W21376

FAMILYMART IN CHINA: THE DIVORCE OF A 20-YEAR

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP?1

Dr. Lucas Liang Wang and Dr. (Shiny) Xuan Feng wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not
intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
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materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to [email protected].

Copyright © 2021, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2021-09-09

On May 14, 2019, breaking news appeared in the headlines of numerous business media outlets revealing an
ongoing lawsuit between FamilyMart Co. Ltd. (FamilyMart) Japan, a world-leading convenience store chain,
and Ting Hsin International Group (Ting Hsin), a Taipei-based food and beverage conglomerate.2 Over nearly
20 years the two firms had collaborated to develop FamilyMart convenience stores in mainland China through
a joint venture (JV).3 Judging from the swift expansion of FamilyMart stores and the chain’s top ranking
among all foreign convenience stores in terms of market share, the collaboration had been quite successful.
The market for convenience stores in China was also promising. Against this bright picture, the claim that
FamilyMart Japan would terminate its partnership with Ting Hsin was shocking. Regardless of the lawsuit,
both sides would soon have to come to the negotiation table again, as their 20-year brand licensing
arrangement would expire in a few months. It was thus urgent for both parties to sort out their stands on such
critical decisions as whether to continue with the collaboration and, if so, how to renegotiate the new deal.

CONVENIENCE STORE INDUSTRY

Convenience stores (also known as C-stores) originated in Texas, United States, in 1927, when John Green,
an employee of Southland Ice Company, started to sell daily necessities such as bread, milk, and eggs
through his retail ice dock. Together with one of the founding directors of the Southland Ice Company,
Green thus established the first known convenience store. In 1946, the stores were rebranded as 7-Eleven.4

In 1957, the United States had only 500 convenience stores. This new retailing format, however, swiftly
spread across the country after 7-Eleven began to franchise in 1964. By 1990, the number of convenience
stores soared to 84,500, with a density of 2,940 people per store and annual sales of nearly US$100 billion.5

Spearheaded by 7-Eleven, convenience stores soon spread beyond North America. In 1973, the first 7-Eleven
franchised store opened in Toyosu, Tokyo. In 1991, 7-Eleven became the top convenience store in the retail
industry in Japan⎯a leading status it maintained to date.6 Uni-President Enterprises Corp. brought 7-Eleven
to Taiwan under a franchising deal in 1979. By 2019, Taiwan had about 2,700 stores, accounting for 13 per
cent of the total number of 7-Eleven stores worldwide, ranking third after Japan and the United States.7

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Convenience stores gathered strong momentum across the world in providing a new, convenient retailing
option relative to then-popular supermarkets. These convenience stores were located close to housing or
business estates, allowing residents nearby to reach them within 5−10 minutes on foot.8 The shopping area
was typically small, ranging from 50 to 200 square metres. The goods (e.g., snacks, instant food items, and
beverages) were characterized by limited variety, instant consumption, small volume, and emergence, and
displayed in a straightforward manner on relatively lower shelves. Consumers could therefore find what
they needed quickly, cutting short the shopping time and avoiding a long queue at the checkout. The
business hours of convenience stores were typically 16−24 hours per day year-round, so that consumers
could visit them at nearly any desirable time.9 For these unique features, convenience stores were popular
in countries with a large and dense population and with time-starved residents who shopped mostly on foot
(as opposed to driving long distances).10

While only selling daily necessities at the beginning, convenience stores later added services including
courier, photocopying, ticketing, banking kiosk, and film development services, among others. 11 Recent
major additions to the product portfolio were fresh and grab-and-go food items. For example, the top
convenience retailers in the United States—QuikTrip, Wawa, Sheetz, and Kwik Trip—had made food
service a strategic priority.12

In 2019, the three largest convenience store brands in the world were 7-Eleven, FamilyMart, and Lawson Inc.
(Lawson). Among them, 7-Eleven was the top brand, operating more than 20,000 stores in over 20 countries.13

CONVENIENCE STORES IN CHINA

Convenience stores entered mainland China in 1992 through the opening of a 7-Eleven in Shenzhen and
quickly expanded to other large coastal cities. Boosting this rapid expansion were the dense population and
rapid urbanization in mainland China.14 In 2018, the top 100 convenience store brands witnessed a 21.1 per
cent increase in annual sales and an 18 per cent increase in store numbers.15 The average compound annual
growth rate was greater than 10 per cent from 2016 to 2019, with the total number of convenience stores
jumping from 90,000 to 132,000 (see Exhibit 1).16

The surge of the convenience store industry was likely to continue into the near future. China had 1.36
billion people but only 132,000 convenience stores, leaving a huge market gap for future development. 17
Comparatively, Japan had about 50,000 convenience stores and a population of 120 million, and the United
States had 150,000 convenience stores and a population of 320 million. While sales by convenience stores
were about 5−6 per cent of total retailing in developed economies, that percentage was only 1−2 per cent
in China. In 2019, Euromonitor International predicted greater than 60 per cent growth in China’s
convenience store market in the next five years, to $27 billion.18 To seize the rising opportunities, numerous
institutional investors poured extensive capital into this industry in 2019.19

The boom of the convenience store market in China not only attracted foreign brands like 7-Eleven but also
gave rise to many local brands, the major ones including Meiyijia, Hongqi, Haode, and Tangjiu. As of 2018,
China’s convenience store industry had more than 260 brands in total, most of which were regional. The
industry was highly fragmented. The concentration ratios of the top third and fifth stores were 26.4 per cent
and 37.5 per cent, respectively, much lower than the 90 per cent and 97 per cent of the same in Japan. 20 In
terms of annual sales in 2019, the top four stores in China were Meiyijia, with 12 per cent market share;
FamilyMart, with 8 per cent; Hongqi, with 8 per cent; and Lawson, with 6 per cent. 7-Eleven was ranked
number 9, with about 2 per cent market share.21

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FAMILYMART JAPAN

In the global convenience store industry, FamilyMart was the second-largest chain based on number of
stores or sales volume in 2019. Its first store was opened in Saitama Prefecture in Japan in 1973 as an
experiment by Seiyu Stores Ltd. (which later changed toSeiyu Group), one of Japan’s largest retailers,
operating supermarkets, shopping centres, and department stores. In 1981, Seiyu Stores Ltd. established
FamilyMart as its convenience store business.22

Adopting a franchising system, FamilyMart expanded quickly after its founding, opening 1,000
convenience stores in Japan over the following five years. In 1987, it went public on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. In 2019, FamilyMart occupied a 26 per cent market share and was among the top three
oligopolistic store brands in Japan (see Exhibit 2).23

FamilyMart was one of the earliest Japanese convenience store brands to go international. In 1988, it first
entered Taiwan, which was geographically and culturally proximate, and witnessing swift economic
growth.24 This entry was through a JV, FamilyMart Taiwan, and the other partner was Taiwan’s He Feng
Enterprise Co. Ltd.. After Taiwan, FamilyMart started Bokwang FamilyMart Co. Ltd. in South Korea in
1990 through a franchise licensing agreement with Bokwang Group (now BGF Retail), 25 and Siam
FamilyMart Co. Ltd. in Thailand in 1992.26

As the name suggested, FamilyMart saw its convenience stores not only as a place for convenience
shopping but also as a family that connected neighbourhood customers (i.e., family members) through high-
quality products, “home-like” services, and innovation toward a comfortable lifestyle.27 FamilyMart stores
strove to coexist with and evolve as an integral part of their local communities. This family vision ran
through the design and operation of all its domestic and overseas stores. To maintain a consistent brand
globally, FamilyMart was especially prudent in selecting its business partners. It only worked with partners
with an understanding of FamilyMart’s business model, philosophy, and industry concept. Meanwhile,
FamilyMart also granted certain autonomy to local partners to undertake necessary adaptations that
accommodated the unique differences in customer demands and government policies.28

Starting from the turn of the twenty-first century, FamilyMart had accelerated its global expansion by
foraying into the United States, mainland China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The
overseas FamilyMart stores outnumbered those in Japan in 2009, marking a significant milestone.29 By the
end of 2013, FamilyMart had opened 13,017 overseas stores, about 1.3 times the number of domestic
stores.30 However, its international growth took a downturn when FamilyMart withdrew from South Korea
in 2014 and the United States in 2015, largely because of the fierce competition in those markets and
breakups with partners. As of 2019, FamilyMart had entered seven other countries, with overseas stores
making up about one-third of all stores.31

TING HSIN INTERNATIONAL GROUP

Ting Hsin was a Taiwan-based company that mainly manufactured and distributed food and beverage
products.32 Its predecessor was Ting Hsin Grease Co. Ltd., a small castor oil company founded in 1958 by
Dehe Wei.33 Facing difficulties in scaling up the family business in Taiwan, Yingxing Wei, one of the four
sons of Dehe Wei, came to mainland China in 1988 searching for new growth opportunities.34

The initial investment projects, however, were not successful. In 1989, Ting Hsin established its first JV,
Beijing Ting Hao Oil Making Co. Ltd., to process and produce refined sesame oil and later established a
second JV in Jinan, Shandong, that manufactured egg rolls. Between 1989 and 1991, Ting Hsin invested in

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another four JVs in multiple locations in China, but none of these projects generated profits. Despite a great
deal of publicity through extensive marketing campaigns and its superior product quality, Ting Hsin
struggled to sell its “high-quality, high-price” products to Chinese consumers.35

In 1991, Ting Hsin spotted a vast but untapped market⎯instant noodles. In the early 1990s, domestic instant
noodles were cheap but poor in quality, whereas imported brands were too expensive for Chinese
consumers. Ting Hsin founded Tingyi (Tianjin) Holding Corporation and released the “Master Kong” brand
of instant noodles in August 1992. Master Kong instant noodles were tasty and much cheaper than most of
the imported brands (¥1.9836 for one pack of Master Kong noodles compared with ¥5−¥10 for imported
instant noodles). Master Kong noodles quickly dominated the market and brought Ting Hsin huge profits
along with multiple national awards in the areas of food and food packaging. 37 In 1996, Tingyi Holding
Corporation completed an initial public offering in Hong Kong, and Master Kong became a household
name across mainland China.38

The unprecedented success of Master Kong inspired Ting Hsin to undertake a series of aggressive
extensions into other food and beverage businesses. In 1995, Ting Hsin founded Ding Yuan Food Co. Ltd.
to get a foot in the pastry business. In 1996, it fully acquired Dicos, a fried chicken restaurant brand in
Texas, and brought it to China.39 In the same year, Ting Hsin launched Master Kong tea drinks and
established Hangzhou Ting Jin Food Co. Ltd., which specialized in beverage production. Through
overtaking the food and refrigeration business line of Taiwan Weichuan Group in mainland China, Ting
Hsin added dairy products and fresh juice to its beverage portfolio in 1998.40

Apart from its core food and beverage business, Ting Hsin gained experience in retailing and distribution
by partnering with UK supermarket giant Tesco PLC to open and manage supermarkets in mainland China
between 1997 and 2006. 41 In 1998, Ting Tong Logistics Co. Ltd. was founded to support product
distribution, transportation, and storage for various Ting Hsin businesses. In March 2012, by forming a
strategic alliance with PepsiCo Inc. (PepsiCo), Ting Hsin gained the exclusive authority to manufacture,
bottle, package, distribute, and sell PepsiCo non-alcoholic drinks in mainland China.42

During its 30 years of operation in China, Ting Hsin had gained solid knowledge of the local Chinese
customers as well as extensive local management experience. Moreover, Ting Hsin had also developed a
large business network consisting of production plants, sales offices, retail outlets, and warehouses across
mainland China and Taiwan. This network was a significant contributor to Ting Hsin’s leading market
position, enabling it to introduce new products rapidly and effectively.43

THE FAMILYMART AND TING HSIN ALLIANCE

In early 2000, FamilyMart Japan and Ting Hsin signed a 20-year brand licensing agreement, which kicked
off the preparation for entry into mainland China. As a consequence of this agreement, the JV China CVS
Holding Corporation (CCH) was soon created. Ting Hsin controlled 59.65 per cent equity shares, and
FamilyMart Taiwan controlled 18.3 per cent; the remaining equity went to another JV between FamilyMart
Japan, Itochu Corporation, and FamilyMart Taiwan (see Exhibit 3). In May 2004, CCH established a wholly
owned subsidiary, Shanghai Fumanjia Convenience Co. Ltd., and three months later opened the first
FamilyMart store in Shanghai.44

Per the agreement, Ting Hsin was in charge of the operation of FamilyMart stores, including building new
stores, establishing logistic infrastructure, and marketing and promotion. Ting Hsin was the exclusive
collaborator with FamilyMart; 7-Eleven, in contrast, employed a regional franchising mode and worked

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with multiple partners. Besides licensing its brand, FamilyMart Japan also contributed the fine management
capabilities of chain stores. Itochu Corporation specialized in supporting fresh food production, and
FamilyMart Taiwan transferred its operation experience from Taiwan to mainland stores.45

After the initial entry, FamilyMart was among the fastest-expanding convenience stores in the mainland.
In 2005, the number of stores in Shanghai alone reached 100. In 2006, FamilyMart established an exclusive
logistics company to replace third-party logistics, thus ensuring on-time delivery with lower costs. In 2007,
it extended the business scope to other far-flung cities including Guangzhou and Suzhou. In 2010,
FamilyMart opened its 500th store and built the first exclusive fresh food factory in Shanghai to produce
its proprietary food items. The FamilyMart membership system was launched in 2015 to acquire and retain
customers. The expansion of FamilyMart was so quick and pervasive that people used the saying “a new
FamilyMart store every 18 hours” to describe it.46

Behind this fast-paced expansion was an effective franchising model. FamilyMart not only endeavoured to
attract external franchisees but also groomed its employees. A senior manager at FamilyMart explained,
“We offer employees interest-free loans to open franchising stores. And the payback period of a single
FamilyMart store was shorter than [that of] our rivals.”47

FamilyMart’s product and service offerings in China were greatly localized and thus distinct from those in
Japan. Ting Hsin developed many privately branded products that were manufactured largely by proprietary
factories. Owning factories that produced bread, packaged food, and even sauces afforded powerful control
to Ting Hsin over the whole supply chain as well as exceptional responsiveness to customer demands. The
percentage of private brands in FamilyMart stores was about 40 per cent, whereas this was normally no
more than 10 per cent in other stores.48

Starting from 2018, FamilyMart in China initiated an upgrade to its brand, mostly through improvements
in food service. Besides plain, grab-and-go foods such as steamed buns and boiled eggs, Ting Hsin added
other high-value foods and beverages. For instance, its coffees were pitched against Starbucks coffee. In
fact, FamilyMart was the largest coffee chain in Shanghai for a long period. Other food items such as bread
and desserts were designed to match those from premium bakeries. The norm was that Ting Hsin put forth
innovative products every two weeks and replaced nearly 70 per cent of items on shelves.49

To catch the rapid rise of online ordering and takeout trends, FamilyMart invested significantly in the
takeout business in 2018 and co-operated with all major takeout ordering platforms, such as Meituan and
Eleme. It also began to deploy intelligent vending machines as a new retailing format.50

In 2019, FamilyMart had about 2,500 stores in the mainland, 75–80 per cent of which were franchised.51
Although 7-Eleven had more stores in China due to its earlier entry, FamilyMart was the top in terms of
market share (8.4 per cent), with $17 billion in annual sales, and hence was the most successful foreign
convenience store brand in China (see Exhibit 4).52 More impressive than this was that FamilyMart in China
saw profits in its stores as early as 2008, and the group as a whole reached the break-even point in 2012. In
contrast, the Lawson convenience store chain only started to make profits in 2019, and 7-Eleven continued
to struggle to stop its losses.53

THE LAWSUIT

While FamilyMart stores were popping up across China, a lawsuit between the two partners emerged in the
middle of 2019, which was followed by a fierce feud. On May 15, 2019, many media outlets reported that

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FamilyMart Japan had sued Ting Hsin in the court of the Cayman Islands, where their JV CCH was
registered, and requested a compulsory dissolution of their partnership.54

Ting Hsin was quick to respond by posting an official statement on the same day of the news release. Ting
Hsin expressed that the disclosure of the lawsuit should comply with facts and contractual clauses and that,
due to confidentiality, it would provide no further comments or clarification.55

The news of the lawsuit, nonetheless, upset all stakeholders of FamilyMart China, including employees,
franchisees, and other business partners. To reassure these stakeholders, Lin Jianhong, chief executive
officer (CEO) of FamilyMart China, issued an open letter on May 16:

Convenience store and retail business are the core business of our group and we hold strong
confidence in FamilyMart’s future business operations in China. It is thanks to the continuous
support of the local government, the convenience store industry, and our customers as well as our
hard-working employees that FamilyMart China achieves continuous success.56

Shortly after, rumours started to emerge in the media indicating that FamilyMart had lost the legal case
mentioned in previous news reports. The Japanese party had been sentenced to cover all the litigation
expenses, and FamilyMart China would continue as usual.57

The rumours agitated FamilyMart Japan, and so, on May 17, it immediately released a formal statement
that denied all erroneous reports of the lawsuit, especially those pointing to its loss, and disclosed many
details of the lawsuit. According to the statement, FamilyMart Japan filed the lawsuit in October 2018,
accusing Ting Hsin of unilaterally cutting down the royalty for the FamilyMart brand from 1 per cent of
revenues to 0.3 per cent or even lower, and of having refused to pay the royalty for seven months already.58
Furthermore, Ting Hsin had ceased disclosing information on its affiliated dealings with the JV since 2012,
“which potentially conferred significant financial benefits on the majority directors (nominated by Ting
Hsin).”59 These misdeeds of Ting Hsin had harmed the companies’ co-operative relationship beyond repair,
and FamilyMart Japan therefore requested the court to order Ting Hsin to sell all of its equity shares. In
November 2018, Ting Hsin requested the court to dismiss the case or overrule the claims made by
FamilyMart. In February 2019, the court rejected that request, but suspended the hearing of the case on the
grounds that FamilyMart should press charges only after its claims had been arbitrated per the co-operation
agreement.60 At the end of the statement, FamilyMart Japan stressed that it did not accept the rule and
appealed it in March 2019.61

To counter the allegations made by its Japanese partner, Ting Hsin, which had so far been quite restrained,
issued an emergent and provocative statement at 11:00 p.m. on May 18. Ting Hsin criticized FamilyMart
Japan for making accusations that were completely inconsistent with the facts:

The accusation from FamilyMart Japan was an undisguised slander that not only harmed the
reputation of Ting Hsin but also generated very negative impacts on FamilyMart China, especially
on the 20,000 employees, other alliance partners and over 2 million of loyal customers. Ting Hsin
urges FamilyMart Japan to correct its mistakes immediately and avoid making them in the future.62

It further emphasized, “If FamilyMart Japan deems legal means are necessary to resolve any dispute, it
should resort to the arbitration process originally agreed by both parties. The court of the Cayman Islands
had supported this position and ordered FamilyMart to bear all the litigation costs.”63

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FamilyMart Japan had no intention of backing down. On May 20, it put forth another statement⎯in
Chinese, Japanese, and English⎯to reiterate its previous statement and deny the ordered obligation of
covering litigation costs: “The costs would only be determined in the future as the case is still ongoing.”64
Moreover, FamilyMart Japan again asserted its determination to keep pushing the legal procedures until
winning the order of compulsory dissolution.65

On May 23, Ting Hsin made another statement saying that “the statement by FamilyMart on the 20th [of
May] was untruthful and misleading. We felt deeply sorry about it.” Ting Hsin said that the dispute with its
Japanese partner should properly be settled against the benchmarks of international conventions. “Even if
FamilyMart Japan had to resort to legal means, it should have done so according to the agreement.”66

The disagreement over the royalty was another central issue in the lawsuit. In the original petition, Ting
Hsin had accused FamilyMart Japan of charging a royalty that was too high, almost three times that of other
rivals such as 7-Eleven. The conflict between the two parties, however, went deeper than just the fee. The
former general manager of FamilyMart China reportedly told his counterpart at Lawson China that he
envied Lawson China’s right to secondary franchising—a right that had enabled Lawson to expand quickly.
It was his dream to have that autonomy.67 Moreover, FamilyMart Japan did not see eye to eye with Ting
Hsin on some of its localization strategies. Notably, FamilyMart Japan disliked the expansion into Tier 2
and 3 cities, even though Ting Hsin had deemed the move imperative.68

GOING FORWARD

In the midst of the escalating feud between FamilyMart Japan and Ting Hsin, their 20-year brand licensing
agreement was approaching its expiry. Renegotiation was in order, and both partners needed to carefully
consider their options and bargaining power position. Whether to extend the partnership and under what
new terms were among the most critical issues on the agenda.

The authors would like to thank Ziru Lu, Yuchen Deng, Bo Yang, and
Xinran Li for their assistance during the process of writing this case.

This case is sponsored by the ERU Grant and the Small Research
Grant from the Nottingham University Business School, Ningbo, China.

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EXHIBIT 1: CONVENIENCE STORE GROWTH IN CHINA, 2016−2019

Year Number of Stores Growth Rate (%)

2016 94,000 3
2017 106,000 13
2018 122,000 15
2019 132,000 9

Source: Ran An, “Report on the Prosperity Index of Chinese Convenience Stores in 2020” [in Chinese], China’s Food, 15
(2020): 158−159.

EXHIBIT 2: LEADING BRANDS IN THE JAPANESE CONVENIENCE STORE MARKET, 2019

Company Name Market Share (%)

7-Eleven 44
FamilyMart 26
Lawson 20
Other 4
Ministop 3
Secoma 2
New Days 1

Source: Mengfei Ping, “FamilyMart-Owned Convenience Store Nation is Teetering on the Edge of Takeover” [in Chinese],
Ebrun, July 15, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020, www.ebrun.com/20200715/392966.shtml.

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EXHIBIT 3: STRUCTURE OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN TING HSIN AND FAMILYMART

FamilyMart Japan Itochu

Corporation

Ting Hsin FamilyMart FamilyMart China

International Group Taiwan Holding

18.30%
22.05%
59.65%
China CVS
Holding
Corporation

100%

Shanghai Fumanjia
Convenience Co. Ltd.

Source: Global Finance Newspaper, “What Will Happen to the 2,500 Chinese Convenience Stores if FamilyMart Japan Breaks
the Partnership with Ting Hsin?” [in Chinese], Sina Finance, May 15, 2019, accessed September 4, 2020,
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-05-15/doc-ihvhiqax8984267.shtml.

EXHIBIT 4: OPERATIONAL DATA FOR FAMILYMART, 7-ELEVEN, AND LAWSON, 2017−2019

Annual Growth
Sales Annual Growth Number of Rate in the
Year Stores
(¥ millions) Rate in Sales (%) Stores Number of
Stores (%)
FamilyMart 1,003.00 5.7 2,801 8.9
2019 7-Eleven 738.82 26.4 2,147 18.9
Lawson 596.45 39 2,629 33.2
FamilyMart 949.08 18.3 2,571 17.9
2018 7-Eleven 584.73 25.3 1,802 12
Lawson 429.1 38 1,973 41
FamilyMart 802.58 24.1 2,181 20.5
2017 7-Eleven 466.66 26.7 1,699 23.5
Lawson 310.96 49.8 1,399 45.9

Note: ¥ = CNY = Chinese yuan renminbi; US$1 = ¥6.9041 on May 31, 2019.
Source: China Chain Store & Franchise Association, Top 100 Franchise Chains in China 2017, 2018, 2019 [in Chinese],
accessed November 2, 2020, www.ccfa.org.cn/portal/cn/index.jsp.

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ENDNOTES
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this
case are not necessarily those of FamilyMart Co. Ltd., Ting Hsin International Group, or any of their employees.
2
Cindy Wang, “Japanese Retailer FamilyMart Seeks Split with Chinese Partner,” Yahoo! Finance, May 15, 2019, accessed October
2, 2020, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/japanese-retailer-familymart-seeks-split-180335332.html.
3
Mingjie Wang, “Ting Hsin Group Issued a New Statement to Refute FamilyMart Japan’s Assertion. Partners of 20 Years Continue
the Incessant Accusations from a Distance” [in Chinese], Linkshop, May 25, 2019, accessed October 5, 2020,
www.linkshop.com.cn/web/archives/2019/425432.shtml.
4
“7-Eleven, Inc. - Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, Background Information On 7-Eleven, Inc.,” Reference
for Business, accessed September 23, 2020, https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/4/7-Eleven-Inc.html.
5
Baidu Wenku, “The Development of Convenience Store” [in Chinese], Baidu Group, November 22, 2010, accessed April 30, 2020,
https://wenku.baidu.com/view/1a7ba0ea551810a6f5248673.html. All dollar amounts are in US dollars.
6
Jeffrey R. Bernstein, “7-Eleven in America and Japan,” in Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs,
Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 490−529.
7
Julian Ming-Sung Cheng et al., “Hybrid Convenience Stores − The Changing Role of Convenience Stores in Taiwan,” Asia Pacific
Journal of Marketing and Logistics 21, no. 3 (2009): 417−432.
8
NACS, “Fact Sheets,” Convenience.org, accessed September 23, 2020,
https://www.convenience.org/Research/FactSheets/ScopeofIndustry.
9
NACS, “Convenience Stores Offer More Convenience,” Convenience.org, accessed September 23, 2020,
https://www.convenience.org/Research/FactSheets/ScopeofIndustry/Convenience.
10
NACS, “Three Convenience Chains Recognized as Top Retailers,” Convenience.org, October 10, 2019, accessed September 23, 2020,
https://www.convenience.org/Media/Daily/2019/Oct/10/1-Three-Convenience-Chains-Top-Retail_Community.
11
Ibid.
12
Pablo Plaza, “QuikTrip, Wawa and Sheetz Top US C-stores,” Petrol Plaza, October 14, 2019, accessed October 10, 2020,
https://www.petrolplaza.com/news/23225#:~:text=A%20focus%20on%20Fresh%20and,Eat%20is%20the%20biggest%20differentiat
or.&text=QuikTrip%2C%20Wawa%20and%20Sheetz%20are,the%20Convenience%20Channel%20(RPI).
13
Yuxuan Yang, “Strategic Development Analysis of 7-Eleven, the World’s Largest Convenience Store Chain” [in Chinese], Modern
Business 34 (2018): 18−19.
14
Baidu Wenku, op. cit.
15
China Chain Store and Franchise Association, “Top 100 Chain Stores in China 2018” [in Chinese], CCFA, May 9, 2019, accessed
October 20, 2019, www.ccfa.org.cn/portal/cn/view.jsp?lt=31&id=438636#:~:text=0.3%E4%B8%AA%E7%99%BE%
E5%88%86%E7%82%B9%E3%80%82-,%E8%BF%9E%E9%94%81%E7%99%BE%E5%BC%BA%E9%97%A8%E5%
BA%97%E6%80%BB%E6%95%B013.8%E4%B8%87%E4%B8%AA%EF%BC%8C%E5%90%8C%E6%AF%94%E5%A2%9E%E9%95
%BF,%E4%BD%8D%E6%95%B0%E7%9A%84%E5%90%8C%E6%AD%A5%E5%A2%9E%E9%95%BF%E3%80%82.
16
Ran An, “Report on the Prosperity Index of Chinese Convenience Stores in 2020” [in Chinese], China’s Food 15, (2020): 158−159.
17
Ping Lu, “Convenience Store Market Status Quo and Investment Outlook Report 2017” [in Chinese], Newsijie, July 19, 2017,
accessed October 20, 2019, www.newsijie.com/sijiezixun/siguandian/2017/0316/11236905.html.
18
Bloomberg, “FamilyMart's China Business Threatened by Partners’ Feud,” The Business Times, May 15, 2019, accessed November
9, 2020, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/consumer/familymarts-china-business-threatened-by-partners-feud.
19
Qianzhan Industry Research Institute, “China Retailing Industry Forecast and Investment Strategy Analysis” [in Chinese], Sohu
Finance, May 22, 2019, accessed October 20, 2020, https://m.sohu.com/n/538413348/.
20
“The Convenience Store in China,” HangHangCha, 2018, accessed April 30, 2020, https://www.hanghangcha.com/pdf.html.
21
Ibid.
22
“The Seiyu, Ltd. - Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, Background Information on The Seiyu, Ltd.,”
Reference for Business, accessed October 19, 2020, https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/16/The-Seiyu-
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23
Mengfan Ping, “FamilyMart Japan on the Edge of Takeover, the Convenience Store Giant is Teetering” [in Chinese], Ebrun, July
15, 2020, accessed October 20, 2020, www.ebrun.com/20200715/392966.shtml.
24
Weidong Xi and Yuan Quan, “A Brief Analysis of the Internationalization Strategy of Japanese Convenience Stores—A Case Study of
Family Mart’s Entry into Taiwan,” Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research 109 (2019): 657−660.
25
Reuters Staff, “Japan’s FamilyMart to Sell BGF Stake, Exit South Korea,” Reuters, accessed October 19, 2020,
https://jp.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSBREA3200G20140403.
26
“Company History,” FamilyMart, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.family.co.jp/english/company/idea.html.
27
“FamilyMart Basic Principles,” FamilyMart, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.family.co.jp/english/company/idea.html.
28
“Unique Strategies for Success in Asia--Examples from FamilyMart and Ajinomoto,” Fujitsu Journal, July 11, 2017, accessed
October 15, 2020, https://journal.jp.fujitsu.com/en/2017/07/11/01/.
29
Kyodo News, “Most FamilyMart Outlets Now Overseas,” The Japan Times, August 26, 2009, accessed October 17, 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/08/26/business/most-familymart-outlets-now-overseas/.
30
Weidong Xi and Yuan Quan, op. cit.
31
“Number of Stores,” FamilyMart, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.family.co.jp/english/company/store.html.
32
“Ting Hsin International Group,” Forest 500.org, accessed October 25, 2020, https://forest500.org/rankings/companies/ting-hsin-
international-group.
33
Xi Long, “Legendary! The Four Brothers Co-founded the Business and Became the Richest Businessmen in Taiwan. Three Such
Families in the World, All Chinese” [in Chinese], Business Legend, Sohu, January 18, 2020, accessed February 2, 2021,
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.
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34
Ruiquan Chen, “Craftsmanship of Master Kong: Trajectory of Ting Hsin’s Development in Mainland China” [in Chinese], Tax
Collection and Paying (2003): 36−38.
35
Ibid.
36
¥ = CNY = Chinese yuan renminbi; US$1 = ¥6.9041 on May 31, 2019.
37
“Master Kong: Master and Apprentice in a Flash” [in Chinese], Contemporary Manager Magazine, September 10, 2002, accessed
November 1, 2020, https://www.tech-food.com/news/detail/n0009743.htm.
38
“Introduction of Master Kong,” Master Kong, accessed November 3, 2020, www.masterkong.com.cn/trends/introduction/.
39
“Yingxing Wei from Ting Hsin: A Comeback from Failure” [in Chinese], Global Entrepreneurs, October 11, 2013, accessed
November 3, 2020, www.360doc.com/content/13/1011/16/535749_320597496.shtml.
40
“Ting Hsin Group, Master Kong and their Japanese Shareholders” [in Chinese], Sohu, January 3, 2017, accessed February 2, 2021,
https://www.sohu.com/a/123238130_467215.
41
In 1997, Ting Hsin and Tesco PLC established the Hymall supermarket chain (or Legou in Chinese, meaning “happy shopping”).
The two partners had a 50/50 share split, and Ting Hsin focused on managing the daily operations of the supermarkets. In 2007, due
to unresolved conflicts, Tesco PLC purchased most of the shares Ting Hsin held and removed the latter out of actual business
operation. In 2009, the partnership between Ting Hsin and Tesco PLC officially ended after Ting Hsin sold all the remaining shares to
Tesco PLC. Subsequently, Hymall supermarkets were rebranded as Hymall Tesco.
42
“Introduction of Master Kong,” op. cit.
43
Yukihito Sato, “Strategic Choices of Convenience Store Chains in China,” China Information 23 (2009): 45−69.
44
“Big Events” [in Chinese], FamilyMart China, accessed July 20, 2020, www.familymart.com.cn/brand/bigevents.
45
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Partnership with Ting Hsin?” [in Chinese], Sina Finance, May 15, 2019, accessed September 4, 2020,
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46
Business Observer, “Break Up with the Japanese Parent Company? The Key Factor of the FamilyMart,” Guba.com.cn, 2019,
accessed April 30, 2020, http://guba.eastmoney.com/news,cfhpl,836122305.html.
47
Yan Le, “FamilyMart Japan Suited Ting Hsin, Will FamilyMart China Still Be Called FamilyMart?” [in Chinese], China Business
Network, May 20, 2019, accessed October 22, 2020, https://www.cbndata.com/information/4882.
48
Ibid.
49
Juanyang Yan, “Break Up with the Japanese Parent Company? The Achilles Heel of FamilyMart” [in Chinese], Business Observer,
May 24, 2019, accessed April 30, 2020, http://guba.eastmoney.com/news,cfhpl,836122305.html.
50
Ibid.
51
Yan Le, “Big News: Investigating Pains and Sorrows of the Relationship between FamilyMart Japan and Ting Hsin” [in Chinese],
May 19, 2019, accessed September 4, 2020, https://www.yicai.com/news/100194413.html.
52
Hongli Li, “FamilyMart Japan Initiated Separation: 17 Billion Dollars of Sales Revenues from 2,500 Convenience Stores in China as
the Main Focus of Lawsuit between FamilyMart Japan and Ting Hsin” [in Chinese], Sina Finance, May 22, 2019, accessed October
22, 2020, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-05-22/doc-ihvhiqay0617283.shtml.
53
An Man, “FamilyMart Japan Sued the FamilyMart China! After Breaking Up from a 20-year Loving Relationship, What Will Happen
to 2,500 FamilyMart Supermarkets?” [in Chinese], Sohu, May 22, 2019, accessed November 1, 2020,
https://www.sohu.com/a/315798263_99904060/.
54
Ibid
55
Minjie Wang, “Escalation! Ting Hsin Group Issued Additional Statement to Refute FamilyMart Japan’s Assertation - Partners of 20
Years in Contestation” [in Chinese], International Finance Newspaper, May 24, 2019, accessed November 10, 2020,
https://www.sohu.com/a/316148032_632979.
56
Lele Wang, “After FamilyMart Had Sued Ting Hsin, FamilyMart China CEO Lin Jianhong Spoke to the Media” [in Chinese], Linkshop,
May 16, 2019, accessed April 29, 2020, www.linkshop.com.cn/web/archives/2019/424924.shtml/.
57
Minjie Wang, op. cit.
58
Bloomberg, op. cit.
59
“The Cayman Islands Court of Appeal Relieves the Tension between Arbitration Clauses and the Just and Equitable Winding Up
Jurisdiction,” Ogier, May 14, 2020, accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.ogier.com/publications/arbitration-clauses-and-the-
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60
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61
Minjie Wang, op. cit.
62
Juyang Yan, “FamilyMart Japan Lost, the CEO of FamilyMart China Issued an Internal Letter: Still Confident about Continuous
Operation” [In Chinese], Business Observer, May 16, 2019, accessed February 2021,
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1633703438236759842&wfr=spider&for=pc.
63
Ibid.
64
Ke Li, “Dispute Escalated! FamilyMart Japan Issued Three Statements and Strove to Press the Charge against Master Kong’s
Parent Company” [In Chinese], Sohu, accessed February, 2021, https://www.sohu.com/a/315605872_99945916.
65
Ibid.
66
Minjie Wang, op. cit.
67
Juyang Yan, op. cit.
68
Yicai, “The Pains and Sorrows behind the Intended Breakup between FamilyMart Japan and Ting Hsin” [in Chinese], Ce.cn, May
20, 2019, accessed November 2, 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1634012346062284939&wfr=spider&for=pc.