Middle East

outlook 2023
Weathering political and
economic headwinds
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MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

Weathering political and economic

headwinds
• Economies across the Middle East face mixed prospects in 2023, which will help to drive
comparatively strong growth in the energy-rich Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states but
hold most other economies in check.

• The region’s travel and tourism industry is showing strong signs of recovery and
international visitor arrivals could return to pre-covid levels by the end of 2023—largely
owing to effective promotional campaigns, major investments and the release of pent-up
demand.

• Troubled states face a very uncertain and insecure future—especially internationally

sanctioned Iran and war-torn Syria and Yemen—where conditions are unlikely to improve
and could easily deteriorate.

• Major players in the Middle East—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran—will continue
to look eastwards towards Asia for trade, investment and political ties, which could further
strain relations with Europe and the US. Another year of difficult balancing acts is in store.
Major oil and gas producers in the Middle East have benefited substantially from strong global
demand, rising output and high prices for their energy exports in 2022, and the region’s net energy
exporters—except internationally sanctioned and economically unstable Iran—can look forward to
another year of decent returns from international markets in 2023. The OPEC+ alliance will solely
prioritise price levels, despite concerted diplomatic efforts by the US and European allies
to persuade the cartel to increase production. The recent move by OPEC+ to cut output by 2m
barrels/day will be borne by Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser degree, the UAE. The actual cut to output
will be about half the headline figure, as several major producers, most notably Nigeria and Russia,
are producing well below their current quotas. We expect OPEC+ to maintain its solidarity and
forecast that oil prices will remain above US$90/barrel until at least mid‑2023.

Oil prices
US$/barrel; Brent % change
120 80

100 60

80 40

60 20

40 0

20 -20

0 -40
2018 19 20 21 22* 23† 24† 25† 26† 27†
Sources: International Energy Agency; EIU. *EIU estimates. †EIU forecasts.

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MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

The GCC states and Iraq will benefit the most from international energy market developments in
2023, with GCC states seeing high oil and gas revenue spill over and help to drive business activity in
non-energy sectors—especially through state-backed investment in economic diversification projects.
Inflation will be contained across the GCC in 2023 by exchange-rate pegs to the US dollar and fuel
subsidy regimes. Elsewhere, elevated price pressures will weigh heavily on economic growth and
stability in the region’s more troubled states and some major energy importers—namely Lebanon,
Syria, Yemen and Iran, as well as Egypt and Turkey. These countries face another year of double-digit
annual consumer price inflation—hyperinflation in the case of Lebanon and Syria—which will cause
economic hardship and in some cases fuel anti-government sentiment and protests.

Middle East: inflation, 2023 Middle East: economic growth, 2023

(av; %) (real GDP; % change, year on year)
0 10 20 30 40
Lebanon 167% Turkey
Syria 63%
Yemen Lebanon Syria
Turkey Israel Iraq Iran
Iran Palestine
Egypt
Kuwait
Iraq Jordan Bahrain
UAE Egypt Qatar
Israel Saudi
Palestine Arabia
Qatar Oman
Kuwait
Bahrain
Jordan Yemen UAE
Oman
Saudi Arabia 0.0 2.0 4.0
Source: EIU.

Downside risks prevail

The balance of risks to the region’s outlook is heavily weighted to the downside, which reflects various
global and regional shocks that could act to undermine economic growth and stability, social cohesion
and security. Upside risks are limited to a low-probability scenario surrounding a quick resolution of
the war in Europe leading to less volatility in commodity markets—food and fuel—and easing prices
pressures, as well as the low risk of a stronger rebound of demand from China as covid‑19 disruption
dissipates and the authorities guide the economy to much faster growth.

2 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

Middle Eastern countries are confronted with risks that could disrupt their economies
Risk
Scenario Probability Impact
intensity*
Regional conflict zones. Unresolved regional conflicts – especially in Syria
and Yemen – escalate and spill beyond national borders to damage economic High High 16
infrastructure in nearby states and stoke regional tensions.
Rapprochement efforts dissipate. Relations between Iran and the West
deteriorate sharply and scupper plans to revive the Iran nuclear deal, while Iran
High High 16
escalates tensions with Saudi Arabia and Israel by pursuing its nuclear and missile
programmes coupled with a regional “shadow war”.
Chinese slowdown. China’s economy decelerates rapidly and depresses energy
High High 16
and non-energy trade and investment flows to and from Asia.
US-China tensions. Rivalry and tension between the US and China intensify,
which dampens bilateral trade, accelerates global decoupling and puts pressure Moderate High 12
on states to take sides.
New coronavirus variants. New variants of the coronavirus spread across the
Middle East and in key trade partners - especially China and Europe – disrupting Moderate Moderate 9
domestic business, export markets and supply chains.
Escalation of war in Europe. The war in Ukraine triggers open conflict between
Russia and NATO members, further destabilising Europe, disrupting global supply Very low Very high 5
chains and adding volatility to commodity and financial markets.
Intensity colour key: 1 to 4 5 to 8 9 to 12 13 to 16 17 to 25
*Intensity is a product of the probability and impact scores, where “very low” scores 1 and “very high” scores 5.
Source: EIU.

Focus on business sector reform

Business conditions across the Middle East will differ greatly by country in 2023. Business conditions
in the GCC states will be the most favourable in the region, supported by buoyant energy sectors, the
recycling of oil funds into the wider economy and ongoing business and economic reform programmes.
Strong purchasing managers’ indices (PMIs)—which record business activity in the non-oil private
sector with a 50 threshold that separates expansion from contraction—for most GCC states are
suggestive of relative health and momentum of non-energy private business sectors in the short term.
Competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE to establish leading business hubs will intensify,
although this will also create space for co-operation and joint ventures given the scope for mutual
benefit and the pragmatic nature of intra-GCC business investment. GCC states will continue to push
for openings in new sectors and to attract foreign private investment, which will be supported by well-
capitalised, profitable and strong financial sectors and already enacted pro-business reforms.
Business conditions will continue to be very challenging in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and
Iran owing to a range of factors including sluggish growth prospects, high unemployment, social
instability, international sanctions and conflict. In the case of Egypt and Turkey, volatile and unstable
macroeconomies—including weak currencies, high rates of inflation, rising interest rates and
uncertainty about the direction of economic policy—will represent a difficult backdrop for business
operations in 2023.

3 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

Manufacturing purchasing managers' index, October 2022

(a reading above 50 indicates an expansion of the non-oil private sector compared with the previous month; below
50 represents a contraction; 50 indicates no change)
40 45 50 55 60
Saudi Arabia 57.2
UAE 56.6
India 55.3
Philippines 52.6
GCC states' purchasing managers'
Nigeria 52.3
index (PMI) covers non-oil private
Indonesia 51.8
sector business activity
Thailand 51.6
Israel 51.3
Brazil 50.8
Japan 50.7 Middle East: business
Vietnam 50.6 operating risk
US 50.4
(Q3 2022; 0=low; 100=high)
Mexico 50.3
Kenya 50.2
Turkey
South Africa 50.0
Singapore 49.7 Lebanon Syria
Israel Iraq Iran
Hong Kong 49.3 Palestine
Kuwait
China 49.2
Jordan Bahrain
Lebanon 49.1 Qatar
Egypt
Malaysia 48.7 Saudi
Qatar 48.4 Arabia
South Korea 48.2 Oman
Egypt 47.7
Turkey 46.4 Yemen UAE
Taiwan 41.5 0 50 100

Source: EIU.

Recovery in travel and tourism

Business activity, revenue and profitability in the travel, tourism and hospitality industries in the
Middle East have taken a major hit in recent years stemming from the covid‑19 pandemic and then
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, a corner appears to have been turned and momentum is
building with international arrivals on the upswing in 2022 and a full recovery to a pre-covid levels of

Gulf Co-operation Council: international Dubai: international tourist visitors

tourist arrivals (m)
(m) 20
UAE Saudi Arabia Bahrain 16.7
Kuwait Qatar Oman 15.8 15.9
14.9 15
80 14.2
70.8 70
65.1 64.6 66.3
60
10
50
40 7.3 7.1
27.7 30 5.5
5
17.7 20
10
0 0
2016 17 18 19 20 21 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22*
Sources: Local sources; EIU. *Jan-Jun.

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MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

arrivals expected in late 2023 (or early 2024). The recovery will be aided by major sports and cultural
events—Qatar is hosting the FIFA World Cup in November and December 2022 and the AFC Asian Cup
in 2023, while Saudi Arabia will increase the numbers of foreign visitors allowed to attend the annual
haj pilgrimage. These and other locations, including major tourism hubs in the UAE and Oman, are
redoubling their efforts to promote their tourism offer in major export markets in Europe and Asia, as
well as reassuring visitors through high-level health and security measures.
Domestic tourism has supported a depressed market in recent years and this will continue to be an
important outlet for the tourism sector, along with regional arrivals. International arrivals to the GCC
were back on an upswing and accelerated quickly in late 2021 and in 2022, and looking ahead they
will be aided by vaccine rollout and safety measures, lighter travel restrictions, a further promotional
drive and the release of pent-up demand for travel and tourism. In the longer term, travel, tourism and
hospitality are identified as key ingredients of strategic growth plans and consequently are subject to
pro-business and pro-investment reforms as well as receiving substantial investment from the public
and private sectors.

Another grim year for Iran

Iran will continue to suffer from an unstable economy, elevated unemployment, rampant inflation and
simmering national grievances in 2023. The economy will remain hamstrung by US sanctions and stuck
in slow growth mode, despite the persistence of reasonably high oil and gas prices on international
markets. Disillusionment with the political system, years of repression and the deteriorating economic
situation will drive further social unrest in 2023. The current regime led by the president, Ebrahim Raisi,
will face a serious challenge from mass street protests and strike action, but protests will be met by a
harsh response from the security forces, and hardliners are likely to retain the upper hand politically
and control of the state. However, there is a high risk that further mass street protests will morph into a
violent uprising that complicates matters for the ruling elite.
Hopes for a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal), and
with it a lifting of US sanctions on Iran, are slim to non-existent given disagreement over the terms of the
JCPOA and a deterioration of relations between Iran and administrations in the US and the EU, which
have criticised Iran (and in the case of the EU imposed fresh sanctions) over arms sales to Russia and
human rights abuses linked to the severe clampdown on public protests. Iran will continue to exploit its
ostracism by the West to deepen military and economic ties with China and Russia, in the hope of easing
the impact of existing sanctions and building external relations beyond the reach of the West.

More financial outreach from the GCC

An energy sector-induced economic bounce across the GCC that started in 2021 has helped member
states to restore economic buffers and rebuild their financial war chests. The windfall from strong
global energy demand and high oil and gas prices has enabled the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
in particular, to plough funds into national economic development plans and foreign ventures. During
2023 GCC states will continue to invest in the broader Middle East region, and elsewhere, to pursue
their own economic goals and to strengthen regional alliances. The projection of soft power and the
pursuit of hard-nosed financial investment will see billions of US dollars flow from the cash-rich GCC
into strategic economic and geopolitical projects in 2023.

5 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

Gulf Co-operation Council: foreign-exchange reserves

(US$ bn)
Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman Bahrain
1,000

800

600

400

200

0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Source: EIU.

For instance, GCC states and related institutions will take a leading role in providing development
finance through the Arab Co-ordination Group to help to tackle issues such as food security and
climate adaptation—a food security action plan was agreed in mid-2022 with an initial US$10bn
funding package to help lower-income countries foot the bill for food imports. Separately, GCC states
have pledged about US$41bn in official support and investment to countries such as Egypt, Jordan,
Yemen and Pakistan, where there is a need to provide emergency finance to shore up regional alliances,
address economic instability or tackle humanitarian crisis. In addition, GCC states will continue to
pursue strategic investments in foreign assets and ventures to support economic diversification and
global partnerships, while robust non-oil GDP growth in the GCC in 2023 will continue to support
remittance flows to other parts of the Middle East, as well as Africa and Asia.

Geopolitical pivot towards the East

Major players in the Middle have historical security relations and interaction with the US, strong
trading links to Europe and China, and close ties to Russia. These relations will be tested in 2023 as the
global economy slows, the war between Russia and Ukraine rolls on and China continues to rise as an
influential economic and political player in the Middle East. A further pivot towards Asia—albeit in a
measured fashion for those traditionally aligned to the West—is likely to be a key feature of Middle
Eastern foreign policy in 2023.
Saudi Arabia has a long-standing strategic partnership with the US built on the petrodollar system
and US security guarantees, which will continue to play a critical role in underpinning the kingdom’s
foreign policy and defence capabilities in 2023. However, Saudi Arabia will increasingly adhere to a
more independent foreign policy approach than in the past as it seeks to diversify its international
relations—including closer ties with China and Russia. In part this reflects the ongoing shift in Saudi
trade and investment ties towards Asia, especially China, and the success of the OPEC+ alliance—led
by Saudi Arabia and Russia—in shaping global energy market conditions. China attempted to persuade
Saudi Arabia to denominate oil sales between the two countries in renminbi (rather than US dollars
as is the norm under the petrodollar arrangement with the US) and pressure will mount for this type

6 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

US arms exports by country, 2021

(US$ m; constant 1990 US$)
Saudi Arabia 1,389
Australia 929
Qatar 906
UK 875
Japan 875
South Korea 646
Netherlands 586
Israel 550
Norway 455
India 425
UAE 274
Denmark 226
Italy 214
Morocco 203
Sweden 138
Taiwan 132
Singapore 106
Source: EIU.

Destination of Saudi exports, 2021

(US$ bn; fob)

About 10% of Saudi goods

exports went to the EU

Only 5% of Saudi goods

exports went to the US

About 50% of Saudi

50+ goods exports (mostly oil)
40 went to China, Japan,
India and South Korea
30
20
10
0

Source: EIU.

of transaction. Saudi Arabia will resist in the short term and maintain its exchange-rate peg to the US
dollar, for fear of unsettling its own economy and relations with the US. The decline of the petrodollar
(and the concomitant rise of the “petro yuan”) is a longer-term risk, rather than a short- or medium-
term one.
Iran already has poor relations with the West and these will deteriorate further 2023, which in turn
will prompt the state to seek even stronger ties with other countries, including Russia, but especially
China and India under its “look East” policy. Iran could obtain full Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
(SCO) membership in 2023, which would facilitate its co-operation with SCO members—including

7 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

China and Russia—boost its influence and commercial ties in Central, East and South Asia, and provide
Iran with more wriggle room to withstand sanctions and isolation from the West.

Unresolved conflicts destabilise the region

The decade-long conflict in Syria will remain a highly unstable, multifaceted affair with a myriad of
domestic and international participants—more, rather than less, conflict appears on the horizon in
2023. The Syrian regime led by the president, Bashar al‑Assad, and propped up by the Syrian army will
retain control over most of the country. Outside regime-held territories, instability will be driven by
Turkey’s presence in the north and by opposition to the regime from rebel fighters in north-western
Syria. Outbreaks of fighting in northern Syria between Kurdish-aligned groups and Turkish-backed
rebels are likely to become more frequent in 2023. The Syrian regime will strengthen its influence in
the resource-rich Kurdish territories in north-eastern Syria, leveraging the threat of Turkish invasion to
establish a protectoral relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, the main Kurdish fighting
force in north-eastern Syria)—we expect a rapprochement of some kind between the regime and the
SDF by end-2023. Israel will increase the frequency of air and drone strikes on Iranian and Hizbullah
positions inside Syria, especially as negotiations between Iran and the West over reviving the JCPOA
are expected to falter. In addition, Russian preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine could prove a
destabilising factor, as opposition forces in the north-west, including groups backed by Turkey, sense
that they have an opportunity to take advantage of Russian weakness, whether because of the impact
of sanctions on supply lines to Russian bases or because of military setbacks in Ukraine itself.
The north-south civil war in Yemen will continue and intensify in 2023. Yemen’s warring parties
failed to renew the UN-brokered ceasefire (that began in April 2022) by an October 2nd deadline.
Negotiations to revive the agreement remain ongoing, but major concessions from both sides appear
unlikely, leading to an expected collapse of peace talks and the resumption of heavy fighting in early
2023. Divergent geopolitical ambitions in Yemen’s multifaceted conflict will remain a major barrier to
peace in 2023. Saudi Arabia and the UAE dominate a coalition of mainly Arab countries that oppose the
Houthi rebels, a Shia group with strong positions
in the north of the country. Houthi drone attacks Middle East: risk of social unrest in 2023
targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE are expected, (0=low; 4=high)
which in turn are likely to mark the resumption of
retaliatory Saudi air strikes on Houthi-held cities, Turkey
such as Sanaa and Hodeida. Meanwhile, Iran will
continue to provide some financial, logistical Lebanon Syria
Israel Iran
and military support to the Houthis as it seeks to Iraq
Palestine
Kuwait
undermine Saudi Arabia’s backing of the Houthis’
Jordan Bahrain
opponents by threatening domestic security in the Qatar
Egypt
GCC. Saudi
Arabia
The long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Oman
has a new dynamic following the parliamentary 4
2
election held in Israel in November, which was the 1 Yemen UAE
fifth in four years and produced a narrow victory 0
Source: EIU.

8 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK 2023
WEATHERING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEADWINDS

in the 120-seat Knesset (parliament) for a right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, a former
prime minister. The Netanyahu bloc comprises the major centre-right/right-wing Likud party, two
ultra-Orthodox parties and an alliance of extreme right-wing parties. As prime minister Mr Netanyahu
will attempt to restrict far-right policies to the domestic sphere and prevent them from influencing
foreign policy initiatives, but this will be difficult to achieve given the pressures of governing in a
coalition with personal and ideological differences and rivalries. The right-wing-dominated multiparty
coalition will take a hard line on perceived threats to national security, continue Israeli settlement
expansion and offer little to no concessions to the Palestinians, which will contribute to sporadic
military confrontations on the Gazan-Israeli border and intermittent violent clashes elsewhere. This
outcome will limit Israel’s ability to further expand its regional ties, and especially those with Saudi
Arabia and possibly the UAE.

Social tensions prompt protests and civil unrest

More generally, social tensions will remain high and spill over into highly disruptive mass
demonstrations and protests in parts of the Middle East in 2023. Countries at a high risk of social unrest
are Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, where a difficult economic situation is exacerbated by conflict
and years of oppression or economic mismanagement by ruling elites. Feeling threatened, rulers in
some of these countries—especially Iran and Syria—will crack down hard on protesters. Countries at a
moderate risk of social unrest include Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, which again will find social grievances
driven by poor socioeconomic conditions—especially high rates of unemployment and inflation. In
contrast, the risk of social unrest across the GCC and in Israel will remain low, largely as these countries
are well equipped financially and institutionally to help mitigate socioeconomic pressures.

9 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2022

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