CLARA MARIE SABILAO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS POMAR

46 P 440

FACTS:
The accused being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a
corporation duly authorized to transact business and the petitioner Macaria Fajardo,
whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by reason of
her pregnancy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to
pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she was
entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after
her delivery and confinement which took place on the 12th day of August, 1923, despite
and over the demands made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do
so. To said complaint, the defendant contended that the provisions of said Act No. 3071,
upon which the complaint was based were illegal, unconstitutional, and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

HELD:
NO.
The provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are
unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the
first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS YOUNG

88 P 702

FACTS:
James Young was convicted of murder for the death of Alfonso Ang Liongto. With
the presence of two aggravating circumstances and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, death penalty is imposable in accordance with Article 248 of the RPC. The
incident happened before the approval of RA No.296, reducing the required
concurrence of Justices of the Supreme Court from all to just 8 for the pronouncement
of judgment to impose death penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic Act No. 296 should be applied retroactively?

HELD:
 NO.
Before the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 296, the occurrence of
all the Justices of the Supreme Court was necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment imposing the death penalty. (Section 133, Revised Administrative Code.)
Evidently to remedy the notorious difficulty, if not virtual impossibility, of obtaining
such unanimity, and in view of the alarming rise of criminality, and particularly of the
rampancy of the crime of murder, that for some years had prevailed (and is still
prevailing) in this country, the Congress by said Republic Act No. 296 concurrence of at
least eight Justices in the imposition of the death penalty. After a long deliberation, the
Court by a majority vote reached the conclusion that Republic Act No. 296 is procedural
and not substantive, and that it is the approval of said Act and to crimes committed
before that approval.
In the present case only seven Justices voted to impose the death penalty. Mr.
Justice Perfecto dissented and voted to impose life imprisonment only. Mr. Justice
Paras and Mr. Justice Reyes agreed with the majority that on the merits of the case the
appellant deserves the death penalty but believing Republic Act No. 296 is not
applicable to crimes committed before the approval of said Act, they believed the death
penalty cannot be imposed in this case in view of the dissenting vote for the imposition
of life imprisonment only.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V TAC-AN

February 26, 1990

FACTS:
Accused Renato Tac-an asserts that because he had already been charged with
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated
by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was
unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was
charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed
[firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17
of B.P. Blg. 179

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy

HELD:
No.
It appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is
that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under
the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent
filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a
prohibited second jeopardy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS BARRIOS
245 S 312

FACTS:
The accused Barrios and Ibañez killed a taxi driver, Teodoro Molina by stabbing
him and robbing all his earnings. Both of the accused admit to the crime they have
committed however they have an excuse that they only stabbed the victim because he
fought back after pulling him out to the rear sit of the taxi in order to frisk him for his
belongings. The driver was even able to shout for helped, as seen by one of the witness,
Generoso Quimpo, Jr.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused can be awarded of an aggravating circumstance of
craft oron abuse of superior strength when they robbed and killed the taxi driver

HELD:
NO.
The evidence of the prosecution that the crime was committed was established
beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court imposed the death penalty on both accused
because of the finding that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength without any mitigating
circumstance. The evidence of the prosecution has not established the aggravating
circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE VS QUIJADA
JULY 24, 1996

FACTS:
On December 25, 1992, a benefit dance was held in Dauis, Bohol where a fist fight
occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was
continuously pestering Iroy’s sister. On December 30 of the same year, same event took
place. Iroy’s sister witnessed that Quijada fired his .38 caliber at her brother, which
resulted to the death of the latter. Said event was reported to the police station, and
search operations followed but the appellant was unable to locate. It was found out that
the firearm used by the appellant was not licensed. He was convicted by the lower court
of two separate offenses of murder and aggravated illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be convicted separately of two crimes.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court finding the accused
guilty of the crime of murder and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to
respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where
such a firearm is used in killing a person.

US VS SERAPIO
23 P 584

FACTS:
The defendant was charged with the crime of libel. Upon arraignment, the
defendant, presented a demurrer on the ground that the crime has already prescribed.
The basis is that in the absence of a definite provision in Act No. 277 which fixes the
time during which the penal action arising from the crime of libel may be exercised, the
provisions provided in Article 131 of the Penal Code of the crimes of calumny and insults
is strictly applicable.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Penal Code in the matter of prescription of crimes
is applicable to the crimes created and punished by special laws

HELD:
No.
The doctrine of prescription is of purely statutory origin. Both under the common
and the civil law a right of action never died by mere lapse of time. The court, in the
absence of express law, has no authority to fix a period of prescription or limitation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SUNICO

37 Phil 342

FACTS:
The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose duty among others
was to transfer the names of excess voters in other precincts to the list of a newly created
precinct. Several voters were omitted in the list. Because their names were not in the
list, some of them were not allowed to vote. The accused claimed that they made the
omission in good faith. However, the CFI convicted the accused reasoning that the
offense is malum prohibitum, which is in violation of Secs. 101 and 103 of the Revised
Election Code, and that good faith is not a defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed was malum prohibitum or malum in se

HELD:
 The acts of the accused cannot be merely mala prohibita - they are mala per se.
The omission or failure to include a voter’s name in the registry list of voters is not only
wrong because it is prohibited; it is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and
violates one of his fundamental rights. Hence, for such act to be punishable, it must be
shown that it has been committed with malice. There is no clear showing in the instant
case that the accused intentionally, willfully, and maliciously omitted or failed to include
in the registry list of voters the names of those voters. They cannot be punished
criminally. Accused were acquitted.

MAGNO VS COURT OF APPEALS

210 S 481

FACTS:
Magno entered into a lease agreement for the equipment he needs with LS
Finance with the condition that he pay a warranty deposit. By his admission, the
petitioner asked the VP of LS Finance to look for a third party who can lend him the
money for the warranty deposit. Without his knowledge, VP of Mancor, the company
that distributes the equipment he needs, issued the Case warranty deposit with 3%
interest. When the petitioner was unable to pay the lease and the lease Summary
agreement has been terminated by LS Finance, he found out about the involvement the
VP of Mancor. Later, he was convicted by RTC for issuing bouncing checks to the VP of
Mancor as payment for the amount used by the latter to pay the warranty deposit for the
lease agreement. In an appeal for certiorari with the SC, the court found him not guilty
of violating BP 22.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the violations of Batasang Pambansa No. 22 is mala prohibita

HELD:
YES.
BP22 is a special statutory law and violations of which are mala prohibita. The
court relied on the rule that in case of mala prohibita, the only inquire is whether or not
the law has been violated, proof of criminal intent is not necessary for the conviction of
the accused, the acts being prohibited for reason of public policy and the defense of good
faith and absence of criminal intent being unveiling in prosecution of said offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MACATANDA,

109 S 35

FACTS:
Saglala Macatanda was charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of
cattle rustling, Saglala Macatanda. From the judgment of conviction, Saglala Macatanda
(hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this Court. The Solicitor General
comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to
penalties prescribed by special laws. He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974" as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8
the penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code apply to penalty
prescribed by PD 533, otherwise known as “Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1874”, is a
special penal law.

HELD:
YES.
From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and
duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties
as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft
of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such
as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision
which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be
discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be
applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating circumstances, as found by the
trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating
circumstances to offset them, entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the
penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to
reclusion temporary medium.

DUNLAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

AUGUST 22, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City
using the business name Dunlao Enterprise. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both
employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go
to petitioner premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat.
Alfredo Ancajas to verify information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes
stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat. Upon arrival at petitioner’s
compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound. After he
was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and
had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then
taken to the police station. Dunlap was found guilty. On appeal defense contended that
the appellant had acted in good faith and without any criminal intent in possessing as
temporary custodian of said items subject of thievery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith or lack of criminal intent is a valid defense for a
violation of Anti-Fencing Law.

HELD:
Intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as
P.D. 1612. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in
acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated. When an act is illegal,
the intent of the offender is immaterial.

ALEJANDRO VS PEOPLE
170 S 400

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SIMON

JULY 29, 1994

FACTS:
Martin Simon Sunga was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua
for violating the Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which was sold for
P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988. In this
case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.

HELD:
YES.
The respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of the
RPC. Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its
publication on December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his sentence.
Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision
correctional instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable to this case since drug offenses are not included in nor has
appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and
the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.
Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7569, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correctional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such
offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in the effect punished by and
under the Revised Code.
CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
JUNE 17, 1994

FACTS:
The accused was convicted for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22for issuing a
check knowing he does not have credit with drawee bank and thereafter claiming that
the said check was not intended for circulation and negotiation, the same having been
issued only to serve as mere evidence or memorandum of indebtedness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not deceit is an essential element of the offense penalized by BP 22

HELD:

Knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with
the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense
penalized by B.P. 22. As already aforestated, the gravamen of the offense is the issuance
of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.

ZARI VS FLORES
NOVEMBER 1, 1979

Facts:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City,
recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of
Court of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts
to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending
before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his
uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the
City Judges.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of libel involves moral turpitude

Held:
YES
Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It implies something
immoral in itself punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but the
act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition
by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however it includes such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being
positively prohibited

DELA TORRE VS COMELEC

JULY 5 1996

FACTS:
A case for disqualification was filed against Rolando P. Dela Torre before the
COMELEC. In a resolution, the Commission declared the petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna citing Section 40a of RA 7160 as
the ground for his conviction for violation of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). In his petition
for certiorati, he assails that the crime of fencing does not involve moral turpitude.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude

HELD:
` YES.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

LONEY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FEBRUARY 10, 2006

FACTS:
Department of Justice separately charged petitioners with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree
No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976, Republic Act No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995,[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11] Petitioners claim that the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for violation of PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Revised Penal Code absorbs the charges for violations of
special laws

HELD:
No.
Mala in se cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
109 S 35, JANUARY 18, 1999

FACTS:
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza
was separately charged with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under two Information and was convicted thereof. On appeal, he contended that the
lower court committed an error in not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of
argument, but without conceding, that the crime of parricide was committed, the law
and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide, parricide,
etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must
only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal
laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct

HELD:
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of
firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accussed-
appellant, Republic Act No 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said
decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense. Withal,
accused-apppellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the
presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of
parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death penalty
cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November,
1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NUNEZ

MARCH 1, 2001

FACTS:
 Accused was charged with three separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms,
frustrated murder and murder. The cases were all separately tried. After trial the lower
court found the accused guilty of the crimes charged against him. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. On appeal, accused argued that the court erred in not
applying the ruling of
the court in People vs Molina. The court ruled in that case that the use of unlicensed
firearm in the commission of homicide or murder should be considered only as an
aggravating circumstance. Hence, accused should not be held guilty of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms but should only be considered as aggravating
circumstance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in the case of People vs. Molina can be applied in the
present case

RULING:
The Molina ruling is not applicable in the present case. In Molina, separate
information’s
for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms were filed, but the cases
were eventually consolidated and jointly tried and decided. In the present case, there
were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately tried. Hence, the
evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither adopted nor
presented before the trial court trying the illegal possession case. For this reason, there
is a shortage of evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated
homicide. Since, the facts obtaining in the case do not indubitably prove the frustrated
murder cases or the murder case in relation to illegal possession case, accused should
only be convicted of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MONTINOLA

JULY 1, 2001

FACTS:
William M. Montinola was convicted before the RTC of Iloilo City with robbery
with homicide and illegal possession of firearm in two separate informations for killing
Jose Eduardo Reteracion and taking his cash amounting to P67,500. On appeal, he
contends that the use of an unlicensed firearm should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance and not as a separate offense pursuant to RA No. 8294.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing is perpetrated by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense from the crime of
robbery with homicide

HELD:
NO.
 In recent cases, we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in
the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will be advantageous
to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of
firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect. We affirmed his conviction for both crimes.
Although the crimes were committed on 10 July 1995 before the effectivity of R.A. No.
8294, we applied the said law with respect to the penalty for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm for being more favorable to the accused in that it provided a
lighter penalty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs WALPOND LADJAALAM

SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

FACTS:
Appellant Walpan Ladjaalam alias “Warpan” appealed on September 17, 1998, to
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga, which found him guilty of
three of four charges. Aside from the finding of direct assault and attempted homicide of
the accused and his use of the extension of his house as a drug den on several occasions,
the appellant was also found guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294, and was sentenced to 6 years of
prision correctional to 8 years of prision mayor. The illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition which is penalized under the Presidential Decree No. 1866, is amended
under Republic Act No. 8294, which provides unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
disposition or possession of firearms of ammunition of instruments used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be convicted separately of illegal possession
of firearms

HELD:
No.
The court ruled that the trial court erred, convicting the appellant guilty of illegal
possession of firearms. The appellant is found guilty only of two offenses which are:
direct assault and multiple attempted homicide and maintaining a drug den. As stated
in the law, it is no longer justified in the provision of RA 8294 that such conviction for
illegal possession of firearms should be separate from any other crimes. Section 1 of the
RA 8294 states that if an unlicensed firearm is used in committing a crime, there can be
no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Therefore, since direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed by the accused, the appellant
can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of the firearm used. Furthermore, RA
8294 which expressly superseded PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, made the Supreme Court
affirm with the decisions of the trial court to have found the accused guilty of only two
crimes and not three, when these were committed on September 24, 1997. In
conclusion, illegal possession of firearms should not be separated from any other. The
accused can only be convicted with simple illegal possession of firearms provided that
“no other crime was committed.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs TEMPORADA

DECEMBER 17, 2008

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Beth Temporada was convicted of the crime of large-scale
illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and five (5)
counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the
requirement of her employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove
that she was aware of the latter’s illegal activities and that she actively participated
therein. In essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention is correct

HELD:
No.
The defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of the
activities of her co-accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even assuming arguendo that
appellant was indeed unaware of the illegal nature of said activities, the same is hardly a
defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. Under the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.11 Thus, the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary and the fact alone that the accused violated the law warrants
her conviction. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.

LAPASARAN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FEBRUARY 12, 2009

FACTS:
Private complainant Menardo Villarin and his sister Vilma Villarin met petitioner
Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency at SIMCAS
Building, Makati. For a fee of P85,000.00, petitioner undertook the processing of the
papers necessary for the deployment under a tourist visa and employment of Menardo
in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be employed as factory
worker which was, subsequently, changed to bakery worker. Thereafter, Menardo paid
the said fee in installments. After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo
finally left for South Korea on November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was incarcerated
by South Korean immigration authorities and was immediately deported to the
Philippines because the travel documents issued to him by the petitioner were fake. He
immediately contacted petitioner and informed her of what happened. Thereupon,
petitioner promised to send him back to South Korea, but the promise was never
fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded the return of the
money they paid, but petitioner refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws on illegal recruitment and estafa are applicable in the
case at bar

HELD:
Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that petitioner gave the
complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the
complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his money
in order to be employed. To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it
is plain that there must, at least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the
person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad. Petitioner’s misrepresentations
concerning her purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and
the collection from Menardo of various amounts, clearly indicate acts constitutive of
illegal recruitment

LLAMOSO vs SADIGANBAYAN
AUGUST 7, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioners worked for the district engineer’s office, which undertook the repair of
drainage canals and sidewalks at Sta. Rosa Street, E. Villanueva. On March 10, 1981,
Cagais complained that he had not been paid his wages of P130 for ten working days due
to failure to include him in the payroll. To resolve the issue, Jumamoy listed Aninipo as
substitute for Cagais with Guigue’s approval for the period of March 16-31, 1981. The
anomaly was discovered when the paymaster as the sole prosecution witness gave P130
to Aninipo, but Aninipo demanded a P156 for his actual work, to which the paymaster
refused. The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners as conspirators in the crime of
falsification of public documents. The accused appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are criminally liable for the crime of falsification
of public documents.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the accused are not criminally liable because they
had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion, they admitted that there was
a false entry and they acted in good. They may be disciplined administratively for the
irregularity but their inclusion of Aninipo in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal
law. The inclusion of Aninipo was for Cagais to receive his compensation which he
needed very badly

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS UY JUI PIO

102 P 468

FACTS:
Defendant was charged with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142 for using
publicly a name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he had
been known since childhood. Convicted in that court, he appealed to the Court of First
Instance. Defendant contended that he had the right to use the name "Juanito Uy"
because he has since childhood been known by that name. However, prosecution
contended that the name "Juanito Uy" is an alias and defendant is not authorized to use
it without judicial authorization in view of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 142

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution’s contention was correct
HELD:
The contention is without merit. Section 2 necessarily refers to a name whose use
is not already authorized by section 1 for; otherwise, the two sections would conflict with
each other in that one forbids what the other allows. Commonwealth Act No. 142 is a
penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused

ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
180 S 309

FACTS:
Six accused persons were convicted in connection with the gross overpricing of
land acquired through negotiated purchase by the Bureau of Public Works for the
Mangahan Floodway Project for P80.00 a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per
square meter. This causes undue injury and damage to the Government. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. We agree
with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of
land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis
for conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Arias is part of the planning, preparation, and
perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government.
HELD:
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of
the property started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was
transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already
been consummated before his arrival. That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be
officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed
on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise
any presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the
Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as above shown,
there was no undue injury caused to the Government.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ASTORGA

DECEMBER 221, 1997

FACTS:
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No.
8243 wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.
Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s
witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation
weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the
8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction.
Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that
he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s
decision.

HELD:
The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show
that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286
of the same code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VELASCO

340 S 207

FACTS:
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, was acquitted in the lower
court for the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. He was also absolved from
the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon finding that the act was not a violation of
law. Hence a petition for certiorari was filed assailing that the case will not transgress
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy despite acquittal by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal permissible
considering the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy

HELD:
From the procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites
for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a
competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that
where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level
of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution,
statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground
of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of
Appeals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FEBRUARY 19, 2001

FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan declared the private respondent the owner of 1/7 of the
shares of stock of Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. without first requiring him to present
evidence showing his ownership over them, and awarded him 144.12 million pesos from
a mere motion for execution filed by said private respondent of a judgment on a
Compromise Agreement to which private respondent was not a party. Petitioner alleged
that the owner of said shares was Imelda Marcos who funded the paid-up subscriptions
of all seven incorporators and directors/subscribers for Piedras. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied it. Hence, a petition for
certiorari on the ground that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it declared the private respondent owner of the
shares even without evidence of ownership.

HELD:
The Supreme Court finds petitioner's contentions untenable. The Sandiganbayan
gave both the petitioner and the private respondent ample opportunity to present their
respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the 1/7 Piedras Shares. When petitioner
submitted its Opposition, petitioner was thereby given the chance to air its side which is
the essence of due process of law. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The instant petition was
dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS URSUA

APRIL 10, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted for violating C.A No. 142 as amended by R.A. No, 6085
for introducing himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez”, which was the
name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in
the first place instead of petitioner. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by
petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. On appeal, he claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and
that he only used such name on one occasion, and it was with the express consent of
Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction
under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the
prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered
name in the Registry of Births.

ISSUE:
How should a penal statute be construed?

HELD:
As C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited

ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
180 S 309

FACTS:
Petitioner, an auditor, was one of the six who was charged by the Sandiganbayan
with conspiracy through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in
connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Petitioner approved said project but insisted on his non-
involvement since the illegal transaction has already been consummated prior to his
arrival in office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of conspiracy.

HELD:
The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner on grounds of reasonable doubt.

MAGCUSI VS SANDIGANBAYAN
JANUARY 3, 1995

MAGNO VS CA
JUNE 26, 1992

FACTS:
Oriel Magno lacked funds in putting up a car repair shop. He approached
Corazon Teng of Mancor Industries, who referred him to LS Finance and Management
Corporation. A deal was made between said parties in a condition that Magno would
deposit 30% as warranty. Unable to produce the amount, Teng advanced for the deposit
in consideration of a 3% interest. Magno and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement. Due to failure to pay rentals, the LS pulled out the equipment. Four of the
six postdated checks issued by the petitioner bounced. He was convicted by the lower
court of violation of B.P. No. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Magno is guilty of violating B.P. 22 and whether or not post-
dated checks were issued to apply on account or for values as required under Section 1
of B.P. 22.

HELD:
The Supreme Court acquitted Magno of violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
when he acted without malice. The wrongdoer is not Magno but the lessor who
deposited the checks. He should have returned the checks to Magno when he pulled out
the equipment. To convict the accused would defeat the noble objective of the law and
the law would be tainted with materialism and opportunism.

HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE
237 S 538

FACTS:
 Petitioner, a Davao City policeman, was charged for the murder of Benjamin and
for the attempted murder of Bernabe. In accordance with Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which
provides suspension from office until the case is terminated to police officers who
committed grave felonies, he was suspended. He filed a motion to lift said suspension
pursuant to the Civil Service Decree, limiting suspension to 90 days. He asserted that
suspension of over 90 days contradicts his constitutional right to equal protection of
laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 47 of RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.

HELD:
The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. It gives no meaning than the suspension from office of the member of
the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more
shall last until the termination of the case. The reason why members of the PNP are
treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used
to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions. Hence, the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days
under such Act does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
324 S 689

FACTS:
Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a congressman despite his conviction in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

HELD:
NO.
The Constitution guarantee nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not
show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free
man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. The Court cannot validate badges of
inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

PEOPLE VS FERRER
48 S 382

FACTS:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared R.A. 1700
or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. It is an act to outlaw the CPP
and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. The
trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder

HELD:
The court holds the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder
is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution
of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute to
be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) the
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4
of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the
same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

BON VS COURT OF APPEALS

OCTOBER 30, 2006
FACTS:
Appellant was convicted by the lower court for six counts of rape and two counts
of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. The issue arises as we are
compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed
on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence
was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346,
which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not death penalty should be imposed against appellant

HELD:
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the
six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed
by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage
of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent
cases such as People v. Tubongbanua and People v. Cabalquinto

WRIGHT VS COURT OF APPEALS

AUGUST 15, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner, an Australian citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for
indictable crimes in his country. Pursuant to the Extradition Treaty entered into in 1988
and concluded in 1990 between the Philippines and Australia, extradition proceedings
were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which ordered the deportation of
petitioner. On appeal, petitioner contended that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law. The trial
court’s decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence petitioner filed a review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of the Extradition Treaty giving retroactive effect to
the treaty violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that while the Extradition Treaty concluded prior to the
extradition proceedings of the petitioner, its application did not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The Treaty merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or
crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. In
signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its
interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the
repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country

BAYOT VS SANDIGANBAYAN
128 S 383

FACTS:
Reynaldo Bayot is a government auditor of the Commission on Audit and was
charged before the Sandiganbayan of 100 counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-
existent obligations of the Teacher’s Camp. While his case is pending, he ran for the post
of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite and was elected. He was later on convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. While the case is pending review, Batas Pambansa Bldg. 195 was passed
providing for the suspension from office of any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information is pending in court. Petitioner
argued that to apply the provision to him would be violative of the constitutional
guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the application of the provision to the accused a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law

HELD:
NO.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019,
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal
provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that
suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from
office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional
provision on ex post facto law.

NASI- VILLAR VS PEOPLE

NOVEMBER 14, 2008
FACTS:
An information4 for Illegal Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 was filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Davao del Sur on 5 October 1998 for acts committed by petitioner on 1993. Petitioner
was held liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. On appeal,
petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No.
8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of RTC constitutes an ex post facto law.

HELD:
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the
time of its commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found guilty under the
Labor Code which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed.
Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the
offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable
under the Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was
charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No.
8042.

YNOT VS IAC
148 S 659

FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained, and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to
the Intermediate Appellate Court, but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order 626-A is constitutional

HELD:
No.
 The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner, and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case,
the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

DIMATULAC VS VILON
OCTOBER 12, 1998

FACTS:
On about November 2, 2005, SPO3 Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Masantol, Pampanga by several men under the leadership of Mayor Yabut. A
preliminary investigation was conducted and issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused followed for murder. Murder was lowered to homicide upon reinvestigation.
Upon the contention of the Dimatulacs, the case was transferred to Judge Villon.
Petitioners filed a manifestation informing the latter of the cases pending before the
Secretary of Justice and the prohibition case before the Court of Appeals. However,
Judge Villon ignored this and set the arraignment. Petitioners filed a motion to defer
arraignment of the accused but was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Villon erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment.

HELD:
YES.
Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon receiving
the records of the case from the former trial court judge. He thus committed grave abuse
of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the accused on the assailed information for
homicide, denying due process.

GUEVARRA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 13879-804

FACTS:
Cresencio Gatchalian and Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 with the office of the Ombudsman against the administrators (herein petitioners)
of PUP in connection with certain questionable transactions entered into by the PUP. 13
Criminal cases were then filed. Later, the graft court issued an Order dismissing the 13
criminal cases. After the 15-day reglementary period the Special Prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration arguing that the dropping of the cases applied only to
petitioner Olanan and not to the other petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a deprivation of the right to due process

HELD:
The Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of the 13 cases as against the
petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor on its erroneous perception that
Justice Marigomen recommended in his report the dismissal of the 13 cases against the
petitioners. By its Order, the graft court deprived the respondent People of the
Philippines of its right to due process. In fine, the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal
cases against the petitioners. Hence, its Order dated January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13
criminal cases, as against the petitioners, was null and void; it may thus be rectified, as
did the graft court, per its Resolution dated April 6, 1999 despite the lapse of fifteen days
from notice of the Special Prosecutor of its January 26, 1998 Order. By rectifying its void
Order, it cannot be said that the graft court acted with grave abuse of its discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, in so doing, the Sandiganbayan
acted in accord with law. It bears stressing that the State, like the accused, is also
entitled to due process of law.

LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

JANUARY 1999

FACTS:
Eleven members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. They contend that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
limited to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from
the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A.7975. Petitioner questions the
constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD:
No.
Concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. Paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

PEOPLE VS ECHEGARAY
FERUARY 7, 1997

FACTS:
Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
Accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. He asserts
that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

ISSUE:
Whether or not death penalty law is constitutional

HELD:
Yes.
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. The death
penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest
citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both
their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the
safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal, G.R.
No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996 "Rape is the forcible violation of the
sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply
wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person
has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but
the society itself."

HARDEN VS DIR OF PRISONS

81 P 741

FACTS:
Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden concerning
conjugal partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A preliminary injunction was
issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or alienating, except with consideration
and consent of the court, all assets (money, shares of stock, property, real, personal,
whether in his name, her name or both) in the partnership with Mrs. Harden. During
1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in overseas accounts. In the
course of two years, he received orders from the SC to return the amounts but Mr.
Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail because
of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of producing the amounts) and
held there until he can produce said amounts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive
punishment.

HELD:
No.
Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is something that he
himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the contempt
consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform,
he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs It.

PEOPLE VS DIONISIO
22 S 1299

FACTS:
Unauthorized offering, arranging, and collecting bets for the Special Daily Double
Race. In appeal, he posed that the penalty applied to his offense infringes the
constitutional prohibition of an imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mere severity of fines or imprisonment does constitute in
themselves cruel and unusual punishment

HELD:
 NO.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual
punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as referring to
penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or
imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute, is severe does not make it cruel and unusual."

PEOPLE VS LIVARA
94 P 771

Facts:
Felipe Livara was a disbursing officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Romblon. He
was charged of malversation of public funds after he lost the money entrusted to him
which is supposed to be paid as salaries and subsistence of the Constabulary officers and
enlisted men of Romblon. Counsel for the appellant contends that the Court of First
Instance of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case as the crime happened during the
incumbency of the accused as an officer of the Philippine Constabulary, argued that the
action should have been brought before a court-martial.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Romblon had jurisdiction on
thecase.

Held:
The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses
committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and the public
law. The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other.
The accused-appellant having been first tried and convicted of the crime by the Court of
First Instance of Romblon he cannot now claim that the criminal
action should have been brought before a court-martial .

CRISOLOGO vs PEOPLE
94 P 477

Facts:
Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war on March 12,
1946, accused of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information
filed in the People's Court. But before the accused could be brought under the
jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted for violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a... military
court created by authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three
charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving
information and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men
and other... persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the
USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of
having certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third
charges but guilty of the second, he was on May
8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment. Petitioner presented a
motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy
because of his previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion...
and, after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist
from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution
for the same offense in the civil courts.

HELD:

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the
same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive
their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to the...
petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a bar to petitioner's
further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the criminal case
for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed. Without
costs.

ARULA VS ESPINO
JUNE 23, 1969

FACTS:
Petitioner was recruited as soldier to undergo training in Corregidor Island,
where a shooting incident occurred. He suffered from serious physical injuries but was
able to flee Corregidor. He filed a criminal complaint with the fiscal of Cavite City for
frustrated murder against army personnel responsible for his injuries. Respondents
initiated a pre-trial investigation on said incident and convening of a court-martial
followed. They claimed that the court-martial has sole jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition from said court-martial to take cognizance
of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court-martial can take cognizance of the case despite the fact
that the offense was committed allegedly outside a military reservation.

HELD:
The court-martial may take cognizance of the case in order to carry out a speedy
trial, which is a fundamental right accorded by the Constitution. In the presidential
proclamation of 1948, Corregidor Island is part of the military reservation. The
petitioner and the accused, being part of the military, are subject to military law.

SCHNECKENBURGER VS MORAN
63 P 249

FACTS:
Petitioner, a duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, was charged
in the CFI of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to
the jurisdiction of the court to try him but was overruled. He filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition to prevent the CFI of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action
filed against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not consuls are entitled to the privileges and immunities as accorded
to ambassadors or ministers on the application of Philippine criminal law?

HELD:
NO.
The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such
jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have
already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where
they reside. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try
criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in force prior to the inauguration of
the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred
upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in
such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain
operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend alter,
modify, or repeal the same.
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try
the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

US VS FOWLER
1 PHIL 614

FACTS:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft. Counsel for the defendants
presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction
to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime
was committed on the high seas. This contention was opposed by the prosecuting
attorney, who alleged that in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and
the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessel
flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
No.
Under Act No. 136, the purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the
courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel
of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed
on board the same.

RAQUIZA VS BRADFORD
75 P 50

FACTS:
The petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee, and Emma Link Infante,
were arrested by an agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United States
and have since then been confined in the custody of the respondents by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur. Petitioners Raquiza was charged with
"Espionage activity for Japanese”, Tee Han Kee with "Active collaboration with the
enemy” and Infante with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Petitioners move for
writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to afford relief to the petitioners being
subjected.

HELD:
No.
Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during
passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to
exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the
other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

LIANG vs PEOPLE
MARCH 26, 2001

FACTS:
This case has its origin in two criminal Information for grave oral defamation
filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and
January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal
Information against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People,
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of
the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. Petitioner, thus, brought a
petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, the court rendered the
assailed Decision denying the petition for review. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the Agreement
between ADB and Government of the Philippines.

HELD:
NO. Under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the "Agreement Between the Asian
Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding
the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank," to wit: Officers and staff of the Bank,
including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for
the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:(a) Immunity from legal
process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity. The court ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to
officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. Furthermore, the court held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of
a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY

NICOLAS VS ROMULO
355 S 125

FACTS:
Lance Corporal Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed
Forces and was convicted with the crime of rape committed against a 22-year-old
Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas. The incident happened inside a Starex Van at the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, Olongapo City. Pursuant to the VFA, the confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities of Smith shall be carried out in facilities that agreed on by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. In what was referred to as the
Romulo-Kenney agreement, the two countries agreed that Smith be returned to US
military custody at the US Embassy in Manila where he will be detained in a room of
approximately 10x12sq ft and guarded round the clock by US military personnel. Hence
the petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court contending that the
Philippines should have custody of defendant and that the VFA is void and
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the VFA is void and unconstitutional?

HELD:
NO
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed force allowed to enter
one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The
Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in
terms and conditions, according tofr the situation of the parties involved, and reflect
their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the
parties.

TAVERA VS VALDEZ
1 P 468

FACTS:
Both the private prosecutor and the defendant have appealed from the judgment
of the court below, finding the defendant guilty of the offense of injurias graves under
article 457 and 458 of the Penal Code. The question raised by the appeal of the private
prosecutor relates solely to the propriety of the punishment imposed by the court.
Article 458 of the Penal Code provides that "injurias graves, shall be punished with the
penalty of destierro." Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission "defining
the law of libel" affixes to the offense the punishment of "a fine not exceeding $2,000 or
imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both.

ISSUE:
Which law should apply?

HELD:
Article 22 of the Penal Code states that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime of misdemeanor," etc. In this view of
the case, we have no occasion to consider the question argued by counsel for the private
prosecutor as to whether the provisions of Act No. 277 respecting the penalty are more
favorable to the accused than those of the former law or otherwise. The punishment
must be determined exclusively by the provisions of the Penal Code.

QUE VS PEOPLE
154 S 160 (1987)

FACTS:
The petitioner deliberately issued checks to cover accounts, but the checks were
dishonored upon presentment. He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of violating
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 on two counts, which decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The petitioner contented that he issued the checks in question merely to
guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply Inc., of which he is the
manager. He then filed a motion for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether dishonored checks issued merely to guarantee payment constitute
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

HELD:
It is now well-settled that B.P. Blg. 22. applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in form of deposit or a guarantee. The enactment does not
make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued, in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. Consequently, what are
important are the facts that the accused deliberately issued the checks to cover accounts
and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the
accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee. It is clear that the intention of the
framers of B.P. Blg. 22. to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.
CO VS COURT OF APPEALS
237 S 444 OCTOBER 28, 1993

FACTS:
Albino Co issued a check in payment of his share of the expenses to a salvage
company, but said check was dishonored by reason of account closed. In a complaint
filed by the salvage company, Co was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP Blg. 22). Pending his case, a Ministry
Circular No. 4, which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22, was
reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12. The later circular ruled a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is covered by B.P. Blg. 22. He appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, with the new circular, the guarantee check would still be a valid
defense.

HELD:
It was ruled that the principle of prospectivity of statutes also applies to
administrative rulings and circulars. The new doctrine will therefore apply and should
not be given retrospective effect. Hence, the lower courts’ decisions were reversed.

PEOPLE VS BRACAMONTE
71 SCAD 257 S

FACTS:
Herein defendants were convicted for the crime of Robbery with Double
Homicide. The crime was committed on September 23, 1987, prior the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659 reimposing the death penalty for certain heinous crimes,
including robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Should Republic Act No. 7659 be applied on the imposition of the penalty?

HELD:
NO. Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimpose the death penalty for certain
heinous crimes, including robbery with homicide, the capital punishment could not be
imposed in the case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in September 23,
1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993.[28] To impose upon
appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new
law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be applied,[29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz: Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."

PEOPLE VS TAMAYO
61 P 225

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province
of Ilocos Sur, of a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of
said municipality. While appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2
in question, and the act complained of, instead of being a violation of the municipal
ordinances, is now legal in that municipality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action should be dismissed on account of the absolute repeal?

HELD:
The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication.
Nor was there any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown by the action of the
municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer deemed
criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant for an
offense that no longer exists.

LAGRIMAS VS DOP
57 P 47

FACTS:
The petitioner was charged and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Samar
for the crime of assault for slapping and using offensive language to a public-school
teacher in Laoang, Samar, pursuant to article 251 of the old Penal Code. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, petitioner prayed the application of Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, which prescribes a lesser penalty for said crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, who was sentenced by virtue of a provision of the
former Penal Code, may be set at liberty on the ground that the Revised Penal Code
provides no penalty for the crime committed under the former Code.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that in pursuant to Article 366 of the Revised Penal
Code: “Without prejudice to the provisions in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and
misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be
punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.”
The intention of the Legislature in embodying this provision in the Revised Penal Code
was to ensure that the elimination from this Code of certain crimes penalized by former
acts before the enforcement of this Code should not have the effect of pardoning guilty
persons who were serving their sentences for the commission of such crimes.

US VS CUNA
12 P 241

FACTS:
On June 30, 1907, Chinaman Cuna sold a small quantity of opium to a Filipino
woman in Echague, Isabela, and was charged by the Court of First Instance of Isabela
with the violation of Act No. 1461 or the Opium Law. During the pendency of the case,
said Act was repealed by Act No. 1761. Cuna contended that he must not be penalized for
the offense due to the repeal. The lower court dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty for violation of the Opium Law, which was repealed
by Act No. 1461 during the pendency of the case, should be extinguished.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that a repealed penal statute loses none of its force and
effect as a law defining and penalizing certain acts committed prior to its repeal, and the
courts may and should find in the repealed statute the rule whereby to determine
whether penalties have been incurred thereunder, and the nature and extent of such
penalties as may have been incurred. Thus, the judgment of the lower court was
reversed. this court expressly reserved its opinion as to whether article 22 of the Penal
Code was applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission or Legislature so as to require
the imposition of the penalty provided in the repealing Act in case such penalty should
be more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the former Act. The Act of the
Commission involved in this case was less favorable to the accused than the Act which it
repealed.

ANG BENG VS COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION

100 P 801

FACTS:
Herein petitioners were convicted by the CFI of Manila for violation of the Import
Control Law (RA No. 650). Pending appeal of the criminal case in the CA, the Import
Control Law expired, in view of which, their motion for dismissal was granted and they
were ordered discharged. The Deportation Board however submitted to the President of
the Philippines a recommendation for the petitioner’s deportation. Petitioners filed a
petition for prohibition and certiorari with the CFI of Manila but was dismissed hence
they appealed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order deporting the petitioners should be set aside because
the law defining the crime of which they were convicted had already expired, the order
of deportation being based on said conviction

HELD:
NO. We cannot subscribe to petitioners' contention that the expiration of the
Import Control Law should be considered favorable to them in the sense that it erases
the stigma of their conviction. There is no law upholding such proposition. The benefit
of retroactivity and liberal construction accrues when penal laws are repealed. There is
no subsequent repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law violated by them
expired in virtue of its own force. The case of Tamayo, 6 Phil., 225, invoked by
petitioners is irrelevant, as it involved absolute repeal.

DE JOYA VS WARDEN OF BATANAGS

DECEMBER 10, 2003

FACTS:
Norma de Joya was charged with two counts of BP 22 or the bouncing checks law
in a Batangas MTC. Crim Case 25484 was for issuing a Solid Bank check to Flor
Catapang de Tenorio worth 150,000 which was dishonored because the account was
closed. Crim Case 25773 was for issuing a Security Bank and Trust Company check to
Resurreccion Castillo for 225,000 which was also dishonored because the account was
closed. De Joya pleaded not guilty and then jumped bail during trial. She was unable to
present evidence and she lost both cases. Both decisions were promulgated without her
being there despite due notice. Aside from being ordered to pay the amounts, she was
also given the penalty of one-year imprisonment. In the meantime, SC Admin Circular
12-2000 was passed concerning punishments for BP 22 violations. Two years later, de
Joya was apprehended while applying for an NBI clearance. She was jailed in Batangas
and then she asked to be released by virtue of the circular. She thought that it could be
applied retroactively and that it meant imprisonment was no longer a punishment for
bp 22 violations. The RTC denied her motion hence this habeas corpus petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the SC Admin. Circular 12-2000 is a penal law
HELD:
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the RPC
is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Also, it did not abolish
imprisonment. It merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It says that when imposing a fine would better
serve the interest of justice, the guilty party may just be fined instead of being
imprisoned.

PEOPLE VS GENOSA
SEPTEMBER 29, 2000

FACTS:
On 15 November 1996 in Isabel, Leyte, appellant attacked and wounded his
husband with the use of a hard-deadly weapon, which ultimately led to his death. The
trial court found the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide with treachery as
aggravating circumstance. Marivic presented an Urgent Omnibus Motion, praying for
her examination by expert psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's
reports to prove her claim of self-defense on the theory of a battered woman syndrome.
The Supreme Court partly granted the motion to seek the aid of specialists, who proved
that appellant was suffering from such syndrome.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense on the theory of a battered
woman syndrome.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the defense failed to establish all the elements of
self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily immediate and actual--
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter.

PEOPLE VS JULMAIN
83 P 193

FACTS:
On January 19, 1947, on the way to Jolo, while in between the seas of Zamboanga
and Basilan, herein defendants conspiring together and helping each other killed Moro
Aye and threw him overboard, off the unregistered vinta. Because of the crime, Moro’s
wife Ulka Aye and his children landed at Pangasaan, Basilan Island riding the same
vinta, although they were supposed to land in Kambing, Luuk, Sulu.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga has jurisdiction over
the case

HELD:
Yes, the vinta in question was unregistered or unlicensed and, therefore, is not
within the purview of section 14, paragraph c, of Rule 106, which contemplates a vessel
registered or licensed in accordance with law. It appearing that the crime was
committed in waters within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
the latter is the proper court to try the case. And, even if the vinta in question were
licensed or registered, it appearing that the first port of entry of the vinta was
Pangasaan, Basilan Island, under the jurisdiction of said court, there cannot be any
dispute that the case should be tried in Zamboanga.

PEOPLE VS RODRIQUEZ
G.R. No. L-13981 April 25, 1960

Facts:
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal possession of fire
arms. The accused filed a motion to quash, in the ground that, he alleged that the crime
being charged of him is a component element in the crime of rebellion which he is
charged with. In the preliminary investigation, the accused tried to prove that, the said
firearm
and ammunition in question did not belong to him and was only left by another person
who had disappeared. The justice of the peace of court found a probable cause regarding
the crime committed and ordered to transfer the record to Court of First Instance of
Laguna for trial on the merit. When the cased was called for arraignment the accused
filed again a motion to quash alleging the defense of double jeopardy arising from the
fact that an essential element of another crime is being used to file a separate crime
against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime being alleged which is Illegal Possession of Firearms, is
already absorbed by the charge crime which is Rebellion

Held:
Yes. An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which
the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime
of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate
case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted.

MINUCHER VS CA
FEBRUARY 11, 2003

Facts:
 Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian
Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and
continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986,
Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not Khosrow Minucher has immunity from suit.

Held:
Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil
and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties
of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, he is not generally regarded as a member of the
diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the
diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic
immunity is contentious.

WHO VS AQUINO
48 S 242

FACTS:
Petitioner is a recognized official of the World Health Organization. His personal
belongings contained in twelve crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied
baggage were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Respondent judge issued a
search warrant upon the request of respondent officers of the Constabulary Offshore
Action Center (COSAC) for alleged violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not search and seizure of petitioner’s personal belongings was legal.

HELD:
NO.
Petitioner is entitled to diplomatic immunity as recognized by the executive
branch of the government. Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other
diplomatic privileges abd immunities, personal inviolability of the officer’s properties,
exemption from local jurisdiction and exemption

USA VS GUINTO
182 S644

FACTS:
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon but objections
were raised and a complaint was filed to cancel the award to Dizon and conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against the USA, which have not waived its non-
suability and the US Air Force employees were also immune from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can validly plead state immunity over the
complaint?

HELD:
No. The barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by private people. They are not
agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. All the barbershop concessionaires are
under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government
fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
respective areas.

DIR OF BUTEL VS ALIGAEN

33 S 368

Facts:
Belo argues that even if petitioners are officers of the Government their act of
establishing a local telephone system in Roxas City is without authority of law, and
violates his rights, hence the action for the redress of injuries that he suffered or would
suffer is not a suit against the State.

Issue:
Whether or not the action to enjoin unauthorized acts of public officers is a suit against
the state

Held:
No. An action to enjoin the officers of the Bureau of Telecommunications from
establishing, maintaining and operating a local telephone system in Roxas City, in
violation of law and the rights of the petitioner, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit, the State authorizing only legal acts by its
officers.

SHAUF VS CA
191 S 713
Facts:
Shauf filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity
complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex
(female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth). Defendants argued that
they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of
their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
Armed Forces

Held:
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all
its acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in
indemnifying petitioner Shauf. While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to
complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official
capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the
plaintiff.

PEOPLE VS GONZALES
180 S 324

GUEVARRA VS ALMODOVAR
169 S 476

FACTS:
On October 29, 1984, petitioner, then 11 years old, was playing with his best
friend Teodoro Almine, Jr and three other children in their backyard. They were target-
shooting a bottle cap place around 15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle. In the course
of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his death.
A case was filed against petitioner for Homicide through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a minor over 9 years of age but below 15 may be held liable for a
quasi-offense

HELD:
Yes. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are
indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent
is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element,
hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed
with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him
to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable
for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would
reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction
or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.

PEOPLE VS BARANGAN
OCTOBER 2, 2007

Facts:
Accused-appellant sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
against a 15-year-old girl.

Issue:
What is corpus delicti?

Held:
The corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two things: 1) the existence of
a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge; and 2) the existence of a
criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. In all criminal prosecutions, the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or substance of the crime. In the case at
bar, accused-appellant himself does not deny that he had sexual intercourse with AAA.
His contention, however, is that his carnal knowledge of the victim on the date and time
in question did not amount to the crime of rape because such coitus was consensual.
The foregoing being an affirmative defense, accused-appellant now has the burden of
proving the claim of consent to the sexual act.

PEOPLE VS RENTORIA
SEPTEMBER 21, 2007

Facts:
Accused-appellant was convicted by the RTC for the crime of statutory rape. He
was sentenced to suffer death penalty, hence this automatic review. He contended that
corpus delicti was not proved.
Issue:
What is corpus delicti?

Held:
The corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two things: 1) the existence of
a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and 2) the existence of a
criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. In all criminal prosecutions, the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or substance of the crime. In the case at
bar, the prosecution was able to prove the two components of the corpus delicti.
The evidence presented by the prosecution the testimony of the AAA that the accused-
appellant hurt her in her vagina; the testimony of CCC that she saw accused-appellant
with his pants around his knees lie on top of her sister, remove her undergarment and
make up and down motions; the testimony of BBB that her daughter AAA was three
years old[36] at the time of the incident in question, and that she saw her daughter with
the latters vagina all bloodied; and the testimony of Dr. Mislang narrating the medical
examination conducted on AAA, and the result of such examination attesting to injuries
sustained by AAA are consistent with the penetration of the vagina by a hard object are
fully satisfactory to buttress the existence of the crime of qualified rape.

PEOPLE VS FRONDOZO
JUNE 30, 2009

PEOPLE VS ABDUL
JULY 13, 1999

FACTS:
The five accused were charged for the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide
and Triple Frustrated Homicide for taking the necklace and wrist watch of Abraham
Annudin and Annih Tanjing after shooting them to death and their companions being
mortally wounded. Only Minya Abdul was apprehended the others are still at large. The
shooting incident happened at Langil Island, Tuburan, Province of Basilan where the
five accused invited the victims for a luncheon. During the trial, no death certificate or
testimony of an Imam or Muslim priest was presented to prove the fact of death of the
victims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a death or burial certificate negates the fact of the
killing

HELD:
No.
The absence of a death or burial certificate does not negate the fact of the killing
since corpus delicti can be proved by testimonial evidence Corpus Delicti is the body
(material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a
murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it
means the substantial fact that a crime has been committed and is made up of two
elements: a.) that a certain result has been proved; and b.) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act. In the present case, the eyewitnesses established the
fact of death of the victims at the hands of the three brothers Isa Abdul, Minya Abdul
and Maldis Abdul.

PEOPLE VS ROBLES
APRIL 24, 2009 (DRUGS)
Facts:
The appellant questions, among other things, the forensic laboratory examination
results and the chain of custody of the shabu subject thereof, as in fact the appellate
court itself found that the prosecution failed to distinguish the shabu allegedly sold by
him from that found in his possession.

Issue:
What is the corpus delicti of the crime in prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs?

Held:
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous
drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it
being the very corpus delicti of the crime.

PEOPLE VS DE LEON
MARCH 4, 2009 (ARSON)

Facts:
Accused appellant was charged and convicted for the crime of arson. He
contended that corpus delicti was not proved.

Issue:
What is the corpus delicti of arson?

Held:
Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all
kinds of criminal offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact
that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally
satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house
burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti
and to warrant conviction. The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the
instant case.

PEOPLE VS DELIM
JANUARY 23, 2003

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong
and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder of Modesto Manalo Bantas,
who was adopted by the father of the accused. On January 23, 1999, Modesto was
forcibly taken by defendants who were armed from his home; Marlon poked his gun at
Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim; Rita
and Randy (his wife and son) being warned not to leave the house. His body was
discovered 4 days later by Randy and his relatives. The accused were found guilty for
murder. The Information read “that on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at
Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation,
conspiring with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim,
accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the
wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior
strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs. “The trial court rendered judgment finding accused guilty of aggravated murder,
and wassentenced to death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is kidnapping or murder?
Murder.

HELD:
In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory
facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated
are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the
prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al. that for
kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of
his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the malefactor. What is primordial then is the specific intent of
the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is
determinative of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.

PEOPLE VS. LASERNA

September 5. 1997

FACTS:
On September 12, 1992, the taxicab where the two accused were riding was
flagged down by a patrol mobile car. Upon searching their luggages, the police officers
found dried marijuana leaves in a bag they claimed was sent by their uncle. They denied
knowing that such bag contains marijuana.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the appellant may be held guilty of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs
HELD:
Yes. Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be
identified and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be
established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a
prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same
rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to
another.

From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the
elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the prohibited drug.

The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was in possession
of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs, without the requisite authority. The NBI
forensic chemists’ identification of the marijuana or Indian hemp was conclusive.

GUERERRO VS.AL.MODOVAR
251 S 427

FACTS:
On October 29, 1984, the petitioner, who was then 11 years old, was playing with
his best friend, Teodoro Almine, Jr., and three other children in their backyard. They
were target shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed
from a neighbor. In the course of the game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death. After the investigation, the examining fiscal
exculpated the petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate event appeared to
be an accident. The victim’s parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, who ordered the
fiscal to file a case against the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence. On
October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information. The petitioner’s
main argument was that the term “discernment” connotes “intent” under the exempting
circumstance found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not an eleven (11) year old boy could be charged with the crime of
homicide thru reckless imprudence.

HELD:
Yes. “Intent” and “discernment” are two different concepts. Intent means a
determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong. The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and becaus the infant has no
intelligence, the exempts him from criminal liability. In evaluating felonies committed
by means of culpa, three elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of
action and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.

PEOPLE VS. REY

APRIL 13, 1989

Facts:
Saturnino Rey was charged with the crime of murder. The trial court found the
defendant-appellant guilty, as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The defendant contended that the crime was committed without
criminal intent.

Issue:
Whether or not there was no criminal intent.

Held:
His conduct after the shooting incident was inconsistent with the conduct of a
person who had innocently shot a person by accident. It would appear that he did not do
anything to help his victim who was lying down on the ground, bleeding and moaning.
He did not go down from his house even after finding that the person he had shot was
Nicolas Pagayunan. Instead, he uttered curses. Then, very early the next morning, at
about 5:30 o'clock, he left his house and stayed with his brother in a neighboring
municipality, 11 and did not go home even to help the police in their investigation. Flight
is an indication of a guilty mind.

SORIANO VS. PEOPLE,

88 P 368

Facts:
Frederico Soriano was authorized by his principal, Emilia Saenz, who is an owner
of a building, to collect rents and transmit it to her. Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. who rented
the said building owned by Saenz was indebted for rents due on account of the lease that
was caused by the disturbance of the war. Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. properties that was
inside the building were then lost and have been found inside the house of Soriano after
repeatedly denying to have any knowledge about the lost equipment and accessories. He
also disclaimed any responsibility of their loss. On August 22, 1945, Soriano was
charged on the crime of theft of one electric motor marled “Cyclix”, with Western
Electric company cable, and one lanternslide projector with their corresponding
accessories, which belongs to Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. After trial he was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty with
the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. He then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which modified the above judgment and sentence.
Issue:
whether or not the acts of the accused (Soriano) constitute theft

Ruling:
Yes.
The crime Soriano stands charged and convicted is covered by first paragraph of
article 308 of the Revised penal code which says “Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.”

MANUEL VS. PEOPLE, NOV. 29, 2005

FACTS:
Eduardo was charged with bigamy for contracting a second marriage with Tina
Gandalera while still validly married to Rubylus Gaa. On his defense, petitioner
contends that at the time he married the complainant, he believed in good faith that his
first marriage no longer subsisted since he did not hear from her for more than 20yrs.
He added that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for its nullification
before marrying Tina.

ISSUE:
Whether or not his defense of good faith negates his criminal liability

HELD:
No. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that
the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of
bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

PEOPLE VS. FALLER

Facts:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another’s
property maliciously and willfully. After hearing the evidence, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not caused maliciously and willfully, but
through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under paragraph 3 of
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through
reckless imprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different from that
committed through reckless imprudence?

Held:
No. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to property with
which he is charged. Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The
information alleges that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and
criminally. To this information no objection was interposed. Negligence being a
punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that
the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the
charge that he acted with negligence

QUIZON VS. JUSTICE OF PEACE, 97 P342

Facts:
The respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint
against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not criminal negligence is a crime

Held:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight. Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless
imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately,
"reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages
to property".
SAMSON VS. CA
103 P 277

FACTS:
Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara
and two others whose names are unknown in two separate information with the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National
Bank before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The trio appealed from the decision
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regards to
appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the
crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto
mayor in each of the two cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred that the acts done by Samson constitute to gross
imprudence.

HELD:
The appellant acted with gross negligence in assuring Lt Valencia and the cashier
of the identity of the supposed claimants, as a result of which the impersonators
managed to secure possession of the checks in question and to cash the same. Samson
was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totaling over
twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by
all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts,
since they were personally unknown to him.

PEOPLE VS. ANGELES

PEOPLE VS. CANO, MAY 24, 1965

Facts:
The information alleges that, through reckless negligence of the defendant, the
bus driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers, serious physical
injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical
injuries, in addition to damage to property.

Issue:
Whether or not the court correct in issuing an order holding that slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence cannot complexed with grave or less grave felonies

Held:
No. Such information does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical
injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to property and serious and less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the
information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit
another bus causing upon some of its passengers, serious physical injuries, upon others
less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to
damage to property.

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, MARCH 27, 2001

Facts:
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de
Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course were
performing an Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the lane. A
speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The accused
surrendered to the Governor, and was eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the
Trial Court. Hence, this automatic review.

Issue:
Whether or not there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a
mere reckless imprudence

HELD:
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries. The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to
the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional,
have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48,
they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate information should
have, therefore, been filed.

REODICA VS. CA, JULY 8, 1998

FACTS:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van
along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto
Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
amounted to P8,542.00. Thus, on 20 October 1987, complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. Later, on 13 January 1988, an
information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging petitioner with
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it complexed the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and slight physical injuries imposing a single excessive penalty

HELD:
Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as
infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00,
or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty,
and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a
penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a
correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by petitioner. Hence, the
trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries

PEOPLE VS PUGAY
NOVEMBER 17, 1988

FACTS:

In a town fiesta fair, herein accused-appellants made fun and set on fire Bayani
Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, making a human torch out of him which caused his
death. The trial court found both accused guilty on the crime of murder hence the
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present to qualify the crime into murder

HELD:

No. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and
the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make. Giving Samson the benefit of doubt, it
calls be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any
qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide
defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
PEOPLE VS. APOSAGA,
OCTOBER 30, 1981

Facts:
The victim was hacked to death and his body was buried inside a dry well. The
defense claimed that the charge is a frame-up on the part of the victim’s family who
plotted his murder and theorized that prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong and
Jesus Francisco harbored resentment against the victim for their ouster from tenancy
and that Gloria Salongcong had wanted revenge for the rape of her daughter Fe.

Issue:
Is motive an essential element of a crime?

Held:
No. In the case of People v. Veloso (92 SCRA 515, 324(1979], the Court held that
motive, as distinguished from criminal intent, is not an essential element of a crime and
hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is essential to conviction
in murder cases only when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.

US V. AH CHONG
15 P 488

FACTS:

On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alone in his room, was
awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. The defendant called
out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill the intruder
if he tried to enter. Because of the darkness of the room, the defendant thought he was
being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at the intruder
using a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the said
intruder was actually the defendant’s roommate.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated. In order for mistake of fact
to be held as a valid defense, there has to be several requisites. One, that the act done
would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. Two, that
the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, and lastly, that the
mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. OANIS 74 P 257

FACTS:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major
Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper
clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the
chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to
go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street
leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. They went to the suspected
house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with
his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at
him which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be
Serepio Tecson, an innocent citizen, Irene’s paramour.

Issue:
Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability due to innocent
mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties.

Held:
No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti
excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The
fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked
whether it is the real Balagtas.

CALDERON VS. PEOPLE, 96 P 216

FACTS:
Petitioner, a member of the armed forces, was charged of homicide for the death
of Eustacio Rodil. The accused contended that he acted under a mistake of fact. Rodil
being armed with a bolo, accused fired at him believing him to be a Huk.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of mistake of fact is tenable in the case at bar
HELD:
No. Accused had no reason to assume, or even suspect, that Rodil was a Huk, the
latter being inside his property, which was fenced, as well as outside the area then
guarded by the army. Moreover, shortly before the shooting, members of the Rodil
family had switched on two 100-watt electric bulbs, which illuminated their light
brightly. Then, they went to the yard and started throwing stones in the direction of the
place where appellant and other soldiers were posted, believing them to be marauders
with evil designs. Obviously, no individual, who is a Huk, bent on killing the appellant,
would have lighted the place with said electric bulbs. He is not justified therefore in
shooting Rodil. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted
with reckless negligence.

US VS. MCMANN, 4 P 161

Facts:
McMann and McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao. While McMann
was away, McKay with a revolver in his hand, tried to enter the house of Amay
Pindoloan to get a match to light his cigar but the owner of the house refused to let him
in. McMann then with a revolver and hammer on his hands, attempted to enter the
house but the owner again refused. McMann snatched a bolo from a moro named
Master who cut his finger, went to the authority to report the incident. While McKay and
Pindoloan was seated side by side and 3 to 6 meters away from the defendant, the latter
raised his pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck McKay in the back of his hand
which killed him instantly. McMann also shot Pindoloan while he was running away.
Both McMann and McKay were drunk at this time. McMann admitted in his testimony
that he fired at McKay and three other witnesses testified against him.

Issue:
Whether or not McMann was guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Held:
Yes. McMann’s argument that he had no intention of killing McKay cannot stand
because in the face of a positive testimony of the witnesses, there is no ground for saying
that the shooting was accidental and the fact that the Moro and McKay were sitting side
by side, their testimony makes it plain that in no event was the discharge of the revolver
accidental. In this case, whatever the cause it may have been, it is absolutely
unnecessary for the court to find a motive thereof. Because the question of motive is
important in cases where there is doubt as whether the defendant is or not the person
who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all doubt that the
defendant was the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not so important to know
the exact reason for the deed. The court also held that his drunkenness cannot be used
to lessen his sentence, because it is held that his drunkenness was habitual based on the
testimony of a witness.

PEOPLE VS. AGUILAR, 111 S 222

Facts:

For the killing of the brothers Pedro Gonzales and Vivencio Gonzales, defendant
Lorenzo Aguilar was prosecuted for murder in two seperate cases of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur. After a joint trial, Aguilar was found guilty of murder in both
cases and was sentenced in each case to reclusion perpetua. Defense contended that it
was self-defense.

Issue:

How to determine previous aggression in cases of self-defense?

Held:

The motive or reason behind the crime, in the absence of direct evidence, we can
only surmise, and hazard a possibility. Knowing the desperate nature of the two
brothers and that because of the arrest of Vivencio four nights before, and considering
the threat that he had uttered, the brothers had a score to settle with him, and perhaps
suspecting that they might have been armed, rather than wait to be assaulted, he
anticipated their expected move, and, as it were, beat them to the attack. Of course, in
such a case, there can be no self-defense for the reason that there was no previous
aggression to repel.

PEOPLE VS. MARTINEZ, 127 S 280

FACTS:

The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items were sent
to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria,
were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL. On February 13, 2008, RTC found
Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentenced
each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit. The CA supported
the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt because evidence against the accused are inadmissible and
even if the evidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established. The
evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and
seizures without a warrant are valid in incidence of lawful arrest, “plain view” search of
evidence, moving vehicle search, consented search, customs search, stop and frisk,
exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can
only be done in in flagrante cases, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the
accused appellants was based solely on the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance
of the place was conducted

PEOPLE VS. AQUINO, 122 S 799

Facts:

The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped and
struck with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her statement
which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos.
Carmelita Morado was taken to the hospital in serious condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas,
director of said Medical Center, testified that Carmelita Morado sustained serious
injuries. She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed.
Juanito Aquino was arrested and detained. Appelant pleaded ‘not guilty’ and put up the
defense of insanity. He presented Dr. Echavez, a psychiatrist, to prove insanity. In July
1987, Dr. Echavez conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and
found him to be suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder
with psychosis. Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita Aquino
committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind. The prosecution
presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid before and after the
crime was committed and that he acted with discernment.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense has overcome
the presumption of sanity.

held:

The clinical case report also shows that appellant recalled having taken 120 cubic
centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the
commission of the crime. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some
form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his
reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily
articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of
appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies. The trial court imposed the penalty
of life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of conviction for a felony.

PEOPLE VS. PERALTA, JULY 16, 1986

PEOPLE VS. ULEP, JUNE 20, 1988

Facts:

accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide for the killing of his
wife. trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. accused contended that the
cause of death of his wife was not due to the elbow blows inflicted by him to his wife but
it was due to the long-standing process or condition in her body system, as testified to
by Dr. Pedro Blanco for the defense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is criminally liable

Held:

Yes. "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the
rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended."

We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any
external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and
cause death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some
internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused
such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and
unlawfully inflicted.

PEOPLE VS. MANANQUIL, 132 S 198

US VS. VALDEZ

FACTS:
The accused was in charge of the crew of interisland steamer Vigan. Unsatisfied
with the work of the crew, he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive
epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel, remonstrated, saying that it would be better,
and they would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this
remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards
Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the
accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing
himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared
beneath its surface to be seen no more.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is responsible for the death of Gargantel

HELD:
Yes. It is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely
in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible
for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and
any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same. As was
once said by a British court, "If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate
sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result." The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death
of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide.

USVS. BINDOY, 42 P 497

Facts:
Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused and
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife
and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted
the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself fromPacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest, who was then behind
Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy
appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without
malicious intent.

Issue:
Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable of a crime of Homicide.

Held:
No. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the
Revised Penal Code. The court reasons are that there was no evidence to show that
Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. Second, no evidence that
Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Third, no evidence that
Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. Fourth, no evidence that there was
disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On the contrary, they were
nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other. Lastly, the witness for the
defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had
pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest,
without Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony
of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
US VS. MARASIGAN, 27 P 604

Facts:
Francisco Mendoza had an altercation with Filomeno Marasigan over the
boundaries of their land. It developed into a fight and an as a result Medoza received
three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious
in which the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. Marasigan contended
that the cut in the finger could have been restored through surgical operation and he
should not be held criminally liable.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention has merit

Held:
No. the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a
surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his
crime is not correct. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide
by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

URBANO VS, IAC, JAN. 7, 1988

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his rice field
when he discovered that the place where he stored palay was flooded with water coming
from an irrigation canal. When he investigated the area, he saw Marcelino Javier
(Javier) and Emilio Efre. Javier admitted that he opened the irrigation canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano started to hack Javier with a bolo. Javier was wounded at the right
palm of his hand. Upon intervention, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano agreed to shoulder all the expenses for the medication of the wound of Javier, as
well as to pay also whatever loss of income Javier may have suffered. Javier, on the
other hand, signed a statement of his forgiveness towards Urbano and on that condition,
he withdrew the complaint that he filed against Urbano. After several weeks of
treatments and medication, the doctor pronounced that the wound of Javier was already
healed. However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital when he had
sudden lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus
toxin which infected from the healing wound in his right palm of his hand. The following
day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. The heirs of Javier filed a case of homicide
against Urbano. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the
trial court and on appeal by the Intermediate Appellate Court. Urbano then filed a
motion for a new trial based on the affidavit sworn by the Barangay Captain who stated
that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5.
The motion was denied by the respondent court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier may be considered as the
proximate cause of the latter’s death.

HELD:

No, the wound inflicted by Urbano cannot be considered as the proximate cause
of Javier’s death. The Court defined proximate cause as “that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” In this case, the death of
the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that Urbano is not liable for the death of Javier.
Urbano is only liable for the physical injuries inflicted to Javier through the wound on
the right palm of his hand.

PEOPLE VS. ILIGAN, 191 S 643

FACTS:

On August 4, 1980, while Esmeraldo Quiñones Jr, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban
were walking, the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and Fernando Iligan
hacked Quiñones Jr with his bolo hitting him on the forehead. The victim was then run
over by a vehicle which caused his death. The defendants alleged alibi and made capital
of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiñones Jr died
because of a vehicular accident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable under Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code

HELD:

Yes. Based on the doctrine that “el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado” (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused, the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. We hold that these requisites are
present in this case.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

PEOPLE VS. GUILLEN, 85 P 307

Facts:

Guillen buried one grenade in a plant pot close to the platform, and from a
distance, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his
speech. Castaneda saw the hissing grenade and kicked it away from the platform. The
grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were
standing close to the platform. Varela was seriously injured and died while Eva, Fabio,
Carillo and Maglalang were wounded. Guillen was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder and is sentenced to death
penalty, to indemnify Valera and to pay the costs.

Issue:

Is Guillen criminally liable although the wrongful act be different from that which
he intended?

Held:

Yes. In throwing a hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing
him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of
his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended to do. A deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence.
PEOPLE VS. PINTO, NOV. 21, 1991

Facts:

Patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of killing not only Bello who was the primary subject of the search
warrant but also 2 others and seriously wounding another in their follow up police
operation. They contended that they should not be held liable for the death of the
innocent victims because they had no intention to injure them.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention is correct

Held:

No. The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended
to injure cannot save them from conviction. Mistake in the identity of the victim carries
the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.

The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such
a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity
as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously.

People vs. Alburquerque, 59 P 150

FACTS:
Gines Albuquerque y Sanchez is a widower of 55 years of age and a father of
9 living children. He has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time and as a
result, he has lost control of movement of his right arm. Appellant lives with daughter
Maria along with other children including one named Pilar who became acquainted and
had intimate relations with the deceased Manuel Osma3.
Appellant’s daughter Pilar, hid her pregnancy from her father; the latter only finding
out about said pregnancy after she had given birth already.
Appellant wrote letters to the deceased which were hostile andthreatening at times and
other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying
her, or at least support her and his
child. Deceased agreed to give the child monthly allowance by way of support but he
never complied with promise. Appellant presented himself at the office of deceased
one day and on that occasion, appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the
deceased causing his death.
Appellant testified that he proposed to said deceased to marry hisdaughter and that
upon hearing the latter refuse to do so, the appellant whipped out his penknife.
Upon seeing attitude of appellant, the deceased seized appellant by the neck
ISSUES: 

Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense or is guilty of the crime of homicide

RULING:
The court ruled the case as one of homicide but the degree of penalization lowered.
Related Provisions: Article 13(3), Revised Penal Code MitigatingCircumstances. — The f
ollowing are mitigating circumstances: 3. That theoffender had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that
committed. Article 49, Revised Penal Code Penalty to Be Imposed Upon the Principals
When the Crime Committed is Different from that Intended.

People vs. Gacogo, 53 P 524

FACTS:

Gacogo quarreled with the victim and had fist blows. The other started to run away and
Gacogo went after him, struck him with a fist blow at the back of the head. Because the
victim was running, he lost balance, he fell on the pavement and his head struck the
cement pavement. The victim suffered cerebral hemorrhage and died as a consequence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gacogo’s claim of having no intention of killing the victim exculpates
him from criminal liability

HELD:

No. His claim is useless. Intent to kill is only relevant when the victim did not die.
Although Gacogo is guilty of homicide, he must be given the benefit of paragraph 3 of
Article 13, that is, “that the offender did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.”

People vs. Pinto, Nov. 21, 1991

Facts:

Patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of killing not only Bello who was the primary subject of the search
warrant but also 2 others and seriously wounding another in their follow up police
operation. They contended that they should not be held liable for the death of the
innocent victims because they had no intention to injure them.
Issue:

Whether or not the contention is correct

Held: No. The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended
to injure cannot save them from conviction. Mistake in the identity of the victim carries
the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.

The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such
a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity
as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously.

People vs. Cabareno, Jan. 18, 2001

Facts:

Catedrilla went to the place where there was a commotion to pacify Pestillo and the
younger brother of Manolo. He was followed by Nerio Casaquite. When Catedrilla
reached the place, appellantt, shot him at the back with a 10 inch long firearm. However,
instead of the bullet hitting Catedrilla, it hit the back of Nerio Casaquite. Nerio
Casaquite fell to the ground, while appellant fled from the scene.

Issue:

Whether or not Cabareno is criminally liable

Held:

Yes. In the present case, appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite, even
if the former’s intended target when he fired the gun was supposedly Catedrillo.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the actual
victim be different from the one intended. As held in US v. Diana decided by the Court
as early as 1915," [t]he same crime would have been committed if the injured man and
the deceased had been Dionisio Legara, instead of the defendant’s nephew; the crime of
homicide would have been committed just the same and one man would have been
deprived of his life by the criminal act of another.
People vs. Jaurige, 76 P 724 (Feb. 21, 1946)

Facts:

Amado embraced Avelina, kissed her and touched her breasts. From then on, she
carried a long fan knife for self-protection. About midnight, Amado climbed up her
house and entered the room where she was sleeping. Amado felt her forehead with the
intention of abusing her. She screamed awakening her parents. After few days, Nicolas
and Avelina went to a church where Amado sat beside Avelina and placed his hand on
the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina pulled out with her right hand the fan knife
with the intention of punishing his hand, but she quickly stabbed him once at the base of
the left side of the neck. Amado died. Nicolas was acquitted but Avelina was found guilty
of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not Avelina’s act is self-defense to be exempted from criminal liability.

Held:

No. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability. The means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive. There could be no
possibility of being raped under the circumstances. Nor the aggravating circumstance
that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally
sustained as there is no evidence to show that Nicolas and Avelina had murder in her
heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature.
She happened to kill under the greatest provocation.

People vs. Gacogo 53 P 524

FACTS:

Gacogo quarreled with the victim and had fist blows. The other started to run away and
Gacogo went after him, struck him with a fist blow at the back of the head. Because the
victim was running, he lost balance, he fell on the pavement and his head struck the
cement pavement. The victim suffered cerebral hemorrhage and died as a consequence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gacogo’s claim of having no intention of killing the victim exculpates
him from criminal liability

HELD:

No. His claim is useless. Intent to kill is only relevant when the victim did not die.
Although Gacogo is guilty of homicide, he must be given the benefit of paragraph 3 of
Article 13, that is, “that the offender did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.”

People vs. Abare, Dec. 18, 2008

FACTS: Marcelino Abare was charged for murder qualified by treachery for taking the
life of Samson Cuyogan. The victim was stabbed in the neck by a scythe. According to
the accused, he had an altercation with the victim when he demanded the full payment
of wages due him for the installation of a deep-well but he did not intend to kill the
victim.

ISSUE: Should the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong

be appreciated in the case at bar?

HELD: No. The mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as

that committed and that sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act, find no application to the case at bar. In the first place,
the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be
appreciated in cases of murder qualified by treachery. Moreover, the reply of the victim,
"Problema mo 'yan, hindi ko problema yan," can hardly be considered a sufficient
provocation to warrant the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Badriago, May 8, 2009

Facts:

On the morning of September 13, 2002, Adrian Quinto was asked by his mother to bring
a letter to one Berting Bello at Barangay Guindapunan,Leyte. He drove a tricycle to
deliver the letter along with his younger brother, Oliver. After finishing the errand, they
headed back to the town plaza where their mother was waiting for them. Before they
could reach their destination, however, they were approached by Bonifacio Badriago at
Sitio Mombon in Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang
or long bolo on his lumbar area Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was
able to somehow shield himself. His lower left arm suffered a hack wound as a result.
Struck with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not runaway. He was able to push
Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. He lost consciousness and
only woke up while confined at Carigara District Hospital. His mother later informed
him that Oliver was also attacked and did not survive. Accused-appellant was charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the crime frustrated murder and murder.
Accused-appellant, in his Brief filed before the CA. the instant appeal is partially
granted. Accordingly, in criminal cases no. 4255 accused-appellant is found guilty only
of frustrated homicide and in criminal case no. 4276 accused-appellant is found guilty of
murder.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused- appellant of the
crime of frustrated homicide and murder despite the fact that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

No. Looking at the victims' wounds, however, we cannot count the circumstance in
accused-appellant's favor. Adrian suffered a hacking wound on his left forearm that
caused near amputation, and another one on his lumbar area. These wounds would have
been fatal were it not for timely medical assistance. Oliver, on the other hand, bore the
brunt of the attack with eleven (11) different stab wounds, including one on the skull and
on the chest. The number, location, and nature of these stab wounds belie accused-
appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against his victim.

Urbano vs. People, Jan. 20, 2009

Facts: The petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," to the deceased Tomelden. The blow
caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. 1 week later, Tomelden
died. The cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident. The defense presented
petitioner who denied having any intention to kill.

Issue: whether the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem would apply?

Held: Yes. There was notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting
crime.

People vs. Kagalangan , CA 40 OG 4323

People vs. Saladino, 89 P 807

Facts:
Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his 13-yr old niece.
Considering the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted three (3) death penalties
pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted
rape, and sentenced him to serve an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in imposing death penalty pursuant to RA 7659.
Held:
The lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos 20 the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being
special qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the
death penalty cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove
complainant’s minority and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both
minority and relationship in the four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It
is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both
relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as
punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accused-appellant’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Thus, he
can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua..

INTOD VS CA
215 S 52 OCTOBER 21, 1992

Facts:

On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house
of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan
who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be
killed. On February 4, 1979 10:00 pm, All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's
house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room. The RTC
convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness.

Issue:

Whether or not Intod is guilty of attempted murder since it is an impossible

crime under Art. 4.

Held:

YES. petition is GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding

Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED, sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
PEOPLE VS. GUMIMBA,
FEB. 27, 2007

Facts:

Appellant and his co-accused Abapo dragged the victim to a grassy area and tied latter’s
hands with banana skin. Apabo raped the victim first and appellant followed suit. Once
they had finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the victim with a long
bolo. Appellant contended that he can only be convicted of simple rape, as this is the
only crime to which he has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been
dead after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at
most, would be guilty of an impossible crime.

The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant
was sentenced to suffer the deathpenalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the life of the victim,P30,000.00
as moral damages, and costs. On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo. With
the death penalty imposedon appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic
review. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the appellant’s conviction, but with
modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of his
improvident plea of guilt

HELD:

No. Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have
known positively that the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition
not only completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause
of death. In light of the particular circumstances of the event, appellant's mere
conjecture that AAA had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be sufficient
to support his assertion of an impossible crime.

PEOPLE VS. ENOJA

MARCH 13, 2009

Facts:

That on or about July 2, 1987, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Province of Iloilo,

Philippines, Nicasio Enoja, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with Jose Enoja, Antonio Galuar, Ronnie Enoja and Yolly Armada, armed with firearms
and taking advantage of superior strength to better realize their purpose, with treachery
and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one SIEGFRED INSULAR with said
weapon with which they were then provided, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot
wounds on the vital parts of his body which caused his death thereafter. The accused
appealed and present the theory that even assuming they participated in the killing of
Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible crime
under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59 thereof.
Appellants theorize that the shots first fired by Armada already resulted in the death of
the victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim merely constitutes the
impossible crime of killing an already dead person.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense committed was an impossible crime.

Held:

The proposition not only completely contradicts their defense of alibi and denial,
it is also speculative as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is
irreconcilable with alibi. For alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must show that he
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime,
or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission and that his presence elsewhere
renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party. In this case, Nicasio admitted he
was within the vicinity of the crime but presented the lame excuse that he was inside
Salamanca's rice mill at the time of the shooting. His son, Arnold, corroborated this
testimony. But it was put in doubt by the testimony of Salamanca, who stated that no
milling of palay in his ricemill was going on at the time of the shooting. Alibi, especially
when it is corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by this
Court with extreme suspicion for alibi is easy to fabricate and concoct. Wherefore, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No.
31550, convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja and Ronnie Enoja of the crime of
Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS. MAURICIO, FEB. 28, 2001

FACTS:

Jonalyn Mauricio, the 11-year old daughter of herein accused was raped by the latter for
several times from 1995 until August 1997. During those said times, Jonalyn did not
complain nor exposed to anyone what his father was doing to her, not even her
grandparents who are also living with her and her father. But on Augst 16, 1997, when
she tried, although unsuccessfully, to escape her father who later on returned to his
senses and apologized, Jonalyn finally broke her silence to her neighbor who then called
and asked Bantay Bata 163 for assistance. Because of the statements of Jonalyn and the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, including the findings on the medico-legal of
victim that Jonalyn was in a nonvirgin state, the trial court found Daniel Mauricio guilty
of rape and sentenced him to death. He was also found guilty on attempted rape in the
other case. The defense counsel, however, prayed that the conviction against Daniel
Mauricio be modified wherein the death penalty that was meted out on him should be
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua. The Solicitor General, in his Manifestation and Motion
in Lieu of Brief, made a recommendation to the same effect. Because of a simple,
although vital, omission in the two Information filed by the City Prosecutor’s Office
charging Mauricio with rape, two issues arise.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Daniel Mauricio be sentenced to death for having found guilty of
rape.

RULING:

We sustain the conviction of Daniel Mauricio for rape. His barefaced,

uncorroborated denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of his victim. When a
rape victim's testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-
examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points,
the same must be given full faith and credit. We cannot, however, sustain the imposition
of the death penalty. In the case at bar, although the Information did properly allege the
complainant's minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant
and accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved
during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to
qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would lead to a denial of
accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him. Thus, for this oversight, accused-appellant can only be
convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

US VS. NAMAJA

Facts:

The accused was arrested while he was detaching wood panels in a store. He was
already able to detach two panels.
Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted robbery.

Held:

No, since the act of removing the panel indicates only an intention to enter. The
removal of the paneling is just an attempt to trespass, not an attempt to rob. Although,
Namaja was prosecuted for attempted robbery, the Supreme Court held it is only
attempted trespass because that is the crime that can be directly linked to his act of
removing the wood panel. There are some acts which are ingredients of a certain crime,
but which are, by themselves, already criminal offenses.

US VS. BORINAGA, 55 P 439

Facts:

Mooney, an American resident of Calubian Leyte, while seated on a chair on

evening of March 4, 1929, was struck with a knife by Borinaga, but the knife lodged in
the back of the chair causing the former to fall without injuring him. The assailant
persistent to kill the american returned with a knife but was unable to do so because the
latter was already on guard and turned a flashlight on which frightened the
assailant.The foregoing caused the perpetrator to be convicted for the crime of
frustrated murder.

Issue:

Is Borinaga guilty of frustrated murder or attempted murder?

Held:

YES. That within the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code, the crime committed was
frustrated murder and not attempted murder. The author performed all the acts of
execution. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant
completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.

People vs. Pilones, 84 S 168

Facts:
 The house was stoned where the wake was held. Inside were Ilagan, Tony and
others. As Ilagan stood on the lighted street to check, he was shotin his knee. Tony came
to his assistance but was also shot. Tony died on the way to hospital while Ilagan was
treated for 2 weeks. Assailant was identified as Manuel Pilones where he was convicted
of murder of Tony and frustrated murder of Ilagan.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated murder.

Held:
No. The wound in his knee is not sufficient to cause his death. The accused did
not perform all the acts of execution that would bring about the death of Ilagan. The
crime is attempted murder.

People vs. sy Pio, 94 P 885

Facts:

Sy Pio entered a store in Sta Cruz, Manila one morning and started firing a .45 caliber
pistol. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Then the accused turned around and shot Tan
Siong Kiap on his right shoulder when the latter asked Sy Pio, "What is the idea?"
Thereafter, Kiap ran to a room behind the store to hide. He heard several gunshots
before the accused ran away. Sy Pio was found guilty of frustrated murder against the
person of Kiap by the CFI of Manila. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime committed against Kiap is frustrated murder.

Held:

Sy Pio is only guilty of attempted murder because he did not perform all the acts
of execution. When he hit Kiap, he knew that the latter was able to escape. This fact
must have produced in his mind that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of
the body. Still, with this knowledge, he did not pursue Kiap and instead chose to run
away.

People vs. Brioso, March 13, 2009

Fact:
 Appellant Brioso is charged with raping the 13-year old daughter of his common-
law wife. The appellate court properly appreciated the twin aggravating circumstances
of minority when the victim's just 12 years old when she was first sexually assaulted and
relationship admitting that he’s the common-law husband of the victim’s mother.

Issue:
Whether or not Brioso is guilty of consummated rape.

Held:
No, since there’s was no showing that appellant succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of the victim. Affirmed w modifications, the accused is guilty of attempted
qualified rape sentenced to prision mayor and 2 counts of qualified rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for each count.

People vs. Contreras, 338 S 622, Aug. 23, 2000

Facts:
Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape of a six-year old girl. The witness Nelene
Diaz admitted that she did not really see whether accused-appellant was able to insert
his organ into Angelic’s vagina or even whether his penis contacted the labia of her
vagina. All she said was that when she saw them, his zipper was open and his penis was
out while Angelique was sitting on his lap with legs spread out, that she was not wearing
any panty at all. Stephanie even testified that hindi inano si Angelique dahil nakita na ng
mama ko.

Issue:
Can the appellant be convicted of attempted rape?

Held:
No. The four elements of an attempted felony were established. However, these must be
shown to have been carried out under any of the three circumstances in which the crime
of rape may be committed. In this case, none of these circumstances was proven. Force
or intimidation was not shown. Neither was the victim’s lack of reason or her
unconsciousness substantiated.

People vs. Mingming, Dec. 10, 2008

Facts:

Accused-appellant Catalino Mingming sexually abuses and molested with one AAA, a
virgin and 10 year who happen who be happened to be their neighbor. Sometime in May
1998, AAA answered the call of nature in a vacant lot outside their house when Catalino
appeared, grabbed and pulled her ankle and laid her down on bundles of woods. To
subdue her, catalino covered her mouth and poked a kitchen knife at her neck, and
proceed to have sexual intercourse with her. Done with act, He threatened her. The
sexual abuse was repeated on June 29, 1998. He was convicted of three counts of
statutory rape and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

Issue:

Whether the appellant is criminally liable for three counts of statutory rape

Held:

No. Only two counts of rape. In making this conclusion, we are keenly aware that
without proof of penetration, the crime committed may still constitute attempted rape
or acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape, however, requires that the offender
commence the commission of rape directly by overt acts but does not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. The detailed acts of execution showing an attempt to rape are simply lacking.
Thus, we cannot hold Catalino liable for attempted rape. In the same manner, neither
can we hold him liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

Martinez vs. CA, 521 S 176, April 13, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder but the trial court convicted him of
frustrated homicide for stabbing Dean Dongui-is with a bolo. The victim sustained two
stab wounds in the anterior chest and a lacerated wound in the right elbow , forearm.
Had it not been for the blood clot that prevented the heart from bleeding excessively,
Dean would have died from profuse bleeding. On appeal, petitioner argues that should
he be convicted of any crime, it should be of less serious physical injuries only, absence
the element of intent to kill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Martinez is guilty of frustrated murder

HELD:
Yes. The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:1. The offender performs
all the acts of execution;2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence;3. But the felony is not produced;4. By reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.

A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is
necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.

Esquida vs People, June 18, 2009

Facts:
Venancia and her live-in partner had no inkling that they would be attacked since
petitioner did not reveal his true identity to the victims. His partner in crime
misrepresented that they were the men of Sgt. Torres and with them was Toto Vibar, the
son of the barangay captain. Petitioner misled the victims, so the latter lowered their
guard and suspicion. Thereafter, when the door was opened, the malefactors attacked
them. Trial court found Edgar Esqueda guilty of crime of frustrated homicide upon
stabbing one Venancia Aliser with the use of a knife thereby inflicting upon the said
victim multiple injuries. Esqueda filed petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
and Resolution of the CA affirming the trial court’s judgement finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt if the crime of frustrated homicide.

Issue:
What stage of execution was committed?

Held:
Frustrated murder. Petitioner did all that was necessary to bring an end to the life of
Venancia. However, the crime was not produced by reason of the timely medical
intervention. Dr. Aurelia said that the wounds suffered by Venancia might have been
caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and without proper medical
attendance it might have resulted to death.

Mahawan vs. People, Dec. 18, 2008

Facts:

Accused appellant was convicted for the crime of frustrated homicide. Appellant
contended that he had no intention to kill the victim.

Issue:

Whether or not intent to kill is an element of frustrated homicide

Held:

Yes. An essential element of homicide, whether in its consummated, frustrated or

attempted stage, is intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal
intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

People vs. Castro, Dec. 17, 2008

Facts:
The accused, Marlo Castro, was trialed and was found guilty for the crime of rape.
The accused then filed an appeal questioning the credibility of complainant, stating that
victim did not particularly described the details of the alleged rape and that the victim
did not state that the accused succeeded in inserting his penis into the victim’s vagina,
thus undermining her allegations of consummated rape.

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances made the accused liable for consummated
rape.

Held:
The court sustained its decision and raised that for the crime of consummated
rape, “full or deep penetration is not necessary to consummate sexual intercourse; it is
enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ”. That mere touching of the male organ to the labia of a woman’s private part is
sufficient to consummate rape.

People vs. Orita, 184 S 105

FACTS:
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year old
student, was suddenly held and poked with a knife on her neck by the accused. She was
then forced to take off her clothes and ordered to lie down. Appellant however could not
fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving.
Complainant was able to escape and darted to the municipal building where a policeman
was able to help her. The medical examination revealed that her hymen intact and
vaginal canal tight. The trial court convicted him for frustrated rape.

ISSUE: Is the conviction proper? W/N the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?

HELD: No. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Clearly, in the crime of
rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.

The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate
does not exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was
erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary
congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not
rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was
uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim
positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially. We find the
evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape.

US vs. Valdez

Facts:
In a prosecution for homicide the case against the accused was that he had made a
criminal assault upon another person while the two were in a small boat, under such
circumstances that the party assailed, believing his life in danger, jumped into the river
in order to escape. His body disappeared beneath the surface and was seen no more.

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances made the accused liable for homicide.

Held:
If a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be
in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water,
impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in
case death results by drowning.

People vs. Garcia

Facts:

On Sept 26, 1999 the petitioner Fidel Foz and Armando Foz were having a drinking
spree at their apartment when Manuel Chy asked them to quiet down. Only after the
second time did the group quiet down, however Garcia commented that Chy was being
arrogant and that he would lay a hand on him. A few days later, the group decided to
drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house
and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the
blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to
call the police regarding the mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. The
police came and knocked but there was no answer. Josefina arrived 5minutes later, and
found Chy unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. The cause of death is heart
attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature
as to have caused the death of Chy.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.

Held:

Yes, the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led
to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the heart attack suffered by the
victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had
intended to commit. A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different
from the one he intended. Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without
any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the
minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

PEOPLE VS. ESPIRITU

Facts:
In the Supply Depot of Quezon City, the accused from the pile nine (9) pieces of hospital
linen and took them to their truck, where they were found by a corporal of the Military
Police (MP) when they tried to pass through the checkpoint.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime was considered theft in its consummated stage.

Held:

The court that it was consummated theft. The crime is consummated the moment the
offender gets ahold of the thing taken and/or is in a position to dispose of it freely.

US vs. Diño

Facts:

On June 20, 1946, Roberto Diño was hired as a driver of the US army at a stationin
Quezon City. At above 11:30 in the morning, he brought a truck load of articlesto manila
harbor; the article came from the US army. At the check point a guard approached the
truck and found three boxes, containing ten caliber 30 army rifles.The guard brought
Diño to the lieutenant of the US army for questioning, Diño pointed to the gang but later
denied. Later Diño confessed that there were four persons who placed the boxes on
board and he was instructed to bring them out of the area. While they were to meet after
the truck passed the checkpoint.

Issue:

Whether or not Diño can be convicted of the crime of consummated theft

Ruling:

It was held that the crime committed was frustrated theft, because of the timely
discovery of the boxes on the truck before it could pass out of the check point. in order
for the crime of theft to be consummated the article should have passed the checkpoint,
so that the thief could have full control and could dispense of the property

US vs. Adiao, 38 P 754

Facts:

Adiao abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a Japanese and secreted the belt in
his desk in the Custom House where it was found by other customs employees. Adiao
was charged with the crime of theft. He was found guilty of frustrated theft by the
Municipal Court and appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not all elements of the crime is present so it is a completed crime.

Held:

Yes. Adiao performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment
crime of theft. The fact that Adiao was under observation during the entire transaction
and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House is not decisive.
All the elements of the completed crime of the theft are present.

People vs. Eduave, 36 P 209

Facts:
Defendant Potasio Eduave, who was the paramour of the victim’s mother,
attacked the victim from behind using a bolo producing frightful gash in lumbar region
and severing all muscles and tissue of that part because the latter accused the defendant
of raping her. Knowing that he has already killed the victim, he threw the body into the
bushes and left. Then gave up himself up and declared that he had killed the
complainant.

Issue:
Whether or Not defendant is guilty of the crime frustrated murder.

Held:
Yes. Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. Attacking the victim from behind
severing vital part of the body shows treachery and qualifying it as murder. The crime
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the
will of the offender. Accused did all that was necessary to commit the crime but it did
not result as a consequence due to something beyond his control as victim did not die.

US vs. Valdez, 39 P 240

Facts:

Judgment was rendered whereby Severino or Faustino Valdes y Guilgan was

sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the costs for
the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house. From this judgment this defendant
appealed. Defendant Hugo Navarro’s proceedings were dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not Valdes is guilty of consummated arson.

Held:
 No, the crime is classified only as frustrated arson defendant performed all the
acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes
independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan, March 13, 2009

Facts:

               A.C. Cruz Construction was awarded by the National Housing Authority (NHA)
the original contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services
Project. However, for failure to comply with the work instruction, A.C. Cruz
Construction’s services were terminated by the NHA. But since A.C. Cruz Construction
had already started with the project, it was paid an amount in proportion to what have
they accomplished. Subsequently however, the COA found out that the alleged
accomplishments of A.C. Cruz Construction were just ghost activities. An information
was filed against several NHA Officials, including Lazarte, Jr., for allegedly conspiring
with one another to cause the amount of P232,629.35 to be paid to A.C. Cruz
Construction.

Lazarte, Jr. moved to quash the information filed against them alleging that the
Information was defective because the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense and that the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all
the accused in the information. The Sandiganbayan denied Lazarte, Jr.’s motion to
quash. His motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

               Whether or not the conspiracy alleged pertains to a mode or committing a

crime or constitutive of the crime itself.

Ruling:

The information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. The information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and
Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management
Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance of their
official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with
accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident
bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted
of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount
of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works despite the fact that no
such works were undertaken.
Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime
itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime
only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit
treason, rebellion and sedition.

Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with the
other accused, Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the
Parañaque Police Station, were charged with two (2) counts of murder. Petitioners
assert that there was total absence of evidence to support the theory that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. On March 28, 1995, public respondent
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration. On April 3, 1995,
petitioner Herrrera filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, on May 30, 1995, the latter and
petitioner Mariano filed a petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not acts of the accused constitutes conspiracy.

Held:

Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each
is responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the conspiracy. In the case at bar, petitioner did not do anything to
prevent the killing of the victims, thus, indicative of the fact that they are in unison with
the criminal design of the other accused. The act of one is the act of all. In fact,
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. The petition is denied. Decision of Sandiganbayan is
affirmed with modification.

People vs. Sameniano, Jan. 20, 2009

Facts:

The accused, conspiring and confederating together, hacked to death one Roberto
delos Santos. The Accused pointed out that there was no proof of his participation in the
killing of the victim since Norming testified that he only saw Felicidario wrestled with
Roberto while Aguilar hacked Roberto with a bolo. He argued that the prosecution failed
to prove the existence of conspiracy.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the CA to prosecute the accused is valid.

Held:

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the accused guilt for
the killing of Roberto. As part of the conspiracy, he should be held liable, the Decision of
the CA was affirmed in toto.

People vs. Dela Cruz, Dec. 4, 2008

Facts:

The appellants were charged before the RTC with the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide and robbery in band. Finding all the accused, even those who
did not take active part, equally liable for the crime of robbery with homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellants’ guilt of the crimes charged was proven beyond
reasonable doubt and if they are guilty, whether the trial court imposed the correct
penalties and awarded the proper civil indemnities.

Held:

The court find the appellants guilty of crime of robbery with homicide but modify
the penalties imposed and the amount of the awarded indemnities.

People vs Lopez, April 16, 2009

Facts:
On April 25, 1996 at the Province of Surigao del Sur, accused-appellant Jaime
Lopez with two co-principals was charged of murder to Edencito Chu. Lopez interposed
“defense of relative” and “self-defense” and on appeal faulted the trial court for finding
that conspiracy attended the killing of the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime was out of conspiracy.

Held:
Yes, the evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design to kill Chu.
Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the two other
appellants joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood
along the way. Then, when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and
kicked Chu, enabling Lopez to stab him several times. These indicate a conspiracy.
Wherefore, the appeal is denied, the decision of the CA was affirmed.