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1630-49 Hursti Observations Testing Rejected Ballots
1630-49 Hursti Observations Testing Rejected Ballots
1630-49 Hursti Observations Testing Rejected Ballots
EXHIBIT 99
Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1630-49 Filed 02/13/23 Page 2 of 12
COALITION PLAINTIFFS’
EXPERT DISCLOSURES – OPENING REPORTS
Plaintiff Coalition for Good Governance and Plaintiffs William Digges III, Laura
Digges, Ricardo Davis & Megan Missett (“Coalition Plaintiffs”) hereby disclose the
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after Defendants have produced the numerous requested, but currently overdue and
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give this testimony. The facts stated in this declaration are based on my personal
set forth in my December 16, 2019 declaration. (Doc. 680-1, pages 37 et seq). I
Dominion Voting System used in Georgia, there are only a few independent voting
system researchers with more hands-on experience than I have with key
jurisdiction has permitted, and Dominion has not permitted, independent research,
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material, dynamic settings for brightness and contrast were developed to “wash
out” the defects caused by copying, like white background not being white and
black not being black and a variety of speckles that appear across the paper. In
essence, the goal is to make the text easier to read by the human eye by removing
anomalies and weaker markings. When this kind of techniques are applied and then
the image converted to black-or-white pixels, the image becomes brittle, and
17. While this process is useful for making text on this page easier to
read, it can degrade human markings on a ballot. The human brain with the
experience recognizes the markings better, when excess markings are removed – in
features is not compatible with the approach chosen by the developers of the
Dominion system.
18. Excerpts of the ballot vote targets in the Exhibit A are not
degenerated as result of production for this document. These are degenerated this
way in the original images obtained from Fulton County. While it is unclear what
caused the failure to scan the vote target identically from identical sources, this
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parameters. When the input material is not uniform, it cannot be measured in later
August 25 from 10:50am to approximately 5pm. I had visited the Center multiple
20. I was at EPC to conduct scanner testing using the original voter
marked ballots that were rejected for scanning and hand duplicated in the June 9,
2020 election, as agreed with Fulton County in the discovery process. I was
21. The Dominion technician (Dominic) had full operating control of the
system as he had before during my visits on August 11 and August 17. Fulton
County employees seem to have little to do with operating the server component of
the voting system with proper administrative controls that prevent vendors and
third parties from accessing the system is a troubling sign to voting system security
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touchscreens, printers and scanners are all easily hacked and subject to erroneous
ballot building and malfunction and should not be deployed into the polling places
until each machine has been tested for its ability to accurately register a vote for
each candidate in each race and to register an undervote in each contest. The
system is far too unreliable to conduct sample counts testing as little as a vote for
50. Although Mr. Chris Harvey said in his declaration (Doc 834-3 ¶¶6-7)
that testing all choices on all machines is “overly burdensome and unnecessary
because it would require creating and printing” an extremely large test deck. The
size of a test deck would rarely be unwieldy, but more importantly, BMDs require
testing at minimum level of casting a vote for each position for each race. The cost
of such inconvenience and labor expense for standard Logic and Accuracy Testing
of BMDs should be factored into the purchase decision, and not shortcut after the
__________________
Harri Hursti
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)
DONNA CURLING, et al. )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.:
vs. ) 1:17-cv-2989-AT
)
BRIAN P. KEMP, et al. )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
Institute for Data Science; principal investigator of the Consortium for Data Analytics in
Risk; director of Berkeley Open Source Food; and affiliated faculty of the Simons Institute
for the Theory of Computing, the Theoretical Astrophysics Center, and the Berkeley Food
Institute. Previously, I was Chair of the Department of Statistics and Director of the
2. I have published more than one hundred and ninety articles and books. I have served on the
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Document 1278-1 Filed 01/25/22 Page 202 of 282
5. I have been an expert witness or non-testifying expert in a variety of state and federal cases,
for plaintiffs and for defendants, in criminal matters and a range of civil matters, including,
inter alia: truth in advertising, antitrust, construction defects, consumer class actions, credit
product liability class actions, qui tam, risk assessment, toxic tort class actions, trade secrets,
utilities, and wage and hour class actions. Much of that work concerned statistical sampling
and extrapolation.
6. I have been qualified as an expert on statistics in federal courts, including the Central District
of California, the District of Maryland, the Southern District of New York, and the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
8. I have used statistics to address a wide range of questions in many fields.1
9. I served on former California Secretary of State Debra Bowen’s Post-Election Audit
10.In 2007, I invented a statistical approach to auditing elections (“risk-limiting audits”) that has
been incorporated into statutes in California (AB 2023, SB 360, AB 44, AB 2125), Colorado
(C.R.S. 1-7-515), and Rhode Island (RI Gen L §17-19-37.4 (2017)), and which were recently
For example, I have used statistics to analyze the Big Bang, the interior structure of the Earth and Sun, the risk of
large earthquakes, the reliability of clinical trials, the accuracy of election results, the accuracy of the U.S. Census,
the risk of consumer credit default, the causes of geriatric hearing loss, the effectiveness of water treatment, the
fragility of ecological food webs, risks to protected species, the effectiveness of Internet content filters, high-energy
particle physics data, and the reliability of models of climate, among other things.
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proposed in federal legislation (the PAVE Act of 2018). RLAs have been tested in California,
11.RLAs are widely viewed as the best way to check the accuracy of vote tabulation. They have
Academy of Sciences report “Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,” the
American Statistical Association, the League of Women Voters, Verified Voting Foundation,
Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota, and other groups concerned with election integrity.
12.I have worked closely with state and local election officials in California and Colorado to
pilot and deploy RLAs. The software Colorado uses to conduct RLAs is based on software I
wrote.
13.I worked with Travis County, Texas, on the design of STAR-Vote, an auditable and end-to-
14.I testified as an expert witness in the general area of election integrity, including the
reliability of voting equipment, in 2016 presidential candidate Jill Stein’s recount suit in
15.I have testified as an expert in election auditing and the accuracy of election results in two
16.I have testified to both houses of the California legislature regarding election integrity and
election audits. I have testified to the California Little Hoover Commission about election
17.Since 1988, I have taught statistics at the University of California, Berkeley, one of the top
two statistics departments in the world (see, e.g., QS World University Rankings, 2014) and
the nation (US News and World Reports, 2014). I teach statistics regularly at the
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Document 1278-1 Filed 01/25/22 Page 211 of 282
53.The audit sample must not be predictable before the audit starts. Public trust in audits may be
increased if the public participates in generating “seed” for selecting the sample. In Colorado,
for instance, the “seed” is generated in a broadcast, public ceremony in which 10-sided dice
results) to be known before the audit can conclude. It also requires coordinating the sampling
in different counties, so that each county knows when its portion of the audit can stop.
55.I recommend that starting with the 2018 mid-term election, Georgia conduct ballot-polling
RLAs of all countywide, statewide, and federal contests, using a risk limit no larger than 5
paragraph 52, supra. I believe this is feasible and affordable, but there is no time to waste:
the process for establishing the guidelines and procedures must start immediately.
56.A number of non-partisan, non-profit organizations are ready and able to assist Georgia in
implementing post-election audits, including Verified Voting Foundation. The U.S. Election
Assistance Commission also has staff with extensive experience with RLAs.
57.Although ballot-polling RLAs are not particularly costly, I understand that federal HAVA
presumably including the cost of monitoring the audits and reporting the results to this Court.
I declare under penalty of perjury, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true
and correct.
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Document 1278-1 Filed 01/25/22 Page 212 of 282
_______________________________
Philip B. Stark