Principles of Natural Justice
Principles of Natural Justice
SCHOOL OF LAW
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It is said that principles of natural justice is of very early origin and was known to Greek and
Romans. The Principles were acknowledged as early as in the days of Adam and of Kautilya’s
Arthashastra. According to the Bible, when Adam & Eve ate the fruit of knowledge, which was
forbidden by God, the latter did not pass sentence on Adam before he was called upon to defend
himself. Same thing was repeated in case of Eve. Later on, the principle of natural justice was
accepted by English Jurist to be so essential as to over-ride all laws. In India, this concept was
introduced at an early time. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election
Commissioner, the court held that the concept of fairness should be in every action whether it is
judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative and or quasi-administrative work.
The principles of natural justice were related with a few ‘accepted rules’ which have been
fabricated up and prominent over a long period of time. The word ‘Natural Justice’ establishes
justice according to one’s own morality. Natural justice simply means to make a sensible and
reasonable decision making procedure on a particular issue. Sometimes, it doesn’t matter what
is the reasonable decision but in the end, what matters is the procedure and who all are engaged
in taking the reasonable decision. It is not restricted within the concept of ‘fairness’ it has
different colours and shades which vary from the context.
1. Nemo judex in causa sua - No one should be made a judge in his own cause or the rule
against bias. It is also called as the ‘doctrine of bias’ as the judge may have a prejudice
in the case. It has been pithily put by Sir Edward Coke, namely, Vacate, Interrogate and
Judicate, i.e., call, question, and adjudicate. However, this concept has undergone lot of
changes in recent times, but fundamental still stands the same.
2. Audi alteram partem - Hear the other party or the rule of fair hearing or the rule that no
one should be condemned unheard. In other words, No person accused of any charge or
likely to suffer any civil consequences, must be adjudged unless and until he is aware of
the proceedings together with a notice thereon and an opportunity to present his case
fully.
3. Reasoned Decisions- Speaking Orders It is an order speaking for itself and giving
reasons. Lord Denning says, the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good
administration.
The first principle is that 'No man shall be a judge in his own cause' i.e. to say, the
deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It Implies that no man can act as
a judge for a cause in which be himself has some Interest, may be pecuniary or
otherwise. Pecuniary interest affords the strongest proof against impartiality. The
emphasis is on the objectivity in dealing with and deciding a matter.
It has been laid down as principle of law that pecuniary interest would disqualify a
Judge to decide the matter even though it is not proved that the decision was in any way
affected. This is thus a matter of faith, which a common man must have, in the deciding
authority.
Thus a judge should not only be impartial but should be in a position to apply his
mind objectively to the dispute before him. The rule against bias thus has two
main aspects: -
● Personal Bias
● Pecuniary Bias
● Subject-matter bias
● Departmental bias
● Pre-conceived notion bias
Following cases have been seen under the light of the principle of ‘Nemo Judex in causa
sua’:
In this case, Naquishband, who was the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was a
member of the Selection Board and was also a candidate for selection to All India cadre
of the Forest Service. Though he did not take part in the deliberations of the Board when
his name was considered and approved, the SC held that `there was a real likelihood of a
bias for the mere presence of the candidate on the Selection Board may adversely
influence the judgement of the other members'
SC quashed the decision of the Textbooks' selection committee because some of its
members were also the authors of the books, which were considered for selection. The
Court concluded that withdrawal of person at the time of consideration of his books is
not sufficient as the element of quid pro quo with other members cannot be eliminated.
Issue
Whether the selection of candidate would vitiate for bias if close relative of a members
of the Public Service Commission is appearing for selection?
Held
1. Such member must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process
otherwise all selection would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of
bias affecting the process of selection
2. This is not applicable in case of Constitutional Authority like PSC whether
Central or State. This is so because if a member was to withdraw altogether from
the selection process, no other person save a member can be substituted in his
place and it may sometimes happen that no other member is available to take the
place of such a member and the functioning of PSC may be affected.
3. In such a case, it is desirable that the member must withdraw from participation
in interview of such a candidate and he should also not take part in the
discussions.
It is the basic concept of principle of natural justice. The expression audi alteram partem
implies that a person must be given opportunity to defend himself. This principle is sine
qua non of every civilized society.
This rule covers various stages through which administrative adjudication pasees
starting from notice to final determination. Right to fair hearing thus includes:-
1. Right to notice
2. Right to present case and evidence
3. Right to rebut adverse evidence
a. Right to cross examination
b. Right to legal representation
4. Disclosure of evidence to party
5. Report of enquiry to be shown to the other party
6. Reasoned decisions or speaking orders
Facts
In this case the passport dated 01.06.1976 of the petitioner, a journalist, was impounded
`in the public interest' by an order dated 02.07.1977. The Govt. declined to furnish her
the reasons for its decision. She filed a petition before the SC under article 32
challenging the validity of the impoundment order. She was also not given any
pre-decisional notice and hearing.
Argument by the Govt.
The Govt. argued that the rule of audi alteram partem must be held to be excluded
because otherwise it would have frustrated the very purpose of impounding the passport.
Held
The SC held that though the impoundment of the passport was an administrative action
yet the rule of fair hearing is attracted by the necessary implication and it would not be
fair to exclude the application of this cardinal rule on the ground of administrative
convenience. The court did not outright quash the order and allowed the return of the
passport because of the special socio-political factors attending the case.
The technique of post decisional hearing was developed in order to balance these factors
against the requirements of law, justice and fairness. The court stressed that a fair
opportunity of being heard following immediately the order impounding the passport
would satisfy the mandate of natural justice.
REASONED DECISION
1. The party aggrieved has the opportunity to demonstrate before the appellate or
revisional court that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case
were erroneous;
2. The obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary
action by the executive authority invested with judicial power; and
3. It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made.
The Patna High Court in Raj Kishore Prasad Jaiswal v Subak Narain, had aptly
observed:
“It is well-established rule of law that rule of natural justice is applied only where the
law itself is silent and is not inconsistent with what it provides, but where any provision
as to the rule of natural justice is expressly or by necessary implication negatived by law
that cannot be a ground for holding that the enactment giving that law is ultra vires or
unconstitutional”. The Principles of natural justice are enforceable on all courts of law,
general or special, all tribunals statutory or otherwise, and all persons or bodies
exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function by statute or by agreement between the
parties. This applies equally to any domestic enquiry.
Sri S. Chakravarthi, in his book “Natural Justice”, has very aptly summarised the constituents
of the rules of natural justice. They are:
The requirements of natural justice come from general administrative law, not the particular
statute being administered. Many statutes do, however, spell out procedures that must be
followed when making decisions; for example, the statute might stipulate who is entitled to
notice, when notice should be given and in what form, what kind of hearing is to be given, and
how much time is allowed for a person to respond.
Natural justice imposes similar requirements, independently of the statute. If the statutory
procedures are equivalent or superior to what natural justice would require, compliance with the
statutory procedures will also satisfy the requirements of natural justice. On the other hand, if
the statutory procedures fall short of what natural justice would require, the question of whether
the statute establishes a complete procedural code arises.
A statute that deals exhaustively with decision-making procedures might be read as implicitly
excluding natural justice, but the law leans against that interpretation. If natural justice is not
excluded its requirements operate alongside the statutory procedures and supplement them. This
means it might not be sufficient to comply only with the statutory procedures if natural justice
requires more. For example, if the legislation allows a person to make a submission at a
particular time and further relevant material is later received that is adverse to the person who
made the submission, natural justice allows them to read and comment on the new material
before a decision is made. Natural justice requires this additional procedure, even if the
statutory procedures do not mention it.