379.

Gaanan vs IAC
145 SCRA 113 (1986)

Facts:
Complainant and his client were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
the City Fiscal against Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, the
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. Laconico telephoned the appellant, to
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault. When the complainant called up,
Laconico requested the appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. Twenty minutes later, the complainant
called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the
money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of
the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed an affidavit
stating that he heard complainant demands for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant
and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the
lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico
guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. Not satisfied with the decision,
the petitioner appealed to the appellate court who affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico
was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200.

Issue:
Whether “any other device or arrangement” includes extension phones and
listening thru it is a violation of RA 4200.

Held:
No, an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as
the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line.
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in
order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases
of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that ‘however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.’
Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that ‘the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or
the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments
of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

380. Katz vs U.S.

Facts
The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (“FBI”) agents placed an electronic device outside a
public phone booth to listen to the petitioner’s telephone conversations inside the
booth. The District Court allowed the telephonic conversations to be presented as
evidence against the petitioner. He was subsequently convicted for transmitting
wagering information across US states via telephone. Pursuant to this, he moved to
challenge the evidence obtained using the electronic device in the Court of Appeals,
contending that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals upheld the use of the electronic device on the ground that there
was no physical intrusion into the area occupied by the petitioner. He then moved the
Court via a writ of certiorari.

Issue:
Whether recording of conversations inside a public phone booth using an electronic
device placed outside the phone booth constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

HELD:

The Court, in a 7-1 decision (with Justice Marshall abstaining), held that the use of an
electronic device placed outside a public phone booth for overhearing conversations
inside the booth constituted ‘search and seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment. The
‘search and seizure’ was unlawful as it was conducted without obtaining a prior warrant.
The Court provided five opinions - one majority opinion by Justice Stewart, three
concurring opinions by Justice Douglas, Justice Harlan and Justice White, and one
dissenting by Justice Black.

Discussing the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that it protected
individual privacy against certain types of governmental intrusions and not the right to
privacy in general. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not concern itself
with the question of what constituted ‘constitutionally protected areas’. The Fourth
Amendment protected people and what they sought to protect as private even in public
places. It did not protect places per se.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan explained the nature of the protection provided
to people by the Fourth Amendment by articulating a two-fold test on the ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’. Fourth Amendment protections were available, he held, when a)
a person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and b) the society considered it
reasonable. Therefore, he held that the petitioner, after paying the toll for making calls
and shutting the door behind him, was reasonably entitled to assume that his
conversation was not being intercepted. This expectation was reasonable despite the
fact that the phone booth was a public place.
The Court considered the reading of the Fourth Amendment as limited to search and
seizure of tangible property in Olmstead vs. United States (277 U.S. 438) and Goldman
vs. United States (316 U.S. 129) to be too narrow. It relied on Silverman vs. United
States (365 U.S. 505) and Warden vs. Hayden (387 U.S. 294) to expand it to include
recording of oral statements that were overheard without actual physical
intrusion/trespass. The dissenting opinion, however, held the tangibility of the objects
being searched and seized as sine qua non for the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment.

Discussing the reasonability prong of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that
searches and seizures conducted without a prior warrant by a Magistrate were per se
unreasonable. This was held to be especially true in the case of electronic surveillance,
where the consent of the suspect was crucial. The Court agreed that the seizure of the
petitioner’s private conversations was conducted in a restrained manner, under precise
and discriminate circumstances, and to fulfill legitimate needs of law enforcement.
However, the lack of prior judicial approval in the form of a warrant rendered it
unlawful.

381. Ramirez vs CA
GR No. 93833
September 28,1995

FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and
in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence
the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent

court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The

substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A.

4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the
latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or

expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s
meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

382. Salcedo-Ortanez vs CA
325 SCRA 111

FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by the private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However,

the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied
her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with
the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They
and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice;
and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special
civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

1. W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

2. W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly
availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge
an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow
certiorari as a mode of redress.

383. Alejano vs Cabuay

GR No. 160792
August 25, 2005

FACTS:
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted
explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced
their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later
defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to
their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the
Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers
involved in the Oakwood incident.
The CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing
the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the
detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The
appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court
regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The
appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an
infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights.

HELD:
No, the SC does not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’
letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in
a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves
the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The
letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to
the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading
300 soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The
junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident
involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of
the country.
As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of
War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the
Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the
junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members.
Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we
should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of
patent arbitrariness.

384. In Re Laureta
148 SCRA 382

FACTS:

Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the
her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims
that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st
Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial
ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world.
This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a
press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap
in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of
Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred
to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the
presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents
counsel.
It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still,
Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with more
threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of
justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the
Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute
Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence
in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel
of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished
the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption.
The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with
contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not
intend to dishonor the court.

ISSUE:
WON privacy of communication was violated.

HELD:
The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under
the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession.

385. People vs Albofera

FACTS:
Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio
a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate
in the killing.
The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros
and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He

stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that
said group had ordered the «arrest» of the victim, Carancio, and that the group
«sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.»

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera
sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution.
In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit
and testify in his favor instead.

Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?

HELD:
No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s
privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma
himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court.
Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded
that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving
at a determination of his culpability.

386. Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Privacy of Communication.

Doctrine in Nachura: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked

against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took
documents consisting of private communications between her husband and
his alleged paramour.
FACTs:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her
husband, together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly
opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs without Dr. Martin’s
knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in
a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as
damages against her wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to
be the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE:
the case is between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the
court ruled that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and that the
use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and gross
misconduct.

Issue:
WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.

Held:
Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

388. Waterhouse Drug Corporation vs NLRC

FACTS:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico
sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal
selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.
YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent
in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the
envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC:
Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Facts:
Petitioner, Katz, was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone across state lines. The evidence of petitioner's end
of the conversations was introduced at the trial and obtained and overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
the telephone booth from which the calls were made. The court convicted Katz, who
appealed the conviction on the ground that the evidence entered at trial violated his
Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation since there was "no physical entrance
into the area occupied by" petitioner.

Issue:
 Did the Government’s eavesdropping activities violate the petitioner’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure?

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the Government's eavesdropping activities violated the
privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court further held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items but extends as well to the recording of oral statements. The Court also opined
that because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
Following these, the Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ ruling.

381. Ramirez vs CA
GR NO. 93833, September 28, 1995

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
“An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and
holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of
the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held:
Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,”
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions,
one does not distinguish.

382. Salcedo-Ortanez vs CA
235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Facts:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment
of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of
lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private
respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner
submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence; on the
same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence. A motion
for reconsideration from petitioner was denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by
petitioner in the CA assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette
tapes. The CA dismissed the said petition. From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed
the present petition for review.

Issue:
Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as
evidence in court

Held:
No, RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.
and Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, RTC and CA failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
 383. Alejano vs Cabuay
GR NO. 160792, August 25, 2005

Facts:
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321-armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted
explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced
their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date,
the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had
earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of
Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over
custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place
while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the
Oakwood incident. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with
the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its
decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in
the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in
accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court
directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting
hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court
declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation
of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper
subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

Issue:
Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an
infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights.

Held:
No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’
letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in
a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves
the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The
letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal
courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present
case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes
for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those detained is
subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in
the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary
detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a
civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the
military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the
junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the
NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in
a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers,
together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate
regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the
regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

384. In Re Laureta
148 SCRA 382 (1987)

Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal
of the her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre
claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the
1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial
ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world.
This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a
press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap
in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of
Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred
to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the
presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents
counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the
case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with
more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of
justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the
Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute
Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence
in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel
of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished
the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the
SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private
communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue:
WON privacy of communication was violated

Held:
The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty
under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from
the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.

397.
SJS vs Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA
GR No. 157870, Nov. 3, 2008

FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was implemented. Section 36 (c) thereof provides:
 Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by
any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH
shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing
centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing
centers shall be valid for a one-year period from the date of issue which may be used
for other purposes.

The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing:
Provided, that all drug testing expenses whether in public or private schools under this
Section will be borne by the government.

This was questioned by the Social Justice Society (SJS) on the ground that it
infringes the privacy rights of students.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 36 (c) of RA 9165 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Sec 36 (c) of RA 9165 is constitutional.
It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
Thus:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students;
(2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well –
being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Further, the drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement.
The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process “the well being
of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs.”
This statutory purpose, per the policy – declaration portion of the law, can be achieved
via the pursuit by the state of “an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti – drug abuse policies, programs and projects.

398.
OPLE vs. TORRES
GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Facts:
The petitioner seeks the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy, Petitioner prays that the court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
“Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
privacy.

Issue:
Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy enshrined in
the constitution.

Held:
Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be
let alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The
potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer,
only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to
take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing result could be that
everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a
way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its
benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should
not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with
the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

399.
KMU vs NEDA
Gr No. 167798, April 19, 2006
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order 420
requiring all government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline
and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and
ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government
entities.

Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of

legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they
allege that EO420 infringes on the citizen’s rights to privacy.

ISSUE:
In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or repeal any laws?

HELD:
No, in issuing EO 420, the president did not make, alter or repeal any laws

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing
EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented
and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency,
reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID
systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an
executive issuance and not an act of legislation

400.
SILVERTHORNE LUMBER vs. US
251 us 385, 1920
FACTS:
An indictment was brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his father, the owners of
Silverthorne Lumber Company (Lumber), on a single charge. After the Silverthornes
were arrested at their homes, the government held them in custody. Meanwhile, federal
law enforcement officials, without any legal authority, went to Lumber's office and
obtained books, papers, and documents. An application was made for a return of what
had been taken. The United States made photographs and copies of material papers
and framed a new indictment based upon the knowledge they obtained. The district
court ordered return of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. The
subpoenas to produce the originals were served. Although the district court found that
all the papers were seized in violation of the Silverthornes' constitutional rights, it
ordered them to comply with the subpoenas. The Silverthornes sought review of the
judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Government issue valid subpoenas on the basis of knowledge
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.

HELD:
No, the Government cannot issue valid subpoenas on the basis of knowledge obtained
from an unlawful search and seizure

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court overturned the district court's judgment.
Because the government had obtained the company papers by illegal means, the
government could not use the knowledge gained from its wrong to frame a new
indictment and use the evidence in a prosecution. The Court noted that such use of the
knowledge gained from unlawful means would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a mere
"form of words."

401.
PEOPLE vs. ARUTA
GR. No. 120915, April 3, 1998

FACTS:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day,
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. A Victory Liner Bus with body
number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front
of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two
females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the
team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak."
The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM
office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the
confiscated marijuana leaves. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the
dangerous drugs of 1972.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant
violated the latter’s constitutional rights.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court that the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes
the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed
with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. In the
instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest.
To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accusedappellant’s bag, accused-
appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides
that: Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-
appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law
requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself
may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken,
and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. For lack of evidence to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she
is being held for some other legal grounds.

\
402.
PEOPLE vs. RONDERO
GR. No. 125687, Dec. 9, 1999

Facts:
On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta.
When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his
parents to inquire about his sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing,
their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor. Maximo, who was then
carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian
well about one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. After some time, a restless Maximo began
to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylenes
lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. She was naked from the
waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body.
Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. Half an hour later, five (5)
policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Maximo led the
policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood.
Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. The NBI sent a fax message to the
Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination on the hair
strands because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested
that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the four
regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be
presented. The trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to death. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the taking of some hair strands from the accused without his consent and
submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self incrimination.

Held:
No, the taking of some hair strands from the accused without his consent and
submitted to the NBI for investigation, is not a violation of his right against self
incrimination.

Right against self incrimination actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from
the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used
as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Liability for damages
403. Aberca vs. Ver
160 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila.

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations
of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-
General Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a
judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.

ISSUES:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action
for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of
rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?
2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the
notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been
violated?

HELD:

1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of
another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been
generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior
officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive
factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution
5 acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the
factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception
that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

404. Miranda vs. Arizona
384 US 436 (1966)

Facts:

Miranda was arrested at his home and brought to a special interrogation room where
he signed a confession which contained a typed paragraph stating that the confession
was made voluntarily with full knowledge of his legal rights and with the understanding
that any statement he made might be used against him. He was not informed of his
right to remain silent or his right to have counsel present. At his trial in an Arizona state
court, the confession was admitted in evidence and he was convicted of kidnapping and
rape. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the lower court’s decision. The
case was elevated by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Issue:

Is the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination violated when a suspect

is interrogated in custody without being informed of his right to remain silent and to
have counsel present?

Held:

Yes. As a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of statements made under

custodial interrogation, the suspect must, in the absence of a clear, intelligent waiver of
the constitutional rights involved, be warned prior to questioning that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation cannot be used against a defendant at
trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and
intelligently waived. The confession of Miranda which was obtained without having
appraised him of his rights to remain silent and counsel violated his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and cannot be admitted into evidence against him.
Custodial Investigation
405. People v. Lugod
G.R No. 136253, Feb. 21, 2001

FACTS:

At around 12:30 a.m. on September 15, 1997 Helen Ramos, the mother of the victim
Nairube was awaken by her husband because he sensed that there is someone going
down to the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in her place
she was sleeping so she assumed that Nairube is just answering to the call of nature.
Nairube’s blanket was also no longer at the place where she sleeps but her slippers
were still there. After 3 minutes waiting Helen stood up and began calling Nairube but
there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and she found out that the
backdoor of their house was open. She found a pair of slippers on the top of the
wooden bench outside the backdoor and it does not belong to any member of her
family. In the morning of September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to report
the loss of her child and also the slippers that she found to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She
then went home while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m.,
Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching, Helen found a panty and she
recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was ordered
to go home while others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search
and found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front hanging on a guava twig. Loreto
Veloria informed him that Clemente John Lugod wore the two items when he went to
the house of Violeta Cabuhat.

At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of
slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he
was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did anything to
Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the
same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area,
Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the
townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of
Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the
location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube.
On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment,
Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether Lugod’s confession and subsequent act of pointing the location of the
Nairube’s body may be used against him as evidence.

HELD:

Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with
one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights.
Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be
made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of
counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the
Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or
ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, Lugod's
act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of
the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled
confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume
that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional
rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the
peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2
Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore,
when Lugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole
police force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there.
Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted
to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken to the
police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the
body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous
response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten
up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he
visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face,
corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession
of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was
established by the prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen
Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing
the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa
Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver
who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa
Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are
circumstantial in nature. The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does
not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube.
At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places
Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.
406. PP v. Lauga
GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old
daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay
bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he
proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He
invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga
admitted to him that he raped his daughter because he was unable to control himself.
Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He
argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and
there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

ISSUE:

Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a
lawyer admissible in evidence?

HELD:

No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the
purpose of keeping peace in their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations
in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by
the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a
“bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was
inadmissible in evidence.

407. Luz v. People

FACTS:

PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited
the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the Luz
is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luzo bliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or
metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container, he
asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected
shabu. Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that
there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC
found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE:

Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city
ordinance, and such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?

HELD:

NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for
the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested
the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
408. Van Luspo v. People
GR No. 188487, Feb. 14, 2011

FACTS:
Acting on a report of the COA regarding disbursement irregularities for combat,
clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) in Regions VII and VIII, North Capital
Command, the PNP Inspector General (OIG), conducted an investigation. The Office of
the Directorate for Comptrollership issued two (2) Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASAs),
each amounting to Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00), purportedly for the purchase of
CCIE for the North CAPCOM. The ASAs were approved "FOR THE CHIEF [Director
General Cesar Nazareno (Nazareno)], PNP" by Director Guillermo Domondon
(Domondon), Chief Director of ODC, and signed for him by Police Superintendent Van
Luspo (Luspo), Chief, Fiscal Division, Budget and Fiscal Services of the ODC. The ASAs
were issued without an approved personnel program from the Directorate for
Personnel. Upon receipt of the ASAs Montano, Chief Comptroller, directed Duran, Chief,
Regional Finance Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks of
₱100,000.00 each, for a total of ₱10,000,000.00. The checks were payable respectively
to DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises, and Triple 888 Enterprises, each
to receive 25 checks. All enterprises were owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen
(Private Person). On the basis of the foregoing findings, the OSP filed complaints for
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against them
be filed against Nazareno (Director General), Domondon (Director for Comptrollership),
Montano (Chief Comptroller), Tugaoen, and Pedro Sistoza (Director Sistoza), Regional
Director, North CAPCOM. The office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) approved the
resolution of the OMB-AFP, with the modification that the proper offense to be charged
was violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Although the investigative report did not
mention Luspo’s (Director for Comptrollership) criminal or administrative liability, the
OMB-AFP included him in the charge since his signature appeared on the questioned
ASAs. The OSP cleared Director Sistoza from any participation in the anomalous deal
and the court eventually dropped the information for Nazareno who died and
Domondon was also exonerated because, by virtue of the Delegation of Authority and
Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno. Luspo was acquitted by the SC. Domondon
issued a Memorandum delegating to Luspo and a certain Supt. Reynold Osia (Osia) the
authority to sign for him (Domondon) and on his behalf. As previously mentioned, the
Sandiganbayan absolved Domondon of any liability in the issuance of the ASAs by virtue
of the Delegation of Authority and Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno,
authorizing him (Domondon) to release funds. Domondon

There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable bias or favor towards
Tugaoen. The prosecution failed to show that it was Luspo’s duty to search for,
negotiate and contract with suppliers.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in holding that the investigations conducted
on petitioners are not custodial investigation and in not holding that the sworn
statements taken by the investigating officers during investigations are inadmissible in
evidence for being violative of the constitutional rights of the accused, particularly their
right to counsel.

HELD:
No. The court held that even if the investigation conducted by the PNP was custodial in
nature, the improprieties that Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and
overwhelming evidence showing her and her co-conspirators guilt. Allegations of
impropriety committed during custodial investigation are material when an extrajudicial
admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of
Montano, Duran and Tugaoen was not deducted solely from Tugaoens admission, but
from the confluence of evidence showing their guilt beyong reasonable doubt.
There is ample evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that Duran and Montano
were propelled by evident bad faith in preparing and issuing 100 checks to facilitate a
fictitious and fraudulent transaction and Tugaoen, in accepting the checks and receiving
their value without giving in exchange a single piece of CCIE. Duran’s and Montano’s
palpable bias in favor of Tugaoen is shown by their failure to support and justify the
checks issued to Tugaoen’s enterprises with the obligatory paper trail relative to the
conduct of public bidding or any procurement contract.
409. Perez vs People
Malversation of Public Funds

Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who
was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit,
the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team
embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an
inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on
hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of
P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds,
petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his
late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his
medicine.

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated

January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing
of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public

funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:

Is petitioner guilty of malversation?

Ruling:

YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or
property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.

There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the
crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That
those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the
commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was
accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is
necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that
he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he
could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer
may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation
and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily.

Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if

there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption
that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come
into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is
prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article
217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location
of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption
that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to
do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.

However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he
adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In
the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the
presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.
410. People vs Vallejo

FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the
neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom
noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t
there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was
found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter
strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as
he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have
already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10.
The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared.
Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs)
from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that
there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim,
while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O.
Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when
trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was
threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body
and the clothing of Daisy (including his clothing – which in effect is an admission
placing him in the crime scene – though not discussed in the case) were already soaked
in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to
death by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict
the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered
in this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence
sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the
victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible
results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples
have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons
including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to
obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).
In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine
the statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
411. People vs Del Rosario

Facts:
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to
death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver
who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects
used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for
questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When
the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the
death of some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the
precinct where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was only
subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of
detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was
handcuffed through all this time up on orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities’
belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.
(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

RULING:
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the
investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his Miranda
rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of
custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the
scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited
the accused appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the
case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an
unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.

(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless
arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made
immediately after the crime was committed; and when the one to be arrested is an
escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not f all in any of these
exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the
crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely
relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest
was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the
accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
412. People vs Bolanos

FACTS:
On June 23, 1993, the deceased Oscar Pagdalian was found dead after a
drinking spree with two others, one of which being the accused, Ramon Bolanos. When
the accused was nabbed by the police upon corroborated testimonies, the gun of the
deceased was found with him, thus strengthening the case against him.
They boarded Ramon Bolanos and along with the other companion on the
drinking spree on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the
vehicle where the suspect was riding, Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he
killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive.
The admission was used by RTC of Malolos, Bulacan in holding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, arguing that the same was given freely and before the
investigation, hence, admissible as evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel.

RULING:
Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on
the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have already been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section
as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and
their families.

Failing to have the accused informed of this right and being unassisted by a counsel
during the alleged confession, the same cannot hold admissible in evidence against the
accused.
413. Rhode Island vs Innis

Facts:
The respondent was arrested for a robbery of a cab driver that led to the murder of the
driver. The driver was shot in the head with a shotgun, but the weapon was not found
with the respondent at the time of the arrest. The respondent was placed in the back
seat of the patrol car, and he rode back with three officers. The officers, one sitting in
the back seat with the respondent, remarked what a tragedy it would be if a child were
to stumble upon the weapon before they found it. The discussion moved the
respondent enough to disclose the location of the weapon in order to avoid an accident.

Issue:
The issue is whether the conversation between the officers in front of the respondent
constituted an interrogation as defined in Miranda v. Arizona?

Held:
The conversation was not an interrogation, and therefore the respondent’s rights under
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”) were not
violated. Interrogations should not be so broadly defined to include such a wide range
of conduct by officers post-arrest, but rather should only include conduct that police
should know would illicit a response.
414. People vs Mahinay

FACTS:
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to
take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the latter’s
residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother.
The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found
in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the
victim was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a
brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother to
belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as
that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three arms length away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers
positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted
him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death. The case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
RULING:
Yes. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed. Larry Mahinay during the
custodial investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave
his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay given
with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and
voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any
maltreatment on his person. He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he
was sworn to the truth of his statement on 8 July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or
was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details known
only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty.
Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes informed and explained to
Mahinay his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the
testimony. That he signed the statement given by Mahinay.

A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant
to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions
of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death Asphyxia by
manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with
the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table
and the victim lost consciousness. There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have
been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the
accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. In his extrajudicial
confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious
child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the felony of rape
with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, RA 7659.
415. PP vs. Baloloy
GR No. 140740
April 12, 2002

FACTS:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the
evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho
(hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-
appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught
sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his
alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girl’s
unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his
alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set
aside.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused's extrajudicial confession to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and
Judge Dicon violated his rights against self-incrimination.

HELD:
No. The extrajudicial confession made to Brgy. Captain Ceniza did not violate
his rights against self-incrimination.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a
suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use
of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was
asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he
raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a
spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given
before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.

As for his confession to Judge Dicon, it was deemed inadmissible as evidence

because Judge Dicon failed to inform him of his rights before he made the confession.
Moreover, it was done without the assistance of counsel. It was held that the rights of
the accused become operative once custodial investigation starts, which actually begins
from the time the accused is arrested or voluntarily surrenders to the police. The
accused was already in the custody of the police at the time he made his confession to
Judge Dicon. Furthermore, even if no complaints yet filed against the accused at that
time, the judge should still have honored the rights of the accused under the Bill of
Rights.However, his confession to the judge is not entirely useless as those who
witnessed the confession may still testify to this verbal admission by the accused.
416. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY
GR NO. 130612
MAY 11, 1999

FACTS:
Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of
Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove with 38
stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the right side,
though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant
guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. Conviction was based primarily on the
testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellant confessed to the killing of Jennifer and
disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for
the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the
waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. On the other hand,
Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer;
that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his
uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were about 2-3 meters from him and
that no lawyer assisted appellant during the interview. Also presented as a witness was
Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the
lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the
male organ..

ISSUE:
W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which
appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible.
HELD:
The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only
in writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in
violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this prohibition does not apply
to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters. For
an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police
station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the only
one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12 (1) of the Constitution
applied to him. But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither
put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid
and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession
of the accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the
bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's
confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, the
accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the
media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his
answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: Appellant's oral confessions
to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State
and its agents.
417. PP vs. Pasudag
GR No. 128822
May 4, 2001

FACTS:
Around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo
fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about
70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote
tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the
garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it. He went to the Police
Station and reported to Chief of Police. The latter dispatched team to conduct an
investigation. At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived and went
straight to the house of accused Pasudag.
SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to
his backyard garden which was about five 5 meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana
plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag
standing besides one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The
team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the
police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police that he
owned the marijuana plants.
On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
as charged and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached only
grade IV), Hence, this appeal. In his brief, accused-appellant contended that the trial
court erred in finding that the marijuana plant submitted for laboratory examination
was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants confiscated from his garden; that the trial
court erred in concluding that the confiscation report was not an extrajudicial admission
which required the intervention of his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis of
inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants, owned the same
or that he permitted others to cultivate the same. The Solicitor General contended that
accused-appellant admitted before the lower court that tile specimen was one of the
plants confiscated in his backyard; that appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he signed the confiscation report; and that the inferences deduced by the lower
court strengthened the conviction of accused-appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding Pasudag guilty of illegal cultivation of
marijuana.

HELD:
Yes. The arrest of the accused was tainted with constitutional infirmity.
The procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly
search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution
provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible.
The police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search
warrant. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized
plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Moreover, it was
revealed that the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights. The court did
not agree with the Solicitor General that the accused was not under custodial
investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers
begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission. Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made
without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the accused was acquitted from the
crime charged.
418. PP vs. Lugod
GR No. 136253
Feb. 21, 2001

FACTS:
On October 10, 1997, an Information for rape with homicide was filed against the
accused. PEDRO DELA TORRE testified that on September 15, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., the
accused arrived at his house and joined the drinking session of his son. He noticed that
the accused was wearing a black T-shirt and appeared to be drunk. Dela Torre claims
that the accused left at around 11:45 p.m. ROMUALDO RAMOS testified that at around
8:30 on the morning of September 16, 1997, he was driving his tricycle towards the
poblacion of Cavinti. While driving towards the poblacion, he noticed the accused
coming out of the gate of Villa Anastacia. Upon seeing the accused, he stopped his
tricycle thinking that the accused would board the same but the accused did not mind
him. He noticed that the accused was wearing only a pair of white short pants with a
red waistline and was not wearing a T-shirt or any slippers. The accused also appeared
to be drunk.
Thereafter, he proceeded to the poblacion terminal where he discovered that
Nairube was missing. He also learned that the accused was the suspect behind her
disappearance. Upon learning this, he told Ricardo Vida, the Chief of the barangay
tanod who was searching for the victim, to look for her at Villa Anastacia because it was
the place where he saw the accused come out from. Ramos further testified that the
house of the victim is about five hundred (500) meters away from the place where he
saw the accused but if one passes through the coconut plantation, it is only two
hundred (200) meters away. FLORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, testified
that on September 19, 1997 at around 3:30 p.m., he attended the funeral of Nairube.
After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation
with the accused, the accused confessed to the commission of the offense.
On October 8, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. In view of the imposition
of the death penalty, the case is now before the Court on automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lugod’s confession and subsequent act of pointing the location
of the Nairube’s body may be used against him as evidence.

HELD:
No. The records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive
these rights. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped
and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for
having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill of Rights.
In the same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of
Nairube was also elicited in violation of the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same
was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the
poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation
and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the
police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as
having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his
detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he
would help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2
Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti
escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic
towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was
apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have
pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not
conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere,
Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very
serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who
testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises
on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated.
 Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only
remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that several
persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on
several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the
house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of
Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning
of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers.
These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The combination of the above-
mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod
raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies
of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that
fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. Lugod
was acquitted.

Administrative Investigations
419. People vs. Judge Ayson
175 SCRA 216 (1989)

FACTS:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit
team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however
this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

HELD:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-
incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to
a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is
not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right
to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or
to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He
must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
420. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang
271 SCRA 316 (1997)

FACTS:
On September 1, 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in
charge. It was during her tenure on August 8, 1994, that an on-the-spot audit
examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court
Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions were
discovered. One involved a managers check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon
in connection with Civil Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August 7, 1992
during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to said respondent
instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No.
13-92.
When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited
it at the Sta Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank but she and Judge
Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that the defendant, Dizon, would
demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further
questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount
of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Mercado, and
P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the
hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for personal purposes.
 Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado
borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used
P100,000.00 for her personal needs.

Upon learning that they were being implicated in the anomalous transaction,
Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of P55,000.00 was from the
personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount deposited before the
court and such loan has already been paid.8 Mercado, on the other hand, claims that
the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took place,
when Malla was no longer employed with the court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied
any involvement in any of the transactions.

Respondents Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and

Nieva Mercado, court employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna
(hereinafter referred to as the lower court), were charged in a memorandum report by
the Office of Court Administrator dated August 16, 1994, for misappropriating funds
deposited by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, entitled Spouses Entero Villarica and
Felicidad Domingo v. Teodorico Dizon. On October 5, 1994, this Court issued a
resolution treating the aforesaid memorandum report as an administrative complaint
which was docketed as Administrative Matter No. MTJ-94-989.

In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial
records outside the court premises. This Court decided to include this matter in the
original complaint earlier docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-94-989 in a resolution dated March
6, 1995.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Felicidad Malla were violated when she
signed the affidavit dated September 14, 1994 before the Office of the Court
Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.
Administrative Investigations
Case 421
People v. Uy
G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005

Facts:
The accused, Uy, Gamus and Ochoa, public officers being employed by the National
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), was charged for allegedly diverting and
collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of
US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805,
291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation
through Falsification of Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating with the
private co-accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for
the managers check with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sandigan Bayan rendered
a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said crime and is ordered
to pay the equal amount malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claims
that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of
stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed
the sworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and upon assurance it would
not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his
constitutional rights when he executed the constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated?

Held:
The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was
taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was
taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense.
Appellant cannot claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time
at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities.
The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for
NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate
proceeding, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused
or lumped together with the latter.

Police Lineup
Case 422
Gamboa vs. Cruz
162 SCRA 642, June 27, 1988

Facts:
On July 19, 1979, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner Christopher Gamboa
was arrested for vagrancy, without warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. On
July 20, 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees including petitioner Gamboa who
was identified by complainant Erlinda B. Bernal as one of the companions in the
commission of the crime of robbery. On July 23, 1979, an information for robbery was
filed against him. On August 22, 1979, he was arraigned. On August 13, 1980,
petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-
up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. On October 23, 1980, the lower court denied the
Motion to Acquit, hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were
violated during the conduct of police line- up.
Held:
Police line- up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled at such stage to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession
the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the
course of his identification in the police line- up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel
because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated
petitioner’s right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State
and him had not begun. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of
an offense. On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any
way, deprived of the substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by
a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to
file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process
abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The petition is dismissed. The
temporary restraining order issued is lifted.
Police Lineup
Case 423
United States v. Wade
388 US. 218 (1967)

Facts:
Two men robbed a bank in Eustace, Texas. One man, with two pieces of tape on his
face, went into the bank, pointed a gun at the cashier and demanded the money. His
accomplice waited outside in a stolen getaway car. Wade and his accomplice were
indicted for the robbery and counsel was appointed. About two weeks later, a Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent caused the two men to be part of a lineup
consisting of five or six other men at which the bank employees were asked to make an
identification, and at which the two men were in fact identified.
At trial, Wade’s defense counsel objected to the identification procedures, but his
efforts to have them stricken were in vain. Wade was convicted of the robbery. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup had violated Wade’s Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to counsel.

Issue:
Whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded from
evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post
indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes, without notice to, and in the
absence of, the accused’s appointed counsel?

Held:
Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice. The in-court identification must be found to have independent origin, free of
the primary taint of the improperly conducted lineup, in order to be admitted.

Discussion: The opinion emphasizes the fact that the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination is not implicated because nothing about the lineup itself violated the
long line of cases holding that only testimonial or communicative evidence must be
suppressed if coerced. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, did attach to
pretrial proceedings because of the importance that they have carrying on an adequate
defense. The right has been interpreted to apply to “critical” stages of the proceedings.
Identification procedures are critical because of the many dangers that inhere in
identification procedures in general, and in eyewitness identifications in particular. Any
prejudice occurring in an identification procedure without counsel present would
denigrate the right of the defendant to effectively cross examine the witness in
question.
Police Lineup
Case 424
People v. Escordial
G.R. No. 138934, January 16, 2002

Facts:
The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa
Gellaver. On the night of the incident, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man.
The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife
about four inches long and asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and Michelle
Darunday gave the money because they were threatened by the man to be killed. The
assailant then blindfolded Michelle and began to rape her. After satisfying his lust, the
assailant conversed for a while with complainants. The accused, threatening to call his
companions, then, again, raped the complainant in the other orifice of the
complainant’s nether regions. Accused then warned the women not to report or else
they would be killed. After 30 mins. The complainants told their neighbor of what
happened. Then they told the owner of the boarding house what happened who then
told the police. Physical description of the assailant was given by the complainant at the
police station. Police found that the descriptions given by the complainant fit that of a
worker in the Coffee Break Corner, where the accused was employed. Heading there,
the police asked of the accused whereabouts which was, as they were told, watching a
basketball game. The police arrested the accused (w/o warrant) and proceeded to the
police station where he saw the complainant and inadvertently blushed. Complainant
then identified him based on the marks on the neck and matched other physical
descriptions. Court of first instance ruled that accused is found guilty of robbery and
rape with no mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with maximum penalty
of death.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?

Held:
NO. The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he was seized
therefore, he was not
1.) In flagrante delicto
2.) He was not an escaped convict
3) the arrest was not after direct consummation of the crime.
The question here is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase “personal
knowledge” in paragraph Section 5(b) of Rule 113 has been defined that personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon “probable cause”
which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer
making the arrest. Here, in question of the “Personal Knowledge”, the police were not
at the scene of the crime when it happened, therefore “Personal Knowledge” does not
apply. Furthermore, there was ample time for police to procure a warrant and no
reason for them not to obtain one. This deficiency is, however, cured once accused-
appellant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and not questioning the
invalidity of the arrest. The accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by
the police after he had being pointed by a Ramie as the possible suspect of the crime,
was already under custodial investigation when these outof-court identifications were
conducted by the police. Thereby all questions answered by accused-appellant is hereby
deemed as hearsay. Furthermore, his right to counsel was violated. Hence, evidence is
inadmissible in court. Hence, it is found that the prosecution has failed to meet the
degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in a criminal case. In lieu of the
above mentioned, the Supreme Court hereby reverses the sentence and acquits the
accused-appellant.

Police Lineup
Case 425
People vs. Piedad, et al.,
G.R No. 131923, Dec. 5, 2002

Facts:
On 10 April 1996, Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran, Barangay South
Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had earlier gone. As she was
walking by the gate of the company compound where they reside, she heard Piquero
shouting for help because Mateo was being mauled by a group of men. She rushed out
of the compound and saw her husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma,
Lito Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself.
Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large
stone, measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateo’s head with it. Then, Lito
approached Mateo’s side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the
face. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because
of the injuries he sustained. Piedad , Garcia and Palma were charged with Murder.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued
thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding Piedad and Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances present, and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held solidarily liable to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00. Richard Palma
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and Garcia appealed.

Issues:
Whether or not the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was
suggestive and fatally flawed.

Held:
No. The claim by the defense that Piedad’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that
even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand,
knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not
identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper
suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the
witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible
for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply
because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were
certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which
requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime.
What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons
charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason to doubt the
veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively,
categorically and unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the
head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby
inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateo’s
death. Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually
strive to remember the faces of the assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife,
who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who eventually died by
reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Luz was right beside
her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz could not
have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot
away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand
was identified by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the
incident. There was light from a bulb 5 meters away from the scene of the crime.
Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed
right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and attention afforded
the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters
the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. While Piedad and Garcia may have
been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less
forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under
custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police
never allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily
presented themselves to the authorities.

Police Lineup
426 - PP vs. Dagpin, GR No. 149560, June 10, 2004
427. Magtoto vs. Manguer G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975

FACTS:

Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his
right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article
6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution. Petitioner Magtoto stressed that since
Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution favor the accused it should be given
retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given

retrospective effect
HELD:

Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be
given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained
from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been
informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same
had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented
after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel,
since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

428. People v. Caguioa

GR No. L-38975 January 17, 1980

Facts:
Accused Paquito Yupo was arrested and tried for murder. He pleaded “not
guilty.” The prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of Meycauayan Police
Department as witness, before whom a written statement of the accused and his
alleged waiver of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own
choice was taken. After the witness had identified the statement of the accused and the
waiver, the prosecution started asking him on the part of the incriminating answers in
the statement of the accused. The defense counsel objected based on the ground of
such statements being inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the
police without any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the waiver presented was admissible as evidence.
Held:
No, the presented waiver was not admissible as evidence.

Ratio
The right to counsel may be waived as long as such waiver is made
intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequence. However it was
not shown that the waiver was given voluntarily and freely. An even more disturbing
factor is that the accused, a 19-year old native of Samar, was interrogated extensively
in Tagalog instead of the language he was most comfortable which was Waray.

Maybe to impress the Court, the opening statements by the police in the waiver were in
Tagalog followed by a monosyllabic answer “Opo.”However, there was no signature
by the accused. There were only illegible letters, perhaps indicating that they were his
initials. This only shows that the accused was not literate enough to fullyunderstand the
legal implication and effects of the waiver.

Additional

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates inany manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
429. People v. Tampus
G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE,

accused whose death sentence is under review.

FACTS:

At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a
prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of
nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal
institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons,
assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from
the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told
the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report
submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that,
according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was
armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the
victim on the chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated
Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted
that they assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The
court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the
following issues:

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article
IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain
silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de
oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD:

1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had
already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered
to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had
committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary
confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of
the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to
have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings
in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to
be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,
confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial
confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right
to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not
claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place
where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial
in the national penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case
is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground
for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial
court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be
offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of
the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and
the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.
430. People vs. Sayaboc, GR 147201, 15 January 2004

FACTS:
On 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging
House owned by him, which was located at Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.

A waitress of the rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo and Tessie Pilar, the
caretaker of the lodging house heard four gun bursts emanating from the ground floor
of the building. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing
the latter to fall to the ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc
forthwith ran out and disappeared into the darkness.

SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command Headquarters in

Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc.

When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters

inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room.
Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional
rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have counsel of his own choice. But
since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer.

Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who
then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, “okay,” he
continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time.

However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo

would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial
confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest
of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000.

He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession

was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.

The accused filed for demurrer of evidence which was denied by the trial court.

Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi.
He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights.

He testified to having been beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating
room, who then coerced him to confess to having killed Galam.

Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated 20 March

1995 and an affidavit dated 10 April 1995 to support his claim of police brutality and
retraction of his confession.

Trial court convicted Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of murder, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may be admitted in
evidence against him.

Held:
No. The Court held that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used
in evidence in this case. Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are
presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the
prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an
accused's rights during... custodial investigation have been strictly complied with,
especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this
requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to
coercion while in the unfamiliar or... intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been
given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged
intimidators for maltreatment. The failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights
during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.

Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession
contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be
informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People vs. Jara, the Court
explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or
ask the... accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious,
fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and...
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle". It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of...
any waiver he might make of these rights.

The Court likewise ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to
a competent counsel. The right to a competent and independent counsel means that
the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the
suspect understands the import and consequences of answering the questions
propounded. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice
given is so cursory... as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. This is not to say that
a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession. Indeed, as an
officer of the court, it is an attorney's duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain... the nature
of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the
need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial
investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at
any time.

For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in

evidence against him. The Court held, however, that the prosecution has discharged its
burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.

431. PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had
been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary.
So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreatt and beat him. 'They covered his face with a
rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not
take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the
indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.
Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting
it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions
and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about two weeks after he had executed the
salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not
assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

432. G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accused-appellant.

Facts:

After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked, JUANITO
GARAY, a lawyer, was found dead with three (3) gunshot wounds. For his death and
the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, AURELIO BANDULA, PANTALEON
SEDIGO, TEOFILO DIONANAO and VICTORIANO EJAN were haled to court for robbery
with homicide.
After hearing,the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty
of the crime charged. However, his three (3) co-accused were acquitted “for
insufficiency of evidence.”
In arriving at its conclusions, the trial court considered the alleged confession of
accused Bandula that after the incident he gave his .38 cal. revolver for safekeeping to
Jovito Marimat, Jr., from whom three handguns were recovered by the police
Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula
and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the
crime by “Boy Tall” and “Boy Short.” “These extrajudicial confessions made by accused
Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula extracted during custodial investigation,” the trial
court ruled, “have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an
admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were
informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly
represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna).
Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao
executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence
considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely
countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was
not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without
the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to
convict him of the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether or not accused was deprived of an independent counsel during the custodial
investigation.

Ruling:

Yes. The prosecution likewise asseverated that accused Bandula was arrested, brought
to the Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated. Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula
allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his
participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In that statement, Bandula narrated that after
“Boy Short” and “Boy Tall” shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot
the latter which he did.
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused
Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present.
If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to
accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney
of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the
accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna
assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering
that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality
in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of
peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a
fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the conviction of accused-appellant AURELIO
BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged.

COUNSEL OF CHOICE

439. People v. Gallardo, GR 113684, 25 January 2000

FACTS:
On July 28, 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of
Ronnie Balao. The victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds in the
chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm
and back.
Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of
Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa, and Jessie
Micate y Orteza. The police received information that the suspects were detained at the
Camalaniugan Police Station because of other criminal charges. The Tuguegarao police
went to the Camalaniugan Police Station to fetch the suspects. Only Armando Gallardo
and Alfredo Columna alias Fermin were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police
Station. They were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they
gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo
Orizal.

During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the
accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them.
Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the jurat of the
statements. Accused-appellants signed their statements admitting the killing of
Edmundo Orizal.

ISSUE:
Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutional
requirement that a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial
investigation.

RULING:
Yes.
The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and
clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge
administered their oath. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person
under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged
in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators
is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
Although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused themselves,
the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their
lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their
counsel during the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the
lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them. The
Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who
will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further,
to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused
from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance with
the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused of their Constitutional rights.
Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements given by the
accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the
investigating officers to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy
all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2)
the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.
All these requirements were complied with.
 440. People vs. Barasina 229 SCRA 450 (1994)

FACTS:
Fiscal Mayo of Olongapo City succumbed to a single bullet on his side of his face fired
from an unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while he was walking at the VIP parking lot of
the Victory Liner Compound at Caloocan City. It was herein accused-appellant who was
accountable therefor, resulting in his being charged with the separate misdeeds of
illegal possession of a firearm and murder.

Accused-appellant raised that the manner of the extrajudicial confession and waiver
were extracted from him in the absence of a lawyer of his own choice. He maintains
that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza in the course of the custodial
investigation but it turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo Torres who assisted during the
interrogation upon the directive of P.Lt. Surara. Accused-appellant concludes that the
extrajudicial statement can not thus be utilized against him for want of competent,
independent counsel of his own choice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court admitting in
evidence the extrajudicial confession of the herein accused-appellant

RULING:
No, the claim of herein appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his own
choice, is belied by the records. During the custodial investigation, he failed to indicate
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney of his own preference before speaking or giving any statement. Indeed, there
is no showing that he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres.

Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person
undergoing investigation reads:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
The phrase “competent and independent” and “preferably of his own choice” were
explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the
1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law
period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the
military and therefore beholden to the military.

Withal, the word “preferably” under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay,
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not
have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.

COUNSEL’S PRESENCE REQUIRE IN ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS

441. People vs. Morial, GR 129295, 15 August 2001

FACTS:
· On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed.
· As a part of the investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and
Leandro Morial were asked several questions by the policemen and were invited to the
police station for continuing investigation.
· They were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again
after they woke up at past 6 in the morning.
· That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by
Leandro that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide.
· With the latter’s consent, his statements were reduced into writing. SPO4
Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel,
whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court.
· SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which
Leandro consented.
· Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former and he first met the latter at January
9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning.
· After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used
against him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez
with the presence of the counsel.
· After “all the material points” were asked, Atty.
· Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important
engagement.
· The latter agreed to the lawyer’s request.
· But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer
questions in his absence, the latter agreed.
· During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the
investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter
answered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.

RULING:
Yes. Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial
investigation; therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against
him and his other co-accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after Leonardo had
admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring
to the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph
of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall
be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation
and to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid
waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing
and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and counseled
waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with
Homicide," with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito
Abiñon are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, while
Edwin Morial, on account of his minority, is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate
penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

SEIZED ARTICLES

442. People vs. Castro, 274 SCRA 115 (1997)

FACTS:

On 19 March 1991, Capt. Evasco together with Sgt. Raguine, Sgt. de Guzman and CIC
Discargar formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation. The team
went to their target area in San Roque, San Miguel, Pangasinan and proceeded to
deploy themselves as planned. Sgt. de Guzman who acted as poseur-buyer and civilian
informer Discargar proceeded to Victoriano Castro`s house. Sgt. Raguine, meanwhile,
hid in a grassy spot near the house. Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de Guzman
who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana leaves. After going inside
the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman who,
in turn, paid him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged
signal, indicating that the transaction was complete, by raising his right hand. Upon
espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the other team members approached Castro,
introduced themselves as NARCOM (Narcotics Command) agents, and arrested him. He
was thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went
to San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to
Camp Crame for examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of the
confiscated marijuana leaves was 930 grams. Castro was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated 21 March 1991, for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
After Castro entered a plea of not guilty, trial on the merits commenced. On 29 April
1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Castro appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether Castro’s signature on the “Receipt of Property Seized” is admissible in
evidence.

RULING:
No.
Castro's signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence as there
is no showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since this is a
document tacitly admitting the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be
observed. Be that as it may, even disregarding this document, there is still ample
evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having been shown
by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation.

443. People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)

FACTS:

• Said eleven (11) accused arrived as a group at the NAIA on Sept. 1991 at 1:00PM.
Their respective passports showed that Wong and Au are the only British (Hongkong)
nationals in the group while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. All accused arrived in
Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Au Wing
Cheung, an employee of said travel agency, acted as the tour guide.
• After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers, the group
went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the customs area which at the time was manned by
customs examiner Danilo Gomez.
• According to Gomez’ testimony, he instructed the group to place their baggages on
the examiner’s table for inspection. Chin Kong Song’s bag was first to be examined. In
the course of the inspection, Gomez found 3 brown colored boxes, marked Alpen
Cereals and similar in size to powdered milk boxes, underneath the clothes. Gomez
found nothing wrong with them. Gomez allowed Chin Kong to go. Following the same
procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong Chuen and the former again
found and pulled out 2 boxes of Alpen Cereals without cutting them open. He found
nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong Chuen to go. But by the time the third
baggage belonging to Lim Nyuk was examined, Gomez again pulled out another 3
boxes of Alpen Cereals and this time he became suspicious and decided to open one of
the boxes with his cutter. The box contained white crystalline substance. Gomez
immediately called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector
Zenaida Bonifacio.
• The group were thereafter escorted to the district collector’s office, including Chin
Kong and Wong Chuen who were previously cleared by Gomez. Gomez continued to
examined the remaining baggages and he allegedly found that each baggage contained
1, 2, or 3 boxes similar to those previously found. A total of 30 boxes (34.45 kg) of
Alpen Cereals were recovered. Gomez bundled these boxes together with a masking
tape and handed them to Bonifacio, who in turn called out the names of the accused,
one by one, and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes
allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.
• Capt. Rustico Francisco, who was present in the district collector’s office, testified that
he conducted a field test on a sample of the substance and confirmed that they were
indeed “Shabu.” Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they were under
arrest.
• The accused were brought to Camp Crame, where they were asked to identify their
signatures on the boxes. They were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance. Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Lab
confirmed that they were indeed “Shabu.”
• The defense endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song, and Lim
nyuk Sun were responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country (Lim
Chan testified that he met the two at his boarding house in Hongkong a few days
before the trip; that a certain Hongkong businessman Ah Hong asked Lim Chan to
deliver these boxes and in turn the former will see to it that the latter will have a good
time in the Philippines; that Lim Chan requested Chin Kong and Lim Nyuk to
accommodate some of the boxes in their baggages) and that they cannot be held liable
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act because they had no knowledge that these
boxes contained “shabu.”
• As for the accused-appellants Wong Chuen and Au Wing, they denied that the boxes
were recovered from their baggages. They claimed that they were forced into signing
the boxes by the police authorities who were present inside the collector’s office.
• Only Wong Chuen and Au Wing appealed (the others neither filed a notice of appeal
nor filed their appellant’s brief.

ISSUE:

Whether the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are admissible in evidence.

RULING:
The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic
bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records
reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire
time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix
their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again,
on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By
affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused
in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is
punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article
III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission
wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against
them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of
the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of
Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

444. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102 (1999)

FACTS:
On February 10, 1989, Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage
of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this
reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in
apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village
following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day.
Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and
two other agents in a private car.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of
the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing
with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two
persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The
latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI
team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their
car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing
over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela
arrested the two accused.
The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes
of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative
and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the
letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.

A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were
declared guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence and
not violates his rights to be witness against himself.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during
custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the letters
are still admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only by means
of these letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the
Supreme Court held that the letters were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest
and therefore can stand on their own. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

445 - People v. Macabalang, G.R. No. 168694, Nov. 27, 2006

Seized Articles

FACTS:
Appellant was charged before the RTC for violation of Section 15, R.A. 6425, by selling
and distributing to a poseur buyer about 1,972.6 grams of “shabu”, a regulated drug.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
The facts, establishing the case against the appellant, was testified to by the following:
PO1 Christopher Guste (PO1 Guste), the poseur-buyer; PO1 Ronnie Fabia (PO1 Fabia),
member of the buy-bust operation team; Chief Inspector Leonardo Suan (Inspector
Suan), head of the buy-bust team; and Senior Inspector Sonia S. Lodovico, a Forensic
Chemist.

On 21 July 1999, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Inspector Suan, Deputy Chief
of the Intelligence Division of Narcotics Command, received a report from a confidential
informant that a certain Amin was looking for a buyer of shabu. Inspector Suan
instructed his informant to contract with Amin for two (2) kilos of shabu.Two (2) hours
later, a fourteen-man buy-bust team was formed by Inspector Suan, with PO1 Guste
acting as poseur-buyer. After the briefing, Inspector Suan gave PO1 Guste two (2)
genuine P1,000.00 bills, marked with letters "CG" and boodle money amounting to
P1,000,000.00.
At 6:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to the fourth level
parking lot of SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City, the meeting place designated by
appellant. They observed the area for two (2) hours and positioned themselves within
the vicinity. PO1 Guste stayed outside the car with the informant while the others were
inside their separate vehicles.

Two hours thereafter, a Mitsubishi Lancer car, with Plate No. UTD 147, approached the
parking lot. Appellant alighted from the car. PO1 Guste and the informant approached
him and appropriate introductions were made. Appellant then went to a green Toyota
Corolla car, parked next to his car, bearing Plate No. WBH 491. He opened the rear
compartment, took out a yellow box, and gave it to PO1 Guste. When appellant asked
for the money, PO1 Guste invited the latter over into his own car, which was parked
about ten (10) meters away. Upon reaching his car, PO1 Guste checked the contents of
the box and found two (2) plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. He
immediately gave the money to appellant and stepped out of the car. As a prearranged
signal to his police companions to close in, PO1 Guste removed his cap. The rest of the
team members converged to where PO1 Guste, the informant and appellant were
situated, introduced themselves as policemen, and apprehended appellant.
Appellant was brought to the Narcotics Command (Narcom) office at Camp Crame,
Quezon City for investigation. PO1 Guste executed an affidavit narrating the incident.
The carton containing shabu and the boodle money were turned over to the
investigator. On the following day, the confiscated carton containing two (2) plastic
bags was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were examined by Forensic
Chemist Sonia S. Lodovico. The test results confirmed that the white crystalline
substance sold by appellant was shabu, weighing a total of 1,972.6 grams.

ISSUE:
Whether accused’s right to counsel was violated

RULING:
Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property
Seized" is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and
a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that appellant signed
receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders inadmissible the
receipt itself.
In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted to entrap appellant. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established
that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the
shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust
team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed in two (2) plastic bags
seized from appellant.
Besides, the prosecution did not present in evidence any receipt of property seized
relating to the shabu confiscated from the appellant. Appellant may have testified as to
having signed such receipt, but it was not introduced in evidence. What was presented
before the Court was a receipt attesting to the seizure from the appellant of two
vehicles he was in possession at that time of his arrest, and not that of a shabu in
question. Considering that appellant is charged with the sale of shabu, and not of those
vehicles, any irregularity that would have attended the signing of the receipt would bear
no relevance to the crime for which appellant was charged.

446 - People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997)

Confession to Newsmen

FACTS:
Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima
School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan invited her inside his
house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife’s grandmother should be
taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched
her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. The following day, the
body of Marianne was discovered.

Marianne’s gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio
Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Andan’s nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the
wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant’s wife, that Andan also lived
there but that he, his wife and son left without a word.
The police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his parents’
house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of
Marianne’s death. By this time, people and media representatives were already
gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor
Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said
“Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne.”
The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives
witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no
lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant’s own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness
from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.After his confession, appellant hugged
his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Andan’s confession to the Mayor is inadmissible

RULING:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has “operational
supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1 ) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response
to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all.
No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has
been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in
an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

447 - People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001

Confession to Newsmen

FACTS:
Gerry Galgarin and his nephew Edward Endino were accused of slaying Dennis Aquino,
where the former stabbed him several times and the latter shot him. This was done in
the presence of the victim’s girlfriend.
Galgarin was arrested and interviewed by TV Patrol where he confessed and begged his
nephew to surrender as well. This confession was admitted by the trial court as
evidence for his guilt. Trial court convicted him of the crime of murder.
He questioned this before the Supreme Court, stating that it was forced from him and
against his constitutional right.
The Court rejected his contention stating that it was not part of the custodial
investigation, since it was given to newsmen and not to police. It however cautioned
lower court from admitting evidence such as this, since it should be done only after
scrutiny to avoid abuse and legalizing coerced extra-judicial confessions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in admitting the videotape confession as evidence .
RULING:
No. The interview and confession does not form part of custodial investigation since it
was not given to the police officers but to the media in an attempt to elicit sympathy
and forgiveness from the public. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
television as a medium for admitting guilt, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded
that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. We should
never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been given
freely. It should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.

448 - People vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000
Confession to Newsmen

FACTS:
On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes
near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as
Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old, who three (3) days before was reported missing.
Post-mortem examination conducted by the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped
and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio
Medina as the authors of the crime.
The police thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police
station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina returned to the
police station and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. The police
immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions inwriting. They
however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two(2) accused in
the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the
Municipality. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where
nevertheless taken. Both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their
choice. They assure that they understood their rights and did not require the services of
counsel, hence, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal
Mayor, the Chief of Police, other police officers and the suspect’s wife and mother, in
attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two
(2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.
Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and interviewed them. In the interview
which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime
and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission thereof:
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO
lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. PAO lawyer apprised each
of the accused of his constitutional rights and explained to them each of the questions
and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the
consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/ thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to
Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. They assured that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had
not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked
the accused to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and
to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their
assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the
signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty. The
accused are now assailing their conviction on the ground that constitutional infirmities
attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel
to assist them during custodial investigation thereby making their confessions
inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE
Are the confessions inadmissible in evidence due to the lack of counsel assistance
during custodial investigation?

RULING:
Yes, the absence of counsel renders the extrajudicial confession inadmissible. The
presence of the mayor, municipal judge, and the family of the accused during the
confession did not cure the defect.
Confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental
requirements:(a) the confession must be voluntary;(b) the confession must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and(d) the confession must be in writing.
Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused’s
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the
otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the
start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
Before persons can appear as substitute for counsel, two (2) conditions must be met:
(a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and (b) a valid waiver must be executed
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal
Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the
municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the
two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to
be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently,
any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounseled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the
assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this
omission either. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible in evidence, we
are left with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-
slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by
herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview
was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in
answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk
to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounseled
confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, herein accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of rape
with homicide on two (2) counts as de
449 - People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004
Confession to Newsmen

FACTS:
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic
Manufacturing Corp. with principal place of business at Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics
shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. The part of
the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of
the wall to see what was on the other side.
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard on duty.
At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser
Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Later, at around 10:00 a.m.,
Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises
("kalabugan") coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking
that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay
much attention to the sound.
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties
when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall.
According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and
needed Campos’ assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he
could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone
the police. Ten minutes later, the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station,
arrived at the crime scene. They were immediately met by Campos, who informed them
that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the
premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. Once inside, SPO4
Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako
lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito." ("Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering,
and I shall face the consequences.") Keyser’s death shocked the nation. Appellant
Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by
two TV reporters, namely: Augusto "Gus" Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of
GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant
admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head
and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why
he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not
feed him properly, and treated him "like an animal." Both Abelgas and David said that
Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course
of their respective interviews with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guillermo’s confession to the police officers, to the security guard of
Greatmore Corp., and to the newsmen are admissible as evidence.

RULING:
The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Reyes
for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective
standards laid down by the Constitution. The investigating officer made no serious
effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While
the investigating officer was aware of Guillermo’s right to be represented by counsel,
the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation.
Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his
constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. Be that as it may,
however, the inadmissibility of Guillermo’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional
safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not
apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense.
Herein, Guillermo admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also
to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo
Campos, on the very day of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his
employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos’ testimony was not
rebutted by defense, and thus Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for
being part of the res gestae.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, Guillermo not only
agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his
guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to
reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were not under the direction and
control of the police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The
interviews also took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did
not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had
done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan, statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are
voluntary and admissible in evidence.

450 - People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, Sept. 26, 2006

Other Confessions

Facts:
January 2, 2001 when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-appellant, one hired
as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her employer.
She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified
as Rolando Gruta. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman
Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he
received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly
before the occurrence of the fire, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the house.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to
Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as
accused-appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag.
Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the
presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her
employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and
that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home.Accused-appellant was then turned over to arson
investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire
Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn
statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the latters detention
cell why she did the burning of her employers house and accused-appellant replied that
she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to her
province, the wife of her employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza asked
accused-appellant how she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that
she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on
top of the table inside the house.

Issue:
Whether the all confession without the assistance of competent and independent
counsel of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
No, Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular
instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to
the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually
the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family
of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already
been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay

Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to
her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the
police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally
admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto
Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible
in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee.
Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship
between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does
not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private
individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza
undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was
acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellants uncounselled
extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.

452. Illinois v. Perkins - 496 U.S. 292, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990)

RULE:
Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a
law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.

FACTS:
An informer told the police that a particular suspect might be responsible for an
unsolved Illinois murder, and the suspect was traced to an Illinois jail in which the
suspect was being held pending trial on an aggravated-battery charge unrelated to the
murder. The police placed an undercover agent in the jail with the suspect. Eventually,
the agent, without giving the suspect Miranda warnings, engaged in conversations with
the suspect, who made incriminating statements about the murder. The suspect was
then charged with the murder, but the circuit court of St. Clair County (Illinois) granted
the suspect's pretrial motion to suppress the statements made to the agent in the jail.
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, affirmed, expressing the view
that Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, prohibited all
undercover contacts which were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from
incarcerated suspects. Petitioner, the State of Illinois, was granted certiorari.

ISSUE:
Should an undercover law enforcement officer, posing as a fellow inmate, be required
to give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before engaging in a conversation
that could elicit incriminating response from the incarcerated suspect?

ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held
that Miranda warnings were not required when the suspect was unaware that he was
speaking to a law enforcement officer and gave a voluntary statement. The Court found
that conversations between suspects and undercover agents did not implicate the
concerns underlying Miranda. According to the Court, the essential ingredients of a
police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion were not present when an incarcerated
person spoke freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. Coercion was to be
determined from the perspective of the suspect. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that did not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to
speak were not within the concerns of Miranda warnings. The Court averred that
Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities.
453. Sec. of Justice Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
Ponente: Justice Mendoza

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner for the request to televise and
broadcast live the impeachment trial of former President Joseph Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the right of the people to public information and
right of the press should be upheld because the people are the repository of
sovereignty. Petitioner also argued that live television coverage is a safeguard against
any attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments to achieve their selfish
interests. Respondent objects to the live television coverage and radio broadcast as it
will violate the rule of sub judice and live media coverage will pave the way to “expert
commentary” which will result in demonstrations aimed at pressuring Sandiganbayan to
render a decision one way or another.
ISSUE:
WON live media coverage be allowed in former President Estrada’s impeachment
proceeding.

HELD:
The motion for reconsideration by the Petitioner is denied. However, the Supreme Court
has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial. The recording of the trial
will only be available after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision.
There are several reasons for such recording. First, the trial is of historical significance.
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for
the education and civic training of the people. Above all, there is a need to keep audio-
visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful
in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite
do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. Also, delaying the
release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings
will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance
of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be
allayed.

454. People v. Lugod, GR 136253, 21 February 2001

FACTS:

On September 15, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., the accused arrived at his house and joined the
drinking session of his son. He noticed that the accused was wearing a black T-shirt and
appeared to be drunk. Dela Torre claims that the accused left at around 11:45 p.m.
ROMUALDO RAMOS testified that at around 8:30 on the morning of September 16,
1997, he was driving his tricycle towards the poblacion of Cavinti. While driving towards
the poblacion, he noticed the accused coming out of the gate of Villa Anastacia. Upon
seeing the accused, he stopped his tricycle thinking that the accused would board the
same but the accused did not mind him. He noticed that the accused was wearing only
a pair of white short pants with a red waistline and was not wearing a T-shirt or any
slippers. The accused also appeared to be drunk. Thereafter, he proceeded to the
poblacion terminal where he discovered that Nairube was missing. He also learned that
the accused was the suspect behind her disappearance. Upon learning this, he told
Ricardo Vida, the Chief of the barangay tanod who was searching for the victim, to look
for her at Villa Anastacia because it was the place where he saw the accused come out
from. Ramos further testified that the house of the victim is about five hundred (500)
meters away from the place where he saw the accused but if one passes through the
coconut plantation, it is only two hundred (200) meters away. FLORO ESGUERRA, the
Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, testified that on September 19, 1997 at around 3:30 p.m., he
attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell.
In the course of his conversation with the accused, the accused confessed to the
commission of the offense. On October 8, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. In view of
the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before the Court on automatic
review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lugod’s confession and subsequent act of pointing the location of the
Nairube’s body may be used against him as evidence.

RULING:

No. The records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive
these rights. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped
and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for
having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill of Rights. In the same vein, Lugod's
act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of
the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled
confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume
that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional
rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the
peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2
Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore, when Lugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo,
the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him
there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards Lugod and
wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken
to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of
the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous
response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten
up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he
visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face,
corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession
of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was
established by the prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen
Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing
the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa
Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver
who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa
Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are
circumstantial in nature.

The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably
logical conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these
circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely
establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of
the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.

455. People vs Guillermo

G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004

Facts:
In 1998, the accused, armed with a piece of wood and a saw, attack, assault and
hit with a piece of wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw Victor F. Keyser,
his employer, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused his
death.
When arraigned, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to
the charge. However, later on, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and
prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion. Assisted by counsel de
parte, he entered a plea of not guilty.4 The case then proceeded to trial.
The prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard testified that he
saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he
saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. At around noontime, appellant calmly told him that he had
killed Victor Keyser and needed his assistance to help him carry the corpse to the
garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately
called the police. A team from the (PNP) arrived at the crime scene. Once inside, SPO4
Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako
lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito." SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of
the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes,
the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser.
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had
been maltreating him and his co-employees. The police then brought Guillermo to the
Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without
apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with
the services of counsel.
Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on
separate occasions by two TV reporters, "Gus" Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara
David of GMA. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave
it second thought. He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he
struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces. When asked why he killed
his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him
properly, and treated him "like an animal." Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo
expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their
respective interviews with him.
At the trial, appellant Guillermo’s defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged
he was a victim of police "frame-up." On cross-examination, appellant admitted that
he was the shirtless person in the photographs taken at the crime scene, while the
persons with him in the photographs were policemen wearing uniforms. He likewise
admitted that the cartons and sacks found by the police inside the factory premises
contained the mutilated remains of his employer. He claimed, however, that he was
surprised by the contents of said cartons and sacks. Appellant admitted that a
bloodstained piece of wood and a saw were also recovered by the police, but he
insisted that the police made him hold the saw when they took photographs. The trial
court disbelieved appellant’s version of the incident, but found the prosecution’s
evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the appellant.

Issue:
 (1) WON the appellant’s offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death
penalty, or only homicide for which a lesser penalty is appropriate?

Held:
Murder.
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that
the person has been truly "informed" of his rights. The confession of appellant made
while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes falls short of the protective
standards laid down by the Constitution. Appellant’s alleged confession at the police
station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer
made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial
investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellant’s right to be
represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the
flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer
proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Thus, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

However, the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes as

evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to
spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to
having committed the offense.

The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the
crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. As the Solicitor General points
out, appellant’s statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Rules of Court,48 a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.49 All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant’s
spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or
a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate,
admissible in evidence against him.

The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as
media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the
direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV
cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not
just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead,
he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing.
Thus, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a
televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.

Moreover, for treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any
crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender
arising from any defense which the offended party might make.52 Two essential
requisites must concur for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.53

A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and
increases the imposable penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.54 In the instant case, we find insufficient the
prosecution’s evidence to prove that the attack on the victim came without warning and
that he had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, or to escape. None of the
prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was initiated or carried out, simply
because there was no eyewitness to the offense. In addition, appellant’s narration in his
taped interview with Channel 7 is not too clear on this point. From the foregoing, all
that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the appellant, and the victim’s
back was turned towards the appellant when the latter picked up the piece of wood. It
does not, however, show that there was any deliberate effort on the part of the
appellant to adopt the particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the
commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. The
NBI pathologist who autopsied the victim’s body, observed that it was difficult to
determine the position of the victim in relation to his assailant.56 Nor was the expert
testimony of Dr. Baluyot definitive as to the relative position of the assailant and the
victim.
 The gap in the prosecution’s evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation.
Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in the victim’s demise.59
Any doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved in favor of appellant.

One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecution’s

evidence which shows that the victim’s corpse was sawn by appellant into seven (7)
pieces. Under Art. 248 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, "outraging or scoffing at the
corpse" is a qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim.60 In the instant case, the corpse of
Victor F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant who sawed off the head, limbs, and
torso. The Information categorically alleges this qualifying circumstance, when it stated
that the appellant "thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser." This
being the case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is guilty not just of homicide
but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances in the instant case, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon appellant.

456. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDES PAYNOR SEPTEMBER 9, 1996

G.R. 116222. 261 SCRA 615

Topic: Free Access to Courts

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Roxas, Isabela Br. 23
FACTS:

On September 18, 1991, on or about 4:00 in the afternoon, a ten-year old pupil named
Fesnaida Magaway, while sweeping the ground near her classroom having been
assigned as cleaner that day, witnessed the stabbing incident perpetrated by the
accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor against the victim-teacher of Roxas Central
Elementary School known as Carmelita Aguinaldo. The victim was rushed to the hosp
ital by her fellow teachers but was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA). Through t he
lone testimony of witnessed Magaway and after due investigation, a criminal case was
filed against the accused in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela.

RTC rendered its decision on April 21, 1994 declaring the accused guilt y beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code and imposes upon him a penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with all the necessary penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of
victim in the amount of P50,000 pesos, without however, subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay cost. Appellant sought the reversal of that verdict
claiming that the lower court erred, among others, that there was violation of the
MIRANDA DOCTRINE.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the MI RANDA
DOCTRINE when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped him of his clothing and
personal items, the latter having been introduced as evidence during the trial?

RULING:

The court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation
which is invoked by the accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor, refers to TESTIMONIAL
COMPULSION. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (Bill of Rights) provides
that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel,
and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of such rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him . As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional
right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused
is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the
proscription against testimonial compulsion.

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

457. People v. Garcia

G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003
FACTS:

Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. It is alleged in the
information they have unlawfully took from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX owned by Fernando Ignacio. During the commission of the offense they
assaulted and stabbed Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing mortal wounds
which directly resulted to his death. Both of the accused were found guilty by the trial
court and were both sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. They filed an appeal one of the
errors they raised is that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Bernabe
on the basis of his alleged admission of the crime to private individuals. Bernabe further
claims that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia
should not prejudice him; and (c) assuming he made such admission, it should be
excluded for having been made under duress and intimidation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the Bernabe’s admission
to Cortez and Ignacio.

RULING:

No, the court did not commit an error in admitting Bernabe’s admission to the
crime. Records show that both Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that
they were responsible for taking the vehicle and killing the victim. They first admitted it
on December 24, 1996 when Cortez visited them, when they were subsequently visited
by Cortez and Ignacio on December 26, 1996 only Garcia admitted to the commission
of the crime while Bernabe kept quiet. In the case of People v. Andan, it was held that
the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.

What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or

confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed
to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. Hence, appellant’s voluntary admission to Cortez that he and his co-accused
conspired in killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is
admissible as evidence against him.
Furthermore, accused appellant Bernabe failed to refute the extrajudicial confession
made by Garcia imputing him to the commission of the offense. Rule 130, Section 32 of
the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within
the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. . As
correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, “he cannot invoke his silence
during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing to do so, his
silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was not accused-appellant’s Garcia’s admission
that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when it was ‘such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true.

Wherefore, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

458. People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992)

Facts:
By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C.
Luvendino, Cesar Borca and Ricardo de Guzman with the crime of rape with murder of
victim Rowena Capcap on January 17, 1983. The trial court rendered a decision finding
Luvendino guilty.

On appeal, Luvendino contends that the "demonstration" or re-enactment and his

extrajudicial confession were effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by
him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the confession should be
held inadmissible in evidence because they had been involuntarily made.

The records indicate that immediately after appellant’s apprehension, the police officers
brought him to the Deva Subdivision, where the body of Rowena was found, where he
demonstrated how the victim was boxed, dragged and taken to the vacant lot where
she was raped and throttled to death. According to the evidence for the prosecution,
Luvendino in the re-enactment, had not only admitted his presence in the commission
of the crime but had likewise admitted he was with Borca in abusing Rowena.
Significantly, the evidence for the prosecution in this regard was not rebutted nor
denied by the accused.

Issue:

Whether the re-enactment may be admitted as evidence in the court.

Held:

The re-enactment of the accused of a crime he was charged of without the presence of
an independent and competent counsel cannot be admitted as evidence in the court.

The re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino

and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial
court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights “before he was
investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters” and cited the “Salaysay” of
appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took
place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the
record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of
his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had
waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration.
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court declined to uphold the admissibility of
evidence relating to that re-enactment. That the “demonstration” or re-enactment and
the accused extrajudicial confession were effected and secured in the absence of a valid
waiver by him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the confession
should be held inadmissible in evidence because they had been involuntarily made. 

459. People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)

Facts:
Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder
before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the
court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came
to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where
to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its
admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing
and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant

guilt of the accused.

Held:

In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the
court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is
in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence
against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer
and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession.
Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar.

The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is
competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in
substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial
investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the
judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.  

460. People v. Alicando 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a
minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after
appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the
parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five
arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3
Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police
came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him.
Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue:

Whether the evidence gathered is admissible to convict appellant of the crime and
punish him of death penalty.

Held:

The evidence gathered is inadmissible to convict appellant of the crime and punish him
of death penalty.

Once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The “fruit of the poisonous tree” is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to
counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the
prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived
from confession is not tainted as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The burden has to be
discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III
of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not reduce all the important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived
his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled
confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains
were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police
from the appellant. 

461. Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

FACTS:

Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police
officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales
at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial.
However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the
second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then
used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.

ISSUE:

Did the use of Harris' post-arrest statement violate his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision?

HELD:

No, the use of Harris' post-arrest statement did not violate his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision.

Petitioner's testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7

contrasted sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The
impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing
petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost, because of
the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.

Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse

to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak
truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the
traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements
been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the
conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and
impeachment.

The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury
by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances. 
462. New York vs. Quarles, 104 US 2626 (1984)

FACTS:

Respondent was charged in a New York state court with criminal possession of a
weapon.

The record showed that a woman approached two police officers who were on road
patrol, told them that she had just been raped, described her assailant, and told them
that the man had just entered a nearby supermarket and was carrying a gun. While one
of the officers radioed for assistance, the other (Officer Kraft) entered the store and
spotted respondent, who matched the description given by the woman. Respondent ran
toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun but lost
sight of him for several seconds.
Upon regaining sight of respondent, Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and put his hands
over his head; frisked him and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder
holster; and, after handcuffing him, asked him where the gun was. Respondent nodded
toward some empty cartons and responded that "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft
then retrieved the gun from one of the cartons, formally arrested respondent, and read
him his rights. Respondent indicated that he would answer questions without an
attorney being present and admitted that he owned the gun and had purchased it in
Florida.

The trial court excluded respondent's initial statement and the gun because the
respondent had not yet been given the Miranda warnings, and also excluded
respondent's other statements as evidence tainted by the Miranda violation. Both the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the exclusion of respondent's initial
statement and the gun because of Officer Kraft's failure to read respondent his Miranda
rights before attempting to locate the weapon.

Held:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the exclusion of respondent's initial statement
and the gun because of Officer Kraft's failure to read respondent his Miranda rights
before attempting to locate the weapon. Accordingly, it also erred in affirming the
exclusion of respondent's subsequent statements as illegal fruits of the Miranda
violation. This case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in
Miranda.

(a) Although respondent was in police custody when he made his statements and the
facts come within the ambit of Miranda, nevertheless on these facts there is a "public
safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's
answers may be admitted into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not
depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. The doctrinal
underpinnings of Miranda do not require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in
which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety. In this case, so long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket,
it posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of
it, or a customer or employee might later come upon it.

(b) Procedural safeguards that deter a suspect from responding, and increase the
possibility of fewer convictions, were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. However, if
Miranda warnings had deterred responses to Officer Kraft's question about the
whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the
failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting respondent. An answer was needed to
insure that future danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun
in a public area.

(c) The narrow exception to the Miranda rule recognized here will to some degree
lessen the desirable clarity of that rule. However, the exception will not be difficult for
police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency
which justifies it. Police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. 
463. Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)

FACTS:

On October 2, 1945, petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee, a political detainee, through

her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition praying for her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she
could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's
Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive
order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing then
officer having official custody of her person to immediately release her.

On October 9, 1945, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of said Court, entered an
order disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the
offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors
recommends as high as Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000) for her provisional release.”

ISSUE:

Whether Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth Constitution is applicable to

the instant case.

HELD:

Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth Constitution is applicable to the instant
case.

Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that:

“All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not
be required.”

This Constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a
complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all
persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when
he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course,
only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of
their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order
that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should
wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is
placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged
with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

Hence, the proper application of the pertinent constitutional, statutory, and

reglementary provisions alluded to in the body of this decision, a hearing of the
petitioner's application for bail be held before the People's Court with due notice to the
Solicitor General, as well as to the petitioner, as herein above outlined, said hearing,
whether summary or otherwise, to be such as would enable the People's Court to
exercise its sound discretion in the disposal of the aforesaid petition.
464. PEOPLE vs SAN DIEGO

FACTS:
The accused were charged for murder. The prosecution and the defense agreed that
the motions for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular
trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the
prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail
granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still
had material witnesses to present. Bail was granted on the ground that the evidence of
guilt was not strong.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial
court granted bail without allowing the prosecution to present their other witnesses?

RULING:
Yes. The prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial court granted
bail without allowing the prosecution to present their other witnesses.
The rule is whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered
void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having
been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void.
The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a
summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by
its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9
and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance
because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
They only contain the court’s conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being
thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this
ground, be allowed to stand.

465. CORTES vs CATRAL

FACTS
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral
of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he
granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v. Duerme, et al., Criminal Case
07-893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for murder);
(2) he reduced the bailbond granted by the provincial prosecutor from P180,000 to
P30,000 without hearing (Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s Criminal Case 11-6250
for Illegal Possession of Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond of P14,800 in a homicide
case (Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors
spreading that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s house to get
the envelop. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the
complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that would
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the judge.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to
the accused
in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866.

RULING
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been
emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the
accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It
may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt
be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07-874 was
subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda does not completely exculpate Judge Catral.
The judge is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and
sworn statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly be
the basis for determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. The procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by the fact that even though
the accused in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be
arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. The right to bail can
only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for
some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases
07-874 and 08-866 without having conducted the requisite hearing.
466. LAVIDES vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
The parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16
years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at
Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at
the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When
Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-
shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. In all the cases, it was alleged
that Lavides had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in
prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No
bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail.
Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount
of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-
departure" order of 10 April 1997. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision that (1)
the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In
the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other
respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his
presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.

RULING
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at
the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116,
§1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the
grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be
held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the
accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's
strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's
constitutional rights.
467-468. GOVERNMENT OF U.S.A vs JUDGE PURGANAN

FACTS
The US Government and the Philippines has an existing treaty namely the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. On June 16, 1999, the US Government sent notes to the Philippine
government requesting for the extradition of a certain Mark Jimenez. The note was
transmitted to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and was forwarded to the Secretary of
Justice. The request for extradition was granted and a TRO was issued. The Secretary
of Justice filed a Motion for Reconsideration and with 9-6 votes, the decision was
reversed. This decision was based on the fact that Jimenez was deprived of his right to
hearing and notice. On the other hand, the US Government mentioned that the
extradition was necessary because Jimenez was subject to a warrant of arrest in
Florida. He was charged with the crimes of conspiracy to defraud US, tax evasion, wire
fraud, false statement, and illegal campaign. Due to these reasons, the US Government
seek for the immediate arrest of the accused. Respondent Jimenez filed an Urgent
Manifestation to set the hearing for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. After the
hearing, the Court granted the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixed the bail of
Jimenez at one million pesos. The substantive issues in this case involved the power of
the Supreme Court to handle the petition for certiorari without the ruling of the CA and
the interpretation of the law on extradition.

ISSUE
Whether or not Private Respondent Jimenez is entitled to bail while his
extradition proceeding is pending.

RULING
No, he is not entitled to bail. Extradition cases are different from ordinary
criminal proceedings. The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.”It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. Respondent
Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing that, constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.” Contrary to his contention,
his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to
a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the
doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case — call for it, a
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness. Moreover, he cannot apply for bail to the Extradition Court (PH).
Instead, he can apply for bail before the court that will render the decision against the
criminal offense he was charged with.
469. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs
OLALIA

FACTS
Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an
advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common
law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the
provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to
RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him. Respondent filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of
arrest. The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong
Department of Justice thru DOJ. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and
sustained the validity of the arrest. Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the
RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the
petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private responded is a “flight risk”. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

RULING
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases,
since it is available only in criminal proceedings. However the Supreme Court,
recognised the following trends in International Law. 1. The growing importance of the
individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th century attained global
recognition. 2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international
sphere 3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations 4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition on the
other. In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been
detained for 2 years without being convicted in Hongkong. The Philippines has the
obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process and should not
therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for
the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE”. However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to
show and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is
remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the
cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.
TOPIC: WHEN RIGHT MAY BE INVOKED

470. COMMENDADOR
v
VILLA
200 SCRA 80
(Mark Felias)

RULE: Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to

be heard; The right to bail is not available in the military.

FACTS:

These four cases have been consolidated because the invoke practically and
related issues arising from the same incident,

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were
directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there
was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A
motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration alleging denial
of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, LtC Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge
of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately.
The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail
the right to bail.
 The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges.
The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had
been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a denial of due process.

2. Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

HELD:

1. No. There was no denial of due process.

Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after
the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7,
1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion
for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been
expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence."
Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of
members of G/SCM).

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be

heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill
of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI
Panel. Moreover, even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a
general court- martial of jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction
of a court-martial.

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to
order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is
without merit. *The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.

2. No. There was no violation of the accused right to bail.

The right to bail is not available in the military4. The right to bail invoked by the
private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was
able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R.
No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles
of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of
the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed
and set aside. No costs.
471. ARULA
v
ESPINO
28 SCRA 540
(Mark Felias)

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction to try a particular criminal case is vested in a court only when
the appropriate charge is filed with it AND when jurisdiction of the person is acquired by
it through the arrest of the party charged or by his voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction

NATURE: Original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction.

FACTS:

The present original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction seeks the annulment of Special Order 208 (issued on April 6,
1968 by the respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino as commanding general of
the Philippine Army), which special order convenes a general court-martial and appoints
the members thereof, and to prohibit permanently the said court-martial, composed of
the other respondents, from taking cognizance of and proceeding with the trial of the
case before it with respect to the shooting and wounding of the petitioner Jibin Arula.
The petition was filed with this Court on April 25, 1968, and given due course the
following day, April 26. We issued a temporary restraining order on the same day, April
26, "effective immediately and until further orders from this Court," and set the
"hearing on the injunction and merits" for May 6.

The petitioner Arula was on December 17, 1967 recruited by one Capt. Teodoro
R. Facelo of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at Simunul, Sulu, to undergo training.
On the following January 3, he, together with other recruits, was taken to Corregidor
island. On March 18 a shooting incident occurred at Corregidor, resulting in, among
other things, the infliction of serious physical injuries upon the petitioner. Despite his
wounds he succeeded in fleeing Corregidor, and on March 23, he filed, a criminal
complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt. Alberto
Soteco, Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio
Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, and nine others. Acting on the criminal complaint, the city
fiscal on March 29 sent subpoenas to the persons above enumerated, advising them
that the preliminary investigation was set for April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the morning, and
requiring them to appear at his office on the same date and time.

On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the Philippine
Army, informing the latter that he was "not filing any charges" with the military
authorities against the army personnel responsible for his injuries, for the reason that
he had "already filed the corresponding criminal complaint" with the city fiscal of Cavite
City. On the following day, April 3, the date set for the preliminary investigation, army
lawyers headed by Capt. Jose Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the respondents and
requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which, as a result of such
request, was reset for April 16.

Meanwhile, the respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of

his command to conduct a pre-trial investigation of the Corregidor incident to pinpoint
responsibility therefor. As early as March 22, however, all of the army personnel, except
two, supposedly involved in the hapless incident had already been placed under
technical arrest and restricted to camp limits. (These last two were subsequently, on
April 16, placed under technical arrest.)

On April 6, Capt. Pontejos submitted his pre-trial investigation report, the

respondent General Espino issued Special Order 208, appointing a General court-
martial, composed of the other respondents, to try the case against the army personnel
involved in the Corregidor incident, intervenors herein being among them. Charges and
specifications for violations of articles of war 94 and 97 5 were filed with the general
court-martial; additional charges and specifications were subsequently filed and
renumbered.

At the hearing by the general court-martial on April 16, the petitioner Arula
adduced testimony to prove specification 1, charge 1 (violation of the 94th article of
war) which directly and squarely pertains to the shooting and wounding of the said
petitioner.
 On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with
the city fiscal of Cavite upon the ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction over
the case because a court-martial had been convened.

It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as

Commander-in-Chief) ordered an investigation of the reported killings of commando
trainees on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day, March 22, directed the
creation of a court-martial to try whomsoever might be responsible for the reported
killings. (See the March 22 and 23, 1968 issues of the Manila Times, Philippines Herald
and Manila Daily Bulletin.) So that before the petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint
(on March 23) with the city fiscal of Cavite, the President had already ordered an
investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of a court-martial relative
thereto.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the general-court martial have jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether or not the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint (involving
the same offense) with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the
Court of First Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to try the case to the exclusion of
the general court-martial.

HELD:

(1) The general-court martial have the jurisdiction over the case.

Of basic and immediate involvement is article of war 94 of Commonwealth Act

408, as amended by Republic Act 242, which provides in full as follows:

Various Crimes. — Any person subject to military law who commits any
felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance which is
recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal
laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation
when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be
more than one) in a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct, Provided, That, in time of peace officers and
enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-
 martial for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinances committed under this article. In imposing the penalties for such
offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in
the penal laws of the Philippines or such municipal ordinances shall be taken
into consideration.

Proclamation No. 69 (hereinafter referred to as P-69) declaring "Corregidor,

including the adjacent islands and detached rocks surrounding the same," a military
reservation and placing it under the direct supervision and control of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The petitioner's insistence that Corregidor is no longer a military
reservation is anchored on Executive Order No. 58 (hereinafter referred to as EO 58)
issued on August 16, 1954 by President Ramon Magsaysay, which declared "all
battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan province" as national shrines and "except
such portions as may be temporarily needed for the storage of ammunition or deemed
absolutely essential for safeguarding the national security," opening them "to the
public, accessible as tourist resorts and attractions, as scenes of popular pilgrimages
and as recreational centers," from which the petitioner argues that Corregidor is no
longer a military reservation because it has been converted into a national shrine and
made accessible to the public.

The duty of the Commission to recondition the airstrip in Corregidor (paragraph

6, EO 58) does not, in fact and in law, make the said air-strip itself a "battlefield area"
or "historic site" within the contemplation of EO 58. Clearly, the airstrip and resthouses
mentioned are only service facilities to promote tourism.

Corregidor island, in its entirety, is a battlefield area, the petitioner invokes

Executive Order No. 123 dated March 15, 1968, which, amending EO 58, authorizes the
National Shrines Commission, with the prior approval of the President, "to enter into
any contract for the conversion of areas within national shrines into tourist spots and to
lease such areas to any citizen or citizens of the Philippines, or any corporation 60% of
the capital stock of which belongs to Filipino citizens." In the absence, however, of the
delimitation and marking of the historical sites or battlefield areas and pending the
conversion of portions thereof into tourist spots (disposable for lease to private parties),
the status and identity of the entire Corregidor Island as a national defense zone
remain unchanged.

Thus, the airstrip on Corregidor Island where the shooting and wounding of the
petitioner Arula allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of
Proclamation No. 69, series of 1948, and is therefore to be properly considered a part
of the military reservation that is Corregidor Island

(2) The general-court martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
latter court.

Because the prime imputed to the accused, who are persons subject to military
law, was committed in a military reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction
concurrent with the Court of First Instance of Cavite to try the offense.

The record in the present case discloses that on April 6 and thereafter, charges
and specifications were preferred against Major Eduardo Martelino and several others
including the accused Soteco, Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara
for violations of the 94th article of war. An order for their arrest and/or custody was
issued (annex 13). Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara were subsequently, that is,
on April 16, placed under technical arrest. On the other hand, no indictment has yet
been filed with the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the complaint lodged by the petitioner
with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite City, the same being merely in the preliminary
investigation phase. The mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting fiscal cannot
have parity with the filing of such complaint with the court. And even if there could be
such parity, the criterion laid down in Crisologo is not the mere filing of the complaint or
information but the actual taking into custody of the accused under the process of one
court or the other.

Evidently, the general court-martial has acquired jurisdiction, which it acquired

exclusively as against the CFI of Cavite, not only as to the element of precedence in the
filing of the charges, but also because it first acquired custody or jurisdiction of the
persons of the accused. Court-martial jurisdiction over the accused having properly
attached, such military jurisdiction continues throughout all phases of the proceedings,
including appellate review and execution of the sentence.

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pre-trial investigation

under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial
might nevertheless have jurisdiction. 16 Significantly, this rule is similar to the one
obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of
preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings.
 Likewise, the respondent Espino's authority, as commanding general of the
Philippine Army, to refer military charges against members of his command for trial by
general court-martial cannot legally be assailed. Under article of war 8, as implemented
by the Manual for Courts-Martial (PA) and Executive Order 493, series 1952, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force is empowered to appoint general
courts-martial.

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and

discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. "Even an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari."

The speedy referral by the appointing authority, herein respondent Espino, of the
case to a general court-martial for trial is not jurisdictional error. Speedy trial is a
fundamental right accorded by the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1[17]), the Rules of Court
(Rule 115, Sec. 7[h]) and article of war 71 to an accused in all criminal prosecutions.

This right to a speedy trial is given greater emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist. In Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court of the United States
observed that the discipline necessary to the efficiency of the Army required swifter
modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts.

In the military, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by article

of war 71 which requires that when a person subject to military law is placed in arrest
or confinement, immediate steps shall be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss
the charge and release him. This article further requires that, if practicable, the general
court-martial charges shall be forwarded to the appointing authority within eight days
after the accused is arrested or confined; if the same is not practicable, he shall report
to the superior authority the reasons for delay.

The importance of the right to speedy trial is underscored by the fact that an
officer who is guilty of negligence or omission resulting in unnecessary delay may be
held accountable therefor under article of war 71.
472. TRILLANES
v
PIMENTEL
(Mark Felias)

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that
evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court
to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to
be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court
to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant can avail for Leave of Court to attend
Senate Sessions upon his election as Senator.

HELD:
 No. The accused-appellant cannot avail for Leave of Court to attend Senate
Sessions upon his election as Senator.

The Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law .

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated
range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it
is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance
was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in
such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.”

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior
term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine
of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election
to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.
 It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty
conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may
be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate
of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Emergency
or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed
petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in
February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take
his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of
the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely
banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
473. PADILLA
v
CA
260 SCRA 155
(Mark Felias)

FACTS:

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found
in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions;
and;
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 1866. Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black
bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine.

PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a
Certification which stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16
Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919
and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C.
Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three firearms were not also registered in
the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.

After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April
5, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". Petitioner filed his notice of
appeal on April 28, 1994. Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on
December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond.

Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent
authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and
cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that
petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the
Solicitor-General's change of heart.

Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no
dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.

HELD:

No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner,
but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
 Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We
beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner’s
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the
most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by
himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could
have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to
contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein
involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported
and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,
cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.
The exigent circumstances of – hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the
public place and the raining nighttime – all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that
the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper as he was
again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be

justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was
no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge
in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast-
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by
Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. This formed part of the arresting
police officer’s personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was
indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police
officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
 Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information,
his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to
assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived
such irregularities and defects.

In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears that the

authorities stumbled upon petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver
and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner’s waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting
from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite
rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at
the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver’s seat. Thus it has been
held that:

“(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,

the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by
any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.”

“Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain

view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.”

With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent
court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent
case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate
penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals

sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

473. OBOSA
v
CA
266 SCRA 281
(Mark Felias)

DOCTRINE: Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for
his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the
answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the
accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years
long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide
and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong
reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an
ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It
found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in
danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
attended by his personal physician.

For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be

allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie
determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of
petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application
for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory
is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal from judgement

convicting him of homicide though charged with murder.

HELD:

No. The petitioner is not entitled to bail.

Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the

offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On
the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except
when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor a
discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of right.
(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied).

And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 of

Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure - the presence of
any of which could preclude the grant of bail - are as follows:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused
may commit another crime.

It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing amendments, not only
does the conviction of petitioner for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being
admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound
discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in
paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are present in petitioner's situation, would have
justified and warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive application of the
said circular in the instant case is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to
petitioner.
 We have previously held that, while the accused, after conviction, may upon
application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion - particularly with
respect to extending the bail - should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and
only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and
the administration of justice.

In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital
crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering
that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged
and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would
be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.

We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion
and caution required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from
being too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting
without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact
of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be commended for its
vigilance, discretion and steadfastness. In ruling against bail, it even scoured the
records and found that treachery attended the killing thereby justifying its action. The
trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully debunked by the
appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law
must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." Law
should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the
sake of logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific
environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the
social edifice." 39

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
two assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.
475. ENRILE
v
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

General Rule of Law/Doctrine:

One of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before the proper
court whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing
supports this purpose.

Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is
the reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important
factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases.
The exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official and
social standing and his other personal circumstances arc considered and appreciated as
tending to render his flight improbable.
FACTS:

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
of the Office of the Ombudsman, have filed their Motion for Reconsideration to assail
the decision promulgated on August 18, 2015 granting Enrile (charged with plunder a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua) bail despite the constitutionally mandated rule
under Article III Section 13:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required .

SC said Enrile can bail.

Under the original case the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of
age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion
for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that
before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is
the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his
age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof
showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends
that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to
be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Decision openly ignore and abandoned the constitutionally
mandated procedure for determining whether a person accused of a crime punishable
by Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment such as plunder can be granted bail.

HELD:

No. According to the Supreme Court, Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
expressly states that one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before
the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail
fixing supports this purpose. Thus, in Villasenor v. Abano, the Court has pronounced
that "the principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which most
factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight
to avoid punishment."

The Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting
bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and would
continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayanto answer the charges
levelled against him. Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused
answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and
without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the
function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is
required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced.
Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon
mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the
procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards
has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the
individuals wrongly accused could be punished by the period or imprisonment they
undergo while awaiting trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel, searching
for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense.

Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's

interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial. The
petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he would not be a flight
risk. For one, his advanced age and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood
that he would make himself scarce and escape from the jurisdiction of our courts. The
testimony of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, Director of the Philippine General Hospital, showed
that the petitioner was a geriatric patient suffering from various medical conditions,
which, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to his life. The medical findings
and opinions have been uncontested by the Prosecution even in their present Motion
for Reconsideration.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the

objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s
Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile upon posting of a
cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release
of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.

476. Paderanga vs. Drilon

247 SCRA 741 (1995)
(Christine Funcion)

FACTS:
On 28 January 1990, Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended
information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had
initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as
the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet
Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The
others have remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one
Felizardo Roxas was implicated in the crime. As Paderanga was his former employer
and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case.
Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed
affidavit which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally
charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information
dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the
way to the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon.
Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy
and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19 April 1991, the Court
sustained the filing of the second amended information against him.

The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga through
counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court
which set the same for hearing on 5 November 1992. As Paderanga was then confined
at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his
counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to
the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of
the law. ProsecutorAbejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance
with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail
and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon
further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5
November 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, 6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak
but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case. On 1 October 1993, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari.
The resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled
on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for
admission to bail.

RULING:
Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and
physically placed under arrest. He may, however, therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the
hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place
Paderanga in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated
and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering
his confinement or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the
constructive custody of the law.

477. Go vs. Bongolan

AM 99-1464, 26 July 1999
(Christine Funcion)

FACTS:
On November 10, 1997, in the province of Abra, Balmores, Reynaldo, PO1
Molina, Cacal, and three other John Does, allegedly kidnapped and detained Samuel Go.
The vehicle he was in during his transport from Abra to Ilocos Sur was intercepted by
the PNP wherein Go was recovered.

A case was filed against the accused for kidnapping with ransom. The
prosecution recommended no bail for the accused as the penalty for the crime allegedly
committed is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.
 Balmores filed a motion, asking for the amendment of the information from
kidnapping with ransom to simple kidnapping, alleging that the evidence presented did
not show that the kidnapping was for ransom. Respondent Judge Benjamin Bongolan of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Balmores’ motion, holding that it is the State that
determines the contents of the information and it is the State's responsibility to prove
its allegation contained in the information under the principle of `allegata et probata'.

Molina and Cacal, as allowed by the RTC, filed their separate memorandum for
motion for bail, reiterating the claim that prosecution failed to prove kidnapping for
ransom. The prosecution asserted that the motion was prematurely filed since they are
still in the process of presenting further evidence to prove the commission of the crime.

Judge Bongolan subsequently granted the motions for bail, holding that the
prosecution did not show that the evidence of guilt is strong. He, however, gave the
prosecution 10 days to file its motion for reconsideration.

Before such motion could be filed, the accused were already released, through
the order by Judge Alberto Banesa, the designated pairing judge of Judge Bongolan,
which he issued based on seeing that Judge Bongolan already approved the motion for
bail. Judge Bongolan was unaware of the accused release since he was in the hospital.
Subsequently, Judge Bongolan denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Bongolan correctly granted the accused motion for bail before
hearing the bail application.

RULING:
No. Judge Bongolan incorrectly granted the accused motion for bail. Complaints
involving irregular approval of bailbond and issuance of order release appear to be a
common offense of judges. A bail hearing is necessary to give the prosecution
reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by showing that the evidence of guilt
is strong.

It is true that when asked by Judge Bongolan whether the prosecution would
present additional evidence, Prosecutor Gayao responded in the negative.
Subsequently, however, the prosecution changed its mind when it stated in its
Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for admission to bail would be premature
since it has additional witnesses to present. In his Comment, Judge Bongolan contends
that it is not necessary for the prosecution to present all its witnesses before he could
resolve the motion for bail. The stance cannot be sustained.

In Borinaga v. Tamin, the Court ruled that the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the motion for bail
of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution is denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process. The records show
that the prosecution was supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses on June 4,
1998 when Judge Bongolan prematurely resolved the motion. A bail application does
not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of
the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous
elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of discretion.

478. People v. Gako

GR 135045, 15 December 2000
(Christine Funcion)

FACTS:
Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead and an Information was filed against the three accused
namely, de la Peña, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan.

Judge Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused. An Urgent Motion to confine Go in a
hospital was thereafter filed which was later on granted. Judge Agana sustained the
objections of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to
establish the conspiracy to kill the victim.

The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. Court
of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of
Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the dismissal
of the appeal of Go and Herodias, the case was re-raffled and an Alias Warrant of
Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias.

The physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, to which Go filed
a Petition for Bail.
The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. An
Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of
Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard. Judge Gako, Jr. issued an
Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go.

Prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay
in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of Go.
Prosecution moved for the reconsideration of order which granted bail to Go. Judge
Gako, Jr. thereafter issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order which granted the Bail of Go (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion
to Inhibit the Presiding Judge.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Gako’s grant of bail to Go was proper.

RULING:
No. The assailed Order granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the
requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing
for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.” Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect
to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the
criminal case, was charged with murder, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that
re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, accused Go’s right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is
discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it,
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have
appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he
did not even bother to hear the prosecution.

The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the
accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is
worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process

Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion
without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the
grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted
or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution. The judge’s findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr.
Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November
1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of
Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report when 9 months had
already passed from the time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore
clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting
bail when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise
strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his
life.

479. Enrile vs Salazar

G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
(Christine Funcion)

Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula
Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed
on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from
an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme
penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in
the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion
may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by
the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which
this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle
for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied
by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was
also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings
in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail
to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus
oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
480. People v. Judge Donato
G.R No. 79269, 05 June 1991
(Christine Funcion)
FACTS:
Private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody following their arrest.
An information was then filed charging them for the crime of rebellion. A petition for
habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed but was dismissed
on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent
“will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his
person” and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they
shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person. Private respondent then filed a petition for bail which
respondent judge granted.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the right to bail may be waived.

HELD:
YES. The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with
a right recognized by law.

Orders of respondent judge are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

481. People v. Fortes

223 SCRA 619 (1993)
(Christine Funcion)
Facts:
Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said
municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following
this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed,
the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the
ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Issue:
Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.

Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a
matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once
it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.

Case # 482
Right to Bail:
Bail on Appeal:
Maguddatu, et.al. vs Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 139599,
February 23, 2000

FACTS:
After being charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners
Maguddatu, et.al filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the
prosecution’s evidence is not strong. After partial of the merits, the motion was granted
which petitioners filed through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. However, said
corporation filed a motion before the trial court for the cancellation of petitioner’s bail
bond due to failure to renew upon its expiration.
The petitioners were convicted by the trial court of homicide and issued an order
for their immediate arrest. While remaining at large, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal
from the order of conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional
liberty, under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court forwarded the record
to the Court of Appeals.
The CA issued a resolution declaring that the appeal is deemed abandoned and
dismissed, and thus ordered the RTC to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate
apprehension and service of sentence of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to bail during the whole duration when
their cause is on appeal and still at large.

HELD:
No. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody
of law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Despite an order of arrest from the trial court
and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large.
The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. Petitioners Compliance and Motion, dated Feb. 8, 1999
came short of an unconditional submission to respondent court’s lawful order and to its
jurisdiction.

Case # 483
Right to Bail:
Bail on Appeal:
Oboza Vs. C.A.
G.R. No. 114350
Jan. 16, 1997

Facts:
While fugitive from justice, petitioner committed other crimes including double
murder for which he was convicted only for double homicide. While he was appealing
his conviction therein, the convicting court allowed him to post bail notwithstanding that
he was already serving prison terms for prior offenses. Respondent court, in a
resolution, canceled petitioner’s bail bond, nullified the trial court’s order granting him
bail, and issued a warrant for his immediate arrest. It also denied petitioner’s twin
motion for reconsideration and to quash the warrant of arrest.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal from judgment
convicting him of homicide though charged with murder.

Ruling:
No. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused,
who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime.
Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that
the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and
that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be
well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court’s sound discretion.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit and assailed resolutions are
affirmed.

Case # 484
Right to Bail:
Standards for fixing bail:
Villaseñor vs. Hon. Abaño,
September 29, 1967
G.R. No. L-23599

FACTS:
Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of
P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five, was charged with the murder of
a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k. The
petitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty. -
However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the information, now accusing the
petitioner with “Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder"
before the arraignment on the murder charge. So on August 7, respondent judge
cancelled the petitioner’s bond and ordered his immediate arrest.
On September 9 upon petitioner’s motion to reconsider, the respondent judge
resolved to admit petitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60k. -On
September 15, on petitioner’s motion that original bond previously given be reinstated,
respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of
P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually
staying, therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of
said residents for five years."
On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for prelim injunction to SC, seeking to set
aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, and to reinstate the
bail bond approved on May 29 (original bond), charging the respondent judge of having
acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/
violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed orders.
Oct 3, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond. Nov 5,
SC allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its
prosecution.

ISSUES
1. WON the orders of August 7 and 9 should be set aside
2. WON THE P60K bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional
injunction that excessive bail shall not be required?
3. WON the condition that the property bond be posted only by "residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying therein" is within the power of the respondent
judge
4. WON the requirement that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the
possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five years” is within the power of
the respondent judge
 HELD:
1. NO NEED, A rule of ancient respectability is that it is not the function of a
court of justice to furnish answers to purposeless questions that no longer exist.
The said orders were replaced by the last order of September 15, 1964, by virtue
of which the cash bond required was reverted back to property bond. The two orders of
August 7 and September 9, 1964 thus became functus officio.
2. NO, the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most
other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his
flight to avoid punishment. Reasoning Guidelines in fixing bail:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing at trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from just ice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definition of bail): "the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond
or recognizance." -Circular 47 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48,
directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the
offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here, petitioner is
charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority
with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of capital punishment.
3. YES, Bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are
not within the reach of the processes of its courts. - Bail is given to secure appearance
of the accused. If bondsmen reside in faraway places, even if within the Philippines, the
purpose of bail may be frustrated. Reasoning Weighing as heavily against petitioner's
case is the fact that a reading of his petition fails of an averment that the requisite
exacted that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in Marinduque would cause
him prejudice. The burden of his arguments solely is that such a condition runs counter
to the rules of court (Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court1). -reason why respondent
judge issued such condition: it is hard to send notices to people outside of the province
through registered mail accompanied by return cards which in many instances have not
been received in court when trial comes and when the parties fail to appear, there is no
way of knowing whether the notices have been duly received; therefore, he cannot
order the confiscation of the bond and the arrest of the accused because he is not sure
whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people
outside the province is costly, and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses. 1
"SEC. 9. Qualification of sureties- The necessary qualifications of sureties to a bail bond
shall be as follows: (a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder
within the Philippines

4. YES, Circular 2 of the Secretary of Justice, addressed, amongst others, to

Judges of First Instance recites that it had been brought to the attention of the
Department of Justice that in certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious
land owners have been accepted as sureties. The Secretary then suggested that "(1)t
may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered by
certificates of title unless they have been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the
person offering them as bond for at least five (5) years." -rationale of Circular 2:
prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal bail bonds
and to protect the interests of the Government. - the order of September 15, 1964 is to
be understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement
that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the
sureties for at least five years. Disposition With the observations heretofore adverted to,
we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction issued herein. Costs against petitioner. So, ordered.

Case # 485
Right to Bail:
Standards for fixing bail:

De la Camara vs. Enage

G.R. Nos. L-32951-2
September 17, 1971

Facts:
Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of
twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of
Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against
petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for
bail was filed by petitioner which was granted and the amount was fixed at the
excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.

ISSUE:
WON the amount of the bail bond is excessive

HELD:
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore,
than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional provision
under the circumstances.

Case # 486
Right to Bail:
Standards for fixing bail:

Almeda v. Villaluz
G.R. No. L-31665
August 6, 1975

Facts
Petitioner was charged with qualified theft. Respondent judge approved a bail of
P15,000.00 on the condition that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing, petitioner
asked that he be allowed to post instead a surety bond, which request, however, was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond
and disallow the petitioner’s attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.

Held
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that bail is “the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance.” The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused
from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
Moreover, the trial court cannot strictly require that bail shall only be in the form
of a cash bond. The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon
his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law
on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when
required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the
accused nor revenue on the part of the government.
The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction
only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of
bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly
speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the
body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option
to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.
Therefore, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist
that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.

Case # 487
Right to Bail:
Standards for fixing bail:

Yap vs Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 141529,
June 6, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA
granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on
condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to
the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested the
condition imposed by the CA that he secures a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right
against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and
right to travel.

Held:
1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and

constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when
required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction
of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not
intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily
await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

 The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
“The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.”
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the
Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.