Pale #31 To #53

31. A.C. No.
6166 October 2, 2009
MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified complaint1 dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl
Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law
and falsification of public documents.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share of
her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for
attorney’s fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002,
respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo
Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the
complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no
docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three
months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that
they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED"
thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket
number was filed.2
Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to
file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal,
South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real
actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that
respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached
to a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. 3
In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute the
administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for partition and
recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the administrative complaint were all
hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was
belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed his
statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.4
On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the rubber stamped
"RECEIVED" on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at the
RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him through cellular phone and directed him to stop the
filing of the complaint as the same lacked certain attachments. However, one copy thereof was
already stamped "RECEIVED" by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a docket
number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the stamp, to be filed later
when the attachments are complete.
Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion praying that
the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the criminal case due
to complainant’s apparent lack of interest to prosecute.
On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be found
guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three years. The report reads in part, as follows:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved no private interest. The
complainant or person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s misconduct is in no
sense a party and has generally no interest in its outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice. It affords no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57
SCRA 154)
Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if herein
complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge has been
proven.
On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondent’s contention that
she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainant’s husband, when he borrowed money from a
money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount representing the acceptance, does not inspire belief.
The promissory note dated May 3, 2002, appended as Annex "A" of the complaint-affidavit
eloquently shows that consistent with the complainant’s allegation, she was made to borrow said
amount to be paid as respondent’s acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of the promissory
note is the same date when respondent’s services were engaged leading to the preparation of the
subject civil complaint. Complainant’s allegation is further enhanced by the fact that such promissory
note was even notarized by the respondent.
On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same was not filed before
the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as evidenced by a Certification from the said
office appended as Annex "A" of complainant’s Manifestation dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the
claim of complainant that respondent falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked received dated
May 10, 2002 including the case number "4198", finds factual and legal bases.
It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by complainant from the
respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that contrary to her suspicion, the subject
civil complaint was already filed in court. However, inquiry made by the complainant shows
otherwise.
Respondent’s contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped by court
personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the court’s docket, she caused it to
be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain attachments, is bereft of merit.
In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments that allegedly
caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming arguendo that the withdrawal was
due to lacking attachments, how come the same was not filed in the next office day complete with
attachments. And lastly, the Certification of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188
is not the case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.
xxxx
The fact that the City Prosecutor’s Office of Digos, upon motion for reconsideration of the
respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein complainant will not in anyway affect the
above captioned administrative complaint.
The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts of which the disciplinary
proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the
disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447) His conviction is not necessary to hold the
lawyer administratively liable because the two proceedings and their objectives are different and it is
not sound public policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court act on a
complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of the court. (In re Brillantes,
76 SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to an administrative complaint against him.
(Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).
The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found to be without basis.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty. Vivian C. Rubia, be
found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the Investigating
Commissioner’s recommendation with modification, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237
Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s falsification of public document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby DISBARRED.
However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors reconsidered its May 31,
2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty of disbarment to five years suspension from
the practice of law, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715
Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED with modification, that Resolution RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of
Governors dated 31 May 2007 recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is reduced to
Five (5) years Suspension from the practice of law.
On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided under Rule 139-B,
Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering
the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.5
The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.
In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent

misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification
with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the
complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations,
complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a
public document.
A perusal of the records shows that complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-
Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences
set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of
her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of
public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.
Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the
complaint by respondent’s staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial
court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent’s claim that the case
was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a
docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did
not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are
received by the court.
Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL
CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondent’s claim,
but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198"
indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.
Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner’s ruling that respondent
was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no
factual basis to stand on.1avvphi1
However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or
administratively sanctioned.
We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent’s act of charging an acceptance fee of

P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies
in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the
payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause
of complainant’s mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render
legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of
acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant’s
mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.
Respondent’s transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship
due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies,
which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby
leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for
the withdrawal of her services.
Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the
status of their complaint.
Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give
his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his client,
whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his
best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (client’s) cause with reasonable dispatch.
Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For
the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal profession
demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned. 6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of
violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision, and be it duly recorded in
the personal file of respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/ac_6166_2009.html
32. Adm. Case No. 5530 January 28, 2013
SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO and FRANCING

GALGALAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Arcing and Cresing Bautista, Eday
Regadio1 and Francing Galgalan (complainants) against Atty. Arturo Cefra for violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and 139 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The complainants were the defendants in Civil Case No. U-6504 an action for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan.2 The complainants engaged the services of Atty. Cefra to represent them in the
proceedings. According to the complainants, they lost in Civil Case No. U-6504 because of Atty.
Cefra’s negligence in performing his duties as their counsel. First, Atty. Cefra only presented
testimonial evidence and disregarded two (2) orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal
offer of documentary exhibits. Second, Atty. Cefra belatedly submitted the formal offer of
documentary exhibits after the complainants had been declared to have waived their right to make a
submission. Third, Atty. Cefra did not file a motion or appeal and neither did he file any other
remedial pleading to contest the RTC’s decision rendered against them.
The Court ordered Atty. Cefra to comment on the complaint. Despite the extensions of time given by
the Court, Atty. Cefra did not file any comment. He did not also comply with the Court’s Minute
Resolutions,3 dated December 14, 2005 and March 22, 2006, directing him to pay a ₱2,000.00 fine
and to submit the required comment.
On July 16, 2008, we held Atty. Cefra in contempt of court, ordering his detention for five (5) days.
We also reiterated the order for Atty. Cefra to pay a ₱2,000.00 fine and to submit a comment on the
complaint.4
On August 4, 2008, Atty. Cefra filed his Comment, 5 denying the allegations in the complaint. He
claimed that the complainants misunderstood the RTC’s decision:
2. That Respondent denies the allegation in Paragraphs (sic) 7 of the complaint that
defendants miserably lost the case because the Decision itself confirmed and affirmed our
stand that defendants do not contest the ownership of x x x Serlito Evangelista x x x.
3. That it was defendants (sic) failure to fully understand the Decision which led to the filing
of this administrative case and which subsequent events have proven that in the
implementation of the Writ of Execution the land owned by the defendants covered by
Transfer Certificates of Titles were not affected. 6
In a Minute Resolution7 dated September 24, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On June 11, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner 8 recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner opined:
The administrative complaint failed to show sufficient evidence to warrant disciplinary action against
respondent. Complainants filed this complaint because they believed that they lost their case,
however, their claim over their properties was not affected by the Decision of the court. 9
In Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Cefra negligent
in handling the complainants’ case and unanimously approved his suspension from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
Atty. Cefra filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 14, 2012, in Resolution No. XX-2012-24,
the IBP Board of Governors partially granted Atty. Cefra’s motion in this wise:
RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and unanimously

MODIFY Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010 Suspending Atty. Arturo B. Cefra from
the practice of law for six (6) months to REPRIMANDED considering that the failure was not material
to the case and that complainants were not prejudice. [emphasis supplied]
The Court’s Ruling
Except for the recommended penalty, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Cefra has
been guilty of negligence in handling the complainants’ case. His actuations in the present
administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the
Court.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence."10
It further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." 11 In addition, a lawyer has the corresponding duty to
"keep the client informed of the status of his case."12
In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,13 the Court held:
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is
worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy
from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.
Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards. Interestingly, he did not deny the complainants’
allegations and impliedly admitted his actions in the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-6504.
The records further substantiate clear acts of negligence on Atty. Cefra’s part in handling the
complainants’ case.
First, Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within the period
given by the RTC. Atty. Cefra submitted a formal offer of documentary evidence five (5)
months after the RTC’s first order directing him to make a formal offer. The formal offer of
evidence was only made after the complainants had been declared by the RTC to have
waived their right to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence.
Second, Atty. Cefra failed to comply with the two (2) orders of the RTC directing him to
submit a formal offer of documentary evidence. He made no effort to submit the required
formal offer of documentary evidence within the prescribed period. Neither did he give his
reasons, within the required period, on why he could not make the required formal offer of
documentary evidence. In fact, Atty. Cefra’s belated explanation for this omission was only
done in a motion for reconsideration (with motion to admit the formal offer of documentary
evidence) that he subsequently filed, which motion the RTC denied for lack of merit.
Third, Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial
measure to contest the RTC’s decision. His claim that the complainants had not been
prejudiced by the RTC’s decision is incorrect. The dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision
clearly adjudged the complainants liable to pay ₱30,000.00 moral damages. 14 Considering
the pecuniary consequence of the RTC’s decision to his clients, Atty. Cefra should have filed
a motion for reconsideration before the RTC or appealed the RTC’s decision with the Court
of Appeals, or he should have at least immediately explained to his clients his reasons for
not taking remedial action. The failure to avail of available remedial measures apparently
prejudiced his clients. As matter now stands, the complainants’ liability under the RTC’s
decision is already final and executory.
Fourth, Atty. Cefra’s allegations in his Comment show his failure to effectively communicate
with the complainants. As Atty. Cefra puts it, the administrative complaint was the result of
the complainants’ failure to fully understand the RTC’s decision. In other words, he admits
that the present case would have been averted had he exerted reasonable efforts to inform
the complainants of the legal implications of the RTC’s decision and to explain to them the
material developments in the case.
We significantly note that even before this Court, Atty. Cefra’s conduct was less than what is
expected of an officer of the Court. He was held in contempt for his cavalier and indifferent attitude in
complying with the Court’s directives.
In sum, the above actuations showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a
lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. We have repeatedly held that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 15
Under the circumstances, the IBP Board of Governors’ recommended penalty of simple reprimand is
not commensurate with the gravity of Atty. Cefra’s infractions. As the complainants incurred
pecuniary damage by reason of Atty. Cefra’s negligence, a suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law is in order.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Arturo Cefra guilty of negligence, in violation of
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jan2013/ac_5530_2013.html
33. A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013
JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint 1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.
for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross
misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the
spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in
their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses
where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s
payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he
would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged ₱30,000 as
attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before
Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions
that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they
have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable
resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to
respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for ₱950 and delivered it to
respondent’s office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the
spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was "needed to
have [the resolution] reversed."2Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant
that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and
presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund
of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional ₱10,000 to respondent which he asked
for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to
await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave him
any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of
the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was
able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses
could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine the
whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but
because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter regarding
the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s
possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty.
Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6,
20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was only ₱2,440 and
not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program also sent
respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s
previous letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of
gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
merit. He denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he
charged and received only ₱2,000. He also countered that the payment of ₱30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise
denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before
the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that
he promised to fix the case; and that he charged ₱10,000, as he only charged ₱5,000, as filing fee
for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform
petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of
complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact that
complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be attending his daily court
hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his
counsel attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were
directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days, 6 to which complainant and respondent
complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply 8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual
and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel when he filed
the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before
the RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases
as his job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for the client. He
continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a bottle of Carlos Primero I and
that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000. Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the
total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected exceeded ₱30,000 – the amount being
claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for negligence within the meaning
of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore thumb
rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for repair of
the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral or
written, the consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for
damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is
purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent
(spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the
dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where the
actual damages claimed is ₱36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC [which]
has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the
proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil
complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the
jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already ₱400,000.00.
xxxx
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters
marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by complainant’s secretary,
except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent
by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent with good
faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the
complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but
omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the meeting. This
failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad faith on the part of
respondent.10
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646,
adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution 11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration 12 and asked that the penalty of suspension be
reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion
to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office." 13 Respondent asserted that
the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He
stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in
the afternoon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office
in Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence
in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without malice or bad
faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. 14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration15which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011. 16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution 17 and noted the aforementioned Notices of
Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another
Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon
18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find
respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein. 19
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the following
provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
a)
Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client;
b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body;
c)
Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from his client;
d)
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him;
e)
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f)
Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and
g)
Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. 20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated
Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with
competence and diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the
case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the
complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil
case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative
prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only ₱36,000. As correctly stated in the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,]
vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of
demand does not exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act,
the same shall be adjusted to ₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34). 21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily
averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What
aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not
motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The
civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a
basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent
and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He
paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups.
Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be
a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program
in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his attention.
Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays his
lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’
He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and
a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning
and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause." 22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04,
a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other
information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly
should there be queries or requests for information from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too
lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that complainant
had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by
complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to
keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The legal
profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor
bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his
practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is
tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant
who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence 23 the allegations in the complaint. In the
instant case, complainant was only able to prove respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of
Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly,
complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon
16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required filing fees.
As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision
of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent
Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and
18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s
Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of
his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be disseminated to
all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Quintin
P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/sep2013/ac_9149_2013.html
34. A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed
1
by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent),
charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for
fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of
the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan. After accepting the engagement,
2
respondent filed the corresponding complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
3
Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by
the RTC in an Order dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
4
evidence. While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14,
5
2007, complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s
6
office. On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment
7
of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of
the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. On September 12, 2007, Tan
8
handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal before 9
the RTC. 10
In an Order dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been
11
filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose
such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued
12
by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to
prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the
technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for
an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9,
2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court. Complainant also found out that,
13
contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he
14
filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

15
complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that
resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have
assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
court’s unfavorable decision.16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
17
(IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly

recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him. 18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-

founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the issue
of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on
arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand. 19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that the
spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent
who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.
20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. 21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated
on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping
the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust
and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer
is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that
22
his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer
is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals
with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.
23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to
inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when
he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing
complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor,
thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment. 24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In
so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue
prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, failing in which whether in his personal or
25
private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. A lawyer’s inexcusable
26
neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be
countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep
complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified court order
evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable
27
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law. In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis is instructive, viz.:
28 29
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral
flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be
1âwphi1
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the
lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should
be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to the
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
30
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the
status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares
v. Romana, the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and
31
adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid,
Jr., the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the
32
status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying
documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v.
Contawi, the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to
33
mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in Embido v. Pe, the penalty of disbarment was meted
34
out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his

client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case
had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the
latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar.
His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in
view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
35. A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct filed with this Court on
1
September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent Atty. Eugenio
T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed
2
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester

Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100
(Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt
hereof
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
4
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected
the total amount of ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the
following manner:
Voucher
Date Amount Purpose
No.
021051200 7802 ₱20,000.00 Attorney's fees
4
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
021261200 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
4
4
4
4
Total Amount: ₱95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of
₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod
City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to
resolve the issues.
In his Comment, respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
5
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed
to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the
attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent
incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of ₱189,491.60, the sum of ₱17,226.57
representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance of
₱172,275.13. Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he will get ₱100,000.00 and the
6
balance of ₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the
amount of ₱95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.00 attorney's fees,
7
₱17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to
respondent was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below the promised
25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of ₱72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than what he
expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses Lopez the sum
of ₱93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will
get a total amount of ₱110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of
₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
8
investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued his Report and Recommendation with the following recommendation:
9
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of
two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his
possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees. On October 28, 2011, the
10
IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139, which approved the Report and
11
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law
for two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute the sum of ₱85,500.00 to 12
the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure
to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement
and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship." Specifically,
13
Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004
received payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to three months he
had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered
an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being
implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the
total amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor
tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount,
which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant brought the matter
before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on
the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the
presumption that he converted it to his own use. His unjustified withholding of the funds also
14
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him. 15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment. He
implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez to his
additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the
total amount of ₱72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts
of ₱20,000.00, ₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was only
₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his
self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent's claim that
he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay
him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in
connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer's agreement, or
itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even
1âwphi1
assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from
his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional
employment. "The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He
is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his
client." "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected
16
for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting." Moreover, a
17
lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone
that the client owes him attorney's fees."
18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon
demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness,
and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action."
19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to
account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the
practice of law for two years." Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the
20
imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is already a
nonagenarian, the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty
21
of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T.
Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
one (1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution, the
net amount of ₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution
until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas'
record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/ac_7337_2014.html
36. A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross
ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), 2 a British national who passed
away on June 18, 2004. 3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and
owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. 4 (Consulting Edge), a
domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged
the services of respondent.5
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui Bantegui), 6 a
major stockholder of Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the
company.8 They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui.
Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent insisted
that the appointment proceed as scheduled. 9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to
the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the
door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal. 10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and
respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them
to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key.11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock
of the Consulting Edge office door, 12 which prevented the employees thereof from entering and
carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutor’s Office) a complaint for grave coercion against complainant
and respondent.13 In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be
initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in
Consulting Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of
Agreement,15 whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which
complainant paid the amount of ₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondent ₱1,000.00 for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution 17 dated October 13, 2004,
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants
of arrest were issued against them. 18 Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go
into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent
abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant. 19 Failing to reach
respondent despite diligent efforts,20 complainant filed the instant administrative case before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The
case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006, 22 which was reset twice,23 on
January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to
respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason "moved out." 24 In view thereof,
Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference terminated
and required the parties to submit their position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits. 25
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo)
issued a Report and Recommendation, 26 observing that respondent failed to safeguard
complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case. Commissioner
Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of David
because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her interest in
Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the
door of the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced
with the counter legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause. 28 Commissioner
Magpayo found that respondent’s acts evinced a lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the
applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 5 29 of the Code of Professional Responsibity
(Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months. 30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011
Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules.31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s November 19, 2011
Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation 34 dated February 6, 2013,
concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to safeguard the
latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer. 35 It deemed that the six-
month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and,
in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be suspended for three years. 36 Likewise, it ordered
respondent to return the ₱150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee. 37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would
be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ
only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. 39 These principles are embodied in Canon 17,
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
xxxx
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and
diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and,
second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her
deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action
taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latter’s interest in
Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free
ingress and egress of the employees of the said company – was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light,
respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal
case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of
the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his
client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, 40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only improper but
also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s
trust in him – in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal
advice in pursuing her interests – thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely
abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this
notwithstanding petitioner’s efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance
fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch,
and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. 41 Hence, considering
respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal
case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of
Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
due notice. This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest in
1âwphi1
clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges
leveled against him.42 In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable for his infractions as
herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,43 a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's
funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares, 44 the Court meted a similar
penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the
complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client
on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and
attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 45 a lawyer who
neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s money and to return
the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her
requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference
before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes
that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for
the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it
not for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the
proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution.
Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt
to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three years as recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of the ₱150,000.00
acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should
only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil
liability,46 it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his
client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of
respondent’s receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains undisputed, 47 the
Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03
of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the
₱150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/ac_9532_2013.html
37. A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa
Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with
violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they
both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer
while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed
that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a
baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer
the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the
later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant's
account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges
being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of
the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her
before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing
personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's
legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file
her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, 5 respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and
sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant
portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of

her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had
any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained
any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS.
She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential
information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the
Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also
result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL
MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain
the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of

her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and
her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also
filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a child ….
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998,
are all part of public records ….
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even
with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she
knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC
ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL
ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came
out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the
respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended
that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.

Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty.
Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare
what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is,
at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little
moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the
relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6 -
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the
confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and
the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to
condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At
the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate
without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was
violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client
relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/ac_6711_2007.html
38. EN BANC
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.

VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No.
119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY.
HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S.

1
Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution,
we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation, we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of
2
indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice
Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the
case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his
request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded.
Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when heal
so believes in the merits of his client’s case.
Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us
of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral
arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have
disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice
Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to
do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza
3
doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative
complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he
4
must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the
5
propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law
and legal processes. 6
A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that

7
cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. In 8
this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of
our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and
his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of
him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to
1âwphi1
strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand,
with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and
enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants
who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we
shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide the
outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of
erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them;
neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that
they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when the complaints they
filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of
thecasethat,when read together with the administrative complaint heprepared,shows that his
complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s
penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores
C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his
client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for
alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s
client, disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate
grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc., we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of
9
court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the
Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance
of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle
to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to
degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under Section
3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as
a member of the bar. If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are
10
prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8,
2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he should
not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza
through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is
independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether
in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against
him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side. 11
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding
12
cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. There can be no
13
substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of
the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals.
The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in exercising its
power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general. Its 14
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of

judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice; thus,
15
it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court. Further,
16
jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal
principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment
dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner
that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal. 17
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not
intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege
of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for
its primary objective, public interest. Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer
18
from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the
ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent
charge for unprofessional conduct. 19
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different

procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
1âwphi1
whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof. 20
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT
for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby
sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine
of ₱5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a
ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/dec2013/ipi_12-205-ca-j_2013.html
39. G.R. No. 143365 December 4, 2008
GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA

SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA, SR., petitioners,
vs.
MONICA PALANOG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for Revival of Judgment. The case is an
offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title with Damages in Civil Case No. 2570.
The Facts
Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint
dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria
Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In the
complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan.
The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject
premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that
they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question.
When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977, Atty. Edilberto Miralles (Atty.
Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas, verbally moved for the appointment of a commissioner to
delimit the land in question. Rizalino Go, Deputy Sheriff of Aklan, was appointed commissioner and
was directed to submit his report and sketch within 30 days. 1 Present during the delimitation were
spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and Ernesto Saligumba, son of spouses Saligumbas. 2
After submission of the Commissioner’s Report, spouses Palanogs, upon motion, were granted 10
days to amend their complaint to conform with the items mentioned in the report. 3
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June 1984, only the counsel for spouses
Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order resetting the hearing to 15 August 1984 and
likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another counsel who should be
ready on that date. 4 The order sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court unserved with
the notation "Party–Deceased" while the order sent to defendant Valeria Saligumba was returned
with the notation "Party in Manila." 5
At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs’ direct examination was suspended and the
continuation of the hearing was set on 25 October 1984. The trial court stated that Atty. Miralles,
who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge, would be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he
formally withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of
spouses Saligumbas for his withdrawal. 6 A copy of this order was sent to Valeria Saligumba but the
same was returned unserved with the notation "Party in Manila." 7
The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial court directed that a
copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila. 8
The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January 1985 despite the motion
of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client was sick. The exhibits were admitted
and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their case. Reception of evidence for the defendants spouses
Saligumbas was scheduled on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. 9
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of the spouses
Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence.
On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the case
submitted for decision.
On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 declaring spouses
Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate the premises and restore
possession to spouses Palanogs.
The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of the court’s decision
be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant Valeria Saligumba.
Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial
court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the date
of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.
Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to
revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 which she claimed has
not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and
Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto who was out
of the country working as a seaman, engaged the services of the Public Attorney’s Office, Kalibo,
Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner Generoso
Saligumba filed his Answer10 alleging that: (1) respondent had no cause of action; (2) the spouses
Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of substitution was issued and
hence, the trial was null and void; and (3) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the
spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was not binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to implead additional
defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba, who are also the heirs and
children of spouses Saligumbas. 11 They were, however, declared in default on 1 October 1999 for
failure to file any responsive pleading. 12
The Trial Court’s Ruling
On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the revival
of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased
spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the
exclusive property of defendant Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased
parents. The death of her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the complexion of the
ownership of the property that would require his substitution. The spouses Saligumbas’ children,
who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while Valeria Saligumba was still
alive. The trial court further found that when defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty.
Miralles, did not inform the court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the non-
substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to the negligence of counsel. Moreover,
petitioner Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case No. 2570 as he was present
during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial court likewise held that the decision in Civil Case
No. 2570 could not be the subject of a collateral attack. There must be a direct action for the
annulment of the said decision.
Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the present petition.
The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be revived in this
case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not
one for annulment of judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. 13 An
action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself
and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. 14Revival
of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory. 15
The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been rendered final
and executory by the lapse of time with no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed.
While it may be true that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may be revived and its execution may
be had, the issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against
petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in
Civil Case No. 2570.
Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 is null
and void since there was no proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the
trial court’s knowledge that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by
counsel. They argue that they were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on
them.
Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of death of spouses Saligumbas but
justified the validity of the decision rendered in that case despite lack of substitution because of the
negligence or fault of their counsel. Petitioners contend that the duty of counsel for the deceased
spouses Saligumbas to inform the court of the death of his clients and to furnish the name and
address of the executor, administrator, heir or legal representative of the decedent under Rule 3
presupposes adequate or active representation by counsel. However, the relation of attorney and
client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on record, Atty. Miralles, as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge even before the deaths of the spouses Saligumbas were known. Petitioners
invoke the Order of 1 June 1984 directing the spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another
lawyer to replace Atty. Miralles. The registered mail containing that order was returned to the trial
court with the notation that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was "deceased." Petitioners thus question the
decision in Civil Case No. 2570 as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not
duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2570 nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is
unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void
judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners.
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 16 as the claim is not extinguished
by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court17 provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the
duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death
by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or
heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal representative or heir to appear,
nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the deceased.
Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the
heirs ever ask to be substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2
February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death
of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the
death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s orders
which were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear
arises only "upon proper notice." The notation "Party-Deceased" on the unserved notices could not
be the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As the trial court could not be expected to know or
take judicial notice of the death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial
court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing
that the court’s proceedings were tainted with irregularities. 18
Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death of
the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of
such death as required by the rules. 19 The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders
and notices to defendants spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect
from counsel.20
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly provides:
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. - Whenever a

party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of
his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative.
It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of
counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The decision
rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-interest. 21
The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position
than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court
of the name and address of his legal representative. 22
Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latter’s demise. Acting on
their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the hearings and did not even confirm the
death of his clients nor his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly negate
petitioners’ contention that Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas’ counsel.
Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the alleged appointment
as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was called for trial on 25 October 1984, Atty.
Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement. The 25 October 1984 Order reads:
ORDER
Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on record of this case and who is held
responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone the hearing of this case to
JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x23
The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the defendants to secure the services of
another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. by registered mail but the same was
returned with the notation "Party-Deceased" while the notice to Valeria Saligumba was returned with
the notation "Party in Manila." 24Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984. When Atty. Miralles
appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not affirm nor inform the court of the death of his
client. There was no formal substitution. The trial court issued an order resetting the hearing to 25
January 1985 and directed that a copy of the order be furnished petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at
COA, PNB, Manila by registered mail. 25 When the case was called on 25 January 1985, Atty.
Miralles sought for another postponement on the ground that his client was sick and under medical
treatment in Manila.26 Again, there was no manifestation from counsel about the death of Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January 1985 setting the reception of
evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. A copy of this order was sent to Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. by registered mail. Nonetheless, as the trial court in Civil Case No. 5288 declared,
the non-substitution of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. did not have any legal significance as the land subject
of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of Valeria Saligumba who inherited it from her
deceased parents.
This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985, Atty. Miralles again did not
inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba. There was no formal substitution nor
submission of proof of death of Valeria Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his
client’s interest until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record
until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.27
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for the relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least, so far as the opposite party is
concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation. 28 Unless properly relieved,
the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case. 29 Until his withdrawal shall have been
approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court
to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the
attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. 30
Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal
substitution. Yet, despite the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners,
petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on until
the trial court rendered its decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even an
action to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign
ignorance of the case since during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during the delimitation of
the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5 November 1977. 31 Petitioner Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy of the trial court’s orders and notices. It was only the
Answer filed by petitioner Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No. 5288 that confirmed the dates
when the spouses Saligumbas died and named the latter’s children. Consequently, Atty. Miralles
was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been properly relieved as counsel of
record. His acts bind his clients and the latter’s successors-in-interest.
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown much interest in the
case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for failure to
file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a seaman. Only
petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in this Court was
signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on behalf of petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba without the latter’s authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_143365_2008.html
40. G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009
ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY and NATIONAL POWER
sCORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006, Decision 3 dated 29 January 2007, and
Resolution4 dated 27 September 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and
95946.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 26 September 1978, the National Power Corporation Board of Directors (NAPOCOR Board),
pursuant to its specific power and duty to fix the compensation, allowance and benefits of the
NAPOCOR employees under Section 6(c) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, passed
Resolution No. 78-119 approving the grant of a monthly welfare allowance equivalent to 10% of an
employee’s basic pay to all NAPOCOR employees effective 1 October 1978. 5Pursuant thereto, the
NAPOCOR Welfare Plan Committee, renamed and reconstituted later on as the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund Board of Trustees (NAPOCOR-WFBT), issued and promulgated a charter for the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund which includes the following provisions:
ARTICLE VII
TERMINATION/AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN
"Section 1. Termination/Amendment of the Plan – The Board of Directors may amend, revise, repeal
any or all of the provisions herein contained and/or terminate the Plan, subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Trust Agreement.
Section 2. Payment of Member’s share – In the event of termination of the Plan, the balance to the
credit of each member and the General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be paid to the
members in full. The accumulated amount in the General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be
distributed among the members in the proportion to the amount outstanding to their credit as of the
time of termination.6
The NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172 fixing a NAPOCOR employee’s
contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in a sum equivalent to 5% of his basic pay. 7
Almost two decades thereafter, on 8 June 2001, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise
known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA). EPIRA directed the restructuring of the
power industry which includes the reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of EPIRA,
the NAPOCOR Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March 2003 abolishing the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund Department and other departments, and dissolving the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon
the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001. 8 Consequently, some of the employees in the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund Department and in other departments (who were also members of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund) resigned, retired or separated from service. Thereafter, the liquidation and dissolution
process for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund commenced.
On 11 May 2004, the NAPOCOR-WFBT, with authority from the Commission on Audit, approved
Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the release of ₱184 million (which represented 40% of the
liquid assets of NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in the total amount of ₱462 million as of 16 April 2004) for
distribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund members who resigned, retired, or separated upon the
effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001 (EPIRA separated members). 9
Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent Edmund P. Anguluan (Anguluan), as Ex-
Officio Chairman of NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a memorandum on 17 May 2004 to implement the
release of ₱184 million only to the EPIRA separated members to the exclusion of the NAPOCOR
employees (who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) who have resigned, retired, or
separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA (non-EPIRA separated members). 10
This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former Vice-President of Human Resources and
Administration and former Ex-Officio Chairman of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-
EPIRA separated members and in her own personal capacity, to write a letter to Mr. Rogelio M.
Murga, then NAPOCOR President, demanding their equal shares in the remaining assets of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund and access to information and records thereof. 11
On 13 July 2004, there being no action or response on her letter, Segovia, together with Mrs. Emma
C. Baysic (Baysic), former President of the NAPOCOR Employees Association and former member
of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in their personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated
members, filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, a Petition
for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunction against respondents NAPOCOR, the NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan (as
NAPOCOR Vice-President, Human Resources, Administration and Finance Department) and Lorna
T. Dy (as NAPOCOR Senior Department Manager on Finance). 12 The Petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q04-53121.
Segovia, Baysic and the 559 non-EPIRA separated members were represented in Civil Case No.
Q04-53121 by petitioner Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal Retainer Agreement" 13 dated 1
September 2004, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
SUBJECT: Petition for Mandamus with Damages Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction, etc. with
the Court "NPC RETIREES versus NPC, NP Board of Directors, et. al. before the RTC Quezon City
for the payment/settlement of their claims for NPC Welfare Fund (P462 Million assets and other
assets liquid or non-liquid).
Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:
In connection with the above-stated subject, hereunder are our terms and conditions, to wit:
1. No acceptance fee;
2. All costs of litigation ([filing] and docket fees, etc.), miscellaneous and out-of-pocket
expenses the prosecution of said action shall be for the account of the clients;
3. No appearance/meeting fee;
4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value of assets

(liquid and/or non-liquid) are recovered;
5. This Retainer Agreement serves as Legal Authority for the Law Firm to receive and/or
collect its contingency/success fee without further demand.
On 22 February 2006, the parties in the above-mentioned case, duly assisted by their respective
counsels, executed a Compromise Agreement 14 whereby they agreed to amicably settle their dispute
under the following terms and conditions:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
xxxx
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the instant case amicably.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have agreed as follows:
1. Both the NPC EPIRA separated members (those members of the Welfare Fund
affected by the EPIRA law and ceased to be members of the Welfare Fund anytime
from June 26, 2001 [effectivity of the EPIRA LAW] to March 1, 2003 [implementation of
the EPIRA law and date of abolition of the Welfare Fund]) and NPC non-EPIRA
separated members (those who ceased to be members of the Fund prior to June 26,
2001) are entitled to "Earnings Differential" of the NPC Welfare Fund;
2. "Corrected Earnings Differential" refers to a benefit which is a result of re-

computation of Member’s Equity Contributions and Earnings using the correct rates
of return vis-à-vis what was used when they were separated. Period covered by the
discrepancy is from 1989 to 2003. Hence, affected are WF members separated anytime
within the period 1989 to 2003;
xxxx
4. The Corrected Earnings Differential of all affected WF separated members shall earn 6%
legal interest per annum computed from the separation of the members from service up to
March 31, 2006 for all the non-EPIRA separated members and May 31, 2006 for the EPIRA
separated members;
5. As of March 2006, the estimated Corrected Earnings Differential for the non-EPIRA
separated members is ₱119.196 Million while for the EPIRA separated members is
₱173.589 Million or a total of ₱292.785 Million, inclusive of the 6% legal interest;
6. In conformity with the Retainer Agreement dated September 1, 2004 between Mrs.
Perla A. Segovia, Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio; and Irrevocable
Special Power of Attorney dated July 20, 2005 executed by Mrs. Perla A. Segovia and
Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic in favor of Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, counsel for petitioners,
(copies attached as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively), 15% attorney’s fees shall be
deducted from the corresponding Corrected Earnings Differential of those non-EPIRA
separated members who have already executed the corresponding Special Power of
Attorney/Written Authority for the deduction/payment of said attorney’s fees, and shall
be paid to V.V. Orocio and Associates Law Office, represented by Atty. Victoriano V.
Orocio, as compensation for his legal services as counsel for the non-EPIRA
separated members subject to deduction of applicable taxes;
xxxx
15. The parties herein shall exert their best effort in order that the terms and conditions of
this agreement are implemented and complied with in the spirit of fairness, transparency and
equity;
16. This Agreement is not contrary to law, good customs, public order or public policy and is
voluntarily entered into by the parties of their own free will. 15
The parties filed with the RTC the very next day, 23 February 2006, a Joint Motion before the RTC
for the approval of their Compromise Agreement. 16 The RTC rendered a Decision on 3 April 2006
granting the parties’ Joint Motion and approving the said Compromise Agreement. 17
On 10 April 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Approval of Charging (Attorney’s) Lien.
Petitioner asked the RTC to issue an order declaring him entitled to collect an amount equivalent to
15% of the monies due the non-EPIRA separated members as his attorney’s fees in conformity with
the Compromise Agreement. 18 In an Order dated 15 May 2006, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion
and decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so demanded. 19
On 20 June 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution of
the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. 20 Respondents opposed the motion on the ground that there was
no stipulation in the Compromise Agreement to the effect that petitioner is entitled to collect an
amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents
contended that the amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members under the
compromise agreement was a mere estimate and, as such, cannot be validly used by petitioner as
basis for his claim of 15% attorney’s fees.21
The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioner’s Motion 22 and, accordingly, a Writ of
Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006 was issued on 26 July 2006. Pursuant to the said
Writ of Execution, RTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo B. Madoloria (Sheriff Madoloria) issued a Notice of
Garnishment to Ms. Aurora Arenas (Arenas), Assistant Vice-President and Business Manager of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB)-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, and to Mr.
Emmanuel C. Mendoza (Mendoza), Unit Head of the Landbank of the Philippines-NAPOCOR
Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City.23
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006. 24
On 12 August 2006, Sheriff Madoloria served to Arenas an "Order for Delivery of Money." 25
Respondents Anguluan and Dy filed before the Court of Appeals on 22 August 2006 a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95786, assailing the
RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying that a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the implementation of the said RTC order. 26 Respondent
NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals on the same date another Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95946, also challenging the RTC Order
dated 25 July 2006 and praying that it be set aside and a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued prohibiting the RTC from enforcing the said order and the
corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment. 27 Subsequently, respondent NAPOCOR
filed a Motion to Consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 with CA-G.R. SP No. 95786 which was granted
by the appellate court.28
On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting respondents’ application for
a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. It enjoined the RTC from implementing its Order dated 25
July 2006 and the corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment during the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 and No. 95786. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution.29
On 29 January 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision annulling and setting aside: (1)
the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006; (2) the corresponding Writ of Execution dated 26 July 2006; (3)
the Notice of Garnishment dated 28 July 2006; and (4) Order for Delivery of Money dated 10 August
2006. It also held that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees
on the basis of quantum meruit.
The Court of Appeals held that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 sought to be collected by petitioner as
attorney’s fees, equivalent to 15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential
for non-EPIRA separated members, was excessive based on the following reasons: (1) the
corrected earnings differential in the amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated
members was a mere estimate and was hypothetical. Thus, petitioner was unjustified in using said
amount as basis for his 15% attorney’s fees; (2) there was hardly any work by petitioner since (a) the
compromise agreement was reached without trial or hearing on the merits; (b) there was no issue
regarding the release and distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to the non-EPIRA separated
members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts of petitioner, made such distribution possible;
(c) there was no issue on how much each non-EPIRA separated members would receive because
the amount of their respective contribution was duly recorded by the respondents; (d) respondents
have already distributed the corrected earnings differential to some non-EPIRA separated members,
and have given petitioner his corresponding partial attorney’s fees amounting to ₱3,512,007.32; (e)
most of the non-EPIRA separated members have not yet received their share under the compromise
agreement but petitioner, who was merely their agent, was already given partial payment as
attorney’s fees; (f) the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 represents "only less than one fourth partial
release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which means that the equivalent of three-fourths more
would be demanded [by petitioner] in the future;" and (3) the money claim of the non-EPIRA
separated members was settled through a compromise agreement and not won by petitioner in a
trial on the merits.
The Court of Appeals determined that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. However, since petitioner already received
₱3,512,007.32 from respondents as partial payment of his supposed 15% attorney’s fees, it ruled
that such amount was more than sufficient and petitioner was not entitled to claim anymore the
additional amount of ₱14,282,565.38. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed July 25, 2006 Order, the July 26, 2006 Writ of
Execution, the July 28, 2006 Notice of Garnishment, and the August 10, 2006 Order of Delivery of
Money are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is ordered, CAPPING at
₱3,512,007.32, the amount manifested to have already been received from the welfare fund as
attorneys fees, as the maximum amount that may be billed or collected as attorneys fees from the
whole welfare fund – which amount is NOTED to have already exceeded what this court had fixed at
₱1,000,000.00 as the reasonable amount, on quantum meruit, that may be collected as attorneys’
fees, pursuant to the guidelines codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 27 September 2007. 31
Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition before us assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS EDMUND P. ANGULUAN,

LORNA T. DY AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO
[PRELIMINARY] INJUNCTION AS THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH
ARE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE, i.e. RIGHTS OF BEING CLIENTS TO QUESTION THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE ATTORNEY’S FEES OF A LAWYER. THIS ALLEGED RIGHT IS
NON-EXISTENT AND IN FACT FABRICATED CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
NOT THE CLIENTS AT ALL OF PETITIONER, ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%)
CONTINGENCY/SUCCESS FEE OF PETITIONER VICTORIANO V. OROCIO IS
UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNREASONABLE DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE SAID
ATTORNEY’S FEES IS AMONG THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A JUDICIALLY APPROVED
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND COURT ORDER APPROVING HIS CHARGING LIEN, WHICH
AGREEMENT AND ORDER HAVE ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. 32
In his first assigned error, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of
Appeals granting respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. He claims that the
lawphil.net
Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because petitioner
allegedly violated respondents’ material and substantial right as petitioner’s clients to pay only
reasonable attorney’s fees. Petitioner asserts that none of the respondents is his client in the present
case; that even respondents themselves have not alleged or claimed that they are his clients; that
the amount of attorney’s fees he claimed was chargeable on a portion of the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund due his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees; that if anyone would be injured by his
claim of attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees, and not
respondents; that none of his clients has questioned or complained about the amount of attorney’s
fees he is claiming; that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest and at most are merely
nominal parties-in-interest; that as mere nominal parties-in-interest, respondents are not entitled to a
writ of preliminary injunction under the Rules of Court; and that the requisites for the proper issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction are lacking in the instant case.33
In its Resolution dated 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ application for a
writ of preliminary injunction based on the following reasons:
This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima facie established [their] compliance with strict
requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in this case. Under the leading case
of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 72 (2001), the requisites of preliminary injunction are as
follows: (a) the invasion of the right of [herein respondents] is material and substantial; (b) the right
of [herein respondents] is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious irreparable damage to [herein respondents].
The right of [herein respondents] alleged to have been invaded is that a client has the right to
pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and only for services actually rendered –
which is clearly and unmistakably available to all clients. What [herein respondents] are claiming is a
material and substantial right. This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima
facie established an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, to avoid irreparable injury to [herein respondents]. x x x.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of Appeals in granting the writ was
petitioner’s alleged violation or invasion of respondents’ right, as petitioner’s clients, to pay only a
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner.
The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.
It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated members in the
latter’s quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or
employed by respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not
claim or allege that they are clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA
separated members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present cases.
Further, the amount of attorney’s fees being claimed by petitioner is chargeable to the
₱119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members.
Respondents have actually partially distributed such amount to some non-EPIRA separated
members pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA separated
members are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which petitioner’s attorney’s fees
had been and shall be taken.
Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, the
non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of the non-
EPIRA separated members has questioned or complained about petitioner’s claim for attorney’s
fees.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts.34 A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit, as well
as a preservative remedy issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. 35For a writ of preliminary injunction to
issue, the applicant is tasked to establish and convincingly show the following: (1) a right in esse or a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) there is an urgent
and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 36
A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.37 The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction.38 A writ of preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise.39 It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown an actual existing right that
should be protected during the pendency of the principal action. 40 In the absence of a clear legal
right, or when the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is not
proper.41
It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a clear right or right in esse to pay only
a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the petitioner because such right belongs solely to
petitioner’s clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. There can be no violation of a right which
does not exist in the first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction
since the non-EPIRA separated members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the
execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming that respondents would probably
suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund if the writ of
preliminary injunction was not granted, our ruling would still be the same. We have held that the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 42Given these considerations, we hold that the issuance
by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents in its Resolution,
dated 31 October 2006, was improper. lawphil.net
With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner maintained that his claim for attorney’s fees
equivalent to 15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-
EPIRA separated members was not unreasonable or unconscionable because such amount was
expressly agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated members
and respondents. The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the RTC for approval through the
joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated members and respondents, and the RTC had rendered a
final and executory decision approving the same. By virtue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals
cannot alter or change the terms of the Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from
collecting his stipulated amount of attorney’s fees. 43
Petitioner also avers that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70, which is equivalent to 15% of the
₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated members
from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is already the total, not partial, amount he is claiming as
attorney’s fees; that the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-
EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is not hypothetical, such amount
having been actually computed and fixed by respondents themselves without the participation of
petitioner and his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members; that he did a lot of legal work and
utilized his legal skills on discovery procedures to force respondents to enter into the Compromise
Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members; that the passage of EPIRA merely paved the
way for the distribution of the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; that if not for his
legal work and skills, the non-EPIRA separated members would not have received their lawful
shares in the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; and that his claim for 15%
attorney’s fees is supported by jurisprudence. 44
An attorney’s fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for
the legal services he has rendered to a client. 45 The client and his lawyer may enter into a written
contract whereby the latter would be paid attorney’s fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to
the client. This is called a contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney’s fees in this contract
may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher compensation is allowed in consideration of the
risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. 46 In the case at bar, the non-EPIRA separated
members and petitioner voluntarily entered into a contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did not
receive any acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA separated members
expressly agreed to pay petitioner "contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever
amount/value of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid)" recovered; and authorized petitioner’s law firm "to
receive and/or collect its contingency/success fee without further demand."
Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound to the benefit of the
poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but
no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent
fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor clients can have their rights vindicated and
upheld." Further, such contracts are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 47
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. 48
A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily

controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such
stipulated amount to be unreasonable or unconscionable. If the stipulated amount for attorney’s fees
is excessive, the contract may be disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity
thereto.49 Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of the services rendered. In such a
case, courts are empowered to reduce the attorney’s fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking
into consideration the surrounding circumstances and the established parameters. 50
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for determining the
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment
based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. It
is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed fee
was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the time spent, and extent of
services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the subject matter;
skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred
case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and professional
standing of the lawyer, may be considered. 51
It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner as their counsel because the
latter, as former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for two terms or four years, is familiar and
knowledgeable on the operation of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. 52 Yet, according to the contingency
fee contract agreement between petitioner and the non-EPIRA separated members, petitioner
received no acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he took on the non-EPIRA separated
members’ case. Petitioner’s attorney’s fees were absolutely dependent on the success of non-
EPIRA separated members’ claim on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Despite these circumstances,
petitioner worked diligently in advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA separated members against
respondents as shown by the following: (1) petitioner took pains in verifying the identity and claim of
each of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2) petitioner
prepared and filed a well-researched and well-argued petition with the RTC for the claims of the non-
EPIRA separated members;53 (3) he prepared and presented several witnesses and numerous
pertinent documents before the RTC in support of their application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondents’ plan to exclude the non-
EPIRA separated members from receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (4) he
participated, as non-EPIRA separated members’ counsel, in the conduct of several hearings
regarding the said application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction;54 (5) he obtained a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction from the RTC which enjoined/prohibited respondents from excluding the non-EPIRA
separated members from their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; 55 (6) he held numerous
conferences with the non-EPIRA separated members wherein he apprised the latter of the status of
their claims and his legal strategies pertinent thereto; 56 and (7) he exerted utmost efforts which
eventually led to the execution of the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated
members and respondents.
By reason of petitioner’s dedication and persistence as can be gleaned above, respondents finally
agreed to settle amicably with the non-EPIRA separated members as regards the latter’s claim for
shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.
Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioner’s vigilance and zeal, respondents would not have executed
the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members. Hence, it is fair to conclude
that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably high compensation.
However, petitioner’s attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 or equivalent to 15% of the ₱
119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members should be
equitably reduced.
In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. The National Power Corporation
(NPC),57 we awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus backwages to several NPC
employees because they were illegally dismissed by the NPC. The NPC employees were
represented by a certain Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, (the
petitioner in the instant cases) under a legal retainer agreement which provides: (1) no acceptance
fee; (2) miscellaneous/out of pocket expenses in the amount of ₱25,000.00; and (3) twenty-five
percent (25%) of whatever amounts/monies are recovered in favor of said NPC personnel
contingent on the success of the case. Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio filed a Motion for Approval of
Charging (Attorney’s) Lien pursuant to the legal retainer agreement. Although we granted the said
motion, we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees which was chargeable on the monies recoverable
by the NPC employees from 25% to 10% because:
While we duly recognize the right of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio to a charging lien on the amounts
recoverable by petitioners pursuant to our 26 September 2006 Decision, nevertheless, we deem it
proper to reduce the same. Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable. The amounts which petitioners may recover as the logical and necessary
consequence of our Decision of 26 September 2006, i.e., backwages and separation pay (in lieu of
reinstatement), are essentially the same awards which we grant to illegally dismissed employees in
the private sector. In such cases, our Labor Code explicitly limits attorney’s fees to a maximum of
10% of the recovered amount. Considering by analogy the said limit on attorney’s fees in this case of
illegal dismissal of petitioners by respondent NPC, a government-owned and controlled corporation;
plus the facts that petitioners have suffered deprivation of their means of livelihood for the last five
years; and the fact that this case was originally filed before us, without any judicial or administrative
proceedings below; as well as the fundamental ethical principle that the practice of law is a
profession and not a commercial enterprise, we approve in favor of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio a
charging lien of 10% (instead of 25%) on the amounts recoverable by petitioners from NPC pursuant
to our Decision dated 26 September 2006.
The abovementioned case may be reasonably applied by analogy in the instant case since they
have substantially similar circumstances. In the case before us, although the non-EPIRA separated
members were not illegally dismissed, they were, nevertheless, separated from work by reason of
EPIRA. In addition, the non-EPIRA separated members had a legal retainer agreement/contingency
fee contract with petitioner as their counsel.
It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a moneymaking venture. A
lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a trustee of his client’s cause of action
and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the
fundamental function of administering justice in society. It follows that a lawyer’s compensation for
professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that
the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered,
but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking
his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the courts to
regulate his right to charge professional fees.58
Thus, taking into account the foregoing circumstances and recognized principles, the 15%
attorney’s fees of petitioner should be reduced to 10%. As such, petitioner is entitled to collect
only, as attorney’s fees, an amount equivalent to 10% of the ₱119,196,000.00 or ₱11,919,600.00.
We note, however, that the compromise agreement was partially implemented in the first week of
April 2006 with the payment of ₱23,416,000.00 to some non-EPIRA separated members. 59 Petitioner
admitted having already received an amount of ₱3,512,007.32 as his attorney’s fees on the said
partial payment of ₱23,416,000.00. 60 Accordingly, the amount of ₱3,512,007.32 received by
petitioner as attorney’s fees should be deducted from the fixed 10% attorney’s fees or the amount of
₱11,919,600.00. Per computation, petitioner is entitled to recover the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 as
attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 October 2006
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Resolution, dated 29 January 2007 and 27
September 2007, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in
the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 on the corrected earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated
members. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_179892_2009.html
41. A.C. No. 9091 December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A.
FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan. n 4 1
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid ₱35,000.000 for all the lots
that would be sold in the subdivision. For that purpose, they executed a Pecial Power of Attorney
2
authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign those
agreements on their behalf. 3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to accout
for the titles to the subdivided land. Complainants also found that he had sold a number of parcels
4
to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were complainants invited
to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project. 5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously executed
in his favor.
6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of ₱10,000,000, but the
latter again failed to pay them. 7
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting them in
the preparation of a settlement agreement. 8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against
Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal services, in
9
which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but
that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would
pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In preparation for the filing of
an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking
to annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.
10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the
Register of Deeds of Bataan. 11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the
adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced complainants to
agree to another settlement. 12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July
2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles, and
damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006. 13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the services
of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and
finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging that
15
the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the intent of
defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in
the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases. 16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint, he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
17
Reconsideration. 18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the former’s
allegation of collusion, complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent through a
19
Complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007.
20
Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits
of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal problems" brought
about by respondent. 21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01, 1.03, 1.04, 12.02, 15.05, 18.04, and 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It suspended respondent from the practice of
29
law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement. 30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this Court noted
the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondent’s second motion
for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by complainants.
In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the instant complaint against him at
the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover
their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of ₱10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to
that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of
₱35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective
client and pursue the ends of justice. 31
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the
circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only
because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants that they were
not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of
respondent. He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim.
Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants and Fevidal. We
also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received various amounts as loans from
respondent from August 2006 to June 2007, they could not spare even a few minutes to ask about
32
the status of the case. We shall discuss this more below. As regards the claim that respondent
refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latter’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not
convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement. 33
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his attorney’s
charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his
rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which
his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene in
proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI, we granted counsel’s motion
34
to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable cause.
Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to deprive counsel of
his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent fees.
Thus, the determination of whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the
discretion of the court before which the lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for
professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that
the fees they charge remain reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually
rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well. 35
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services. 36
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for disciplinary
action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find that the
1âwphi1
contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the nature of a champertous
contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to
enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. 37
Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent.
38 39
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that
lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. A reading of the contract for
legal services shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket
40
fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse claim.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to
safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to reimbrusement. The 41
purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause.
Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation
advanced by respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and transportation
allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash
advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants. 42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests with
the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this case, an
admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must
always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation
expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of reimbursement and
lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
42. G.R. No. 176425

HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA. DE UY, Petitioners (Heirs
of Manuel Uy Ek Liong),
vs.
MAURICIA MEER CASTILLO, HEIRS OF BUENAFLOR C. UMALI, represented by NANCY
UMALI, VICTORIA H. CASTILLO, BERTILLA C. RADA, MARIETTA C. CAVANEZ, LEOVINA C.
JALBUENA and PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1dated 23 January 2007 rendered by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84687,2 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed January 27, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 93-176, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered declaring the AGREEMENT and the KASUNDUAN void ab initio for being
contrary to law and public policy, without prejudice to the attorney’s filing a proper action for
collection of reasonable attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit and without prejudice also to
administrative charges being filed against counsel for counsel’s openly entering into such an illegal
AGREEMENT in violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility which action may be
instituted with the Supreme Court which has exclusive jurisdiction to impose such penalties on
members of the bar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)
The Facts
Alongside (together with) her husband, Felipe Castillo, respondent Mauricia Meer Castillo was the
owner of four parcels of land with an aggregate area of 53,307 square meters, situated in Silangan
Mayao, Lucena City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
42104, T-32227, T-31752 and T-42103. With the death of Felipe, a deed of extrajudicial partition
over his estate was executed by his heirs, namely, Mauricia, Buenaflor Umali and respondents
Victoria Castillo, Bertilla Rada, Marietta Cavanez, Leovina Jalbuena and Philip Castillo. Utilized as
security for the payment of a tractor purchased by Mauricia’s nephew, Santiago Rivera, from
Bormaheco, Inc., it appears, however, that the subject properties were subsequently sold at a public
auction where Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) tendered the highest bid. Having
consolidated its title, ICP likewise sold said parcels in favor of Philippine Machinery Parts
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (PMPMCI) which, in turn, caused the same to be titled in its name. 4
On 29 September 1976, respondents and Buenaflor instituted Civil Case No. 8085 before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon, for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the transactions
and/or proceedings involving the subject parcels, as well as the TCTs procured by
PMPMCI.5 Encountering financial difficulties in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 8085, respondents
and Buenaflor entered into an Agreement dated 20 September 1978 whereby they procured the
legal services of Atty. Edmundo Zepeda and the assistance of Manuel Uy Ek Liong who, as
financier, agreed to underwrite the litigation expenses entailed by the case. In exchange, it was
stipulated in the notarized Agreement that, in the event of a favorable decision in Civil Case No.
8085, Atty. Zepeda and Manuel would be entitled to "a share of forty (40%) percent of all the realties
and/or monetary benefits, gratuities or damages" which may be adjudicated in favor of respondents.6
On the same date, respondents and Buenaflor entered into another notarized agreement
denominated as a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to sell their remaining sixty (60%) percent share
in the subject parcels in favor of Manuel for the sum of ₱180,000.00. The parties stipulated that
Manuel would pay a downpayment in the sum of ₱1,000.00 upon the execution of the Kasunduan
and that respondents and Buenaflor would retain and remain the owners of a 1,750-square meter
portion of said real properties. It was likewise agreed that any party violating the Kasunduan would
pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed in the sum of ₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses incurred should a case be subsequently filed in court. The parties likewise
agreed to further enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to ensure that the sale
would push through and/or in the event of illegality or impossibility of any part of the Kasunduan. 7
With his death (Manuel) on 19 August 1989, 8 Manuel was survived by petitioners (Heirs of Manuel
Uy Ek Liong), Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong, who were later represented in the negotiations regarding
the subject parcels and in this suit by petitioner BelenLim Vda. de Uy. The record also shows that
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8085 culminated (end) in this Court’s rendition of a 13 September
1990 Decision in G.R. No. 895619 in favor of respondents and Buenaflor .10 Subsequent to the finality
of the Court’s Decision, 11 it appears that the subject parcels were subdivided in accordance with the
Agreement, with sixty (60%) percent thereof consisting of 31,983 square meters equally apportioned
among and registered in the names of respondents and Buenaflor under TCT Nos. T-72027, T-
72028, T-72029, T-72030, T-72031, T-72032 and T-72033. 12 Consisting of 21,324 square meters,
the remaining forty (40%) percent was, in turn, registered in the names of petitioners (Heirs of
Manuel Uy Ek Liong) and Atty. Zepeda under TCT No. T-72026.13
Supposedly acting on the advice of Atty. Zepeda, respondents wrote petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy
Ek Liong) a letter dated 22 March 1993, essentially informing petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek
Liong) that respondents were willing to sell their sixty (60%) percent share in the subject parcels for
the consideration of ₱500.00 per square meter.14
Insisting on the price agreed upon in the Kasunduan, however, petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek
Liong) sent a letter dated 19 May 1993, requesting respondents to execute within 15 days from
notice the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale over their 60% share as aforesaid, excluding the 1,750-
square meter portion specified in their agreement with Manuel.
Informed that petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) were ready to pay the remaining
₱179,000.00 balance of the agreed price, 15 respondents wrote a 28 May 1993 reply, reminding the
former of their purported refusal of earlier offers to sell the shares of Leovina and of Buenaflor who
had, in the meantime, died.16 In a letter dated 1 June 1993, respondents also called petitioners (Heirs
of Manuel Uy Ek Liong)’ attention to the fact, among others, that their right to ask for an additional
consideration for the sale was recognized under the Kasunduan. 17
On 6 October 1993, petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) commenced the instant suit with the
filing of their complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondents and
respondent Heirs of Buenaflor, as then represented by Menardo Umali. Faulting respondents with
unjustified refusal to comply with their obligation under the Kasunduan, petitioners (Heirs of Manuel
Uy Ek Liong) prayed that the former be ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale
over their shares in the subject parcels, with indemnities for moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs of the suit. 18 Served with summons, respondents
filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to File Third Party Complaint on 3 December 1993.
Maintaining that the Agreement and the Kasunduan were illegal for being unconscionable and
contrary to public policy, respondents averred that Atty. Zepeda was an indispensable party to the
case. Together with the dismissal of the complaint and the annulment of said contracts and TCT No.
T-72026, respondents sought the grant of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.19
The issues thereby joined, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lucena City, proceeded to
conduct the mandatory preliminary conference in the case. 20 After initially granting respondents’
motion to file a third party complaint against Atty. Zepeda, 21 the RTC, upon petitioners (Heirs of
Manuel Uy Ek Liong)’ motion for reconsideration, 22 went on to issue the 18 July 1997 Order
disallowing the filing of said pleading on the ground that the validity of the Agreement and the cause
of action against Atty. Zepeda, whose whereabouts were then unknown, would be better threshed
out in a separate action. 23 The denial24 of their motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
order25 prompted respondents to file a notice of appeal 26 which was, however, denied due course by
the RTC on the ground that the orders sought to be appealed were non-appealable. 27 On 14
December 1997, Menardo died 28 and was substituted by his daughter Nancy as representative of
respondent Heirs of Buenaflor. 29
In the ensuing trial of the case on the merits, petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) called to the
witness stand Samuel Lim Uy Ek Liong 30whose testimony was refuted by Philip 31 and
Leovina32 during the presentation of the defense evidence. On 27 January 2005, the RTC rendered a
decision finding the Kasunduan valid and binding between respondents and petitioners (Heirs of
Manuel Uy Ek Liong) who had the right to demand its fulfillment as Manuel’s successors-in-interest.
Brushing aside Philip’s testimony that respondents were forced to sign the Kasunduan, the RTC
ruled that said contract became effective upon the finality of this Court’s 13 September 1990
Decision in G.R. No. 89561 which served as a suspensive condition therefor. Having benefited from
the legal services rendered by Atty. Zepeda and the financial assistance extended by Manuel,
respondents were also declared estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement,
Kasunduan and TCT No. T-72026. With the Kasunduan upheld as the law between the contracting
parties and their privies,33 the RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds for the petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek
Liong) and hereby:
1. Orders the respondents to execute and deliver a Deed of Conveyance in favor of the
petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) covering the 60% of the properties formerly
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3175, 42104, T-42103, T-32227 and T-42104
which are now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-
72030, T-72031, T-72032, T-72033 and T-72026, all of the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City,
for and in consideration of the amount of ₱180,000.00 in accordance with the provisions of
the KASUNDUAN, and
2. Orders the petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) to pay and deliver to the respondents
upon the latter’s execution of the Deed of Conveyance mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the amount of ₱179,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price as
provided in the KASUNDUAN, and
3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) the following
amounts:
a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;
b). ₱50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and

c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.34
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, both petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) 35 and
respondents perfected their appeals36 which were docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No.
84687. While petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) prayed for the increase of the monetary
awards adjudicated a quo, as well as the further grant of liquidated damages in their
favor,37 respondents sought the complete reversal of the appealed decision on the ground that the
Agreement and the Kasunduan were null and void. 38 On 23 January 2007, the CA rendered the
herein assailed decision, setting aside the RTC’s decision, upon the following findings and
conclusions, to wit: (a) the Agreement and Kasunduan are byproducts of the partnership between
Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who, as a non-lawyer, was not authorized to practice law; (b) the
Agreement is void under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines which prohibits lawyers
from acquiring properties which are the objects of the litigation in which they have taken part; (c)
jointly designed to completely deprive respondents of the subject parcels, the Agreement and the
Kasunduan are invalid and unconscionable; and (d) without prejudice to his liability for violation of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Zepeda can file an action to collect attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit.39
The Issue
Petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) seek the reversal of the CA’s decision on the following
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH DIVISION,

COMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF
THE RTC BRANCH 59, LUCENA CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 93-176 DECLARING THE
AGREEMENT AND KASUNDUAN VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF ART. 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.40
We find the petition impressed with partial merit.
At the outset (beginning), it bears pointing out that the complaint for specific performance filed before
the RTC sought only the enforcement of petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong)’ rights and
respondents’ obligation under the Kasunduan. Although the answer filed by respondents also
assailed the validity of the Agreement and TCT No. T-72026, the record shows that the RTC, in its
order dated 18 July 1997, disallowed the filing of a third-party complaint against Atty. Zepeda on the
ground that the causes of action in respect to said contract and title would be better threshed out in a
separate action. As Atty. Zepeda’s whereabouts were then unknown, the RTC also ruled that, far
from contributing to the expeditious settlement of the case, the grant of respondents’ motion to file a
third-party complaint would only delay the proceedings in the case. 41 With the 1 October 1998 denial
of their motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, respondents subsequently filed a notice of
appeal which was, however, denied due course on the ground that the orders denying their motion
to file a third-party complaint and their motion for reconsideration were interlocutory and non-
appealable.42
Absent a showing that the RTC’s ruling on the foregoing issues was reversed and set aside, we find
that the CA reversibly erred in ruling on the validity of the Agreement which respondents executed
not only with petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong)’ predecessor-in-interest, Manuel, but also
with Atty. Zepeda. Since it is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, 43 the rule is settled that a court must first acquire jurisdiction over a party –
either through valid service of summons or voluntary appearance – for the latter to be bound by a
court decision.44 The fact that Atty. Zepeda was not properly impleaded in the suit and given a
chance to present his side of the controversy before the RTC should have dissuaded the CA from
invalidating the Agreement and holding that attorney’s fees should, instead, be computed on a
quantum meruit basis. Admittedly, Article 1491 (5) 45 of the Civil Code prohibits lawyers from
acquiring by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession. The CA lost sight of the fact, however,
that the prohibition applies only during the pendency of the suit 46 and generally does not cover
contracts for contingent fees where the transfer takes effect only after the finality of a favorable
judgment.47
Although executed on the same day, it cannot likewise be gainsaid that the Agreement and the
Kasunduan are independent contracts, with parties, objects and causes different from that of the
other. Defined as a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other to give something or to render some service, 48 a contract requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and, (c) cause of the obligation which is
established.49 Executed in exchange for the legal services of Atty. Zepeda and the financial
assistance to be extended by Manuel, the Agreement concerned respondents’ transfer of 40% of the
avails of the suit, in the event of a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 8085. While concededly
subject to the same suspensive condition, the Kasunduan was, in contrast, concluded by
respondents with Manuel alone, for the purpose of selling in favor of the latter 60% of their share in
the subject parcels for the agreed price of ₱180,000.00. Given these clear distinctions, petitioners
(Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) correctly argue that the CA reversibly erred in not determining the
validity of the Kasunduan independent from that of the Agreement.
Viewed in the light of the autonomous nature of contracts enunciated under Article 1306 50 of the Civil
Code, on the other hand, we find that the Kasunduan was correctly found by the RTC to be a valid
and binding contract between the parties. Already partially executed with respondents’ receipt of
₱1,000.00 from Manuel upon the execution thereof, the Kasunduan simply concerned the sale of the
former’s 60% share in the subject parcel, less the 1,750-square meter portion to be retained, for the
agreed consideration of ₱180,000.00. As a notarized document that carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, 51 the Kasunduan was shown to have been signed
by respondents with full knowledge of its contents, as may be gleaned (gathered) from the
testimonies elicited from Philip52 and Leovina.53
Although Philip had repeatedly claimed that respondents had been forced to sign the Agreement and
the Kasunduan, his testimony does not show such vitiation of consent as would warrant the
avoidance of the contract. He simply meant that respondents felt constrained to accede to the
stipulations insisted upon by Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who were not otherwise willing to push
through with said contracts.54
At any rate, our perusal of the record shows that respondents’ main objection to the enforcement of
the Kasunduan was the perceived inadequacy of the ₱180,000.00 which the parties had fixed as
consideration for 60% of the subject parcels. Rather than claiming vitiation of their consent in the
answer they filed a quo (from which), respondents, in fact, distinctly averred that the Kasunduan was
tantamount to unjust enrichment and "a clear source of speculative profit" at their expense since
their remaining share in said properties had "a current market value of ₱9,594,900.00, more or
less."55 In their 22 March 1993 letter to petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong), respondents also
cited prices then prevailing for the sale of properties in the area and offered to sell their 60% share
for the price of ₱500.00 per square meter 56 or a total of ₱15,991,500.00. In response to petitioners
(Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong)’ insistence on the price originally agreed upon by the
parties,57respondents even invoked the last paragraph 58 of the Kasunduan to the effect that the
parties agreed to enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to ensure the fruition
(realization) of the sale.59
In the absence of any showing, however, that the parties were able to agree on new stipulations that
would modify their agreement, we find that petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) and
respondents are bound by the original terms embodied in the Kasunduan. Obligations arising from
contracts, after all, have the force of law between the contracting parties 60 who are expected to abide
in good faith with their contractual commitments, not weasel out ( to avoid doing something that
you have agreed to do, especially by being dishonest ) of them.61 Moreover, when the terms
of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the rule is
settled that the literal meaning of its stipulations should govern. In such cases, courts have no
authority to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties. Since their duty
is confined to the interpretation of the one which the parties have made for themselves without
regard to its wisdom or folly, it has been ruled that courts cannot supply material stipulations or read
into the contract words it does not contain. 62 Indeed, courts will not relieve a party from the adverse
effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into.63
Our perusal of the Kasunduan also shows that it contains a penal clause64 which provides that a
party who violates any of its provisions shall be liable to pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed at
₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred by the latter should
judicial resolution of the matter becomes necessary. 65 An accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation, the foregoing stipulation is a
penal clause which serves to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and provides for
liquidated damages for such breach.66 "The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated
indemnity without the necessity of proof of the existence and the measure of damages caused by
the breach."67Articles 1226 and 1227 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages
and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in
the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the obligation by paying the
penalty, save in the case where this right has been expressly reserved for him. Neither can the
creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation and the satisfaction of the penalty at the same time,
unless this right has been clearly granted to him. However, if after the creditor has decided to require
the fulfillment of the obligation, the performance thereof should become impossible without his fault,
the penalty may be enforced."
In the absence of a showing that they expressly reserved the right to pay the penalty in lieu of the
performance of their obligation under the Kasunduan, respondents were correctly ordered by the
RTC to execute and deliver a deed of conveyance over their 60% share in the subject parcels in
favor of petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong). Considering that the Kasunduan stipulated that
respondents would retain a portion of their share consisting of 1,750 square meters, said disposition
should, however, be modified to give full effect to the intention of the contracting parties. Since the
parties also fixed liquidated damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 in case of breach, we find that said
amount should suffice as petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong)' indemnity, without further need
of compensation for moral and exemplary damages. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty
generally substitutes the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-
compliance.68 Usually incorporated to create an effective deterrent against breach of the obligation
by making the consequences of such breach as onerous as it may be possible, the rule is settled
that a penal clause is not limited to actual and compensatory damages 69
The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 is, however, proper. Aside from the
1âwphi1
fact that the penal clause included a liability for said award in the event of litigation over a breach of
the Kasunduan, petitioners (Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong) were able to prove that they incurred said
sum in engaging the services of their lawyer to pursue their rights and protect their interests. 70
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' assailed 23 January 2007 Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the RTC's 27 January 2005 Decision is REINSTATED
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the exclusion of a 1,750-square meter portion from the
60% share in the subject parcel respondents were ordered to convey in favor of petitioners (Heirs of
Manuel Uy Ek Liong); and (b) the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary damages. The
rights of the parties under the Agreement may be determined in a separate litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Sources: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_176425_2013.html
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_176425_2013.html
43. Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012
AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on March 3,
1
1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria
Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation dated September 29,
2
2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted to
3
the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution and the records of the
4
case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint, Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in Civil Case No. 777.
5
In consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also
agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer fee
paid.
Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several
occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would
allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that
they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She
immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty.
Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988,
because the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and
colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse
party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to
comply with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development
from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the
decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told
her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty.
Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty.
Rañeses about her discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply
denied any knowledge of the decision.
In a separate affidavit, Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for
6
money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked her to deliver a
telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell
Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to
Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her (Bueno’s)
presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused
to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received
from them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the
hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May 11, 2000 and on 8
October 2, 2000. During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an
9
Order declaring Atty. Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a
10
formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the
Complaint and Supporting Papers" (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty.
11
Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December
2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint
and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of
substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16,
2000 12
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing,
Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted (negated) Atty. Rañeses’ claim
that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another
clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case
would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant submits her memorandum. 13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner
Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant’s submission of
her memorandum. 14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another
hearing on March 14, 2003. During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were present. The
15
Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the
hearing’s resetting because he had prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty.
Rañeses never filed an answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus,
Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence
16
and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal
17
offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments to her
complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty.
18
Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a
judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that
she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have proven that Atty. Rañeses had
indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to
procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s
bare allegations which could not support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to
bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to
bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her
statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before the
investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the
Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by
the registry receipt card evidencing his receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure to
maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 19
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law
in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own observations
and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients
with competence and diligence. Specifically,
Rule 18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation."
Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them." A client is entitled to the benefit of all
20
remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these
remedies or defenses. 21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief
amounts to inexcusable negligence. In Garcia v. Bala, the Court even found the respondent lawyer
22 23
guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice
of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence
and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted
by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents that she
could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are
insufficient to prove Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this
point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio, the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable
24
decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and persistently called his residence
to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein
violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to
refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of
influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a
fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are
exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he
practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners
regarding the notices given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating
Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating
Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in
secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo
Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in
hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part,
has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any
hearings scheduled in this investigation. 25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his
propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him
to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that
Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered
impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not
be, in a lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.]
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false
1âwphi1
because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent
because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned
the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but
through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty.
Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the
Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not
allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers,
their clients and the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions
composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided
members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the
respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/ac_8383_2012.html
44. A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION FELIPE-

DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On March 5, 1996, a Petition for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A.
1
Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution dated June 19, 1996, we required
2
respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16, 1996. On 3
August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of Time To File
Comment. He requested for additional period of 30 days within which to file his comment citing
4
numerous professional commitments. We granted said request in our October 2, 1996

Resolution. The extended deadline passed sans (without) respondent’s comment. Thus on January
5
29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative Case For Resolution
Without Comment Of Respondent claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his right to file
6
comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-Palma who
set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. 8
The Minutes of the Hearing showed that both parties were present. The next hearing was set on
9
1âwphi1
November 6, 1997 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel.
10 11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing,
complainants moved to calendar the case. 12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on January
12, 1999. 13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their Position
Paper. Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.
1âwphi1
14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper on January 28, 1999.

15 16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation. 17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the Petition; he
then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no discussion was made
regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19,
2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-22906
pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the
counsel for the defendants therein; that respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other
despite knowing that the defendants are half-brothers and half-sisters of complainants; and that they
filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as
Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as
part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed another Perjury charge [against
the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants averred that respondent knowingly filed a
totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with the rules of procedure; that the
said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous
Opposition to the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent
violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the
amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine, complainants charged
respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified
Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to determine
whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue of whether the
complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being half-brothers
and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on the authenticity of the
Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906.
Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites cannot be accomplished in
this administrative case. The resolution of whether the parties are related to each other appears to
be one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint for Partition,
Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Damages. The complainants claimed that
they are the legitimate children of the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the
defendants therein, as represented by the respondent, who denied their filiation with the
complainants. Clearly, the issue of filiation must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this
administrative case. The same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage
Certificate which was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed against
the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending
before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement that they are strangers
to each other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil Case No.
A-95-22906 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-
A for allegedly submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed
a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed
out in a judicial action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion that -
18
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter
involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's
disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liablity, and
which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be
a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's
disciplinary authority. x x x
19
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin, viz:

20
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a
member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance,
however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual
matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as
not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court
deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending
on the final outcome of the civil case. Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition
21
filed by complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion
here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not file his
comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be
sanctioned.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His
conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves
officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of
this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers. 22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the infraction
committed by the respondent. 23
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to give due
respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that commission of a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19,
2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/dec2013/ac_4549_2013.html
45. G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59976,
which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 22,
2000 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated April 10, 2002, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL Shipping
Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine
Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex General
(MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly salary of
US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month,
vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A request
for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996,
feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and
swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to
board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages,
overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping
and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the latter
alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for unjust
repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment

representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living allowance,

overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages from
August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In its
Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but modified the
appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant due to his
illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick wage benefit is
deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of May
3, 2000.5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated December 18, 2001, the
CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision. 7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
April 10, 2002.8
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed from
employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to pre-terminate
private respondent's employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to the award
of attorney's fees.9
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of the
NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his part to abandon his job
and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of jumping from the vessel and swimming to
shore is evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his job. Petitioners further
contend that if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is unlikely that
he is able to swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance between their ship and the shore,
considering that he needed to use his limbs in swimming. Petitioners further assert that it is error on
the part of the CA to disregard the entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine Note Protest
evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while these pieces of evidence were belatedly
presented, the settled rule is that additional evidence may be admitted on appeal in labor cases.
Petitioners also contend that Rusel's act of desertion is a grave and serious offense and considering
the nature and situs of employment as well as the nationality of the employer, the twin requirements
of notice and hearing before an employee can be validly terminated may be dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that the termination of his
employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to exercise their prerogative to pre-
terminate such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provision
was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of Employment with petitioners. Petitioners assert that despite
the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the appellate court failed to resolve the same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm the
award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months because
Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards. Petitioners
further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance, should not be
granted because they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer.
Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August 11-22, 1996 should be
applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that under Section 19(E) of the
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-
Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right
to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other
earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney's fees should be deleted because there
is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason why attorney's
fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which have
already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues that,
aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against petitioners'
favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, private
respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions. Private
respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of
desertion. Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is available to local and
overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal protection
as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private respondent argues that
petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as an alternative
defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that private respondent was
dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of attorney's fees, private respondent
contends that since petitioners' act compelled the former to incur expenses to protect his interest
and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that attorney's fees be awarded
in favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that these awards
are all premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's
dismissal was improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court. 10 Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination.11 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater
force in labor cases.12 Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings of
facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the
CA.13 The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC,
have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters. 14 In the
present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual. The Labor
Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that private respondent is not guilty of
desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his employment. After a review of the
records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of these
tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the Marine Note
Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent abandoned the
vessel in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of the Marine Note Protest as well as
the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because aside from the fact that they were presented only
during petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note Protest and
the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers of the vessel were neither notarized nor
authenticated by the proper authorities. Moreover, a reading of these entries simply shows that
private respondent was presumed to have deserted his post on the sole basis that he was found
missing while the MV Cemtex General was anchored at the port of Takehara, Japan. Hence, without
any corroborative evidence, these documents cannot be used as bases for concluding that private
respondent was guilty of desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that what
caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was suffering which
was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain to provide him with the necessary
treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at the anchorage of
Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to protect himself and to
seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusions of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA are based on conjecture because there
is no evidence to prove that, at the time he jumped ship, private respondent was really suffering from
an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private respondent's
confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may not rely on the
letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private respondent's Position Paper because it was
unsigned and it was not established who executed the same. 17 However, the result of the x-ray
examination conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after private
respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there is a soft-tissue swelling
around his ankle joint. 18 This evidence is consistent with private respondent's claim that he was then
suffering from an ankle injury which caused him to jump off the ship.
As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance between
the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of his ankle injury,
suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied seaman and that with the full use of both
his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:
The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By
desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the ship, without
leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention not to return to her
service; or as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that is, with an intention to
desert.19 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to
prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the
clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case,
however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when private
respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped
off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he
sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of deserting his
post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. 20 The case of the employer must stand or fall on
its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense. 21 In the present case, since
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that private respondent is guilty of desertion,
the Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that
private respondent's dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum Circular No.
055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in
terminating the employment of private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION
xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer from such port
provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the seafarer shall
also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination pay equivalent to
one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of termination may only be
exercised by the master/employer if the original contract period of the seafarer is at least ten
(10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall not apply
to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on January 1,
1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between private respondent and
petitioners was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for petitioners to cite this particular
Memorandum because at the time of petitioners' and private respondent's execution of their contract
of employment Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was executed was
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided under the second
paragraph of private respondent's Contract of Employment that the terms and conditions provided
under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully observed. Hence,
it is Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private respondent's contract of
employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical provisions with
Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the
expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seaman from such port
provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the seaman shall
also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination pay equivalent to
one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of termination may only be
exercised by the master/employer if the original contact period of the seaman is at least ten
(10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall not apply
to dismissal for cause.
The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments are misplaced.
Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating private respondent's
employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense that the latter's dismissal from
employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that they ended private respondent's services
because he is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they exercised their option to
prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply because they have the right to
do so under their contract. These grounds for termination are inconsistent with each other such that
the use of one necessarily negates resort to the other. Besides, it appears from the records that
petitioners' alternative defense was pleaded merely as an afterthought because it was only in their
appeal with the NLRC that they raised this defense. The only defense raised by petitioners in their
Answer with Counterclaim filed with the office of the Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was
dismissed from employment by reason of desertion. 23Under the Rules of Court, 24 which is applicable
in a suppletory character in labor cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3,
Rule I of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC 25, defenses which are not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. 26
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum
Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as basis for terminating
private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of the conditions before any of these provisions
becomes applicable is when the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3)
months before the expiration of the contract of employment. In the present case, private
respondent's contract was executed on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve months. He was
deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the Philippines on August
22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not meet this condition because private respondent's
termination was not within a period of three months before the expiration of his contract of
employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with the other
conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private respondent's earned wages
together with his leave pay for the entire contract period as well as termination pay equivalent to his
one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him
and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. 27 In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines
with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor
Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.28 Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court
has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from
the vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that
he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a
representative.29 Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing without regard to the nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the employer.
Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996 were applied
to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the costs of his repatriation
against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under the provisions of Section 19(E) of
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is discharged for any just
cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation
from the seafarer's wages and other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its counterpart
provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have the right
to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seaman's balance of wages
and other earnings.
xxxx
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to recover the cost
of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only if the concerned seaman is validly
discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case, since petitioners failed to prove that
private respondent was validly terminated from employment on the ground of desertion, it only
follows that they do not have the right to deduct the costs of private respondent's repatriation from
his wages and other earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private respondent is not
entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance as well as attorney's fees because he failed to present any proof to show that he
is entitled to these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondent's three months
salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special
allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living allowance as part
of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042,
otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The pertinent
provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims –
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as

defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of the amount
due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In the present case,
since private respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, he is, therefore, entitled to
receive a sum of US$1200.00, representing three months of said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it is clearly
provided under private respondent's Contract of Employment that he is entitled to these benefits as
follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to
US$40.00/month; overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of US$175.00/month. 30
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether or
not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can not leave ship
beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess
of said number of hours.31 In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is not entitled
to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered service in
excess of the regular eight working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is entitled is
the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the computation of private
respondent's salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay amounting
to US$40.00/month. Since private respondent rendered service for two months these benefits should
be doubled, giving a total of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,32 as follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary
and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of
this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the
court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be
awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof
which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorney's fees is the one
contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the

culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict

construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts
and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any
showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the
wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly,
as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations,
the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of
interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law
as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "[a]ll doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor", and Article 1702 of
the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the reasons why
attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private respondent was illegally
terminated from his employment and that his wages and other benefits were withheld from him
without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he is compelled to file an action for the
recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. On these
bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December
18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that
the award of US$1620.00 representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to
US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime
pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof, an award of
US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living allowance, special allowance and
vacation leave with pay for the same period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_153031_2006.html
JUDICIAL ETHICS
46. CANON 1
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain
allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The
investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the Judiciary.1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds
channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country.
In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and
other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities
identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and
events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein
respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses,
filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy
went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of
arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them
not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
2
on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other
special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events
and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong
Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and
Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine
Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene
Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case
could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko
para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa
Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles
called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay
together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo
kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He
said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala
naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-
utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera." (Emphasis supplied.)
3
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled
"Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy
Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together
with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied
knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties
frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly
admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context;
nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the
one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she
was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then
Acting Presiding Justice.
4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein she gave
5
details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or
attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto
2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya
naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests
kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa
gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila
sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong
nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501
Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa
conference room.
xxxx 6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked
to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO
galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS.
SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
7
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his
integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan'
s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted
Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in
February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he
could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest
from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with
Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event
hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she
already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of
Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs.
Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother,
Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan,
acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus
submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to
submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the
Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of
Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs.
Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other
perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the
Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming
koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit
na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx 8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio
under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members
of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their
specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of
non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam). 9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his
comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On
November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's Comment. Respondent categorically denied
10
any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as
testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether
respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she
supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter
is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent
believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at
the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the
Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure
Sula and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and
that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and
become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding
respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-
employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at
her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday
party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him
in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the
Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close
friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black
Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape
the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant
ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe
any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of
courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the
single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw
respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen
Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case
with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and
even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his
Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October
17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on
January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED
as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan),
and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata,
Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the
Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to transmit to this Court
the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-
probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the
following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768
for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of
the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian
employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now
deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three
employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the
questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of
₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment
although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of
Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued
by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of
Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all
underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even
if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself
translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing
the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim
Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of
her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the
corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar
case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help
her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar
case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho
lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms.
Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara
referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi
napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso
na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from
you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms.
Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if
you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga
sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari.
Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala
raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles
and respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she
was sure the decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi
kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni
Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam
niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that
Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige
huwag kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the
Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was
surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case
was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different people during the
pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was
released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew
she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni
Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is
Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What
do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet
Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si
Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala
yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po
si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam
hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong.
Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung
magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago
lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang
sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO (purchase order)
sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May
₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam,
eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong,
but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles'
office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles
introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money
being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent
would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles
informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with
Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
₱282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon
Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the
corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so
kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po
sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa
AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po.
So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng
interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say,
Justice Ong would like to deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina.
Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles,
yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni
Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na
inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer
ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa
personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para
maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13%
interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam
kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11)
checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako
pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So,
pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya,
pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5
million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00
na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong
buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the
interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the
advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you
understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms.
Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered
Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention
respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that
Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention
the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the
checks were issued to respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties
included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses,
transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime
in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on
September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO
galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with
that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she has
contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na

maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang
pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam.
So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat
ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan?
Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon
sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan.
Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that
Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong
ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the
"PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is
respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph
[of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he
has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the
division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second,
because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a
Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event where
respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation that
would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about
the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was
shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend
Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles because she
did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in
one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the

Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar
case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent
claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a
collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente)
and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be
pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior
to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that
Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable
for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and
sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the
decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do
so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him
and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal
in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the
court found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her
charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and
sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she
mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since
he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black
Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access
to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to
the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until
respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo
Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of
his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and
thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining.
Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just
engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of
eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of
₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he
did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch
as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven
(11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that
in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00
per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified
that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork
barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both
whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1.
That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case.
Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last
insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case,
respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on
her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that
Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan,
referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and
everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by
the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And
they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering
this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would
testify false! y against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter.
The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with
bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case
considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she
would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two
members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is
no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case,
money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of
expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the
pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave
respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in
evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and
Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have
personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so
that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my
name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They
did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed
to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and
Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of
the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the
fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led
the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that
Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events,
concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for
him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true
that during that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles
pay respondent an advanced interest of ₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a
consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function.
It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him
morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him.
Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from
Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that
judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office
considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of
Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for
him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have
extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may
think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle
blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at
the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as
the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance
of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes
a personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one
has to pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of
decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach
by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which
provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present
before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her
appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged
administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices
Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme
Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice,
Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not
conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of
the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her
part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly
that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of
the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the
helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-
2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the
acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable

Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and
be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which
are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges
against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was
pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the

promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her
acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll)
checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest
for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and
Napoles. 11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26,
2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he
vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross"
has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is
not to be excused." We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with
12
Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent
("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially
Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly
updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect"
or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and
some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be
acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she
was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the
amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger
detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information
about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010
and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in
2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal
knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles.
Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but
"contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals,
not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really
disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their
conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is
committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of
official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. Ajudge who extorts
14
money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this
Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. 15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a
panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
16
corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent
actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had
confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find
credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt
inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process.
By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the
suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which
was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the
public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and
Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy,
made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present
administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what
they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the
Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close
relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials,
dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez,
the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly
improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation
of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid,
straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their
previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-
examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
17
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. In18
particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and
Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about
her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan
was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have
initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting
with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not
just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from
Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the
Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her
involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case
pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para
tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na
mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos,
sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din
pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat,
dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung
mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale
makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the
case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko.
Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong
ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
19
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother
and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently,
after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier
resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will
focus on respondent's administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly
improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which
took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
20
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being
the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. 21
In Caneda v. Alaan, we held that:

22
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid
not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an
impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay
for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of
judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a
manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing
with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v.
Mania, Jr. where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his
23
lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both
RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo
hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or
parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens
to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such
dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only to
make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he
and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was
insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty.
Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his
telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers,
the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table transactions are
taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former
colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are
not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending
or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was
not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth
Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent
perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them,
to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus,
he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was
still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office
because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and
prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of
partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and
24
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section
2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before
them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of
course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may
be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to
members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in
keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective
litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may
tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and
behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the
judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of
a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately
dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and
executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice
of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch
of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious
repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice
Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you
to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer
through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of
the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request.
Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee
of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for
you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation.
Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I
will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very,
very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a
woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You
could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were
it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply
called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de
San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public
with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a
lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in
a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you
learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the
Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated
yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that. (Emphasis supplied.)
26
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting
Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not
presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued
a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any
money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as
previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded
upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed advance interest
for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the
favorable ruling in the Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles
1âwphi1
spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act
of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first
visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding
advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles
extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the
media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before
this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less
than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or
social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her
office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his
social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as
the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he
visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit
x x x." ).
27
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of
Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;

lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
28
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary. 29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge
may be penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty
are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft
court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/am_sb-14-21-j_2014.html
CANON 2
47. A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 September 8, 2004

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
LUCILA TAN, complainant,
vs.
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, 1 for violation of Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and
Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending
before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent
judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk
to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in
Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for ₱150,000.00 in exchange for
the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal
Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused.
She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits
the amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision
in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand
because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal
cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge. 2
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it
was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to
delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain
judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help
complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading
him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined,
telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had
already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated
that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor
in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher
position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant
offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer.
Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions
in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he
asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was
likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions. 3
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case.
Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy
of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly
handed to her by a member of respondent judge’s staff. 5 Respondent judge, on the other hand,
presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and
Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his
witnesses,6 copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, 7 and various
documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219,
machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13,
2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998,
Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record, which
documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondent’s witness, Fernando B. Espuerta. 8
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case
in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed
two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s Office in Pasig. After
resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the
other one went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge.
Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved
for consolidation and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57.
Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer, Judge
Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent
Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk
of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number of the
Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant then
called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s
Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to meet
the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for
Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October 2000
and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the
Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
During the meeting, Complainant "told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened
and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible" (TSN, page 23,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent
Judge and Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home,
Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, "Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para
bumilis iyong kaso mo" (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie did not
mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie
agreed, she sent the amount of ₱20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN,
pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the Clerk of
Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she
sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there
and there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After
that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce called up the
Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called
saying that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got
back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant something.
When they were in Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned
Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were
dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyce’s request (TSN, pages
30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php
150,000.00 for each case. "Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge
because he is leaving at that time" (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23
February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged "Sabi niya, if I will accede to that
request of ₱150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to reverse the
Decision" and "Si Judge daw" will reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around
February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that
Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the Judge. Complainant went again
to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayor’s help and she met the Mayor at his Office in
San Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court,
Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that
the Judge was out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The
Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor
Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the
phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing
of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor "because his voice is very loud." He said,
"Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know what
is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso
niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan" (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003).
After that they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor
Estrada again. Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it
will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed
the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the
Judge when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in
April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete.
She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the
evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to know
as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and
drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside,
Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the Prosecutor who
talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand
Pesos (₱6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and
his company were still there drinking. While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a
man came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said
that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and
she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the
Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March
3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still scared
because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in her
behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the ₱20,000.00 because
her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised
them that she will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant did
not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of Respondent
Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When
Complainant asked why, "Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang
decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation." She received
the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision was
unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor
of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she
was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the
sister of President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to
the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because
they have a case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy.
She could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or
how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She
denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila
Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her
cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00). She
claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking about regarding the money. There
was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving
money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at
Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her
Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit "1" (TSN,
pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave anything to
her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him "Buboy" and for about two years or more
he had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he "was still working as Clerk in
San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and
eventually asked for a favorable decision against her case." He could not remember
anymore when that was because "it was a long time ago" (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro
Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she
approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce
Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete "because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a
favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete don’t (sic) like his
staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction" (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22,
2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in
San Juan was "the first and the last time." When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he
approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance payment
for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered "I
don’t know about that, sir." (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified
the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the
truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit "2" (TSN, pages
11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at
Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13,
Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the
position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became
Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled having
met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time
he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by
Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because
they had not been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the
restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in
the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him
to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge
Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila
Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22, 2003). They
ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for
their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not know about
Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The incident where he met
Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when she went to his
Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not remember the
month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was nearing Christmas in
2000. "Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po
dala ko." Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. "Meron siyang inalok
sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) para iabot
kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan. Matagal na
kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya ." He
told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second meeting, Lucila
Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No.
59440, which was marked as Exhibit "3" (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the
xerox copy was the exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his
Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were
marked as Exhibit "4" and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22,
2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso
Sy came about. When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent
Judge) was not like that and they had been together for a long time and it is not possible.
When he told Judge Rosete about that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned
to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that her case
will win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of
September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila
Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know Lucila
Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch
57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, "may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni
Mayor kay Judge" (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did not say
anything but Lucila Tan asked "may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office?" and she said "yes,
ma’am." After that there was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to
their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and
the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila "na pinakikiusap ni
Mayor" (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the
things that the sister of the former President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing.
She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November
2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw
money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that she asked the
Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the drawer.
What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their Office and
she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that she called up
Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who called
her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her something. Lucila Tan
showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when the former showed her the
copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not answer and said that
Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003).
She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to
her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in New
Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the
Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the
Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). "He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I
don’t know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ‘ganun
ba?’ then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we left the Office." She denied that
she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s
parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who
showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant
that she allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before
Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable
decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the
Complainant who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn
to on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit "5," and confirmed and affirmed the
truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29,
2003).9
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent
judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of ₱150,000.00 for him to render judgment in
her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other
hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the
downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San
Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the
parties’ evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary
evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not only did
she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned
copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member
of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainant’s staff
met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays ₱150,000.00 for the
reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a
judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people
in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s
disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the
testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed
complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and
Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand,
denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with
respondent judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judge’s two
witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta
testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo
Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan
Restaurant.10 (citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with respondent judge
and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards
the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent
asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with
her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he
entered said country.11 He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned
to the Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1,
2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is
consistent with complainant’s testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with
respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge
must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only
on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in
the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach.12
Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his
draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They
constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without

salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/sep2004/am_mtj_04_1563_2004.html
48. A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998
FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-BARRETO, complainants,

vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148 July 22, 1998
Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant,
vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in
a letter-complaint dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and
1 2 3
Noraliz L. Jorgensen. In view of the allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated
4
December 10, 1997, placed respondent judge under preventive suspension; and referred the case to
retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, who assisted the aforementioned complainants, also
6
filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual
7
harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and
[for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s] demanded by judicial
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998, we resolved to consolidate her Complaint with
8
the earlier one and to refer it likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation,
report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer submitted his Report, dated March
16, 1998, which contained the following exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:
1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic reporter in

Branch 52 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan City. She
affirmed under oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record)
she executed August 15, 1997. She related that on August 8, 1997, while on her way
to the ladies' toilet, she had seen respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking
with a man at the backdoor of his chamber. Out of respect for respondent, being the
Acting Executive Judge of the MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the
ladies comfort room. When she emerged (begin) from the same, she saw that
respondent was still at the backdoor of his office although this time he was alone.
Upon seeing Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean. She
answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached him. When
she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led her into his
chamber. Once inside and while she was standing near the edge of respondent's
office table, he placed his arm around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw and
kissed her on the lips.
Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent. Before
she could recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and
kissed her on the lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent away. Respondent asked
her where she lived and with whom but she hurriedly left respondent's office.
Upon Dawa's return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio, who also
works in Branch 52, asked her what the matter was because she noticed that Dawa
looked dazed ("tulala"). She first said that nothing was the matter but upon [Carpio's]
insistent questioning, she haltingly related her harrowing ( acutely distressing)
experience in respondent's office.
That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-Santiago, the
presiding judge of Branch 52 who, although [she] was then on leave, had gone to her
office on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her coworkers in Branch 52,
whJeano was celebrating his birthday. Judge Santiago, after listening to Dawa's
story, advised her to go home and relate the incident to her parents before deciding
to do anything further. Dawa went home but did not tell her parents who were sickly.
Instead, she told her sister.
The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see Atty.
Mona Lisa Buencamino, the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She was told that
she was not respondent's first victim but that Noraliz Jorgensen and the Clerk of
Court herself had been objects of respondent's amorous advances.
Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a
complaint, she would follow suit.
Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon the
advice of Atty. Buencamino, the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a city
councilor. The latter advised them to go to the police and have their complaints
entered in the police blotter. Calalang brought them to the office of Councilor
Manlapig, a former police colonel. The latter called for a police investigator and
SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them. That same afternoon, the two
complainants went to the police station to have their complaints recorded in the
police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).
Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen and
Femenina Lazaro-Barreto where they filed the letter complaint (Exhibit "X").
Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story although

she admitted that respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.
2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She affirmed

under oath her sworn statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record). The following is
her story:
Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan
City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short), MeTC,
Caloocan City. Among her duties was the preparation and follow up of the payrolls
for RATA (Representation Allowance (RA) and Transportation Allowance.
(TA) and gasoline allowances of the Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon the approval of
said payrolls, it was her duty to receive the cash from the cashier and deliver them to
the individual judges.
Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she had gone
to the office of respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides Branch 51 of the
Court, for the purpose of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges'
allowances. Upon entering the respondent's office, the latter approached her and
suddenly kissed her on the cheek. Jorgensen immediately left respondent's office
after having secured his signature on the payroll.
Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jorgensen had
returned to the respondent's office to deliver the cash representing his allowances for
the months of January, February and March. Upon entering the respondent's office,
the latter immediately stood up, held her two arms, and suddenly kissed her and
licked her left ear, saying "I love you". Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She
asked respondent, "Judge, what is this", at the same time endeavoring (attempting)
to free herself from his hold but she could not because his grip was strong.
Respondent then said, "Don't make noise lest (so as not to) we be heard outside". At
the same time, respondent held her jaw and kissed her on the lips. He said, "Open
your mouth" as her continued to hug and kiss her while she tried to free herself. He
did not heed (care) her pleas although she was then trembling with fear.
On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondent's office to secure his
signature on the payroll for June. Again he kissed her before he signed it. After he
had signed the payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen to eat with him at the Max
Restaurant on EDSA the next Saturday. When she asked him why he was inviting
her, he answered, "You are no longer a child, you ought to know".
Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again to the
respondent and she told Buencamino of what had happened to her. Atty.
Buencamino told Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain, Buencamino would
support her. Jorgensen was afraid that nothing would come out of any complaint
because respondent was a Judge and powerful.
On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the
respondent, Jorgensen tried to look for someone who could deliver the money to him
but she could find no one. So she waited until she knew that someone else was
inside respondent's office. At about 3:00 o'clock, while Roderick Corral was inside
respondent's office, she entered but respondent immediately threw to Corral the
paper he had brought for his signature, in effect dismissing him. Corral immediately
stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone in respondent's chambers. When they were
alone, respondent stood up and held Jorgensen's jaw kissing her on her lips at the
same time saying "Open your mouth". Jorgensen immediately left respondent's office
in tears.
On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in Branch

52, was the latest victim of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her experience to
Judge Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she informed the good judge that she was
ready to file a complaint against respondent in order to obtain justice.
Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before August,
1997, she had gone to respondent's office with Baby Mapue in response to his call
and while there they were shown an anonymous letter (Exhibit 2) which mentioned
[the] alleged misconduct on her part.
3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year-old married woman who is a Court

Stenographer II in Branch 53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her direct
examination by Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her sworn statement (Exhibit E
found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).
On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito
Amatong of Branch 53 was on leave. While attending the session at Branch 51,
respondent dictated an "Order" in open court. Her stenographic notes are found in
Exhibit "F". She transcribed these notes (Exhibit F-1) and left them with the Branch
Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned after lunch, Gina told her there were some
corrections so she again typed and submitted Exhibit "F-2". After typing one more
draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final draft (Exhibit F-4) to respondent's office for
his signature. After respondent signed the "Order", he stood up and while Barreto
was looking at the "Order", he held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked, "What
are you doing?" Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying,
"Sigue na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped
her lips with her hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She did not
relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it from the newspapers.
4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who is

presently the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment was on
June 18, 1987 as Branch Clerk of Court for Branch 51, presided by Judge Filemon
Mendoza, now retired. After she became a lawyer in 1996, she was promoted to her
present position as Clerk of Court.
Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to know
Jorgensen when she assumed office as Clerk of Court because Jorgensen was
detailed to her office. She had known Barreto since 1992 or 1993 and she personally
came to know Dawa when the latter, accompanied by Jorgensen, approached her on
August 12, 1997 and related her harrowing experience in the office of respondent.
Jorgensen herself related similar experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies
that she would refer that matter to Judge Santiago, the executive judge, who was
then on leave. She reasoned that being a woman and the executive judge, Judge
Santiago would understand the complainant's situation. Dawa and Jorgensen told
Atty. Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and the latter had
advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They further told the
Clerk of Court that they had consulted their families and were decided to file an
administrative case against respondent judge. At this juncture, sheriff Noli Calalang
informed the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen that his brother, Councilor Gil
Calalang, was willing to help them.
On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, complainants Dawa and
Jorgensen were advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office. Buencamino and
the two complainants proceeded to Calalang's office who, after hearing their stories,
advised them to report the matter to the police. Atty. Calalang was willing to handle
their case provided permission was obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and
the two complainants were brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former
police colonel, and there they were interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked
what cases could be filed against the judge and Atty. Buencamino answered that a
case for violation of the new "Anti-Sexual Harassment Law" or for Acts of
Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed against respondent. At 5:30
o'clock that same afternoon, Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the Caloocan Police
Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record; pp. 46-47).
On August 14, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister, saw Atty.
Buencamino and told her that she, too, was one of respondent's victims. Ms. Barreto
decided to file an administrative charge against respondent and requested David
Maniquis, the deputy clerk of court, to accompany her to the police station to have
her complaint recorded. (Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).
Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to the
Office of the Court Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of Atty. Perez
of the Office of the Court Administrator, she had administered the oaths of the three
complainants and had signed the original complaint.
5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC,
Caloocan City, took the stand for the complainants to corroborate their testimonies.
She declared that —
She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they were no
longer needed. In this connection, she had to prepare the vouchers and the
breakdown of checks and she had to go to the office of the respondent in order to
secure his signature. In 1997, she remembers having been requested once by
Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature of respondent. After respondent signed
the documents she had brought to him, respondent stood up, went around his table
and abruptly kissed her. She immediately left with Emily Rose Clemente, staff
member of Branch 51 and never again went to see respondent alone. Mapue
admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by respondent in relation to a
complaint of Judge Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she
retorted in the vernacular (language), "Sa bibig, hindi mo ba natatanda-an?" Made to
explain why she had not complained, she answered that she did not want anyone to
know. As a matter of fact, her husband did not know of the incident even as she was
testifying.
6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the City
Mayor's office and detailed to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following to say:
She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was rather
in good spirits because it was the birthday of one of their officemates and there was
some sort of a party. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, Dawa had gone to the
women's comfort room. When Dawa returned a few minutes later, Carpio noticed
that she was pale and fidgety. She kept wringing (squeezing) her hands and was on
the verge (edge) of tears (mangiyak ngiyak na). Carpio asked her what the matter
was but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some prodding (urging),
Carpio asked Dawa to go with her to the court room and there asked what really the
matter was as she was no longer her gay self. Dawa cried and told the story of how
the respondent had twice kissed her on the lips.
At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52, came to
join the birthday party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another stenographer in
Branch 52, that Floride Dawa wanted to see her in private. Judge Santiago brought
Dawa to her private chambers.
On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch 52 and

asked if everything was okay, at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied by Rowena
Martin, went to the courtroom.
7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that on
August 14, 1997, he had been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to accompany her
to police headquarters to lodge a complaint against the respondent. Noli Calalang,
Joselito Bedana, Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride Dawa were with them in the police
station.
8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondent's court, was originally

reluctant to testify. She, however, appeared in the afternoon of February 18, 1998, to
give testimony. She declared that she knew the complaints and that she [was]
directly under the respondent who preside[d] Branch 51. On August 12, 1997, she
learned from others that Floride Dawa was kissed by the respondent. She also
learned that Jorgensen had also been kissed by respondent. She admitted that the
respondent has the inclination for imposing fines on employees who were late or
made mistakes. She identified Exhibit "G" as an order where [sic] requiring her to pay
a fine.
9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52, Metropolitan

Trial Court of Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for the complainants. The
following is her story:
She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this reason,
the respondent, who had been designated Vice Executive Judge, had to act in her
stead.
Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-
7; Record, pp. 17 to 24) which she had sent to the Court Administrator. This was
submitted as her direct testimony.
In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened themselves to
her not only in her capacity as executive judge but because she was a woman. On
Friday, August 8, 1997, she had gone to her office because she had been invited to
lunch by birthday celebrants, Danilo Silverio and Esperancilla Kabiling. Upon her
arrival, Ms. Kabiling had approached her and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her
stenographers, urgently wanted to tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered
the judge's office "red[-]eyed, red-faced and with a shiny nose". She kept clasping
(holding) and unclasping her hands and could not stand still. She spoke in an
incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely understand. She
asked Dawa to sit down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to cry, so
that her story could hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece
out the fact that Dawa had been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by
the respondent sometime that morning.
Dawa sought Judge Santiago's help to transfer to another court and she wanted her
to talk to the respondent in order that the incident would not be repeated. Judge
Santiago could not promise Dawa but she advised her to go home as she obviously
was not herself. She further advised Dawa to think the matter over during the
weekend and to talk to her parents about it. Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa
again the next week.
After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual
employee detailed to the OCC had the same experience. To verify the truth, the
judge went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz Jorgensen
whether it was true that she had been kissed by the respondent. Noraliz blushed and
became red[-]eyed and told the judge of the several instances that the respondent
had forcibly embraced and kissed her on the lips.
Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She related
the stories of Dawa and Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she knew of anyone
from her branch who may have undergone the same experience. Judge Ortiz asked
Jean Marie Lazaro and the latter told them that there was one instance when she
and Zenaida Reyes, another employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the
door of their court and respondent sat between them and placed his arms on their
shoulders and kissed them both on the cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago
that if Dawa would complain, she too would file a complaint. Judge Santiago advised
her to seek the counsel of her parents and her husband and to see her again the
next week.
In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court stenographer

in Branch 53, accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago.
Femenina confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had been kissed and
embraced by the respondent twice. In between sobs and with her handkerchief
almost torn to shreds by her shaking hands, she related how she had harbored her
shame in silence and her guilt at not being able to tell her husband.
That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to Judge
Santiago — how she was forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by the
respondent.
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge Santiago about the instances
that the respondent had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the assistance
of Judge Santiago to transfer to another branch to escape the respondent. 9
The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's witnesses in this wise:
1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondent's branch. He
affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A; Record, pp. 56-57).
He declared that he had been with the MeTC, Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he
was detailed to Branch 51 and later became its permanent sheriff.
In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official who was
faithful to his job. He observed office hours religiously. He was friendly and helpful to
his personnel and was very approachable whenever they needed anything. The
workers in his branch were free to enter his office, it being always open. It [was] not
soundproof such that if anything improper happened inside, it could be heard
outside.
Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge, he had
not heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct. On the other hand, he was the
object of praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a fiscal.
Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had been
charged administratively by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz Jorgensen) and
Flor (Floride Dawa) because he had not seen the respondent do anything indelicate
(offensive) to the three women. Whenever Nina came to Branch 51 to see the
respondent, she would greet him with a "Hello Judge, I am sexy now". On the other
hand, whenever Noraliz brought in documents for respondent's signature, she was
always smiling going in and coming out of respondent's office. Apostol declared that
he had seen Floride Dawa go to respondents' office only once and she was in
company with other employees of Branch 52.
On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondent's office ha[d] a back door
and the same [was] locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts. It was his daily
chore to open this back door from the inside by unlocking the barrel bolts. After he
had done this he would go down to the street to await the arrival of the respondent.
2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondent's second witness. She is a
court stenographer in Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had been with the
MeTC since January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn statement consisting of two
pages (Exhibits 10 and 10-A) which she had jointly executed with Lina V. Cara, a
clerk in the same branch who had been in the service for 17 years.
She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the respondent,
no one had charged him administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful
to those working under him. His office was always open to his subordinates. The
same is not sound proof such that if anything untoward happened inside or [if there
was] any loud conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the staff room.
During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had been
charged [with] sexual harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she had not seen
the respondent do anything indecent to these three women. Everytime Nina saw the
judge, she would smilingly greet him with such remarks as "Hi, Judge" or sometimes
"Hello, I'm sexy now".
She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the Office of
the Clerk of Court to fetch Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the employees thereat about
the incident. She said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n the third floor to ask her
co-workers whether they had heard the news that the respondent had kissed
someone. Those who were still in replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have papers
signed by respondent and sometimes she came to cut the hair of certain employees,
including the respondent himself. On the other hand, she had seen Dawa only once
when she came with her co-employees at Branch 52 to have their daily time records
signed.
3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years old and single. He affirmed
the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).
Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent about a
job in the MeTC. When he entered respondent's office, Atty. Buencamino was with
him. De Asa introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her about his application for a
job in the court. Atty. Buencamino told Muncal to wait for her at her office. When
Muncal saw Buencamino, the latter told him that he would have to undergo an
observation period of one to two weeks. She further told him that although he had
been recommended by respondent, she would be his direct superior and he was
admonished not to relate anywhere else whatever he heard or saw in her office.
Muncal was "taken aback" (surprised) by this admonition knowing that respondent,
as executive judge, was her superior and was entitled to know everything that
happened in the clerk of court's office. He left after Buencamino had told him to
return on August 11 to begin his observation period. He returned to the respondent to
thank him for his assistance.
Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant position
so that he had second thoughts about returning to her. However, on August 16,1997,
after reading in the papers that respondent was being charged with sexual
harassment upon the instigation of Atty. Buencamino, he decided to see respondent
and relate to him what had happened on August 11, 1997.
4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of

February 24, 1998. He affirmed his nine-page answer to the present charges
(Exhibit "12"; Record, pp. 37-45).
Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office, the
same [was] locked from the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main lock. Every
day, he would use this door for entering his office as well as going out of it in order to
avoid "ambush talks" with people. It was the duty of Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel
bolts before respondent arrived at his office so that when he came, he could open
the main lock with his key and have no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever
Apostol was absent, it was Fernandez who did the opening for respondent.
In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these charges "were
obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated". He accused the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this cabal" and that aside from
her there were "other people behind the conspiracy" who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.
Respondent further claimed that "the complaints were set up, hatched and designed,
to destabilize and destroy the good image of the undersigned created in the minds of
party litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City.
Although, known to be strict [in] fining (disciplining) lawyers, litigants, court personnel
and even himself, for unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications for violations of
court rules and procedures, he had gained respect and admiration for his
reasonable, well[-]balance[d], compassionate and well[-]meant application of the rule
of law".
As a possible reason for the animosity (bitterness) of Atty. Buencamino toward him,
the respondent stated in his Answer, the following:
Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and attitudes,

were honed (improved) up if not altogether dramatically changed.
Misconceptions have been straightened up. It was emphasized that
the Office of the Clerk of Court [was] not an independent body. It
must be the secretariat or unit that should serve and cater not only to
its own concern, but that of all the administrative as well as functional
requirements of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat. Not because, it
is called the Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean that the clerk of
court installed, is a co-equal of the judges thereat. It was made clear
that it was for this reason why an Executive Judge/Vice Executive
Judge is designated, to fill up this impasse. Further, as clerk of court,
functionally, such a position is under the direct control and
supervision of all judges thereat. Accordingly, except those as
provided for under the rules and applicable circulars, when a clerk of
court can act independently, any action, movement, process and
exercise, taken, with national, local as well as private agencies must
bear the imprimatur (official permission) of the Executive Judge. This
directive apparently was not observed. Either it was misunderstood,
taken lightly, seriously resisted or even disregarded. But its non-
observance cannot be excused or countenanced.
Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and
designed to update and enhance their working knowledge on
assigned task[s]. Important concerns and problems of their offices
[were] supposed to be taken up.
Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming around

during office hours was prohibited, time records of the Clerk of Court,
Clerks of Court of branches including its [sic] personnel, with
presiding judges on leave or vacant, must after, its being
authenticated, must [sic] be signed by the Executive Judge.
Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received,

specifically in the office of the clerk of court. Ms. Buencamino was
apprised (explain) and directed to closely monitor such problem.
Before the staging of this hatch-up, the undersigned received reports
of its unabated occurrences. However, either these were treated with
tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.
Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an installation of

an office for the Executive Judge was conceived. This project was
apparently disliked. It was about the last week of July or first week of
August, 1997, that Judge Santiago informed the undersigned, that we
ha[d] to implement such a scheme. The plan was to get the room of
Atty. Buencamino, to house the Executive Judge['s] office, as its
perimeter, appeared easily organizable with least renovation and
expense, for a conference room and a library, folded into one.
Buencamino, in turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy
clerk of court, who should occupy the executive table used by the
former, located outside, along with OCC personnel for proper
monitoring and active control of the affairs in the office
As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it and

insinuated to her, to follow first before talking with me, have the room
vacated, place pertinent documents/papers, to be signed and
attended to, locked [sic] it, if the Executive Judge, [was] not around.
Atty. Buencamino approached me in disgust, proposing an
alternative. She submitted a plan for renovation, as she insisted in
maintaining her present location. She suggested to move the
Executive Judge[s] office in the middle, the end part, housing the
office of Maniquis, [to] be the one to be converted as conference
room and library. For her to occupy David Maniquis['] office was "bad
punsoy" (feng shui). However, Judge Santiago's directive was firm.
Mona Lisa, must have to comply first. The matter of renovation, to be
further studied. The suggested sketch plan with scribblings
(drawings) from Judge Delfina Santiago dated August 6, 1997, is
likewise hereto attached as annex "7". Mrs. Buencamino vacated her
office, refused David Maniquis' room and stayed [at] her table outside
with the OCC's personnel.
Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the position of a
sheriff in the said office, the undersigned recommended one Mario
Muncal, Jr. y de Castro, telling Ms. Buencamino that for the more
than four (4) years that he stayed in the office, he was not given the
privilege of appointing one of his own choice. She retorted (answer)
to try Muncal as an understudy for about one (1) to two (2) weeks.
The undersigned acceded. Mr. Muncal followed Ms. Buencamino to
her office where he was interviewed, advised and instructed by the
latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the
developments but he never showed up at the designated time. He
reappeared after reading the accounts in the newspapers about the
complaints lodged against me, with revealing statements why he
gave a second thought [about] returning or not. His affidavit is
attached as Annex "8" (pp. 3-5, Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the Record).
(Emphasis supplied).
Considering the above, respondent believed that "Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino,
took all my actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her
face, she regretted the fact of my designation as Acting Executive Judge. She
is not used to being controlled. She would want to maintain her "madrina" and
"godmother" (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only among the
employees but also among the judges as well. Thus, these pathos, comics." (p.5,
Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).
On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride Dawa. He
stated that on August 8, 1997, he had come to work between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock
in the morning. Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met him. He found that his back door
was still closed and could not be opened with his key. For this reason he had to enter
through his courtroom. He said he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort room
that morning. He saw her at 11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.
The above testimony is also in respondent's Exhibit "12" where he stated that:
The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned after
coming from the public toilet located along the third floor hallway
obliquely facing the backdoor exit of the undersigned's chamber,
asking her whether said comfort room was cleaned, to which she
retorted in the negative, thereafter calling her up, placing the judge's
arm around her shoulders, led her to his room and twice kissed her,
to which she reportedly resisted. Afterwards, conversing with him,
answering questions, as the latter sat comfortably at his seat, as
though nothing had transpired. This is quite indeed a long process to
lend credence to such prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office was not shown to have been
closed on the date the alleged sham had happened, a verification of
the site where the reported incident took place would show that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office leads to a wide public hallway
fronting directly the stairs servicing the second and third floor[s] of
said building, where people come and go. The circumstances of
persons, time and place cannot fit under such a frame set. (pp. 6-7,
Exhibit 12; pp. 42-43 of the Record).
As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that

Buencamino believed her story. The following is what he said:
["]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a casual
employee, . . . detailed at the office of the Clerk of Court, and
believed her story. Ms. Jorgensen is reportedly separated from her
husband. Her credibility throughout the court's environs appears
highly questionable, especially among her staff in the Office of the
Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned letter was sent not only to the
undersigned but also with Judge Santiago, divulging, her unchaste
relationship with a co-employee, also assigned in the office of the
Clerk of Court. . . . Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was
advised, to closely monitor on [sic] this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit
relationship appeared to have continued. Nonetheless, she was
convinced by Buencamino to execute and swear to a statement,
which [was] maliciously and boldly concocted. . . . . Be that as it may,
the story of "victim" Noraliz borders the realm of illusion and fiction. In
no less than three (3) occasions, the dates of which, to lend
credibility, were fixed to coincide when the allowances were allegedly
released and given to the respective judges, she claimed to have
been licked at her ear, her mouth forced open, and kissed by the
undersigned. If one was indeed a victim of such sexual harassment
or lascivious conduct, why would she, after the first incident (January
31, 1997) return for the second (May 26, 1997) and third time (August
4, 1997) and allow herself to suffer the same fate[?] This indeed, is
preposterous (contrary to common sense). It does not have the rings
of truth to it. Her lame excuse, that no one could do her assigned
chore, does not have any legal as well as factual leg to lean on. As
far as the undersigned can remember, there was Roderick Corral
(Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue had occasion to do the same
chore. Even others in the OCC can perform such feat. Such signing is
not the exclusive affair of Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even the August 4,
1977 incident, would not dissuade [sic] a person in her right mind,
that she will still allow herself to be left behind by a co-employee
(Roderick Corral) whom she saw ahead of her inside the judge's
office and be subjected to the same alleged indignant act. This is
plainly ABSURD." (pp. 5-6, Exhibit 12, pp. 41-42 of the Record).
Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:
["]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be a

mere patch up (try to improve). Under the principle that in numbers
there is strength, they blended another scenario consistently claiming
that they were kissed, their mouths forcibly opened. In Barreto's
version, she claimed that she went to the office of the undersigned to
have an order signed as their Presiding Judge was then, on leave.
Immediately thereafter, the judge stood up, approached her and
kissed her. This was allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly resisted.
Then she left.
The size and arrangement of the undersigned's chamber, would rule

out such hallucination. The undersigned ha[s] developed the attitude
of transparency, in his dealings with the public and his personnel. His
room [is] always open. Everybody come[s] and go[es]. His staff can
go inside, any time they wish, without even knocking at his door, [get]
cold water and even [use] his private comfort room. How then could
this be possible.
In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard, much less
substantiated, except the self serving narrations of the alleged
offended parties themselves. If there was really any commotion or
resistance that occurred, the same could not escape the ears of my
personnel, whose tables are constrictedly [sic] placed and
immediately outside. In fact, even the dates alluded to, were even
tailored to fit and coincide, just to give credence, to the presence of
the complainants, in the alleged places of incident.["] (p. 7, Exhibit 12;
p. 43, Record). 10
After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo
arrived at a conclusion, the salient portions of which are reproduced below:
1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed

the acts he is charged with. The testimonies of the three complainants were not in
any manner emasculated (weaken) by the lengthy and thorough cross examination
personally conducted by the respondent. Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess
the investigation several times to give complainants time to compose themselves as
they invariably broke down in tears as they were required to relate the repeated
violations of their persons and their honors by respondent.
Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony

of Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawa's story soon after it had
occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other complainants. Judge Santiago, on
her own accord, wrote a verified letter to the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7;
Record; pp. 17-24), wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different
incident. . . . . 11
x x x x x x x x x
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their
stories. It is highly improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves
only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real or imagined
resentment against respondent. Moreover, the reason given by respondent for the ill
will that Atty. Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely cause such
malevolence, specially because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation
of Atty. Buencamino so that her office could be used by the executive judge. 12
x x x x x x x x x
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to
perform their duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against
loitering and idleness in the premises of the court is not enough to motivate [the]
three women into exposing themselves to ridicule and chastisement, not to mention
criminal prosecution, by relating false stories that would also be derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondent's calling her attention
to an anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with another employees of
the OCC who was also married. We are not convinced that this would move her into
fabricating a story as shocking as the one she related under oath. . . . .
13
x x x x x x x x x
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged the

young Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him,
when she saw him as she was about to enter the comfort room, was an invitation, he
took advantage of the young maiden and forced himself on her. Perhaps because
Dawa was naive and innocent, she panicked and became near hysterical prompting
Carpio to question her. This broke the dam, so to speak. When it became known that
Floride Dawa was going to file a case against respondent, a slew of indignant women
surfaced also wanting to file charges against respondent for his many indiscretions.
How many more remain who prefer to suffer their humiliation in silence, we can only
speculate. 14
3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive

assertions of complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither were the
negative observations of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie the complainants'
declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that they had not seen respondent
do anything obscene to the complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see
such lewd acts is not proof that they did not occur specially so because they were all
done in the privacy of respondent's chambers. 15
x x x x x x x x x
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera,
Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend that
respondent be dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations. 16
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the findings,
conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the
evidence presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, with no
need to rehash (repeat) the reprehensible indiscretions of the respondent judge, we adopt the
conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice.
The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. More than simply projecting an
17
image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also appear to be a
"good person." It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in
18
the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY.
RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence.
x x x x x x x x x
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPRORIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not
only through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior.
It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and
in his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. For this
19
reason, "[t]he Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times." This mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan
20
trial court judges, like herein respondent, since they are the "front-liners" of the judiciary who serve
more people at the "grass-roots" level of society. 21
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity (nerve) of the respondent judge in
subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for
members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of
society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for theemployee[s]." Let it be remembered that respondent has
22
moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which
he is an officer.
In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the
complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court
concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety
and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross
misconduct warrants his removal from office. In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt
23
to iterate our pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved

in a manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has
betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they
hold the judiciary in general.
x x x x x x x x x
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the
executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out
his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of being in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking
advantage of his superior position. 24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the service for
gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/jul1998/am_98_1144_1998.html
49. A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001
RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST JUDGE
FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY.
In a hand written letter dated December 9, 1996 1 addressed to the Honorable Andres Narvasa, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and
their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso complained against Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at Cebu City, alleging that ever since
Ferdinand J. Marcos was appointed judge of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his
family had never seen nor took hold of his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal
amount which was insufficient for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to
believe that he was only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August
1996 when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not even
enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private persons; that
he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance, local and city allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays,
and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena of November direct in Manila when he
was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his mistress.
Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration due
Judge Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she
has been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School) to prevent his mistress from getting
them. They added that Judge Marcos was still receiving local and city allowances and a salary from
the Southwestern University where he teaches in the College of Law. They likewise stated that it
would be advisable for him to resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions
would eventually deprive them of support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or
she would follow him and might pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to file his
comment on the complaint.2
In his comment, dated May 15, 1997, 3 Judge Marcos denied his failure to support complainants and
alleged that during the first few months of assuming his job on the bench, he faithfully and regularly
gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he alone spent for their daily transportation and
for the daily miscellaneous expenses of their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical student at the time,
notwithstanding the fact that his wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount
he gave to his wife was sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan contracted with the
CFI Community Cooperative did not pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his family
because it was made during his first five (5) months in the judiciary when he had not yet received his
salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition fee of their son Joshua; that
said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments and that he hoped it would be fully paid
before the end of the year 1997; that he was not indebted to any private person, not even when he
was still a private law practitioner; that he had no idea why his wife thought that he would be better
off resigning from the judiciary; that even if he were transferred to another sala his regular support to
his family will continue; that the issue of his having a mistress is not true as he has never been
linked extra-maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already signed a letter
withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a letter of undertaking to give all
the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He prayed among other things, for the
dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a family and as this
administrative case is becoming a wedge (piece) of hostility between them.
On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 4
In his report dated October 17, 1997, 5 Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
recommended that the complaint be considered closed and terminated, it appearing that the
complaint against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being no more
compelling reason to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-withdrawal dated
January 10, 1997 submitted by the complainants and the letter of undertaking signed by Judge
Marcos.
In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997, 6 the complainants stated that they wanted to
withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge Marcos as he had made an undertaking that Mrs.
Rotilla A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the Supreme Court; and that the issue of
the alleged mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports and had already been thoroughly discussed by
the family council. They requested that the matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a
closed matter.
On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no objection to
his wife getting all the checks due him from the Supreme Court and gave her the authority to get
them directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Cebu City. He strongly
denied having any relationship with any woman when he talked with his wife and children. His
alleged relationship sprung from unconfirmed reports from the media. 7
As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the latter did not
report the matter to the Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on August 14, 2000, the scandalous
incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association held on
August 11, 2000. Among the RTC judges who attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos. A woman who was reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge
Marcos and the querida joined the Judges at the temporary place reserved for the Judges and
during the latter's breakfast thereat were seated near each other.
Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit
relationship with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted, among other things, that he had been living
with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he was separated from his wife.
Judge Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the woman.
In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for investigation to
OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos.
Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August 15, 2000
ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos from office until further orders from this Court, in view of
the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo and
the referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for
investigation, report and recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United
States of America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator.
Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the Executive
Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15, 2000. 8
On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge of Cebu
City. Only the respondent and his counsel appeared because the notices did not arrive soon enough
in Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 18, was requested to
serve the notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive Judge.
Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while respondent appeared with his counsel. Complainant
manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous commitments. Counsel for the
respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal commitments. Thus the case was reset
for the next day.
On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13, RTC, Cebu
City. After he was discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand herself. Since her
testimony (direct examination) was not completed the hearing was continued the next day. Her direct
testimony was completed on November 16, 2000 but her cross-examination was deferred to
December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.
On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-examined the
complainant. After her testimony, complainants introduced four other witnesses, namely: Maximo
Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma Eguia, all of whom appeared in
obedience to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-designate. These witnesses were presented
principally to identify certain documents that were marked and later formally offered in writing.
Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" - picture of Maydelane Tacaldo, the
alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" - the letter/complaint received by the Court on December 12,
1996;9 "C" - RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22,
1996 in Mandaluyong; "D" - Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" - address of
respondent at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City; "E" - handwritten letter of one Mrs. E.
Dandan, dated October 3, 1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May
in the sum of P11 ,400; "E-1" - a portion thereof; "F" - RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent
purportedly from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" - a portion thereof; "G" - Bankard Statement of Account dated
September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent; "G-1 " - page 2 thereof; "H" - unsigned Certification of
Tenant; "I" - Invoice issued by Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity)
for a "Toyota Revo" Model 1999 allegedly owned in common by respondent and Maydelane
Tacaldo; "I-1" - portion showing the names and addresses of the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J.
and Tacaldo, Maydelene B. of Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" -
particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" - Order issued by respondent on January 24, 2000, in Civil
Case No. CEB-19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-4" - portions thereof; "K" - October 28, 2000 issue of
"THE FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-2" - portions thereof; "L" - October 20, 2000 issue of the "SUN STAR
CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" - portions bracketed; "M" - SUN STAR SUPER BALITA issue of
October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" - portions thereof; "N" - October 28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR
SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" - portions thereof; "O" - SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996;
"O-1" and "O-2" - portions thereof; "P" – Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" - paragraph 7
thereof; "Q" - Affidavit of Anacleta Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" - portions thereof; "R" -
Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated August 15, 2000 in the present administrative
matter10; "R-1" - portion thereof; "S" - Petition filed by respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-25511 for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" - Marriage Contract of
complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971; "U" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" - Certificate of Registration No. 15676143 issued on August 4,
2000 in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-
1" - portion thereof; "W" - copy of Certificate of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of
respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 "
- portion showing owners' names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" -
portion regarding ownership; "Y" - Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo" executed by one Leticia
Cabanes; "Y-1 " - portion showing vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" -
date of execution; "Z" - PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " - portion showing purpose of
certificate; "AA" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB" - Invoice No. 135580 covering
a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1" - name and address of respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-
1" - name and address of respondent; "CC-2" - Private Car Policy No. CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" -
signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office Manager; "DD" - Paramount's Memorandum showing
change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" - portions of the same; "EE" - fax message
received by Paramount re: inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo as one of the insured; "FF" - Chattel
Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "FF-1" - page 2 thereof; "FF-2", "FF-
3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" - Motion for inhibition of respondent in
Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2", - portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment of
Atty. Francis Zosa on the motion for inhibition; "HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same; "II" - Deed
of Sale jointly executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota Revo"; "II-1"
and "II-2" - portions thereof; "JJ" - correction made by Paramount as to who are the assured in CEB-
PC-25687; "JJ-1" - the assured were the respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-
Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery filed against her by the respondent; "KK-1" to "KK-
10" - pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" - annexes to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" - opposition to
motion to disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case No.
CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2 thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" - portions of the same.
From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to the
respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist Church, Cebu
City and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the Gospel. 11 When they got married,
Judge Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar exams and did not have a job. Since she was
already working as a teacher in Catmon she supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of
her grandparents. They have two children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is
26 years old.
When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported him and
the children. In fact, he stayed home and looked after the children.
Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed presiding judge
of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City. After his appointment, she noticed a change in
his conduct towards her. He became cold and no longer performed the usual acts of a husband,
referring to sexual relations, because he was very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one
room. In March 1996, they were living in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano dialect, about
her husband's infidelity. While she could no longer produce the letter at the time of the trial, she
could still remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a stupid wife. Until now, you have not
learned that your husband has a mistress. If you don't believe me, go to the office of the RTC,
Branch 20, right now. You go there-to Branch 20. Ask the people there if there is a convention in
Manila to be participated in by RTC judges. He already bought two plane tickets."
Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She found a
telegram in Judge Marcos' attaché case from a Mario Umali designating respondent as a participant
in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20
- 27, 1996.12
She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the convention
(seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not informed of the convention to which she replied in
the negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was going. She asked Judge Marcos
that night. He told her that he was going and that it was exclusively for the judges. She told him not
to go, as she was afraid he was going to take along another woman. He replied that he would not
go. But, at dawn, he told her that he must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that
would be distributed in the Supreme Court.
She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to attend the
convention but she was sure there was a woman.
Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody in Branch
20 gave her a Statement of Account from Islacom.13
The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand J.
Marcos at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose Village, Lawaan 3,
Talisay, Cebu, where he and his family lived. They have never resided at 615 ZA P. del Rosario
Extension, Cebu City, nor had they any telecommunication facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos
neither has a cell phone nor a telephone line with Islacom.
Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two months to
find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and her parents were living in that house. A
Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez, one of her co-teachers, lives next
door to the Tacaldos.
She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a while in the
office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he refused to take her as the
place was only near the office. He would consult somebody. When he came back, he told her that
they would go to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was lost.
She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The confrontation
took place in the Social Hall of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her brother and his wife, Rotilla
Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her sister were all present then. Rotilla
Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but the billing
address was that of the Tacaldos, and why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter
said that they were friends. The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00
for the cell phone's bill when they were only friends.
Complainant found inside respondent's attaché case that was in his office a yellow sheet of paper,
dated October 3, 1995, addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment of P11,400.00 for
"May's Acct."
As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a secret
because she already had an inkling that he had a relationship with another woman.
She found a birthday card/social telegram 14 addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between the pages
of a law book on a table in the latter's office. It read, among other things, "MT cares a lot, you know,"
and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She discovered it two weeks after his birthday, which
was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences. She did not show him the card, as it would
precipitate another quarrel.
Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard dated
September 10, 1997.15 One of the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and Jewelry. She
never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to her daughter. One of the
"purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe Laguna. There was no
occasion when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her husband. Another item in the Statement of
Account was groceries bought at Gaisano Metro. The groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were
not for their house, as respondent was no longer going home in 1997. Respondent judge left the
conjugal home in 1997 and has not returned since then.
Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located at Don
Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was renting. She saw
Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go inside. Maydelane Tacaldo
left the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family car and the station wagon (car), at
times.
She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's slippers,
and empty water dispenser of a brand similar to what they have at their own place, and the
laundered clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.
She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went to, and the
latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using aliases as the room was
registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a Certification of Tenant from the
Zomer Development Company.16 It was dated May 18, 1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol
was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1 Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez
St., Capitol Site, Cebu City from May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General
Manager of the said company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.
The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was even
published in the newspapers.
Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N",
and "O") where the affair of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was mentioned. In Exhibit "K"
(October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as
saying that respondent was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship and that other
Judges were complaining of his behavior. In Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star
Cebu) Judge Agana was once more quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his
affair was going to destroy him and that the latter never kept his relations with the law student a
secret.
After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to give them
support, the latter executed an authority for them to collect his salary from January 1997 up to
January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998. Since then they no longer received
any support from him.
Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from getting the
checks was because he allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She verbally complained to
Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive Judge) about the stoppage of the
checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court because he told her that she was just an
ordinary classroom teacher with a small salary and that he would use his power as a judge against
her.
Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was because
respondent judge threatened to kill her.
Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo, upon seeing
her picture. He had seen her twice: the first time during the wake of the late Sandiganbayan Justice
German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the Philippine Judges Association held in a
hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June, 1999. Both times he did not see her with a
companion.
At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of some RTC
judges. He knew her to be a law student. He did not think that she was a member of the Judiciary,
the wife of a judge, or an employee of the court.
Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents, the
originals of which were in their possession.
Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short), brought a
photocopy of the certificate of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with Motor No. 7K-0279834
issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane
Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as joint owners.
Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity), Cebu
City, brought to the hearing and identified the following documents: (1) the office copy of Certificate
of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in the names of Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a
Motor Vehicle Inspection Report (Exhibit "X") regarding a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "Y") executed by one Leticia R. Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand
Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999 Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor
Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia Cabanes,
for the purpose of transferring the ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo.
Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought to the

investigation copies of certain documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB" as the invoice for
the insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand Marcos with residence at P.
Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "C" as the Policy Schedule forming part
of the policy which was also issued in favor of the insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St.,
Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as an endorsement (No. 2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of
the aforementioned policy No. CEB-PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as
an insured party. An earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ," No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the
insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change
was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated that the
change was occasioned by a verbal order they received from the PCI Brokers. He further admitted
that he had no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of the change.
The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by respondent
and Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City,
in favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.
Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The same document appeared
to have been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and acknowledged by them before Notary
Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78,
Book No.220, Series of 2000. Another document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was
an endorsement issued by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and
Tacaldo, Maydelene B".
Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked Exhibits "1"
(affidavit of desistance executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of respondent directing the Clerk of
Court to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to "3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to
respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill); "5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI
Leasing); "6-A" (address indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT"
(postdated checks issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery
together with affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order dated February 22, 2000); "11-A" and "11-B"
(portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000); "12-A" and "12-B" (portions
thereof); "13" (original complaint for declaration of nullity in Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A"
(portion thereof); "14" (letter/complaint to Provincial Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B", and "14-C"
(affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15" (certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These
documents, however, were not formally offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.
Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the support
of his family. He alleged that he had supported her and their children, except at the time that she
abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her P22,000.00, more or less,
monthly; that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the letter/complaint against him was because she
suspected that he was not giving her the correct amount since he did not show her the checks from
the Supreme Court; that he revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from
the Supreme Court because he discovered that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos;
that he alone supported their children and her daughter's family from 1998 until the time he was
suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by paying their electric and phone bills.
He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a medical
student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y"). While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he was remitting to
Joshua, a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his son found a job in the year
2000, he reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his daughter Hazel Faith, he gave
P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City; but when he was transferred to Cebu City, he
increased her weekly support to P2,000.00.
He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was given to
his daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries bought at Gaisano Metro were
bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu, especially for his granddaughter. It was his
practice, even when he was still a private practitioner, to purchase all the groceries for the needs of
his family.
He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened all his
communications. As to the birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law book in his
chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did not appear in the card -
only the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the initials M.T. but as his Clerk of
Court, he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you
know", and "It's wonderful to share my life with you."
He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's account by
a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the Bebot to whom the
payment should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled account with anybody when he was
still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be spurious and manufactured by his complainant-wife,
it being undated and because he didn't recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the
note was not in his wife's handwriting but surmised (assumed) that it could have been the
penmanship of the person who was asked by complainant-wife to write it.
He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as he has
always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal home was situated. As to the claim that his slippers
and empty plastic water container were found outside one of the rooms in the Zosa Compound, he
contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his slippers were always left at home
and in his chambers. There were many consumers of mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only
in Talisay but also in Cebu City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of
the Zosa Compound and using the alias Victorino Timol.
With regards to the news item17 wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was not even
discreet about his alleged illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true because Judge Agana
had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.
He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star Super
Balita.18 He likewise denied that he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo City where he
was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had to stay overnight in Toledo City he
usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur Camonggan.
The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a "for-hire"
motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him, being a close friend,
to have his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle. Since he was a judge in Toledo
City, he could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts
motor vehicle units for plying the Toledo, Balamban, and Cebu City routes.
As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an accident or
there was a damage caused to a third party, he as the owner would be held responsible. He averred
that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though the car was insured it did not cover
damages to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there would be a foreclosure of the chattel
because the chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or if the promissory note was not paid, he would be
held liable. He put himself at risk because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they
are very close family friends.
The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The address at
P. Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In some of the
documents, like the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the promissory note he
executed with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay,
Cebu.
The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss Tacaldo, not
his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle, although it appears on paper
that it was registered in both their names but he had no hand in the preparation of the insurance
policy nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was not aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa
Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City. He did not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that
he first saw the insurance policy.
The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos have
invested in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to guarantee payment of
the balance of P300,000.00.
The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted because
after his suspension, the vehicle was shown on television. The Tacaldo family was afraid that the
motor vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the complainants.
He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a paramour
as early as March 1998 and he had told her that he would file the corresponding adultery cases once
he had sufficient evidence against her and her paramour. And this he did. He filed 13 counts of
adultery cases against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of
adultery before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, were filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.
He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as he has a
bigger build than her.
He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent. He was
diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were affected, especially his
sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as 1993, when he was first appointed to
the Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he could not have sex anymore. He was
being treated for diabetes and sexual impotency. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla,
dated December 6, 2000, stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla)
medical professional care since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since
1992, and was on maintenance medication.
His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it because his
diabetes caused his sexual impotency.
In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his order dated
February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for reconsideration because it was not true that he was
living in the property of Atty. Zosa.
While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with him. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him and asked him whether Maydelane Tacaldo had a job
and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he didn't know if she had a job and that he didn't
have a child with her. The Chief Justice told him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was able
to explain the Chief Justice had already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman
who went there was with him.
He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a seminar of
Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She was then the
secretary of Judge Vestil.
He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar
Coliseum but he had never visited their house.
The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent to a
certain Urgello. He didn't have an account with Islacom. Neither did he have a cell phone although
he had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he went to the Islacom office
regarding the allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the real account holder was. All
he did was to execute an Affidavit of Loss, per advice of Islacom.
Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the parents of
Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the Islacom Statement of
Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone because during the confrontation,
Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of Maydelane also said he did not see his
daughter with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly denied having any relationship with him. He also
told the group during the confrontation that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife
instigated the confrontation.
He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo. The
buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.
We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo Quimbo, as
contained in his Report. We find the details of his findings amply supported by the evidence on
record leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit relationship
started even before he separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos in 1997.
Consider the following evidence:
The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his
conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Ext.,
Cebu City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge
Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to
him if he were not the real owner thereof.
Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant desirous of its
services. Islacom would not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of Account if he did not apply for a
phone line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish them.
If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have
stood his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous
(unbelievable) of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation that the
bill was erroneously sent to him without raising hell, so to speak, in finding out the identity of the
Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when this Statement of Account was the catalyst
(substance) in the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms. Tacaldo.
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the social
telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be Maydelane Tacaldo
or Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as
Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is
wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person
who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos would send such a card.
We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The book was
found tucked between the pages of a law book lying on top of his office table. He is the most logical
person to have inserted said card in the law book.
The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos bought,
presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at the Gaisano Metro, and
dined at Cafe Laguna.
Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said restaurant.
She testified that her daughter also did not receive jewelry/ies from her father. They also did not
receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer going home then.
Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her husband
was staying. When she found it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered clothes outside the
place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have known her husband's
preferences as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would have been able to recognize them
upon seeing them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the fact that he
was residing in one of the units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty. Zosa, counsel for one
of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically deny the allegation. Neither did
respondent, in his Order denying the motion, categorically deny the allegation.
Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo
as one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the fact that they lived together was apparent in the
different documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the address they both gave for
these documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. Zosa Compound, by the way, is
located at Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the
owners of a Toyota Revo.
Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it
registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with them as
joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina
Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate that
they were the joint owners of the Toyota Revo.
We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he accommodated the
Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the cooperative because they are very close family friends. If
they are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had never been to the house of the Tacaldos. In
fact, he was not even sure as to the exact location of the Tacaldo residence.
Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration,
the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would be assured.
He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle registered in his and Ms.
Tacaldo's names.
There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an
owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone
call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our
mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting passengers.
Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even
mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's.
We cannot gloss over (evade) the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted
(narrated) by Chief Justice Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice
that he had been living with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated from
his wife. Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering that Judge
Marcos was still very much married even if he and his wife Rotilla were already living separately.
He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was his wife. This conduct is certainly
unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be beyond reproach.
As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,19 the personal behavior of a judge should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy (separation) of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a
judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion."20
In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,21 it was held that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with
more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to
observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency.22
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess
the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the
confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal
for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place
where his court is situated.
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the Court
laid down the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond
reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration
of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal
judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public
decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the
judiciary."23
No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport (behave) himself at all times in
such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public that looks up to him as the epitome (embodiment) of integrity and justice. 24
The Court once again reminds all those who don (put on) judicial robes to maintain good moral
character and at all times observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage (disgrace) public
decency.25
Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and
children.
"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially

when executed as an afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina 26: It would be a dangerous
rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply
because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or
another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous (corrupt) witness(es)."27
Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,28 the Court once more held that:
"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against
herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges
have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court
has an interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of
justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s
desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated."
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He
has violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all
activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain in
office and continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of
disciplinary sanction – dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement
or appointment to any public office including government owned or controlled corporations, and
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.
This decision is immediately executory. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jul2001/am_97-2-53-rtc_2001.html
50. A.M. No. P-16-3541

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P]
SYLVIA G. CORPUZ, Complainant
vs.
CEFERINA B. RIVERA (COURT STENOGRAPHER) , COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTOF DAVAO CITY DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-16-3542

PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES OF

DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent
vs.
TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-16-3543

IRINEO F. MARTINEZ, JR., Complainant,

vs.
CIFERINA B. RIVERA (COURT STENOGRAPHER) , COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ

TRIAL COURT OF DAV AO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES OF
DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution are four (4) consolidated administrative cases, namely: (1) A.M. No. P-16-
3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P); (2) A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-
P); (3) A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P), respectively initiated by Sylvia G.
Corpuz (Corpuz), Presiding Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr. (Judge Ferraris, Jr.) of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, and Irineo F. Martinez, Jr. (Martinez, Jr.), against Ceferina
B. Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) (Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) ), Court Stenographer
III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 12 concerning the latter's money-lending
business; and (4) OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ initiated by Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER)
against Judge Ferraris, Jr. regarding his complicity (involvement) to the said money-lending
business.
The Facts
In the Complaint in A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915- P), it was alleged that in
1
February 2011, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) convinced Corpuz to invest the aggregate
amount of P252,500 in the former's money-lending business with the promise that Corpuz will earn a
monthly interest of two and a half percent (2.5% ), which interest will be deposited to her account at
the end of each month. Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) never fulfilled her promise, which
prompted Corpuz to verify Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER)'s business. After discovering that no
such money-lending business existed, Corpuz immediately demanded the return of her money, and
in response, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) gave her two (2) checks amounting to
P130,000.00 each. However, the checks were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
After her demands for payment went unheeded, Corpuz filed two (2) counts of Estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 against Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER), as well as the instant
2 3
administrative complaint.
Similarly, the affidavit-complaints in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P) and 4
A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P) alleged that Rivera (COURT
5
STENOGRAPHER) convinced Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to invest in her money-lending
business the respective amounts of Pl00,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 with the promise that their money
would earn monthly interest of five percent (5%). As guarantee, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER)
issued checks to Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. corresponding to their investments in her
business. After paying Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. the agreed interest for four (4) and three
(3) months, respectively, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) failed to pay the succeeding interests
and even the principal amounts. Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. then tried to encash their
respective checks, but both were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Ultimately,
Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) failed to pay her liabilities despite demands, thus, constraining
Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to file separate criminal cases against her.
For her part, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) openly admitted having engaged in money-
7
lending activities, albeit offering the excuse that her business was done in good faith and with no
intention of blemishing the good name of her office, as the same was done mainly to augment her
meager salary and accommodate the monetary needs of other court personnel. She likewise
explained that her business took a downward spiral when majority of her borrowers failed to pay
their monthly obligations. Worse, she herself suffered financial troubles when her family and
relatives were hit by the Typhoon Pablo in 2012, which took much of her time and financial
resources in order to support them. As a result, she defaulted in her obligations to Judge Ferraris,
8
Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz. Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) also averred that Judge Ferraris,
Jr. went to her office several times while she was on leave and threatened to have her killed if she
did not pay up. Lastly, she clarified that she had already amicably settled her obligations with
9
Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz resulting in the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case Corpuz filed against her; and the affidavits of desistance executed by Judge Ferraris,
10
Jr. and Martinez, Jr. withdrawing their criminal complaints against her.
11 12 13
In view of Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's claim that she received threats from Judge
Ferraris, Jr., the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that: (a) Rivera (COURT
STENOGRAPHER) 's counter-affidavits in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P)
and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P) be treated as a separate administrative
complaint against Judge Ferraris, Jr. to determine his involvement in Rivera (COURT
STENOGRAPHER) 's money-lending business; and (b) Judge Ferraris, Jr. be ordered to comment
on the administrative case against him. Said recommendations were approved and adopted by the
14
Court in its Resolution dated October 8, 2014 and the counter-affidavits were, thereafter, docketed
15
as OCA IPI No. 14-2731-J.
Pursuant to the Court's directive, Judge Ferraris, Jr. submitted a CounterAffidavit dated September
16
17, 2015, vehemently denying Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's accusation that he threatened
Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's life. He then clarified that after finding out that Rivera
(COURT STENOGRAPHER) has other creditors who were after her, he merely commented that
"good that she is not in the danger of being killed by reason of her non-payment of her account to
other creditors." 17
In view of the similarities in the factual milieu of the complaints, the OCA further recommended that
the four (4) administrative cases be consolidated. Thus, the Court, in its Resolutions dated October
18
1, 2014, October 8, 2014, and March 18, 2015, ordered, inter alia, the consolidation of the said
19 20 21
cases and the referral of the same to the First Vice Executive Judge of the RTC for a joint
investigation, report and recommendation. 22
In a Report and Recommendation dated October 4, 2015, First Vice Executive Judge Retrina E.
23
Fuentes (Judge Fuentes) found both Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) and Judge Ferraris, Jr.
administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalties of
suspension of six (6) months and reprimand, respectively.
Judge Fuentes found that Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) was indeed engaged in money-
lending activities as she herself had admitted, and as attested to by various court employees.
According to Judge Fuentes, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's actions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service as her money-lending business put the image of the
judiciary in a bad light, especially in view of the fact that she performs her transactions during office
hours and within the court's premises. 24
Anent Judge Ferraris, Jr., Judge Fuentes did not find any evidence that would show his active
participation in Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's money-lending activities or that he exploited
his position in order to gain monetary benefit therefrom. These notwithstanding, Judge Fuentes
opined that Judge Ferraris, Jr. should have known that engaging in money-lending activities is
directly prohibited under prevailing Civil Service Rules and, thus, should have taken steps to
prevent Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) from doing such activities. On the contrary, he even
invested capital therein. Consequently, he should be reprimanded for his lack of concern in the
moneylending activity of Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) and his act of investing therein. 25
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum dated March 30, 2016, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that: (a) Rivera
26
(COURT STENOGRAPHER) be held administratively liable for her money-lending activities, and
accordingly, be meted the penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; and (b) the complaint against
Judge Ferraris, Jr. be dismissed, but he be admonished for tolerating and not taking steps to prevent
Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) from engaging in such business. 27
The OCA ratiocinated that as a court employee, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) is required to
serve with maximum efficiency and with the highest degree of devotion to duty in order to maintain
public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's act of engaging in
her money-lending business cannot be countenanced as it tends to distract her from devoting her
entire time to official work so as to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
However, considering that this was Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's first offense in her more
than thirty-six (36) years of government service, the OCA deemed it appropriate to impose upon her
the penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay. 28
As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., the OCA agreed with the conclusion of Judge Fuentes that there is
not enough evidence to show that he took advantage of his position as a judge in order to receive
any monetary gain from Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's money lending business. This
notwithstanding, the OCA recommended that Judge Ferraris, Jr. be admonished for his lack of
concern in taking steps to prevent Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) from conducting her trade
and even expressly supporting it by investing money therein.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) and
Judge Ferraris, Jr. may be held administratively liable for Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's
money-lending activities.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except as to the penalty to be
imposed on Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) . 1âwphi1
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In
order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the
former. Stated differently, if the misconduct does not involve any of the aforesaid qualifying
29
elements, the person charged is only liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct. 30
In this case, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) ought to have known that as a public servant, she
is expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity, as expressly
commanded by no less than Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, as an
31 32
employee of the Judiciary, she should be well aware that the nature of her work demands her
highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, and that she would only be able to meet this demand
by devoting her undivided time to government service. Essentially, this is the reason why court
employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or
moment of such time to serving the public so as to ensure that undue delays in the administration of
justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided. 33
In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) fell short
of the standard required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in general. Her money-
lending activities - which were done even during office hours and within the court premises - surely
put the integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she took advantage of
her position and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her business. However, absent any
34
showing that her inappropriate acts were tainted with corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) should only be held
administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.
Under Section 46 (D), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense which merits the penalty of suspension for a
35
period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and
dismissal from service for the second offense. Considering that this is Rivera (COURT
STENOGRAPHER) 's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of government service, the 36
Court deems it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of
one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., suffice it to say that the OCA correctly recommended the dismissal
of the case against him as there is not enough evidence to show that he exploited his position to
receive monetary benefit from Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) 's money-lending activities.
However, he must nevertheless be admonished for his lack of concern in taking steps to prevent
Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER) from conducting her trade and, in fact, condoned (ignored) it by
investing money into the same.
It is well to reiterate that "those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's
confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never
and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards
an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."
37
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ceferina B. Rivera (COURT STENOGRAPHER), Court
Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del Sur, Branch 12 GUILTY of
Simple Misconduct. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED without pay for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Further, the Court DISMISSES the administrative case against Presiding Judge Rufino S. Ferraris,
Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, docketed as OCA IPI No. 14-2371-
MTJ, for lack of sufficient evidence. This notwithstanding, he is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
vigilant in taking steps to prevent officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging in
prohibited activities.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/aug2016/am_p-16-3541_2016.html
CANON 3
51. I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016 - Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z.
ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA. LUISA C. QUIJANO-PADILLA, COURT OF APPEALS,
MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO. 103042
EN BANC
I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA. LUISA C.
QUIJANO-PADILLA, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO. 103042
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This resolves the verified complaint 1 filed by Catalina Z. Aliling (Complainant) against Justice Ma. Luisa C.
Quijano-Padilla (Justice Padilla) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of Manila for gross ignorance of the law or
procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The complaint stemmed from the Decision 2 of Justice Padilla in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042.
Antecedent Facts
On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado) and Catalina Zamora Aliling (Aliling) filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Santiago City, Isabela for the determination of the
true origin and ownership of a 7,086-square meter parcel of land, described as Lot No. 4900. Jurado and
Aliling alleged that they, together with their deceased brother Fernando M. Zamora, are the registered
owners of Lot No. 4900 covered by TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. They claimed to
have inherited the subject land from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds the property under the
previous title, TCT No. T-2291, after having acquired this from the previous owners, spouses Antonio Pariñas
and Maura Balbin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 36-2438.
Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they learned that defendants in the case were able to
cause the subdivision of Lot No. 4900 into several titles in the names of: Vicente Chai, married to Carmen
Chai; Eduardo Sarmiento, married to Josefina M. Sarmiento; Anastacio Pallermo; and Leonora Pariñas and
Margarita Pariñas, married to Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful ownership over the subject
property, plaintiffs prayed for the nullification of the aforesaid titles.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment holding, among others, that there was an
irregularity in the reconstitution proceedings relative to OCT No. 3429 from which defendants' titles were
derived and that defendants, particularly appellants Spouses Chai, could not be considered as purchasers in
good faith.
The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration while the defendants filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 25 February 2014 decision. The trial court denied both of their motions.
On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision in Civil Case No.
36-2438. It held that while it affirms the trial court's ruling on the irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT
No. 3429, it cannot sustain the finding that appellants are not purchasers in good faith. The CA concluded
that defendant Spouses Chai exercised the due diligence required of them to be rightfully adjudged as
buyers in good faith. The decision was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices
Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the heirs of their brother Fernando M. Zamora, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the CA decision.
Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration, Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the instant
administrative complaint against Justice Padilla.
Our Ruling
Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the CA decision in the administrative complaint, it is
evident that the error she is attributing to respondent Justice Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R.
CV No. 103042. This Court has maintained that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies.3 chanrobleslaw
The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial functions, and as such,
should not be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not
be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith,
fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part.4 Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of
duty in good faith.5 As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 6chanrobleslaw
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error
that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.7 In her ponencia, Justice Padilla explained, citing
evidence and jurisprudence, why she arrived at her conclusion that defendants were purchasers in good
faith. Even assuming that she erred in her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was moved by
ill-will or malicious intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it was
arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the ruling of the respondent justice.
Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. If she
disagrees with the ruling, there are judicial remedies to be exhausted under existing rules. As in
fact, it was noted that complainant, together with the other plaintiffs-appellees, had already filed their
motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA has yet to rule on the motion when complainant filed
the instant administrative complaint.
This Court has settled the rule that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or
judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they
cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been
resolved with finality.8 It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil case has not
yet reached its finality and the instant administrative complaint has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by Catalina
Z. Aliling against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Court of Appeals, Manila for ignorance of the law or
procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016septemberdecisions.php?id=778
CANON 4
52. (A) A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

1
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993,
where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under
rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP.
Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave
Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the
following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative

meetings" in her Order dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a
2
first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted
to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the
rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so
that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser
and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and
development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also
the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,

leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the
creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed
the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending (arrogant) and snide (malicious) remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the
period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and
alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns
regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that
3
the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly
for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered
by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere
(bra.)
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement dated March 18, 2008, referred
4
the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted
a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to
render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that
if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does
not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative
complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available. 5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On
the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and
non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules gives the
6
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the
parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and
that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting
extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules pertains not to the SC, but to the
7
rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but
due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as
evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision
to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation
receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of
the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary
evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in
expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
8
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She
added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards
and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being
judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically (beautifully) made. Lastly, she
submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala should not be applied
9
to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
10
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in

violation of Rules 2.01, 2.02 and 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
11 12 13
In a Resolution dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
14
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report
and Recommendation, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious.
15
She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s
appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the
respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied
on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s
creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary
bickering (debating) with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were
reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off (disregard) the matter
with what would appear to be a conceited (pride) show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done
recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be
temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of
a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.
16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in
the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the
trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance
of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941
17
finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a
management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00.
She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and
judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
18
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety

with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely. 19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to
observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence
are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand,
on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account
contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition
of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-
Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a
matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In the present case, the allegations of grave
20
abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of
circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad
faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures
and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations.
"[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."
22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of
23
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be

assailed instead through judicial remedies. 24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The
truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the
complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person,
and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
25
the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited
by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to
adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This
kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot
overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that
due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his official duties renders him liable. "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty
27
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous." 28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. 29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law
against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment."
30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must
also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or had committed
31
an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified
rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his
allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot conclude
32
that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so
egregious (shocking) as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the
law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants or the general public. The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present
33
proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding
that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence,
nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that
the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of
a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by
Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.
34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of
his/her official functions. When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross
35
and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law. On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of
36
a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the
respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of
one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension
beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving
a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.
37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried
a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court
could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from
the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an
extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of
the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the
extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise
40
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas.
41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, a judge should be
42
considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his
passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, the Court declared that "although
43
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the
bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering (debating) with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide (sarcastic)
remarks, as well as her condescending (humiliating) attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot
allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum
required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she]
should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable
observer. [She] must never show conceit (arrogance) or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of
impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. While judges are not
45
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off ( to lose a covering) their status as judges. They carry with
them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to
follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest (in case) this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." Joining a
46
social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression . The respondent judge’s
act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether
it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives . In particular, Sections 1 and 2
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered"
suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in
mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her
judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the
entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes
are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general
public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to
her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she
placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus
must accordingly comport themselves. 47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The
1âwphi1
very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and
propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach. Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of
48
office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same
Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following:
(1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and
( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for
any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper
the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise
hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/apr2014/am_rtj-09-2200_2014.html
CANON 4
52. (B) [A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999.]
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, Complainant, v. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding

Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Respondent.
DECISION
On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court 1
praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to
"gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession." 2 Attached to her
letter was a sworn statements reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how
respondent allegedly molested her sexually.
SWORN STATEMENT
I, LUALHATI LIWANAG. of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road, Pamana
Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to law, hereby depose and
state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P.
22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to
approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.
2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12)
informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua,
charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the
informations are hereto attached for reference.
3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
by Judge Paterno Lustre.
4. After the information were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment
were (sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused.
5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came,
Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to
inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned.
At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in January and
February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the accused.
He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on December
15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.
7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty.
Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing.
Judge Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.
8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I
went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for
the accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I
will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and
told me he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched
my shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that
he acceded to my request. Later, he told one that he is available during Mondays and
Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the
hearing on January 17, 1995.
9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17,
1995 because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me.
10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the
case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995. he cancelled hearings on all dates as per
request of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and
March 7, 1995.
11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb.
28, 1995.
12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case,
granting postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case
was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the
accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.
13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked
him why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to
him as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I
must obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will
decide our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him
outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he
brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed
my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are
with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set
hearings for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in
May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office on
March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.
14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at
around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his
chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on
the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered
me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my
lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with
him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is
on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.
15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see
Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set
for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.
16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new Subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new
cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I
went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any rate,
there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he was
early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not
come. He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit." cralaw virtua1aw library
17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the
accused’s lawyer.
18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office
because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous settings. I
requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that he
would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching my
breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told to
return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
19. I came backs on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba
Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota car
and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba, Laguna.
I could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at Riverview, he
told me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed himself and ordered
me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our blood money is at stake.
It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for my family. Perhaps I was
too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt. helpless. He ordered me to perform "fellatio" on
him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I also saw black rashes on his
body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see him again on July 10 in his
Office.
20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge
Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to
perform "fellatio" on him.
21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as
requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following
day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he
told me not to fool him.
22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized
before I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could
not take it anymore.
23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and
instead hearing was set in November, 1995.
24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. I went to his office to get an order for the referral of
the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he Kissed me and touched me.
I could not refuse for fear of retaliation.
25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our
cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen front the transcript of the
hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he
is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was
testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.
26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil
doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who
are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain
because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened
by disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to
give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.
27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who
is supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who
are not learned in law as his victims.
28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for
my better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I
did it for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his
money for our future. 3
A part from the letter and the sworn statements complainant also sent the Court 11
photographs showing her and respondent together in various Places. Five of these were
allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in, Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt
issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she
had with Respondent. 4
Respondent’s defense is anchored on denial. In a "2nd Indorsement" 5 he sent to the Court,

by way of answer to the complaint, he "strongly denie(d)" 6 the charges leveled against him
and dismissed them as "the vile products of (complainant’s) malicious and prejudiced mind"
7 According to him. complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges
against him when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant
demands . . .to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very
short period of time" 8 the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainant’s
husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondent’s
refusal to accept complainant’s offer to "reward" him with five percent of the P3.5 million
her husband seeks to recover.
Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the
morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten
minutes before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked
— thus, the impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines — since
the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use it
may enter his room freely.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, With a heart ailment and diabetes," (s)ex is
beyond (his) physical capacity." 9 He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary men
indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt." 10 He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed
against him.
In support of his claims respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1)
affidavit executed by Rodelio A Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually
arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A.
Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondent’s fine work
ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that
respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, a trial fibrillation, and diabetes
mellitus. 11
In response to respondent’s averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their
meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he since he knew that nobody from his staff reported
for work that early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his
office, which must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for respondent’s health condition,
complainant pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but
only engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes
might haze diminished respondent’s sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same. 12
In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge
Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed
to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by complainant’s husband.
On January 8 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from
hearing the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with Respondent.
13 The Court, however in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed
him to resolve the case with dispatch. 14
In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the
complaint against respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Judge Geraldez observed that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he
could recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose
Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the
complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And,
why Jose Zafra allowed it.
The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the court’s decision would be so vital,
that the judge can demand his "price" .
There is a rather large disparity in the value of the "B.P. 22’’ cases vis-a-vis the seriousness
and mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanag’s allegations are beyond comprehension. It
borders on the very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect to
the allegations of oral sex with its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more
than once. If indeed there were "blood secretions" the first time, the claim of a second time
is beyond relief (sic),
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched her.
But human nature would demand another oral sex as they had done before. Moreover, in
her complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why
they stopped at oral sex. 15
Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in
itself.
Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs
showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not establish the acts complained
of. Despite having the opportunity to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to
testify to substantiate her claims, thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-
examine her.
Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly, opposite
that of Judge Geraldez.
The OCA noted that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent
which the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his
subsequent report reveal a perfunctory (unthinking) treatment and analysis of the
submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant herein, and an egregious (shocking)
misapplication of the law and jurisprudence.
x x x
We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears the
earmarks (keep) of truth, of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are
so finely etched (engraved) by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other
similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust:
The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint
and that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and — controlled corporations.
Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire
controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to
judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases.
Only substantial evidence is required, 16 as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence: 17
"SECTION 5. Substantial Evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial

bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."cralaw virtua1aw library
Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently
establish complainant’s case against Respondent.
The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in
various places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andok’s Litson Manok,
another shows respondent’s car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The
car is seen leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in
the driveway of what appears to be one of a row of room. On top of this room’s doorway is
the letter "D." Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming
out of the room together and heading towards respondent’s parked car. 18
Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.
In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent
is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or grave
misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room
together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the resort
did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. 19 On the basis of his
own pictures, he concluded complainant’s photographs could not have been taken at that
resort. When he testified on his behalf, he said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there
because I personally went there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign boards were
not there, sir." 20
A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant’s pictures, was missing in

respondent’s pictures.
Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint — which she
has denied — is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an "outrageous demand"
21 for P3.5 million to settle the case.
We are not convinced however, that respondent’s conduct in this case is entirely blameless,
nor that complainant’s alleged intent would excuse respondent’s wrongdoing.
It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in
any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature,
such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to
us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the
resort himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of
complainant’s.
We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with
complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for
the photograph, 22 but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion
almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as
October 1995 in his comment to complainant’s charges.
If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent
with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant and
respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs,
respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and under what
circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed to
do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private
room.
Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainant’s
vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to
undue speculations. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of
repeated postponements of the hearing of her cases?
Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable
delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with
sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature
and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with
respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing
herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the
exercise save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process. (similar
to Maria Clara Doctrine)
As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moments

Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her
re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of
complainant’s evidence. 23
Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not
cross-examined by respondent is not her fault but respondent’s.
As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrator’s
assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary
and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well. 24 All to the
grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.
The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level
in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public’s faith and
trust in the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he
has already retired as of November 1, 1998. 25 For the serious misconduct of respondent,
the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed. 26
We are not in accord with the OCA’s recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all
retirement benefits due Respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while
directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are
dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the
circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross

misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be
dismissed nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him,
to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any
employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and-controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
SOURCE/S: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1999aprildecisions.php?id=278
CANON 5
53. A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC October 29, 2009
RE: ORDER DATED 21 DECEMBER 2006 ISSUED BY JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 275, SUSPENDING LOIDA M. GENABE,
LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. P-07-2320
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH
275, Complainant,
vs.
LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT. Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the Regional
Trial Court (trial court), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, stemmed from a Letter dated 22 December 2006
addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
(Judge Maceda) of the same trial court. Judge Maceda attached his Order dated 21 December 2006
suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason of neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite
a pending assignment. In the letter, Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be withheld
for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately
executory.
The Facts
On 20 November 2006, Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court of the
same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe referring to her neglect, in leaving
for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for legal researchers, without
finishing her assigned task. The assigned task required Genabe to summarize the statement of facts
in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Marvilla, et al.," set
for promulgation on 21 November 2006. Atty. Escabarte reminded Genabe that such act could not
be tolerated and that similar acts in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.
On 22 November 2006, Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished assigned case.
She stated that she was not able to complete the summary due to lack of transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN). Genabe added that she be absolved for humane considerations.
On 29 November 2006, Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in the
agenda, including the inter-office memorandum. Allegedly, even before the staff meeting, Genabe
resented (bitter) the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to the court staff,
including the clerk of court. At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued her combative behavior in
total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda.
On 30 November 2006, Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not be cited
in contempt by the court and why she should not be administratively sanctioned for conduct
unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.
In her Answer dated 11 December 2006, Genabe denied that she neglected her duty and explained
with counter-charges. Genabe stated that Atty. Escabarte did not give her the opportunity to be
heard and that she was not given sufficient lead time to finish the five consolidated informations of
the criminal case assigned to her. Genabe attributed the lack of stenographers, which was beyond
her control, as the cause of the delay in the transcriptions of the minutes of the meeting. As a
counter-charge, Genabe claimed that Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis. 1avvphi1
On the same day, Judge Maceda conducted a fact-finding investigation inside his chambers. The
agenda of the investigation focused on the charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming, neglect of
duty, and misconduct against Genabe. Judge Maceda directed all members of the staff, including
Genabe, to attend. However, Genabe did not appear despite notice. Later, she appeared to say that
she was waiving her right to be present in the investigation.
On 21 December 2006, Judge Maceda issued the Suspension Order against Genabe for neglect of
duty.
In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda furnished the Office of the Court of
Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the Order dated 21 December 2006. Judge Maceda suspended
Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to appropriate supervisory
officials in disciplining personnel of their respective courts as provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of
Circular No. 30-91 dated 30 September 1991. Judge Maceda declared that the suspension was to
take effect immediately and would not be stayed even if appealed to the Supreme Court . Judge
Maceda then requested that following the suspension order, Genabe’s salary be withheld for the
period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.
The OCA received a letter dated 12 January 2007 sent by Atty. Zandro T. Bato, Clerk of Court VI of
the same trial court, returning the salary check of Genabe following the suspension order issued
against her. On 22 January 2007, Genabe reported back to work after serving the 30-day
suspension order of Judge Maceda.
On 18 January 2007, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and Recommendation to the
OCA, even without any directive from the latter. The report mainly focused on the alleged unruly
conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting of Branch 275 on 29 November 2006. Judge Maceda
submitted the following recommendations:
1. Pending determination of the instant matter by the Honorable Supreme Court, Ms. Loida
M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, be immediately placed
under preventive suspension, and thereafter dismiss her from the service; and
2. Allow the undersigned to recommend a replacement to enable RTC Branch 275 to

function normally soonest.
In a Letter dated 18 April 2007, several staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch
Clerk of Court, assailed the alleged inaction of the OCA on the Investigation Report and
Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda as well as the request for the
detail of Genabe to another post.
In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, this Court resolved to:
1. NOTE the letter dated 22 December 2006 of Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda x x
x x;
2. TREAT the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda as
an administrative complaint against Loida M. Genabe under a separate docket number, A.M.
No. P-07-2320 x x x x;
3. DIRECT Ms. Loida M. Genabe to REPORT BACK TO WORK pending resolution of the
administrative complaint against her, unless another administrative case directs otherwise;
and
4. REQUIRE Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice,
why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed against him for having violated A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and
Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" approved on 27 January 2004 and became
effective on 15 February 2004. 2
Judge Maceda submitted his Explanation dated 29 June 2007, in compliance with the Court’s
Resolution dated 23 May 2007. Judge Maceda reasoned that there were other charges against
Genabe, such as "conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct," which called for the imposition of a
higher penalty. Thus, he endorsed the determination of such other charges to the OCA, including
whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or replacement might be warranted. Judge Maceda prayed
that his explanation be considered as sufficient compliance and that he be absolved of any
disciplinary sanction.
On 22 August 2007, the Court resolved to refer to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation the (1) Order dated 21 December 2006 and (2) Explanation dated 29 June 2007,
both made by Judge Maceda.
On 29 August 2007, the Court resolved to inform the staff members of the same trial court, in
consideration of the Letter dated 18 April 2007, that until Genabe has been formally charged with
"contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct," which are not light offenses, the propriety of
suspending Genabe pending investigation of the charges against her cannot be properly evaluated,
and to await the outcome of A.M. No. P-07-2320.
On 19 November 2007, the staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch Clerk of
Court, filed their Manifestation dated 15 October 2007, that Genabe had been formally charged with
"contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct" as contained in the Investigation Report and
Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda to this Court.
In a Resolution dated 16 January 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to manifest their
willingness to submit the matter for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed. Judge Maceda and
Genabe respectively filed their compliance on separate dates.
In a Resolution dated 4 June 2008, the Court resolved to:
1. APPROVE the previous recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, as

contained in its Agenda Report dated 24 January 2007 particularly items no. 5 and 6.
Accordingly, (a) the Financial Management Office is DIRECTED to pay the salary of Ms.
Loida M. Genabe pending resolution of the administrative case against her by the Court; and
(b) the Office of the Administrative Services-Leave Division is DIRECTED not to deduct the
number of absences incurred by Ms. Genabe from her leave credits since the order of
suspension is unauthorized; and
2. GRANT the application of Ms. Loida M. Genabe for leave for a period of five (5) months
starting 1 May to 30 September 2008 for purposes of taking the bar examination, this,
however, is without prejudice to the action that the Committee of the Education Support
Program may take on her application. 3
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 23 October 2007, the OCA found Judge Maceda’s explanation unsatisfactory.
The OCA stated that Circular No. 30-91 had been impliedly amended by the Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
as contained in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which became effective on 15 February 2004 . The OCA
added that it was clear from the Guidelines that Judge Maceda had no authority to directly penalize
a court employee. As an Executive Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate
administrative complaints involving light offenses. The power to decide and impose a penalty, even
for light offenses, rests with the Supreme Court. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Maceda
be fined ₱12,000 payable immediately and be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future would merit a severe penalty.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both Genabe
and Judge Maceda administratively liable.
In A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty has
been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. 4
Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that no work
would be left pending. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three defense witnesses
for a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that Genabe was only able to summarize
the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to finish the TSN of the other two
witnesses consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to
complete the task. However, the assignment remained unfinished. When such task was assigned to
another court employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of
the two witnesses.
Further, Judge Maceda stated that this was not the only time Genabe had been remiss in her duties.
In Criminal Case No. 98-926 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Russel Javier, et al.," Genabe
failed to include in the statement of facts the detail on the prosecutor’s waiver of the cross
examination and more importantly, neglected to include the testimony of the accused Russel Javier
upon completing his testimony. Also, in Criminal Case Nos. 02-0713 and 02-0714, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Alberto Ylanan," Genabe included the testimony of an alleged poseur when his
testimony, upon motion, had been stricken off the record per Order dated 29 July 2003.
From these instances, we find that Genabe’s actuations constitute simple neglect of duty. As a first
offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one
month and one day.5 The suspension imposed upon Genabe under the Order dated 21 December
2006 shall be considered as the penalty imposed. The remaining balance of one day suspension
must be served upon finality of this decision.
With regard to the other charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, we find no
sufficient basis to hold Genabe accountable for these offenses based on her alleged unruly conduct
at the staff meeting held on 29 November 2006. In administrative proceedings, the burden is on the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. 6 Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. The standard was not met in this case. The Order dated 21 December 2006 and
Investigation Report dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda centered mainly on
Genabe’s neglect of duty in not completing her assigned task on time. The other charges had been
touched on in a sporadic manner. While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant,
suspension, replacement or dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial evidence to
merit such penalties. In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, Genabe cannot be held
accountable for the other charges against her.
In A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find that Judge Maceda failed to observe due process in ordering
the suspension of Genabe and withholding her salary from 21 December 2006 to 20 January
2007.
Judge Maceda suspended a court personnel directly under his supervision by relying on the
authority laid down in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 which provides:
2. Lower Court Personnel
a. Light Offenses –
(1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service law
(Administrative Code of 1987 and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. 6713) where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not
more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty days' salary, and as classified in Civil
Service Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989, shall be acted upon by the appropriate
supervisory official of the lower court concerned.
(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge of the
lower collegiate courts and the Executive Judges of the trial courts with respect to the
personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the individual Justices and
Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate supervisory officials.
(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed with the Court, the Office of the Court
Administrator, or the lower court shall be heard and decided by the appropriate supervisory
official concerned. x x x
The reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced. Judge Maceda found
Genabe to have neglected her duty in November 2006. The guidelines in effect at that time were
already those found in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in 2004 or two years before the
administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against Genabe. Judge Maceda should have
applied these new guidelines and not Circular No. 30-91.
Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for administrative
discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:
SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses.– The Executive Judge shall have authority
to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses as defined under the
Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713), where the penalty is
reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days’
salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge
against a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive
Judge’s area of administrative supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee,
except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of
administrative supervision.
In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and
submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation as
to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30)
days from termination of said inquiry.At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may delegate the
investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court officials
within his/her area of administrative supervision.
In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed by private
complainants against court employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same shall be forwarded
by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action and
disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court personnel, under
their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting an inquiry only. After such
inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the results of the investigation and give
a recommendation as to what action should be taken. An executive judge does not have the
authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty,
unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power
to find the court personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.
In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty. Under
Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,7 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one
day to six months suspension for the first offense. 8 Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge
may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the investigation, the executive judge is
mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action. 9
Even under Circular No. 30-91, Judge Maceda should have referred to Section A(2)(b) of Circular
No. 30-91 which provides:
b. Grave or Less Grave Offenses
All administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes hereinbefore
referred to shall be immediately referred to the Court En Banc for appropriate action within 15 days
from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed directly with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise
from receipt by him from the appropriate supervisory officials concerned.
Thus, under Circular No. 30-91, a court employee charged with a less grave offense could not be
directly penalized by an executive judge. Judge Maceda had no authority to suspend Genabe
outright for a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty even under Circular No. 30-91. Clearly,
Judge Maceda exceeded his authority when he issued the 21 December 2006 suspension order
against Genabe.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge in the discipline of judges of regular courts:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. –
xxxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;

xxxx
Accordingly, Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions to be imposed if one
is found to be guilty of a less serious charge:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. –
xxxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
xxxx
We hold that the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱12,000 is commensurate to Judge Maceda’s
violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. We sternly warn him that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher II of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty.
We SUSPEND her for one month and one day without pay. The 30-day suspension imposed upon
Loida M. Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda shall be considered as a partial service of the penalty imposed. The remaining balance of
the penalty of one day suspension shall be immediately served upon finality of this decision.
Respondent Loida M. Genabe is sternly warned that commission of similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
In A.M No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. Accordingly, we FINE him
₱12,000, with a stern warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Source/s: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/am_07-2-93-rtc_2009.html

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31. A.C. No.

6166 October 2, 2009

MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA, Complainant,

The facts of the case are as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent

We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent’s act of charging an acceptance fee of

SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO and FRANCING

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and unanimously

The Court’s Ruling

In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,13 the Court held:

The antecedent facts follow:

Respondent harps a different tale.

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

(IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester

1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67

2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00

3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46

4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

IBP's Report and Recommendation

The Court's Ruling

warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him. 15

36. A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

The Court's Ruling

MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,

5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of

9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.

A.C. No.: 10300

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S.

A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that

existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different

39. G.R. No. 143365 December 4, 2008

GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA

The Trial Court’s Ruling