Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Order Affirming
Order Affirming
No. 20-10337
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
JOHNNY BLASH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Defendants,
WILLIAM B. CAPE,
Executor of the Estate of Billy Cape deceased,
DANNY BRANNEN,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff,
Pulaski County, Georgia,
Defendants-Appellees.
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________________________
PER CURIAM:
Office, appeals the district court’s (1) grant of summary judgment for the
official capacity as the current Sheriff, and former Sheriff Billy Cape (now
deceased) in his individual capacity, and (2) dismissal of his race discrimination
claim against Brannen in his individual capacity for failure to state a claim.
I.
County Sheriff’s Office from 2010 until he was fired on December 1, 2014 by
then-Sheriff Cape, who was Caucasian. Brannen, who is also Caucasian, held the
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other racially derogatory comments while on the job at the Sheriff’s Office.1 For
the man had a business license, Brannen said to the man, “You know how you can
tell if a black person is lying?” When the man’s wife responded, “How?” Brannen
racial bias. Cape was present on one occasion when Brannen was discussing a call
When a deputy who was also present objected to Brannen’s racist language, Cape
just laughed and Brannen kept talking. One time, during a “town hall” meeting at
about racist and abusive treatment by Brannen. Cape generally made excuses for
Brannen’s racist conduct and language or took Brannen’s side in denying that any
Brannen, who as “Captain” supervised all the patrol shifts, allowed his
evident racism to carry over into his management decisions. One deputy overheard
Brannen saying that each patrol shift needed to have “one black and one white”
1
Brannen denies making such comments, but at the summary judgment stage we must credit
Blash’s version of the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007); Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, we credit the
nonmoving party’s version.” (emphasis omitted)).
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deputy, and that there were “too many blacks” on one shift. The same deputy, who
is African American, testified that Brannen and Cape “made up” policies and rules
as they went along, and that they implemented them in a racially discriminatory
way. For example, the African American deputy was not allowed to drive his
patrol car home for the first year of his employment, ostensibly because of the
distance to his home. But after the Sheriff hired a Caucasian deputy who lived
even further away, the rule was changed so that both deputies could drive their
On one occasion before he was fired, Blash was disciplined more harshly
than a Caucasian deputy who committed the same offense. Specifically, the
Caucasian deputy used his marked patrol car for personal reasons by driving it to
the fairgrounds when he was off duty. He was given a verbal reprimand but was
allowed to retain his patrol car without restriction. When Blash similarly used his
patrol car for nonwork purposes while he was off duty, Brannen personally went to
retrieve the patrol car and Blash was suspended for two days and not allowed to
Aside from the incident with the patrol car, it appears that Blash’s work
performance was satisfactory, at least until just before Blash was fired. The record
contains only one performance evaluation, in which Blash was given a “good”
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told Blash that a postal driver had approached him about his pain medication.
Though Blash didn’t know it, the postal driver, Renee Howard, soon came under
investigation by the United States Postal Service and a local drug task force for
Sheriff’s Office Chief Investigator Robert McGriff and Jay Williams, a Sheriff’s
deputy who was a member of the drug task force, at the Sheriff’s Office to discuss
Howard. At some point during or after the briefing, McGriff showed Blash a
surveillance image of Orta and asked if he knew who he was. Blash identified
Orta and surmised that the Sheriff’s Office was taking part in an investigation.
McGriff did not tell Blash anything about the investigation, and there was no
further discussion after Blash identified Orta. Several weeks later, McGriff told
Blash that there had been a sting operation involving Howard and that it had been
successful. Blash was not advised of any ongoing investigation involving Howard.
To the contrary, McGriff indicated to Blash that the operation was over, since they
“got” Howard.
Blash encountered Orta and advised him to “stay away” from Howard. According
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to Blash and another deputy, it was common practice for law enforcement officers
to tell civilian acquaintances to “stay away” from or “be careful of” situations that
conversation with Orta was reported through a chain of contacts that eventually
reached Sheriff Cape:2 Orta called Howard and told her that a deputy had warned
him to stay away from her. Howard called the Postal Service inspector and told
him that she was afraid that her status as an informant had leaked and she would
not be safe. The Postal Service inspector contacted Deputy Williams and told him
to deal with the Sheriff’s Office leak or the inspector would “handle it.” Williams
relayed the inspector’s complaint to Major Jason Freemont, and together Freemont
and Williams interviewed Orta and then Blash, who freely admitted telling Orta to
stay away from Howard. Major Freemont “briefed” Sheriff Cape, and after
2
Blash objects to Deputy Williams’s testimony regarding out-of-court statements made to
Williams by the postal inspector or by Orta, by Williams to Major Freemont, and by Major
Freemont to then-Sheriff Cape. It is true that generally, inadmissible hearsay cannot be
considered on a motion for summary judgment. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283,
1293 (11th Cir. 2012). But out-of-court statements that are introduced to show the effect of the
statement on the listener, rather than to prove the truth of the matter stated, are not hearsay. Fed.
R. Evid. 801(c); see United States v. Harris, 886 F.3d 1120, 1129–30 (11th Cir. 2018).
Moreover, the district court found that each of the witnesses whose statements Williams reported
could be called to testify at trial, and “a district court may consider a hearsay statement in
passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be reduced to admissible
evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form.” Jones, 683 F.3d at 1293–94.
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meeting with Major Freemont and Captain Brannen to discuss Blash’s “fate,” Cape
told Blash that he could resign or be fired. Blash refused to resign and asked for an
independent investigation of his actions. Cape fired him without having an outside
agency investigate.
investigation to the local district attorney, and Blash was arrested and charged in
Pulaski County Superior Court with violation of his oath as a public officer and
obstructing the Postal Service inspector in the discharge of his official duties, by
charges against Blash were dismissed in September 2017 on motion of the county
district attorney.
Commission, alleging that although he was told that he had been terminated for
against because of his race. After receiving his “right to sue” letter from the
EEOC, Blash filed this employment discrimination suit against Pulaski County and
the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office; Cape, individually; and Brannen, individually
and in his official capacity as the current Sheriff of Pulaski County. Blash alleged,
essentially, that Captain Brannen was a blatant racist who insisted that Blash be
fired, and that the stated reason for his termination was “bogus,” given that Blash
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was unaware of any ongoing investigation and telling civilians that they should
stay away from suspected criminals was a “common practice” among officers. He
contended, among other things, that Cape fired him because of his race, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
claims for failure to state a claim except for the discriminatory termination claims
against Brannen in his official capacity as the current Sheriff and against former
Sheriff Cape in his individual capacity. Following discovery, the district court
Blash now appeals, challenging only (1) the entry of summary judgment for the
defendants on his Title VII discriminatory discharge claim against Brannen in his
official capacity as the Sheriff of Pulaski County, and his claim against Cape in his
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) the dismissal of his § 1983 race
II.
“We review an entry of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and
Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see Fils v.
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City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). We also review a district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting
the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261,
III.
On appeal, Blash argues that the district court erred in granting the
circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to infer that Brannen and Cape acted with
reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Blash’s Title VII claim
against Brannen, in his official capacity as the current Sheriff of Pulaski County,
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
material fact. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir.
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2012). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to rebut that showing by
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Courts must not undertake the
deciding what inferences should be drawn from the facts. Id.; see Latimer v.
Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment
is appropriate only if a case is “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
employment context. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d
468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). Section 1983, which provides a private cause of action
against a state actor who violates federal constitutional or statutory rights, provides
the exclusive remedy for a violation of § 1981 by a state actor. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Butts v. Cty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893, 894 (11th Cir. 2000). To
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must present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue concerning the employer’s
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Brooks v. Cty.
Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). Using the
action. Id. If the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for termination, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason was
3
For the most part, we use the same legal framework to analyze employment discrimination
claims under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d
836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000). But while Blash can succeed on his Title VII claim by proving
that his race was a “motivating factor” in the decision to terminate him, his § 1983 claim against
Cape requires more—to prevail on a claim that the defendant violated § 1981, “a plaintiff must
initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of a
legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1019 (2020).
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discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was member of a protected class;
(2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the
job; and (4) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his class
more favorably. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc). The parties here do not dispute that Blash satisfied the first three
elements of the prima facie case. But they take opposing positions regarding the
fourth element—that is, whether Blash produced evidence showing that “similarly
situated” employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably.
According to Blash, Sheriff Cape postponed any disciplinary action against the
investigation into the incident, and the GBI investigation eventually cleared the
deputies of the charges against them. The district court found that Blash’s
To satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that he and his comparators were “similarly situated in all
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situated comparator ordinarily will have: (1) engaged in the same basic conduct or
misconduct; (2) been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule;
(3) had the same supervisor; and (4) shared a similar employment or disciplinary
history. Id. at 1227–28. Here, Blash was accused of interfering with an ongoing
similar to the Caucasian deputies’ alleged use of excessive physical force against a
Blash argues that the Caucasian deputies were valid comparators because
they received “better treatment” even though they were accused of a more serious
offense. This argument overlooks the fact that the question for purposes of the
was sufficiently similar to his so that the different disciplinary actions they
received would give rise to an inference of discrimination. His insistence that the
Caucasian deputies’ conduct was worse than his merely highlights the fact that
original). To make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
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(quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015)). Blash’s
alleged misconduct was simply too different from that of his proposed comparators
to offer a valid comparison, and the district court did not err in concluding that
Blash failed to make a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of discrimination. See
id. at 1224.
and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary
plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s
case.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. A “plaintiff will always survive summary
exists if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents
discrimination.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320
(11th Cir. 2012). Here, the record contains sufficient evidence to support an
U.S.C. § 1981.
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A.
We begin with Blash’s Title VII claim against his former employer, the
VII discriminatory discharge claim by proving either that bias against his race or
other protected characteristic was the “but-for” cause of his termination—that is,
that it was “the true reason for the adverse action”—or that such illegal bias was at
least “a motivating factor for” his termination, “even though other factors also
motivated the action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (m); Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch.
support an inference of racial bias, even as he acknowledges that only the Sheriff—
Cape, at the time—has the authority to hire and fire Sheriff’s deputies. In some
cases, the discriminatory intent of a supervisor who lacks the authority to terminate
the plaintiff may be imputed to the employer—if, for example, the decision-
To establish liability under this theory, the plaintiff generally must prove that
the supervisor’s discriminatory animus “was an actual cause of the other party’s
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decision to terminate the employee.” Id. at 1331. Where the statute giving rise to
the cause of action only requires proof that the employee’s protected characteristic
established by showing that (1) the adverse decision is “the intended consequence”
biased action was “a causal factor” of the decisionmaker’s adverse decision. Staub
v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419, 420 (2011) (discussing “cat’s paw” liability in
The “requirement that the biased supervisor’s action be a causal factor of the
proximate cause.” Id. at 420. “Proximate cause requires only ‘some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’ and excludes only
those ‘link[s] that [are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.’” Id. at 419
(alteration in the original) (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S.
employment action and expose the employer to liability even if the decisionmaker
is not biased and exercises his own judgment in reaching his decision. In that case,
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automatically shield the employer from liability, either. The “supervisor’s biased
report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into
account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the
Here, Blash presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer
Blash’s employment, and that racial bias was at least a motivating factor in the
decision. Several witnesses testified that Brannen, not Cape, ran the Sheriff’s
Office, even when Cape was nominally the Sheriff. Witnesses testified that Cape
was afraid of Brannen and consistently deferred to him in managing the Sheriff’s
Office. Brannen changed Sheriff’s Office procedures at will, and Cape went along
with any policy or discipline that Brannen implemented. Brannen also created the
position of Captain (supervisor of all the shift supervisors) for himself, and Cape
Brannen’s own testimony to the contrary. Brannen was Blash’s direct supervisor,
and Blash testified that standard protocol in the Sheriff’s Office was that any
In their interrogatory responses, the defendants admitted that Brannen met with
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Sheriff Cape and Major Freemont “to discuss Plaintiff’s fate” just before he was
terminated, and Blash testified that Brannen looked “smug and pleased” when
In addition, a jury could make the reasonable inference that Blash’s warning
to Orta to stay away from the suspect postal worker, which came to Cape’s
attention just before he terminated Blash’s employment, would not have resulted in
Blash’s termination if Blash had been white. Blash and former deputy Eddie
Nieves testified that it was common practice for law enforcement officers,
issue—and former deputy Anthony Taylor both testified that Blash had done
nothing wrong, and Nieves testified that in 15 years of law enforcement in multiple
police departments, he had never seen an officer disciplined or terminated for this
routine conduct. The fact that the county district attorney voluntarily dismissed the
criminal charges arising from Blash’s conduct also gives some support to an
inference that Blash would have been cleared of any wrongdoing if he had been
Blash also presented evidence supporting the inference that Sheriff Cape
Taylor testified that “[w]henever a Sheriff’s Deputy had an alleged infraction Billy
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Cape would call the GBI to investigate.” Blash testified similarly that when
“Caucasian deputies had been accused of infractions that could have resulted in
discharge, any termination decision regarding them had been held in abeyance
pending an investigation by the GBI.” But Cape did not request an investigation
into the allegations against Blash by the GBI or any other outside agency, despite
the fact that Blash specifically asked him to do so. And when Taylor questioned
Cape about Blash’s termination and urged him to “give Johnny Blash a GBI
investigation like was routinely done for Caucasian officers,” Cape had no
meaningful response.
Finally, ample evidence showed that Brannen harbored strong racial animus
against African Americans, and that he displayed that animus in performing his
duties at the Sheriff’s Office. Blash also presented significant evidence connecting
disciplinary decision related to Blash specifically. Assuming that the jury makes
the inference that Brannen recommended that Blash be terminated, this evidence—
coupled with the circumstantial evidence that Blash’s warning to Orta ordinarily
would not have resulted in his termination—would support the additional inference
Putting these pieces together, if the jury makes every reasonable inference
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Blash’s favor—and again, at this stage of the proceedings we must assume that the
jury will do so—it could conclude that (1) Blash’s warning to Orta to stay away
from the suspect postal worker was not a fireable offense, but a common practice
among law enforcement officers; (2) given that such warnings were a common
practice even among officers at the “highest levels” of the Sheriff’s Office, Cape
and Brannen were aware of and ordinarily tolerated the practice; (3) Brannen
that Brannen was racially biased, and under circumstances in which he would not
other words, the jury could find that that the Sheriff’s Office was liable under Title
VII because Brannen’s biased recommendation was intended to cause, and did
cause Blash’s termination, and because Blash’s race was at least “a motivating
factor” for his termination. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 419–20; Quigg, 814 F.3d at
1235.
4
The defendants argue that even if Brannen did recommend that Blash be fired (which they
deny), Cape’s offer to allow Blash to resign shows that Brannen’s recommendation did not
influence Cape’s decision. But this is a distinction that makes no difference—either way, Blash
had no option that would have allowed him to maintain his employment with the Sheriff’s
Office.
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B.
The evidence Blash presented was also sufficient to permit a jury to find in
his favor on his § 1983 claim against Cape. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant, acting under color of state law, violated a
Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007). Where the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful action was taken within the scope of his discretionary authority
the plaintiff must also show that the defendant’s conduct violated clearly
Here, Blash alleged that Cape violated § 1981, which guarantees that every
person shall have “the same right” as white citizens to, among other things, “make
against Cape in this context, Blash must prove that Cape purposefully
discriminated against him, and that Cape would not have terminated his
employment if he had been white. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-
Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1015 (2020) (explaining that “if the defendant
would have responded differently but for the plaintiff’s race, it follows that the
5
The defendants do not dispute that Cape was acting under color of state law in his role as
Sheriff of Pulaski County, or that his action in firing Blash was within the scope of his
discretionary authority as Sheriff.
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plaintiff has not received the same right as a white person”); Ferrill, 168 F.3d at
472. There is no doubt that it was clearly established long before Blash’s
decisions based on the employee’s race violates federal law. See, e.g., Ferrill, 168
F.3d at 472 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459–460
(1975)).
Again, the evidence recounted above would support jury inferences that
(1) Cape was aware that law enforcement officers, including officers at the
away from suspect situations, and such conduct ordinarily did not result in
disciplinary action; (2) if Blash had been white, Cape would have requested an
discipline or termination; and (3) if Blash had been given the benefit of an
would have been cleared of any wrongdoing and would not have been terminated.
against Blash because of his race in violation of § 1981(a) by firing him without
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IV.
Brannen individually, we note that the factual basis for Blash’s claims was
somewhat different at the pleadings stage. We have concluded that Blash was able
discrimination and fend off the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. But in
ruling on Brannen’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court was limited
to the facts alleged on the face of Blash’s complaint. See Brooks v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997). And in his
complaint, Blash failed to allege facts showing the required causal connection
between Brannen’s allegedly racist conduct and Cape’s decision to fire him.
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Thus, at a
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from which we can identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice,
Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001). A pleading that offers “labels and
do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions
Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
the basis of race in the employment context. Ferrill, 168 F.3d at 472. To succeed
on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that the individual defendant’s alleged
statutory or constitutional violation caused the alleged harm. Dixon v. Burke Cty.,
303 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. And the “causal
relation does not exist when the continuum between Defendant’s action and the
makers.” Dixon, 303 F.3d at 1275; see also Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014 (§ 1981
plaintiff must plead and prove that race was a but-for cause of its injury).
Blash alleged in his complaint that (1) Brannen was employed by the
Sheriff’s Office as a Captain and Blash’s direct supervisor, (2) Brannen made
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generally and against Blash specifically, (3) Brannen insisted to Sheriff Cape that
Blash be fired, and (4) the Sheriff’s Office fired Blash without an internal
investigation based on charges that would not have been sustained had they been
management of the Sheriff’s Office, Blash failed to allege facts that would support
such an inference in his complaint. He did not allege, for example, that Brannen
ran the Sheriff’s Office, even when Cape was nominally the Sheriff; or that
Brannen changed Sheriff’s Office policies and made up disciplinary rules at will,
and that Cape routinely deferred to Brannen in such matters. And although he
alleged that Brannen “insisted” to Sheriff Cape that Blash be fired, he failed to
allege that Brannen’s insistence had any effect on Sheriff Cape’s decision, let alone
that it caused the Sheriff to fire him. Indeed, Blash also alleged that Sheriff Cape
and the County Commissioner informed him that Sheriff Cape had “exclusive
any racially motivated action by Captain Brannen and the Sheriff’s termination of
to raise his right to relief on his § 1983 claim against Brannen “above the
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speculative level,” the district court did not err in dismissing that claim. Twombly,
V.
We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Blash’s § 1983
claim against Brannen for failure to state a claim because Blash failed to allege
facts in his complaint showing the required causal connection between Brannen’s
evidence from which a jury could conclude that his employer’s racial bias was “the
true reason for the adverse action” against him—or, for purposes of his Title VII
claim, that his race was at least “a motivating factor for” his termination—and that
Cape failed to accord Blash the same employment rights that he would have
granted to a white deputy, in violation of § 1981(a). Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235; see
Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1015. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Blash’s
§ 1983 claim against Brannen, individually, but reverse the summary judgment for
the defendants on Blash’s Title VII claim against Sheriff Brannen in his official
capacity, and his § 1983 claim against Cape in his individual capacity.
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This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless
exempted for good cause. Non-incarcerated pro se parties are permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an
account at www.pacer.gov. Information and training materials related to electronic filing, are available at
www.ca11.uscourts.gov. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been
entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en
banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing
or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed
by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is
governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all
persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a
copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See
11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the
appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of
certiorari (whichever is later) via the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or
[email protected] for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher system.
Please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the court's website at www.ca11.uscourts.gov.
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block
below. For all other questions, please call Bradly Wallace Holland, DD at 404-335-6181.
Sincerely,