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Case 2022CF000363 Document 173 Filed 05-19-2023 Page 1 of 3

FILED
05-19-2023
Clerk of Circuit Court
Brown County, WI
2022CF000363
STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT BROWN COUNTY
BRANCH II

STATE OF WISCONSIN DA Case No.: 2022BR001645


Plaintiff, Court Case No.: 2022CF000363

vs.
STATE’S REPLY TO
TAYLOR DENISE SCHABUSINESS DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DOB: 11/23/1997 SUPPRESS PHYSICAL
Defendant. EVIDENCE For Official Use

TO: Attorney Christopher T. Froelich


Attorney at Law
125 S. Quincy St.
Green Bay, WI 54301

The State of Wisconsin, by Deputy District Attorney Caleb Saunders, hereby files its
reply to the defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence. (Document 171). For the
following reasons, Schabusiness’ motion should be denied.

Background

In this case, law enforcement sought a search warrant for an apartment on Eastman
Avenue (“the apartment”) where Schabusiness resided. (Document 17.) The warrant was
accompanied by an affidavit from Detective Craig Pakkala of the Green Bay Police
Department. Id. at 6–11. A neutral magistrate “commanded forthwith to search the said
property for said things..." Id. at 4. Pursuant to that search warrant, law enforcement searched
the apartment and located various items of evidentiary value.

Argument

Schabusiness moves to suppress evidence recovered from the apartment on three


grounds. First, Schabusiness argues that officers failed to get a search warrant for
Schabusiness’ bedroom. (171, 2.) Second, Schabusiness argues that law enforcement failed to
name her in the search warrant. Id. Finally, Schabusiness argues suppression is appropriate
because police failed to get Schabusiness’ consent to search the apartment. Id. Importantly,
Schabusiness does not dispute the sufficiency or form of the warrant. The State will address
each argument in turn.

A. The Search Warrant Authorized a Search of Schabusiness’ Bedroom

It is unclear what Schabusiness means in arguing that the police failed to get a search
warrant for her bedroom. If Schabusiness suggests officers were required to get a search

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STATE OF WISCONSIN - VS - Taylor Denise Schabusiness

warrant not only for the apartment but also separately for her bedroom, that argument is
plainly contrary to law and the scope of the search authorized by the warrant.

The warrant at issue in this case authorized the search of “2353 Eastman Avenue,
apartment #1.” (17.) Schabusiness’ bedroom is plainly within the scope of the warrant. The
warrant contains no limitation on which specific rooms were authorized to be searched. Nor
does Schabusiness argue the warrant was not sufficiently particular in including her bedroom
in the places to be searched.

The warrant authorized a search of the entirety of the apartment for the items
delineated in the warrant. It is constitutionally sufficient to delineate a specific apartment to
be searched in a multi-unit building. See State v. Jackson, 2008 WI App 109, ¶ 10, 313 Wis.
2d 162, 756 N.W.2d 623. There is no requirement that law enforcement seek separate
warrants for each and every room in a residence. Any “reasonable reading” of the warrant
indicates it plainly authorized a search of any portion of “2353 Eastman Avenue, apartment
#1” that was “part and parcel” of that premise, including Schabusiness’ bedroom. Rainey v.
State, 74 Wis. 2d 189, 205, 246 N.W.2d 529 (1976). Schabusiness offers no other specific
argument for why the search warrant did not authorize a search of her bedroom, or any
support for her argument that a search warrant authorizing a search of her apartment also
required a separate warrant for a search of her bedroom within that apartment. As a result,
there are no grounds for suppression on this claim.

B. It is Irrelevant that Schabusiness was not Named in the Search Warrant

Schabusiness next argues suppression is appropriate because “police failed to name


the defendant on the search warrant for the apartment.” (171, 2.) Schabusiness’ argument
fundamentally misunderstand what a search warrant is and what is authorizes.

“A search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing a law enforcement officer to


conduct a search of a designated person, a designated object, or a designated place for the
purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of property.” Wis. Stat. § 968.12 (emphasis
added). Search warrants are not typically directed at persons. Rather, “they authorize the
search of ‘place[s]’ and the seizure of ‘things,’ and as a constitutional matter they need not
even name the person from whom the things will be seized.” State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d
383, 400, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996) (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555
(1978)). For that reason, “a premises search warrant authorizes the search of any items found
on those premises regardless of ownership.” State v. O’Brien, 214 Wis. 2d 328, 336, 572
N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d at 400).

Schabusiness argues she has an expectation of privacy in her bedroom. (171, 2.) She
does, which is exactly why law enforcement sought a search warrant to search the apartment.
The warrant requested to search the entirety of the Eastman Avenue apartment. (17, 3.) The
warrant, based upon the sworn affidavit of Detective Pakkala, authorized the search of “said
property for said things.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). It is wholly irrelevant that Schabusiness
was not named in the search warrant, because the warrant was not seeking “things” from her
person but “things” from the Eastman Avenue property.

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Case 2022CF000363 Document 173 Filed 05-19-2023 Page 3 of 3

STATE OF WISCONSIN - VS - Taylor Denise Schabusiness

Under Schabusiness’ novel argument, law enforcement would essentially be required


to identify each and every individual with a possessory interest in a place to be searched, and
be required to specifically enumerate all of those individuals in the warrant. That is a patently
unreasonable interpretation of the law. Section 968.12 delineates the substantive requirements
for a search warrant. The statute plainly does not require what Schabusiness suggests.
Schabusiness certainly cites no authority for that argument in any event, and the State is
unaware of any such authority. This argument also does not support Schabusiness’ argument
for suppression.

C. Law Enforcement did not Need Schabusiness’ Consent

Finally, Schabusiness argues the evidence from the Eastman Avenue apartment should
be suppressed because “police failed to get consent from the defendant to perform a search of
the apartment.” (171, 2.) This claim is without merit. There is no requirement law
enforcement obtain both a search warrant and a possessor’s consent prior to searching a place.
Indeed, consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Artic, 2010 WI
83, ¶ 29, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430. It is illogical for consent to be an exception to
the warrant requirement but for the warrant requirement to also require consent. Law
enforcement did not need to get Schabusiness’ consent because it obtained a valid search
warrant. Under the law, that is sufficient to search the apartment. See generally U.S. Const.
amd. IV.

Conclusion

None of the reasons Schabusiness relies upon offer a basis to suppress evidence
obtained pursuant to a lawful search warrant. As a result, her motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 2023.

Date Signed: 05/19/23


Electronically Signed By:
Caleb J Saunders
Deputy District Attorney
State Bar #: 1094077

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