthepetitionraises.
The petitioners urgedas theirsecondpoint that the CaliforniaConstitu-
tionprovidesan oathforpublicofficers and personsexecuting publictrustsand
forbidsall otheroathsor tests.50The newlyrequiredoaths,in wordswhichthe
United States SupremeCourt used in a similarconnection,"presumes...
guilt"and deniestherightto "teach unlessthepresumption be firstremoved
by theirexpurgatory oath-in other words . .. [it] assume[s]the guilt and
adjudge[s]punishmentconditionally."51 In the absence of any showingof
is
disloyaltyit notsurprising thatmembersof thefacultyofthe Universityof
Californiabitterlyresentpresumptions that the facultyis composedof con-
spiratorialand seditiouspersons.Whatis thepurposeofestablishing constitu-
tionaloaths as exclusive?In regardto a similarprovisiona New York court
said thepurposewas "to preventthesubjectionof an official to any ordeal to
ascertainhispolitical,religious
orsocialviews."52 The petitioners have takenthe
constitutionaloathandconsider itadequate.Even iftheconstitutional oathwere
notexclusivein termsit wouldhave to be interpreted to be so.s3The Supreme
48 Oneofthefewsquareholdings
to thiseffect
is Easonv. Majors,inI Neb. 288,x96N.W.
I33 (1923).
49Whileitis truethatnoonehasa constitutional righttoa job it is alsotruethateveryone
has a legallyenforceable interest
in notbeingunconstitutionally barredfroma job, publicor
private.Aliensmaynotunderthepolicepowerof thestatesbe arbitrarily excludedfrom
privateemployment by statuteevenwhereit is nota totalexclusion, Truaxv. Raich,239
U.S. 33 (1915), thoughcitizensmaybe givenpreference by the stateas employer, Heim
v. McCall,239 U.S. I75 (I915); Cranev. New York,239 U.S. i95 (I9I5). The state in
itscapacityas employer maynotconstitutionally establishdiscriminatory salaryscaleson the
basisofrace,Alstonv. SchoolBoard,I 2 F. 2d 992 (C.A. 4th,1940). Federalemployees have
a legalinterestin theirjobssuchthata legislative act deprivingthemoftheirjobs by name
is punishment withintheconstitutional prohibition againstbillsofattainder, UnitedStates
v. Lovett,328 U.S. 303 (I946). The properstatement of the matterseems to be one of
JusticeCardozo:"It is truethattheindividual, thougha citizen,has no legalrightin any
particularinstance to be selected
as a contractor bythegovernment. It doesnotfollow, how-
ever,thathe maybe declareddisqualified . .. unlesstheproscription bearsomerelationto
theadvancement ofthepublicwelfare." Peoplev. Crane,214 N.Y. 154, i6o, io8 N.E. 427, 43I
(19I5).
soCalif. Const. Art.XX, ? 3.
s"Cummings v. Missouri,4 Wall.(U.S.) 277,325(x866).
s5Rogersv. Buffalo, 3 N.Y. Supp.67I, 674 (i888).
s3 i Storyon theConstitution ? 625 (1891).
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
302 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENTS 303
sumethattheyare in thebestpositionto detectdisloyalty,and thattheywill
be alert to the dangerof seditiouspersonsin the schools.It is moreforthe
regents,thecourts,and thelegislatures, withwhomtheultimatesafeguarding
oflibertyrests,toguardagainsttheschoolsbecomingforums forpartisanpoliti-
cal maneuvering.
If it is thecommonreportthatour schoolsare infiltrated with"subversive
persons" it is also the common reportthat the schoolsface a crisisin giving
Americansthe educationtheymusthave. If theyare to meetthat crisis,not
only the physicalproblemsof buildingsand financemustbe solved,but the
problemofpersonnel mustbe conquered.A patternofconstanttestingofteach-
ersforpoliticalinnocuousness is hardlylikelyto drawthesortof teacherwho
wouldimbuechildrenwitha vigorouslove ofjustice,democraticprinciples, or
country.
Socrates,answering thecommonreportthathe was a subversiveand a cor-
rupterofyouth,said ofone ofhis accusers:"He says thatI am a doerof evil
and corrupttheyouth,but I say to menofAthens,thatMeletusis a doer of
evil in thathe pretendsto be in earnestwhenhe is onlyin jest and is so eager
to bringmento trialfroma pretendedzeal and interestin mattersin whichhe
reallyneverhad thesmallestinterest."58
I
The courtshave come to regardcollective-bargaining
agreementsas con-
tractswhichmaybe enforcedbyanyemployeewhoiscoveredbythem,3 regard-
s8Plato,Apology,
WorksofPlato67 (Mod.Lib. ed., I928).
Slocumv. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Orderof Ry. Conductors
v.
SouthernR. Co.,339U.S. 255 (I950).
2
44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended,48 Stat. Ix85 (I934), 45 U.S.C.A. ? I5i (X943).
withthesuitto enforce
3 An earlydifficulty a collective-bargaining as
a con-
agreement
tractwasfoundbysomecourtsinthelackofconsideration
fromtheindividual who
employee
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:28:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions