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Joint Publication 3-27
T OF T H
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Homeland Defense
10 April 2018
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides joint doctrine for homeland defense.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of
the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for
military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces,
and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of
authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes
joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed
Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication
to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a
manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of
objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed
except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination
with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific
guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition)
military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United
States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and
follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent
with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
i
Preface
Intentionally Blank
ii JP 3-27
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-27
DATED 29 JULY 2013
• Reorganizes Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Homeland Defense,” to describe

homeland security (HS), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and
homeland defense (HD) as a unified approach; adds more information on
Department of Homeland Security’s mission with respect to HS and the
transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional nature of the transnational
threat environment; adds information on unmanned aircraft systems, global
campaign plans, and incident awareness and assessment; updates laws, policies,
and terminology; and enhances the succinctness of the chapter.
• Adds information to Chapter II, “Command Relationships and

Interorganizational Cooperation,” on unified action and properly defines United
States Coast Guard’s (USCG’s) HD roles and the differences between maritime
homeland security (MHS) and maritime homeland defense (MHD) tasks, as well
as the required coordination between US Navy and USCG.
• Adds to Chapter II, “Command Relationships and Interorganizational

Cooperation,” US Alaskan Command and removes Joint Task Force–Alaska;
clarifies US Pacific Command’s role in HD and the MHD execute order; and
updates terminology and references to other joint publications.
• Covers Chapter III, “Planning and Operations for Homeland Defense,”

operations in all domains for homeland defense; adds paragraph on MHS
support to strategic sealift; aligns information operations as one of the seven joint
functions; clarifies roles and responsibilities for homeland ballistic missile
defense; expands cyberspace operations and critical infrastructure protection;
and moves joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration verbiage
to more pertinent location.
• Updates Appendix A, “Relationships Betweeen Homeland Security, Homeland

Defense and Defense Support of civil Authorities,” to reflect changes made by
National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2017 and adds a more concise
diagram depicting the relationship between HS, HD, and DSCA.
• Revises the explanation and mission of multiple interorganizational agencies

within the United States Government in Appendix B, “Facilitating
Interorganizational Cooperation.”
• Updates Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions,

Organization, and Structure,” definitions and provides for a more succinct
document.
• Updates references used throughout the document and removes extraneous

descriptors for Appendix D, “References.”
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Summary of Changes
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF HOMELAND DEFENSE
 General ........................................................................................................................ I-1

 Threats......................................................................................................................... I-4
 Homeland Defense Policy and Legal Considerations ................................................. I-5
 Active, Layered Defense ............................................................................................. I-9
 The Homeland Defense Operational Framework ..................................................... I-10
CHAPTER II
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL
COOPERATION
 General .......................................................................................................................II-1
 Unified Action ...........................................................................................................II-1
 Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities .......................................II-3
 Interagency Coordination.........................................................................................II-16
 Interorganizational Cooperation Considerations .....................................................II-21
 Multinational Forces ................................................................................................II-21
CHAPTER III
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
 General ..................................................................................................................... III-1

 Strategic Guidance ................................................................................................... III-1
 Operational Factors .................................................................................................. III-1
 Intelligence Sharing for Homeland Defense ............................................................ III-3
 Joint Fires ................................................................................................................. III-4
 Movement and Maneuver in the Conduct of Homeland Defense............................ III-5
 Protection ............................................................................................................... III-19
 Sustainment ............................................................................................................ III-26
 Other Activities and Efforts ................................................................................... III-31
APPENDIX
A Relationships Between Homeland Security, Homeland Defense,

and Defense Support of Civil Authorities ................................................. A-1
B Facilitating Interorganizational Cooperation .............................................B-1
C North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions,
Organization, and Structure........................................................................C-1
D Joint Task Force Headquarters Enabling Capabilities Points of Contact ..... D-1
E References ................................................................................................. E-1
F Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... F-1
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Table of Contents
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-8
FIGURE
I-1 Homeland Defense Transnational Threat Environment .............................. I-5

I-2 Guidance and Policy for the Intelligence Oversight Program..................... I-7
II-1 United States Northern Command Homeland Defense Command
Relationships ..............................................................................................II-7
II-2 Maritime Homeland Defense and Maritime Homeland Security
Command Relationships ............................................................................II-9
III-1 Homeland Defense Land Operations Rapid Response Process ............... III-7
III-2 Homeland Defense Land Operations Sustained Response Process ......... III-9
A-1 Relationships Between Homeland Defense, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities, and Homeland Security Missions ............................ A-2
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
• Discusses fundamentals of homeland defense (HD), to include threats; policy and

legal considerations; active, layered defense; and the HD operational framework
• Describes command relationships and interorganizational cooperation in HD
• Outlines strategic guidance, operational factors, intelligence sharing, and joint

functions considerations for planning and operations for homeland defense
Fundamentals of Homeland Defense
The United States Government (USG) employs all

instruments of national power to continuously
detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the
homeland. This national imperative translates
operationally into homeland security (HS), defense
support of civil authorities (DSCA), and homeland
defense (HD). The Department of Defense (DOD)
is the lead federal agency (LFA) for defending
against traditional external threats or aggression
(e.g., nation-state conventional forces or weapons
of mass destruction attack) and against external
asymmetric threats that are outside of the scope of
HS operations. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is the LFA for HS, and the United
States Coast Guard (USCG) is the LFA for
maritime homeland security (MHS). By law, DOD
is responsible for two missions in the homeland:
DSCA and HD.
HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory,

domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression or other
threats, as directed by the President of the US.
DOD executes HD by detecting, deterring,

preventing, and defeating threats from actors of
concern as far forward from the homeland as
possible. HD is executed across the active, layered
defense construct composed of the forward
regions, the approaches, and the homeland.
Commander, United States Northern Command
(CDRUSNORTHCOM), and Commander, United
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States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are

the supported commanders for HD in their
respective areas of responsibility (AORs), with all
other combatant commanders (CCDRs) as
supporting commanders.
Threats The homeland is confronted by a variety of both

disparate and interrelated threats that demand
coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts
among interagency partners responsible for law
enforcement and national defense, particularly
those who have overlapping roles, responsibilities,
authorities, and capabilities.
Homeland Defense (HD) Policy When conducted domestically, certain intelligence

and Legal Considerations activities, military information support operations,
rules of engagement (ROE), and rules for the use
of force (RUF) have specific limitations,
applications, and legal considerations.
Active, Layered Defense Defending the homeland neither begins nor ends at
US borders, so DOD planning is guided by the
construct of an active, layered defense—a global
defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression
abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland.
It is a defense-in-depth that relies on collection,
analysis, and sharing of information and
intelligence; strategic and regional deterrence;
military presence in forward regions; and the
ability to rapidly generate and project warfighting
capabilities to defend the US, its allies, and its
interests. This defense strategy integrates US
capabilities in the forward regions of the world, in
the geographic approaches to US territory, and
within the US homeland.
The HD Operational Framework The HD operational framework includes the plans

and actions taken to detect, deter, prevent, shape,
and defeat threats and aggression against the
homeland. The purpose of HD is to protect against
incursions or attacks on sovereign US territory, the
domestic population, and critical infrastructure and
key resources as directed.
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Executive Summary
Command Relationships and Interorganizational Cooperation
Virtually all the strategic threats to the homeland

in United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) AORs are based in the
AORs of other geographic combatant commanders
(GCCs). This requires command relationships for
a collaborative, federated architecture for targeting
by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM with the
Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence Directorate]; the
intelligence directorates of the combatant
commands; the National Joint Operations and
Intelligence Center; and other supporting CCDRs,
especially those supporting GCCs in whose AORs
those strategic threats reside.
Unified Action Unified action is the synchronization, coordination,

and/or integration of the activities of governmental
and nongovernmental entities with military
operations to achieve unity of effort. In HD, this
includes interaction with joint, single-Service, and
multinational operations with the activities of other
interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), international organizations, and the private
sector to achieve unity of effort.
Command and Control As stipulated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP),

Relationships and CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM have
Responsibilities: specified tasks for HD activities. They are
responsible for planning, organizing, and
executing HD operations within their respective
Geographic Combatant AORs. Other CCDRs support them and contribute
Commander Responsibilities to the protection of the US homeland either
through actions within their own AORs (forward
regions and approaches) or through global
responsibilities assigned in the UCP.
Functional Combatant Commander, United States Strategic Command

Commander Responsibilities (CDRUSSTRATCOM), is the lead CCDR for
strategic deterrence planning and executes
strategic deterrence operations, as directed.
US Cyber Command can support HD cyberspace

operations (CO) in collaboration with
USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and DHS by
coordinating activities within the required AOR
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Executive Summary
and assisting with expertise and capabilities

directed and made available.
For operations conducted in the homeland,

Commander, US Special Operations Command,
serves as either a supported or supporting
commander for selected counterterrorism activities
and serves as a supporting commander to the GCCs
with geographic HD responsibilities within their
respective AORs.
For HD operations, Commander, US

Transportation Command, provides, upon request,
a director of mobility forces to advise on air
mobility support operations
Interagency Coordination HD operations are conducted in a complex

operational environment (OE) that contains
thousands of different jurisdictions (federal, state,
tribal, and local), many agencies and organizations,
the private sector, and several allies and multinational
partners. From a USG perspective, this necessitates
coordinated and integrated activities that have been
previously exercised/rehearsed to facilitate effective
interagency interoperability in addition to unity of
effort. Coordination should be conducted through the
defense coordinating officer/defense coordinating
element of the affected region. The inherent
interrelationships between HS, HD, and DSCA, and
the potential for transition between those missions,
creates a dynamic and complex environment in which
interorganizational coordination and resulting
interoperability could prove critical. From a DOD
perspective, understanding and executing the
multiple command relationships and organizational
relationships required for simultaneous execution of
HS, HD, and DSCA requires the utmost in
interagency coordination.
Interorganizational Cooperation HD mission response forces involve multiple

Considerations organizations. Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the
North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM
operation aimed at defending the homeland,
involves active duty personnel from the US Air
Force, US Navy, the Canadian Forces, and
National Guard members federalized for the
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Executive Summary
mission. These military forces coordinate with

Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation
Administration), DHS, the Department of Justice,
and other USG departments and agencies.
Multinational Forces To conduct the full range of HD operations,

CCDRs should consider multinational and
nonmilitary organizations. When a response force
resides within an alliance, the procedures and
structure of that alliance will normally determine
the operational-level leadership. When a response
force is based in a coalition (or a lead-nation
structure in an alliance), the designated lead nation
or other leadership mechanism will normally select
the operational-level leadership. While the
President and Secretary of Defense retain
command authority over US forces, it is often
prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US
forces under the tactical control of a foreign
commander for reasons such as maximizing
military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort.
Planning and Operations for Homeland Defense
Strategic Guidance General strategy is provided in high-level policy

documents such as the National Security Strategy,
Defense Strategy Review, and the National
Military Strategy (NMS). Similarly, high-level
planning guidance is provided in the UCP;
Guidance for Employment of the Force and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP). Planning architecture is provided in
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution
Formats and Guidance.
Operational Factors: Regardless of the size and scope of the particular

operations, inevitably they will involve multiple
jurisdictions (such as cities, counties, regions, tribes,
Civil and Military Relationships and states). Managing such relationships will
require significant time and effort on the part of
federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to ensure
proper coordination.
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Executive Summary
Commander’s Communication Joint force commanders (JFCs) are required to

Synchronization and Public include communication goals and objectives in the
Affairs commander’s intent and to have a communication
approach that ensures unity of themes, objectives,
and messages among key activities; consistency in
intent or effect between command operations,
actions, and information; and a risk assessment of
the information that may reach unintended
audiences, create unintended consequences, and
require risk mitigation measures.
Non-Department of Defense Interorganizational cooperation must occur

Federal, State, Territorial, Local, between elements of DOD and non-DOD federal,
and Tribal Planning Factors state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as other
participating USG departments and agencies for
the purpose of achieving HD objectives.
Legal Considerations Military operations inside the homeland can

present unique and complex legal issues. Certain
military functions (e.g., intelligence operations,
ROE, and RUF) have specific applications and
legal implications when conducted domestically.
Coordination with the servicing office of the staff
judge advocate for legal advice should be as early
in the operation planning process as possible.
Intelligence Sharing for HD The success of interorganizational cooperation in

HD operations hinges upon timely and accurate
information and intelligence. Information sharing
environments should include as many essential
participants as possible, understanding that not all
are capable of participating in a collaborative
environment. When possible, a collaborative
intelligence sharing environment should be
capable of generating and moving intelligence,
operational information, and orders where needed
in the shortest possible time.
Joint Fires Joint fires may be provided to assist air, land,

maritime, or special operations forces in
conducting HD activities within an OE framed by
complex legal authorities and significant
interagency coordination. Although major
operations against an enemy in the US remain
highly unlikely, various threats require capabilities
and preparations to deter or defeat them. For that
xii JP 3-27
Executive Summary
reason, the supported JFCs for HD have

plans/orders for HD operations that anticipate the
use of joint fires across the range of military
operations.
Movement and Maneuver in the HD land defense actions may include movement
Conduct of HD: and maneuver, fires (for lethal and nonlethal
effects), closing with and destroying an enemy,
sustaining a joint force, and setting conditions for
a return to peace. Specific HD land operations in
Land Operations in the Conduct support of HD may include security operations
of HD through force protection (FP) tasks or critical
infrastructure protection (CIP). Defensive land
operations will make use of existing USG
departments’ and agencies’ capabilities where
possible (e.g., DHS).
Maritime Operations in the Maritime operations in support of HD offer distinct

Conduct of HD challenges due to the nature of execution in or near
the homeland in conjunction with interagency
partners. DOD is the LFA for maritime HD and the
USCG is the LFA for MHS. Through the relevant
CCDR, DOD provides an active, layered defense;
supports USCG MHS operations with DOD
forces/capabilities; and defeats maritime threats to
the homeland beyond the scope of MHS. Where
coordination under the maritime operational threat
response plan is required, issues such as
designation of lead and supporting agencies,
desired national outcome, required capabilities,
asset availability, and authority to act must be
determined.
Air Operations in HD Operations NORAD is assigned the mission of aerospace

control (including air sovereignty and air defense)
of the airspace of the US and Canada. NORAD
routinely maintains forces on alert for homeland air
defense, cruise missile defense, and aerospace
control alert missions against long-range
incursions.
Space Operations in the Conduct To deter or preempt attacks and to protect military
of HD space assets, DOD conducts space operations in
support of HD. These activities may serve to
protect and defend the US’s ability to operate in
and through space. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the
supported commander for protecting and
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defending the right to operate in space and is

responsible for identifying, assessing, and securing
DOD critical assets in space.
Cyberspace Operations in the The NMS for CO addresses three main roles: defense
Conduct of HD of the nation, national incident response, and CIP.
GCCs with geographic HD responsibilities should
ensure unified action at the theater level for CO. This
includes coordinating with multinational and
interagency partners as outlined in strategy, policy,
and agreements.
Information Operations in the Information operations (IO) complements HD

Conduct of HD movement and maneuver in all domains by
generating effects in the information environment
that give the JFC a decisive advantage in any and all
of its dimensions: physical, informational, and
cognitive. IO also plays a significant role in the
JFC’s communication synchronization.
Movement in Support of HD US Transportation Command can quickly

assemble aircraft and flight crews for operations
where expedited passenger movement is required.
Surface transportation (commercial and organic)
can be a viable option in those situations where the
distance between the home station and the
operational area is relatively short. Coordination
with the National Guard Bureau is essential when
using Air National Guard/Army National Guard
assets for support of HD. In some instances, state
and federal forces may be in the same operational
area. Coordination between state and federal
forces should occur to achieve unity of effort.
Protection The protection function focuses on conserving the

joint force’s fighting potential in four primary
ways: active defensive measures, passive
defensive measures, application of technology
and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire,
and emergency management and response to
reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to
an all-hazards incident. It includes, but extends
beyond, FP to encompass protection of US
noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil
infrastructure of friendly nations; and other USG
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Executive Summary
departments and agencies, international

organizations, and NGOs.
Sustainment: The core functional responsibilities of the

manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
are accomplished during any HD or other operation
Personnel and are tailored to meet mission-specific
requirements.
Personnel Support The authorities and responsibilities for personnel

support to HD operations are largely the same as
those for any other DOD mission set. Some
exceptions may apply to the USNORTHCOM
AOR.
Logistics The authorities and responsibilities for logistics

operations in support of HD are largely the same as
any other DOD mission set. Some notable
exceptions, however, apply to HD operations
within the US. More specifically, the exceptions
apply to the USNORTHCOM AOR.
Engineering Military engineering support may be required

simultaneously for HD and DSCA operations. The
primary focus of the engineering effort will be to
sustain and assist DOD forces employed in HD.
The secondary effort will be DSCA, when
requested and approved in accordance with DOD
guidance and applicable plans.
Environmental Considerations Military commanders employ environmentally

responsible practices that minimize adverse
impacts to human health and the environment.
Plans will be developed to reduce or eliminate
negative impacts on the environment and to
minimize negative impacts to mission
accomplishment caused by environmental
degradation.
CONCLUSION
This publication provides joint doctrine for HD.
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Intentionally Blank
xvi JP 3-27
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF HOMELAND DEFENSE
“…the Secretary, with the approval of the President and after consultation with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide, every two years or
more frequently as needed, to the Chairman written policy guidance for the
preparation and review of contingency plans, including plans for providing
support to civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a
catastrophic incident, for homeland defense, and for military support to civil
authorities. Such guidance shall include guidance on the employment of
forces, including specific force levels and specific supporting resource levels
projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be
effective.”
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
1. General
a. The Homeland. The US homeland is the physical region that includes the
continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and surrounding
territorial waters and airspace. The United States Government (USG) employs all
instruments of national power to continuously detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats to
the homeland. This national imperative translates operationally into homeland security
(HS), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and homeland defense (HD). The
Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for defending against
traditional external threats or aggression (e.g., nation-state conventional forces or weapons
of mass destruction [WMD] attack) and against external asymmetric threats that are outside
of the scope of HS operations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the LFA
for HS, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the LFA for maritime homeland
security (MHS). By law, DOD is responsible for two missions in the homeland: DSCA
and HD.
b. HS, DSCA, and HD operations and events may occur simultaneously and require
extensive coordination, integration, and synchronization. HS forms the foundation upon
which the USG counters threats and hazards, consistent with Presidential Policy Directive
(PPD)-8, National Preparedness. HS operations are constantly executed under legal
authorities that enforce the rule of law at all levels of government in all areas subject to US
jurisdiction, including the homeland and its approaches. DSCA and HD build upon the
foundation of HS to counter the most sophisticated and/or nation-state threats that either
exceed the scope of HS capabilities or require use of DOD authorities to defeat threats to
the homeland. Considerations regarding simultaneous HS, DSCA, and HD operations are
covered in more detail in Appendix A, “Relationships Between Homeland Security,
Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”
(1) HS is an integrated concept developed as a result of the 11 September 2001

attacks on the US. The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review describes HS as the
intersection of evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic
responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement (LE), customs,
I-1
Chapter I
border control, and immigration. In combining these responsibilities under one

overarching concept, HS breaks down longstanding stovepipes of activity that have been
and could still be exploited by those seeking to cause harm. HS is a widely distributed and
diverse national enterprise comprised of the collective efforts and shared responsibilities
of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners,
individuals, families, and communities to maintain critical HS capabilities.
(a) DHS missions under the general concept of HS include the following:
1. Prevent terrorism and enhance security.
2. Secure and manage our borders.
3. Enforce and administer our immigration laws.
4. Safeguard and secure cyberspace.
5. Strengthen national preparedness and resilience.
For more information on DHS missions, see the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review at https://www.dhs.gov/quadrennial-homeland-security-review.
(b) DOD supports HS operations through DSCA and by providing DOD

forces and capabilities to USCG MHS operations pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security
for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime
Homeland Security and applicable Secretary of Defense (SecDef) execute orders
(EXORDs).
(c) DOD may also be required to participate in emergency preparedness (EP)

under the National Preparedness System. EP includes measures taken in advance of an
emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions from
all types of hazards through five preparedness mission areas under the National Response
Framework (NRF). These five mission areas are prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery. EP is considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities
in support of the NRF. NRF is not a stand-alone activity, but is an integral part of DOD
training, mitigation, and response for both HD and DSCA.
For more information on EP, see PPD-8, National Preparedness, and the National
Response Framework at https://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.
(2) DSCA is support provided by US federal military forces, DOD civilians,

DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, reserve and National Guard (NG) forces
(when SecDef, in coordination with the governor[s] of the affected state[s], elect and
request to use those forces under Title 32, United States Code [USC], Section 502) in
response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, LE
support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events.
I-2 JP 3-27
For more information on DSCA, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities.
(3) HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and

critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats, as directed
by the President of the US.
(a) DOD executes HD by detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating

threats from actors of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible. DOD is
responsible for the HD mission and leads the response with support from international
partners and USG departments and agencies. HD is executed across the active, layered
defense construct composed of the forward regions, the approaches, and the homeland.
Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and
Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are the supported
commanders for HD in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs), with all other
combatant commanders (CCDRs) as supporting commanders. CDRUSNORTHCOM and
CDRUSPACOM are charged with specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA.
(b) CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for planning, organizing, and, as

directed, executing HD operations within the United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) AOR in concert with missions performed by the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
(c) CDRUSPACOM is responsible for planning and, as directed, executing

HD operations within the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR.
(d) All other CCDRs, except Commander, United States Transportation

Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), are responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing
attacks against the US, its territories, and bases and, should deterrence fail, employ
appropriate forces to defend the nation in forward regions and within the approaches to the
homeland.
c. Within the homeland, HD, DSCA, and HS require pre-event and ongoing
coordination with interorganizational and multinational partners to integrate capabilities
and facilitate unified action. In this complex environment, there are numerous threats
across multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, local, and tribal) that are addressed by a
diverse group of actively involved stakeholders (e.g., international organizations,
multinational partnerships, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and the private
sector). DOD plans and prepares to operate in concert with other USG entities. For
example, DOD operations may coincide with other actions to counter violent extremist
threats, such as those of a hijacked commercial aircraft or attempts to perpetrate attacks
using WMD. A coordinated approach to unified action promotes early identification of the
desired USG objective(s) and subsequent coordination and collaboration with potential
participants. Guidance such as the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan
is an example of this approach to operations.
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For additional information, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
For information regarding interagency roles, responsibilities, and required coordination

protocols for conduct of air defense and maritime security operations to counter threats to
the US, see the President-approved Aviation Operational Threat Response (AOTR) Plan
and the MOTR Plan.
Specific guidance on interagency headquarters (HQ) planning and command center

support of HD operations is contained in annex V (Interagency Coordination) of HD
concept plans (CONPLANs) or operation plans (OPLANs).
2. Threats
a. HD should address all external threats and other threats (as directed by the
President) to facilitate a broad-based defense-in-depth. An external threat or aggression is
an action, incident, or circumstance that originates from outside of the homeland. Threats
planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may develop or take
place inside the homeland. The reference to external threats does not limit where or how
attacks may be planned and executed. The USG has sought to shape the international
environment through the judicious application of diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic instruments of national power. Given the persistent presence of both traditional
nation-state and asymmetric threats, a proactive, comprehensive, and disciplined approach
to HD is required. Additionally, military operations conducted in the homeland require an
in-depth understanding of laws, policies, and procedures because of overlapping
jurisdictions and legal authorities on the use of military forces.
b. The homeland is confronted by a variety of both disparate and interrelated threats

that demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among interagency partners
responsible for LE and national defense, particularly those who have overlapping roles,
responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities. Transnational threats have proven to be
complex and enduring. A transnational threat is any activity, individual, or group not tied
to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens
US national security or interests. Figure I-1 lists various aspects of the transnational threats
to the homeland.
c. WMD. Adversaries have and continue to seek WMD and the means to deliver
them to enhance their influence and achieve greater strategic leverage against US
advantages. They may use the weapons to conduct an attack on US citizens, infrastructure,
and other vital interests and to exploit US power projection, sustainment, and force
protection (FP) vulnerabilities. Increased access to technology, materials, and expertise
heightens the risk that threats will develop, proliferate, and use WMD to achieve their
goals.
See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on WMD.
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Homeland Defense Transnational Threat Environment

 Increased capability for cyberspace operations against the United States
Government, Department of Defense, and nations’ critical infrastructures
 Continued desire of transnational terrorists to attack United States with variety
of weapons and means (including improvised explosive devices; chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]/weapons of mass destruction
[WMD])
 Continued proliferation of CBRN/WMD capabilities
 Ongoing rogue nation threats
 Active transnational criminal organizations
 Ongoing illegal immigration and potential special interest aliens
 Presence of homegrown violent extremists
 Continued traditional threats from nation-states (including intercontinental
ballistic missiles)
Figure I-1. Homeland Defense Transnational Threat Environment
See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, for more
information on DOD actions and capabilities to mitigate the effects of a chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack.
d. Adversaries. The joint force faces an increasingly complex global security

environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. State and non-state
adversaries seek to challenge the current international order by establishing new rules and
norms that are unfavorable to our national interests. Weak states are increasingly incapable
of maintaining domestic order, which permits other actors to employ violence in pursuit of
their beliefs. Conflicts are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional
(TMM) as adversaries’ interests, influence, capabilities, and reach extend beyond single
geographic areas. Additionally, the threat from individual actors and homegrown violent
extremists, where an individual or small group of individuals executes attacks without any
direct contact with a parent organization, has increased. These threats will continue to
employ a variety of tactics, in particular, asymmetric employment of weapons, platforms,
and information that could significantly affect not only the political-military balance, but
potentially more significantly, the US economy and global trade.
3. Homeland Defense Policy and Legal Considerations
a. Multiple documents provide guidance for conducting HD operations. Specific

planning factors, requirements, and objectives for HD operations are contained in plans
associated with the HD mission.
b. Special Considerations. When conducted domestically, certain intelligence

activities, military information support operations (MISO), rules of engagement (ROE),
and rules for the use of force (RUF) have specific limitations, applications, and legal
considerations. Further, ROE and RUF for domestic situations are often developed by less
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institutionalized processes and can therefore potentially be less thorough and subjected to
less rigor.
(1) Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). The PCA prohibits the use of the United States
Army (USA) and United States Air Force (USAF) to participate in civilian LE within the
homeland. Title 10, USC, also directs SecDef to promulgate regulations prohibiting
members of the USA, United States Navy (USN), USAF, and United States Marine Corps
(USMC) from providing direct assistance to civilian LE, which was accomplished in
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies. HD is a Constitutional exception to the PCA. Military operations
conducted as HD are not LE activities, and thus, Title 10, USC, forces are not subject to
the restriction of the PCA. Additionally, several Act-of-Congress exceptions to the PCA
permit the Armed Forces to support LE activities under other conditions. The PCA does
not apply to NG forces under Title 32, USC, or state active duty status.
(2) Intelligence Activities. Intelligence activities refer to all activities that DOD
intelligence components are authorized to undertake in accordance with (IAW) Executive
Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended); DODD 5240.01,
DOD Intelligence Activities; Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5240.01,
Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities; DOD 5240.1-R,
Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United
States Persons; Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) Instruction 2000.01, National
Guard Intelligence Activities; and CNGB Manual 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence
Activities. Intelligence activities include the collection, retention, and dissemination of
intelligence by DOD intelligence components.
(a) Intelligence activities conducted by US intelligence organizations in the

US and its territories are strictly controlled. Several regulations and laws specifically
govern the use of DOD intelligence assets and organizations in domestic operations.
Figure I-2 lists several policy and guidance documents for the intelligence oversight
program.
(b) Acquisition of Open-Source Information. Publicly available, open-

source information can be used to obtain basic situational awareness and regional industrial
knowledge on any part of the world; however, intelligence oversight still applies to
information gathered on US persons or companies regardless of whether it is publicly
available or not. Adherence to DODD 5240.01, DODM 5240.01, and DOD 5240.1-R,
when performing such collections, is critical to the success of the effort and to avoid the
appearance or conduct of questionable intelligence activities.
(c) Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations

Not Affiliated with DOD. Some restrictions on information gathering apply DOD wide,
not just to DOD intelligence elements. IAW DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information
Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense,
DOD policy prohibits collecting, reporting, processing, or storing information on
individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD except in those limited circumstances
where such information is essential to the accomplishment of certain DOD missions
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Guidance and Policy for the Intelligence Oversight Program

 Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended)
 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence Oversight
 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities
 DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons
 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s National System for Geospatial
Intelligence Manual FA 1806, Domestic Imagery, Revision 5, March 2009,
Administrative Update: May 2011
 North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern
Command Instruction 14-3, Domestic Imagery, 29 July 2014 modified 23 June 2016
 Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5240.01, Procedures Governing the
Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities
 DOD Instruction 3115.12, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
 Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction, 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence
Activities
 Chief, National Guard Bureau Manual, 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence Activities
Figure I-2. Guidance and Policy for the Intelligence Oversight Program
outlined within the directive. DOD intelligence elements are not governed by this directive
and must look to DODM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence
Activities; DODI 3115.12, Open Source Intelligence; DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence
Activities; and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons, for guidance.
(d) Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs). Unless

specifically provided for in policy, law, or other guidance, SecDef approval is required for
all domestic military UAS operations. Domestic use of UASs requires consultation with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and must be consistent with applicable laws,
regulations, and memoranda of agreement concerning the operations of UASs in the
National Airspace System.
For more details regarding domestic use of UASs, refer to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems. For additional details, refer to Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum 16-
003, Countering Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Homeland.
(e) Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) Products. In support of

the LFA and civil authorities in a HD or DSCA mission, SecDef authorizes the use of
traditional intelligence capabilities of DOD intelligence component assets for non-
intelligence purposes to provide IAA for the following missions: situational awareness,
damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, search and rescue, CBRN assessment,
hydrographic survey, and dynamic ground coordination. IAA should be performed by
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DOD assets only when such actions cannot be performed by local entities or other USG
departments and agencies in a timely manner.
For more information on IAA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Standing DSCA EXORD.
Details on intelligence support to HD can be found in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
(3) MISO. MISO are not conducted against US persons IAW law and DOD
policy. However, in addition to HD activities outside of the US homeland, as part of the
discussion in paragraph 5, “The Homeland Defense Operational Framework,” military
information support forces and equipment may also be used to conduct civil authority
information support (CAIS) activities during domestic emergencies within the boundaries
of the US homeland. A CAIS element supports the designated primary agency or civil
authority to disseminate information during domestic emergencies (whether relating to
national security or disaster relief operations). CAIS activities are not part of any MISO
program. The Joint Staff issues specific guidance for military information support forces,
as well as the designated command and control (C2) authority for the mission-tailored
CAIS component.
See JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, for a more complete discussion
on MISO.
(4) ROE and RUF. US forces, when performing an HD mission, must be

prepared to engage the enemy IAW the appropriate ROE and RUF.
(a) ROE are directives issued by competent military authorities which

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered. Standing rules of engagement
(SROE) apply to air and maritime HD missions conducted within the US, its
territories, or territorial seas, unless otherwise directed by SecDef. Supplemental ROE
may be necessary to meet mission-specific ROE requirements and are submitted by the
appropriate commander.
See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules
of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, for additional
information.
(b) RUF are directives issued to guide US forces on the use of force during
various operations. The standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) apply to land HD
missions occurring within US territory and to DOD forces, civilians, and contractors
performing LE and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation, while
conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US territory, unless
otherwise directed by SecDef. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) may augment
SRUF by submitting a request for mission-specific RUF to the CJCS for SecDef approval.
(c) ROE and RUF must conform to appropriate laws, including federal law
(to include military law), the law of war, and other relevant international laws, and they
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must conform to the situation and locality involved. When NG forces are in state active
duty or Title 32, USC, status, the state RUF will apply. Commanders are responsible for
the education and training of their personnel on ROE, RUF, and the use of nonlethal
and lethal force before they deploy from home station to perform a DSCA or HD
mission. Escalation of force (i.e., moving from nonlethal to lethal force as the situation
dictates) also needs to be part of the training. Self-defense is an inherent right and
obligation exercised by the unit commander in response to a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent. Individual self-defense is exercised IAW established ROE or RUF.
c. Commanders consider a variety of weapons, to include nonlethal weapons and

capabilities. Nonlethal capabilities may provide an effective alternative means of
employing force to reduce the probability of death or serious injury to civilians or
belligerents, as well as decrease the possibility for collateral damage. Employment of
nonlethal capabilities must be considered for inclusion in HD plans, ROE, and RUF.
Additionally, commanders plan and conduct rehearsals that test and exercise the adequacy
of planned ROE and RUF and prepare their personnel for HD operations.
Additional information on the employment of nonlethal capabilities can be found in DODD

3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy;
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) (Field Manual [FM] 3-22.40)/Marine Corps Tactical
Publication (MCTP) 10-10A (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-
15.8)/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Employment of Nonlethal Weapons; and Army Training Circular 3-19.5, Nonlethal
Weapons Training. USNORTHCOM guidance on the use of nonlethal capabilities can be
found in USNORTHCOM OPORD [Operation Order] 01-13.
4. Active, Layered Defense
a. Defending the homeland neither begins nor ends at US borders, so DOD planning
is guided by the construct of an active, layered defense—a global defense that aims to deter
and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland. It is a defense-in-
depth that relies on collection, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence;
strategic and regional deterrence; military presence in forward regions; and the ability to
rapidly generate and project warfighting capabilities to defend the US, its allies, and its
interests. This defense strategy integrates US capabilities in the forward regions of the
world, in the geographic approaches to US territory, and within the US homeland.
b. The Forward Regions. In the forward regions outside US territories, the objective
is to detect, prevent, shape, or when necessary, defeat threats to the US. Actions may
include combat operations; security cooperation; military engagement activities; peace
operations; intelligence operations; or preemptive measures such as direct action missions,
cyberspace operations (CO), or global strike.
c. The Approaches. The approaches extend from the limits of the homeland to the
forward regions. The approaches are not uniformly defined, may not have boundaries, and
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may be characterized based on a specific situation. The primary objective of actions within
the approaches is to locate threats as far from the homeland as possible and defeat them at
a safe distance. The National Military Strategy (NMS) emphasizes the importance of
joining the efforts of multinational and interagency partners to form an integrated defense.
Protecting these approaches requires intelligence and, when possible, enhanced, persistent
surveillance that allows the US to detect, track and, if required, interdict and defeat
potential threats.
d. The Homeland. If deterring or defeating threats in forward regions and approaches

fail, DOD must be postured to take immediate, decisive action to defend against and defeat
the threat in the homeland. Actions in the homeland may take place simultaneously and in
coordination with operations conducted in the forward regions and/or the approaches.
5. The Homeland Defense Operational Framework
a. The HD operational framework includes the plans and actions taken to detect, deter,
prevent, shape, and defeat threats and aggression against the homeland. The purpose of
HD is to protect against incursions or attacks on sovereign US territory, the domestic
population, and critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) as directed. The
following are DOD HD objectives:
(1) Dissuade threats from undertaking programs or conducting actions that could
pose a threat to the US homeland.
(2) Ensure defense of the homeland and deny a threat’s access to the nation’s
sovereign airspace, territory, and territorial seas.
(3) Ensure access to cyberspace and information (including information systems

and security).
(4) Protect the domestic population and critical infrastructure.
(5) Deter aggression and coercion by conducting global operations.
(6) Decisively defeat any attack if deterrence fails.
(7) Recover the military force to restore readiness and capabilities after any attack
or incident.
b. The diversity of threats requires DOD, the military instrument of national power,
take a broad role to coordinate all the requirements and objectives of the HD operational
framework. HD operations require integration of capabilities and synchronization of
activities (i.e., arrangement of activities across time, space, and purpose) through
interagency coordination, and, when necessary, interorganizational coordination.
c. DOD conducts activities and operations globally to contribute to national

preparedness and defense of the homeland. They are carried out in various operational
environments (OEs). An OE encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and
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space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the

electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. HD operations are conducted IAW laws;
treaties and international agreements; national authorities; and DOD, CJCS, Military
Department, and Service policy and doctrine. HD operations require active and passive
defenses, and DOD may conduct offensive actions (to include preemptive activities) to
deter, disrupt, and destroy enemy capabilities before they can be offensively employed.
(1) Outside the US (in the forward regions and approaches), DOD conducts
activities to maintain the freedom to operate in portions of the OE, access information, and
conduct operations or campaigns to disrupt and defeat terrorists and other enemies before
they are able to execute attacks against the US homeland. Per CJCSI 3110.01, (U) Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), HD must be integrated into the global campaign plans.
Identity activities are used to restrict mobility and access. Collected identity information
and identity intelligence analytical methodologies are leveraged to identify threat actors
and produce widely releasable products to support targeting, tactical screening, vetting, and
FP initiatives that support global operations, HD, national security screening, and vetting
activities by interagency partners. DOD security cooperation activities (e.g., exercises,
exchanges) and counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities also advance working
relationships, gain or maintain access to a partner nation (PN), and increase interoperability
with friends and allies. The DOD State Partnership Program (SPP) contributes to these
initiatives and is part of the GCCs’ security cooperation program.
See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-16, Identity Activities, for more information on identity
information and identity intelligence.
(2) Within the homeland, military activities are conducted in, or adjacent to, the
land mass, airspace, and territorial waters of the US. These activities require freedom of
action and full access and use of capabilities in cyberspace and space. HD includes ballistic
missile defense (BMD); cruise missile (CM) defense; interdiction; land operations, to
include protection of critical infrastructure; and defensive cyberspace operations (DCO).
The defense of the homeland requires a multi-domain approach.
d. HD operations require thorough preparation. DOD EP activities at the strategic

level may focus on actions associated with continuity of operations (COOP), continuity of
government (COG), and national preparedness. At the operational level, however, DOD
emergency preparations to defend the homeland include activities such as joint and
interagency interoperability and coordination, joint training exercises and experimentation,
and development of information and intelligence sharing architectures.
e. Early detection facilitates timely identification, tracking, and engagement

decisions for threats before they reach the homeland. In the forward regions and
approaches, intelligence and, when possible, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance can provide decision makers with possible warnings, early warning, and
assessments. CONUS airspace is protected in part by NORAD’s integrated tactical
warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) functions. For maritime domain awareness, the
National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office is an interagency organization that
works at the national and international levels to facilitate the integration of maritime
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information and intelligence collection and analysis in support of national policy and
interagency decision makers at all levels of the USG. Additionally, maritime warning
utilizes mutual support agreements with other commands and agencies responsible for
maritime defense and security to enable identification, validation, and response to threats
to North America. Another essential interagency organization is the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that has the specific and unique mission to acquire,
integrate, analyze, and disseminate all available USG information about terrorist threats
and identities. The US and its multinational partners seek a global awareness of all threats
to national security, individually and collectively, to increase the ability to deal with a range
of threats at home and abroad. Early detection of CBRN threats emanating from any theater
must be integrated throughout intelligence planning and execution from collection to
dissemination.
f. Deterrence is a key HD objective. Deterrence is the prevention of adversary

actions contrary to enduring national interests of the US, by the existence of a credible
threat of unacceptable consequences. Credible deterrence operates by influencing
adversary decision making through the demonstration of US capability and strategic
messaging of US resolve to employ capabilities to not only deny the adversary any benefits
from taking action, but also to impose costs from taking action. USG offensive capabilities
coupled with defensive measures and DOD EP activities may deter an adversary from
threatening or attacking the homeland. Adversaries must understand USG capabilities, to
include the reliability and readiness of well-trained, equipped, and rapidly deployable
forces. Therefore, deterrence is fundamentally about shaping adversary perceptions to
believe that the cost of action, or inaction, outweighs perceived benefits. See JP 3-0, Joint
Operations, for additional information on deterrence.
g. DOD must be prepared to rapidly act offensively or defensively against threats

and aggression. DOD, as directed by the President, may conduct preemptive and/or active
defense actions including flexible deterrent options and flexible response options IAW
international and domestic law, national policy, and directives. If deterrence fails, the
objective of these operations is to destroy, degrade, disrupt, or neutralize weapons; launch
platforms; support command, control, and communications; logistics; and intelligence
collection capabilities before they are employed by a threat. Examples of offensive
operations may include global strikes, direct action, and offensive space control. The US
and its multinational partners work together to synchronize activities and measures that
may include any or all of their instruments of national power.
h. Primary HD defensive actions include active and passive measures to defeat

threats already deployed or en-route to a target. Active defenses employ defensive actions
(e.g., defensive counterair) and offensive actions (e.g., counterattacks) to deny a contested
area or position to the enemy and are designed to reduce the effectiveness of or stop attacks
on US sovereign territory, domestic population, and CI/KR. Active defenses employ land,
maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces assets. This multi-domain
approach increases the reach of active defenses. The objective of HD passive defense is to
reduce the probability of, and minimize the damage caused by, hostile actions. Passive
defenses include FP and critical infrastructure risk mitigation actions to reduce targeting
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effectiveness. They also include deception, mobility, dispersion, systems hardening and
protective construction, warning and surveillance, and operations security.
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CHAPTER II
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL
COOPERATION
1. General
a. HD is part of a global active, layered defense-in-depth that aims to deter and defeat
aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland. It includes the forward
regions, the approaches, and the homeland. The relationships of participants for some HD
activities/operations may be simple and others may be complex, but the supported joint
force commander (JFC) is responsible for all participants understanding their established
command and organizational relationships for the unity of command and
interorganizational cooperation required for unified action during an HD operation.
b. CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned

forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of
assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of
command within their commands and designate the appropriate authority to be exercised
by subordinate commanders. Dependent upon the location and type of threat to the
homeland, CDRUSNORTHCOM and/or CDRUSPACOM would be designated as a
supported CCDR for HD.
For more details regarding establishment of support relationships and responsibilities of

supported and supporting CCDRs, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States.
c. A consideration that significantly affects command relationships for HD is that

virtually all the strategic threats to the homeland in USNORTHCOM and USPACOM
AORs are based in the AORs of other GCCs. This requires command relationships for a
collaborative, federated architecture for targeting by USNORTHCOM and USPACOM
with the Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence Directorate]; the intelligence directorates of the
combatant commands (CCMDs); the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center;
and other supporting CCDRs, especially those supporting GCCs in whose AORs those
strategic threats reside.
For more details regarding the relationships and process for federated targeting support,
see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
2. Unified Action
a. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the

activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to
achieve unity of effort. In HD, this includes interaction with joint, single-Service, and
multinational operations with the activities of other interagency partners, NGOs,
international organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Because of
the normal multitude of interorganizational partners and other participants, HD is
essentially a model of unified action, especially with regard to how forces and other
organizations can coordinate and operate day-to-day in the same OE.
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b. Canadian forces work with US forces to provide aerospace warning concerning

North America through NORAD. In the context of NORAD’s missions, “North America”
means Alaska, Canada, CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands, including the air
defense identification zones, the air approaches, maritime areas, internal navigable
waterways, and the maritime approaches thereto. In the US, DOD, through NORAD,
defends against air threats—including manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft (UA), and
CMs—whether in the approaches or within US airspace. While DOD has sole
responsibility for defeating air threats, it receives assistance from the FAA and DHS assets
for early identification of anomalous air activity which may ultimately threaten the US.
The Air National Guard (ANG) supports HD on a daily basis with alert aircraft to rapidly
establish air dominance within US airspace. The Army National Guard (ARNG) supports
HD on a daily basis on alert while conducting missile defense operations within US
airspace.
c. During preparation for potential HD land operations, specific USA, USMC, and
special operations units, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM and USPACOM
components and subordinate unified commands, coordinate and conduct exercises with
DHS and other interagency partners. ARNG may support HD as a functionary of the
individual states and territories under Title 32, USC, status or in state active duty status.
The USA and USMC interact with mission partners through civil-military operations
centers (CMOCs) or state emergency management agencies staffed with an emergency
preparedness liaison officer (EPLO). The CMOC capability is established and manned by
civil affairs personnel, but works best when tailored to the specific task associated with the
mission and augmented by assets (e.g., engineer, medical, transportation) available to the
supported commander and unified action partners to synchronize resources, personnel, and
stabilization efforts. The components and subordinate unified commands also work with
Canadian forces to conduct a cooperative defense to secure the land approaches supporting
in-depth defense of the homeland. Command relationships and interagency coordination
required for the complex OE for HD are planned and routinely rehearsed in national-level
exercises.
d. The Royal Canadian Navy teams with USN (i.e., US Naval Forces, Northern
Command) and USCG forces through cooperative training and combined exercises to
ensure both nations’ maritime forces and agencies are poised to respond to maritime threats
to either nation. In the US, DOD has the lead for HD, but many USG departments and
agencies are partners in a collaborative approach.
e. The use of civilian and military space capabilities is essential to the effectiveness
of conducting HD. Canadian forces work with US forces to provide aerospace warning of
space and missile attack through the NORAD Agreement. The Joint Functional
Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) at United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) and the Service space forces conduct operations to protect and defend
the right to operate in space and are responsible for securing DOD critical assets in space.
GCCs with HD responsibilities provide FP for those ground-based space assets located in
their respective AORs. USSTRATCOM and JFCC Space coordinate with the CJCS, other
CCMDs, DOD, other USG departments and agencies (e.g., Defense Information Systems
II-2 JP 3-27
Agency [DISA]), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, commercial

partners, and international agencies to integrate civil and military space assets.
f. For cyberspace, the vulnerability and complex interrelationship of national and

international networks demand closely coordinated action among the military, private
sector, and other government entities at all levels. CCMD CO support staff, the Services,
and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are the military front line of
defense. DHS has the responsibility for securing US cyberspace at the national level by
protecting non-DOD USG networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. Within
DHS, the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) is tasked to protect USG
network systems from cyberspace threats. USPACOM and USNORTHCOM, because of
their HD and DSCA responsibilities, have unique coordination requirements for CO
through their CO support staff with USCYBERCOM.
For more information on operations in cyberspace, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
3. Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities
a. Military forces remain under control of the established chain of command when
conducting HD operations. IAW with DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities
Conducted by the National Guard, in exceptional circumstances, NG forces may conduct
HD activities in a state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. These NG forces may
subsequently transition to Title 10, USC, status as authorized by law.
(1) SecDef. SecDef is the President’s principal assistant in all matters related to
DOD. Subject to the direction of the President and law, SecDef has authority, direction,
and control over DOD. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the operational chain
of command runs from the President to SecDef and from SecDef to the CCDRs.
(2) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security)

(ASD[HD&GS]). The ASD(HD&GS), under the authority, direction, and control of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), serves as the principal civilian advisor to
SecDef and the USD(P) on HD activities, DSCA, and Western Hemisphere security
matters. The ASD(HD&GS) provides overall supervision of HD activities of DOD
pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 138. These activities include, but are not limited, to the
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), domestic antiterrorism (AT), the Defense
Continuity Program, the Emergency Management Program, other HD-related activities,
and alignment of HD policies and programs with DOD policies for counterterrorism (CT)
and counternarcotics. The ASD(HD&GS) provides DOD policy and guidance for the
following:
(a) Preparedness to execute the national security missions of DOD pertaining

to the defense of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure.
(b) DCIP. (See DODI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

[DCIP] Management.)
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(c) DOD domestic AT IAW DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT)

Program.
(d) DOD domestic CT activities, except those executed by special operations

forces (SOF). (See DODD 5111.13, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas’ Security Affairs [ASD{HD&ASA}].)
(e) DOD continuity-related activities, to include COOP, COG, and enduring

constitutional government, are managed under the Defense Continuity Programs. (See
DODD 3020.26, Department of Defense Continuity Programs.)
(f) Policy guidance on HD-related education, training, and professional

development programs.
(3) CJCS. As senior military advisor to the President, the National Security
Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), and SecDef, the CJCS has
numerous responsibilities relating to HD and DSCA. These include advising the President
and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in
implementing operational responses to threats or acts of terrorism; and translating SecDef
guidance into strategic plans, including those which conform to resource levels projected
by SecDef. The CJCS also provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans,
which conform to policy guidance from the President and SecDef. The CJCS reviews HD
plans and operations for compatibility with other military plans and assists CCDRs in
meeting their operational requirements. Finally, IAW established DOD policy, the CJCS
reviews and assesses requests from governors for NG HD activities and provides
recommendations to SecDef.
(4) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS is made up of the CJCS; the Vice
CJCS; the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the CNGB. While the CJCS is the senior military
advisor, the other members of the JCS are military advisors to the President, the NSC, the
HSC, and SecDef, as well. A member of the JCS may submit to the CJCS advice or an
opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the
CJCS. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the CJCS shall present that advice or
opinion to the President, NSC, HSC, or SecDef at the same time that he presents his own
advice. The individual members of the JCS may also provide advice when specifically
requested.
(5) Commandant, USCG. The Commandant of the USCG advises the JCS on
matters related to HD, HS, and DSCA from the USCG perspective and, as a force provider,
allocates forces under Title 10, USC. The USCG’s supporting roles in HD include
maritime interception and interdiction operations, port security and harbor defense, coastal
sea control, MOTR support, and protection in cyberspace. The Secretary of Homeland
Security delegated authority to the Commandant, USCG, to conduct all MHS activities,
and the Commandant, USCG, conducts MHS under Title 14, USC, authority, through area,
district, and sector commanders. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement Between the
Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security for the Inclusion of the US
II-4 JP 3-27
Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense, Commanders Atlantic Area and
Pacific Area continuously exist within DOD as Commander, Coast Guard Defense Force
(CGDEFOR), East and West, respectively. USCG forces must maintain a state of readiness
to rapidly transition from carrying out MHS roles and missions under Title 14, USC, and
the C2 of USCG commanders to execute specific maritime homeland defense (MHD) tasks
under Title 10, USC, and the C2 of CGDEFOR.
(6) CNGB. The CNGB serves as a principal advisor to SecDef, through the
CJCS, on matters involving non-federalized NG and on other matters as determined by
SecDef. As the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air
Force on NG matters, the CNGB assists the state adjutants general in supporting,
synchronizing, and facilitating NG HD activities.
(7) Governors of the States. Governors retain C2 of state NG forces executing

HD activities in their respective states IAW Title 32, USC, Sections 901-908. The
President, SecDef, and CCDRs are not in the state operational chain of command.
However, SecDef may set conditions for authorization of Title 32, USC, Section 902.
Governors coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to facilitate NGB
synchronization of state HD activity planning with the appropriate CCDRs to ensure NG-
funded, Title 32, USC, Section 902, HD activities do not conflict with ongoing federal
missions. Governors and state adjutants general are not in the federal operational chain of
command.
b. GCC Responsibilities. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes CCMDs’

missions, responsibilities, AORs, and functions. As stipulated in the UCP,
CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM have specified tasks for HD activities (these
commanders are referred to subsequently in this publication as GCCs with geographic HD
responsibilities). They are responsible for planning, organizing, and executing HD
operations within their respective AORs. Other CCDRs support them and contribute to the
protection of the US homeland either through actions within their own AORs (forward
regions and approaches) or through global responsibilities assigned in the UCP.
(1) Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command

(CDRNORAD). By international agreement, CDRNORAD leads the bi-national
command composed of Canadian and US forces. Per the NORAD Terms of Reference,
NORAD’s primary missions are aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning for North America. CDRNORAD is responsible to the Canadian government and
USG, communicating through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) (Canada) and CJCS,
respectively. CDRUSNORTHCOM is normally designated as CDRNORAD. IAW the
NORAD Agreement, when CDRNORAD is a Canadian, CDRUSNORTHCOM will be
designated Deputy Commander NORAD. While NORAD and USNORTHCOM have
separate missions defined by separate authorities, parts of the USNORTHCOM AOR
overlap with NORAD’s operational area (OA) (in the NORAD Agreement, this is normally
referred to as an area of operations [AO]). The organizations are separate commands and
neither is subordinate to the other or is a part of the other. However, their operational focus
runs parallel with detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats and aggression in
the air approaches and airspace of North America. NORAD is supported by the Canadian
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Joint Operations Command (CJOC), USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and United States

Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in the conduct of missions assigned to NORAD.
NORAD’s maritime warning mission supports CJOC, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and
USSOUTHCOM in their assigned missions to defend North America. NORAD warns of
maritime threats to or against North America to enable identification, validation, and
response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and
security.
See Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command, Missions, Organization,

and Structure,” for detailed information on NORAD.
(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM. As directed by the President, CDRUSNORTHCOM

conducts military operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR utilizing forces to detect,
deter, or defeat an incursion into US sovereign territory. CDRUSNORTHCOM has
COCOM over USA, USAF, USN, and USMC Service component command HQs and
operational control (OPCON) over the theater special operations command (TSOC). When
forces are OPCON to the command for HD operations, the deployment order or EXORD
will normally establish command relationships. CDRUSNORTHCOM, normally
designated a supported commander for HD, determines the appropriate C2 structure to
employ these forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM may retain direct C2 of forces as the JFC,
designate an existing joint task force (JTF) commander, or establish a new subordinate
JTF. CDRUSNORTHCOM and subordinate JTF commanders will normally organize
forces around a joint construct with functional component commanders. However,
CDRUSNORTHCOM may conduct HD operations using any combination of subordinate
JFCs and functional component, Service component, single-Service task force (normally
assigned to the Service component), or specific operational forces necessary to accomplish
the mission. Figure II-1 provides the USNORTHCOM HD command relationships.
For additional information on C2, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States.
(a) C2 for HD Land Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Land

defense forces generally plan and execute HD land operations using a mix of Service assets,
primarily those of the USA and USMC. Operations can be conducted through Service task
forces or joint forces. Force size, composition, and C2 relationships depend upon the
situation and mission requirements. Commander, United States Army, North
(CDRUSARNORTH), is designated as the joint force land component commander
(JFLCC) for USNORTHCOM and has a main command post and deployable contingency
command post that can, with augmentation, quickly become a full JTF. United States
Army, North (USARNORTH) has the mission to conduct HD operations for
USNORTHCOM, but current USA doctrine stipulates that division and corps HQs provide
C2 for USA units conducting major combat operations, not theater USA operations.
Nevertheless, the homeland is a unique theater of operations for the USA with special
requirements, so USARNORTH could request that state NG units provide assistance for
HD activities. USARNORTH could then focus on the theater opening and sustainment
operations for all ground forces participating in an HD mission in the homeland.
II-6 JP 3-27
United States Northern Command Homeland Defense

Command Relationships
USNORTHCOM TAG
NORAD NGB
USELEMNORAD
CONR ANR CANR
USNAVNORTH/ AFNORTH/ USARNORTH/ MARFORNORTH JTF-N ALCOM JFHQ-NCR SOC

JFMCC JFACC JFLCC NORTH
Designated NG
Command CGDEFOR CGDEFOR JFHQ-
Element West East State
Legend
AFNORTH Air Force North combatant command
ALCOM United States Alaskan Command (command authority)
ANR Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region supporting
CANR Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command Region operational control
CGDEFOR Coast Guard defense force coordination
CONR continental United States North American Aerospace Defense direct support
Command Region
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JTF-N Joint Task Force-North
MARFORNORTH United States Marine Corps Forces, North
NGB National Guard Bureau
NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
SOCNORTH United States Special Operations Command, North
TAG the adjutant general
USARNORTH United States Army, North
USELEMNORAD United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense
Command
USNAVNORTH United States Naval Forces, Northern Command
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
Figure II-1. United States Northern Command Homeland

Defense Command Relationships
(b) C2 for HD Maritime Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Northern Command (COMUSNAVNORTH), is
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the component commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM and has been designated as the joint
force maritime component commander (JFMCC). COMUSNAVNORTH conducts MHD
operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR and supports USCG MHS operations. Upon
declaration of an MHD mission in the USNORTHCOM AOR, the USCG allocates forces
to USNORTHCOM, when requested, for execution of JFMCC-assigned tasks under the
C2 of CGDEFORs East and West. USCG forces allocated to USNORTHCOM for MHD
tasking may be attached with specification of tactical control (TACON) of the JFMCC, to
USNORTHCOM, or OPCON if mutually agreed with the USCG. Figure II-2 depicts the
applicable MHD and MHS command relationships.
(c) C2 for HD Air Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. C2 for HD

air operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR is complex. Where the NORAD OA and the
USNORTHCOM AOR overlap, NORAD normally retains authority for the aerospace
control and aerospace warning missions. The Commander, Continental United States
North American Aerospace Defense Command Region (CONR), is appointed the
Combined Force Air Component Commander for CONUS, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto
Rico. For US-only air operations within CONUS, the Commander, Air Force North
(CDRAFNORTH), is designated the joint force air component commander (JFACC).
CDRAFNORTH is dual-hatted as the Commander, CONR. For US-only air operations in
Alaska, the commander of the combined US-Canadian Alaskan North American
Aerospace Defense Command Region (ANR) may be designated the JFACC. Close
coordination between the JFACC(s) and NORAD is essential for synchronization of
operations.
(d) C2 for HD Space Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

USSTRATCOM conducts space operations in direct support to USNORTHCOM’s HD
operations. Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), has
designated coordinating authority to Commander, JFCC Space, for the planning of space
operations in operational-level support of USSTRATCOM’s UCP missions. Commander,
JFCC Space, integrates military, intelligence, civil, and commercial space requirements
between CDRUSSTRATCOM and CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM has
designated CDRAFNORTH as USNORTHCOM’s space coordinating authority (SCA)
with primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining
space requirements in support of USNORTHCOM’s HD operations.
CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSSTRATCOM may prescribe direct liaison authorized
(DIRLAUTH) between SCAs to ensure prompt and timely support.
(e) C2 for HD CO in the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM

is responsible for defending against, mitigating, and defeating cyberspace threats against
USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions that are not associated with the defense of the
Department of Defense information network (DODIN) in coordination with
USCYBERCOM and USPACOM. USNORTHCOM will plan and execute CO during HD
in coordination with USCYBERCOM. Finally, geographic and functional CCDRs, as well
as the Services, are responsible for protecting their networks located within the
USNORTHCOM AOR which are not specifically assigned or attached to
USNORTHCOM.
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Maritime Homeland Defense and Maritime Homeland Security

Command Relationships
Supported CCDR for

Commandant, USCG
Homeland Defense
 Combatant command (command  Title 10, USC, Service/Force
authority) Provider
 Conducts MHD operations through  Title 14, USC, Command
JFMCC Authority
 Conducts MHS operations
through subordinate USCG
Joint Force Maritime commanders
Component Commander
Commander, CGDEFOR Area Commander
This arrangement exists at all times.
CGDEFOR Forces (under Title 10, USCG Forces (under Title 14,
USC, Command) USC, Command)
 Allocated DOD and USCG forces  USCG area commanders retain OPCON
carrying out MHD tasks are TACON to of USCG forces that are TACON to
CGDEFOR* CGDEFORs*
 Conduct JFMCC-assigned MHD tasks  Conduct commandant-assigned MHS
 SROE Applies tasks including MLE, PWCS, and
regulatory functions
 USCG use of force policy applies
 Allocated DOD forces to support MHS
tasks are TACON to USCG commander
Legend
CCDR combatant commander USC United States Code
CGDEFOR Coast Guard defense force USCD UOF United States Coast Guard Use of
COCOM combatant command (command authority) Force Policy
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander * unless otherwise agreed
MHD maritime homeland defense
command authority (as specified)
MHS maritime homeland security
OPCON
MLE maritime law enforcement
TACON
OPCON operational control
PWCS port, waterways, and coastal security
SROE standing rules of engagement Joint Service
TACON tactical control
Figure II-2. Maritime Homeland Defense and Maritime Homeland Security Command
Relationships
For more information on CO, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
(f) C2 for HD Special Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. United

States Special Operations Command, North (SOCNORTH) is under COCOM of
Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), and OPCON
to CDRUSNORTHCOM. As a subordinate unified command, SOCNORTH provides a
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responsive and scalable capability to C2 SOF and conventional forces, when attached, in
support of USNORTHCOM’s mission. Commander, SOCNORTH, is the principal SOF
advisor to CDRUSNORTHCOM. The SOCNORTH staff provides special operations
expertise, advice, and assistance to USNORTHCOM, its Service components, and
subordinate commands. SecDef assigns the TSOCs to US Special Operations Command
under CDRUSSOCOM’s COCOM and assigns OPCON of the TSOCs to the GCCs.
SecDef also authorizes CDRUSSOCOM and the GCCs to establish support relationships
when SOF commanders are required to simultaneously support multiple operations or
commanders.
(g) Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).

JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs
forces for HD and DSCA in the National Capital Region (NCR) joint operations area (JOA)
to safeguard the nation’s capital, excluding air defense and air warning. NORAD executes
air defense operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR, to include the NCR, through the
National Capital Region-Integrated Air Defense System (NCR-IADS).
(h) United States Alaskan Command (ALCOM). ALCOM is a subunified

command under USNORTHCOM. The Commander, ALCOM, is assigned responsibility
for HD and DSCA operations within the assigned ALCOM JOA by CDRUSNORTHCOM.
ALCOM normally requires staff augmentation from the USNORTHCOM staff and Service
components for HD and DSCA operations.
(i) Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N). JTF-N coordinates with DHS and
other federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to leverage military
activities to support CT, counterdrug (CD), and counter transnational organized crime
operations along US borders and littorals to disrupt transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) and deter their freedom of action in order to protect the homeland. JTF-N is an
element of USNORTHCOM under OPCON of CDRUSARNORTH.
(j) USNORTHCOM Contingency JTF(s). When combat forces for a joint

HD operation are attached to USNORTHCOM, CDRUSNORTHCOM exercises command
authority delegated by SecDef, as necessary, to accomplish required missions or tasks.
Based upon the scope and objectives of the operation, CDRUSNORTHCOM may decide
to establish one or more subordinate JTFs. For example, Joint Task Force-National Capital
Region, when activated, could have combat forces attached to conduct HD operations
within its respective JOA. For various HD contingencies, CDRUSNORTHCOM may task
a component command(s) or supporting commanders to provide the core of a new JTF HQ
with augmentation from the other Service components.
(3) CDRUSPACOM. CDRUSPACOM integrates and synchronizes a broad

range of military activities to defend the homeland against attacks and aggression. These
activities include the protection of the domestic population; the critical infrastructure of the
US and its territories; and the domestic population and critical infrastructure of the
sovereign nations, commonly called freely associated states, under the Compact of Free
Association in the USPACOM AOR. The US territories located in the Pacific and the
nations included in the Compact of Free Association include American Samoa; Northern
II-10 JP 3-27
Mariana Islands; Guam; Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands; Johnston Atoll; Kingman
Reef; Midway Atoll; Palmyra Atoll; Wake Atoll; the Federated States of Micronesia; the
Republic of the Marshall Islands; and the Republic of Palau. USPACOM also contributes
to the active, layered defense-in-depth of the western approaches to CONUS and Alaska.
CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander for HD within the USPACOM AOR.
Support relationships are coordinated among CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities
such as against threats from outside the AOR (e.g., USPACOM supporting
USNORTHCOM). CDRUSPACOM may be tasked to support the collaborative federated
architecture for targeting required by CDRUSNORTHCOM.
(a) C2 for HD Land Operations in the USPACOM AOR. Commanding

General (CG), United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC), assumes functional
component commander responsibilities as the land component commander for the
USPACOM portion of the US and its territories. CG USARPAC is responsible for Joint
Task Force-Homeland Defense (JTF-HD) to conduct operations within the USPACOM
JOA (including CBRN response and DSCA) and for working closely with applicable
federal, state, tribal, and local agencies when orchestrating DOD operations. All HD
activities are coordinated with USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, and others across AOR
boundaries, including those concerning Hawaii and Alaska.
(b) C2 for HD Maritime Operations in the USPACOM AOR. The

Commander, United States Pacific Fleet (COMUSPACFLT), conducts MHD operations in
the USPACOM AOR, supports CDRUSNORTHCOM in the conduct of MHD operations
in the USNORTHCOM AOR, and supports USCG MHS operations. COMUSPACFLT
conducts MHD operations with assigned forces within the USNORTHCOM AOR in close
coordination with USNORTHCOM’s JFMCC while keeping CDRUSPACOM informed.
Upon declaration of an MHD mission in the USPACOM AOR, the USCG allocates forces
to CDRUSPACOM under the C2 of CGDEFOR West, which may be attached with
specification of TACON to COMUSPACFLT, or OPCON if mutually agreed with the
USCG. Figure II-2 depicts the applicable MHD and MHS command relationships.
(c) C2 for HD Joint Air Operations in the USPACOM AOR. The

Commander, Pacific Air Forces (COMPACAF), is the theater JFACC for the USPACOM
AOR and maintains a theater joint air operations center in Hawaii.
See JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, for details regarding theater
JFACC, the joint air operations center, and C2 for joint air operations.
(d) C2 for HD Space Operations in the USPACOM AOR.

USSTRATCOM conducts space operations in direct support to USPACOM’s HD
operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM has designated JFCC Space as USSTRATCOM’s SCA,
responsible for the deconfliction, prioritization, and integration of military, intelligence,
civil, and commercial space requirements between CDRUSSTRATCOM and
CDRUSPACOM. CDRUSPACOM has designated COMPACAF as USPACOM’s SCA
to conduct joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements in
support of USPACOM’s HD operations. CDRUSPACOM or CDRUSSTRATCOM may
authorize DIRLAUTH between the SCAs to ensure prompt and timely support.
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(e) C2 for HD CO in the USPACOM AOR. CDRUSPACOM is

responsible for defending against, mitigating, and defeating cyberspace threats against
specific USPACOM systems that are not associated with the DODIN. HQ USPACOM
will coordinate CO with USPACOM component commands, subordinate unified
commands, JTFs, direct reporting units, and other CCMDs through USPACOM’s CO
support staff; USCYBERCOM provides a cyberspace forward support element to
USPACOM to support CO and as required for liaison between USCYBERCOM and
USPACOM components. For HD, USPACOM coordinates through USCYBERCOM with
DHS through its CS&C as the primary agency for protecting USG and public networks
against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. Functional CCDRs and the Services are
responsible for protection of their networks located within the USPACOM AOR, but not
assigned or attached to USPACOM.
(f) C2 for HD Special Operations in the USPACOM AOR. Special

operations conducted in the USPACOM AOR are normally conducted with
CDRUSPACOM as the supported commander while OPCON is exercised through the
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC). In the USPACOM AOR, SOCPAC
conducts TSOC functions and serves as the USPACOM entry point for all SOF matters.
SOCPAC is tasked to conduct regional activities that may support future operations.
(g) Commander, JTF-HD, employs two task forces and subordinate

coordination teams in two Pacific OAs (i.e., Task Force East in Hawaii and Task Force
West in Guam). These forces, along with local installations, conduct HD operations and
respond to support requests from civil authorities per USPACOM CONPLAN 5001-13,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
(h) To assist Commander, JTF-HD, in accomplishing HD missions,

organizations such as the USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), Joint
Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W), SOCPAC, and USPACOM Service components
provide intelligence, staff augmentation, interagency coordination, and military forces as
necessary. The USPACOM JIOC provides support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI’s) Honolulu Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), with an analyst imbedded as a
member of the DOD analytical team residing within the Honolulu JTTF. All USPACOM
Service and functional components involved in HD operations provide situational
awareness and coordinate their actions with JTF-HD, per USPACOM CONPLAN 5002,
Homeland Defense.
(4) Commander, United States Southern Command

(CDRUSSOUTHCOM). CDRUSSOUTHCOM provides contingency planning,
operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except
US commonwealths and territories and foreign nations and territories within the
USNORTHCOM AOR), and Cuba, as well as for the FP of US military resources within
these locations. CDRUSSOUTHCOM is also responsible for defense of the Panama Canal
and canal area. Key contributions to defending the homeland are to provide:
(a) Interdiction of air and maritime threats to the homeland before they enter
the USNORTHCOM AOR and C2 military handoff when/as appropriate.
II-12 JP 3-27
(b) Designated lead CCDR element within Joint Interagency Task Force-
South (JIATF-S). JIATF-S works with PNs and US LEAs to stem illegal production and
trafficking of illicit drugs and precursors and to counter the affiliated TCOs, which
undermine the security of nations in the USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM AORs and
threaten overall US national security. USSOUTHCOM’s role provides significant insight
into extant and emerging threats to the homeland. This includes contacts established during
JIATF-S missions that may be determined by USSOUTHCOM or USNORTHCOM to be
an HD threat.
(5) Commander, United States European Command (CDRUSEUCOM);

Commander, United States Africa Command (CDRUSAFRICOM); and
Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM).
CDRUSEUCOM, CDRUSAFRICOM, and CDRUSCENTCOM play vital roles in
defending the homeland and supporting CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM for
HD. Specifically, they provide a forward presence to obtain information on threats that
may be planning attacks on the homeland, and they can deny adversaries freedom of access
to the air, land, and maritime approaches to the homeland. CDRUSEUCOM and
CDRUSCENTCOM may be tasked to support the collaborative federated architecture for
targeting required by CDRUSNORTHCOM.
c. Functional CCDR Responsibilities
(1) CDRUSSTRATCOM. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead CCDR for strategic

deterrence planning and executes strategic deterrence operations, as directed. Specifically,
CDRUSSTRATCOM conducts the following activities associated with defending the
homeland:
(a) Synchronizes planning for global missile defense and coordinates global
missile defense operations support. Provides missile warning information to CCDRs and
allies, and assessment of missile attack if the appropriate CCMD is unable to do so.
Provides alternate global missile defense execution capability as directed and, as required,
to ensure COOP.
(b) Plans, coordinates, and executes nuclear, conventional, or global strike,

as directed.
(c) Supports the collaborative federated architecture for targeting required

by CDRUSNORTHCOM for HD.
(2) Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM),

plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities for offensive
cyberspace operations (OCO), DCO, and DODIN operations and conducts CO to enable
actions in the physical domains, facilitates freedom of action in cyberspace, and denies the
same to adversaries. USCYBERCOM can support HD CO in collaboration with
USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and DHS by coordinating activities within the required
AOR and assisting with expertise and capabilities directed and made available.
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(a) CDRUSCYBERCOM synchronizes planning for CO, to include

direction of DODIN operations and defense to secure, operate, and defend DOD
cyberspace and to defend US critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions. Directs
DODIN operations and defense in coordination with the CJCS and CCMDs. Coordinates
with other CCMDs and appropriate USG departments and agencies prior to the creation of
cyberspace effects that cross AORs in response to cyberspace threats.
(b) USCYBERCOM normally provides cyberspace forward support

elements to CCMDs to support CO during major operations and exercises and for liaison
between the GCCs’ components and USCYBERCOM Service components, as required.
For details regarding USCYBERCOM and all aspects of CO, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace
Operations.
(3) CDRUSSOCOM. CDRUSSOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes, and, as

directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks. US Special Operations
Command also organizes, trains, equips, and deploys combat-ready SOF in support of other
CCMDs, while retaining COCOM of the TSOCs. For operations conducted in the
homeland, CDRUSSOCOM serves as either a supported or supporting commander for
selected CT activities and serves as a supporting commander to the GCCs with geographic
HD responsibilities within their respective AORs. USSOCOM also integrates planning for
DOD countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts. This CWMD effort is
directly coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), CCMDs, USG departments and agencies, international organizations,
NGOs, and foreign partners. USSOCOM integrates and synchronizes DOD-wide efforts
in support of the CWMD mission by planning, advocating, and advising CCMDs on
WMD-related matters, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
education, personnel, and facilities.
(4) CDRUSTRANSCOM. CDRUSTRANSCOM provides common-user and

commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; patient movement; and
aerial refueling to supported commanders. For HD operations, CDRUSTRANSCOM
provides, upon request, a director of mobility forces to advise on air mobility support
operations.
d. Reserve Component (RC) Responsibilities. The RC of the US Armed Forces

consists of the ARNG, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve,
the ANG, the Air Force Reserve, and the USCG Reserve. By virtue of their geographic
dispersion throughout the US, the RC represents a significant military response capability
for HD missions and activities.
e. NG. The NG is forward-based in nearly 3,000 communities throughout the US; the
territories of Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico; and the District of Columbia.
It is readily available to conduct domestic operations, including HD, DSCA, NG civil
support, and HS activities. As a military organization, the NG routinely interacts with state
and local emergency managers; local LE; first responders; and Title 10, USC, forces. The
NG is experienced in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. NG forces
II-14 JP 3-27
have both federal and state responsibilities specified in the Constitution of the US; Title
10, USC; Title 32, USC; and applicable state constitutional provisions and statutes. It
operates not only as RCs of the USA and the USAF supporting the President and their
assigned CCMDs when under Titles 10 and/or Title 32, USC, in time of war and in national
contingencies, but also as an organized militia supporting governors in domestic operations
in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status. It is important that other Service/component
commanders and staffs understand that the statutory roles and authorities of NG forces,
when acting under state control, vary from state to state. Governors may employ the NG
for the HD mission in state active duty status or as provided in Title 32, USC, Section 902,
when approved by SecDef, for HD activities such as critical infrastructure protection (CIP).
When federalized pursuant to Title 10, USC, NG units and personnel are subject to federal
C2.
For more detailed information regarding the NG and HD, see DODD 3160.01, Homeland
Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard.
(1) NGB. NGB is a joint activity of DOD and serves as the channel of
communications for all matters pertaining to the NG between the Departments of the Army
and Air Force, the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the US Virgin Islands. CNGB is the principal advisor to SecDef, through the CJCS,
on matters involving non-federalized NG forces and on NG matters to the Secretaries of
the Army and Air Force and to the Service chiefs of the Army and Air Force. The NGB
participates with the USA and USAF staffs in the development and coordination of
programs pertaining to or affecting the NG. The NGB formulates and administers the
programs for the training, development, and maintenance of the ARNG and ANG.
(2) The Adjutants General (TAGs). The non-federalized NG is commanded

and controlled by the governor through TAG of each state (or, in the case of the District of
Columbia, by SecDef through the CG of the District of Columbia NG). TAG exercises C2
through their applicable National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State).
For more information on the roles and responsibilities of TAGs, see DODD 5105.83,
National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State).
(3) Reserves. The reserves, at all times, are subject to a federal chain of
command pursuant to Title 10, USC, as defined by their parent Service. The USCG
Reserve is subject to both Title 10, USC, and Title 14, USC, under the direction of the
Commandant of the USCG.
For additional information on the RC mobilization/demobilization process, see JP 4-05,

Joint Mobilization Planning.
e. CCDRs HD Relationships. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions

in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place
and time. Integration should include military and civilian organizations as appropriate. In
consideration of strategic direction, the JFC establishes the priorities, timelines, goals, and
objectives for HD missions that allow synchronization and integration of all operations for
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Chapter II
unified action. Federal and international law, international and command agreements,
DOD policies, and selected plans provide guidance which the CCDR must integrate to
achieve synchronization. Command arrangement agreements (CAAs) establish
procedures and delineate responsibilities between two or more CCDRs concerning mutual
support, interface, and cooperation. They prescribe the arrangement necessary to support
the employment of forces from one CCDR to another and the control of these forces
operating within a specific AOR or JOA. CAAs may also delineate information and
intelligence dissemination requirements in order to enhance coordination for planning and
execution of cross-AOR operations. CAAs must remain consistent with DOD guidance as
promulgated from SecDef and the CJCS. The CAA between CDRUSNORTHCOM and
CDRUSPACOM establishes the methodology under which transfer of forces between the
two CCMDs is executed in support of HD missions. Additionally, per DOD policies,
CNGB and the state NG forces must be coordinated and synchronized within both the
planning and execution phases to ensure unity of effort. Processes, C2 arrangements, and
communication requirements are representative items addressed in the document.
4. Interagency Coordination
a. Interorganizational Coordination and Interoperability. During an HD

operation, civil authorities may span the gamut of being fully functional to non-existent, or
could contain any combination of federal, state, and local authorities. The events that
initiate an HD operation are so diverse, it is difficult to estimate the civilian functions likely
to be functional and can only be determined as the situation develops. HS activities of
some interorganizational partners may overlap with some HD activities, and while the
major military activities that are the responsibilities of DOD cannot be accomplished by
other interorganizational partners, their support is essential. Unity of effort among all HD
participants is fundamental and essential. HD operations are conducted in a complex OE
that contains thousands of different jurisdictions (federal, state, tribal, and local), many
agencies and organizations, the private sector, and several allies and multinational partners.
From a USG perspective, this necessitates coordinated and integrated activities that have
been previously exercised/rehearsed to facilitate effective interagency interoperability in
addition to unity of effort. Coordination should be conducted through the defense
coordinating officer/defense coordinating element (DCE) of the affected region. The
inherent interrelationships between HS, HD, and DSCA, and the potential for transition
between those missions, creates a dynamic and complex environment in which
interorganizational coordination and resulting interoperability could prove critical. From
a DOD perspective, understanding and executing the multiple command relationships and
organizational relationships required for simultaneous execution of HS, HD, and DSCA
requires the utmost in interagency coordination.
(1) Within the US homeland and its approaches, forces may face continuous
media scrutiny. When faced with media questions or scrutiny, consult with the public
affairs (PA) office before responding. This is due to the sensitive jurisdictional
considerations and political dimensions of a domestic response.
(2) Operational coordination is conducted within appropriate joint force

command centers and their corresponding non-DOD counterparts. It is not complete until
II-16 JP 3-27
it includes interorganizational planning considerations, which are intrinsic rather than

optional in the planning process. CDRUSNORTHCOM and/or CDRUSPACOM may seek
approval and guidance from SecDef to conduct interorganizational planning and
coordination when appropriate.
(3) Each CCDR has the prerogative to organize or tailor the interorganizational
coordination function differently based on mission requirements. Regardless of the title of
the interorganizational coordination effort, it should include agency representatives,
command liaison officers (LNOs), and staff representatives who collaborate to share
information; analyze ongoing activities, actions, implications, and/or consequences; and
participate in planning. Interorganizational coordination efforts should ensure the
commander and staff are completely informed on interagency issues and implications.
For more information on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational

Cooperation.
(4) Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of unity of effort. A

proven approach to information sharing during interorganizational cooperation is the use
of transparency to develop shared situational awareness of common objectives.
Commanders and interorganizational partners should provide guidance on what
information needs to be shared with whom, when, and how. DOD’s over-reliance on the
classified information system for both classified and unclassified information is a frequent
impediment, and the means of sharing the information must be established in advance.
DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made available throughout
the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the maximum extent allowed
by US laws and DOD policy. Critical to transparency of information sharing is the proper
classification of intelligence and information.
b. MHD and MHS Coordination. MHD and MHS are closely related, but separate
activities based on the distinct authorities used to implement either MHD or MHS tasks.
The Title 14, USC, functions and powers of the USCG enable USCG commanders to
conduct a broad spectrum of regulatory functions and MHS activities, while maintaining
the capability and readiness to rapidly transition to execute Title 10, USC, MHD tasking
when required. USCG regulatory functions, such as captain of the port (COTP) authorities
and marine transportation system/waterways management activities, may be used to
support or complement MHD operations. MHS activities and USCG regulatory functions
are not conducted under CGDEFOR C2 due to the limitations of Title 10, USC, authority.
JFCs seeking to leverage USCG regulatory functions or MHS activities must coordinate
with the appropriate USCG area commander. DOD forces that are provided to support
MHS operations are TACON to specifically designated USCG commanders. Figure II-2
depicts the C2 of both MHD tasks pertaining to CGDEFOR, as discussed in applicable
EXORDs and interdepartmental agreements, and MHS tasks that are conducted under
USCG-specific authorities.
For more information on coordination of USCG-specific authorities, see JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation.
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Chapter II
(1) MHD Tasks. MHD tasks conducted under the C2 of DOD forces are
categorized under the joint functions and are subject to SROE (see Chapter III, “Planning
and Operations for Homeland Defense”).
(2) MHS Tasks. MHS tasks and related regulatory functions are conducted
under the C2 of USCG commanders, are further described in USCG policy directives and
doctrine, and are subject to USCG use of force policy. Certain MHS tasks may require
immediate USCG access to DOD capabilities and forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM,
CDRUSPACOM, and CDRUSSOUTHCOM may transfer forces to operate under the
TACON of USCG commanders for MHS operations upon request by the USCG. In certain
circumstances, SecDef authorization may be required to reallocate forces or approve a
request for assistance to support MHS for 48 hours or more. DOD forces conducting MHS
operations under USCG C2 must adhere to USCG use of force policy for warning shots
and disabling fire.
For more information on MHS tasks and USCG use of force policy, see Commandant
Instruction (COMDTINST) M16600.6, Maritime Security and Response Operations
(MSRO) Manual; COMDTINST M16247.1, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM);
COMDTINST M16600.3, Underwater Port Security Operations Manual; and Coast Guard
Publication 3-0, Operations.
For more information on USCG regulatory functions concerning ports and waterways, see
COMDTINST M16000.11, Marine Safety Manual, Volume VI, Ports and Waterways
Activities.
For more information on the force transfer process for DOD support to MHS operations,
see the CJCS MHD EXORD, CJCS DSCA EXORD, and the Memorandum of Agreement
Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for
Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland
Security.
c. MOTR Process
(1) The MOTR Plan aligns the response to maritime threats against the US. The
MOTR Plan has been used to facilitate the resolution of many maritime threat responses
ranging from migrant interdictions and drug seizures to terrorism and piracy. Operational
protocols complement the plan with detailed guidance for specific types of cases and
agency/department contact information.
(2) The MOTR Plan provides the framework for integrated military, LE,
diplomatic, and intelligence community (IC) action. Ensuring an aligned response is
particularly challenging in the maritime environment where multiple USG departments and
agencies may be involved, each having separate authorities, responsibilities, and
capabilities.
(3) The MOTR Plan supports, for example, the coordinated response to a vessel
suspected of illicit trafficking. Such a response may include identifying the legal basis for
boarding, enactment of diplomatic efforts with a vessel’s flag state, and resolution of
II-18 JP 3-27
investigative and disposition determinations, all of which potentially involve multiple USG
departments’ and agencies’ authority and jurisdiction.
(4) The Global MOTR Coordination Center facilitates the coordination process
and serves as the executive secretariat for implementation of the MOTR Plan. During
MOTR coordination activities, the Global MOTR Coordination Center is accountable to
the NSC staff (see National Security Presidential Directive [NSPD]-41/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive [HSPD]-13, Maritime Security Policy).
(5) Successful MOTR execution relies on the operations-intelligence linkage

enhanced by ongoing efforts to achieve maritime domain awareness and to facilitate timely
decision making. The objective is to identify threats as early and as distant from the
homeland as possible, but no later than the time required to defeat or otherwise overcome
threats at a safe distance from the US. This is enabled by maritime domain awareness.
For additional information on maritime domain awareness, refer to JP 3-32, Command

and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
d. Land Operational Threat Response
(1) The homeland is a unique theater of operations for US ground forces and is
subject to special requirements. The USA and USMC components to USNORTHCOM
and USPACOM work with DHS, other interagency partners, and civil authorities to
support HS, which complements some aspects of HD. The USA and USARNORTH also
support security cooperation activities with North American partners to help build a
cooperative military defense as part of the effort to secure the land approaches and ensure
defense of the homeland in-depth.
(2) Many of the missions and activities that are conducted by the land component
during shaping operations support other interagency partners and civil authorities, (e.g.
defense support of LEAs, CD, CWMD, countering TCOs, FP, security cooperation
activities with Mexico and The Bahamas, and partnership with Canada). These efforts
contribute to, and are enablers to, both HS and HD. Those efforts help constitute the
prevent aspect of HD. The sharing of identity information between interagency partners is
a key enabler to manage and track cross-border movement. NSPD-59/HSPD-24,
Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security, instructs all
federal agencies to make available to other agencies biometric and associated biographical
and contextual information associated with persons of interest. Operational commanders
collect and provide identity information on terrorists encountered in the OE to the NCTC
through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Watch Listing Division.
For additional information on joint land operations, refer to JP 3-31, Command and
Control for Joint Land Operations.
e. AOTR Process
(1) An AOTR ensures a comprehensive and coordinated USG response to air

threats against the US or its interests. NSPD-47/HSPD-16, Aviation Security Policy,
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Chapter II
prescribes the AOTR Plan as part of the overall national aviation policy. Simply stated,
the AOTR is primarily to counter asymmetric threats involving civilian aviation, but
includes considerations for interagency coordination to defend against foreign military air
and missile attacks. Several DOD HD responsibilities fall within the protocols of the
AOTR. DOD response capabilities remain an integral part of the overall national response
in support of HD and HS complementary objectives and missions.
(2) AOTR comprises immediate actions, generally short duration in nature, to

counter the full range of airborne and ground-based aviation security threats. These threats
include, but are not limited to: attacks using civilian aviation (i.e., commercial/general
aviation) manned and unmanned aircraft as weapons against ground-based or airborne
targets; attacks against aircraft, including hijacking and air piracy; attacks using standoff
weapons, including man-portable air defense systems; attacks involving civilian aircraft
carrying WMD; and attacks against aviation transportation system infrastructure. AOTR
execution begins when intelligence or other information is received that an incident is
imminent or occurring and that an immediate response is necessary and concludes when
the threat has been defeated or otherwise resolved.
(3) Upon AOTR execution and time permitting, DOD initiates secure
communications with appropriate departments and agencies to facilitate the timely flow of
information. This will allow for appropriate consultation related to the initial DOD
airborne operational response, as well as coordination of related LE actions or other
security measures. DOD performs the following activities specific to AOTR, as
appropriate:
(a) Specific Airborne Threats (an ongoing or potential attack from the air):
1. Through CCDRs and NORAD, SecDef directs the necessary

supporting measures to facilitate effective response and to mitigate subsequent effects of
an ongoing or potential attack from the air. In extreme circumstances, this includes a
determination, made in consultation with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and
DHS, whether to implement emergency security control of air traffic measures. Unless the
President directs otherwise, DOD is the only USG department authorized to direct
engagement using deadly force against airborne civilian aircraft that present an imminent
threat to the US or US interests.
2. Interception of designated flights of interest that do not present an

immediate threat to the US or its interests, as deemed necessary by SecDef or designee.
This includes response to a threat against aircraft with US persons onboard that occurs
overseas, in coordination with the Department of State (DOS) and the affected countries,
as appropriate.
3. Conducting air defense against airborne hostile military threats.
(b) General Threats:
1. Conducting air defense against threats to DOD assets and

infrastructure on DOD installations.
II-20 JP 3-27
2. Response to other aviation threats globally, including airborne or

ground-based actions taken at the request of foreign partners and when directed by SecDef
or the President.
For more information on the full range of air operations, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air
and Missile Threats, and JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. For
more information on the AOTR, refer to the Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan.
5. Interorganizational Cooperation Considerations
a. The threat exists across a continuum that ranges from nation states down to
individuals and small groups, who are intent on doing harm to the US. Today, HD mission
response forces involve multiple organizations. Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), the
NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM operation aimed at defending the homeland,
involves active duty personnel from the USAF, USN, Canadian Forces, and NG members
federalized for the mission. These military forces coordinate with DOT (FAA), DHS, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate. A
response to a possible hijack situation would involve the private sector as well as local first
responders. For example, airline companies, private or municipal airports, local
municipalities, and other non-federal entities are responsible for the aircraft and any
airports where the aircraft may attempt to land or be directed to land. This demonstrates
the complex environment in which DOD forces must respond to threats that involve
multiple jurisdictions (federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal) with domestic partners
and international/multinational partners (e.g., NORAD).
b. The HD C2 structure will depend upon early identification of the responsibilities,

authorities, and capabilities of USG organizations which support HD, plus the additional
considerations of other governmental organizations or NGOs, and multinational forces.
The resulting complexity of C2, mission planning, and operational execution should drive
early identification of the desired end states and necessary collaboration with the
operational partners. Moreover, the JFC with HD missions should also account for likely
media scrutiny and sovereignty and jurisdictional issues. For example, MHD operations
may transition from HD to HS to DSCA missions, or vice versa, with the selection of the
primary agency being dependent upon both the developing real-time situation and the USG
desired end state. HD, HS, and DSCA operations can occur simultaneously or transition
from one to another. HD missions in the homeland and in the approaches are truly dynamic
as situations may change in minutes or hours versus days or weeks.
For additional information on interorganizational cooperation, refer to JP 3-08,

6. Multinational Forces
To conduct the full range of HD operations, CCDRs should consider multinational and
nonmilitary organizations. When a response force resides within an alliance, the
procedures and structure of that alliance will normally determine the operational-level
leadership. When a response force is based in a coalition (or a lead-nation structure in an
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Chapter II
alliance), the designated lead nation or other leadership mechanism will normally select
the operational-level leadership. While the President and SecDef retain command
authority over US forces, it is often prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces
under the TACON of a foreign commander for reasons such as maximizing military
effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort.
a. Security Cooperation Efforts. The US seeks the cooperation of numerous foreign

governments, multinational forces, and other international partners to achieve its national
security goals, to include defense of the homeland. CCDRs integrate this cooperation with
their theater campaign plans (TCPs) and conduct security cooperation activities to
encourage and enable countries to work with the US to achieve strategic objectives.
Strengthening security relations with multinational partners increases their capabilities to
contend with common challenges.
(1) In the forward regions, CCDRs and their components conduct security
cooperation activities with PNs that help provide the outer layer of HD.
(2) GCCs with geographic HD responsibilities have AORs with very different
characteristics. In addition to its vast airspace, the USPACOM AOR is predominantly
maritime and includes considerable political, religious, cultural, social, and economic
diversity. It encompasses the Asia-Pacific region, with numerous sovereign nations and
one-half of the Earth’s surface. The area includes five of seven US security treaty alliances
and extensive international waters covered by international law, as well as US territories
under US law, treaties, or compacts. The USNORTHCOM AOR is primarily continental,
with extensive land borders and coastal regions. It includes Canada, Mexico, The
Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the
US Virgin Islands, and the US (excluding Hawaii and Pacific territories) with multiple
legal and policy concerns. USNORTHCOM security cooperation efforts with Canada and
Mexico directly impact US defense-in-depth.
(a) Military Engagement and Shaping. Security cooperation enhances

access, readiness, and training by strengthening partnerships and regional security. This
involves specific focus areas as described in the Guidance for Employment of the Force
(GEF). GCCs with geographic HD responsibilities address commander’s communication
synchronization in their security cooperation planning efforts. CCDRs seek to diminish
the conditions that terrorists exploit and to support activities that deny sanctuary to
terrorists. The plans also strengthen and improve collaboration among joint commands,
agencies at all levels of government, and regional partners.
(b) Enabling Continental Defense. Cooperative defense, in association

with US regional partners, enhances successful continental defense, achieving collective
security interests and the desired HS and HD shaping objectives established in the GCC’s
TCP. Security cooperation activities are essential to both USNORTHCOM support of HS
and the HD mission through mutually beneficial partnerships. Military and civilian
interoperability and cooperation begins by establishing and maintaining relationships.
These relationships build to include combined education, training, military engagement,
equipping, and exercises supported by intelligence and information sharing, exchange of
II-22 JP 3-27
LNOs, and other activities that facilitate HD. Cooperative defense helps foster appropriate
relationships to leverage complementary capabilities and capitalize on limited resources.
Finally, current efforts toward an integrated North American defense warrant an increase
in HD exercises and personnel exchanges.
(3) Various initiatives and agreements exist that forge relationships and provide
for multinational coordination in the defense of the homeland. For example, the Canada-
United States Combined Defense Plan is another step towards an integrated North
American defense.
b. Alliance Support to HD. Various alliances may be a source of additional HD

support. For example, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “… an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence….” When the US was
attacked on 11 September 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked
Article 5 and provided NATO Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to help patrol
US airspace and initiated Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as part of an AT effort.
c. Other Multinational Considerations. Many activities can increase US partners’

capabilities and create the conditions for establishing new multinational partnerships to
contend with mutual challenges. The GEF outlines a series of security activities a CCDR
can use to advance long-term security objectives with multinational partners wherever
feasible and collectively supportive. These activities include:
(1) Multinational exercises, training, education, and experimentation.
(2) Counternarcotics assistance.
(3) CWMD activities.
(4) Defense and military contacts.
(5) Defense support to public diplomacy (e.g., developing information programs

in regional languages that complement other security cooperation activities).
(6) Security force assistance, to include DOS security assistance programs.
(7) Forensics and biometrics capability and capacity building.
(8) Other programs and activities (e.g., Regional Defense Counterterrorism

Fellowship Program and Defense Environmental International Cooperation).
(9) DOD SPP.
d. The OE and the coordinated and integrated action of all contributors may blur the
distinct contribution of any individual organization or capability in isolation from all
others. This is particularly true when contemplating the complex environment within the
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Chapter II
homeland. Each organization has unique capabilities that may not be easily duplicated by
other departments, agencies, or organizations. The supported JFC should continually
address the challenge of coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the wide range of
available capabilities to defend the homeland. Employment of nonlethal capabilities
should be considered in any situation requiring direct fire capabilities.
e. To achieve the objectives, unified action, and the synchronization and integration
of military operations in time, space, and purpose, the JFC must consider many factors, to
include:
(1) What objectives, when achieved, will attain the desired end state?
(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve the objectives?
(3) How can the resources of the joint force and interorganizational and
multinational partners be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?
(4) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence
of actions?
For additional information on multinational coordination, see JP 3-16, Multinational

Operations.
II-24 JP 3-27
CHAPTER III
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
1. General
The threat to the homeland is both difficult to predict and increasingly diverse. The
likelihood of conventional large-scale land attack on the US may be remote. However, the
wide range of threats that does exist must be addressed. In modern times, US forces have
concentrated on defeating threats as far away from the homeland as possible and that
remains the objective. The central idea is to protect the homeland from external threats
and aggression using integrated strategic, operational, and tactical offensive and defensive
measures as necessary. The ability to detect, deter, prevent, or, if necessary, defeat threats
is a required capability to protect the homeland. Specific planning factors, requirements,
and objectives for HD operations are contained in OPLANs and CONPLANs associated
with the mission.
2. Strategic Guidance
General strategy is provided in high-level policy documents such as the National

Security Strategy (NSS), Defense Strategy Review, and the NMS. Similarly, high-level
planning guidance is provided in the UCP; GEF and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Planning architecture is provided in Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Formats and Guidance.
3. Operational Factors
a. Civil and Military Relationships. Civil-military relationships may be more

complicated during HD operations because the military operations will be taking place in
our homeland. Regardless of the size and scope of the particular operations, inevitably
they will involve multiple jurisdictions (such as cities, counties, regions, tribes, and states).
As a result, multiple agencies and organizations will participate. Some may directly or
indirectly support military operations and some may conflict with them, not because of
different loyalties, but because of different authorities. Managing such relationships will
require significant time and effort on the part of federal, state, local, and tribal authorities
to ensure proper coordination. Interagency forums, associations, information sharing, and
constant communications will be vital enablers. Interorganzational coordination and
synchronization with governmental and nongovernmental entities, as well as ensuring
conformity with the Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, may assume a level
of importance not matched in most overseas theaters of operations.
For additional information on civil and military relationships during a domestic incident,
see PPD-25, Guideline for US Government Interagency Response to Terrorist Threats or
Incidents in the US and Overseas.
b. Commander’s Communication Synchronization and PA
III-1
Chapter III
(1) CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Formats and
Guidance, requires the JFC to include communication goals and objectives in the
commander’s intent and to have a communication approach that ensures unity of themes,
objectives, and messages among key activities; consistency in intent or effect between
command operations, actions, and information; and a risk assessment of the information
that may reach unintended audiences, create unintended consequences, and require risk
mitigation measures.
For more information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs; and JDN 2-
13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.
(2) PA. The role of PA in HD operations is to support the JFC by communicating

truthful and factual unclassified information about DOD activities to US, allied, national,
and international audiences, publics, and stakeholders. Due to the involvement of other
USG departments and agencies in HD missions, PA will require interagency cooperation,
coordination, and unity of effort. PA in HD operations enables all USG departments and
agencies to speak with one voice and provide consistent, factual information to the public.
As the LFA for HD, DOD develops key messages and provides PA guidance. Supporting
agencies conduct their respective PA operations in concert with this guidance. PA should
be included in all phases of planning and coordination from the onset of HD operations.
Specific DOD PA responsibilities are outlined in various CCMD plans and standing PA
guidance. The EXORD for the incident will provide the PA posture and media engagement
policy. Incident-specific guidance will be developed by the primary agency in coordination
with participating agencies.
For more information on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
c. Non-DOD Federal, State, Territorial, Local, and Tribal Planning Factors
(1) Interorganizational cooperation must occur between elements of DOD and

non-DOD federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as other participating USG
departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving HD objectives. Commanders of
USNORTHCOM and USPACOM have designated DCEs assigned to each of the 10
respective Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. Each Service has
state EPLOs assigned to the same regions designated to conduct interagency coordination.
Service EPLOs usually coordinate with NG JFHQs-State joint operation centers. Each
FEMA region also contains additional NG planners to assist CCMD planners. Positive and
active participation by command interagency staff members from the interagency
coordination office, group, or planning cell can be used to mutual benefit.
(2) Commanders and their staffs should consider the interrelationship between
HD and DSCA operations (i.e., the potential for transition between the missions and
simultaneous operations).
d. Legal Considerations. Military operations inside the homeland can present

unique and complex legal issues. Certain military functions (e.g., intelligence operations,
ROE, and RUF) have specific applications and legal implications when conducted
III-2 JP 3-27
domestically. Coordination with the servicing office of the staff judge advocate for legal
advice should be as early in the operation planning process as possible.
4. Intelligence Sharing for Homeland Defense
a. The success of interorganizational cooperation in HD operations hinges upon

timely and accurate information and intelligence. Information sharing environments
should include as many essential participants as possible, understanding that not all are
capable of participating in a collaborative environment. When possible, a collaborative
intelligence sharing environment should be capable of generating and moving intelligence,
operational information, and orders where needed in the shortest possible time.
Intelligence staff responsibilities can be found in the JP 2-0 series. Coordination for
information sharing, and especially intelligence sharing, should begin early in all HD
planning processes.
b. The architecture which supports this type of environment needs to be dynamic,

flexible, and capable of providing multinational partners and interagency participants rapid
access to appropriate data. It should facilitate the capability of the IC to support the JFC
and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from and to non-DOD
agencies and NGOs as needed.
c. The intelligence sharing architecture is configured to provide the baseline data

needed to support commanders at all levels. CCDRs are responsible for the intelligence
sharing architecture for their commands and all assigned, attached, and supporting
elements. For contingency operations, subordinate JFCs, supported by their intelligence
directorates, are responsible for establishing the intelligence architecture required to
accomplish the HD mission. In HD, it is particularly important that effective fusion of
intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), LE information, and other available threat
information occurs. This will assist in developing a more accurate assessment of threats to
the homeland and may prevent surprise.
d. The parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are
overseas. In the past, one individual typically dealt with foreign information and the other
domestic. Today both involve elements of foreign and domestic information. Determining
the nature of the data required and the right units to gather it are areas that often require
judge advocate input regarding the legal authorities for information gathering. Intelligence
activities in the homeland are strictly governed by the Constitution; applicable laws; the
policies and procedures authorized in DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities; and
other relevant DOD policies (e.g., intelligence oversight). These policies permit DOD
intelligence missions in the homeland if the subject of the intelligence effort is definitively
linked to defense-related foreign intelligence and CI activities. Intelligence oversight
policies also provide established guidance and requirements to perform activities or
missions not intelligence related (e.g., using domestic imagery for incident assessment and
awareness). However, intelligence oversight policies also provide specific guidance and
regulations to ensure or safeguard against unauthorized collection against US persons
(citizens, legal residents, and organizations). Special emphasis shall be given to the
protection of the Constitutional and privacy rights of US persons.
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Chapter III
e. LE information received by DOD frequently contains US person information. US

person information or information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with
DOD is subject to various statutory and regulatory rules and processes. Military criminal
investigation organizations’ agents or the FBI may provide sensitive threat information
derived from ongoing LE or CI investigations. It is imperative DOD personnel handling
LE information be fully cognizant of all restrictions and processes for receipt, retention,
handling, dissemination, and oversight.
f. Intelligence activities specific to the NG are covered by CNGB Instruction 2000.01

series, National Guard Intelligence Activities, and CNGB Manual 2000.01, National
Guard Intelligence Activities.
5. Joint Fires
Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more
components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common
objective. Joint fires may be provided to assist air, land, maritime, or special operations
forces in conducting HD activities within an OE framed by complex legal authorities and
significant interagency coordination. Although major operations against an enemy in the
US remain highly unlikely, various threats require capabilities and preparations to deter or
defeat them. For that reason, the supported JFCs for HD have plans/orders for HD
operations that anticipate the use of joint fires across the range of military operations. The
following preparations provide useful examples of the challenges of employing joint fires
in HD.
a. Deterrence and Preemptive Self-Defense. The complexity and diversity of the

strategic threats to the homeland range from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to
terrorists with WMD. The common factor is that such attacks would have a devastating
effect of strategic proportions. From a joint fires perspective, HD capabilities have a
deterrent effect that minimizes the threat of an overt attack of strategic proportion by an
enemy. For threats from rogue states and non-state actors, deterrence may not work, so an
active, layered defense-in-depth complements the deterrence capabilities. Also, the use of
joint fires, to include global strike options in preemptive self-defense, is a strategic
consideration.
(1) The threat of ballistic missile attack against the homeland is the one strategic
threat that would require the use of fires to protect the homeland. The limited defense
option for BMD is discussed under paragraph 7, “Protection.”
(2) ONE. While initially conceived in the immediate aftermath of the 11

September 2001 attacks, this operation incorporates both the response to terrorist use of
aircraft as weapons and NORAD’s air defense mission. ONE and air defense is discussed
under paragraph 7, “Protection.”
(3) Terrorist threats to the homeland from overseas may require use of joint fires
through military CT operations or in support of LE activities. Terrorist threats within the
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homeland are an HS mission rather than a matter of HD, unless directed otherwise by the
President.
b. Maritime Joint Fires. Maritime joint fires provide significant capabilities against
any maritime-based threat to the homeland. The maritime environment, including the sea
approaches to the homeland, may afford opportunities to employ joint fires in support of
both HS and HD. Maritime forces can be employed to rapidly destroy, intercept, or
neutralize conventional and terrorist threats, both at sea and ashore. These assets are used
to keep potential threats at bay, far from US shores, but could be deployed close to home
if threats dictate. Use of fires for lethal or nonlethal effects are options. The maritime
aspect of air and missile defenses are discussed under paragraph 7, “Protection.”
(1) A variety of maritime threats to the homeland exists and may include cargo
ships, fishing boats, semi-submersibles, and military vessels. Once a vessel has been
identified as a threat to the homeland, maritime forces’ options may be employed to detect,
deter, prevent, and defeat the delivery of the weapons, cargo, or people to the intended
target(s). Maritime forces may take action as defined by the chain of command, the SROE
and supplementary measures, if any.
(2) Depending on the threat, MHD options may be determined through the
MOTR Plan protocol process. Within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the JFMCC directs
MHD operations that may include appropriate Service or SOF assets to detect, deter,
prevent, and defeat threat vessels.
c. Land-Based Fires. HD presents complex operational challenges for joint fires due
to the necessity to achieve unity of effort within an OE of sovereign states (with NG units)
and the need to interface with a number of disparate government agencies, NGOs, and the
private sector. Land-based fires for HD operations require interorganizational cooperation,
especially since there is significant overlap between DOD executing HD and LE
organizations executing HS and supporting HD. Land-based fires for air and missile
defenses are discussed under paragraph 7, “Protection.”
d. Supporting Fires. Conducting HD, US-only air missions may require a high
degree of dynamic targeting that relies on rapid coordination and integration of assessment,
surveillance, and attack assets in real time. In the homeland, it is likely dynamic targeting
and deliberate targeting (via air tasking orders [ATOs]) would require close coordination
and integration with FAA operations.
See JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, for information on
coordinating and executing ATOs, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for information on
dynamic targeting.
e. CO. HD also presents unique challenges for the JFC in the selection and
engagement of the cyberspace elements of targets. Since specific attribution of cyberspace
threats and their geographic locations are often difficult to determine, the JFC must
carefully coordinate cyberspace fires based upon best available target intelligence and the
specific effects authorized in their order.
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Chapter III
6. Movement and Maneuver in the Conduct of Homeland Defense
a. Land Operations in the Conduct of HD
(1) The GCCs with geographic HD responsibilities should anticipate, plan, and
be prepared for offensive and defensive land operations. Large-scale HD operations
involving maneuver forces, combined arms maneuver, and the conduct of major combat
offensive or defensive operations would be an extraordinary circumstance involving
extraordinary decisions by the President. However, these types of operations are planned
and prepared for within the doctrinal realm of HD. HD land defense actions may include
movement and maneuver, fires (for lethal and nonlethal effects), closing with and
destroying an enemy, sustaining a joint force, and setting conditions for a return to peace.
Specific HD land operations in support of HD may include security operations through FP
tasks or CIP. Defensive land operations will make use of existing USG departments’ and
agencies’ capabilities where possible (e.g., DHS).
(2) Land operations in the conduct of HD are planned and executed by the GCCs
through their subordinate commands and either Service-specific task force HQs or JTFs.
Commanders consider the scope of the OE, the specified and implied tasks, and span of
control when selecting the appropriate C2 relationship. In addition, commanders should
consider the interagency environment; the effect of current operations on the civilian
populace; and the role of the state, tribal, and local LEAs when executing HD operations.
Based upon available forces, each GCC with geographic HD responsibilities has identified
subordinate commands that establish or source HQs for HD operations. The JFLCC may
utilize the respective DCE assigned to the region as an advance element to provide
situational awareness within the AOR and coordinate with interagency partners during
DSCA and/or HD operations. Service components may utilize their respective EPLOs as
an advance element to provide situational awareness within the AOR and coordinate with
interagency partners during DSCA and/or HD.
(3) Although land defense forces may be required to defend in the short term,
decisive results require shifting to the offense as soon as possible. However, HD operations
should be of limited duration and conclude when the land forces achieve the objectives of
the operation.
(4) USNORTHCOM Land Operations
(a) CDRUSNORTHCOM may employ designated land component response

forces from the USA and USMC to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats or aggression
within the AOR. USARNORTH is a Service component command that has also been
designated by CDRUSNORTHCOM as the standing joint force land component command.
USARNORTH could also be designated by CDRUSNORTHCOM as a JFC and provide
C2 of subordinate JTFs and land forces for HD and DSCA missions. USPACOM provides
a quick response force (QRF) for HD operations in the Alaska JOA. USNORTHCOM also
has QRF and rapid response force (RRF) packages available for HD operations. In
addition, individual states possess NG QRFs that may be used in response to an HD
III-6 JP 3-27
situation IAW Title 32, USC, Sections 901-908, and DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense
Activities Conducted by the National Guard.
1. Figure III-1 shows how land forces may be provided and employed
for a rapid response. When directed by the President or SecDef to conduct HD operations,
CDRUSNORTHCOM can consider several initial land force options: employ a QRF or
RRF, employ a JTF with OPCON over a QRF or RRF, employ a JFLCC with OPCON
over a QRF or RRF, or employ USARNORTH as a single-Service HQ with OPCON of a
QRF or RRF. Based on this decision, CDRUSNORTHCOM sends a request for forces
(RFF) to the Joint Staff. Once SecDef approves the RFF, force providers are directed to
source personnel and equipment through Service components and provide them to
CDRUSNORTHCOM. If a larger force is required, then follow-on forces can be
employed. These follow-on forces may combine with the QRF or RRF as a task force,
under a JTF. A dedicated QRF/RRF would only be utilized in a very small or isolated
incident requiring quick reaction.
Homeland Defense Land Operations Rapid Response Process
President
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff
Forces Commander
Force Providers CNGB TAG
USNORTHCOM
NG
JFHQ-
QRF or USARNORTH or State
RRF or
JTF or JFLCC or
MARFORNORTH
NG
QRF or QRF or QRF
Execution QRF or RRF
RRF RRF
Task Force
(Follow on force,
if employed)
Legend
CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau TAG the adjutant general
JFLCC joint force land component commander USARNORTH United States Army, North
JTF joint task force USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
MARFORNORTH United States Marine Corps Forces
North command authority
NG National Guard operational control
NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force coordination
headquarters-state
QRF quick response force force option
RRF rapid response force
Figure III-1. Homeland Defense Land Operations Rapid Response Process
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Chapter III
2. USARNORTH. CDRUSARNORTH has been designated to serve

as the JFLCC for USNORTHCOM, including QRF/RRF missions. CDRUSARNORTH
plans and prepares for potential HD operations through continuous coordination with other
Service components; the NGB; NG JFHQ-State; JTFs; and other federal, state, local, and
tribal agencies. USARNORTH-designated task forces/JTFs can provide C2 for Title 10,
USC, forces designated to conduct HD missions.
3. United States Marine Corps Forces, North (MARFORNORTH).

In addition to command responsibilities, MARFORNORTH supports, coordinates, and
provides advice to CDRUSNORTHCOM on the employment of Marine forces when they
are attached to USNORTHCOM for the conduct of HD operations.
4. SOCNORTH. CDRUSNORTHCOM has OPCON of SOCNORTH,

SOCNORTH provides SOF advice, support, and coordination. It is also designated the
joint force special operations component commander.
(b) Although considered extraordinary, conditions may arise that require

conventional land operations within the continental limits of the US (to include Alaska).
In such instances, forces will be made available to USNORTHCOM. These operations
will be guided by established doctrine, principles, and fundamentals. Procedures for
identifying C2 structures, requesting and employing response forces, and coordinating
actions will be consistent with established doctrine. Special considerations will likely
apply due to the unique nature of operating in the homeland environment and the
requirement for interorganizational cooperation. Figure III-2 illustrates the HD land
operations sustained response process. Conventional land forces are provided to
CDRUSNORTHCOM per the RFF process described above and allocated to the JFLCC or
the commander, joint task force (CJTF), who will have OPCON over these forces.
For more information, refer to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400, Homeland Defense.
(5) USPACOM Land Operations
(a) CDRUSPACOM establishes JTF-HD as the HQ responsible for land HD

operations on all bases and in all US territories within the USPACOM AOR. Commander,
JTF-HD, receives ready forces in support of security operations, from military engagement
to warfighting. These forces promote regional stability and provide crisis response.
(b) Commander, JTF-HD, has two task force structures to respond to

HD/DSCA requirements. Task Force East-Hawaii is a scalable command, depending on
the scope of the response as determined by USARPAC. Commander, Joint Region
Marianas, is designated Commander, Task Force West-Guam, under Commander, JTF-
HD.
For more information, refer to USPACOM CONPLAN 5002, Homeland Defense.
b. Maritime Operations in the Conduct of HD. As previously mentioned, the

conduct of MHD is the responsibility of CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM.
III-8 JP 3-27
Homeland Defense Land Operations

Sustained Response Process
President
2. Approved
RFF
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff
1. RFF
3. Forces Commander
Force Providers USNORTHCOM
Joint Task or JFLCC

Force
USMC Army USMC Army

Forces Forces Forces Forces
Execution
Legend
JFLCC joint force land component commander command authority
RFF request for forces operational control
USMC United States Marine Corps
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command force option
Figure III-2. Homeland Defense Land Operations Sustained Response Process
When directed by the President, responsibility for the security and defense of the homeland
and its maritime approaches is shared between DOD and the USCG.
(1) Maritime operations in support of HD offer distinct challenges due to the

nature of execution in or near the homeland in conjunction with interagency partners. DOD
is the LFA for MHD and the USCG is the LFA for MHS. Through the relevant CCDR,
DOD provides an active, layered defense; supports USCG MHS operations with DOD
forces/capabilities; and defeats maritime threats to the homeland beyond the scope of MHS.
Where coordination under the MOTR Plan is required, issues such as designation of lead
and supporting agencies, desired national outcome, required capabilities, asset availability,
and authority to act must be determined.
(2) COMUSNAVNORTH, designated as the theater JFMCC for

CDRUSNORTHCOM, conducts MHD operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR and
supports the USCG for MHS and the operations of the other components, as directed.
JFMCC can plan and execute unilateral USNORTHCOM MHD operations while
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Chapter III
supporting binational NORAD missions when required, including maritime warning and
aerospace warning and control (air defense).
(3) COMUSPACFLT, designated as the theater JFMCC for CDRUSPACOM,

conducts MHD operations in the USPACOM AOR, supports CDRUSNORTHCOM in the
conduct of MHD operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR, and supports the USCG for
MHS. Coordination between CCDRs for HD is addressed in specific CAAs.
(4) MHD operations may be accomplished independently or in support of other

operations. When established, a maritime AO can include international and territorial
waters, harbor approaches, ports, waterfront facilities, and those internal waters and rivers
that provide access to port facilities (including associated airspace). The JFMCC plans and
conducts HD operations to: maintain sea control; strengthen USCG MHS operations
through port security and harbor defense operations; conduct mine countermeasures
(MCM) operations; ensure protection of strategic sealift operations outside US ports and
harbors; provide a secure environment for US and coalition forces; and support other
component commanders, as directed.
For further information, see JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime
Operations. For additional discussion of USN C2 and commander, task force, integrated
air and missile defense (IAMD), see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Maritime
Operations at the Operational Level of War, and NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations
Center. For further information on the maritime composite warfare commander, see NWP
3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War. For more
information, refer to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400, Homeland Defense, and
USPACOM MHD EXORD.
(5) MCM Operations
(a) Enemy mining of US territorial waters can be conducted by a variety of

methods (e.g., surface vessels, air, submarines, or swimmers and/or divers). Multiple
agencies could be involved in a response. Guidance regarding notification, and where
necessary, coordination, is provided in the MOTR protocols. Detection of mining activity
is a priority for maritime surveillance systems monitoring the seaward approaches and
internal waterways. DOD is responsible for all MCM operations in the maritime
environment, including waters subject to US jurisdiction. Under its MHS role, the USCG
is responsible for prevention and detection of mining within waters subject to US
jurisdiction, which includes maritime interdiction of mine laying platforms or vessels as
required. DOD also supplements the USCG’s MHS role with specific DOD MCM forces,
capabilities, and expertise. MCM operations can be conducted for the following reasons:
1. Bottom mapping for OE awareness prior to an event.
2. Exploratory operations to identify suspected mine threat and/or

boundary of the threat area.
3. Clearance operations to locate, identify, and neutralize mine threats.
III-10 JP 3-27
(b) Limited access areas such as safety or security zones may be required to
support MCM operations. MCM forces must coordinate these regulatory functions with
USCG COTPs, through the cognizant USCG area commander, when the MCM AO
encompasses waters subject to US jurisdiction. DOD forces, through the senior naval
officer present in command, have authority to enforce exclusionary zones established
around large naval vessels, 100 feet or longer, whenever the USCG is not present in an
effective MHS/LE capacity. These naval vessel protection zones are always in effect when
large naval vessels transit waters subject to US jurisdiction.
For more information, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, and Title 33, Code of
Federal Regulations, Parts 6 and 165.
(c) Maritime forces may support MCM operations by providing protection

for MCM assets and providing logistics support for ashore staging areas in the AO.
Maritime forces provide aircraft and surface vessels in order to protect MCM forces from
harassment or attack. Logistics support to MCM forces is limited to messing, berthing,
and potable water supplies. In the event logistics support is required, consideration should
be given to basing MCM assets with or adjacent to maritime forces to economize security
and logistics support.
For further information, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint
Operations.
(6) Sea Lines of Communications and Chokepoint Operations. Seaward

security is a focused maritime operation that complements broader maritime operations
designed to maintain sea lines of communications. The primary objective is to provide for
the safe passage of strategic sealift and commerce to and from deep water and to deny use
of these areas to enemy forces. Similarly, maritime forces can be employed in a chokepoint
(e.g., narrow strait or canal) to provide for the safe passage of friendly forces through that
chokepoint. Maritime units can be employed as part of a force—air, surface, and
submarine units and their supporting systems, positioned across the likely courses of
expected enemy transit—for early detection and rapid warning, blocking, and destruction
of the enemy. During a declared MHD mission, USCG MHS operations will support
military strategic sealift operations in strategic US ports, harbors, and their approaches
under the national port readiness network, specifically through military outload protection
operations. If the corresponding MHD mission requires USCG units conducting military
outload protection under MHS authority to counter a specific MHD threat, the applicable
USCG area commander and JFMCC may request the transfer of forces to CGDEFOR as
needed to defeat the threat under SROE.
For more information on USCG military outload protection, see COMDTINST M16600.6,
Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO) Manual.
(7) Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), Expanded Maritime

Interception Operations (EMIO), and Boarding
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Chapter III
(a) MIO are designed to halt the movement of designated items into or out
of a nation or area. Units involved in MIO not only provide unit presence, but may also
use reasonable force if a boarding is noncompliant or opposed, subject to applicable ROE.
The specific political, geographic, and tactical factors and the legal authority on which the
MIO are based influence the enforcement procedures. Under certain circumstances, MIO
conducted by a JFC may lead to a DOD-initiated MOTR process if additional interagency
authorities, capabilities, disposition, and/or application of US jurisdiction are in the USG’s
interest.
(b) MIO are a USN core mission. Most USN ships and USCG cutters are
capable of conducting compliant and certain types of noncompliant boardings. USN ships
and USCG cutters must be augmented by other forces (e.g., SOF, USMC maritime raid
forces, USCG LE detachment or maritime security response team) to conduct certain types
of noncompliant boardings or to conduct opposed boardings.
For more information on compliant, non-compliant, and opposed boardings, see NTTP 3-
07.11M/CGTTP 3-93.3/Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-33.04, Visit, Board,
Search, and Seizure Operations.
(c) Maritime forces may also be tasked to conduct EMIO. EMIO are
authorized by the President through SecDef to deter, degrade, disrupt, or prevent attacks
against the US and its allies. EMIO involve interception of targeted personnel or materiel
that poses an imminent threat to the US and its allies. EMIO may be implemented without
sanctions and may involve multinational forces. For further reference, see NTTP 3-
07.11M/CGTTP 3-07.11/MCIP 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Operations.
See also JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
(8) Littoral Operations. Both MHS and MHD operations may occur
simultaneously in the homeland’s littoral areas. The USCG conducts MHS operations at
all times to prevent, disrupt, and respond to terrorism, sabotage, espionage, or subversive
acts. During a declared MHD mission, MHD in the littoral regions includes maritime
forces conducting harbor approach defense to protect shipping in designated harbor
approach areas, to assure unimpeded use of harbor approach areas and application of lethal
and nonlethal force under SROE to deny the use of these areas by enemy forces.
c. Air Operations in HD Operations. NORAD is assigned the mission of aerospace

control (including air sovereignty and air defense) of the airspace of the US and Canada.
NORAD routinely maintains forces on alert for homeland air defense, CM defense, and
aerospace control alert missions against long-range incursions. Air and missile defenses
are discussed under paragraph 6, “Protection.” USNORTHCOM is generally responsible
for all other air operations supporting land and MHD outside the scope of the NORAD
Agreement.
(1) NORAD/United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense

Command (USELEMNORAD) should also be prepared to intercept and defend against
terrorist air threats, even when the intent to harm the US is uncertain. These threats could
include commercial or chartered aircraft, general aviation, ultra-light aerial vehicles,
III-12 JP 3-27
unmanned aerial systems (from commercial to radio-controlled aircraft), or even balloons.

Early detection and successful interception of these types of potential threats requires
cooperation and very close coordination with interagency partners, including FAA and
DHS.
(2) Aerospace defense operations within the homeland provide some unique
concerns for CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM.
(a) Size. The GCCs’ HD responsibilities include vast areas of airspace, land
masses, and water. In particular, North America is a huge land mass with multiple avenues
of approach that an adversary could use to advantage.
(b) Control of Airspace. US airspace is under the control of the FAA.

Civilian control of airspace, as well as other security functions vital to the homeland,
requires coordination among several USG departments and agencies.
(c) Peacetime Environment. Operations must be conducted in peacetime,

as well as in times of crisis.
(d) Duration. Defense of the homeland, involving US and Canadian air,

land, and maritime forces, is on a continuous operational basis in peacetime as well as in
times of crisis.
(e) ROE. The airspace over areas of the homeland is congested. For
example, there may be up to 5,000 aircraft at a given time over CONUS. ONE operates
with strict ROE in this very dense airspace. The ROE for operating in US airspace often
produce a constrained engagement environment.
(3) SecDef has designated CDRNORAD as the supported commander for

aerospace warning and aerospace control aspects of HD within the NORAD OA.
(a) Aerospace warning consists of surveillance, detection, validation, and

warning of an attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles, or space
vehicles. Aerospace control consists of air sovereignty and air defense operations within
US and Canadian airspace.
(b) The OA includes the portions of the homeland that fall within the
USNORTHCOM AOR, specifically CONUS, Alaska, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto
Rico. CDRUSPACOM is the designated CCDR for HD missions within the USPACOM
AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported CCDR for HD missions within the
USNORTHCOM AOR that are not under the direction of CDRNORAD.
(4) The missions of NORAD and USNORTHCOM are complementary.

NORAD conducts aerospace defense missions and operations within the USNORTHCOM
AOR and provides warning of all airborne threats, to include aircraft and missile attack, as
well as maritime threats. USNORTHCOM conducts US-only air, land, and maritime
defense. The commands work side-by-side and coordinate on many issues. NORAD is an
integral part of an active, layered defense that relies on the early warning of an emerging
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threat to quickly deploy and execute a decisive response. NORAD plays a critical role in
the air and space defense of Canada and HD of the US by providing aerospace warning
and airspace control and maritime warning for North America.
(a) ONE. ONE is the operation covering aerospace warning and control
aspects of HD for CONUS, Alaska, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. As the
binational element of this operation, NORAD is tasked to support ONE by employing the
forces and C2 necessary to protect these areas from air attack. USPACOM provides C2
(through Pacific Air Forces) for ONE support to Hawaii and US territories in USPACOM’s
AOR.
(b) The authority and decision to engage is made at the highest levels of
command. NORAD constantly refines its procedures and coordinates with DHS; Public
Safety Canada; Emergency Preparedness Canada; the FAA and its Canadian equivalent,
NAV CANADA (air traffic control agency); and with civilian LE organizations and other
government agencies within the US and Canada.
For a more complete description of the NORAD missions, organization, and structure, see
Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command, Missions, Organization, and
Structure.” For more information, refer to NORAD CONPLAN 3310, Aerospace Defense
& Maritime Warning, and ONE EXORD.
d. Space Operations in the Conduct of HD. The region in space above the US and
other countries cannot be owned or possessed like territory. However, it is USG policy
that purposeful interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on
the nation’s sovereign rights. In order to deter or preempt attacks and to protect military
space assets, DOD conducts space operations in support of HD. DOD defense critical
infrastructure (DCI) activities may be closely related to military space operations, given
that selected space capabilities may be classified as DCI. These activities may serve to
protect and defend the US’s ability to operate in and through space. CDRUSSTRATCOM
is the supported commander for protecting and defending the right to operate in space and
is responsible for identifying, assessing, and securing DOD critical assets in space.
(1) Enabling Capabilities. Military space operations bring enabling capabilities

and information to the JFC such as initial threat detections and locations, global
communication, positioning, navigation, timing, real-time weather, high-resolution
imagery, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Using the global communication capability,
the JFC is able to exercise real-time C2 functions and post-mission assessment. Satellite
communications (SATCOM) technology can link HD forces with interagency;
international; and other federal, state, tribal, and local partners in support of HD operations.
This information from space systems provides decision makers advance warning to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threats to the homeland.
(2) Roles and Responsibilities
(a) CDRUSSTRATCOM develops desired characteristics and capabilities

and advocates, plans, and conducts space operations. These responsibilities are to:
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1. Provide warning and assessment of space attack.
2. Support NORAD by providing the missile warning and space

surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
3. Serve as the single point of contact for military space operational

matters, except as otherwise directed.
4. Provide military representation to US national agencies, commercial

entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations. This
will be as directed and in coordination with the CJCS and other CCDRs.
5. Coordinate and conduct space planning.
(b) CDRUSSTRATCOM established the JFCC Space to serve as the single

point of contact for operational space matters, including planning, tasking, directing, and
executing space operations using assigned space forces.
(c) GCCs with geographic HD responsibilities are the supported

commanders responsible for conducting HD operations within their respective AORs.
These include:
1. Communicate space capability requirements to JFCC Space through

the command’s SCA when acting in an HD capacity.
2. Provide FP for space assets located within their respective AORs.
(3) Integration of Civilian Space Capabilities. HD is a high-priority activity

which requires the marshalling of all available space capabilities. Key to maximizing US
space capabilities is the successful integration of civilian space assets with military space
capabilities. In many cases, especially in the area of SATCOM, environmental monitoring,
and some space imagery, the contribution of civilian systems provides an integral part of
the total US space capabilities. The private sector and other civilian space capabilities are
essential to the effectiveness of the US’s ability to successfully accomplish the HD mission.
For additional information, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.
e. CO in the Conduct of HD. The US conducts operations, including HD, in a

complex, interconnected, and increasingly global OE. Cyberspace is a global domain
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers.
(1) The NMS for CO and the DOD Cyber Strategy offers a comprehensive
strategy for DOD to enhance US superiority in cyberspace. The NMS for CO addresses
three main roles: defense of the nation, national incident response, and CIP. GCCs with
geographic HD responsibilities should ensure unified action at the theater level for CO.
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This includes coordinating with multinational and interagency partners as outlined in

strategy, policy, and agreements. DOD Cyber Strategy instructs DOD to be prepared to
defend the US homeland and US vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyberspace
attacks of significance consequence. JFCs employ cyberspace capabilities to achieve
objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include OCO, DCO, and protection
of the DODIN.
(2) National Infrastructure Protection through CO.
(a) The security and effective operations of US critical infrastructure—

including energy, banking and finance, transportation, communication, and the defense
industrial base (DIB)—rely on cyberspace (e.g., industrial control systems and information
technology are vulnerable to disruption or exploitation).
(b) DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center

is a continuous cyberspace situational awareness, incident response, and management
center that is a national nexus of cyberspace and communications integration for the USG,
IC, and LEAs.
For more information on DHS’s role in CO, see https://www.dhs.gov/topic/cybersecurity.
(c) As LFA for the maritime transportation system under the DHS National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, the USCG leads overall unity of effort required to protect
the maritime transportation sector from cyberspace attacks while supporting DODIN
operations.
For more information on USCG roles in CO, see the USCG Cyber Strategy, at
https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/cyber.pdf.
(3) NG support to CO at the state level consists of CO squadrons within the ANG
and cyber protection teams within the ARNG.
For additional information, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
f. Information Operations (IO) in the Conduct of HD. IO are the integrated

employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with
other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of
threats while protecting our own. Information-related capabilities include some already
discussed separately, such as space operations and CO, but also includes such capabilities
as MISO, electronic warfare, combat camera, operations security, and military deception.
IO complements HD movement and maneuver in all domains by generating effects in the
information environment that give the JFC a decisive advantage in any and all of its
dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. IO also plays a significant role in the
JFC’s communication synchronization.
(1) The information environment supports the HD framework. The information

environment is made up of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. The
physical dimension is composed of C2 systems, key decision makers, and supporting
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infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. The informational
dimension specifies where and how information is collected, processed, stored,
disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those
who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. Information-related
capabilities such as MISO as part of commander’s communication synchronization are
used to create effects in the information environment.
(2) DODIN. As part of the overall information environment, the DODIN

represents the set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel whether interconnected or stand alone.
The DODIN includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and
services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other associated
services and national security systems.
(a) Consistent with laws and policy, Services, DOD agencies, and non-DOD
agencies should provide capabilities to support CCMD requirements to ensure the
interoperability, availability, and shared situational awareness and understanding of the HD
information environment. This includes capabilities to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat
virtual and physical attacks against DODIN infrastructure that directly or indirectly
supports HD missions.
(b) There are three primary aspects to providing available and effective
systems to execute HD. These are: providing a reliable, robust HD communication
system; improving information sharing among HD mission partners; and assuring and
defending the critical DODIN infrastructure against threats and aggression.
For more information on DODIN, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, and JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.
1. The communications system enables centralized planning and the

coordinated and mutually supporting employment of forces and assets. It includes
command centers, operations centers, processing and distribution centers and their
associated systems, deployed systems, and data sources. Systems or information and
decisions generated by them should be shared to the maximum extent possible to ensure
synchronization of effort among mission partners. For example, the common operational
picture (COP) facilitates decentralized execution in rapidly changing OEs and should be
shared among appropriate agencies, to include LE, to ensure consistent situational
awareness.
2. Commercial infrastructure plays a critical role in enabling the

communication systems that directly support HD operations. This infrastructure may be
damaged to the point that military and supporting operations are adversely affected. DOD
must identify capabilities that can help bridge the gap until local infrastructure is restored.
These capabilities must be highly mobile, rapidly deployable, and commercially
interoperable.
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3. The GCC AORs are rich with existing commercial communications

systems that can be leveraged to the maximum extent possible. For example, commercial
cellular capabilities represent a choice medium that can provide immediate capability.
DOD communications systems will serve as the backbone in support of HD operations.
Systems that are scalable, interoperable, and complementary with those used by
multinational and civilian partners, will be essential to augment traditional intelligence
collection and C2 nodes, especially in the early phases of military operations. These
communications must be mobile, secure, and voice and data capable. Wireless voice, data,
and video are critical to effective C2. Planning for the integration of spectrum resource
allocation will enable DOD, federal, state, local, and tribal responders; international
organizations and NGOs; and private sector responders to operate on the same bandwidth
to facilitate interoperability. Planning for the secure integration of internationally donated
telecommunications resources, including hardware and SATCOM bandwidth, must be
conducted in the event the USG accepts offers of international aid.
4. The Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service provides emergency

communications for civil defense organizations as authorized by Title, 47, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 97, Section 97.407.
For more information on spectrum management, see JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic

Spectrum Management Operations, and for more information on joint electromagnetic
spectrum operations, see JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum.
g. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).

JRSOI is the essential process that assembles personnel, equipment, and materiel after
movement or deployment into forces capable of meeting the CCDR’s operational
requirements. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, portions of JRSOI are not regarded as
discrete steps necessary for HD operations.
(1) JRSOI for a large force can/will most likely require resources beyond that of
the designated base support installation (BSI). The supported CCDR should request
sufficient JRSOI support to ensure the designated BSI can perform JRSOI.
(2) Reception operations include all those functions required to receive and clear
unit personnel, equipment, and materiel through the BSI or reception area. For HD
operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the personnel, equipment, and materiel will
likely originate from within the JOA. In that case, personnel, equipment, and materiel are
already accounted for at the home base, making the home base essentially the point of
departure. Component support plans should address processes for in-place personnel
reporting to the CJTF.
(3) Similar to reception, personnel, equipment, and materiel to be employed for

HD operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR may stage within the confines of their
home installation. Otherwise, arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel may be
temporarily held at a BSI or other location while they are staged, assembled, and organized
into forces and capabilities in preparation for onward movement.
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(4) Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying materiel
from reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly areas
(TAAs), OAs, or other theater destinations. Because units and forces employed in HD
operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR are likely to be geographically close to the
JOAs, the TAA can be located at the unit’s or force’s home base. Onward movement, in
many instances, can be accomplished concurrently with reception and staging activities at
the home base. When a unit or force is not geographically close to an OA and a TAA other
than the home base is desired, then discrete, onward movement activities would be
required. Oftentimes, a TAA would be located at a designated BSI that would provide
logistics support and be located near the OA.
(5) Integration is the synchronized handoff of units into an operational

commander’s force prior to mission execution. HD operations within the USNORTHCOM
AOR often require complex C2 structures. Special attention to integration,
synchronization, and coordination is required. Refer to Appendix A, “Relationships
Between Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.”
h. Movement in Support of HD. Deployment operations within the homeland can

be extremely time compressed. The national importance of these missions is reflected in
the elevated movement priorities that can be invoked by the President or SecDef. United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) can quickly assemble aircraft and
flight crews for operations where expedited passenger movement is required. Surface
transportation (commercial and organic) can be a viable option in those situations where
the distance between the home station and the OA is relatively short. Coordination with
NGB is essential when using ANG/ARNG assets for support of HD. In some instances,
state and federal forces may be in the same OA. Coordination between state and federal
forces should occur to achieve unity of effort.
For more information on JRSOI, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
7. Protection
The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in
four primary ways: active defensive measures employed outside the defended area that
protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of
communications from an enemy’s attack by employing limited offensive action and
counterattacks; passive defensive measures employed within a defended area that make
friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy and to
minimize damage from enemy attacks; application of technology and procedures to
reduce the risk of friendly fire; and emergency management and response to reduce the
loss of personnel and capabilities due to an all-hazards incident. It includes, but extends
beyond, FP to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil
infrastructure of friendly nations; and other USG departments and agencies, international
organizations, and NGOs. Planning for HD includes combating terrorism, criminal
enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and CO. Joint intelligence preparation of the
OE must be conducted to ensure adequate planning and implementation of protection
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measures. A separate directorate may be established for interagency coordination for HD

planning due to intelligence limitations in the homeland and the vast amount of information
the interagency partners can provide.
For additional information on the protection function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For
more information on DOD AT and FP programs, refer to DODI 2000.12, DOD
Antiterrorism (AT) Program; DODI O-2000.16, Volume 1, DOD Antiterrorism (AT)
Program Implementation: DOD AT Standards; DODI O-2000.16, Volume 2, DOD
Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DOD Force Protection (FPCON) System;
and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
a. IAMD. IAMD is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to

defend the homeland and US national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom
of action by negating the adversary’s ability to create adverse effects from their air and
missile capabilities. Due to policy differences and legal agreements and physical
characteristics of threats, air and missile defense are not integrated in the same manner as
air and missile defense in other GCCs’ AORs. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and
USPACOM, share the missions of air defense and missile defense for the homeland, and
C2 of forces are integrated at the CCDR level. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM
Command Center coordinates air and missile fires. As explained in Chapter I,
“Fundamentals of Homeland Defense,” CDRNORAD is tasked to provide aerospace
warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America, while
CDRUSNORTHCOM is tasked to provide BMD and all other forms of HD within the
AOR. Although CDRUSNORTHCOM is normally designated CDRNORAD, the
commands are distinct entities. CDRUSPACOM is responsible for HD within the
USPACOM AOR, including air and missile defense. USPACOM supports
USNORTHCOM for certain limited BMD defense options, for example the defense of
Hawaii.
For further discussions on missile defense, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile
Threats.
(1) Air Defense. CDRNORAD is tasked to provide aerospace control for North
America, which includes surveillance and control of Canadian and US airspace, as well as
ensuring air sovereignty and air defense against aircraft and CMs. NORAD has the
responsibility to protect the US and Canadian homelands against military or civilian
airborne threats.
For more detailed discussions on air and missile defense, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air
and Missile Threats.
(a) Aircraft. To accomplish the aerospace control mission, NORAD uses a

network of satellites, ground-based radar, airborne radar, and fighters to detect, intercept
and, if necessary, engage any air-breathing threat to Canada and the US.
(b) CMs. CMs are air-breathing threats capable of delivering a full range of
warheads, from conventional to WMD. Because they are air breathing threats, CMs are
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part of the air defense role executed by NORAD. CMs present significant detection
difficulties due to standoff range and very small radar cross-section.
(c) Other Threats. UA are a growing threat to the US and Canadian

homelands. Larger UA threats are prosecuted in the same manner as other military or
civilian-based air threats. Smaller UA threats are addressed through cooperation efforts
with federal, state, and local agencies. A terrorist attack using an aircraft as a weapon
continues to be a threat to the homeland.
(2) NCR-IADS. Defense of the NCR is a special case of air defense in the
homeland. DOD employs an integrated air defense system (sensors, weapons, visual
warning system, C2 systems, and personnel) as part of the around-the-clock, multilayered,
military, and interagency effort to protect the NCR.
(a) The NCR-IADS augments ONE fighter defenses by providing in-place

assets which are in a quick reaction posture to protect the seat of the USG, as well as other
key locations in the NCR from air attacks.
(b) The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other elements of

DHS, as well as DOJ and DOT, conduct significant aviation security efforts throughout the
US and in the NCR. Principal among the efforts designed to improve interagency
coordination is the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), sponsored by
TSA. The NCRCC enhances interagency coordination by providing a venue for
representatives of the many organizations with a stake in the defense of the NCR to stand
watch together. Through the NCRCC, various agencies have improved situational
awareness regarding the actions of their defense partners. The NCRCC is a coordination
center, and no command or control of forces occurs. NCRCC participants include the FBI,
TSA, FAA, US Capitol Police, US Secret Service, US Customs and Border Protection
Office of Air and Marine Operations, USCG, JFHQ-NCR, and NORAD. Representatives
from other state and local LEAs and the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC)
also participate at the NCRCC when threats or circumstances warrant.
For additional information on air operations, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile
Threats; JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations; and JP 3-52, Joint
Airspace Control.
(3) BMD. BMD capabilities are designed to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat
adversary ballistic missile threats and help protect the US domestic population and critical
infrastructure. US homeland BMD includes not only the means for active and passive
defenses, but the capability to strike in retaliation or to preempt the launch of a missile
threat. For HD, there are BMD capabilities against limited attacks by rogue states using
ICBMs and capabilities against threats from short-range ballistic missiles, medium-range
ballistic missiles, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. ICBM threats are deterred by
US capabilities that include global strike. BMD is a key element of HD. However, BMD
activities do not include defense against CMs or tactical air-to-surface missiles.
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(a) BMD System. The BMD system includes the sensors (air, land, sea, and
space), anti-ballistic missiles, communications, and C2 for launch warnings and
assessment for all categories of ballistic missile launches, whether targeted against the
homeland or other AORs. The ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the
BMD system provides USNORTHCOM the capability to engage and destroy limited
intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in space to protect the US. The GMD
system is composed of ground-based interceptors and associated sensors and fire control
systems. The ground-based interceptor is a multi-stage, solid fuel booster with a lethal
payload. Fire control systems consist of redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch
facilities, and a communications network.
(b) BMD Roles and Responsibilities. GCCs are responsible for planning
and executing BMD against ballistic missile threats that target their AORs, to include
threats that cross AOR boundaries. This is supported by shared situational awareness,
integrated battle management, adaptive planning, and accurate and responsive battle
damage assessment. The following have specific BMD responsibilities to support HD.
1. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM have specified HD responsibilities

and authority to deter ballistic missile attacks on the US, its territories, and bases within
their respective AORs, and other areas as directed by the President or SecDef. In
coordination with other CCMDs, they synchronize operations to detect, deter, prevent, and
defeat ballistic missile attack on the homeland. Should deterrence fail, and/or as directed
by the President or SecDef, they employ BMD forces to protect the US against ballistic
missile attacks. CDRUSNORTHCOM, in coordination with CDRUSPACOM, has
responsibilities within the USPACOM AOR to ensure homeland BMD. Employing the
GMD system requires centralized planning and direction by CDRUSNORTHCOM and
centralized execution due to the required positive direction from the weapons release
authority (WRA). WRA is the authority delegated from the President to use ground-based
interceptors against ICBM threats. CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander for
homeland BMD that does not include GMD.
2. The NG provides BMD-trained personnel to USNORTHCOM. The

100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) is a multi-component
brigade consisting of Active Component (AC) Army and ANG Soldiers in Colorado,
California, and Alaska who are tasked with the mission of defending the homeland from
limited ICBM attacks. The 100th operates the GMD while under OPCON of
CDRUSNORTHCOM.
(4) Space Operations and BMD. Space operations are considered critical
enabling activities for BMD. For example, space-based surveillance and sensor
capabilities provide ballistic missile early warning, assist in intelligence gathering, and
facilitate tracking inbound missiles.
For further space operation considerations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.
b. CIP
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(1) DCI. DCI consists of DOD and non-DOD networked assets essential to
project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Assets are people,
physical entities, or information. Physical assets include infrastructure such as
installations, facilities, ports, bridges, power stations, telecommunication lines, and
pipelines, most of which will not be located on USG property.
(a) Examples of DCI include strategic military bases, ports of

embarkation/ports of debarkation, and mobilization staging and storage areas, plus rail and
trucking transportation centers. Protection and defense of non-DOD facilities is normally
coordinated with federal, state, tribal, and local LEAs. However, if directed by the
President, DOD may be tasked to provide the forces and have the overall responsibility to
defend these facilities as a constitutional exception to the PCA. HD includes the protection
of critical DOD networks and, when directed, national networks against threats and
aggression. This includes DOD critical information infrastructure. It is accomplished
through physical and virtual protection. State and local governments also are interested in
securing CI/KR, so coordination of physical/virtual protection measures should be part of
the USG efforts.
(b) Mission Assurance and the DIB. Mission assurance is the process to
protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets—including
personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems,
infrastructure, and supply chains—critical to the execution of DOD mission-essential
functions in any OE or condition. Mission assurance focuses on the “protection,”
“continued function,” and “rapid reconstitution” of critical assets which support mission
essential functions, rather than the execution of these missions themselves. Threats to non-
DOD government and commercially owned infrastructure, facilities, and capabilities, to
include the DIB, can jeopardize DOD HD mission execution. Mission assurance focused
only on assessing and protecting, or enhancing resilience against DOD-specific
vulnerabilities, will fail. Thus, it is necessary to comprehensively assess and mitigate risk
in a way that accounts for DOD dependence on civilian assets and systems and the
cascading consequences of their disruption. These include, but are not limited to,
transportation networks, global supply chains, electric power, telecommunications, and
information technology infrastructures. Simultaneously, one must also recognize the lead
role of other USG departments and agencies, especially DHS, the Department of Energy
(DOE), and DOT, in coordinating risk mitigation for threats to civilian infrastructure.
(c) All CCDRs, in coordination with DOD asset owners, DOD components,
and the defense infrastructure sector lead agents, take action to prevent or mitigate the loss
or degradation of DOD-owned DCI within their assigned AOR.
For more information concerning CIP and the DCIP, see DODD 3020.40, Mission
Assurance (MA), and DODI 5220.22, National Industrial Security Program.
(2) CI/KR. As stated in the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support
Annex to the NRF, “CI/KR includes those assets, systems, networks, and functions—
physical or virtual—so vital to the US that their incapacitation or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on HS, national economic security, public health or safety, or any
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combination of those matters. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources
essential to minimal operation of the economy and the government.” An attack on CI/KR
could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce
cascading effects far beyond the physical location of the incident. Although DOD’s role
is normally one of administrative and logistical support to DHS or another sector-specific
agency through DSCA or direct MHS support, in certain circumstances, the President may
direct DOD to provide military protection to CI/KR.
For further information, see PPD-25, Guideline for US Government Interagency Response
to Terrorist Threats or Incidents in the US and Overseas; HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection; the National Strategy for Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets; the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; and
HSPD-23/NSPD-54, US Cyber Security Policy. See also the NRF at
https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks.
c. CWMD
(1) WMD capabilities are of particular concern to the USG. Threats may use
WMD as a tool to inflict mass casualties on homeland civilian populations or cause
disruption or destruction to critical infrastructure.
(2) CWMD, as a part of HD, is a global mission with potential consequences that
cross AOR boundaries. CWMD requires an integrated and synchronized effort from
numerous interagency and multinational partners for effective mission accomplishment.
CWMD is a continuous effort that requires a coordinated, unified effort to curtail the
conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-
related expertise, materials, and technologies.
(3) CWMD contributes to HD through an integrated approach to reduce

incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD; increase the barriers to WMD
development, acquisition, advancement, proliferation, and use; manage WMD risks
emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states, non-state actors and safe havens; and deny
the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses.
(4) CWMD includes DOD CBRN Response Enterprise, which has the primary
mission to detect and respond to WMD incidents in the homeland.
For more information on CWMD, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction;
JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response; and JP 3-11,
Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
d. CO and DODIN Operations. Each CCMD, Service, and DOD agency contributes
to overall HD cybersecurity by rigorous implementation of cybersecurity policies and
procedures. CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies employ appropriate cyberspace security
actions to prevent intrusions and defeat other adversary activities on DOD networks and
systems that are not a part of what is specifically defined as the DODIN. There are
subordinate HQs of USCYBERCOM that execute C2 of the Cyber Mission Force and other
cyberspace forces. These include the Cyber National Mission Force-Headquarters, the
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Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network, joint force HQ-

cyberspace, and Service cyberspace component commands. Each of the Service
cyberspace component commanders is dual-hatted by Commander, USCYBERCOM, as a
commander of one of the four joint force HQs-cyberspace to enable synchronization of CO
C2. In addition, there are other centers and staff elements that further enable unity of
command for CO. Due to the close interdependencies DOD and IC components have on
each other’s networks, it is essential reporting procedures be in place to ensure rapid
coordination in cyberspace defense. Reporting on IC networks comes from the IC through
USCYBERCOM and is shared with the CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities.
For more information on CO, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
e. FP. GCCs are responsible for FP within their respective AORs. FP includes
actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include
family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It does not include actions
to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. All GCCs have FP
responsibilities, including those with AORs which contain geographic areas of the
homeland. Force health protection (FHP), the protection component of health services,
complements FP and includes all measures to ensure a healthy and fit force, prevent injury
and illness, and protect the force from health hazards.
(1) AT and FP. GCCs have overall AT responsibility within their respective
AORs, except for those DOD elements and personnel for whom another commander has
security responsibility pursuant to law or a memorandum of agreement. The AT program
is designed to prevent and detect terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families,
facilities, resources, installations, and DCI, as well as to prepare to defend against, and plan
the response to the consequences of, terrorist incidents. TACON (for FP) applies to all
DOD personnel assigned, permanently or temporarily; transiting through; or performing
exercises or training in the GCC’s AOR. GCCs have the authority to modify FP conditions
for covered individuals. CDRUSNORTHCOM has overall DOD AT program and FP
responsibility in CONUS. USNORTHCOM’s FP mission and AT program are outlined in
the USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, Force Protection Mission and Antiterrorism
Program.
For additional information, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
(2) FHP. FHP provides the framework for optimizing health readiness and
protecting Service members from all health threats. In general, US states and territories
are normally at low risk for endemic diseases, although pandemic disease outbreaks have
the potential to rapidly place the US military and wider population at risk. Additionally,
some areas within the homeland are heavily industrialized and have the potential for
deliberate or accidental release of a large variety of toxic industrial chemicals/materials at
production sites and during transportation. Furthermore, WMD attacks pose unique FHP
risks due to the health effects and threats of CBRN agents. Thus, man-made hazards
(deliberate or accidental) may present the greatest potential health risk to forces conducting
HD operations.
III-25
Chapter III
For more on FHP, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.
f. Combating terrorism includes AT and CT actions taken to oppose terrorism

throughout the entire threat spectrum. The broad USG strategy is to continue to lead an
international effort to deny violent extremist organizations the resources and functions they
need to operate and survive. CT activities and operations are taken to neutralize terrorists,
their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to
instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. DOD’s strategy for
combating terrorism implements the following objectives from the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, which are derived from the NSS:
(1) Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the US, its PNs, and its interests.
(2) Attack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause adversaries to be

incapable or unwilling to attack the US homeland, allies, or interests.
(3) Deny terrorist networks access to WMD.
(4) Establish conditions that allow PNs to govern their territory effectively and
defeat terrorists.
(5) Deny a hospitable environment to violent extremists.
For more information on countering threat networks and CT, refer to JP 3-25, Countering
Threat Networks, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.
8. Sustainment
a. Personnel
(1) The core functional responsibilities of the manpower and personnel

directorate of a joint staff (J-1) are accomplished during any HD or other operation and are
tailored to meet mission-specific requirements.
(2) Personnel Support. The authorities and responsibilities for personnel

support to HD operations are largely the same as those for any other DOD mission set.
Some exceptions may apply to the USNORTHCOM AOR.
(a) Personnel Accountability. Personnel accountability is a command

responsibility. Personnel accountability, strength reporting, and manpower management
are the focal points for a joint force J-1 during HD operations. HD operations in CONUS
pose specific challenges. For example, units deploy from their home stations instead of
from a unique designated port of embarkation. Service personnel elements supporting
home station deployments must ensure all processing and reporting requirements are met
prior to unit deployment. In specific circumstances, such as operations in a CBRN
environment, the employing CJTF may establish a joint personnel reception center to
ensure arriving units are ready for employment.
III-26 JP 3-27
(b) Individual Augmentation. Tactical capabilities are provided by organic

unit force structure wherever possible, and the request vehicle for this type of requirement
is the RFF. Individual subject matter experts may be required to augment operational C2
organizations. The request vehicle for joint individual augmentation is a CCDR-approved
and Joint Staff-validated joint manning document. Joint individual augmentees are not
QRFs but are a result of planning for contingencies, if the contingency for the unique task
organization is projected to last longer than 90-120 days. For detailed guidance, refer to
CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.
(c) Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Disasters. Attacks on

the US can affect DOD personnel and their dependents. Service components account for
and report the status of all DOD-affiliated military and civilian personnel, including
contractors and all family members, immediately following a disaster or attack.
Additionally, Service components should be prepared to report the number of Service
members, DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and their dependents requiring evacuation
from an affected area.
See DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction With Natural or Manmade

Disasters. For detailed guidance on personnel support, see JP 1-0, Joint Personnel
Support.
b. Logistics. The authorities and responsibilities for logistics operations in support of

HD are largely the same as any other DOD mission set. Some notable exceptions, however,
apply to HD operations within the US. More specifically, the exceptions apply to the
USNORTHCOM AOR.
(1) JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, states “exercise of
directive authority for logistics by a CCDR includes the authority to delegate authority to
issue directives to subordinate commanders” and “CCDRs exercise COCOM over assigned
forces.” Within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the CDRUSNORTHCOM executes OPCON
or TACON over attached forces, normally without directive authority for logistics. Given
the robust capabilities within each Service component, DOD combat support agency
(CSA), and the commercial contracting infrastructure in USNORTHCOM AOR, directive
authority for logistics is not necessary to execute the HD mission. CDRUSNORTHCOM
has theater- and operational-assigned and allocated logistical forces and capabilities
executing OPCON of those forces via Service component HQs. CDRUSNORTHCOM
may still exercise directive authority for logistics in responding to an HD threat; the
President or SecDef may also extend this authority to attached forces when transferring
those forces for a specific mission.
(2) Implementation and execution of logistics functions remain the responsibility

of the Services and the Service component commanders. Each Service is responsible for
the logistics support of its own forces, except when logistics support is otherwise provided
by agreements with national agencies, allies, or another Service.
(3) In the case where multiple agencies, PNs, international organizations, NGOs,
and private sector entities are involved in HD operations, each is ultimately responsible for
III-27
Chapter III
BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION
A base support installation (BSI), when approved by the Secretary of

Defense, serves as the main logistical hub for military support operations
in the US and its territories. Although joint forces may arrive through
multiple reception sites near the joint operations area (JOA), generally the
logistics support is provided by the BSI. Typically, most forces will deploy
through, and the majority of sustainment will be positioned at, the BSI. A
BSI will normally have the following characteristics: a logistics
requisitioning activity; an airfield (or nearby airport) and communications
infrastructure sufficient to meet the surge of forces into an operational
area; dry, open areas for staging of supplies and equipment; a good road
network; health and other life-support services (e.g., billeting, food
service, and force protection); and proximity to the JOA to remain
responsive and flexible to the needs of the joint force.
Various Sources
providing logistics support for their own personnel. However, the GCC should strive to
integrate efforts through the use of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements along with
associated implementing arrangements to ensure needed logistics support. Optimizing the
capabilities should result in greater flexibility, more options, and more effective logistics
support. In allocation of logistics support to HD activities, unit force activity designators
should be reviewed for possible improvement or downgrade based on mission criticality.
(4) Logistic Capabilities. Responsibilities for logistics as described in JP 4-0, Joint

Logistics, apply to HD operations as follows:
(a) Supply. USNORTHCOM will synchronize Service component and CSA

logistics supply capabilities to support the joint force.
(b) Maintenance Operations. Service components and CSAs will maintain

administrative and coordination responsibilities for maintenance operations within the
USNORTHCOM AOR.
(c) Deployment and Distribution. HD airlift priorities are outlined in

CJCSI 4120.02, List of Priorities -- DOD Transportation Movement Priority System. The
national importance of included mission areas is reflected in the elevated movement
priorities that can be applied to them by the President or SecDef. For operations that
demand expedited movement, CDRUSTRANSCOM maintains on-call readiness levels
necessary to meet CDRUSNORTHCOM mission requirements. The North American
Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command Deployment and
Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) is embedded within the Joint Logistics Operations
Center and is composed of personnel from NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and national
partners as required (e.g., USTRANSCOM, Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], the
Services, and other organizations). It is established as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM
to support HD (and DSCA) operations and operates under the direction of the NORAD and
USNORTHCOM logistics and engineering directorate. The NDDOC implements
command movement priorities, anticipates and resolves transportation shortfalls,
III-28 JP 3-27
prioritizes transportation assets, synchronizes deployment force flow and distribution, and
provides in-transit visibility.
(d) Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS is a Service responsibility. It

enhances combat capability and improves productivity by providing life-sustaining and
essential service. CSS also provides critical supply, maintenance, and transportation
services to enable the operating force to conduct HD missions. Additionally, CSS supports
force reception and beddown during military operations. The primary focus of the CSS
effort in HD is to sustain and assist employed DOD forces. The primary method for
common-user logistics support or sustainment is normally accomplished through the
supporting BSI.
(e) Operational Contract Support (OCS). OCS provides the CCDR the
tools and processes to manage the variety of services that may be required. Within OCS
are contract support integration, contractor management, and contracting support.
For more information on OCS, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, and DODI
3120.41, Operational Contract Support.
c. Engineering. Military engineering support may be required simultaneously for

HD and DSCA operations. The primary focus of the engineering effort will be to sustain
and assist DOD forces employed in HD. The secondary effort will be DSCA, when
requested and approved IAW DOD guidance and applicable plans. The scope of
engineering support for HD focuses on mobility, FP construction, force beddown,
geospatial engineering, and emergency stabilization and repair of damaged DOD critical
infrastructure. The duration and scope of DOD engineer involvement will be directly
related to the severity and magnitude of the threat, situation, or event. Engineer planners
should develop plans with forces capable of initial tasks and priority of effort. Engineer
efforts in HD may evolve into DSCA engineer actions. Whether the focus is HD or DSCA,
engineering missions may require the use of Service members or contracted services.
For additional information on engineer organizations and assets of Services, see JP 3-34,
Joint Engineer Operations.
d. Environmental Considerations. Military commanders employ environmentally

responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts to human health and the environment.
During all operations, plans will be developed to reduce or eliminate negative impacts on
the environment and to minimize negative impacts to mission accomplishment caused by
environmental degradation. Contingency planning for HD must include environmental
considerations in planning and executing operations. Operational alternatives that
minimize damage to the natural environment or cultural/historic resources must be
considered. HD actions undertaken during crisis are considered emergency actions,
whereby national security and protection of life or property are at risk. HD response in
crisis circumstances may make it necessary to take immediate actions without preparing
the normal environmental planning documents; however, compliance with applicable
federal, state, tribal, and local laws to the maximum extent possible during crisis
III-29
Chapter III
circumstances is still a DOD objective. Commands will initiate actions to curtail further
environmental damage and to resolve environmental impacts.
For additional information on environmental considerations, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer

Operations.
e. Mortuary Affairs (MA). USNORTHCOM and USPACOM may be required to

conduct MA for US, allied, or adversary casualties of HD operations.
See JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs, for details on employment of DOD MA assets in DSCA,
mass-fatality management, CBRN response, and HD operations.
f. Religious Support (RS). RS during HD missions is conducted by a religious

support team (RST) consisting of one chaplain and an enlisted assistant of the same service.
Guidance for RSTs operating during a HD mission is described in Joint Guide (JG) 1-05,
Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. In addition, RSTs will ensure they understand and
adhere to all echelons of guidance, such as Service policy and doctrine, command direction,
and legal counsel, regarding permissible chaplain activities. Upon the assessment and
direction of the unit commander, RSTs may receive additional RS duties to assist other
commands. The primary role and mission of the RST during HD is to support authorized
personnel. However, RSTs may provide RS to persons unaffiliated with the Services
absent other RS providers, and with proper command authority and tasking, consistent with
the guidelines in JG 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.
See JG 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, for details.
g. Joint Health Services. The objective of health services is to provide lifesaving

measures, as well as prevention, protection, and treatment capabilities, to mitigate the risk
of disease nonbattle injuries, and battle injuries to support mission accomplishment. Joint
health service provides joint medical capabilities to ensure the seamless delivery of medical
support for military forces.
(1) DOD coordinates, employs, and integrates medical response through the
capabilities of care: first responder care, forward resuscitative care, theater hospitalization,
and definitive care.
(2) As part of planning activities and prior to deployment to an HD event,

commands should conduct predeployment health assessments to ensure medical and dental
requirements are current. Specific activities concerning exams, predeployment sample
collections, issuance of medications, training on equipment and devices (e.g., respirator
fittings), and record-keeping should be assessed.
(3) DOD medical assets and organizations may also be involved in support to
local and state health providers in dealing with the aftermath of a CBRN attack and other
large-scale, casualty-producing attacks. As part of HD, there may be a requirement to
augment civilian medical capabilities in the handling of casualties resulting from CBRN
attacks or other toxic materials release. The ability of state and local medical facilities to
III-30 JP 3-27
handle mass casualties from CBRN effects must be assessed and factored into DOD
planning.
For additional information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and JP 4-
02, Joint Health Services.
9. Other Activities and Efforts
a. Arctic Region. The overarching strategic national security objective in the Arctic
is a stable and secure region where US national interests are safeguarded and the US
homeland is protected. This objective is consistent with current international law and
diplomatic engagement, but also with demonstrated ability and commitment to defend the
northern approaches to North America.
(1) DOD takes steps to anticipate and prepare for Arctic operations. Capabilities
are reevaluated as conditions change, and gaps are addressed in order to prepare for
operations in a more accessible Arctic. Key challenges include shortfalls in ice and weather
reporting and forecasting, limitations in C2, communications, computer connectivity,
intelligence, harsh environmental conditions, limited inventory of ice-capable vessels, and
limited shore-based infrastructure. The US has a vital Arctic neighbor and partner in
Canada, with its shared values and interests in the region. DOD works with the Canadian
Department of National Defence to ensure common Arctic interests are addressed in a
complementary manner.
(2) There are two GCCs with Arctic responsibilities: CDRUSEUCOM and
CDRUSNORTHCOM are each responsible for a portion of the Arctic Ocean aligned with
adjacent land boundaries—an arrangement suited to achieve unity of effort with key
regional partners.
b. Information Sharing
(1) The objective of information sharing is to achieve seamless access to a trusted

information sharing environment throughout the AOR and between CCDRs. A
collaborative environment among domestic and international military and nonmilitary (i.e.,
LEA) HD mission partners is particularly critical to facilitating information sharing and
interoperability. It provides the ability to create and share data, information, and
knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations in support of HD,
thereby enabling a commander to make decisions faster than the adversary. The speed with
which information is gained, processed (and, if necessary, sanitized for required
dissemination and/or sharing), and understood influences how well we engage targets.
(2) Proper organization of the battle staff support structure is another way to
synchronize and share information. In an adaptive HQ model, for example, the staff
reorganizes from its normal functional areas of personnel, intelligence, operations,
logistics, plans, and communications to working groups that address current operations,
future operations, joint plans, joint support, and interorganizational coordination. The
organization must also transcend culture, policy, and technical barriers to be effective.
III-31
Chapter III
Intentionally Blank
III-32 JP 3-27
APPENDIX A
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMELAND
DEFENSE, AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
1. General
a. Achieving Unity of Effort Through HS, HD, and DSCA. Perhaps one of the
greatest challenges for a military staff is conducting military operations in or near the
homeland that integrate into the overall USG unity of effort to secure and defend the
homeland. This effort entails USG departments or agencies inherent authorities and
jurisdiction at the federal, state, and local level, which DOD may support directly by
providing forces or capabilities to HS operations, through DSCA, or if the magnitude of
threat exceeds the capabilities of the HS enterprise, through HD operations. These TMM
challenges are set against the evolving range of threats to the homeland, countering diverse
threat networks, transregional terrorist organizations, potential nation state, and individual
threats both internal and external to the US. This appendix provides additional context and
considerations for the JFC and military staffs that plan and execute HD and DSCA
missions, or otherwise directly support HS. Figure A-1 depicts the relationship between
HD, DSCA, and HS missions and provides examples of the types of operations that can
take place for each mission. Those missions could be conducted in a simultaneous, near-
simultaneous, or sequential fashion, across the threat spectrum, within or near the
homeland. A full range of threats and hazards confronts the homeland. However, many
threats may not require a DOD-led response and may only require a response from one or
more USG departments or agencies. Depending on the type of threat and its magnitude,
the lead and supporting relationships may vary across the specific types of operations that
can take place for each mission. HD, DSCA, and HS operations may occur in parallel and
require extensive synchronization.
(1) Threat Characterization. The characterization of a particular threat, and the

designated response agencies and modes, ultimately rests with the President. To prepare
for wide-ranging contingencies, the USG has developed specific protocols and response
options that address the coordination, integration, and responsibilities of the USG
departments and agencies to respond to the full spectrum of threats and hazards.
Codification of these strategies, processes, and procedures is found in documents such as
the National Strategy for Maritime Security and US Aviation Security Policy and their
respective supporting plans. These types of processes aid both the military and civil
authorities to identify the organizations best suited to achieve the USG’s desired outcome,
given the unique circumstances of the event.
(2) Transitioning Between HD, DSCA, and HS. In addition, operations may
also transition from HD to DSCA to HS or vice versa (e.g., maritime security) with the
lead depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome (as depicted in Figure A-1).
While the lead may transition, a single agency will always have the lead at any given time
for a particular activity. However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the
designation of LFA may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, on-scene leaders
are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular threat. The
MOTR protocols provide guidance for maritime security, which can transition between
A-1
Appendix A
Relationships Between Homeland Defense, Defense Support of

Civil Authorities, and Homeland Security Missions
Homeland
6 Defense
DOD
Lead Role
DOD
ROE/RUF 11
Applies
Magnitude of Threat
Homeland Security
3 7 9 10
Defense Support
of Civil Authorities
2 8 12* DOD
Support Role
4 5* Homeland Security Missions

Supported USG
Departments  Prevent terrorism/enhance security
and Agencies Executed at all  Secure/manage our borders
Use of Force times under  Administer/enforce immigration
Policies supported agency  Safeguard/secure cyberspace
authorities  Ensure disaster resilience
Legend
CBRN chemical, biological, 1. ballistic missile defense

radiological, and nuclear 2. DOD support for disaster relief
DOD Department of Defense 3. CBRN response
FAA Federal Aviation 4. airport security and critical infrastructure/key resources
Administration 5. maritime homeland security and DOD forces* (less than 48 hours)
NORAD North American Aerospace 6. FAA support to DOD (NORAD)
Defense Command 7. emergency preparednesss
ROE/RUF rules of engagement/rules 8. support to law enforcement
for use of force 9. National Guard state active duty (in exceptional circumstances)
USG United States Government
10. Cybersecuritym
11. maritime homeland defense
12. maritime homeland security & DOD forces* (48 hours or more)
* DOD forces attached to Coast Guard under tactical control
Figure A-1. Relationships Between Homeland Defense, Defense Support of Civil

Authorities, and Homeland Security Missions
HD, DSCA, and HS (see Chapter III, “Planning and Operations for Homeland Defense”).
The NG and the reserves also play a vital role in the defense of the homeland. Figure A-1
depicts NG Title 10, USC, authorities for HD and DSCA under DOD C2. It also depicts
A-2 JP 3-27
Relationships Between Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
NG Title 32, USC, authorities for HS, HD activities, and DSCA. Figure A-1 also depicts
the fact that, in exceptional circumstances, NG forces may perform HD activities in state
active duty. Title 32, USC, and state active duty fall under state or territory C2. EP remains
part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, DSCA, and HS and includes
DOD’s lead, support, and enable functions. Mobile command centers and DOD aviation
support to the US Secret Service are just two examples of how DOD prepares for and
supports EP operations. HD efforts often complement HS efforts and the reverse is also
true.
b. Key Departmental Roles
(1) DHS. As stated in Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Homeland Defense,” DHS,

through DHS missions set forth in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, leads the
HS enterprise in whole-of-government and community-based efforts to achieve HS. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security addresses the terrorist threat and provides a
comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, tribal, and
private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security.
(2) DOJ. DOJ has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts
or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the US, or directed at US citizens or
institutions abroad, where such acts are within federal criminal jurisdiction of the US. They
also have lead responsibility for related intelligence collection activities within the US,
subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law.
(3) DOD. DOD is a key part of the HS enterprise that protects the homeland
through two distinct but interrelated missions, HD and DSCA. DOD is the federal agency
with lead responsibility for HD, which may be executed by DOD alone (e.g., BMD) or
include support from other USG departments and agencies. DOD’s role in the DSCA
mission consists of support of US civil authorities (DHS or other USG departments or
agencies), as well as state, local, or tribal entities for domestic emergencies and for
designated LE and other activities. While these missions are distinct, some department
roles and responsibilities overlap and operations require extensive coordination between
lead and supporting agencies. HD and DSCA operations may occur in parallel and require
extensive integration and synchronization with HS operations. Understanding the roles
and responsibilities of AC and RC forces and how they are used and the various duty
statuses used to employ NG forces (Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state active duty) is
critical to achieve integration and synchronization.
2. Command and Control Options for Transition
a. In DOD, integration includes the synchronized transfer of units into an operational

commander’s force prior to mission execution. HD operations require special attention
regarding integration, since the C2 possibilities are extensive. Traditional considerations
for integration are generally adequate when DOD is the lead and is defending against
traditional external threats/aggression. However, when DOD is simultaneously performing
HD operations and supporting DHS or other federal agencies, C2 becomes more complex.
To promote seamless and interoperable interagency communications for the DSCA portion
A-3
Appendix A
of DOD missions, DODI 6055.17, DOD Emergency Management (IEM) Program, directs
that DOD installations will adopt and implement procedures consistent with the National
Incident Management System (NIMS). Procedures will include a well-defined
communication plan that includes the capability to communicate within DOD, with
personnel conducting the response, as well as with civil authorities. For interoperability,
the Incident Command System per the NIMS will be used in the civil sector. This approach
provides for common interaction when DOD is in support of civil authorities and requires
planning consideration by the JFC performing such dual mission sets.
b. CCDRs cannot predict when an HD operation will transition to DSCA or vice

versa. Additionally, CCDRs may need to execute HD and DSCA simultaneously. Thus,
C2 in support of HD and DSCA operations should have a straightforward C2 template that
permits the CCDR to respond as the supported commander, supporting commander, or
both. Changes in law and DOD policy have increased the CCDR’s C2 options. Options
include using a standing JTF HQ, augmenting a core Service component HQ, or forming
an ad hoc organization from various contributors. Regardless of the organizational
structure, there are fundamental rules for forming and operating a JTF.
3. Planning Considerations for Transition
a. Employment of RC Forces. The RC possesses resources (personnel, equipment,

and skills) that can be appropriately leveraged and effectively integrated into DOD’s HD
plans and operations, based on the operational requirements. When mobilized, RC forces
operate as active duty forces. While the NG is normally employed in Title 10, USC, status
in support of HD missions, Title 32, USC, Section 902, authorizes SecDef to provide funds
to state governors for NG forces to perform specified HD activities without first activating
these forces under Title 10, USC, status. When placed on federal active duty, all RC forces
conduct HD operations under Title 10, USC, guidelines.
b. Geographic Coordinate System. Federal, state, regional, local, and urban

governmental entities use a variety of state and local grid systems and methodologies for
specifying geographic locations. Latitude and longitude values can be based on different
geodetic systems, or datums. The most common is the World Geodetic System 1984, a
global datum used by all Global Positioning System equipment. Other datums are
significant because they were chosen by a cartographical organization as the best method
for representing their region and are used on printed maps and charts. The latitude and
longitude on a printed map or chart may not be the same as the Global Positioning System
receiver. Coordinates from the mapping system can sometimes be roughly changed into
another datum using a translation. This need for translation may complicate coordinating
activities between federal, state, tribal, and local responders.
c. USCG. The USCG has inherent authorities and capability to seamlessly transition
between HS and HD operations. As discussed in Chapter II, “Command Relationships and
Interorganizationl Cooperation,” USCG execution of MHD tasks will be under the C2 of
CGDEFOR, and USCG execution of MHS tasks will be under the C2 of USCG
commanders. Additional considerations for the transition of USCG operations between
MHS and MHD include the following:
A-4 JP 3-27
(1) Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS). In general, the USCG
PWCS mission under the regime of MHS overlaps with many MHD port security and
harbor defense activities. It is important for JFC planning purposes to note that MHS
operations are always in effect, and there are significant force demands within the USCG
to conduct MHS, especially if maritime security conditions increase in a heightened threat
environment. The USCG may also raise maritime security condition levels, which
generally increases vessel and port security activities at the federal, state, and local levels
and across commercial enterprise within the maritime transportation system and may lead
to USCG force requirements for DOD to support MHS. A particular advantage of PWCS
over MHD port security and harbor defense activities is the more flexible USCG use of
force policy, compared to more restrictive SROE. Only in circumstances where SROE is
necessary to defeat a particular threat should a transition from PWCS to MHD be
considered.
For more information on PWCS activities in relation to USCG-declared maritime security

conditions, see COMDTINST M16600.6, Maritime Security and Response Operations
(MSRO) Manual.
(2) COTP Functions. The USCG’s regulatory functions are also a key planning
factor for JFC staffs planning maritime operations in areas subject to US jurisdiction. Both
the Magnuson Act and Port Waterways Safety Act grant regulatory powers to the USCG
Commandant and the various designated COTPs. JFC staffs may coordinate regularly with
USCG staffs to identify pre-planned regulatory actions, including safety and security zones
that may be required to support joint MHD operations.
For more information on COTP functions, see Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts
6 and 165, and COMDTINST M16000.11, Marine Safety Manual, Volume VI, Ports and
Waterways Activities.
(3) Balancing Enforcement and Security with Defense. The USCG conducts
LE operations and joint MIO using cutter and shore based boarding teams, LE detachments,
and maritime security response team direct action sections, as needed. The USCG will
normally require DOD-provided lift and surface assets under the auspices of direct MHS
support if USCG cutters or aircraft are unavailable to support short-notice maritime
response operations. When necessary, USCG assets conduct operations that preserve
evidence required for prosecution of a maritime threat under US law while balancing risk
associated with certain types of boarding operations. As a member of the IC, the USCG
may also contribute to tactical intelligence exploitation in support of other federal agencies
when such activities are authorized by US law and policy.
For more information, see COMDTINST M16247.1, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual
(MLEM); COMDTINST M16600.6, Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO)
Manual; and Coast Guard Publication 3-2, Short Notice Maritime Response.
(4) Domestic MHS Coordination. Maritime security authorities that contribute

to both HS and HD include domestic frameworks that coordinate partnerships, establish
maritime security standards, collaborate with shared maritime security interests, and
A-5
Appendix A
facilitate the sharing of information. Domestically, the USCG-led area maritime security
committees carry out much of the maritime security regime effort. COTPs, in their role as
federal maritime security coordinator, lead the area maritime security committees through
state-wide and municipal-level coordination with federal, state, and local LEAs and
commercial port partners. In exercising COTP authority, COTPs consider all equities in
the port environment as certain regulatory actions can have significant economic impact
and may dictate trade-offs with security demands.
(5) International MHS Activities. Abroad, and in a similar fashion to how

DOD conducts defensive activities in the forward regions whenever possible, the USCG
conducts the International Port Security Program, which works with other countries and
through the International Maritime Organization, a specialized agency of the United
Nations.
For more information on USCG domestic and international port security compliance, see
COMDTINST M16000.12, Port Security Compliance Manual.
d. Auxiliary Organizations
(1) USAF Auxiliary. The USAF Auxiliary, also known as Civil Air Patrol
(CAP), has forces with unique capabilities that can contribute to the successful prosecution
of HD air operations. Air Education and Training Command serves as the force provider
of CAP to CCDRs. CAP, a volunteer, federally chartered, nonprofit organization, may
function as an auxiliary of the USAF IAW Title 10, USC, Section 9442, to support USAF
noncombat programs and missions. Such missions may include airborne surveillance and
reconnaissance using visual observation and imagery, search and rescue, light airlift, or
utilizing CAP aircraft as an “airborne target” during air intercept training.
(2) USCG Auxiliary. The USCG Auxiliary was established by Congress in 1939
under Title 14, USC. The USCG Auxiliary supports MHS through the USCG Port Safety
and Security Program. For more information, see COMDTINST M16790.1, Auxiliary
Manual.
(3) Military Auxiliary Radio System. Both the USA and the USAF maintain
auxiliary communications that can handle unclassified message traffic, including
encryption capabilities.
e. State Defense Forces. State defense forces (e.g., state military, state guards, or
state military reserves) are military units that operate under the sole authority of a state
government; they are partially regulated by the NGB but they are not a part of the ARNG.
State defense forces are authorized by state and federal law and are under the command of
the governor of each state. There are active state defense forces in 20 states and the US
territory of Puerto Rico. At the discretion of individual states or territories, state defense
forces may support, assist, and augment their state’s NG forces and civilian authorities
such as police and fire departments.
f. Chapter 18 (Title 10, USC, Sections 271-282). This chapter concerns military
support for civilian LEAs and provides statutory authority for specific types of military
A-6 JP 3-27
support to LE. Title 10, USC, Section 275, directs SecDef to promulgate regulations that
prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps
in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by
such member is otherwise authorized by law.” This guidance is currently set forth in DODI
3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.
g. Insurrection (Title 10, USC, Sections 251-255). These statutory provisions allow
the President, at the request of a state governor or legislature, or unilaterally in some
circumstances, to employ the US Armed Forces to suppress insurrection against state
authority, to enforce federal laws, or to suppress rebellion. When support is directed for
such HD-related purposes in the US, the designated JFC should utilize this special
application knowing the main purpose of such employment is to help restore law and order
with minimal harm to the people and property and with due respect for all law-abiding
citizens.
h. CIP. Most infrastructure assets are inherently interconnected and part of larger
integrated systems. Therefore, the removal of one asset’s functionality due to an outage or
attack could have devastating effects on larger infrastructure networks, causing broad
service disruptions and potentially adverse regional impacts. Almost all national and
defense response capabilities rely, to some extent, on commercial infrastructures. National
and DCI supporting national security functions must be available when required to protect
the homeland. These will include DCI assets and DIB assets, the protection of which is
the responsibility of DOD. JFCs’ preparations to conduct CIP should consider those in
either a HD or DSCA role or as one transitions from one to another. For example, an
explosion occurs at a major dam or nuclear facility. These are considered key assets from
a national perspective. With no initial determination of cause, authorities suspect terrorism.
National leadership makes the initial determination to deploy a QRF for HD to protect
critical infrastructure due to unknown intent and for the purpose of expediency.
Subsequent to QRF arrival, an assessment is made whether an external threat or terrorism
caused the event. Upon such determination of threat, but if a need for security remains,
the QRF would perform security in a DSCA role until sufficient numbers of other federal
agency, local LE, and/or NG (Title 32, USC) can provide necessary support.
For complete details on the DSCA mission, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.
A-7
Appendix A
Intentionally Blank
A-8 JP 3-27
APPENDIX B
FACILITATING INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION
1. General
DOD leads HD missions and will be supported by other USG departments and
agencies while conducting such missions. Conversely, DOD supports other USG
departments and agencies for DSCA missions. Events or operations that begin as HD
missions may transition to a DSCA mission (normally for response to an incident) or
evolve to a concurrent DSCA mission. This appendix identifies organizations that
normally support HD missions in some fashion, notwithstanding that some may also
support DSCA missions separately, concurrently, or as a follow-on requirement.
2. Combat Support Agencies and Other Supporting Organizations
CSAs provide direct support to the CCMDs performing HD during wartime or

emergency situations and are subject to evaluation by the CJCS. The paragraphs below
address general and specific missions, functions, and capabilities of DOD CSAs and other
selected organizations which conduct HD activities.
a. DISA. DISA provides, operates, and assures C2, information sharing capabilities,
and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to joint
warfighters, national-level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners. DISA
supports national security communications requirements and functions within the
following core mission areas: communications; C2 capabilities; cybersecurity; computing
services; interoperability, testing, and standards; DODIN services; engineering; and
acquisition. It is the Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent for the DODINs, per DODD
3020.40, Mission Assurance (MA), and implements and executes the DCIP requirements.
Joint Force HQ-DODIN, a staff subordinate to CDRUSCYBERCOM, plans, directs,
coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes execution of global DODIN operations and DCO
internal defensive measures to secure, operate, and defend the DODIN.
For more information on DISA, see DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA).
b. DIA. DIA provides intelligence on foreign militaries and operating environments

that delivers decision advantage to prevent and decisively win wars. The Director of DIA
advises SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, CJCS, CCDRs, and Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence on all matters concerning military and military-related
intelligence and is the principal DOD intelligence representative in the national foreign
intelligence process.
For more information on DIA, see DODD 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
See also JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
c. DLA. DLA provides worldwide logistics support for the missions of the Military
Departments and the CCMDs. Specifically:
B-1
Appendix B
(1) DLA provides support to other DOD components and USG departments and
agencies, and, when authorized by law, state and local government organizations, foreign
governments, and international organizations.
(2) DLA provides support to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for planning and
execution of HD. DLA has many capabilities in USPACOM’s AOR led by the DLA-
Pacific Regional Command. DLA has LNOs positioned at USNORTHCOM that can be
augmented during a crisis. An operational planning team is located at DLA HQ, with
planners dedicated to each CCMD. A catalog of DLA-type unit capabilities is available to
both commands for planning and execution in the Adaptive Planning and Execution
system. The Defense Logistics Agency support team, a type unit capability, that when
deployed/employed in a JOA, is the primary focal point for disseminating, coordinating,
and tracking issues of the CCDR or JFC concerning DLA.
(3) Provides enabler OCS support to CCDR planning efforts and training events
and, when requested, advises, assists, and JFC oversight of OCS during HD and DSCA
operations.
For more information on DLA, see DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and
JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
d. National Security Agency (NSA). NSA provides the following support:
(1) Solutions, products, and services that contribute to cybersecurity.
(2) SIGINT for an effective, unified organization and control of all the foreign
signals collection and processing activities of the US. NSA is authorized to produce
SIGINT IAW objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of
National Intelligence with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
(3) Information systems security activities, as assigned by SecDef, to include

managing and providing OPCON of the US SIGINT System.
For more information on the responsibilities of NSA, refer to EO 12333, United States
Intelligence Activities.
e. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA works directly with

defense suppliers to help ensure DOD, USG, and allied government supplies and services
are delivered on time, at projected cost, and meet all performance requirements. DCMA
performs all contract audits for DOD and provides accounting and financial advisory
services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible for
procurement and contract administration. Within the DCIP, DCMA (subordinate to the
Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics]) is DOD’s lead for
the DIB sector.
f. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA provides timely,

relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in support of national security
objectives. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information
B-2 JP 3-27
Facilitating Interorganizational Cooperation
to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced
activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
information. NGA also:
(1) Supports customers in the defense, LE, intelligence, federal, and civil
communities with its analytic GEOINT capabilities.
(2) Supports DOD and civil authorities by building integrated datasets to support
the COP and situational awareness. These datasets provide a common frame of reference
for USG decision makers and operational planners regarding critical infrastructure
vulnerability analysis, domestic incident management, and CIP.
(3) In concert with other federal partners, serves as the imagery and geospatial
data broker, integrator, and consolidator in building a single database to support domestic
situational awareness, incident management, and CIP.
(4) Provides integrated geospatial information in support of the planning and

execution of HD exercises where there is federal, DOD, state, and local government
participation.
(5) Deploys fully equipped geospatial analytic teams to support military and
civilian exercises, as well as other crisis and national special security events in real time.
(6) Provides direct, tailored, geospatial information support.
(7) Provides externally assigned support personnel as part of the National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team (NST) program to CCMDs, the Services, IC
partners, and USG departments and agencies (e.g., DOS, FBI, and DHS). These embedded
NST personnel provide day-to-day GEOINT support to the commands or agencies and
have the capability to reach back to NGA for requirements that exceed the capacity or
capability of the team. In addition, NGA maintains a group of support personnel as part of
NGA voluntary deployment teams that can deploy to augment an NST. NST members or
individuals from the NGA voluntary deployment teams can be called upon to participate
as part of a national intelligence support team, along with other members of the IC, in
response to a crisis or emergency situation to augment the staffs of a JIOC, command, or
agency.
g. DTRA. DTRA’s mission is to safeguard the US and its allies from global WMD
and improvised threats by integrating, synchronizing, and providing expertise,
technologies, and capabilities. DTRA provides integrated technical and operational
solutions, as well as intellectual capital, to inform and support national-level and DOD
policies and strategies that address WMD and improvised threats to the homeland and the
warfighter. Additionally, DTRA provides support to DOD components, interagency
stakeholders, and allied partners to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective strategic
nuclear deterrent for defense of the homeland. Specific DTRA capabilities that help
prevent acquisition of WMD and related materials, contain and reduce threats, and respond
to crisis in defense of the homeland include the following functions:
B-3
Appendix B
(1) Provide continuous support to the warfighter through its National CWMD
Technical Reachback Enterprise, a national CWMD support element that provides CWMD
analysis and decision support capability for planning, operations, and post-event analysis
to CCMDs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the IC, DOD command
elements, other USG departments and agencies, and first responders.
(2) Balanced survivability assessments are mission survivability assessments of

critical national or theater mission systems, networks, architectures, infrastructures, and
assets of the US and its multinational partners. Assessment areas include surveillance
operations; physical security; telecommunications; selected information-related
capabilities; DCO; and cyber security analysis, structural protection and response, utility
subsystems, WMD protection, emergency operations, and electromagnetic protection.
(3) CBRN military advisory teams, when requested, provide technical and
scientific subject matter experts, planners, and hazard prediction modeling support to
CCDRs and federal coordinating agencies or their delegated representatives in response to
catastrophic incidents involving WMD in the US and abroad.
(4) Deployable CWMD plans teams assist CCMDs or other supported

commanders with CWMD planning and analysis of existing plans or assist the supported
commander in developing plans, annexes, or appendices for CWMD operations.
(5) The mission assurance methodology integrates 10 protection programs (AT,

DCI, COOP, emergency management, LE, FHP, defense security enterprise, fire
prevention and protection, insider threat, and cybersecurity) into a single risk assessment
process with common standards and metrics ensuring commanders at all levels are more
informed as to the overall risk to mission. A joint mission assurance assessment is a “risk-
based” assessment of an installation’s ability to mitigate threats from all hazards and
threats. A risk-based assessment addresses the impact to missions if affected by an
identified hazard or threat.
(6) Technical support groups located in CONUS, USPACOM, United States

European Command (USEUCOM), US Africa Command, and US Central Command
provide the capability to train, advise, assist, and equip in order to conduct tactical low-
visibility radiological search operations.
(7) DTRA serves as DOD lead for US nuclear weapon incident training and
executes the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise program along with supporting
training events.
(8) DTRA’s Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) enables DOD

actions to counter improvised threats through anticipatory and rapid acquisition and with
tactical responsiveness in support of CCDRs’ efforts to prepare for, and adapt to, battlefield
surprise in support of CT, counterinsurgency, and other related mission areas, including
counter-improvised explosive devices. JIDO capabilities to enhance CCDR readiness to
perform HD activities include:
B-4 JP 3-27
(a) Enhanced situational understanding of improvised threats through a

global common operational and intelligence picture.
(b) Forward-deployed and embedded presence at critical points in order to

illuminate threat networks, their activities, and vulnerabilities.
(c) Peacetime, contingency, and crisis support that enables the pursuit of
threat networks, their urgent and emerging use of technologies, and counter-threat
requirements and solutions.
(d) Establishing and enabling communities of action to leverage the

capabilities, authorities, and access of DOD, national laboratories, USG departments and
agencies, industry, academia, and international partners to assist with counter-improvised
threat solution development.
(e) Applying weapons technical intelligence tools and solutions for forensic
and technical exploitation of asymmetric/improvised weapons.
(f) Expeditionary, quick reaction surge, and reachback support to enhance

tactical and operational responsiveness to CCMD contingency operations.
(g) Threat and counter-threat intelligence, information, and capabilities in

support of military and joint training programs.
(h) Supporting Military Departments/Services’ predeployment training and

CCMD’s priority training exercise support.
For additional information on DTRA capabilities, see DODD 5105.62, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA).
h. JIATF-S. JIATF-S is a multi-Service, multiagency, national task force based at

Naval Air Station Key West, Florida. JIATF-S detects and monitors aircraft and maritime
vessels suspected of trafficking in illicit goods and then provides this information to
international and interagency partners who have the authority to interdict illicit shipments
and arrest members of TCOs. In support of HD, JIATF-S helps track military equipment
destined for terrorist organizations. The interorganizational cooperation that occurs daily
promotes shared responsibilities and facilitates appropriate and legal LE information
sharing between non-DOD LEAs (both US and other countries). This, and the combined
operations that are conducted under JIATF-S auspices, supports a concerted HD and HS
approach to protecting US national interests in Latin America and the Caribbean.
i. JIATF-W. JIATF-W is the USPACOM Executive Agent for DOD support to LE

for CD and drug-related activities. The JIATF-W team is a composite of active duty,
reserve, DOD civilian, contractor, and US and foreign LEA personnel. JIATF-W plans,
integrates, synchronizes, conducts, and assesses DOD CD activities for CDRUSPACOM
in order to shape the theater and disrupt TCOs that threaten US interests in the USPACOM
AOR. JIATF-W targets organizations that threaten the US, its territories, and its interests
so they are denied the ability to traffic illicit drugs and precursor chemicals used to produce
B-5
Appendix B
illicit drugs in the USPACOM AOR; the OE is less permissive for their activities, and
regional partnerships and stability are enhanced.
j. Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The MDA is a research, development, and

acquisition agency within DOD whose mission is to develop and deploy a layered BMD
system to defend the US, deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks
from all ranges in all phases of flight. This includes using international cooperation by
supporting mutual security interests in missile defense. The agency works with the CCDRs
(e.g., USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSTRATCOM) to develop BMD systems
technologies and a program to address the challenges of an evolving threat. The agency
uses the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) as the central
communications node for situation monitoring and information collection on current BMD
systems performance. From the MDIOC, MDA can coordinate support to the CCDRs,
Services, and other agencies and provide staff assistance to BMD systems element
managers. The MDIOC functions include the coordination and monitoring of concurrent
operational and test activities of the BMD systems, supporting emergency activation of
BMD system test bed resources for operational execution, and for receiving and
disseminating New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Treaty on Open Skies inspection
information. MDA also supports BMD systems asset management and logistical support.
Asset management enables event owners and asset owners to deconflict their events and
asset requirements (e.g., tests and maintenance) and to use a cooperative approach between
CCDRs, Services, and MDA to provide for the capability testing, sustainability, and
maintainability of MDA elements and components.
k. Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3). DC3 provides digital

forensics support to DOD and to other LEAs. The DC3’s main focus is in criminal, CI,
CT, and fraud investigations, but two of the groups associated with the DC3 support HD-
related efforts. These are the DOD-Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information
Sharing Environment (DCISE), National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force-Analytical
Group (NCIJTF-AG), and Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy.
(1) DCISE is the focal point and clearinghouse for referrals of intrusion events
on DIB unclassified corporate networks. The DCISE is a collaborative information sharing
environment among multiple partners that produces threat information products for
industry partners with reciprocal responsibilities of providing notice of anomalies and
sharing of relevant media.
(2) The NCIJTF-AG coordinates with the National Cyber Investigative Joint
Task Force, a cyberspace investigation coordination organization overseen by the FBI
which serves as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and
sharing pertinent information related to cyberspace threat investigations. The NCIJTF-AG
mitigates, neutralizes, and disrupts cyberspace intrusions presenting a national security
threat. The NCIJTF-AG synthesizes a COP of hostile intrusion related activity to aid
investigations, review all source data, and support timely reporting in order to shrink the
cyberspace CI response time on defense-related intrusions.
B-6 JP 3-27
l. Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency (DFBA). DFBA leads, consolidates,

and coordinates forensics and biometrics activities and operations for DOD in support of
identity activities.
(1) DFBA operates DOD’s authoritative biometrics repository, the Automated

Biometric Information System, collected on foreign nationals throughout the course of
military operations and shared by PNs and interagency partners. DFBA’s efforts provides
significant contribution to the whole-of-government CT approach to collect, match, store,
share, and use biometrics to the fullest extent practicable, lawful, and necessary to protect
national security interests.
(2) DFBA performs the dissemination of the DOD Biometric Enabled Watch List
on behalf of DIA and provides the conduit for matching against interagency authoritative
data sets (DHS’s IDENT [Automated Biometric Identification System] and the FBI’s NGI
[Next Generation Identification] databases).
3. Other United States Government Departments and Agencies
a. DHS. Key directorates and components of DHS, as they relate to HD, include:
(1) The Science and Technology Directorate is the primary research and
development arm of DHS. The Science and Technology Directorate provides federal, state,
and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.
(2) The National Protection and Programs Directorate bolsters the nation’s
security through a multilayered system of preparedness measures based on risk assessment
and management. Working with state, local, and private sector partners, the directorate
identifies threats, determines vulnerabilities, and targets resources where risk is greatest.
Through grants and training on both national and local levels, DHS fosters a layered system
of protective measures to safeguard US borders, seaports, bridges and highways, and
critical information systems. The directorate has five divisions: Federal Protective
Services, CS&C, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Risk Management and
Analysis, and United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(biometrics-based technological solutions).
(3) The Office of Policy strengthens HS by developing and integrating

Department-wide policies, planning, and programs in order to better coordinate DHS’s
prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions.
(4) The Office of Health Affairs is DHS’s principal authority for all medical and
health issues. This office anticipates the public health impact of biological attacks,
chemical releases, pandemics and infectious disease threats, and disasters to help prepare
the nation to respond and rebound.
(5) The Office of Partnership and Engagement coordinates DHS’s outreach

efforts with critical stakeholders nationwide, including state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments; elected officials; LE; the private sector; and colleges and universities,
ensuring a unified approach to external engagement. This office advocates and represents
B-7
Appendix B
interests of these stakeholders through DHS’s policy making process and as a conduit for
the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage with stakeholders or share information.
(6) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis uses information and intelligence
from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the US.
(7) The Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate monitors the

security of the US on a daily basis and coordinates activities within DHS and with
governors, advisors, LE partners, and critical infrastructure operators’ areas nationwide.
(8) The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is a jointly staffed office

established to improve the nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to
import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against
the nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. It is the primary entity in the
USG for implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts for a managed and coordinated
response to radiological and nuclear threats, as well as the integration of federal nuclear
forensics programs. This office coordinates the development of the global nuclear
detection and reporting architecture, with partners from federal, state, local, and
international governments and the private sector.
(9) The Federal LE Training Center serves as an interagency LE training

organization for 91 federal agencies. It also provides services to state, local, tribal, and
international LEAs.
(10) US Customs and Border Protection protects the nation’s borders to

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the US. It facilitates the flow of
legitimate trade and travel while enforcing US regulations, including immigration and drug
laws.
(11) US Citizenship and Immigration Services is the USG agency that oversees
lawful immigration to the US. It administers immigration and naturalization adjudication
functions and establishes immigration services policies and priorities.
(12) The USCG is one of the five military Services under Title 10, USC, and
established separately within DHS under Title 14, USC.
(13) FEMA supports US citizens and first responders to ensure, as a nation, we

work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.
(14) US Immigration and Customs Enforcement promotes HS and public

safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control,
customs, trade, and immigration. It identifies and shuts down vulnerabilities on the
nation’s border and in the economic, transportation, and infrastructure security.
(15) The US Secret Service mission is to safeguard the nation’s financial

infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy and to protect
the President and other national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated
B-8 JP 3-27
sites, and national special security events. The US Secret Service’s partnerships—public
and private, domestic and international, LE and civilian—play a critical role in preventing,
detecting, investigating, and mitigating the effects of electronic and financial crimes.
(16) TSA protects the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of

movement for people and commerce.
For additional information on DHS directorates and offices, refer to JP 3-08,

b. DOJ/FBI. As the lead for crisis management and CT, the Attorney General
investigates terrorist acts or threats; coordinates LE activities to detect, prevent, preempt,
and disrupt terrorist attacks; and, if an attack occurs, to identify and prosecute the
perpetrators. The FBI, as LFA, manages the federal LE response to threats or acts of
terrorism that take place within US territory or those occurring in international waters that
do not involve flag vessels of foreign countries. The FBI maintains two operational
watches within a single operations center, the Strategic Information and Operations Center
(SIOC) Watch and CT Watch. The SIOC Watch retains primary daily responsibility for
criminal investigative matters, administrative issues, and information management. The
CT Watch works side-by-side with the SIOC Watch to support seamless and efficient
handling of strategic information and emerging events, both domestically and globally.
The dual location of both watches supports the proper flow of information to FBI HQ, field
divisions, legal attachés, and other government agency operations centers within the IC.
The Crisis Coordination and Administration Unit within the SIOC coordinates and
prepares the operational activation system at FBI HQ for a watch, threat or incident, special
event, or natural disaster. This includes coordination with field offices, legal attachés, and
specialized national assets when required to manage a critical incident. Additionally, the
SIOC supports FBI field commanders who represent the FBI worldwide in major
investigations, tactical operations, and other matters.
c. DOE. DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration is the USG’s primary

capability for radiological and nuclear emergency response and for providing security to
the nation from nuclear terrorism. DOE maintains a high level of readiness for protecting
and serving the US and its multinational partners through the development,
implementation, and coordination of programs and systems designed to respond in the
event of a nuclear terrorist incident or other types of radiological accidents. DOE provides
a dedicated resource capable of responding rapidly to nuclear or radiological incidents
worldwide. Key areas include radiological search teams to locate and identify radiological
material, render safe capability to make sure a nuclear device is safe, and CBRN response
to determine the spread of radiological material.
(1) DOE also has a variety of emergency response assets. These assets
encompass four core competencies: core knowledge of US nuclear weapons, “dirty
bombs,” and crude nuclear devices; core knowledge of use and interpretation of specialized
radiation detection equipment; core technical operations; and core technical support
requirements.
B-9
Appendix B
(2) The assets are:
(a) Aerial Measuring System. The Aerial Measuring System utilizes aerial
platforms to characterize ground-deposited radiation. These platforms include fixed-wing
and rotary-wing aircraft with radiological measuring equipment; computer analysis of
aerial measurements; and equipment to locate lost radioactive sources, conduct aerial
surveys, or map large areas of contamination.
(b) Accident Response Group. The Accident Response Group response

element is comprised of scientists, technical specialists, crisis managers, and equipment
ready for short-notice dispatch to the scene of a US nuclear weapon accident.
(c) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center. The National

Atmospheric Release Advisory Center is a computer-based EP and response predictive
capability. It provides real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of
material from radioactive release.
(d) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. The

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center is a federal asset available on
request by DHS and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident.
This organization has representation from the National Nuclear Security Administration,
DOD, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), the FBI, and other USG departments and agencies.
(e) Radiological Assistance Program. The Radiological Assistance

Program also provides advice and radiological assistance for incidents involving
radioactive materials that pose a threat to the public health and safety of the environment.
It can provide field deployable teams of health physics professionals equipped to conduct
radiological search, monitoring, and assessment activities.
(f) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. This site

provides medical advice, specialized training, and onsite assistance for the treatment of
radiation exposure accidents.
(g) Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST provides technical

assistance to a LFA to deal with nuclear threats and incidents. NEST addresses threats by
domestic and foreign terrorists that may have the will and means to employ WMD. NEST
assists in the identification, characterization, rendering safe, and final disposition of any
nuclear weapon or radioactive device.
d. DOT/FAA. The mission of DOT is to ensure a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and
convenient transportation system that meets US vital national interests and enhances the
quality of life of the American people. Under DOT, the FAA provides air movement and
flight plan data for all aircraft operations. It oversees the safety of civil aviation and
maintains primary jurisdiction over all air space within the US National Airspace System.
In close coordination with DOD and NORAD, the FAA clears air traffic as needed to
expedite intercept operations. The safety mission of the FAA is first and foremost and
includes the issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards related to the
B-10 JP 3-27
manufacture, operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft. The agency rates and
certifies airmen and airports serving air carriers. It also regulates a program to protect the
security of civil aviation and enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act for shipments by air. The FAA, which operates a network of airport
towers, air route traffic control centers, and flight service stations, develops air traffic rules,
allocates the use of airspace, and provides for the security control of air traffic to meet
national defense requirements. Other responsibilities include maintaining most of the
radars which perform air surveillance over the CONUS FAA control centers, providing
cueing for targets of interest, and providing maintenance and logistics support for nearly
all ground-to-air radios used by the air defense sectors (ADSs). These and other support
activities and procedures are governed by a series of agreements and FAA orders.
e. NCTC. The NCTC is organizationally part of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and is staffed by more than 16 departments and agencies. NCTC has two core
missions. The first is to serve as the primary organization in the USG for analysis and
integration of all terrorism intelligence and, in that capacity, the Director reports to the
Director of National Intelligence. The second mission is to conduct strategic operational
planning for CT activities integrating all elements of US national power. In this role, the
Director reports to the President. The NCTC serves as the central and shared knowledge
bank on terrorism information, provides all-source intelligence support to government-
wide CT activities, and establishes the information technology systems and architectures
within the NCTC and between the NCTC and other agencies that enable access to, as well
as integration, dissemination, and use of, terrorism information. One way the NCTC
supports HD is its operation of a secure website, NCTC Online CURRENT, which serves
as the primary dissemination mechanism for terrorism information produced by the NCTC
and other CT mission partners, to include international partners. NCTC Online CURRENT
is directly available to a broad audience and includes USG partners with an operational
focus (e.g., FBI’s JTTFs and DOD’s CCMDs).
f. DHHS
(1) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC is a
USG agency under DHHS. It is the US’s national-level public health institute and works
to protect public health and safety by providing information to enhance health decisions,
and it promotes health through partnerships with state health departments and other
organizations.
(2) The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise

coordinates federal efforts to enhance CBRN threats and emerging infectious diseases
preparedness from a medical countermeasures perspective. It is led by the DHHS Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and includes three primary
DHHS internal agency partners: the CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
National Institutes of Health, as well as several interagency partners: DOD, the
Department of Veterans Affairs, DHS, and the Department of Agriculture.
B-11
Appendix B
Intentionally Blank
B-12 JP 3-27
APPENDIX C
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND MISSIONS,
ORGANIZATION, AND STRUCTURE
“Mindful in the years since the first NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command] Agreement was concluded in May 12, 1958, NORAD, as
a distinct command, has evolved to address the continuing changes in the
nature of threats to North America and that it will need to adapt to future shared
security interests.”
NORAD Agreement, 2006
1. North American Aerospace Defense Command Overview
a. Since 1957, Canada and the US have defended the skies of North America. A
formal NORAD Agreement between the two governments was signed on 12 May 1958 to
establish NORAD as a bi-national command. Using data from satellites, as well as airborne
and ground-based radars, NORAD monitors, validates, and warns of attack against the
Canadian and US homelands by aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles. The command
ensures Canadian and US air sovereignty through a network of alert fighters, tankers,
airborne early warning aircraft, and ground-based air defense assets cued by military and
interagency surveillance radars, such as those of the FAA and its Canadian equivalent,
NAV CANADA.
b. As an executed international covenant, the NORAD Agreement is binding under

international law. The CDS and the US CJCS provide the Terms of Reference to the
NORAD Agreement to supplement and clarify military responsibilities directed or implied
by the agreement.
c. In the context of NORAD’s missions, “North America” means Alaska, Canada,

CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands, to include the Air Defense Identification
Zone, the air approaches, maritime approaches and territorial seas, and the internal
navigable waterways (principally the Gulf of St. Lawrence, St. Lawrence Seaway System,
Great Lakes, and other internal waterways of concern as identified by CDRNORAD).
Responsibility for aerospace warning and aerospace control of US territory outside North
America (e.g., Hawaii and Guam) lies with the appropriate GCC.
2. Missions
a. Aerospace warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating

intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the air and space domains, plus
the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft,
missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands
and agencies. An integral part of aerospace warning entails monitoring of global aerospace
activities and related developments. NORAD’s aerospace warning mission for North
America includes support of US commands that are responsible for missile defense.
C-1
Appendix C
b. Aerospace control consists of providing surveillance and exercising NORAD

OPCON of the airspace of the US and Canada. NORAD OPCON is defined in the NORAD
Agreement and NORAD Terms of Reference as the authority to direct, coordinate, and
control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available
to NORAD. Aerospace control involves a continuum of combined air operations that
includes air sovereignty operations aimed at controlling access to the sovereign airspace of
North America, air enforcement operations aimed at controlling activities approaching or
within sovereign airspace, and air defense operations aimed at defending against air attack.
This means NORAD has the authority to monitor, control, and prosecute (in cooperation
with the FAA and Transport Canada/NAV CANADA) all unwanted and unauthorized
activity approaching and/or operating within North American airspace, including cross-
border air operations.
c. Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating

intelligence and information related to the respective maritime approaches to the US and
Canada. It also includes warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against, North America
utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies, to enable
identification, validation, and response by national commanders and agencies responsible
for maritime defense and security. These tasks develop a comprehensive shared
understanding of maritime activities to better identify potential maritime threats to North
American security. Maritime surveillance and control should be exercised by national
commands and, as appropriate, coordinated bilaterally.
3. Supporting Mission Areas and Systems
a. ITW/AA. Tactical warning is a warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile

act based on an evaluation of information from all available sources. Attack assessment is
an evaluation of information to determine the potential or actual nature and objectives of
an attack for the purpose of providing information for timely decisions. The ITW/AA
system is a critical component of the US nuclear C2 system and is comprised of the sensors,
command centers, and communications networks required to detect, assess, and
communicate its information to designated users. The main purpose of the ITW/AA
system is to provide timely, reliable, and unambiguous warning information of
ballistic missile, space, and air attacks on North America. To provide ITW/AA of an
aerospace attack on North America, NORAD, as a supported command, correlates and
integrates relevant information. Space surveillance, nuclear detonation detection, and
ballistic missile warning information is provided by USSTRATCOM for NORAD to
execute its aerospace warning mission for North America. CDRUSSTRATCOM, as a
supporting commander, retains OPCON over USSTRATCOM-assigned ballistic missile
and space surveillance and warning systems; the Nuclear Detonation Detection System;
and command, control, and communications systems. CDRNORAD retains the authority
to redirect operational priorities of the ITW/AA systems to execute NORAD assigned
missions IAW the priority assigned to attacks against North America.
b. Routine Air Operations. NORAD provides surveillance and control of North

American airspace. This includes:
C-2 JP 3-27
North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions, Organization, and Structure
(1) Day-to-day surveillance and control of the airspace approaches to, and the
airspace within, North America to safeguard the sovereign airspace of both Canada and the
US. Surveillance and control includes the capability to detect, identify, monitor, and, if
necessary, take appropriate actions (ranging from visual identification to destruction)
against manned or UA approaching North America.
(2) Air defense against manned or UA weapon systems attacking North America.
c. Information and Intelligence Sharing. NORAD aerospace warning, maritime

warning, and aerospace control missions require effective information and intelligence
sharing by many organizations and agencies within Canada and the US. A “need to share”
philosophy facilitates the effective execution of these NORAD missions on behalf of the
governments of Canada and the US.
d. Interorganizational Cooperation. The effective execution of NORAD missions

requires significant cooperation with agencies outside the Department of National Defence
in Canada and DOD in the US. NORAD is authorized direct liaison with these agencies in
order to solicit and acquire the necessary cooperation, while keeping appropriate national
commands and authorities informed.
e. Direct Communications. CDRNORAD is authorized direct communications with

the CDS; CJCS; SecDef; Commander, CJOC; CDRUSNORTHCOM; CDRUSPACOM;
CDRUSSTRATCOM; CDRUSSOUTHCOM; nation Service chiefs; and other
commanders on matters relative to NORAD’s missions. This includes requests to
appropriate agencies to expedite the release of classified information to facilitate the
accomplishment of NORAD’s missions.
f. CD and Countering Transnational Organized Crime Operations. TCOs

facilitate the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into North America has been
identified as a threat to the national security of Canada and the US by both governments.
DOD is the LFA to detect and monitor illegal airborne and maritime drug trafficking into
the US. To accomplish this mission, SecDef tasked CDRNORAD and selected CCDRs to
support the GCCs planning and execution requirements for CD and to counter TCOs,
required. Likewise, the Canadian National Drug Strategy named the National Defense
Headquarters (Canada) as a supporting department to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
As a result, 1 Canadian Air Division (CAD) is responsible for conducting CD operations
when directed by National Defense Headquarters (Canada). To accomplish this mission,
NORAD conducts operations to detect and monitor aerial transit of drug trafficking into
North America; coordinates with other federal, provincial, state, and local agencies
“Close cooperation, liaison, and intelligence and information sharing among

these commands will ensure the ability of our armed forces to act, in a timely
and coordinated fashion, to deter, identify, disrupt, and defeat threats to
Canada and the United States.”
Canada-United States Basic Defense Document

July 2006
C-3
Appendix C
detecting, monitoring, and apprehending aerial drug traffic; and integrates NORAD
operations into an effective CD network.
For more information on the differences between Canadian and US law for military
support to LEAs, refer to NORAD Instruction 10-24, (U) Counterdrug (CD)/Counter
Narcoterrorism (CNT) Operations.
4. North American Aerospace Defense Command Organization
NORAD is organized on three distinct levels. The HQ NORAD staff and the
command center operate at the strategic level. The three NORAD regions conduct
activities at the operational level, and the ADSs and their TACON forces operate at the
tactical level.
a. Missions are accomplished through a combination of assigned and attached

Canadian and US forces (AC, NG, and reserves). These forces are employed in three
NORAD regions, further described in paragraph 6, “North American Aerospace Defense
Command Subordinate Commands.”
b. CDRNORAD. CDRNORAD and the Deputy Commander cannot be from the

same country, and their appointments must be approved by both Canadian and US
governments. The jurisdiction of CDRNORAD over those forces specifically made
available to NORAD by the two governments is limited to OPCON.
c. Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense

Command (CDRUSELEMNORAD). This officer is the senior US officer assigned to
NORAD. USELEMNORAD serves as an administrative construct to permit the
assignment or attachment of US forces to perform NORAD missions. Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance, Section II, Assignment of Forces (Forces for
Unified Commands), states, “Although not a CCDR, CDRUSELEMNORAD exercises
COCOM over US forces made available to NORAD.”
d. HQ NORAD. HQ NORAD provides the strategic guidance necessary for the

regions to execute their assigned missions. Additionally, the HQ coordinates with the
senior military staffs of both countries, as well as other CCDRs who may be in a supporting
role. HQ NORAD and the command centers are composed of integrated staffs with
representatives of both countries.
e. HQ NORAD Staff Organization. The HQ NORAD staff is organized along the

same J-code construct as the Joint Staff. In addition, the commander’s staff includes
Canadian and US political advisors, an interagency group, a Washington Office, and
special assistants for NG and reserve affairs. A unique aspect of the HQ NORAD staff is
that most staff elements are dual-hatted as both NORAD and USNORTHCOM
organizations. The exception is the operations directorate, which is a NORAD-only
organization. Despite most of the staff being dual-hatted with USNORTHCOM, the
commands remain separate with complementary missions, roles, and responsibilities.
C-4 JP 3-27
5. North American Aerospace Defense Command Relations with Other Commands
a. USNORTHCOM. NORAD and USNORTHCOM share a special and unique

relationship. A majority of USNORTHCOM’s AOR and NORAD’s OA overlap. Note
that in the NORAD Agreement, this is normally referred to as an AO. Each command has
its missions defined by separate sources. NORAD is a bi-national military organization
which exists under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty, the NORAD Agreement, the
NORAD Terms of Reference, and the Canada-United States Basic Defense Document
between Canada and the US. Conversely, USNORTHCOM is a purely US military
organization based on the US UCP. USNORTHCOM forces operating in the same area as
NORAD forces may provide tactical intercept information to NORAD forces. Conversely,
NORAD air defense control assets may provide tactical intercept information to
USNORTHCOM forces while they remain under the OPCON of their respective
commander. To create combined effects, USNORTHCOM accomplishes coordination
with numerous commands and agencies. For instance:
(1) USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and, as directed, executes HD operations

within the USNORTHCOM AOR in concert with missions performed by NORAD. The
mission and geographic overlaps between NORAD and USNORTHCOM require both
commands to coordinate and synchronize their operations.
(2) USNORTHCOM coordinates with NORAD and CJOC for the ground and
maritime defense of North America.
(3) USNORTHCOM coordinates air defense operations with NORAD.
(4) To facilitate coordination, a Memorandum of Understanding Between North

American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command and
Canadian Joint Operations Command Concerning the Exchange of Information Between
the Three Commands of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Other
Information Requirements, was codified on 25 January 2012.
b. USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM support to NORAD includes:
(1) Provide the missile warning and space surveillance information necessary to
fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement.
(2) Provide ITW/AA of space, missile, and air attacks on CONUS and Alaska if
NORAD becomes unable to accomplish the aerospace warning mission.
(3) Coordinate with NORAD to support accomplishment of both commands’

missions.
c. USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM provides common-user and commercial air,

land, and sea transportation; terminal management; patient movement; and aerial refueling
to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US
forces. As such, USTRANSCOM is responsible for the following support to NORAD:
C-5
Appendix C
(1) Provide air-refueling support to NORAD, as required. Ensure main and

forward operating bases are capable of supporting designated refueling and associated
support operations.
(2) Support NORAD deployment, resupply, and redeployment with air, sea, and
other assets, as directed by SecDef.
(3) Coordinate force movement requirements and related materials (including

strategic aeromedical evacuation) involving common user lift.
d. USPACOM. USPACOM plans, organizes, and, as directed, executes HD

operations within the USPACOM AOR. The mission and geographic proximity between
NORAD and USPACOM require both commands to coordinate and synchronize their
operations.
e. USEUCOM. USEUCOM’s AOR extends across the Atlantic Ocean to the west
coast of Greenland and west to approximately 45 degrees west longitude. NORAD’s OA
and USEUCOM’s AOR overlap.
f. USSOUTHCOM. NORAD’s OA and USSOUTHCOM’s AOR overlap. NORAD

has a memorandum of understanding with USSOUTHCOM to address issues of mutual
concern, list support rendered by one party to the other, and deconflict their operations
when necessary. Of particular interest to NORAD, this memorandum of understanding
addresses CD operations and US military operations in the vicinity of Cuba.
g. NORAD, CJOC, and USNORTHCOM. NORAD supports CJOC and

USNORTHCOM in their assigned missions to defend Canada and the US. NORAD is
supported by both commands in the conduct of missions assigned to NORAD. NORAD
provides bi-national aerospace and maritime situational awareness to CJOC and
USNORTHCOM.
6. North American Aerospace Defense Command Subordinate Commands
a. NORAD aerospace warning and air control operations are conducted by its three
subordinate regions. Each region has an air operations center and is further subdivided into
one or more ADSs for tactical execution. The ADS operates a battle control center (BCC),
a tactical C2 node that supports air battle management, air weapons control, surveillance
and identification, data links, and airspace management.
b. Each BCC contains a combat mission crew and battle staff. When formed, the
battle staff directs sector air control activities. The BCC operates on a continuous basis
and closely coordinates air sovereignty activities with FAA air traffic control centers to
ensure HD activities can be safely and successfully executed.
c. NORAD tactical-level operations also include ground-based air defense units in

fixed locations (e.g., the NCR) and temporary sites, as needed, to support national special
security events. Units supporting temporary sites (e.g., USAF control and reporting centers
C-6 JP 3-27
and airborne warning and control systems) share air picture information with the associated
BCC. A more detailed description of each of the three NORAD regions is provided below.
(1) ANR. ANR is the bi-national organization responsible for performing the
NORAD air sovereignty and air control mission over the state of Alaska and the northwest
approaches to North America. HQ ANR is collocated at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson,
Alaska, with HQ US ALCOM, a subordinate unified command of USNORTHCOM. The
ANR Commander is also the Commander, 11th Air Force, as well as commander of
ALCOM. ANR is supported by both active duty Canadian forces and US forces, as well
as Alaska ANG units. The ANR’s BCC is manned by both US personnel and Canadian
forces to maintain continuous surveillance of its OA. The Alaska Air Defense Sector is
the single ADS within the ANR and is collocated at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson.
(2) Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command Region

(CANR). CANR is the bi-national organization responsible for performing NORAD’s air
sovereignty and air control mission over Canada and the polar approaches to North
America. CANR is located at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Winnipeg, Manitoba. The
BCC for Canada is located at CFB North Bay, Ontario. The CANR commander is also the
commander of 1 CAD. CANR is manned by both 1 CAD and US personnel.
(3) CONR. CONR is the subordinate, bi-nationally staffed command

responsible for the air sovereignty and air control of the airspace over the CONUS and the
approaches to North America. The CONR commander exercises OPCON over all air
defense forces within CONUS. CONR operates in a complex, bi-national, and multi-
command environment where political, military, and economic conditions interrelate.
CONR is collocated with 1st Air Force, a numbered air force subordinate to Air Combat
Command. The CONR commander is also the CDRAFNORTH and may be designated
the JFACC for USNORTHCOM for unilateral US air operations within the
USNORTHCOM AOR. CONR ADSs and the NCR-IADS are identified below.
(a) NCR-IADS. NCR-IADS consists of two tactical C2 entities that provide

air defense for the NCR under the OPCON of the CONR commander. The Eastern Air
Defense Sector (EADS) is responsible for surveillance, identification, and air intercept
operations, while the JADOC provides ground-based air defense forces to complement
EADS capabilities. EADS and JADOC coordinate on all air tracks of interest within the
NCR.
(b) EADS. EADS, located at Rome ANG Base, New York, is responsible
for all CONR air operations east of the western boundary of the following states:
Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama.
(c) Western Air Defense Sector (WADS). WADS, located at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, Washington, is responsible for all CONR air operations west of the
eastern boundary of the following states: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, and
Mississippi.
C-7
Appendix C
7. Other Forces
a. USELEMNORAD. USELEMNORAD is an organizational construct created in

response to the requirements of Title 10, USC, which specifies that US military forces must
be kept in a US military “chain-of-command” and may not be assigned directly to a
multinational or bi-national command. CDRUSELEMNORAD is the senior US officer
assigned to NORAD.
b. 1 CAD. Winnipeg, Manitoba, is home to the dual HQ for 1 CAD and the CANR.
The HQ serves as the central point of C2 for Canada’s operational Air Force and oversees
the monitoring of Canada’s airspace in support of commitments to NORAD.
C-8 JP 3-27
APPENDIX D
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS ENABLING CAPABILITIES
POINTS OF CONTACT
Joint Staff/J7/Doctrine Division

Web Site: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
Email Support: [email protected]
Phone number: 1-703-692-7273 (DSN 222)
Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J35

At the time of this publication:
JOD Americas
Comm: 1-703-697-9400
NIPR: [email protected]
SIPR: [email protected]
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)

Mailing Address: 9712 Virginia Ave. Building X-132
Naval Station Norfolk, VA 23511
Web Site: http://www.jecc.mil/
JECC Communication/Public Affairs:
Phone: 757-836-8935
DSN: 836-8935
Email: [email protected]
24/7 JECC Watch Officer:
Phone: 757-836-8939
DSN: 836-8939
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Mailing Address: 8725 John J. Kingman Rd. Stop 6201
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6201
Web Site: http://www.dtra.mil/Home/Contact.aspx
Phone Number: 1-703-767-5870
Toll Free: 1-800-701-5096
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)

Mailing Address: 10244 Burbeck Road, Building 358
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5805
Web Site: https://public.jpra.mil/default.aspx
JPRA Operations Support Center
Phone Number: (703) 704-4111
D-1
Appendix D
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Mailing Address: Office of Corporate Communications
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling
Building 6000
Washington DC 20340-5100
Web Site: http://www.dia.mil/
Phone Number: 202-231-5554
Joint Warfighting Analysis Center (JWAC)

Mailing Address: Joint Warfare Analysis Center
4048 Higley Rd. Dahlgren, VA 22448-5144
Web Site: http://www.jwac.mil/
Phone Number: (540) 653-3749
(540) 653-3750
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Mailing Address: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Andrew T. McNamara Building
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6221
Web Site: http://www.dla.mil/
INFORMATION/STAFF DUTY OFFICER (SDO)
SECURITY: 703-767-4010
SDO: 1600-0730/Weekends/Holidays: 703-767-5200
Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC)

Mailing Address: U.S. Strategic Command
Public Affairs Office (J020)
901 SAC BLVD STE 1A1
Offutt Air Force Base, NE 68113 – 6020
Web Site: http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-
View/Article/978985/joint-electronic-warfare-center-jewc/
Phone Number: (402) 294-4130 (DSN 271)
D-2 JP 3-27
APPENDIX E
REFERENCES
The development of JP 3-27 is based on the following primary references:
1. General
a. United States Constitution.
b. Canada-United States Rush-Bagot Treaty.
c. Air Defense of the United States and Canada.
d. Title 10, USC, Armed Forces.
e. Title 14, USC, United States Coast Guard.
f. Title 18, USC, Section 1385, The Posse Comitatus Act.
g. Title 32, USC, National Guard.
h. Title 33, USC, Navigation and Navigable Waters.
i. Title 46, USC, Shipping.
j. Title 50, USC, War and National Defense.
k. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act (as amended).
2. Strategic Guidance and Policy
a. National Strategy for Homeland Security.
b. National Strategy for Maritime Security.
c. National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.
d. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
e. National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America.
f. National Military Strategy of the United States of America.
g. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
h. National Response Framework.
i. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
E-1
Appendix E
j. Defense Strategic Guidance.
k. Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.
l. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
m. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.
n. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Geospatial Intelligence Series (GIPS).
o. National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations.
p. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civilian Authorities.
q. Unified Command Plan.
r. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.
s. DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
t. HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council.
u. HSPD-2, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies.
v. HSPD-6, Integration and Use of Screening Information.
w. HSPD-10/NSPD-33, Bio-defense for the 21st Century.
x. HSPD-11, Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures.
y. HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees

and Contractors.
z. HSPD-14/NSPD-43, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
aa. HSPD-15/NSPD-46, US Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror.
bb. HSPD-16/NSPD-47, US Aviation Security Policy.
cc. HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.
dd. HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States.
ee. HSPD-23/NSPD 54, U. S. Cyber Security Policy.
ff. HSPD-59/NSPD-24, Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance

National Security.
E-2 JP 3-27
References
gg. National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National

Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees, April 4, 2017.
hh. PPD-8, National Preparedness.
ii. PPD-10, US Ballistic Missile Defenses.
jj. PPD-17, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices.
kk. PPD-18, Maritime Security.
ll. PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.
mm. PDD-24, US Counterintelligence.
nn. PPD-25, Guideline for U.S. Government Interagency Response to Terrorist Threats
or Incidents in the U.S. and Overseas.
oo. PPD-40, National Continuity Policy.
pp. PPD-42, (U) Preventing and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use.
qq. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-14, Counternarcotics.
rr. PDD-67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government

Operations.
ss. EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.
tt. EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.
uu. EO 13223, Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and
Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Transportation.
vv. EO 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland
Security Council.
ww. EO 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.
xx. EO 13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for

Access to Classified National Security Information.
yy. EO 13385, Continuance of Certain Federal Advisory Committees and

Amendments to and Revocation of Other Executive Orders.
zz. EO 13388, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect

Americans.
E-3
Appendix E
aaa. EO 13470, Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States

Intelligence Activities.
3. Department of Defense Publications
a. DODD 3020.26, Department of Defense Continuity Programs.
b. DODD 3020.40, Mission Assurance (MA).
c. DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard.
d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components.
e. DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
f. DODD 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
g. DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
h. DODD 5105.62, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
i. DODD 5105.77, National Guard Bureau (NGB).
j. DODD 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-

State).
k. DODD 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight

(ATSD[IO]).
l. DODD 5148.13, Intelligence Oversight.
m. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and

Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.
n. DODD 5205.02E, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.
o. DODD 5210.56, Arming and Use of Force.
p. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.
q. DODD 8000.01, Management of Department of Defense Information Enterprise

(DOD IE).
r. DODD 8521.01E, DOD Biometrics.
s. DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
E-4 JP 3-27
References
t. DODI O-2000.16, Volume 1, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation:

DOD AT Standards.
u. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.
v. DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction With Natural or

Manmade Disasters.
w. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
x. DODI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management.
y. DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards.
z. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.
aa. DODI 3115.12, Open Source Intelligence.
bb. DODI 5220.22, National Industrial Security Program (NISP).
cc. DODI 6055.17, DOD Emergency Management (EM) Program.
dd. DODI 8500.01, Cybersecurity.
ee. DODM 3020.45, Volume I, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP):

DOD Mission-Based Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP).
ff. DODM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence

Activities
gg. DOD 5240.1-R Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence

Components that Affect United States Persons.
hh. Global Force Management Guidance. Section II, Assignment of Forces (Forces
For Unified Commands).
ii. Joint Planning Guidance.
jj. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the

Department of Homeland Security for Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of
Maritime Homeland Defense.
kk. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the

Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States
Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security.
E-5
Appendix E
ll. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the

Department of Homeland Security on the Use of the United States Coast Guard
Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Maritime Strategy.
mm. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement and
Terms of Reference.
nn. Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Reference Guide.
oo. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report.
pp. Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR).
qq. Contingency Planning Guidance.
rr. Canada-United States Basic Defense Document.
ss. Military Order of 13 November 2001.
tt. National Industrial Security Program.
uu. Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-01, DOD Minimum Standards for Buildings.
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
a. CJCSI 1301.01F, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.
b. CJCSI 3100.01C, Joint Strategic Planning System.
c. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.
d. CJCSI 3213.01D, Joint Operations Security.
e. CJCSI 3610.01D, Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne

Objects.
f. CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD Counterdrug Support.
g. CJCSI 4120.02D, List of Priorities—DOD Transportation Movement Priority

System.
h. CJCSI 5221.01D, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant

Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and
International Organizations.
i. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.
E-6 JP 3-27
References
j. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Formats and

Guidance.
k. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
l. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.
m. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
n. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
o. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
p. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.
q. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
r. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
s. JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.
t. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
u. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.
v. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

Environments.
w. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
x. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.
y. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
zz. JP 3-14, Space Operations.
aa. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.
bb. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
cc. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
dd. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
ee. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.
ff. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
gg. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
E-7
Appendix E
hh. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
ii. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
jj. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
kk. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.
ll. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
mm. JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations
nn. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
oo. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
pp. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
qq. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.
rr. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning.
ss. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.
tt. JP4-10, Operational Contract Support.
uu. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
vv. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
ww. JG 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.
xx. JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.
5. Multi-Service Publications
a. ATP 3-22.40 (FM 3-22.40)/MCTP 10-10A (MCWP 3-15.8)/NTTP 3-

07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP 3-92.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.
b. ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
c. NTTP 3-07.11M/CGTTP 3-93.3/MCIP 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure

Operations.
6. Army Publications
a. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army.
E-8 JP 3-27
References
b. ADP 3-0, Operations.
7. Marine Corps Publication
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting.
8. Navy Publications
a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.
b. NWP 3-10, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Forces.
c. NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War.
d. NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.
9. Air Force Publications
a. Air Force Doctrine Volume 1, Basic Doctrine.
b. Air Force Doctrine Volume 3, Command.
c. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-27, Homeland Operations.
d. Air Force Doctrine Annex 4-02, Medical Operations.
e. Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol.
10. Coast Guard Publications
a. COMDTINST M16247.1, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM).
b. COMDTINST M16600.6, Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO).
c. COMDTINST M16000.3, Underwater Port Security Operations Manual.
d. COMDTINST M16000.11, Marine Safety Manual, Volume VI, Ports and

Waterways Activities.
e. COMDTINST M16000.12, Port Security Compliance Manual.
f. COMDTINST M16790.1, Auxiliary Manual.
g. Coast Guard Publication 1, Doctrine for the US Coast Guard.
h. Coast Guard Publication 3-0, Operations.
i. Coast Guard Publication 3-2, Short Notice Maritime Response.
E-9
Appendix E
11. National Guard Publications
a. CNGB Instruction, 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence Activities.
b. CNGB Manual, 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence Activities.
E-10 JP 3-27
APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-
[email protected]. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,
consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
a. The lead agent for this publication is US Northern Command. The Joint Staff
doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Mark
Clements, US Northern Command; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, LCDR Justin Cooper, Joint
Staff J-3; Mr. Robert Brodel, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Lt Col
Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 July 2013.
4. Change Recommendations
a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-
[email protected].
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned
and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and
dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force.
The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by
F-1
Appendix F
providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As
these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use,
a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated
into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can
be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
6. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.
7. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/ (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.
F-2 JP 3-27
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
AC Active Component
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADS air defense sector
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ALCOM United States Alaskan Command
ANG Air National Guard
ANR Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command
Region
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AOTR aviation operational threat response
ARNG Army National Guard
ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and
Global Security)
AT antiterrorism
ATO air tasking order
ATP Army techniques publication
BCC battle control center

BMD ballistic missile defense
BSI base support installation
C2 command and control

CAA command arrangement agreement
CAD Canadian air division
CAIS civil authority information support
CANR Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command
Region
CAP Civil Air Patrol
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CD counterdrug
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)
CDRAFNORTH Commander, Air Force North
CDRNORAD Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command
CDRUSAFRICOM Commander, United States Africa Command
CDRUSARNORTH Commander, United States Army, North
CDRUSCENTCOM Commander, United States Central Command
CDRUSCYBERCOM Commander, United States Cyber Command
CDRUSELEMNORAD Commander, United States Element, North American
Aerospace Defense Command
GL-1 JP 3-27
Glossary
CDRUSEUCOM Commander, United States European Command

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, United States Southern Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command
CDS Chief of Defence Staff (Canada)
CFB Canadian forces base
CG commanding general
CGDEFOR Coast Guard defense force
CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures
CI counterintelligence
CI/KR critical infrastructure and key resources
CIP critical infrastructure protection
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command
CJTF commander, joint task force
CM cruise missile
CMOC civil-military operations center
CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau
CO cyberspace operations
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COG continuity of government
COMDTINST Commandant instruction (USCG)
COMPACAF Commander, Pacific Air Forces
COMUSNAVNORTH Commander, United States Naval Forces, Northern
Command
COMUSPACFLT Commander, United States Pacific Fleet
CONPLAN concept plan
CONR continental United States North American Aerospace
Defense Command Region
CONUS continental United States
COOP continuity of operations
COP common operational picture
COTP captain of the port
CS&C Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (DHS)
CSA combat support agency
CSS combat service support
CT counterterrorism
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction
DC3 Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center

DCE defense coordinating element
GL-2 JP 3-27
Glossary
DCI defense critical infrastructure

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
DCISE Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information
Sharing Environment
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency
DCO defensive cyberspace operations
DFBA Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIB defense industrial base
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODIN Department of Defense information network
DODM Department of Defense manual
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EADS Eastern Air Defense Sector

EMIO expanded maritime interception operations
EO executive order
EP emergency preparedness
EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer
EXORD execute order
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (DOT)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FHP force health protection
FM field manual (Army)
FP force protection
GCC geographic combatant commander

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GMD ground-based midcourse defense
HD homeland defense
GL-3
Glossary
HQ headquarters
HS homeland security
HSC Homeland Security Council
HSPD homeland security Presidential directive
IAA incident awareness and assessment

IAMD integrated air and missile defense
IAW in accordance with
IC intelligence community
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IO information operations
ITW/AA integrated tactical warning and attack assessment
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

JADOC Joint Air Defense Operations Center (NORAD)
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDN joint doctrine note
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFCC Space Joint Functional Component Command for Space
(USSTRATCOM)
JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JG joint guide
JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force-South
JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force-West
JIDO Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (DTRA)
JIOC joint intelligence operations center
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration
JTF joint task force
JTF-HD Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense
JTF-N Joint Task Force-North
JTTF joint terrorism task force
LE law enforcement
LEA law enforcement agency
LFA lead federal agency
LNO liaison officer
MA mortuary affairs
MARFORNORTH United States Marine Corps Forces, North
MCIP Marine Corps interim publication
GL-4 JP 3-27
Glossary
MCM mine countermeasures

MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDA Missile Defense Agency
MDIOC Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDA)
MHD maritime homeland defense
MHS maritime homeland security
MIO maritime interception operations
MISO military information support operations
MOTR maritime operational threat response
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCIJTF-AG National Cyber Investigative Joint Task
Force-Analytical Group (DOD)
NCR National Capital Region (US)
NCRCC National Capital Region Coordination Center
NCR-IADS National Capital Region-Integrated Air Defense System
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NDDOC North American Aerospace Defense Command and United
States Northern Command Deployment and Distribution
Operations Cell
NEST nuclear emergency support team (DOE)
NG National Guard
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB National Guard Bureau
NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIMS National Incident Management System
NMS national military strategy
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRF National Response Framework
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSPD national security Presidential directive
NSS national security strategy
NST National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP Navy warfare publication
OA operational area
OCO offensive cyberspace operations
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment
ONE Operation NOBLE EAGLE
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
GL-5
Glossary
PA public affairs
PCA Posse Comitatus Act
PDD Presidential decision directive
PN partner nation
PPD Presidential policy directive
PWCS port, waterways, and coastal security
QRF quick response force
RC Reserve Component
RFF request for forces
ROE rules of engagement
RRF rapid response force
RS religious support
RST religious support team
RUF rules for the use of force
SATCOM satellite communications

SCA space coordinating authority
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIOC Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI)
SOCNORTH United States Special Operations Command, North
SOCPAC Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF special operations forces
SPP State Partnership Program
SROE standing rules of engagement
SRUF standing rules for the use of force
TAA tactical assembly area

TACON tactical control
TAG the adjutant general
TCO transnational criminal organization
TCP theater campaign plan
TMM transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional
TSA Transportation Security Administration (DHS)
TSOC theater special operations command
UA unmanned aircraft
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UCP Unified Command Plan
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USARNORTH United States Army, North
USARPAC United States Army, Pacific Command
GL-6 JP 3-27
Glossary
USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USELEMNORAD United States Element, North American Aerospace
Defense Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USG United States Government
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
WADS Western Air Defense Sector

WMD weapons of mass destruction
WRA weapons release authority
GL-7
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
aerospace defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy or nullify attacking enemy

aircraft and missiles and also negate hostile space systems. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
air sovereignty. A nation’s inherent right to exercise absolute control and authority over
the airspace above its territory. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-27)
critical infrastructure and key resources. The infrastructure and assets vital to a nation’s
security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence. Also
called CI/KR. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-27)
defense critical infrastructure. Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense

networked assets and facilities essential to project, support, and sustain military forces
and operations worldwide. Also called DCI. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-27)
defense industrial base. The Department of Defense, government, and private sector
worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development
and design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components,
or parts to meet military requirements. Also called DIB. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary.)
domestic emergencies. Civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, or

natural disasters affecting the public welfare and occurring within the United States
and its territories. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-27)
homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other
threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP
3-27)
homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other
emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies that occur. Also called HS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-27)
national preparedness. Actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build
and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects
of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security
of the nation. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-8 JP 3-27
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-27 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

l JP published and continuously l Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
l Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following l Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
l Revision begins 3.5 years l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
l Each JP revision is completed l Program directive (PD) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing/joint working group
signature l PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
l JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development
STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 l LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
l JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l JSDS prepares JS staffing package
l FD comment matrix adjudication
l JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature l JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
l Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
l FC joint working group

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Joint Publication 3-27

This publication provides joint doctrine for homeland defense.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

• Reorganizes Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Homeland Defense,” to describe

• Adds information to Chapter II, “Command Relationships and

• Adds to Chapter II, “Command Relationships and Interorganizational

• Covers Chapter III, “Planning and Operations for Homeland Defense,”

• Updates Appendix A, “Relationships Betweeen Homeland Security, Homeland

• Revises the explanation and mission of multiple interorganizational agencies

• Updates Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions,

• Updates references used throughout the document and removes extraneous

 General ........................................................................................................................ I-1

 General ..................................................................................................................... III-1

A Relationships Between Homeland Security, Homeland Defense,

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

I-1 Homeland Defense Transnational Threat Environment .............................. I-5

• Discusses fundamentals of homeland defense (HD), to include threats; policy and

• Describes command relationships and interorganizational cooperation in HD

• Outlines strategic guidance, operational factors, intelligence sharing, and joint

Fundamentals of Homeland Defense

The United States Government (USG) employs all

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory,

DOD executes HD by detecting, deterring,

States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are

Threats The homeland is confronted by a variety of both

Homeland Defense (HD) Policy When conducted domestically, certain intelligence

The HD Operational Framework The HD operational framework includes the plans

Command Relationships and Interorganizational Cooperation

Virtually all the strategic threats to the homeland

Unified Action Unified action is the synchronization, coordination,

Command and Control As stipulated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP),

Functional Combatant Commander, United States Strategic Command

US Cyber Command can support HD cyberspace

and assisting with expertise and capabilities

For operations conducted in the homeland,

For HD operations, Commander, US

Interagency Coordination HD operations are conducted in a complex

Interorganizational Cooperation HD mission response forces involve multiple

mission. These military forces coordinate with

Multinational Forces To conduct the full range of HD operations,

Planning and Operations for Homeland Defense

Strategic Guidance General strategy is provided in high-level policy

Operational Factors: Regardless of the size and scope of the particular

Commander’s Communication Joint force commanders (JFCs) are required to

Non-Department of Defense Interorganizational cooperation must occur

Legal Considerations Military operations inside the homeland can

Intelligence Sharing for HD The success of interorganizational cooperation in

Joint Fires Joint fires may be provided to assist air, land,

reason, the supported JFCs for HD have

Maritime Operations in the Maritime operations in support of HD offer distinct

Air Operations in HD Operations NORAD is assigned the mission of aerospace

defending the right to operate in space and is

Information Operations in the Information operations (IO) complements HD

Movement in Support of HD US Transportation Command can quickly

Protection The protection function focuses on conserving the

departments and agencies, international

Sustainment: The core functional responsibilities of the

Personnel Support The authorities and responsibilities for personnel

Logistics The authorities and responsibilities for logistics

Engineering Military engineering support may be required

Environmental Considerations Military commanders employ environmentally

This publication provides joint doctrine for HD.