UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Nika Lesjak, Laila Burkardt and Chloé Lallemand

Mentor: doc. dr. Danijel Crnčec

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Seminar paper

Ljubljana, 5. 11. 2022

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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................3
MAIN PART........................................................................................................................................3
1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.....................................................................................................3
2. ORGANIZATION OF WORK..................................................................................................4
3. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS, MEMBERSHIP.........................................................................6
4. FIELD OF WORK AND ACHIEVEMENTS............................................................................9
5. IMPACT AND ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION..........................................10
6. CURRENT CHALLENGES....................................................................................................11
7. RESEARCH QUESTION........................................................................................................13
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................13
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................................14

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INTRODUCTION

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military

alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. It was created in 2002 and it was based on the Collective
Security Treaty that was signed in 1992 in Tashkent in Uzbekistan. Its previous members
include Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan. It focuses on collective security and collective
defence. In this seminar paper we will look at the historical overview, the structure, its
objectives and goals, as well as membership. We will also discuss the field of work of the
CSTO and their achievements, the impact and role they play on the European integration and
the current challenges they face. The goal of this seminar paper is to introduce and present
the Organization and to deepen our understanding of its work in today’s political climate. 

MAIN PART

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created from the Collective
Security Treaty (CST), which was signed in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) on May 15, 1992 by the
heads of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The treaty
was later joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia in 1993. The treaty entered into force on
April 4, 1994 after completion of the ratifications in each member state (Collective Security
Treaty Organization, 2022). It was formed from 6 states that were a part of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was created immediately after the
dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) in 1991 with
the members being all former Soviet states and three Baltic republics (Archer, 1994, pg. 40).
Central Asian republics, even though they gained their independence, were struggling with
the issue of ensuring their own security. Being neighbouring countries China, Afghanistan,
and states of the Middle and Near East added quite a few difficulties to the hard times of the
Central Asian states (Tikhova, 2016, pg. 64). Some observers pointed out that while this may
have been the case for many treaty participants, collective security was not what motivated
all parties. Several countries are said to have been forced into the treaty by Russia, which has
found it difficult to accept the loss of its superpower status. In order to maintain its direct

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influence in as many of the former Soviet republics as possible, Russia has virtually created
the CST. Nevertheless, nine countries acceded to the treaty, making the CST an important
regional entity in the former Soviet republics (Saat, 2005, pg. 3). Unlike the CIS, which is
focused more on economic and political cooperation, the CSTO’s main goal is collective
security and defence as stated in the Key Article 4 of the Treaty (Collective Security Treaty
Organization, 2022).

The CST was signed for a period of 5 years, with the option for further extension. As the 5
years passed in 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan
signed a Protocol on the extension of the Collective Security Treaty. Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Uzbekistan did not agree to renew the treaty for the next 5-year period and stepped away
from the CST (Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2022). On 10th anniversary of the
Treaty, May 15th, 2002, at the Council meeting, Members agreed that new initiatives are
needed to take CST activities and procedures to the next level. It is this shared concern about
the unstable situation in Afghanistan that has prompted the CST member states to reformulate
the treaty and establish a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) on the basis of the
treaty, which could become an important regional security organisation (Saat, 2005, pg. 4).
On October 7th, 2002 at the CIS summit in Chisinau, the Presidents of the Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan approved the CSTO Charter. In December
2003, the CSTO Charter was registered with the UN Secretariat. And in 2004, the
Organization received an Observer status in the UN General Assembly (Collective Security
Treaty Organization, 2022). In 2006 Uzbekistan re-joined the CSTO and later withdrew again
in 2012 because it disagreed with the Organizations strategic plans for Afghanistan and plans
for boosting military cooperation between the states.

2. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The highest body of the Collective Security Treaty Organization is the Council on Collective
Security (CCS). This Council deals with the key questions of the CSTO and its activities. It
resolves measures for the implementation of objectives and tasks. The Council ensures the
feasibility of the attempted measures and makes sure that financial and other means are
available for the organization to work on its tasks, including the coordination of the member

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states. For the achievement of its goals the Council of the CSTO oversees and coordinates the
joint action of member states (Bordyuzha, 2010).

The Council is composed of the heads of the member states. The last session they had was an
extraordinary one, discussing the situation in connection with the sharp deterioration in
certain areas on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Specialist might be invited to
join certain meetings of the Council. For instance Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of
Defence, Secretaries of Security Councils of Member States or others. The Chairman of the
Council is the respective representative of the state in which the Council is held. The head of
state, carries rights and obligations which change to the next one as soon as the next session
of the Council takes place (CSTO, 2022).

In between the sessions of the Collective Security Council, decisions that need to be made are
directed to the Permanent Council, this Council then guides actions and accompanies and
coordinates the implementation of decisions made by the Collective Security Council. Each
state appoints one representative, which in summery the Permanent Council consists of
(Bordyuzha, 2010).

The coordination of Foreign Affairs of the Collective Security Treaty Organization takes
place in the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA). It is the consultative, advisory
and executive body of the CSTO in any situation the member states want to perform a joint
action in the field of Foreign Policy. This Council consists of all the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the member states (Bordyuzha, 2010).

The Council of the Ministers of Defence is the consultative and executive organ for the
coordination and cooperation of the member states on topics such as military policy, military
construction and military technical cooperation. The decision-making competence in this
council lies with the ministers of defence of the member states (Bordyuzah, 2010).

Another organ consists of the State Secretaries of the member states‘ Security Councils. The
Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils (CSSC) coordinates the interaction of the
CTOS’s member states to ensure national security (CSTO, 2022).

The Secretariat of the Organization is a permanent working body. It supports the other organs
in their activities and helps with organisational, informational and analytical issues. The head
of the CSTO Secretariat is the Secretary-General. He is currently from the Republic of

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Belarus and called „Zas Stanislav Vasilievich“. He is the highest administrative official of the
Organization.

The CSTO Joint Staff is a permanent working body of the Organization. It hands in drafts on
military related issues, it organizes the practical implementation of decisions on military
cooperation. All tasks are related to the formation, operation and use of the CSTO Troops.
The most important tasks it is dealing with are the formation of a collective security system,
questions concerning the CSTO Troops (Collective Forces) and planning joint training for all
CSTO troops. (Bordyuzah, 2010) The CSTO troops are collective rapid reaction forces and
form an important part of the organization. They are designed to react to challenges and
threats the organization and especially the member states have to face. They are supposed to
respond quickly to upcoming security issues (CSTO, 2022).

The following organigram is a presentation of the organs, which the CSTO itself provides on
its website. The edging was added subsequently, to show which organs this paper focuses on.

(CSTO, 2022)

3. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS, MEMBERSHIP

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In its charter, the CSTO clearly states their goals : “strengthening of peace, international and
regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Member States”. The objective stated is therefore to create an
intergovernmental military alliance in order to maintain peace in the area, as well as to
protect members state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

 The article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty also establishes that an aggression against one
member state would be perceived as an aggression against all. This reciprocal assistance is
very similar to NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) among other military
alliances. Indeed, if we look closer to NATO’s collective defence in its article 5, which states
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all”. The purpose of this principle of
collective defence, beyond ensuring security, is to establish a spirit of solidarity and to bind
the Member States together. Indeed, it is completely prohibited for CSTO’s Members States
to join other military alliances (Anastassia Obydenkova, 2011). To sum up, CSTO’s goals are
very similar to those of NATO, as they are both military alliances based on this collective
defence mechanism. We can therefore assume that another objective of the CSTO is to
compete with NATO (as it is the most powerful international military organization), and even
to protect itself from NATO by establishing another large intergovernmental military
alliance. President Putin's objective might be to show the United States that Russia is also
surrounded by military allies ready to defend it. This can be guessed by the complicated
relationship between Russia and the US, but also from the way the operation in Kazakhstan
was reported in the media, and how President Lukashenko and President Putin praised the
organisation for this operation (see Field of Work and Achievements). However, the goal of
having a strong and reliable membership between States Members is often complicated.
Indeed, even if Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan have been full members
since 1994, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew in 1999. And Uzbekistan
withdrew a second time in 2012.

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In 2012, Uzbekistan had 2 main reasons to withdraw from CSTO (Marlène Laruelle, 2012).
The first one is what she calls “Conflicting values and principles”. In 1999 already, they
protested against inefficiency of post-soviet security structures. But the main problem was
that + “The Uzbek government shares (…) (a) view of international relations, where power
has more relevance than legal obligations. It therefore signs many documents but never
considers them to be binding.” And it was apparently the case for their commitment to
CSTO. The second reason why Uzbekistan decided to withdraw was to “Free itself from
historical Russian domination”. This reason shows how much Russia has a right-of-way in
the CSTO. Indeed, the official discourse denounces it as “colonization”, and considers Russia
as an “illegitimate actor in terms of its regional hegemony”. The reason why Azerbaijan and
Georgia decided to withdraw from the CSTO in 1999 is because they established (with
others) the GUAM group (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development) in

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1997, which is largely seen as planning to confront Russian influence in the region.
Uzbekistan joined the GUAM group in 1999, and therefore those three countries withdraw
from the CSTO in 1999.

It leads us to consider that another goal of the CSTO is Russia asserting its domination in the
area. Indeed, Anastasia Vishnevskaya-Mann in “Providing Security along the Silk Road:
Bridging the Russian and Chinese Security Concerns in Central Asia” wrote that “Despite the
stated equality of its members, the CSTO is a Russia-dominated organization”. She argues
that in addition to contributing 95% of the military spending, Russia “remains the de facto
primary arms dealer for all CSTO member states and allows them to purchase arms at the
same price as the Russian government”. Moreover, it can be noted that there were only
Russian Secretary-Generals from 1996 to 2017, Nikolai Bordyuzha staying in this position
from 2003 to 2017, “leaving no chance for representatives of any other member state to
influence the organization.” Since 2017, the CSTO had an Armenian Secretary-General :
Yuri Khatchaturov, and since 2020 a Belarus one : Stanislas Zas. However, he was selected
to study at the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
before becoming a general in the Belarus army. He therefore might still have a strong
connexion with Russia.

4. FIELD OF WORK AND ACHIEVEMENTS

For 30 years, the CSTO remained as a peaceful alliance that conducts collective military
drills every year, but before 2022 it had never sent its troops anywhere. In 2006, CSTO
members agreed to a major expansion of the organization, leading to the creation of a CSTO
peacekeeping force that could deploy with or without a U.N. mandate in its Member States.
The field of work of this organization is therefore military protection, in order to ensure the
security and sovereignty of its Member States. But the CSTO has trouble to achieve these
goals. Frist of all, for material reasons: compared to NATO which has more than a half of the
world’s military spending, the CSTO, 95% of whose military expenditure is financed by
Russia, finds it difficult to compete with NATO. Second of all, its States Members requested
assistance twice in CSTO’s history without any success.

The First time was in 2010, when ethnical violence happened in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Violent clashes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek diasporas have threatened civil war, but the

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CSTO has refused to send troops. They only participated to the conflict resolution, and this
response was highly criticized. Indeed, according to Anastasia Vishnevskaya-Mann “A
peacebuilding operation would have been a most natural thing to do in that situation”. The
Second time was during the summer of 2021, when Armenia sent an appeal to CSTO,
following the capture of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020.
Armenia contested its borders, and wanted CSTO’s help to claim back Nagorno-Karabakh,
but the request was again rejected.

Moreover, in 2022, Tajik and Kyrgyz forces exchanged gunfire and several armed attacks
happened in September, leading Kyrgyzstan Defence Minister to propose a plan for resolving
border disputes with Tajikistan and asking for CSTO forces. The CSTO has not yet decided
to respond to the proposition by Kyrgyzstan, seeing as Tajikistan is also a member of the
Organization and there could be the impression that the CSTO peacekeeping force is limiting
Tajikistan.

Anastasia Vishnevskaya-Mann summed up why CSTO’s achievements fallen out of its goal
by writing: “One of the key problems with the CSTO is that it has never been seen as an
acting defence union, but rather as the security element within the Russian toolbox used to
dominate its “near abroad.” For example, Kremlin deployed “preplanned exercises” to
Belarus in September 2020 with multilateral participation (by using CSTO forces) so they
seem internationally accepted, but according to George Barro, they might actually want to
undermine Belarus’s sovereignty.

Nevertheless, in 2022, the CSTO made its first deployment of military forces: a peacekeeping
operation in Kazakhstan, which has managed to stabilize the situation after an attempt of a
coup d’etat.  Indeed, according to Kazakh President Tokaev, “there was an attempted coup
d’etat in the country” and according to Putin, the CSTO, “in a matter of hours”, managed to
prevent the undermining of state power and an “all-out deterioration of the internal
situation”. The main task, according to Igor Korotchenko editor-in-chief of ‘National
Defense’ magazine, was “to protect important state and military facilities, as well as to
assist law enforcement forces in stabilizing the situation and returning it to the legal field”.
He also stated that it was entirely a peacekeeping operation as “No shots have been fired yet
and weapons will be used only as a final means if our soldiers will be in danger”. Belarus
President Lukashenko proudly stated that “The joint efforts of the CSTO peacekeeping forces
have also demonstrated the close ties of the CSTO member states”. This can lead us to guess

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that one of the main reason the CSTO accepted to send troops after 30 years, is to show to the
international world what the CSTO is capable of, and how Member Sates can work together.

5. IMPACT AND ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

From the CSTO member countries there are two that lay in continental Europe. Those two are
Belarus and Russia, with the border being the Ural Mountains. There is some debate whether
the region of Armenia is considered to be Europe. Armenia lays geographically in the South
Caucuses but is geopolitically considered European. It takes part in many European as well as
Eurasian organizations.

Even though the European Union is not one of the primary international organization
partners, it does have an interest in the Central Asian region. The EU's interests in Central
Asia are geopolitical and geo-economic (Pop, 2009). The European Commission wrote in the
European Security Strategy (2009, pg. 24 – 25) that it has deepened links with their Central
Asian partners, though CSTO is never directly mentioned in the strategy, they have
strengthened the political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and
security. In the Strategy Russia is described as an important partner on global issues. Armenia
and Belarus are even included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). ENP is the
foreign policy framework aiming at bringing the EU and its Eastern and Southern neighbours
closer to their mutual benefit and interest. It was launched in 2004 and it has not yet
expanded to the other members of the CSTO in Central Asia (European External Action
Service, 2021).

In line with its political strategy, the European Union has a strong interest in a peaceful,
democratic and prosperous Central Asia, as strategic, political and economic developments
and trans-regional challenges affect the EU to some extent, either directly or indirectly. These
are ideas that EU representatives have also emphasised in their speeches (Pop, 2009). The EU
has also set up two programmes in cooperation with Central Asian states. Those are Central
Asian Drugs Action Programme (CADAP) and The Border Management in Central Asia
Programme (BOMCA). CADAP and BOMCA have received a similar budget since February
2004. BOMCA also has the support of the USA, Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), and the UN's Office on Drugs & Crime (UNDOC). One of the official
partners of the CSTO is also the OSCE. They work closely with governments of CSTO

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member states to assist in areas such as police reform, environmental security, rule of law,
antiterrorism, fight against organised crime, weapons and drug trafficking (Pop, 2009).
Overall the CSTO doesn’t have a big impact on the European integration, other than Belarus
and Armenia being included in the ENP. It does impact the foreign policy of the EU, CSTO.

6. CURRENT CHALLENGES

While Russian-centred alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union are present in media
and amongst politicians, the military alliance of countries that were part of the former Soviet
Union, the CSTO is often forgotten. This organization has somehow never enjoyed great
awareness or significance, neither among the six member states nor beyond.

The CSTO is frequently accused of not providing equal standing to its member states, despite
the official intention. Instead it is clearly conceived by Russia to project its power regionally.
The alliance appears to serve as means of strengthening Russia’s national identity as a great
power dominating a regional military alliance, as means of stopping other entities to grow
their impact, such as China or the NATO (Deyermond, 2022). The fact that the organization
seemingly only serves Russia as an instrument to stabilise its hegemonic power, weakens the
organizaton’s legitimacy globally (Avedissian, 2019). There are significant doubts among the
International Community about the CSTO being a really functioning collective organisation
for security.

Shedding a light on one recent event, is supposed to give a deeper understanding of why the
CSTO has been dismissed as irrelevant and whether there is a good reason for doing so.

There has been a military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1988 over the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh as explained above. Only recently the troops of both countries
claimed ceasefire violation due to the exchange of fire on September 13. Despite the fact that
CSTO hasn’t intervened in any of the attacks related to that issue, Armenia once again
appealed to the military alliance asking for military aid (Episkopos, 2022). Even though
Armenia faces severe security problems it doesn’t feel supported accordingly. After a joint
video summit, the CSTO did decide to send a fact-finding mission, however before the
missions even arrive, the organization said it did not anticipate sending peacekeepers
(Mejlumyan, 2022).

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At the same time CSTO managed to send troops to Kazakhstan. It has been the first time in
the organization’s 30-years history that it reacted to a country’s request of military aid.
Indeed this „threat to national security“ doesn’t even fulfill the CST’s requirements for an
intervention, as Article 4 of the charter implies that the security problem is supposed to have
an external origin (Kucera, 2022).

Especially considering the fact that Armenia sent about 100 troops to Kazakhstan when the
peacekeeping troops went there to help put down anti-government protests, the country
strongly criticised the CSTO. Armenians accused the CSTO having double standards when
deciding on peacekeeping-missions and the trust in the organization has strongly decreased
since these occasions (Mejlumyan, 2022).

Scepticism arose not only about the effectiveness of the organizaton’s functioning, but also
about Russia’s willingness to protect its smaller partners militarily. Instead doubts arose
about whether the organization treats Article 4 of the charter according to nations’ and
especially Russia‘s own interests. (Deyermond, 2022)

Additionally, Russia’s war in Ukraine indeed is raising more concerns about the clear
common purpose of the organization. Analysts suggest that Russia loses parts of its
dominance due to its struggles managing the war in Ukraine (Mejlumyan, 2022). Concerning
this war, there has not been a lot of support by the CSTO member states. Putin called the
alliance to act as unified front and act as Eastern counterweight to NATO. Instead CSTO
members are largely withholding support for Russia’s invasion (Gale, 2022).

7. RESEARCH QUESTION

Going deeper into the history, structure, achievements and especially current issues of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization brought insight about some severe challenges the
organization and its member states have to face. The Russian-led military alliance is not
considered reliable among some of its member states. There are strong doubts about the
motives of sending peacekeeping missions and the intentions of Russia are questioned.
Additionally the Russian invasion of Ukraine emphasises the decrease of Russian dominance
and brings up further questions about whether the organization is still built on a stable
foundation which allows them to work on a common purpose. In further research, we want to
continue diving deeper into these questions. We especially want to find out about whether

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these current challenges allow a common future to an organization which was once supposed
to be a counterpart to the NATO. Therefore our research question for the upcoming research
paper is the following: What are CSTO’s perspectives for the future based on the current
international climate?

CONCLUSION

The CSTO is a military organization focused on collective security and defence. The idea of
it was to become a Russian-led version of NATO. Over the years the organization has
developed a stronger structure, yet its functioning hasn‘t improved accordingly. The CSTO is
indeed considered Russian-dominated because it was created after the USSR’s fall, and 95%
of its military spending is Russian.  Moreover, except for the “peacekeeping operation” in
Kazakhstan in 2022, the CSTO never sent its troops anywhere in 30 years, even when other
Member States needed it. Therefore, there are strong doubts among the international
community and also the member states about the CSTO being a real functioning security
alliance.

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