Samira Elmi Bachelor's Thesis SOCK01
Samira Elmi Bachelor's Thesis SOCK01
Department of Sociology
State-building in Somalia
Voices from the “International community” and the
“Somali diaspora”
Somalia has been a failed state since 1991, which has made it questionable whether the
country would be able to rebuild its state. This thesis aims at understanding the factors
affecting the state-building process in the country based on voices from interviewees
belonging to the “International community” and the “Somali diaspora”. To gain an
understanding of what implications the factors could have on the reconstitution of a Somali
state, a Weberian inspired theoretical framework was applied. This thesis argues that three
main categories i.e. political, social and economic factors can be identified as having
implications on the state-building process. However, the political aspects are highlighted as
the most important. Furthermore it is argued that the ideal state model, as a Eurocentric
discourse, evolves to the “hegemonic powers” advantage, thus supporting their dominant
position, which makes it questionable if the Somali state can adapt to such a model.
Keywords: Somalia; state-building; Weberian ideal state; social contract; power relationships;
Eurocentric discourse
ii
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
8. References ..................................................................................................... 26
List of interviewees .......................................................................................... 26
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 26
Endnotes .............................................................................................................. 31
iii
List of abbreviations
EU – European Unions
AU – African Union
UI – Utrikespolitiska institutet
UN – United Nations
iv
1. Introduction
“Before you can have democracy or economic development, you have to have a state”. 1 But,
how does a country build a state? During the 1980s and early 1990s a neoliberali view
dominated development policy discussions; thus, questions of state-building and state
capacity were excluded. As part of the push for liberalization and a minimalistic state, the
scope of the state was reduced in developing countries through privatization, subsidy cuts,
deregulation etc. However, these donor-imposed programs were often counterproductive. In
many African states for example, former colonial administrative systems existed alongside
neopatrimonialii regimes that competed for resources and often felt threatened by Weberian
rational bureaucracy. Donor conditionality was therefore used as an excuse by regimes to
expand and protect the scope of the neopatrimonial state, while reducing the “modern” state
sectors.2 Today, several African states are among the weakest in the world;3 unable to
preserve rule of law, guarantee territorial integrity and support development among other
Weberian state functions.4 During the 1990s, the weakness or collapse of these states resulted
in human rights and humanitarian disasters in countries like Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor and
Somalia.5 Subsequently, it has been concluded that development is mostly affected by
institutional and political rather than economic factors.6
In the case of Somalia, there was an inability to establish a central government after the
downfall of the dictatorial Barre regime in 1991. In a state of anarchy, clan-based groupings
(Somaliland and Puntland) and militant Islamic groupings (southern and central Somalia)
gained control of different parts of the country.7 Several internal and external actors tried and
failed in reconstructing the Somali state. Due to these failures, the world community’s
involvement in the country was reduced to food aid.8 However, as global problems such as
terrorism, poverty, trafficking and AIDS are seen as closely related to weakness or failure of
states,9 the world once again turned its attention to Somalia during the 21st century as the
1 Fukuyama, Francis. “STATENESS” FIRST. Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, Nr.1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005 p.84
[DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0006]
2 Fukuyama, Francis. The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, Vol.15, Nr.2, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004,
p.25; Leonard, David K. with Samantar, Mohamed S.. What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract and the State?.
International Institute of Social Studies, Development and Change 42(2), Published by Blackwell Publishing, 2011 p.559 [DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01702.x]
8 Shinn, David H. ‘Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality’. In Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Predicaments in the
Horn of Africa: 10 years of SIRC Conferences in Lund on the Horn of Africa. Lund: Media-Tryck, Lund University, 2012, p.15
9 Fukuyama 2004:17-18
1
instable situation in the country affected both regional and international peace and security.10
It is therefore questionable whether a Weberian state, that has monopolized the legitimate
claim on force within a territorial jurisdiction,11 can be established. A post-transitional
government, which was established in August 2012 to assist the state building process in
Somalia, is experiencing dire obstacles.12
This has been the basis of the research question this thesis has been built around: What
factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali state? This thesis aims at
understanding the factors that could affect the state-building process in Somalia based on
views of interviewees from both the “Somali diaspora” and the “International community”.
The identified factors are analyzed in relation to a theoretical framework, which is mainly
based on the Weberian concept of state, since it is a guideline for defining a state. Rousseau’s
concept of the social contract is also consulted in this framework, as it is assumed that the
state is established on the basis of such a contract. According to D.K. Leonard and M.S.
Samantar “[t]hese assumptions and attendant ones about how a social contract is established
implicitly guide most international efforts to deal with collapsed states.”13 These conceptual
tools are complimented with other theories that expand the possibilities for analyzing the
identified factors.
The study is delimited in accordance to ethnic heritage, political knowledge and residency
in Sweden, when it comes to the interviewees belonging to the category “Somali diaspora”.
The “International community” is delimited to non-ethnic Somalis, who have worked with
questions concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping and human rights etc. Both of these
communities can be seen as consisting of several different actors, therefore the interviewees
opinions are not seen as representative for the whole community.
This thesis has been structured so that previous research is firstly presented to give a brief
insight into the field that is followed by the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built.
This section is accompanied by a short description of the limitations of a Weberian
framework. After a methodological discussion, a historical background gives a contextual
framework to highlight the internal and external aspects of the Somali state-building process.
Thereafter, main factors identified by the interviewees shall be presented with an analysis
based on the theoretical framework. This thesis will end with a critical discussion highlighting
10 Frisell, Eva Hagström; Lindell, Magdalena Tham and Skeppström, Emma. Land i sikte? – EU:s samlade ansats gentemot Somalia.
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Report nr: FOI-R--3462--SE, 2012, p.9;14-15
11 Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. (n.d.) Trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York: The
2
the limitations of the Weberian ideal state model in its application to the Somali stat-building
process.
2. Previous research
Several studies have been done on failed or weak African states, where focus mainly has been
on factors contributing to their failure. Since 9/11 this particular phenomena has been
associated with terrorism, transnational crime etc. according to Harry Verhoeven. Verhoeven
challenges this “Orthodox Failed State Narrative”, which parallels state failure with terrorism
and anarchy, by emphasizing the development of political entities capable of providing
stability and order within the Somali territory.14 In comparison to Verhoeven’s study, a
critical approach to international narratives is not taken in this thesis. However, of particular
importance for this study is one of Verhoeven’s concluding remarks, which highlights the
difficulties with reconstituting a Somali state:
The international community would do well to enter into far more dynamic,
nuanced engagements with collapsed states - instead of being (selfishly) security-
obsessed, it should explore how alternative forms of legitimate political authority
can help bring about the substantive freedoms people need to realise their
fundamental aspirations.15
This is also a factor Leonard with Samantar point to, when they state that:
[…] the fixation of the international community on state governance has inhibited
the development of other, more feasible, forms of governance (which, even if
imperfect, would be better than the collapsed states)16
In contrary to Verhoeven, Leonard with Samantar tries to gain knowledge about the social
contract through highlighting contemporary Somali polities, while the social contract in this
study is used as an analytical tool applied on interview material.17
Furthermore, researchers, like Hussein Ahmed Warsame18, Mwangi S. Kimenyi et.al.19 and
J. Peter Pham20, have also focused on the process of reconstituting a Somali state, not least
concerning the international involvement in such a transformative process. Similar to this
14 Verhoeven p.405-25
15 Ibid. p.418
16 Leonard with Samantar p.561
17 Ibid.
18 Warsame, Hussein Ahmed. Role of International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali State. Bildhaan, An International
Middle East and Africa, 2 Taylor & Francis Group, 2011, pp.153–187 [DOI: 10.1080/21520844.2011.617238]
3
thesis, Kimenyi et.al. include the Weberian concept of state. However, it is used as a tool to
characterize state failure,21 which is not the objective of this study.
3. Theoretical framework
The starting point of the following theoretical framework is the political sociology of Max
Weber, where the main concepts of state and legitimacy are outlined. Thereafter, the basis for
building a state is predominantly founded on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of social
contract. Rousseau was an advocator for egalitarianism; i.e. the equality of humans; equal
voting rights for all men (excluding women) and participatory democracy.22 As these concepts
are similar to those of the traditional Somali kinship system (see Pre-colonization:
Traditional kinship society) Rousseau’s concept of social contract is seen as most applicable
in the case of Somalia in relation to other contractual theorists. Furthermore, as Michel
Foucault states that power is everywhere,23 this concept of power is seen to enable a wide
applicability in the case of the Somali state-building process. In addition, John Searle’s theory
on the construction of social reality is seen as a compliment to these theories.
State-building
What is a state? In the Weberian sense a state has monopolized the legitimate claim on force
within a given territorial jurisdiction. Weber describes it as:
Furthermore, characteristic for the modern state is the existence of rule of law, i.e. a legal and
administrative order, which is changeable by law. The rule of law holds authority over
citizens and all actions taken within its territory.25
There are two distinguishing aspects of the Weberian ideal state. Firstly, the definition
implies a form of bureaucratic apparatus i.e. administrative staff. Secondly, the administrative
authoritative rule is established on a monopoly of legitimate use of force. Thereby, legitimacy
of authority must exist when enforcing order. However, “no system of authority voluntarily
limits itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives on as the basis of
4
guaranteeing its continuance”,26 according to Weber. Moreover, variations in obedience and
exercising authority for example depend on the type of legitimacy that is claimed. Weber
identifies three ideal types of legitimate authority; legal, traditional and charismatic authority;
each with a different basis for legitimacy. Within a system of impersonal order, legitimacy is
obtained on a rational basis i.e. the belief that authority will follow the rule of law, thus legal
authority is achieved, which is in accordance with the Weberian definition of a modern state.
If legitimacy is, however, based on the sanctity of tradition; as in kinship systems, monarchies
among others; the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty, whereby traditional
authority is attained. In the case of charismatic authority, an individual’s characteristic
qualities are the basis for obedience.27 By obeying authority, order can be enforced and if the
states monopoly of force is seen as legitimate by the member of the state the states survival
chances are improved. The monopoly of the use of force is according to Weber an essential
character of the modern state.28
Theoretically, states can be seen as built through warfare or on the basis of a social
contract. According to Charles Tilly, warfare created the European state apparatus, based on
interaction between military machinery and the development of the market.29 Through
increasing control and monitoring means of violence,30 power holders concentrated the means
of coercion within a territory.31 Additionally, an administrative state structure was created to
control and extract resources from the population for sustaining the army. Thereby, power
holders became involved in capital accumulation, dispute settlements, distribution of services
and goods, among other things.32 However, Tilly's theory on state-building through warfare is
not applicable to post-colonial African states, which inherited administrative systems33 and
were territorially divided by former colonial powers.34 Yet, as the African continent is
currently facing several intra-and-interstate conflicts,35 the emergence of new state formations
cannot be excluded, which the division of Sudan36 exemplifies. Therefore, state-building
through warfare might still be a plausible way for establishing a state.
26 Weber p.325
27 Ibid. pp.325-28
28 Ibid. p.156
29 Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., (revised paperback edition),
1992. p.94
30 Ibid. p.68
31 Ibid. p.20
32 Ibid. pp.19-20
33 Fukuyama 2004:26-29
34 Lewis, Ioan M. A Modern History of Somalia – Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980.p. iv
35 Wai, Zubairu. Neo-patrimonialism and the discourse of state failure in Africa. Review of African Political Economy, Vol.39 Nr.131,
2012, p. 29 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2012.658719]
36 Bereketeab, Redie. Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: challenges to postcolonial state-building. Discussion
paper 75; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Milton Keynes: Lightning Source UK Ltd., 2012, p.11
5
On the other hand, contractual theorist Rousseau asserts that when humans lack the power
to overcome the obstacles of their preservation in the state of nature, the only means for
survival is uniting their powers.37 However, Rousseau states that the difficulty is:
[…] to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while
uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before.38
The solution is the social contact, by which each individual unites himself and his power in
command under the general will, and in their shared capacity each member becomes an
inseparable part of the whole.39 Moreover, the general will is based on common denominators
of different interests, thus, society should be governed by the general will.40 Ergo, this
contract creates a unified moral and collective body, with a common will. The public person,
formed by the unification of people, constitutes the state.41
Despite losing one’s natural freedom through contractual consolidation, the individual
gains civil liberties, moral liberty and the proprietorship of his possessions. Through moral
liberty i.e. obeying laws that he himself has prescribed, the individual acquires freedom
within the state.42 Hence, the purpose of the social contract is the prosperity and preservation
of its members.43 It can be seen as regulating the relationship between the state and its
citizens.44 However, if the social contract is breached the state dissolves into anarchy.45
In both Weber’s and Rousseau’s conceptual frameworks forces of power are highlighted in
different ways. The states capacity to enforce order is based on its ability to monopolize force,
which is dependent on its ability to gain obedience, and ultimately through legitimacy of
authority it gains power through the members of the state. For Rousseau the social contract is
a consolidation of power; the unification of each members force; thus the construction of a
contract is built around the concept of power. Furthermore, within the state the general will,
can be seen as holding power over the single individual, however, as he is a constituent of the
public body, he gains power in the form of moral liberty. Thus, power relationships are
illustrated through the social contract. Similarly, power plays a role within the state-building
37 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Om Samhällsfördraget eller Statsrättens grunder. 1762. Trans. Sven Åke Heed and Jan Stolpe, Stockholm:
Natur & Kultur, 2009, p.27
38 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. 1761. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. New York: Prometheus Books, 1988.p.23
39 Rousseau 2009:29
40 Ibid. p.39
41 Ibid. p.30
42 Ibid. p.33-34
43 Ibid. p.99
44 Ibid. p.47
45 Ibid. pp.102-03
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process presented by Tilly, in which power holder concentrate power over a territory, army
and population.
Foucault states that power is everywhere, as it is exercised in the interaction between
people or groups of people, thereby power is a relationship. It is dynamic; constantly active
and changeable within relative strengths. Relative strengths of people or groups of people
exist in power relationships.46 An important aspect of Foucault’s concept of power is that it is
not limited to state-centric power struggles.47 The relative strengths within interpersonal
relationships are dependent on differences in for example ethnicity, knowledge, gender, and
social position. However, the degree of relevance and importance of these factors are decided
by deeper power structures,48 as some power relationships can become institutionalized,49 and
power relationships and their power techniques can become intertwined and develop into
bigger institutions if they find support within each other.50 Each power relationship holds a
momentary position within a continuous struggle. The existence of diverse relative strengths
within power relationships, in a context, constitutes the continuous struggle that increases risk
or chance for transformation of the relative strengths within each power relationship.
Therefore, transformation of the power relationship is affected by other relative strengths and
conditions, thus, the subordinate actor might not actively guard their interests as the dominant
actor due to having a higher chance of changing their position within another power
relationship.51 Furthermore, Foucault point to the relationship between power and knowledge,
and states that the utilization of knowledge increases the relative strengths within power
relations and enables the exercise of power.52 The interplay between power and knowledge
signifies the constitution of power through accepted forms of knowledge, “truth” and
scientific understanding. According to Foucault, each society has a regime of truth i.e. a
system of truth conditions, discourses and theories, which has evolved within the local
continuous struggle. When well established, this regime of truth becomes the basis for the
relative strengths within power relationships in a society. Furthermore it functions as a
fulcrum for the dominating actor’s exercise of power.53
As the interplay between the concept of state, state-building (through warfare or social
contract) and power have been illustrated, the remaining question is: How are these concepts
46 Hörnqvist p.28-30
47 Ibid. p.50
48 Ibid. p.52
49 Ibid. p.47
50 Ibid. p.55
51 Ibid. p.37-8
52 Ibid. p.153
53 Ibid. pp.165-9
7
shared in social reality? According to Searle some facts, so called institutional facts, within
social reality only exist on the basis of human institutions.54 Humans assign certain functions
to objects, which are assigned in relation to the users and the observers’ interests. Thereby, it
is assigned functions that are not possible merely based on the objects physical attributes.55
However, human institutions, which create institutional facts, are based on collectively
accepted rules.56 These facts are created through the application of certain rules that exist
within this system, whereby the status of an assigned function is collectively acknowledged.57
Thus, a specific object (X) is identified as (Y) in a specific context (C).58 Subsequently, the
assigned status function (Y) also allots a subject with certain deontic power i.e. obligations,
rights, restrictions etc.59
Hence, in reference to Searle’s concept of institution, legitimacy of authority within a state
is based on collectively identifying a specific authority (X) as having legitimacy (Y) within a
given territory (C), and the basis for legitimacy i.e. the collectively accepted rules are either
legal, traditional or charismatic, according to Weber. Thus, the status function of legitimacy
assigns this authority with deontic power. In a similar way the social contract can be
interpreted; by commonly identifying the social contract (X) as regulating the relationship
between state and citizen (Y) within a society (C) deontic power is created.
54 Hörnqvist pp.15-16
55 Searle, John R. Konstruktionen av den sociala verkligheten. Trans. Staffan Ahlin, Göteborg: Bokförlaget Daidalos AB, 1997, p.241
56 Ibid. p.141
57 Ibid. p.55
58 Ibid. p.127
59 Ibid pp.113-14
60 Boatcă, Manuela., ‘‘FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GERMANISM’’: A POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUE OF WEBER’S
THEORY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, Postcolonial Sociology - Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, p.56
[doi:10.1108]
61 Boatcă p.63
8
[…] a vulgar universalism that disregards specific historical experiences while
subsuming them under the totalitarian grip of a Eurocentric unilinear evolutionist
framework. Explicitly or implicitly, this evolutionist framework produces a
particular notion of history which holds that African phenomena can only really be
understood as mirroring an earlier European history.62
Wai also argues that discourse established by using concepts like neopatrimonialism and state
failure is a function of power, and constructs a reality that supports “the hegemonic power”iii,
thereby, normalizing power relationships.63
As this critique mainly points to the Eurocentric basis for Weber’s theoretical framework, it
is relevant to incorporate these considerations in relation to the factors identified as affecting
the state-building process. However, according to the prescriptions of the world society, a
state is able to gain legitimacy by conforming to a universalistic state model,64 thereby
making the Webarian conceptual framework pertinent for analyzing factors that could affect
such an establishment.
4. Methodological framework
A case study
To identify factors affecting the state building process in Somalia, the methodology employed
throughout the thesis is a single case study on one phenomenon; hence the study is small-
scale, but thick since focus is on one particular situation i.e. the state-building process in
Somalia.65 The study aims at gaining contextual understanding of the case of Somalia, and
not generating generalizing results.66 Case studies can be over-simplified resulting in that
readers draw misleading conclusions, as they presume the result is descriptive of a whole
situation instead of an entity of it.67 Therefore, this thesis stresses that focus is only put on one
entity of the Somali society i.e. the process of reconstituting the state, and thus the aim is not
to describe every aspect of the Somali society.
Interview selection
Different forms of literature (factsheets, articles and books) were read to get an insight into
the situation in Somalia. This clarified the limitations (time, access to the field etc.) the study
would have before “casting a net”, which means calling and e-mailing relevant interviewees.68
62 Wai p.33
63 Ibid. p.41
64 Meyer, Ohn W. ; Boli, John; Thomas, George M. and Ramirez, Francisco O., World Society and the Nation‐State, American Journal
9
Since the situation in Somalia has been turbulent the possibilities to do an ethnographic study
were nonexistent. Through such a method the process of reconstituting the Somali state could
have been understood as it is experienced by people who live in the country.69 That this is not
included could be seen as a limiting factor, as the study lacks firsthand observers to the effects
of the state-building process within the country. Instead the study is based on interviews with
so called “outside observers”, that can be seen as belonging to either the “Somali diaspora” or
the “International community”. Since Somalia has a history of both internal and external
involvement in the state-building process it was considered relevant to reflect voices from
both of these communities. The categorization had a target-oriented basis, that is, interviewee
selection was based on criteria identified as important for each group,70 which also served as
the delimitations for this study. According to Chein target-oriented selections are conducted
so that as much knowledge as possible is attained.71 Therefore, the criteria for the “Somali
diaspora” was Somali ethnicity, knowledge of current Somali politics and residency in
Sweden, whiles the group called the “International community” was delimited to non-ethnic
Somalis, who have worked with issues concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping,
human rights and equivalent issues. However, none of the interviewees’ opinions are seen as
representative for a larger community. Instead, the main objective is to accentuate their views.
The aim was to comprehend what factors the interviewees, as outside observers perceived as
affecting the reestablishment of the Somali state. As the interviewees have different
relationships to Somalia they were able to give different perspectives to the situation.
However, as the focus of this study is to identify factors that could affect the state-building
process, the interview answers are not divided into two different groups, because they are not
seen as two opposing groups in this matter.
The research question – What factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali
state? – became the foundation for the interview guides. To try to achieve a balance between
what Katarina Sjöberg calls the researchers “inside understanding”iv and “outside
understanding”,72 and thus limit the influence of bias the interview questions were based on
knowledge gained from literature. Since, the interview guides were not followed rigorously
the interviews became semi-structured.73
10
Awareness of clan identity and suspicion between clans is a reality, and this could have
become problematic when contacting interviewees with a Somali background. However, the
first Somali interviewee opened doors, like a “gate-keeper”,74 to other interviewees with
different genealogies. Thereby, these were so called snowball selections,75 but in accordance
with characteristics composing the group “Somali diaspora”. E-mails were sent and phone
calls were made to different governmental and international institutions, such as UN’s
Swedish office, UI, EUSR for the Horn of Africa (HOA), FOI, to come in contact with
interviewees that could constitute the group “International community”. However, only two
interviewees were reached using this method; a researcher focused on the HOA and a
diplomat. Through my supervisor I came into contact with a third interviewee; a lieutenant
commander.
The majority of the interviews took place in Malmö. However, three interviews were
conducted in Stockholm, Uppsala and Karlskrona. Only one of the nine interviews was
carried out over the phone and all interviews besides the telephone interview was tape
recorded. As the telephone interview was done in the end phase of this study the possibilities
to travel to interviewee’s hometown were nonexistent. According to Bryman, a telephone
interview does not have to be limiting if the interviewee is open and gives detailed answers,76
which I feel was the case here. The remaining interviews took place where the interviewee
proposed, which was mostly in offices, some at cafés and one took place at the home of an
interviewee. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes (only 2) up to 120 minutes (only 2).
Three of the interviews were conducted in Somali, one in English and the rest in Swedish.
Translations can be problematic when doing interviews in a different language because of
erroneous language translations.77 To prevent this, when difficulties occurred, the
interviewees were asked to specify words and concepts during the interview or afterwards.
After the material was transcribed it was categorized according to the main subjects that the
interviewees identified as affecting the state-building process. The variety composing each
category of interviewees enabled a nuanced identification of factors that could affect the
reconstitution the Somali state. Their voices will serve as the basis for the analysis.
74 Eklund, Lisa. ‘Cadres as Gatekeppers: the art of opening the right doors?’. In Gregory S. Szarycz (ed.), Research Realities in
Social Science: negotiating fieldwork dilemmas. Amherst: Cambia Press, 2010, pp.129-130
75 Bryman pp.196-7
76 Ibid. p.432-33
77 Crang and Cook pp.22-26
11
Ethical considerations
Different research areas have established codes for ethical research,78 however, Alan Bryman
states that the fundamental aspects of ethics is confidentiality, voluntariness, anonymity and
integrity.79 Therefore, this study takes a starting point in these aspects in the discussion of
research ethics.
In accordance with the information and consent criteria of ethical behavior within social
science,80 all involved in this study were informed of the purpose of the study, the
voluntariness of participation and their role in the study before the interviews took place.
According to Mike Crang and Ian Cook, the researcher cannot remember all that is said
verbatim and constantly taking notes could be disturbing during the interview.81 Hence, this
felt like the optimal reason for recording the interviews. Consent was given before the
interviews were tape recorded, and the reason for recording was also stated. However, three of
the interviewees wanted to be anonymous. Therefore, all personal information that could be
traced back to the individual, such as names, hometown and specific workplaces are excluded
in this study and in the transcribed material, in accordance with the definition of anonymityv
made by the Swedish Research Councils ethical expert group.82
Furthermore, the criteria of confidentiality were considered in relation to all interviews, in
accordance with article 23 in the Declaration of Helsinki 2008 that states:
Every precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects and the
confidentiality of their personal information and to minimize the impact of the
study on their physical, mental and social integrity.83
Thus, all recorded material was deleted after transcription and the transcribed material is
stored safely.
78 Gustafsson, Bengt; Hermerén, Göran and Petterson, Bo. God forskningssed. Vetenskapsrådet, Bromma: CM-Gruppen AB,
Vetenskapsrådets rapportserie 1:2011, pp.1-130 [ISSN 1651-7350] p.18
79 Bryman p.131
80 Ibid pp.131-2
81 Crang and Cook pp.60-89
82 Gustafsson, Hermerén and Petterson p.67
83 WMA (World Medical Association). WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.
12
Pre-colonization: Traditional kinship society
Before colonization Somalis lived in a stateless society, where the individual could only rely
on kinship solidarity for help and security.84 Therefore, loyalty was offered first to those with
common ancestry, this was a major obligation uniting a single clan. Clan, based on patrilineal
principlesvi, was the essential political entity, where agnaticvii origin determined political
alliances. However, these alliances were always fluid85 and the extent of the political
community was defined through informal political-legal contracts (xeerviii), which were used
to settle political and legal disputes, thus, reinforcing political loyalties.86 Moreover, within
the community political authority was shared and political control was not centralized.
Therefore, clan leaders, lacking executive powers and right to rule presided over the assembly
of eldersix (shir), and where responsible for inter-clan relationships and all other clan affairs.
Furthermore, the societal concept of egalitarianism was fundamental. Thereby, all adult males
were allowed to have a say in the institutionalized shir and were empowered to direct the
policies of the lineage through a contractual treaty. A so called pastoral democracy existed,
where all had the right to participate and decisionsx were based on consensus.87 Consequently,
the traditional Somali autonomic pastoral-or agro-nomadic lifestyle, was related to the
nomadic people’s autonomic relationship to the state.88 However, the construct of clan as a
shared identity became a power tool used by colonialists, whereby clan came to be the only
legal identity the Somalis could have by which they could gain access to the state.89
84 Schackt, Jon. ‘Folk och historia’. Trans. Lena Hagberg. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), Somalier: grundinformation. Norrköping: Statens
Invandrarverk, 1993 pp.6-7
85 Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M. The collapse of the Somali state – The impact of the colonial legacy. London: HAAN Associates, 1994, p.72
86 Ibid. pp.3-4
87 Ibid.
88 Schackt pp.6-7
89 Mahmood Mamdani in Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan cleansing in Somalia – the Ruinous Legacy of 1991, University Pennsylvania Press,
13
Kenya (Northern Frontier District) and Ethiopia (Ogaden) with a Somali populations; the
dictator gained popular support.92 Yet, Somali nationalistic strife for territorial reunification,
created strained relationships to both Ethiopia and Kenya.93 Thus, in 1977 the Ethiopian-
Somalia War broke out. The Barre regime’s defeat against Ethiopia in 1978xiv was followed
by a shift of ideology and alliances.94 With the inflow of refugees to the country, the loss from
the war and the downward spiraling economy, the antagonism against the regime was
accentuated.95 Subsequently, the Barre regime’s exercise of power changed character such
that corruption and nepotism became rampant and people started fleeing the country on
political grounds.96 To suppress political opponents and the public’s dissatisfaction, the
regime implemented divide-and-rule policies, where feelings of clan affiliation were used to
trigger and escalate competition, dissatisfaction and conflict among Somalis,97 thereby
increasing people’s awareness of clan identity.98
In early 1980s US support – weapons, financial aid and generous loans – was offered to the
Barre regime, because of their interest in the strategically located xv naval base in Berbera. The
American interest in the country also attracted other western supporters,99 and the support
continued in spite of offences against human rights and deep rooted corruption.100 Thus,
Somalia became dependent on western aid,101 as it was a major part of the economy.102 Yet,
neither did this aid noticeably fuel industrial development nor improve living standards for the
population. The only road to prosperity for the “common man” during the 1980s was through
relatives who had access to development agency funds,103 and for the majority of Somalis,
“the State” was an abstract entity that they were not a part of.104 Somalia’s strategic
importance reduced with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the Barre regimes lost
donated, financial capacity to uphold the state through patronage and coercion.105
92 Helander, Bernhard. ‘Från kolonialism till kaos’. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), Somalier: grundinformation. Norrköping: Statens
Invandrarverk, 1993, pp.14-17
93 Samatar, Said S. Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil. A Minority Rights Group Report, London: The Minority Rights Group (MRG),
(ed.), The Horn of Africa: intra-state and inter-state conflicts and security. London: Pluto Press, 2013, pp.166
101 Helander p.17
102 Kapteijns pp.75-81
103 Helander pp.16-18
104 Ibid. p.18
105 Menkhaus, Ken. World Development Report 2011: background case study - Somalia and the Horn of Africa. 2011, pp.2-3 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/07/13/000333038_20110713031744/Rendered/PD
F/632040WP00WDR0009B0Somalia00PUBLIC0.pdf (Retrieved May 10th 2013)
14
In 1991 the dictatorial regime was overthrown by oppositional groupings, 106 leaving a
power vacuum making it possible for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Gen.
Mohammed Farah Aidid, to seize power,107 which resulted in a power struggle between
opponent clans.108 Food became a weapon, as militias enforced a man-made famine109 by
looting food convoys and threatening relief workers among other things.110 The oppositional
groupings “became another way to further clan interests with arms”111 by employing the same
political tactics as Barre regime.112 According to Kapteijns, a “key shift” occurred, when
political violence became communal violence. Through rationalized clan cleansing campaigns
based on clan identity, people were turned against each other.113 And in 1992 the situation
deteriorated, as clan antagonism deepened and the famine reached horrendous proportions,
whereby the United Nations (UN) implemented the peacekeepingxvi operation UNOSOMxvii114
to help restore the countries nation state status. However, insecurity and continuous fighting
hampered the relief efforts.115 Consequently, the US government approved Operation Restore
Hope,116 a massive military intervention with humanitarian overtones,117 with the UN Security
Councils authorization to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure
environment for humanitarian relief”.118 In 1993 a ceasefire was agreed upon between the
Somali political movements, but it was not preserved and conflicts occurred between
militiamen and UNOSOM. Subsequently, several countries withdrew in 1994 followed by an
entire withdrawal of the UN operation in 1995.119 Simultaneously, as the country fell apart
due to the intra-state conflict, the clans claimed different regions in the country.120 Somalis
formed proto-state systems in Somaliland, Puntland and alternative forms of order exist in
other parts of the country today, which lack juridical status in the international community.121
(1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them. New York, 1994, p.10
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S%201994%20653.pdf (Retrieved May 2nd 2013)
109 Samatar 2013:167
110 Issa-Salwe p.96
111 Ibid. p.75
112 Ibid.
113 Kapteijns p.75-81
114 UN (United Nations). Somalia – UNOSOM I: Background. (n.d.A)
15
1995-2008: Humanitarian and military interventions
The international community showed reticence in their involvement in the country after the
failed UN intervention.122 Meanwhile, the agenda of peace conferences, organized by
international and regional actors, became dominated by warlords.123 However, in recent years
the international and particularly American interest in Somalia was revitalized, as the country
became a haven for al-Qaeda affiliated terrorism.124 Simultaneously, some elements of the
Somali society were becoming radicalized; among them was the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab.
After a reconciliation conference in Kenya 2002-04, the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) was created, where the Ethiopian affiliated warlord triumphed. But, because political
representation was built on genealogical formula (4.5xviii), as the basis of power-sharing, it
was endorsed by the international community.125 Yet, the TFG had difficulties gaining control
over the Somali territory,126 while several parts of the country fell under the control of Union
of Islamic Courts (UICs).127 Hostile statements made by leaders of the rising UICs,128 and
their seizure of the capital Mogadishu lead to a TFG supported Ethiopian intervention.129
According to Brett Morash “the fall of Mogadishu to UIC was a serious issue in Washington
and Addis Ababa as it meant to them that Somalia was preparing to become the next Taliban
like state, coupled with the risk of making a play for Ogaden as well.”130 Even though the
Ethiopian troops succeeded in retrieving the capital, groups like al-Shabaab still posed a threat
to TFG.131 Therefore, the African Union (AU) launched the UN supported regional
peacekeeping operation AMISOM in 2007, which aimed at stabilizing the situation in the
country.132 However, terrorism was not the only problem facing the region that the
international community had to contend with. Piracy had escalated in the Indian Ocean and
Gulf of Aden, which has affected the vital international trading passing through the region.133
Thus, in 2008 the European Union’s (EU’s) engagement in the HOA extended to security
with the launch of the naval Operation Atalanta, which later has become a part of the EU’s
comprehensive approachxix in the country.134
16
6. The road to reconstituting the Somali state?
After schematizing the interview material, three main factors were identified as affecting the
reconstitution of the Somali state; political, social and economic. As these are intertwined, the
factors will be interlinked in this following section to give an understanding of what
implications they may have for the reconstitution of the Somali state. The aim of this section
is to give an analysis of the interview material through a theoretical lens. Therefore this
section is structured so that the main identified factors are presented and highlighted through
the voices of the interviewees. Each of the presented factors is followed by an analysis based
on the theoretical framework, thus, this section has combined the empirical material with a
theoretical analysis. While presenting empirical findings, three people will remain
anonymous, therefore they will be called: Somali Axx, Somali B and the diplomat. Besides the
diplomat, two other people are categorized as belonging to the “International community”,
lieutenant commander Kjell Augustzen and researcher Redie Bereketeab. In the presentation
of empirical findings, their work titles will be used in front of their names, so that the voices
of each group i.e. the “International Community” and the “Somali diaspora” are more
noticeable. This section of the thesis will end with a short summary of the identified factors.
Now the issue is; which are the constituting units of the federal state? It’s not
clear how they are going to be shaped, and reshaped. We have a government in
central Somalia, which is in Mogadishu. We have the case of Puntland, which has
declared its autonomy for more than ten years, even though they are not claiming
to secede from Somalia. At the end there is the issue of Somaliland, they have
declared their independence and are claiming for complete separation. And on
the south we have Jubaland, were at least recently, there has been what is now
known as the Jubaland initiative, whereby the southern regions could constitute a
federal entity within the Somali federation. And the issue within the ongoing
17
debate is who is going to have the upper hand; is it the central government in
Mogadishu or the federal states?135
Researcher Bereketeab expresses the challenges with power balance between the federal
entities and the central government. Also problems of state legitimacy are indirectly
expressed, as Somaliland has declared their independence. How the relationship between the
self-declared independent region Somaliland and the central government will evolve seems
problematic, as this region has been self-governing since 1991. Hence, the Somaliland
government has gained the monopoly of legitimate use of force within this territory, which
enables the regional government to uphold its order, according to the Weberian state model.
With reference to Rousseau, the populations within these clan-based entities i.e. the regional
territories have been able to establish a social contract as they were not able to survive in the
state of nature that the Somali society returned to in conjunction with the outbreak of the civil
war. Thereby the consolidation represents the populations general will, thus the question is:
Why would the population break a social contract that has led to their prosperity and survival
to consolidate a new contract? A new social contract, uniting the power of the whole Somali
population might imply that the individual’s proprietorship of his possessions i.e. land and
natural resources could change. Therefore it is questionable whether the central state will gain
legitimacy within this region. The problem with legitimacy is also questioned by Warsame
Yassin Osman, uttering that:
Right now, the government is built on clan and not knowledge. It is important that
you can count on the government, that it is transparent etc. They are merely
symbolic.136
From a Weberian perspective, the lack of legitimacy which Yassin Osman emphasizes
indicates that the post-transitional government is not seen as an authority. Thereby its
enforcement of order will not become successful until it gains obedience from the people.
However, gaining legitimacy through obedience in the central governments order might take
time in lieu of Somalia’s history of corrupt and nepotistic governments. Furthermore, the state
lacks ability to enforce its order within its jurisdiction, as proto-state systems are established.
According to the Weberian state model the central government has to establish some sort of
18
authoritative rule within the regional areas to be able to include them in its territorial
jurisdiction.
The challenge that the state it facing is also interlinked with the issue of rule of law, as
Somali A expresses:
It is worrying, how the state will handle this (federal entities) […] the regions
have the right of self-determination according to the constitution, whiles it seems
that the state does ad hoc attempts at going in and governing these parts.137
Several interviewees have stressed the importance of rule of law, and how the population
perceives the central government which is illustrated by the previous statement. This indicates
that the central government tries to move beyond the authority it is granted by the
constitution, from a Weberian standpoint. What is then its basis for legitimacy? According to
Yassin Osman the government is based on clan and not merits, this signifies that the central
government’s authority is based on kinship. As the central government is composed by all
clans (4.5) the sanctity of tradition is the basis for legitimacy.
In reference to Foucault, how the power relationship will form between the central
government and the federal entities also illuminates momentary relative strengths within a
continuous struggle, which might be seen as decided by a deeper power structure within the
Somali society i.e. clan. The clan structure has been institutionalized, as it is incorporated in
both the private and the public sphere within the society. According to all Somali interviewees
the clans has always had an important role for the individual, and also in the transformation of
the Somali society, which was in agreement with the opinions of the “International
community” as well. The following statement by Somali B clarifies this:
With the civil war in Somalia, a void occurred when the state function
disappeared. The individual thus sought affiliation and the clan filled the void of
the state. […]His feeling of identity or self is coupled with the clan and not the
nation.138
Not only did the function of the clan change, but it replaced the functions of the state, which
Asho Omar Geesdiir, former gender adviser and child protection coordinator for the TFG
(2009) and chairlady of Somali National Woman Organization, highlights:
19
Before, they defended the culture, but now they are engaged in politics. Their
social function is nonexistent; they used to solve disputes, defend women’s rights
for example. Clan leaders protected people through dialogue, but after the war
the warlord took, by arms, the role of the clan leaders.139
Moreover, Omar Geesdiir asks: If you base a state on a clan system – How can I have the
right to live were ever I want, buy a house, and engage in the politics in that area? How can I
do that?140
In asking that question, Omar Geesdiir is referring to the different federal entities that are
predominantly clan based, and the limitations people have with mobility within the country.
The previous statements indicate both the relationship the individual has to his clan and the
structural change of the clan function in which governments find support for their structure
through the incorporation of clan, which has also been illustrated in the historical overview.
According to Foucault’s concept of power, the continuous struggle within relative strengths
i.e. the power relationship between central government and regional entities and their relative
strengths can increase the chance for transformation of these relationships. This could mean
that the dominant actor i.e. the central government that has gained international
acknowledgement loses its dominant position. However, interpreting Weber, if the central
government does not have authority within its territorial jurisdiction, and cannot uphold the
monopoly of legitimate force to obtain order, then it cannot be seen as the dominant actor
within the power relationship. As both regional governments and the central government find
support in the clan structure, the clan structure can be seen as the regime of truth which they
use to support their power exercise. By accepting the clan structure as truth, knowledge is
utilized by both the regional governments and the central government to improve their
position within the relative strengths. On the other hand, by identifying a certain union of
people i.e. a government (X) as representative of a clan (Y), thus the representative
government gains deontic power, which is rights and obligations, however, this requires that
this institutional fact is collectively accepted. If the central government or the regional
governments are not collectively accepted as representative of the clan, then they lack deontic
power. Thereby, their authority i.e. their deontic power is nonexistent within a territorial
jurisdiction. Then according to Weber, the citizens do not see the state as legitimate, and it
will therefore not survive.
20
Another recurring factor that was mentioned during the interviews was the role of different
international actors in their involvement in the Somali state-building process. Lieutenant
commander Kjell Augustzen states that: Then, there is the image now that there are many
stakeholders when there are natural resources that can be extracted.141 Further lieutenant
commander Augustzen point to the importance of dialogue: You have to have an open
dialogue with all nations who have an interest in Africa; an open dialogue in which the UN is
involved.142 However, researcher Bereketeab emphasizes an important question when it comes
to nations implicit motives for intervening:
How do you weigh your motives, are your motives helping the Somali people or is
your motives your own national interests? Now, these are the crucial questions
that have to be asked whenever someone intervenes, what is the motive, what is
the driving reason pushing that actor to intervene.143
In retrospect Somalia’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War and in the War against
terror, these questions are relevant, as they indicate what the implicit reasons for foreign
interventions can be. Some of the Somali interviewees mentioned that international actors
have their own interests for involving themselves in the process of state-building, and that
these interests do not coincide with what is best for the population. Interpreting Foucault, this
might indicate a power relationship between the intervening actors and the intervened party.
Intervening actors find support from certain regimes of truth i.e. humanitarian, military etc.
that enables them to motivate their exercise of power, thus legitimizing their actions to
enforce a certain order in a country. As the dominating actor, they actively guard their
interests, since a transformation in the relative strengths might imply that their dominant
position shifts. Thereby, the regime of truth that supports their actions might change
character, and thus shifting the hegemony towards the subordinate actor. But, it has to be
emphasized that several actors have different agendas for involvement in a country, thus,
several relative strengths exist simultaneously both inside and outside a country, within
continues struggle, all trying to gain the position as the dominant actor.
The distrust between Somalis, caused by divide-and-rule policies and the clan war, was
another factor that was frequently mentioned during the interviews. According to the
interviewed diplomat, the question of land ownership has been unsolved since the beginning
21
of the civil war. Therefore the challenge is of trying to find a common idea about what kind of
society they want, where everyone has the same rights and obligations.144 How will such a
common idea be accomplished? With reference to Searle it might be possible if the Somali
people collectively assign their society with certain values, a common idea. However,
according to Rousseau, to create a common idea of what kind of society the entire Somalia
will be, a new social contract might have to be established between the central government
and the people, which could result in a change in proprietorship. Land ownership has been a
contested question, Somali B stated that: Property has to be returned. It is important for the
peace process between the clans.145 As the safeguarding of peoples proprietorship of their
possessions is one of the reasons for establishing a social contract the proto-state might have
to break its social contract with people within its territory to resolve the question of land
ownership. By not solving the question of land ownership a social contract between the
central government and the Somali people might not be established.
The diplomat states that the state should not be equivalent with Mogadishu.146 During the
Barre regime everything i.e. universities, governmental offices etc. was located in the capital,
which is something that has also been emphasized by the Somali interviewees, If people
worry that the government will limit its focus to the central part of the country, this might
strengthen the power the proto-states hold, thereby making it difficult for the central
government to establish a social contract with its population, a social contract based on people
believing that their union will lead to survival and prosperity.
The minimal involvement of women in public affairs, the lack of education and
infrastructure were also factors brought up during the interviews. Several interviewees stated
that these are challenges facing the process of rebuilding the country, which are interlinked
with the economy. The state’s ability to insure security, basic needs etc. is based on economy,
which several of the interviewees brought up. Researcher Bereketeab states that:
The challenge, for the emerging federal government is; how do you build a
military force, the security intelligence and police force, which are professional,
which are accountable to the civilian government in Mogadishu? Now, as we
know, there are many international agencies training the Somali army. But, at the
end the Somali government has to be able to train its one army, it has to take the
22
responsibility of training, organizing its own military, own security forces, its own
intelligence forces.
To be able to endow its people with security as well as basic needs, a state must possess a
capacious economic base. Because in order to get legitimacy from its own people then the
government has to be able to give those services, according to researcher Bereketeab. The
central government therefore needs to uphold monopoly of the legitimate use of force, from a
Weberian standpoint. Moreover, the population will not feel personal loyalty; which is the
basis for obedience in states with traditional authority; if the central government does not
achieve this. But, the chaotic situation in the country might be beneficial to some actors,
which is highlighted by Somali B’s statement:
These people who enriched themselves in the chaos, oligarchs, these rich, rich
people; smuggle, money launder, loot, sell drugs, confiscate arable land from the
little people, the farmers. They are corrupt. These people who profited during this
anarchic time they do not want peace. They have money.147
Hereby the question is: what kind of livelihood options are there for the people, if war
economy is the only economy that exists? How will the government be able to give basic
services to the people and thereby gain legitimacy? According to Tilly no means of coercion
has been concentrated by the central government, as it is unable to stabilize order within the
country, furthermore it lacks the economic resources to enable such an order. But, Yassin
Osman questions the reason for there not being any other economy, as he states:
Why is a country aid dependent, when their country has everything; ocean, arable
land etc. But we don’t use it. Somalis have to start using it. From donors the
country may for example get cheap rice, thus the rice grower in the country stops
producing rice, as he doesn’t earn a living on it anymore.148
This statement also highlights a power relationship between a donor country and the receiving
country, where the receiving country becomes subordinate in such a relationship as it is
dependent on donations for its survival. Therefore, to ensure the survival of the citizens,
which is an aspect of the social contract, the government has to generate internal growth.
Otherwise the social contract can be seen as breached. Moreover, Yassin Osman points out
23
that the Somali people themselves have to change the relative strengths by using their natural
and human resources. The power of the people was an aspect highlighted by all the
interviewees, as they stated that unless the Somali people are determinate to reconstitute the
state, then the external support might not help in achieving this goal. Within all of the theories
employed the people are the actors who for example, establish a social contract, collectively
assign certain functions with status, constitute both the state and power relationships.
24
specific status, with reference to Searle. But, the state also needs international
acknowledgment, thus, it has to transform itself according to the universalistic models so that
the “hegemonic powers” do not find this establishment illegitimate, thereby, the state might
disregard its historical experiences, according to Wai. So it is questionable whether traditional
societies will ever gain the equivalent status as so called modern Western states within the
world community. As “modern states” are still evolving they are outgrowing the definition of
the Weberian ideal state; the gap to modernity will grow farther in relation to “traditional
societies”. Thus, the concept of the modern state can also be seen as evolving; adopting to the
benefit of “hegemonic powers” in the global economy. So as we live in a world consisting of
power relationships that are relative strengths within a continuous struggle, according to
Foucault, the dominant actors’ exercise of power is supported by regimes of truth, such as the
concept of the modern state. However, without our collective acceptance of these regimes,
thus, assigning them with a certain status function, they would not exist. Therefore the
question of what factors are seen as important for the reconstitution of the Somali state might
depend on how the country will adopt to the transforming standards of universalistic state
models.
25
8. References
List of interviewees
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Appendix: Map of Somalia
30
Endnotes
i
Neo-liberalism refers to advocacy of the minimalistic state, and the rights of the individual against those of the
state (see neo-liberalist as Robert Notzick, Friedrich Hayek). The view is influenced by classical liberalism
(Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). Oxford dictionary of Sociology. 3ed ed. revised, New York: Oxford
University press, 2009 p.509)
ii
Neopatrimonialism: patron-client relationships, where support (e.g. investments, votes) is given to a particular
political party (or equivalent) and the supporters gain security and/or access to different benefits etc.
iii
Hegemony refers to “the production of ways of thinking and seeing, and excluding alternative visions and
discourses” (Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). Oxford dictionary of Sociology. 3ed ed. revised, New York:
Oxford University press, 2009 p.306)
iv
“Inside understanding” and “Outside understanding “– my own translation from Swedish; originally called:
inifrånförståelse and utifrånförståelse.
v
“Anonymization or anonymous assumes that the coupling between samples or answers to a questionnaire and a
specific individual has been eliminated so that either unauthorized or research group can restore it. No one can
thus combine e.g. a specific task with a specific individual's identity. The code list is destroyed. Anonymity can
also be achieved by making the collection of materials without a specific individual's identity is recorded.”
(Gustafsson, Hermerén and Petterson p.67: my own translation)
vi
The clan-name is based on a common male ancestor. The traditional clan structure and genealogy of the Somali
society is traced to two brothers; Soomaal and Sab. The clan-families traced to Soomaal led mostly a pastoral-
nomadic life, whilst clans traced to Sab led an agro-nomadic life. Descendants of Sab are Raxanweyn and Digil,
whilst the clan-families Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Daarood can be traced back to Soomaal. The Somali society
mainly constitutes of these six clan groups (see Issa-Salwe p.2).
vii
Agnatic means to be related on one’s fathers side
viii
Xeer (sometimes spelled Heer) is customary law
ix
All adult males are elders.
x
After lengthy discussions decisions were based on consensus.
xi
During 1975 a system of renewable land-leasing was introduced, which was tarnished by corruption and
manipulation. After 1991, the issue of land (and blood debt) became an important and contentious part of the
intra-state conflict, which has not yet been resolved.
xii
State-control apparatus i.e. in the form of a dreaded counterintelligence; National Security Service; “special”
secret prisons among other things
xiii
MOD – three clans; Ogaden, Marehan and Dhulbahante; constituted President Barres most important support
xiv
The Ogaden War (1977-1978): a war between the Ethiopian and the Somali government, where Somalia
losses Soviet patronage to Ethiopia, which led to the Somali break with USSR and a strengthening of
relationship with the USA (see Ofcansky p.937).
xv
The port city has an inflow the Red Sea and Suez Canal
xvi
According to the principles of UN peacekeeping, no operation can be deployed without the consent of the
main parties of a conflict
xvii
UNOSOM mandate was for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance in Somalia
xviii
4.5 formula means that 1 quota of the seats in Parliament is given to each of the four majority clans, whiles a
quota of 0.5 seats are appointed to a coalition of minority clans.
xix
EU:s comprehensive approach in the HOA – The thought behind is that the cooperation and coordination of
security and development in a country will lead to more efficiency (Frisell, Lindell and Skeppström, p.11)
xx
To anonymize the Somali interviewees they are called A, B. These are letters chosen because they are the first
two in the alphabet. Since the occupation of the interviewees belonging to the “International community” is
relevant for this study, as it aims to reflect their voices, the anonymized interviewees’ profession is mentioned.
However, all other information is excluded so that the specific identity of the person is concealed.
No reference after the endnote implies that the endnote has the same reference as the sentence where
you can find it.
31