Joint Publication 3-0

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Joint Campaigns and Operations

18 June 2022
 PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for joint campaigns
and operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint campaigns and operations, and it provides
considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies,
multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance
for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders
(JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military
guidance for use by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their
plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC
from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most
appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the achievement of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant
commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of
these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination
with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific
guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition)
military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United
States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should
evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable
and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

STUART B. MUNSCH
Vice Admiral, United States Navy
Director, Joint Force Development

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Preface

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 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0
DATED 17 JANUARY 2017, INCORPORATING CHANGE 1, 22 OCTOBER 2018

• Includes description of global integration and global campaigns.

• Includes discussion on campaigning.

• Integrates the competition continuum terminology.

• Incorporates current information on joint electromagnetic spectrum

management operations.

• Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between this publication and

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and JP 5-0, Joint
Planning.

• Updates the discussion on the information joint function consistent with JP 3-

04, Information in Joint Operations.

• Includes a discussion on the mission areas within the global campaign plans.

• Updates terms and definitions.

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Summary of Changes

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iv JP 3-0
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

 Introduction................................................................................................................ I-1
 Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges......................................... I-2
 Instruments of National Power and the Competition Continuum ............................. I-4
 Strategic Direction ..................................................................................................... I-5
 The Philosophy of Global Military Integration ......................................................... I-6
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Role in Global Military Integration ............ I-7
 Unified Action ........................................................................................................... I-8
 Fundamental Considerations ................................................................................... I-10

CHAPTER II 
JOINT COMMAND

 Introduction...............................................................................................................II-1
 Strategic Art ..............................................................................................................II-1
 Operational Art – In Planning and Execution...........................................................II-3
 Operational Design ...................................................................................................II-6
 Joint Planning ...........................................................................................................II-6
 Assessment ...............................................................................................................II-8
 The Civil-Military Dialogue Within the Department of Defense ...........................II-12

CHAPTER III 
JOINT FUNCTIONS

 Introduction............................................................................................................. III-1
 Command and Control ............................................................................................ III-1
 Information ........................................................................................................... III-16
 Intelligence ........................................................................................................... III-28
 Fires ...................................................................................................................... III-30
 Movement and Maneuver ..................................................................................... III-37
 Protection .............................................................................................................. III-40
 Sustainment........................................................................................................... III-48

CHAPTER IV 
ORGANIZING AND PRACTICING GLOBAL INTEGRATION

 Understanding the Operational Environment ......................................................... IV-1

 Global Integration ................................................................................................... IV-4
 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan ................................................................................ IV-8
 Global Campaigning ............................................................................................... IV-9
 Global Campaign Considerations ......................................................................... IV-10

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 Operational and Strategic Objectives ................................................................... IV-13

 The Joint Operation .............................................................................................. IV-14
 Phasing a Joint Operation ..................................................................................... IV-14
 Organizing Operational Areas .............................................................................. IV-19
 Linear and Nonlinear Operations.......................................................................... IV-23
 Global Integration in Practice ............................................................................... IV-27
 The Global Campaign, Combatant Command Campaign, and Global
Integration Framework ......................................................................................... IV-27
 Global Effects Coordination ................................................................................. IV-30
 Mission Areas and Enduring Requirements ......................................................... IV-33
 Tailoring Headquarters and Forces ....................................................................... IV-38
 Partner Alignment ................................................................................................. IV-46

CHAPTER V
THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM
 
 Introduction.............................................................................................................. V-1
 Competition Continuum Overview.......................................................................... V-3
 Cooperation.............................................................................................................. V-5
 Competition ............................................................................................................. V-6
 Armed Conflict/War ................................................................................................ V-7
 The Competition Continuum and Deterrence .......................................................... V-7

CHAPTER VI 
JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN COOPERATION AND
ADVERSARIAL COMPETITION

 Introduction............................................................................................................. VI-1
 Global Integration of Cooperation and Competition .............................................. VI-2
 Considerations for Cooperation .............................................................................. VI-3
 Typical Cooperative Operations and Activities .................................................... VI-14
 Responding to Crises ............................................................................................ VI-20
 Adversarial Competition Below Armed Conflict: Foundation and Practice ........ VI-20
 Patterns of Coercion and Determinants of Success .............................................. VI-26
 Considerations for Countering Coercion and Malign Influence........................... VI-35

CHAPTER VII 
JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICT

SECTION I
 Introduction............................................................................................................ VII-1
 Joint Force Preparation and Transition to Armed Conflict ................................... VII-5
 Joint Warfighting – Offensives, Counteroffensives, and Transitions.................. VII-22
 The Transition from Armed Conflict into the New Competition ........................ VII-33

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SECTION II
 Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Violent Extremist Organizations ....... VII-38
 The Limited Contingency .................................................................................... VII-41
 Direct Action ....................................................................................................... VII-42
 Counterinsurgency ............................................................................................... VII-43
 Global Integration and the Joint Force’s Enduring Role in Competition ............ VII-45

APPENDIX 

A Principles of Joint Operations ................................................................... A-1

B References ..................................................................................................B-1
C Administrative Instructions ........................................................................C-1

GLOSSARY 

Part I Shortened Word Forms (Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms) ..... GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-7

FIGURE

I-1 Competition Continuum .............................................................................. I-5 

II-1 Assessment Interaction .............................................................................II-11 
III-1 Command Relationships Synopsis ........................................................... III-3 
III-2 Risk Management Process ..................................................................... III-15 
IV-1 A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment ......................... IV-3 
IV-2 Operational Areas within a Theater ....................................................... IV-21 
IV-3 Typical Operational Areas ..................................................................... IV-22 
IV-4 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas ............................... IV-24 
IV-5 Combinations of Areas of Operations
and Linear/Nonlinear Operations ........................................................... IV-26 

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an overview of the strategic environment and national security

challenges.

• Discusses the instruments of national power and the competition continuum,

strategic direction, and the philosophy of global military integration.

• Describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s role in global military
integration.

• Discusses unified action.

• Discusses joint command through development of strategic art and operational

art.

• Describes the civil-military dialogue within the Department of Defense.

• Presents the joint functions of command and control, information, intelligence,

fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

• Outlines how to organize and practice global integration.

• Presents the competition continuum.

• Discusses joint campaigns and operations in cooperation and adversarial

competition.

• Discusses joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict.

Fundamentals of Joint Campaigns and Operations

Introduction The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD)

employs two or more Services (from at least two Military
Departments [MILDEPs]) in a single operation is through
joint operations. Normally implemented within a broader
campaign, joint operations are military actions conducted
by joint forces and those Service forces employed in
specified command relationships with each other, which of
themselves do not establish joint forces. A joint force is
one composed of significant elements, assigned or

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attached, of two or more MILDEPs operating under a

single joint force commander (JFC).

Strategic Environment and The strategic environment consists of various national,

National Security international, and global interests and influences that affect
Challenges the decisions of senior United States (US) civilian and
military leaders concerning the employment of US
instruments of national power. The strategic environment
is uncertain, complex, and dynamic, requiring
commanders to maintain surveillance of the operational
environment (OE) and conduct military engagement with
interagency and multinational partners. Threats present
the joint force with situations that cut across multiple
combatant commands’ (CCMDs’) areas of responsibility
(AORs) and functional areas. These threats present
themselves in the OE (land, maritime, air space, and
cyberspace; the information environment [IE]; and
electromagnetic operational environment [EMOE]). The
strategic environment is fluid, with continually evolving
alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational
threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge.
While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges
will appear and what form they might take, the joint force
should expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise
will persist.

Instruments of National The instruments of national power are all the means
Power and the Competition available to the government in its pursuit of national
Continuum objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military. The instruments of national
power are continuously active across the competition
continuum. The ability of the United States to advance its
national interests depends on how effectively the United
States Government (USG) aligns and employs the
instruments of national power within the competition
continuum to achieve strategic objectives.

Strategic Direction US federal law and policy provide the framework for
strategic direction among the branches of government and
their departments. Strategic direction, specific to DOD, is
the strategy and intent of the President, the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) in pursuit of national interests. Strategic
direction provides context, purpose, and tasks employing
the instruments of national power.

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The Philosophy of Global Global military integration enables SecDef, assisted by the
Military Integration Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders
(CCDRs), to make timely decisions and establish
operational priorities and institutional choices across
multiple geographic, organizational, and functional
boundaries and time horizons. This process is necessary
because of the challenges of today’s strategic environment,
the realities of limited joint force resources, and expanding
requirements. As CCMDs address complexities of their
OEs and requirements, SecDef prioritizes resources.
Global military integration is additive to and reinforces the
Unified Command Plan (UCP).

Chairman of the Joint The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and 2017
Chiefs of Staff’s Role in UCP expanded the CJCS’s responsibilities, to include
Global Military serving a role in global military integration for the joint
Integration force (as codified in Title 10, United States Code [USC],
Section 153). The CJCS provides advice for prioritization
to the President and SecDef on the allocation and transfer
of forces across CCMDs. As required by Title 10, USC,
the CJCS provides the President and SecDef advice on
ongoing joint force activities and the allocation and
transfer of forces required to execute those activities. For
global military integration, the CJCS assists in strategic
planning and direction of the Armed Forces of the United
States to ensure the effective employment and coherent
pursuit of strategic objectives to integrate action across the
worldwide campaigning effort, while balancing risks.

Unified Action Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination,

and alignment of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve
unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces,
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
and other interorganizational partners. The joint force
integrates actions within DOD and seeks to align actions
collaboratively outside the purview of DOD. Failure to
achieve unified action can jeopardize mission
accomplishment.

Fundamental The framework of strategic, operational, and tactical levels

Considerations of warfare helps commanders visualize the relationships
and actions required to link strategic objectives to
campaigns and major operations and link their objectives
to tactical operations. These levels help commanders
visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate
resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands.

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Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment,

and types and location of forces or components may often
relate to a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or
tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature
of their task, mission, or objective.

Strategic Uses of Military Force. The United States

leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its
national interests. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools
of diplomacy, DOD provides military capabilities to
ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from
positions of strength. DOD has a supporting role when the
military instrument of national power is not the main
instrument for the strategy. Whether in a primary or
supporting role, strategic uses of a military force include
integrated assurance, both forms of coercion (deter and
compel), and forcible action

Joint doctrine distinguishes between traditional warfare

and irregular warfare (IW) but recognizes the strengths of
employing them together in conjunction with appropriate
information activities. All military activities (or
inactivities) are inherently communicative and can affect
behavior in the OE. Both traditional warfare and IW serve
a fundamentally discrete purpose that drives different
approaches to its conduct. In practice, conducting
effective warfare requires creative, dynamic, and
synergistic combinations of proper information integrated
with traditional warfare and IW.

Joint Command

Introduction Command is the authority a commander in the armed

forces exercises lawfully over subordinates by virtue of
rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the
responsibility to effectively visualize, organize, direct,
coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish
assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for
the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned
personnel.

Strategic Art Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and

application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy
and promote national interests. Strategic art and
operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art
provides policy context to strategic objectives and
prioritizes resources. Operational art is the cognitive

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approach by commanders and staffs to develop campaigns

and operations to organize and employ military forces by
integrating ends, ways, and means.

Operational Art – In Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders

Planning and Execution and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,
creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns,
and operations to organize and employ military forces by
integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is
useful to the JFC in initial policy/strategy formulation and
planning. The commander’s judgment, decision making,
and adaptation to the changing OE may also draw upon
operational art.

For planning, operational art provides a thought process to

mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE
and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational
art promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staff to
consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and
operating processes of interagency partners and other
interorganizational participants when they determine
objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to
subordinate forces

In execution, operational art is making decisions before

they are obvious or easy choices and adapting to the
unfolding circumstances. Guided by imperfect
information, commanders issue orders based on opaque
circumstances, all the while anticipating the lag between
the decision and its impact on the enemy and future
friendly force operations and long before it is clear how
those decisions will play out.

Operational Design Operational design is the analytical framework that

underpins planning. Operational design supports
commanders and planners in organizing and understanding
the OE. Additionally, operational design provides an
iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and
mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends,
ways, means, and risk questions and appropriately
structure campaigns and operations.

Joint Planning Joint planning consists of planning activities that help

CCDRs and their subordinate commanders transform
national objectives into actions that mobilize, deploy,
employ, sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It
ties the employment of the Armed Forces of the United

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States to the achievement of national objectives across the

competition continuum. Based on understanding gained
through the application of operational design, more
detailed planning takes place within the steps of the joint
planning process (JPP). JPP is an orderly, analytical set of
logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission;
develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of
action (COAs); select the best COA; and develop a plan or
order.

Assessment Assessment is a continuous and actionable process that

measures the overall effectiveness of the joint force. The
process involves monitoring and evaluating the current
situation and progress toward the objectives. The results
can help determine whether an activity contributes to the
desired effects or progress toward an objective.

The Civil-Military Dialogue At the start of the civil-military dialogue, military

Within the Department of commanders work with their civilian counterparts to gain
Defense a shared understanding to begin to identify the problem or
problems they are facing. Commanders should explain
their understanding of the problem and articulate the
assumptions they are making. One primary goal of the
civil-military dialogue is to confirm or refine the problem
and necessary assumptions. Additionally, effective
dialogue identifies new considerations commanders
should address based on civilian leadership perspectives.
The military leadership should clearly articulate what
actions military capabilities are capable of performing, the
objectives these options can achieve, the costs and risks
associated with each option, and how those options address
the problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue
matures, the specificity of civilian leadership guidance will
typically increase.

Joint Functions

Introduction There are seven joint functions common to joint

operations: command and control (C2), information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection,
and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of
multiple joint functions during operations. The joint
functions apply to all joint operations across the
competition continuum and enable both traditional warfare
and IW, but to different degrees, conditions, and standards,
while employing different tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The integration of activities across joint

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functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all

levels of command.

Command and Control C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by

a commander over assigned and attached forces to
accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational
vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2
function encompasses several tasks, including:

 Establish, organize, and operate a joint force

headquarters (HQ).
 Command subordinate forces.
 Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and
guidance.
 Establish command authorities among subordinate
commanders.
 Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and
designate operational areas (OAs).
 Prioritize and allocate resources.
 Manage risk and force protection.
 Communicate across the staff and joint force.
 Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating
conditions, and achieving objectives.
 Coordinate and control the employment of joint forces
to create lethal and nonlethal effects (i.e., the use of
intermediate force capabilities incorporating both lethal
and nonlethal means) across the competition continuum.
 Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate,
integrate joint operations with the operations and
activities of other participants.
 Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from
a higher authority.

Information The information function encompasses the management

and application of information to support achievement of
objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other joint
functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and
other elements that drive desired relevant actor behaviors
and to support human and automated decision making.
The information function helps commanders and staffs
understand and leverage the prevalent nature of
information, its military uses, and its application during all
military operations. This function provides JFCs the
ability to preserve friendly information and leverage
information and the inherent informational aspects of
military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives.

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The information joint function provides an intellectual

framework to aid commanders in exerting one’s influence
through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or
projection of information.

Intelligence The intelligence function informs JFCs about adversary

intentions, capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), critical
factors, vulnerabilities, and future COAs and helps
commanders and staffs understand friendly, neutral, and
threat networks. The joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (JIPOE) process includes
integrating analysis, production, collection management,
and targeting processes to shape decision making and
enable operations. Using the continuous JIPOE analysis
process, properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance OE
understanding and enable the JFC to act quickly and
effectively. Intelligence activities and assessments also
occur while defending the homeland within the guidelines
of applicable regulations and laws. The intelligence joint
function encompasses the joint intelligence process. The
joint intelligence process consists of six interrelated
categories of intelligence activities and operations:

 Planning and direction of intelligence activities.

 Collection.
 Processing and exploitation of collected exploitable
material and other data to produce relevant information.
 Analysis of information and production of intelligence.
 Dissemination and integration of intelligence with plans
and operations.
 Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence
effectiveness and quality.

Movement and Maneuver Movement and maneuver encompasses the disposition of

joint forces to conduct operations by securing positional or
informational advantages across the competition
continuum and exploiting tactical success to achieve
operational and strategic objectives. Movement is
deploying forces or capabilities into an OA and relocating
them within an OA without the expectation of contact with
the enemy. Maneuver is the employment of forces for
offensive and defensive purposes while in, or expecting,
contact with the enemy. It also includes assuring the
mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver
function encompasses several tasks, including:

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 Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and component

force formations and capabilities by multiple means or
modes throughout the OE.
 Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage
over an enemy or adversary.
 Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their
movement and maneuver without delays caused by
terrain or obstacles.
 Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by
enemy formations. These actions include operations
that employ obstacles (i.e., counter mobility), enforce
sanctions and embargoes, and conduct blockades.
 Control significant areas; deny, expand, and manipulate
access to information; and influence relevant
populations relative to the objective whose access to
possession or control provides either side an operational
advantage.

Protection Protection is all efforts to secure and defend the

effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military
and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities,
information, and infrastructure deployed or located within
or outside the boundaries of a given OA to maintain
mission effectiveness. The protection function
encompasses force protection, force health protection
(FHP), and other protection activities.

Some tasks in the protection function include:

 Provide air, missile (including hypersonics), and space

defense (including all space segments and counter-
unmanned aircraft system operations).
 Provide physical security to protect forces, bases, joint
security areas (JSAs), posts, infrastructure that enables
power projection, and lines of communications (LOCs)
(including contractors and US civilians accompanying
the force).
 Protect friendly information. These activities include
operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence,
defense countermeasure operations, military deception
in support of OPSEC, counter deception, and
counterpropaganda.
 Conduct cyberspace security, cyberspace defense, and
electromagnetic protection to protect information
networks.

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 Provide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) defense to minimize CBRN attacks and
incidents.
 Provide engineering and explosive ordnance disposal
support for counter-improvised threat activities, such as
counter-improvised explosive device activities.
 Identify and neutralize insider threats.
 Conduct detainee operations.
 Conduct medical, environmental, and occupational
surveillance activities.
 Conduct law enforcement and criminal investigation
activities to protect personnel and assets.
 The function focuses on force protection, which
preserves the joint force’s fighting potential in four
primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures
that protect the joint force, its information, and its bases;
necessary infrastructure; and LOCs from an enemy
attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures
that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities
difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Passive measures
reduce the probability and minimize the effects of
damage caused by hostile action without seeking the
initiative. The application of technology and procedures
to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents is equally
important. Finally, emergency management and
response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities
due to isolating events, accidents, health threats, and
natural disasters.
 Force protection does not include actions to defeat the
enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.
FHP complements force protection efforts by
promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the
behavioral or physical well-being of Service members.
 As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function
also extends beyond force protection to encompass the
protection of US noncombatants.

Sustainment Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel

services support to maintain operations through mission
accomplishment and redeployment of the force.
Sustainment gives the JFC the means for freedom of
action, endurance, and to extend operational reach.
Sustainment enables the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative. The sustainment function includes tasks to:

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 Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel

and other energy requirements), arms, munitions, and
equipment.
 Provide for maintenance of equipment.
 Coordinate and provide base operations support for
forces, including field services; personnel services
support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious
support; postal support; morale, welfare, and
recreational support; financial support; and legal
services.
 Build and maintain contingency bases.
 Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.
 Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.
 Provide common-user logistics support to other USG
departments and agencies, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, other nations, and
contractors as authorized by their contracts.
 Establish and coordinate movement services.
 Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain
enduring detainee operations.

Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

Understanding the The joint force conducts joint campaigns and operations in
Operational Environment a complex, volatile, security environment characterized by
contested norms and persistent disorder. National security
threats are transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional.
Since each threat presents unique challenges, the dilemmas
caused by one event impact others, often with no regard
for distance and time. As threats gain access to advanced
capabilities and contest US advantages, competition and
armed conflict are increasingly occurring across multiple
AORs and throughout the physical domains (land,
maritime, air, and space), the IE (which includes
cyberspace), and the EMOE. These realities have eroded
the US competitive military advantage while global
demand for the joint force continues to exceed resources.

Global Integration Global integration enables DOD leadership to provide

advice, make timely decisions, and inform operational
priorities and institutional investment choices across
CCMDs and multiple time horizons. Global integration
requires a global perspective organized around and against
priority challenges with global campaigns and a posture to
execute contingency plans associated with each challenge.
Within each global campaign plan (GCP), CCDRs use broad

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mission areas to structure how CCMDs can execute each

global campaign. Within each mission area of a global
campaign, the joint force executes subordinate operations,
activities, and investments to address specific aspects of the
priority challenges. The result of integration is effective
joint campaigns and operations employing cohesive military
actions arranged across time and multiple AORs to achieve
strategic objectives and balance strategic risk.

Joint Strategic Campaign CJCS Instruction 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic
Plan Campaign Plan (JSCP), [short title: JSCP], fulfills the
CJCS’s statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section
153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for the
strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United
States. The JSCP provides the framework for military
direction to the joint force, implementing and augmenting
the President and SecDef’s guidance found in the national
security strategy, UCP, contingency planning guidance,
and national defense strategy and in the CJCS’s guidance
in the national military strategy. The JSCP provides
guidance for CCMDs, Services, the Joint Staff (JS), and
DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans
and establishes a common set of processes, products, roles,
and responsibilities to globally integrate the operations,
activities, and investments of the joint force. The CCDRs
then operationalize and execute the campaign plan. The
JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products,
priorities, roles, and responsibilities to integrate the joint
force’s global operations, activities, and investments
across the competition continuum.

There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, functional

campaign plans (FCPs), and combatant command
campaign plans (CCPs).

 The JS develops and maintains the GCPs for SecDef

approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that
significantly affect US interests across the globe and
require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all,
CCMDs.
 FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not
bound geographically but require coordination across
multiple CCMDs.
 The CCPs are the primary means through which the
CCMDs collaboratively develop operations, activities, and
investments within their UCP-assigned mission/AOR.

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Global Campaigning The joint force campaigns across the competition

continuum. GCPs and CCPs encompass concurrent and
related operations, activities, and investments to achieve
operational-level objectives that support achievement of
strategic objectives. In concert with other instruments of
national power, these actions not only maintain or achieve
strategic objectives but anticipate a future beyond those
objectives. The actions include many Service component
operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of
military actions with interorganizational and multinational
partners.

Global Campaign When an emerging situation exceeds the scope, scale, or

Considerations responsibility of a single CCDR or global campaign, the
joint forces’ senior leadership will determine an
appropriate response, including the likely supported and
supporting commanders, diagnosing the matter through
the lens of the global campaign design considerations:

 Strategic analysis.
 Range of possible outcomes.
 Anticipate the consequences.
 Commander’s vision.
 Operational direction.
 Campaign narrative.
 Follow-through and enduring efforts.
 Authorities.
 Alignment.
 Force architecture.

Operational and Strategic While operational and strategic objectives are uniquely
Objectives different, they must link with one another. In following
the commander’s vision throughout the process, forces
arrange to achieve the operational objectives.

Strategic objectives are expressions of national interests.

In practice, some strategic objectives are expressions of
policy, not necessarily physical entities. The keys to
achieving strategic objectives can exist thousands of miles
from any particular challenge, in orbit around the Earth,
reside as disaggregated sentiment spread across several
continents, or within information activities. Effective
global campaigning reaches beyond individual regions;
otherwise, joint campaigns and operations address only
symptoms.

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The Joint Operation Joint operation is a general term that describes military
actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces
employed in specified command relationships with each
other. Any single joint operation may be subordinate to a
campaign or part of a larger campaign. A commander is
responsible for the development and execution of an
individual operation.

Phasing a Joint Operation Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint
operation in manageable parts. The phases are unique for
each operation as a tool to integrate and synchronize
related activities, in time and space within available
resources, thereby enhancing C2 to improve flexibility and
unity of effort during execution. Phases in a plan are
distinct and sequential; however, activities often overlap
between the phases.

Organizing While the UCP assigns AORs, CCDRs and other JFCs
Operational Areas designate smaller OAs (e.g., joint operations area [JOA]
and area of operations) temporarily. OAs have physical
dimensions composed of some combination of air, land,
and maritime domains. While domains are useful
constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical
environment in which operations unfold (the OA), the use
of the term “domain” does not imply or mandate
exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. The
appropriate JFC specifies authorities and responsibilities
within an OA. JFCs define these areas with geographical
boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate,
integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force
components and supporting commands.

Linear and Nonlinear In linear operations, each commander directs and

Operations sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert
with adjacent units. In linear operations, emphasis is on
maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to
other friendly forces.

In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives

without geographic reference to adjacent forces.
Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific
effects on multiple decisive points.

Global Integration in Global integration includes the entire joint force’s actions,
Practice unfolding over different time horizons, and begins with the
CJCS. In execution, the joint force campaigns to achieve
operational-level objectives as described in the global

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campaigns, CCDR campaigns, and standing execute

orders. To oversee execution and gauge the degree of
effective integration, the CJCS’s JS regularly examines and
collaborates with each coordinating authority’s ongoing
campaign activities throughout the year of execution.

The Global Campaign, Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to prepare
Combatant Command strategic plans, as required, and provide for the preparation
Campaign, and Global and review of contingency plans. The CJCS provides
Integration Framework advice on ongoing military operations and the allocation
and transfer of forces among CCMDs. In performing this
role in global integration, the CJCS is responsible for
operationalizing the national strategies and other policy
guidance, aligning the actions of the joint force, balancing
risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to
SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS,
through the JSCP, assigns which sets of global challenges
requires GCPs and global integration frameworks.

Global Effects Coordination Global effects coordination focuses primarily on

integration and synchronization across the CCMDs to help
prioritize lethal and nonlethal global effects. The global
effects coordination process seeks to improve situational
awareness across CCMD theater and functional
responsibilities; identify opportunities, tensions, and
consequences of joint force action or inaction; and align
CCMD global operations to generate desired effects.

Mission Areas and Enduring The mission areas constitute the framework of global
Requirements campaigns. Within the global campaigns, five mutually
supporting mission areas describe the principal orientation
and way the joint force operates across the competition
continuum and around the globe—simultaneously in
multiple regions with allies and partners, and, as necessary,
across UCP-designated AORs and other military
boundaries. The mission areas are:

 Deter strategic attack.

 Deter conventional attack.
 Assure allies and partners.
 Compete below the level of armed conflict
(competition).
 Prepare/respond to threats.

Tailoring Headquarters and How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces
Forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint
operations. The JFC’s mission and operational approach,

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the principle of unity of command, and a mission

command philosophy are guiding principles to organize
the joint force for operations. JFCs can establish joint
forces on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may
centralize selected functions within the joint force but
should not reduce the versatility, responsiveness, and
initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service
and special operations tactical and operational forces,
organizations, and capabilities to function as designed.

Partner Alignment The US military cannot achieve acceptable and sustainable

strategic objectives acting alone. Allies and partners are
an important aspect of the global campaigns. In the
conduct of military activities, the joint force may rely on
partners to increase capacity, access unique capabilities
and authorities, share intelligence, and extend operational
reach to achieve objectives. However, many strategic
challenges exist that military force cannot solve alone—
especially in competition but also during post-combat
consolidation and stabilization activities. Global
integration uses a comprehensive approach, to include
considerations of nonmilitary means to address these
challenges and achieve operation-level objectives.
Interorganizational partnerships are the sources of these
means.

The Competition Continuum

Introduction There are four core elements of competition: influence,

advantage, and leverage form the common elements,
which are fundamentally interrelated aspects through
which a nation advances and protects the primary core
element, its interests.

 Interests are qualities, principles, matters of self-

preservation, and concepts that a nation or actor values
and seeks to protect or achieve concerning other
competitors. Interests are contextual and may include
the maintenance of physical security, economic
prosperity, continuity of government and culture at
home, and value projection in the geopolitical
environment, as well as emotional triggers (e.g., fear,
honor, glory), and other drivers (e.g., virtual, cognitive)
that animate action.
 Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct,
indirect, or intangible ways. An actor can accumulate,
spend, or lose influence.

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 Advantage is superiority of position or condition. States

may create an advantage by the accumulation of
influence toward the desired effect or acceptable
condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage
through the exercise of the instruments of national
power.
 Leverage is the application of advantage gained to create
an effect or exploit an opportunity. From a position of
leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and
protecting its interests.

Competition Continuum The competition continuum describes a world of enduring

Overview competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation,
adversarial competition below armed conflict, and armed
conflict. These descriptors refer to the relationship
between the United States and another strategic actor (state
or non-state) concerning a contested interest or set of
specific policy objectives. This description allows for
simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at
different points along the competition continuum.

Elements of the Competition Continuum:

 Cooperation. Situations in which joint forces take actions

with another strategic partner in pursuit of policy
objectives.
 Adversarial Competition. Joint forces or multinational
forces can take actions below armed conflict against a state
or non-state adversary in pursuit of policy objectives in
response to antagonistic and threatening behavior.
 Armed Conflict/War. Armed conflict/war occurs when
a state directs its military forces to take actions against an
enemy in hostilities or declared war.

Cooperation Cooperation can be an enduring activity where the

relationship with the ally or partner is in place and will
continue for the foreseeable future. However, cooperation
in specific areas with a partner whose overall relationship
with the United States is neutral or even adversarial may
be necessary.

Competition Competition tends to occur over extended periods of time.

In comparison to armed conflict, actions are often more
indirect, risks are different, and the expenditure of
resources less intense, thus allowing for a more protracted
effort.

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Armed Conflict/War Armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive

effort in terms of scale, scope, and totality. Joint forces
integrate capabilities across CCMDs to conduct combat
operations and defeat the enemy’s capabilities, strategy,
and will. However, even during periods of armed conflict,
success depends on the effective conduct of ongoing
cooperative and competitive activities.

The Competition Continuum Integrated deterrence applies across the competition

and Deterrence continuum, though in different fashions according to the
situation. Deterrence applies to cooperation. US cooperation
with various allies and partners can serve as a deterrent of
aggression by others.

Deterrence in competition has a similar nuance and may

be harder to judge. For instance, if an adversary supports
a surrogate in a neighboring country, this is not proof that
deterrence has failed. The adversary might have preferred
to make an overt incursion but concluded the risks were
too great. In that case, successful integrated deterrence of
armed conflict led to competition.

During armed conflict, integrated deterrence continues and

requires effort and consideration. In other instances,
integrated deterrence must unfold over extended periods.
The joint force seeks to deter a conventional attack against
a partner or ally.

Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

Introduction The joint force rarely operates unilaterally. In any

significant campaign, cooperation is a feature of nearly
every substantive military action. In an interconnected
world, most major joint force activity includes some
ramifications for competition with a global or regional
rival or adversary. Cooperation and competition are
perpetual. The joint force conducts cooperative activities
with allies and partners and competitive activities to
counter adversaries who seek to turn the competition to
their advantage.

Global Integration of JFCs account for external considerations such as the

Cooperation and desired conditions that cooperation should create the
Competition nature of the relevant relationships and the potential
partner’s willingness and capacity. Commanders also
account for internal considerations such as the interests,
objectives, and priorities of other contributing USG

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departments and agencies; resource limitations; relevant

statutory or policy restrictions on the amount, categories,
and purposes of US security cooperation (SC) expenditure;
and other policy on SC that is relevant to the specific
situation. Just as in armed conflict, the employment of the
military instrument of national power, in concert with
interagency partner efforts, seeks to achieve operational
objectives in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Considerations for Considerations for effective cooperative activities include:

Cooperation
 Identification of the conditions JFCs can create within the
security environment that favor US interests.
 Recognition of the state and character of US partner
relationships.
 Determination of our partners’ propensity, likelihood, and
capacity to act in a manner aligned with our interests.
 Conduct interest mapping with allies and partners over
mutual concerns and opportunities.
 Comprehension of other USG departments and agencies’
interests, objectives, and priorities with respect to the
specific circumstance.
 Understanding the amount, scope, categories, and
purposes of all the US foreign assistance funding Congress
planned for the relevant area(s).
 Analysis of how the joint force can most aptly apply the
existing authorities and resources to the specific area and
issue.

Typical Cooperative Stabilization. Stabilization is an inherently cooperative

Operations and Activities endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts (e.g.,
diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense) to
create conditions for local legitimate authorities and
systems to manage unstable environments effectively.
Department of State, United States Agency for
International Development, and DOD cooperate to
stabilize these fragile countries of strategic importance to
the United States.

National Emergency Preparedness (Domestic

Operations). Emergency preparedness consists of
measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the
loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions
from all types of hazards through a comprehensive
emergency management program of preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery.

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Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament.

Commanders and staffs oversee activities of military
personnel involved in arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament activities.

Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is an aspect of protection

and involves defensive measures to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts,
to include limited response and containment by local
military and civilian forces.

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed

by Title 10, USC, Section 401. This assistance is in
conjunction with military operations and exercises to
fulfill unit training requirements while incidentally
creating humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

Homeland defense and defense support of civil

authorities. Security and defense of the US homeland is
the USG’s top responsibility and is a continuous,
cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as
state, tribal, and local government.

Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. When

requested, DOD may provide support to federal, state,
territory, tribal, insular areas, and local law enforcement
reacting to civil disturbances, conducting border security
and counterdrug missions, preparing for antiterrorism
operations, and participating in other related law
enforcement activities.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA

operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease,
hunger, or privation in countries outside the United States.

Recovery Operations. Recovery operations may search

for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel,
sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or
human remains.

Responding to Crises A crisis is an incident or emerging situation involving a

possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military
forces, or vital interests. A crisis can develop rapidly and
create a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or
military importance that national leaders consider a
commitment of military forces and resources. A crisis can

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occur anywhere across the competition continuum and the

response can include almost any type of joint operation.

Adversarial Competition Adversarial competition surrounds a persistent and long-

Below Armed Conflict: term struggle between actors seeking to achieve
Foundation and Practice incompatible strategic objectives while avoiding armed
conflict. In adversarial competition, nations or non-state
actors apply their instruments of power over extended
periods and throughout the OE to either initiate or counter
malign or antagonistic behavior against their adversaries.
The strategic purpose of these activities is to gain and
sustain long-term comparative advantages (and mitigate
disadvantages) indefinitely.

Patterns of Coercion and The United States has used its military power in
Determinants of Success adversarial competition and in the competitions that
always emerge after armed conflict. Most of these cases
involved both a diplomatic and economic dimension
implemented to influence the perceptions and behavior of
foreign countries’ political leaders. JFCs posture and
employ military forces in discrete ways for specific
objectives. JFCs recognize successful employment is
different for each situation. Evaluating these discrete
activities requires considering the full range of uses of the
armed forces in adversarial competition. Understanding
the adversarial mechanisms that ultimately drive a US
response is equally important. Finally, JFCs
understanding how the armed forces can maximize their
unique role and what options can be most successful is key.

Considerations for When directed, the joint force has traditionally exercised
Countering Coercion and influence over key territories in conditions less than armed
Malign Influence conflict to maintain and advance US national interests.
Now, the situation can become more complex as threats
have challenged the United States in orbital and
cyberspace. Within enduring competitions, actors
continually probe and seek to gain an advantage. Previous
strategic guidance has directed military forces to counter
these provocations on many occasions. The US and joint
force experiences have exceeded the scope of most
anecdotal coercion theories. For example, some situations
include more than two actors that bear on the situation and
its outcome. With the inclusion of multiple actors, an
effective response requires a holistic framework where
multiple power struggles may be in play concurrently. In
the US experience, general deterrence is broad and
continuous throughout the competition continuum.

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Alternatively, the United States normally tailors its use of

force to compel behavior short of war only in specific
circumstances.

Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

Introduction Armed conflict or war is a violent conflict between

nations, state-like entities, or armed organizations. A
nation with a central government or occupying power
opposed by insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups
engage in armed conflict. Additionally, armed groups that
do not recognize national borders may fight wars in
semiautonomous regions. The situation presented by an
enemy often drives CCDRs to pursue a complex array of
overlapping operational objectives across numerous
AORs. Along with conventional forces, the enemy may
employ coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal
activity, and information warfare to complicate operations.
The enemy’s campaign progresses throughout the OE.
Joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict can be
an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale,
tempo, and scope of capabilities. Prevailing against the
enemy requires senior military and civilian leadership to
transition the force’s posture optimized for the global
campaign to a disposition for joint warfighting.

Joint Force Preparation Preparation. While commanders conduct activities of

and Transition to cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still
Armed Conflict preparing for armed conflict. In many cases, the
preparations enhance bonds between multinational
partners, increase understanding of the AOR, help ensure
access when required, and strengthen the capability for
future multinational operations. All these qualities can
help deter armed conflict. As CCDRs compete for access
and influence across their AORs, they simultaneously set
conditions to avoid armed conflict and ensure the joint
force postures to respond to adversary actions and execute
operations. CCDRs’ GCPs’ “prepare/respond to threats”
mission area provides considerations for setting the theater
for armed conflict. Preparing multiple geographic theaters
or regions for armed conflict requires investment in
leadership, diplomacy, and long-term programming,
which includes institutional planning, resources, and
activities.

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Transition to Armed Conflict

 Remain vigilant and ready: recognition. The joint force

and interagency partners must remain ready to defeat an
initial enemy offensive, overcome surprise, and recover
from loss of initiative. The enemy can employ a mix of
irregular, traditional, and informational activities that may
not present a triggering event until their operation or
campaign is well underway.
 Establish command relationships. Armed conflict may
require multiple supported CCMDs quickly shifting main
efforts between them. Command relationships have trade-
offs, but proper balance is essential. When command
relationships are less than optimal, they can create
operational gaps and unnecessary risk.
 Local Superiority. Air and maritime commanders have a
key role in the transition to armed conflict. By maintaining
control of the air and sea in the transition to armed conflict,
the JFC is able to set the conditions for successful
engagements early in a conflict.

Other Transition Considerations

 Littoral areas offer positions from which to begin,

sustain, and support joint operations. Even when joint
forces firmly establish ashore, littoral operations provide
JFCs with opportunities to gain leverage over the enemy
by operational maneuver from the sea.
 JFCs can operate from an HQ platform at sea.
Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed
planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the
joint force.
 Special operations forces (SOF)-conventional forces
integration. The JFC, using SOF independently or
integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional
and specialized capability to achieve objectives that might
not otherwise be possible.
 Stabilization activities. Stabilization activities provide an
opportunity to support objectives and create the conditions
to achieve strategic- and operational-level objectives.
 Protection Considerations. The JFC may designate a
JSA as the operational footprint expands to accommodate
the forces required for armed conflict. The JSA should
include key logistics nodes and infrastructure such as aerial
ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation.

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 Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents. Without limiting

boldness or initiative, JFCs should make every preparation
and effort to reduce the potential for the killing or
wounding of friendly and neutral personnel, damaging
friendly and neutral property, and degrading friendly and
neutral capabilities.
 Logistics Support and Sustainment. The scale of
operational-level warfare traditionally requires significant
logistics and sustainment support. CCDRs and
subordinate commanders identify logistical and
sustainment requirements and shortcomings for forces
assigned and allocated to the theater.
 Space Considerations. Space is a contested environment
where commanders anticipate and mitigate hostile actions
that may affect friendly space operations and impact the
ability to create effects from space.
 Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO).
The joint force is critically dependent on the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for operations across all
joint functions and throughout the OE. For example,
modern C2 requires the operation of EMS-dependent
sensing and communication systems, while advanced
weapons rely on positioning, navigation, and timing
information transmitted through the EMOE.
 Cooperative Activities. Activities before armed conflict
may focus on continued planning and preparation for
anticipated stabilization activities. These activities should
include conducting collaborative interagency planning to
synchronize the civil-military effort; confirming the
feasibility of pertinent objectives; and providing for
adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other
capabilities. Joint force stabilization activities may be a
part of the USG’s security sector assistance to restore
security and infrastructure eventually.
 Targeting. As the CCDR and JFC define the JOA,
establish a joint task force, and set the theater for potential
armed conflict, they must refine or begin target
identification, prioritization, and analysis per existing
contingency plans, guidance, and the situation.
 Informational Considerations. Leveraging the IE to set
conditions for success during armed conflict begins with
the JFC and staff identifying relevant platforms for
information dissemination in the OE.

Preparing the OE. JIPOE products facilitate the joint

force in preparing the OE for operations. Conventional

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forces conduct, promote, and anticipate enduring

preparations and readiness based on JIPOE. The
objectives may or may not be threat-specific. Of course,
the responses are all scalable and employed in the context
of the specific situation.

Considerations for Isolating a Peer Enemy. As guided

by strategic direction, the United States and the joint force
strive to isolate enemies by denying them access to allies
and sanctuary. The purpose of isolation is to strip away as
much of the enemy’s external support or freedom of action
as possible. However, peer enemies have strategic depth
and global reach. A peer enemy will likely have strong
influence within its periphery. Still, isolating an enemy is
an important aspect of waging warfare at the strategic
level. These actions can limit the enemy’s potential for
horizontal or vertical escalation and enable joint force
freedom. CCDRs may support diplomatic, economic, and
informational actions.

Initial Response and Employing Flexible Deterrent

Options (FDOs) and Flexible Response Options
(FROs). The joint force executes FDOs and FROs to
respond to situations by leveraging capabilities and
options to counter coercion or disrupt, deny, degrade,
destroy, or deceive as appropriate.

Protection. CCDRs and staff should consider introducing

protection assets into the theater early and integrate with
host nation (HN) defenses.

Preparation to Execution. The circumstances

surrounding armed conflict rarely unfold as imagined.
Regardless of how much time and effort went into
anticipating, planning, and wargaming wartime scenarios,
commanders recognize that the existing plan will likely
need changes as the force transitions from competition to
armed conflict.

Gain Operational Access. US forces may gain

operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to
establish an operating base in or near the conflict or using
forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and
activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a
base or support facility. CCDRs can introduce forces
during cooperative activities such as SC, military
engagement, establishing an expeditionary advance base,

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or bilateral exercises. The CCDRs employ immediately

available forces and request appropriate FROs.

Force Projection. Projecting US military force invariably

requires extensive use of the international waters,
international airspace, orbital space, the IE (which includes
cyberspace), and the EMS to gain operational access. The
ability to freely maneuver to position and sustain our
forces is vital to our national interests and those of our
partner nations. US forces may gain operational access to
areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating
base in or near the conflict or use forcible entry operations.
Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in
the invitation to establish a base or support facility.

Joint Warfighting – The Enemy Offensive. Commanders posture forces and

Offensives, enabling capabilities of the force so they are able to survive
Counteroffensives, and the enemy’s anticipated initial attack. This posture should
Transitions have support from sustainment and replacement forces
through HN and allied infrastructure and logistic support.

Attack Operational COGs and Supporting Structures.

Essential to joint warfighting and prevailing in armed
conflict, the JFCs attack the COGs prior to the enemy
seizing their geographic objectives. As difficult as it may
be, joint forces must attack the enemy’s operational forces
and critical infrastructure to degrade its capability, erode
its will and commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion
of its military.

Drive the Enemy to Culmination

 Create Local Air and Maritime Freedom of

Movement. Achieving local air and maritime
superiority allows joint forces to penetrate the enemy’s
antiaccess (A2)/area denial (AD) systems, secure a JSA
or lodgment, and close the strategic and operational
distance.
 Disrupt Portions of Enemy Integrated Air Defense
Systems (IADSs) and A2/AD Systems. JFCs, through
their joint force air component commanders and joint
force maritime component commanders, cannot achieve
necessary air and maritime superiority without
neutralizing some aspects of enemy A2/AD systems and
IADSs.
 Close the Strategic and Operational Distance.
Closing the strategic and operational distance requires

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contesting enemy maneuver forces to deny their

objectives and degrade enemy long-range intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
 Protect and Expand the JSA. The JFC must exploit
the advantages achieved by closing the strategic and
operational distance to protect and expand the JSA. This
exploitation enables the deployment and sustainment of
expeditionary forces to support follow-on operations
and secures operational access within the theater.

Counteroffensive. As soon as possible, the joint force

must initiate offensive operations; when conducted in
response to enemy attacks, they are referred to as
counteroffensives.

Joint Warfighting — Integrating Capabilities and

Synchronizing Action. Commanders must integrate the
capabilities and synchronize the operations of air, land,
maritime, space, and cyberspace forces, along with
JEMSO, to defeat peer enemies. JFCs should consider
intelligence collection, providing joint fire support,
maneuvering to close with the enemy, and protecting the
force, for example, as separate operations but
complementary joint actions executed to create necessary
effects against the enemy.

Transition and Adaptation. Commanders adapt

continuously and transition as necessary as they anticipate
the enemy’s future actions. At some point during the joint
force’s initial offensive or counteroffensive, the attack will
culminate or pause. This action will be by design or enemy
response. Still, there should be no reason to believe the
enemy will abandon their objectives after the first iteration
of offensive-counteroffensive. Commanders expect to
transition through multiple iterations where the side that
adapts to the enemy and adjusts to the OE quicker realizes
an advantage. Commanders know that on every occasion
the United States has engaged in sustained armed conflict
against a peer enemy; the joint force has had to change
methods, organizations, and capabilities to succeed in the
new environment. Until this adaptation occurred, the
military could not bring effective force to bear against the
enemy.

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The Transition from Armed Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be
Conflict into the New elusive. To make a military victory meaningful, CCDRs
Competition take on the timeless challenge of translating the military
success in the OE into enduring and favorable outcomes.

Operations, Activities, and Investments. To effectively

campaign throughout the transition from armed conflict to
competition, joint forces take specific actions that:

 Establish security from external threats.

 Execute governance over occupied territories to
establish a military government in occupied territory
(e.g., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions,
the law of war).
 Coerce adversaries from behaving in a malign or
detrimental manner by rewarding appropriate behavior
and imposing costs for malign or antagonistic behavior.
 Influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning,
decision making, and behavior of adversaries’
leadership, security forces, and civil society and other
foreign audiences and inform domestic audiences to
create desired psychological effects.
 Influence adversaries’ risk assessments to reduce their
willingness to engage in malign or antagonistic
behavior.
 Counter or contest adversaries’ operations, activities,
and investments to deny or delay their operational
success.
 Continually seek to gain and sustain long-term
competitive advantages as the new adversarial
competition will go on indefinitely or until the former
combatants, now competitors, reach a mutually
acceptable political settlement.
 Conduct security tasks to protect friendly forces,
installation routes, critical infrastructure, populations,
and actions within an assigned OA.
 Execute stabilization activities.
 Establish influence over local and regional audiences (as
authorized). Commanders develop and communicate
supporting and credible narratives to the intended
population to assist them in understanding the overall
goal of military actions and the benefits of those actions
for the population.
 Establish, maintain, and sustain large-scale detention
compounds and sustain enduring detainee operations.

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 Execute peace enforcement operations. Peace

enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations
are coercive actions that orient on adversarial behaviors.

Joint Campaigns and IW is a struggle among state or non-state actors to

Operations Against Violent influence populations and affect legitimacy. The term
Extremist Organizations irregular highlights the nontraditional methods that state
and non-state actors incorporate through their actions,
information efforts, activities, and operations to gain the
broadest and most impactful influence and effects.

Violent extremist organizations (VEOs). VEOs include

individual terrorists that align with a group, terrorist
organizations, and ideologically driven groups that
promote violence. A sound global approach for countering
terrorism outlines a strategic vision built around an
international effort. The aim orients on defeating violent
extremism, which threatens the way of life for free and
open societies and creating a global environment
inhospitable to violent extremists and their supporters.

Combating Terrorism (CbT). CbT involves actions to

oppose terrorism from all threats. CbT encompasses
antiterrorism, which are defensive measures taken to
reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist
acts. These actions include rapid containment by local
military and civilian forces and counterterrorism, which
are activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists
and their organizations and networks.

Joint Campaigns and Operations Against VEOs.

Successful campaigns and operations against VEOs
require an integrated USG strategy that establishes
relevant strategic objectives. A GCP for countering VEOs
translates USG policy and strategy into a set of strategic-
and operational-level military objectives necessary to
establish the conditions necessary to achieve the desired
strategic objective.

The Limited Contingency Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US

citizens and US interests. Many of these operations
involve a combination of military forces and capabilities
operating in close cooperation with interorganizational
participants. Commanders seek to integrate and execute
within one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort.

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Executive Summary

The timing of the transition from planning and preparation

to execution can change rapidly, as necessary.

Direct Action Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-
scale offensive actions conducted in hostile, denied, or
diplomatically sensitive environments. Direct action
employs military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture,
exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile,
denied, high-risk, or diplomatically and politically
sensitive environments.

Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency consists of comprehensive civilian and

military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and
contain insurgency and address its root causes.

An effective counterinsurgency operation utilizes all

instruments of national power to integrate and synchronize
political, security, legal, economic, development, and
psychological activities carried out by the HN. CCDRs
also leverage applicable USG and multinational partners
to create a holistic approach to resolve core grievances
where able and for those irreconcilables remaining in the
insurgency, weakening their cause for violence.

Global Integration and the Arranging and accomplishing global integration’s actions
Joint Force’s Enduring Role are essential. For the joint force to prevail against a peer
in Competition enemy, it is imperative for JFCs to implement the directed
prioritization of effort and integrate capabilities that work
together to create advantages. If CCDRs are unsuccessful in
executing these essential operations, then the war effort
could face costly protraction, stalemate, or even worse.
CCDRs achieve success by continually denying the enemy’s
objectives, attriting and dismantling enemy A2/AD defense
networks, targeting C2 systems, and isolating the enemy’s
forces from their strategic infrastructure. Simultaneously,
CCDRs continue protecting the force and accumulating
combat power from across the globe. As the campaigns and
major operations begin to create diplomatic and political
leverage and advantage, national leaders can begin to either
impose or negotiate a settlement.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and

guidance for joint campaigns and operations.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series
and is a companion publication to joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Volume 1, Joint
Warfighting, and JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force. It provides guidance to joint force
commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint campaigns
and operations. It also informs interagency and multinational partners, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers
of fundamental principles that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United
States. This publication describes fundamental keystone constructs—such as unified
action and joint functions—that apply regardless of the nature or circumstances of a
specific joint operation. This publication provides context not only for the joint operations
series but also for other keystone doctrine publications that describe supporting functions
and processes.

b. The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services
(from at least two Military Departments [MILDEPs]) in a single operation is through joint
operations. Normally implemented within a broader campaign, joint operations are
military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified
command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces.
A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more
MILDEPs operating under a single JFC.

c. The foundation of joint operations doctrine rests upon the principles of joint
operations and the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1, Volume 1,
Joint Warfighting. These principles and fundamentals apply to both traditional and
irregular forms of warfare. Joint doctrine recognizes the utility of unity of command and
the synergy created by the integration and synchronization of military operations in time,
space, and purpose. Joint doctrine recognizes the nine principles of war (objective,
offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise,
and simplicity). Experience gained in a variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has
reinforced the value of three additional principles (restraint, perseverance, and
legitimacy). Together, they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations, see Appendix
A, “Principles of Joint Operations.”

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on traditional warfare,

IW, and the instruments of national power.

d. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization at all levels—
are a team. Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters (HQ), supporting
organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components’
capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.
The JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission.

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e. Overview of Joint Campaigns and Operations

(1) The joint force continuously plans and conducts joint campaigns and
operations to protect and promote the Nation’s interests within a dynamic and complex
environment. The ability to prevail in armed conflict against a variety of enemies is
fundamental and joint warfighting remains paramount. Additionally, the joint force
conducts joint campaigns and operations to limit adversary influence and counter coercive
efforts seeking to undermine our interests without provoking armed conflict. Growing
instability, the erosion of international norms, and the rise of near peers all suggest such
adversarial competition below armed conflict (from this point forward “competition” will
be used in this publication) will be increasingly prevalent in the future operational
environment (OE). The joint force contributes to the maintenance and viability of the
international system of cooperative alliances and partnerships. The benefits of pursuing
mutual interests alongside allies and partners are powerful and priceless. For decades,
these cooperative alliances have provided enduring strategic advantages against our
adversaries.

(2) A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and

operational objectives within a given time and space. The joint force campaigns by
integrating and employing measures of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict to
create the conditions and behaviors necessary to achieve United States (US) strategic
objectives. In the most successful instances of the use of military force, our civilian and
military leaders coordinate and align the military with other instruments of national power
as part of a broad national effort. This effective blending of instruments of national power,
in parallel with the coordinated and aligned efforts of allies and partners, is essential across
the competition continuum.

(3) Joint warfighting includes major operations and campaigns involving large-
scale combat. A major operation is a series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces,
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an
operational area. Major operations are a primary building block of a campaign. Campaigns
are joint in nature; functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supporting
operations, not independent campaigns.

2. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

a. The strategic environment consists of various national, international, and global

interests and influences that affect the decisions of senior US civilian and military leaders
concerning the employment of US instruments of national power. The strategic
environment is uncertain, complex, and dynamic, requiring commanders to maintain
surveillance of the OE and conduct military engagement with interagency and
multinational partners. Threats present the joint force with situations that cut across
multiple combatant commands’ (CCMDs’) areas of responsibility (AORs) and functional
areas. These threats present themselves in the OE (land, maritime, air space, and
cyberspace; the information environment [IE]; and electromagnetic operational
environment [EMOE]). The strategic environment is fluid, with continually evolving
alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge,

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disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will
appear and what form they might take, the joint force should expect that uncertainty,
ambiguity, and surprise will persist.

b. Today’s threats can increasingly synchronize and integrate direct military force and
information activities and employ other instruments of national power to create
combinations of lethal and nonlethal effects with greater sophistication while less
constrained by geographic, functional, legal, or moral boundaries. Threats present these
dilemmas in large part due to the nature of the modern IE. Technology that reaches across
space and cyberspace characterize the instantaneous and persistent global reach of
information and the critical dependency modern societies have on advanced information
and communications technologies. A peer enemy has strategic depth and global reach.
Armed conflict is inherently transregional as enemies’ interests, influence, and capabilities
extend beyond traditional and recognized international order and boundaries. Significant
and emerging challenges include conventional armed conflict; attacks in space, cyberspace,
and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) threats and employment. Additional challenges include terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), adversary information and influence
activities, and proliferation of an adversary’s exclusion zones (enforced) through antiaccess
(A2) and area denial (AD) capabilities. Long-range A2 capabilities may prevent or inhibit
the joint force from entering an operational area (OA). If a force can overcome an enemy’s
A2 capabilities, additional AD capabilities can still limit a force’s freedom of action.

c. The challenges may not be specific to any single AOR and can create problematic
consequences for international security. Such an environment poses dilemmas for US
decision makers; can result in uneven US and allied physical and informational responses;
and may weaken US alliances that promote trade, economic development, and diplomatic
agreements. A JFC’s OE, which may encompass all enemy, friendly, and neutral factors
relevant to a specific joint operation, can include actions directed against a variety of state
and non-state actors, including insurgents, proxies, surrogates, warlords, criminals, and
others. The joint force counters threat networks by continuous and simultaneous
engagement at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Third-party entities and
organizations may also affect achievement of strategic objectives, including the civilian
population, host nation (HN) government, other political groups, international
organizations, NGOs, and contractors from which everyone expects to draw support.

d. Enemies who attack the United States and overseas interests may use indirect and
non-attributable methods. They will avoid secure and defensible targets and attack
vulnerabilities. Targets may include US and partner nations’ (PNs’) lines of
communications (LOCs), seaports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, critical
infrastructure, information centers, economic centers, historically and culturally significant
landmarks, and military and police personnel and facilities. The joint force can counter
these attacks with tailored operations and activities aligned with the efforts of interagency
and international partners and organizations.

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e. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of

warfare. Developments in space and cyberspace provide the US military, allies, and
partners the means to improve economic and physical security. However, they also provide
adversaries with similar capabilities and increase access to open-source information and
intelligence, the Department of Defense information network (DODIN), critical
infrastructure and key resources, and an extensive propaganda platform with global reach.

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and the Defense Strategy Review for more
information on the strategic security environment. Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational
Cooperation, for more information on interorganizational cooperation.

3. Instruments of National Power and the Competition Continuum

a. The instruments of national power are all the means available to the government in
its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and
military. The instruments of national power are continuously active across the competition
continuum. The ability of the United States to advance its national interests depends on
how effectively the United States Government (USG) aligns and employs the instruments
of national power within the competition continuum to achieve strategic objectives.

b. Whether in a primary or supporting role, the military can provide its strengths,
assets, and capabilities in a range of strategic uses. As a significant part of the military
instrument of national power, the joint force organizes efforts through cooperation,
competition, and armed conflict. Much of DOD’s focus and effort is on deterrence through
cooperation and competition, while remaining prepared for armed conflict. Through
cooperation, DOD supports USG strategic objectives by developing security relationships;
building allied and partner capacity and capability; enabling them to operate alongside US
forces around the globe; and securing access in, over, and through allied and partner
nations. As states and others seek to protect and advance their interests, they are in
continual competition for influence, leverage, and advantage. Influence, advantage, and
leverage accrue through the affiliation or alignment of relevant actors with the United
States. It is people and their aggregate organizations through their decisions and behavior
that enable or impede friendly freedom of action. The joint force may counter adversarial
actions and malign influence through measures of persuasion and coercion. The United
States employs military forces in a wide variety of activities and roles that vary in purpose,
scale, risk, tempo, and intensity along the competition continuum (see Figure I-1).
Cooperative and competitive activities comprise essential elements of global campaign
plans (GCPs) and combatant command campaign plans (CCPs). The potential character
of GCP and CCP campaign activities and their subordinate operations can begin with
cooperative measures such as security cooperation (SC) and other military engagement
activities. Campaigns and major operations can include cooperative to coercive measures
such as exclusion zones, interception, enforcement of US and international economic
sanctions, actions against irregular threats, and support to resistance. They may also
include IW and traditional warfare. The military’s role increases relative to the other
instruments of national power as the need to compel or force a threat through military
action increases.

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 Fundamentals of Joint Campaigns and Operations

Competition Continuum
Continuum Cooperation Adversarial Competition Armed
Below Armed Conflict Conflict/War
Strategic
Use of Assure Deter Compel Force
Force
Large-Scale
Combat Operations

Campaign Limited Contingency Operations

Operations
Activities Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
(Illustrative)
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction/Countering Adversarial Coercion/
Global Deployment and Distribution/Space Operations/Cyberspace Operations/
Operations in Information Environment

Security Cooperation

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Forward Presence / Freedom of Navigation

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Figure I-1. Competition Continuum

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on the instruments of

national power. Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information about a
CCMD’s role in SC. Refer to Chapter V, “The Competition Continuum,” and JP 1, Volume
1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on the competition continuum.

4. Strategic Direction

a. US federal law and policy provide the framework for strategic direction among the
branches of government and their departments. Strategic direction, specific to DOD, is the
strategy and intent of the President, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in pursuit of national interests. Strategic direction
provides context, purpose, and tasks employing the instruments of national power. The
specifics of strategic direction address long-term, emergent, and anticipatory issues or
concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances. The Nation’s
leaders normally formulate strategic direction through lengthy and comprehensive
dialogue that considers a great deal of input from initial joint planning. The actual direction
may reside in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance, or senior leaders
may communicate directly through other means. Strategic direction can change rapidly in
response to changes in the global environment, whereas strategic guidance document
revision is cyclical and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

b. In general, the President frames the Nation’s strategic context by defining national
interests and goals through strategic guidance documents like the national security strategy
(NSS), Presidential directives, interim strategic guidance, and executive orders drafted by

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and coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security
Council. Three Presidential strategic guidance documents provide broad strategic direction
to DOD. They are the NSS, Unified Command Plan (UCP), and contingency planning
guidance (CPG).

c. SecDef incorporates national strategic guidance and provides defense-wide

strategic guidance to DOD components and the joint force primarily through the national
defense strategy (NDS), the defense planning guidance (DPG), and the Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). The CJCS publishes the national
military strategy (NMS) that provides strategic guidance and gives more specific, tailored,
and prioritized objectives that guide joint planning and execution related to the national
objectives. Campaign planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff (JS),
combatant commanders (CCDRs), Service Chiefs, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and
combat support agencies (CSAs) translate strategic direction into clear planning guidance,
tailored force packages, operational-level objectives, and contingency plans.

For more information on campaign and contingency planning guidance, see Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, and
JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

For more information on national strategic direction, refer to CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff
Participation in Interagency Affairs; JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force; the DPG; the
GFMIG; and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title:
JSCP].

5. The Philosophy of Global Military Integration

a. Global military integration enables SecDef, assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
CCDRs, to make timely decisions and establish operational priorities and institutional
choices across multiple geographic, organizational, and functional boundaries and time
horizons. This process is necessary because of the challenges of today’s strategic
environment, the realities of limited joint force resources, and expanding requirements. As
CCMDs address complexities of their OEs and requirements, SecDef prioritizes resources.
Global military integration is additive to and reinforces the UCP. Joint force decision
making through an individual regional context can lead to myopic perspectives and sub-
optimized employment of the joint force. Global military integration mitigates
geographical and functional seams inherent in the division of responsibilities in the UCP.
Joint force decision making through a multi-regional and functional context requires
integration through a global perspective.

b. The proliferation of advanced technologies used during warfare has accelerated its
speed, added to its complexity, and expanded its scope to encompass all aspects of the OE.
These factors have eroded the United States’ perceived competitive military advantage.
Simultaneously, the global demand for joint forces continues to exceed capacity. To meet
these challenges, the joint force must integrate at the right place, at the right time, with the
right amount of force.

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For more information on global military integration and the global integration process,
see CJCSI 3050.01, Implementing Global Integration.

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Role in Global Military Integration

a. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and 2017 UCP expanded the CJCS’s
responsibilities, to include serving a role in global military integration for the joint force
(as codified in Title 10, United States Code [USC], Section 153). The CJCS provides
advice for prioritization to the President and SecDef on the allocation and transfer of forces
across CCMDs. As required by Title 10, USC, the CJCS provides the President and SecDef
advice on ongoing joint force activities and the allocation and transfer of forces required
to execute those activities. For global military integration, the CJCS assists in strategic
planning and direction of the Armed Forces of the United States to ensure the effective
employment and coherent pursuit of strategic objectives to integrate action across the
worldwide campaigning effort, while balancing risks. CJCS advice supports informed
SecDef decisions on CCMD resourcing necessary to achieve directed objectives and,
where necessary, prioritizes resources. Subject to SecDef authority, direction, and
established command relationships, the conduct of CCMD campaigns and operations is the
sole purview of the CCDR. Global military integration balances demand across regions
relative to the overall defense strategy and global campaign perspective. The CJCS
provides advice to SecDef and the President on optimizing the force to achieve global
military integration. The final decisions are made by civilian leadership.

b. The NMS is the CJCS’s central strategic guidance document. The NMS provides
the strategic framework to prioritize the planning, resource allocation, and mitigation of
risk. The guidance translates defense guidance into military strategy and assists SecDef in
providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States. The NMS serves
as the starting point for all other Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) actions.

c. The CJCS also publishes the JSCP, the CJCS’s primary strategic document, to
guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign and contingency
plans. It translates national security policy and strategic guidance into strategic objectives
and guidance for the preparation and integration of global, CCMD, and functional
campaign plans and their corresponding operational-level objectives. The JSCP tasks
CCMDs, Services, the JS, and DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans.
There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, functional campaign plans (FCPs), and
CCPs. The contingency plans represent a branch of a campaign plan that is based on a
hypothetical situation, for designated threats or a catastrophic event. The JSCP directs
contingency planning at the global and CCMD level. The CJCS oversees joint force
campaign and contingency planning and makes recommendations for global military
integration of cross-CCP planning efforts. In execution, designated CCDRs serve as
coordinating authorities to implement the GCPs and CCPs and plan the associated
integrated contingency plans (ICPs). An ICP coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs
in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic
boundaries or functional responsibilities. For a crisis or transition to armed conflict, global
integration frameworks (GIFs) integrate joint force actions, provide initial crisis options,
and identify potential senior leadership decisions based on the global response to a priority

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challenge. The decision may be to recommend implementing an ICP. ICPs differ from
traditional contingency plans, as they require integration between the coordinating
authority and collaborators across multiple regions, whereas previous contingency plans
assumed regional challenges and a single supported command. Global military integration
relies on a GCP’s associated GIF and ICP to determine and synchronize the response to a
global challenge by expanding the operations and authorities within a GCP or transitioning
to one or more of the ICP family of contingency plans.

7. Unified Action

a. General

(1) Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of

the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to
achieve unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces, international
organizations, NGOs, and other interorganizational partners. The joint force integrates
actions within DOD and seeks to align actions collaboratively outside the purview of DOD.
Failure to achieve unified action can jeopardize mission accomplishment.

(2) Interorganizational partners refers collectively to other USG departments

and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; international
organizations; foreign security forces and government agencies; NGOs; academia; entities
of the private sector; nontraditional security entities (e.g., armed groups and their irregular
forces, and private military companies); and foreign populations and groups that may be
part of interorganizational cooperation.

For more information on interorganizational cooperation, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational

Cooperation.

(3) Unified action is a function of national strategic direction, the Constitution,

federal law, and USG policy. Unified action is a broad government approach that focuses
on coordination and cooperation of the US military and other interorganizational
participants toward common objectives, even though the participants are not part of the
same command or organization. The principle of unity of command enables commanders
to understand the effective mechanisms to achieve military unity of effort.

(4) The United States Department of State (DOS) has a complementary approach,
which defines unity of effort as a cooperative concept that refers to coordination and
communication among USG organizations toward common goals for success. The basis
for cooperation is the necessity of each department’s efforts to work in harmony with the
short- and long-range goals of the mission.

(5) The United States Department of Commerce plays a key role in the economic
security of the Nation, which relates to national security. The Department of Commerce
operates on multiple fronts to protect Americans and the US economy by enforcing trade
laws and providing tools to thwart cybercrime. This makes the Department of Commerce
a key department for interagency coordination.

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 Fundamentals of Joint Campaigns and Operations

b. The JFC’s Role. Facilitating unity of effort with interorganizational partners is

both challenging and mission-essential for JFCs. JFCs play a pivotal role in unifying joint
force actions, since all the elements and actions that compose unified action are normally
present at their level. However, subordinate JFCs and component commanders also align
and synchronize their operations, activities, and investments directly with the operations
of other military forces and interorganizational partners to promote unified action.

c. Multinational Participation in Unified Action. Joint forces should plan and

execute campaigns and operations with partner forces, to include both uniformed personnel
of a PN and irregular forces. Campaigns, major operations, and other operations may occur
within the framework of an alliance or coalition led by the United States, or the joint force
may act in a supporting role to a PN. Although individual nations may place greater
emphasis on some objectives over others, the key is to find commonality within the
objectives to promote unity of effort and make progress toward achieving the objectives.
Cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships among counterparts may enable
success. Language and communication differences, cultural diversity, historical
animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and multinational partners are factors that
complicate the alignment and synchronization of activities during multinational operations.
Likewise, differing national obligations derived from international treaties, agreements,
and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of whether other
members participate within their treaty or agreement obligations, the United States remains
bound by treaties and agreements to which it is a party.

For more information on unified action concerning multinational participation, refer to JP

1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting. For more information on all aspects of multinational
operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)-specific doctrine ratified by the United States, see Allied Joint
Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Conduct of Operations.

d. Interorganizational Cooperation in Unified Action. CCDRs and subordinate

JFCs often interact with a variety of interorganizational partners. This interaction varies
according to the nature of the partner (e.g., capability, capacity, posture,
authorities/national caveats) and the type and objectives of the operation. JFCs and
planners consider the potential contributions of other agencies and determine which can
best contribute to achieving specific objectives. Often, other interagency partners,
primarily DOS, can facilitate a JFC’s cooperation with PN agencies, NGOs, and the private
sector. DOD may support other USG departments and agencies during operations;
however, under US law, our military forces remain under the DOD command structure.
Law or regulation, Presidential directive, policy, or agreement among or between agencies
may prescribe federal lead-agency responsibility. Even when in a supporting role, the joint
force will likely provide significant support to the lead agency because of its resources and
well-established planning methods.

e. Interorganizational Alignment

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(1) Military operations require civil-military alignment. The degree of alignment

depends on the mission, objectives, organizations, governments, and people involved.
Presidential directives guide participation by all USG departments and agencies and may
influence decisions and actions by NGOs, academia, and private-sector organizations.
Military commanders work with the other USG partners to promote unified action.
Differences in policies, procedures, decision-making processes, terminology, and
organizational cultures, as well as the nature and extent of resourcing across the various
USG departments and agencies, often complicate and may initially create challenges to
successful civil-military integration.

(2) Alignment, cooperation, and coordination between military forces and

interorganizational partners may have less structure than military command and control
(C2) arrangements. Some organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the
USG, particularly those of the US military. Formal agreements, robust liaison, and
information collection and sharing through interorganizational coordination and civil-
military operations (CMO) facilitate common understanding and informed decision
making. Information sharing with NGOs and the private sector may be more restrictive.
Still, options such as the CCMD-level joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) and
operational-level civil-military operations center (CMOC) are available to the JFCs to
facilitate interorganizational coordination and civil information collection and sharing.
DOD, in collaboration with federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, uses the
structures and procedures provided by the National Response Framework (NRF) and the
National Incident Management System to provide defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA) in response to disasters and civil disturbances within the United States and its
territories. Specifically, United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific
Command produce contingency plans to support domestic operations. Similar structures
and processes incorporate the capabilities and interests of foreign partners and enable DOD
to provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) outside the United States. In armed
conflict, joint forces conduct CMO to interact with foreign governments and civil societies.

For more information on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation. For more information on CMO and the CMOC, refer to
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For more information on DOD’s coordination and
involvement with other USG departments and agencies within the context of support to
civil authorities, homeland security, and role within the NRF, refer to JP 3-28, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities.

8. Fundamental Considerations

a. Levels of Warfare

(1) General. The framework of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

warfare helps commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic
objectives to campaigns and major operations and link their objectives to tactical
operations. These levels help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations,
allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands. Echelon of command, size
of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often

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relate to a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their
employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.

(2) Strategic Level. In the context of national interests, strategy develops an idea
or set of ideas associated with the employment of the instruments of national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve strategic objectives. Considerations at the
strategic level allow the President and SecDef, often in concert with leaders of other
nations, to examine and account for an adversary’s or enemy’s strategies, as well as the
OE’s evolving circumstances. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy and
strategic objectives through continuous iteration. In parallel, SecDef translates the
emerging policy into guidance that facilitates joint planning. CCDRs participate in
strategic discussions with the President and SecDef, usually with the CJCS. CCDRs also
participate in strategic discussions with allies and multinational partners. Thus, the
CCDR’s strategy relates to both US national strategy and joint campaigns and operations
within the AOR. This analysis informs the development of the strategic-level objectives,
identifies obstacles to the achievement of these objectives, the associated narrative,
required level of commitment, and the allocation of national resources to achieve those
objectives. The strategy, derived from strategic direction and informed by planning,
provides a framework for conducting campaigns and subordinate operations, activities, and
investments at accepted levels of risk.

(3) Operational Level. At the operational level of warfare, JFCs identify and
arrange objectives, operations, and forces to effectively conduct campaigns and major
operations. The operational level of warfare links the tactical employment of forces to
strategic objectives. Effective campaigning requires achieving the operational-level
objectives that link and lead to the strategic objectives. Operational objectives may be
behavioral or territorial/conditional, but to achieve the strategic objectives, effective
campaigning requires their deliberate identification and formulation. Military action at the
operational level is normally a series of major operations oriented on operational objectives
organized within a campaign. JFCs and component commanders use operational art to
determine the purpose of military force; set goals, such as to strengthen the resolve,
commitment, and resiliency of partners; persuade neutral parties to join the friendly forces’
campaign; and convince adversaries to abandon or not engage in an armed struggle. Many
factors affect relationships among military leaders at these levels. Service and functional
component commanders of a joint force do not plan the actions of their forces in a vacuum;
they and their staffs collaborate with the operational-level JFC to plan the joint operation.
This collaboration facilitates the components of planning and execution. Likewise, the
operational-level JFC and staff collaborate with the CCDR to frame strategic objectives,
as well as tasks the CCDR may assign to the subordinate joint force.

(4) Tactical Level. Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of
forces in relation to each other. Tactics typically manifest themselves as individual
operations. In armed conflict, tactics include planning and executing battles, engagements,
and activities at the tactical level to achieve military objectives. An engagement can
include a wide variety of noncombat tasks and activities between opposing forces, normally
of short duration. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last

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longer than engagements, involve larger forces, and have greater potential to affect the
course of an operation.

For more information on the levels of warfare, see JP 1, Volume, 1, Joint Warfighting.

b. Strategic Uses of Military Force. The United States leverages all instruments of
national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of
diplomacy, DOD provides military capabilities to ensure the President and our diplomats
negotiate from positions of strength. DOD has a supporting role when the military
instrument of national power is not the main instrument for the strategy. When directed,
or if the other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military becomes the
Nation’s primary instrument. In either case, the military contribution is essential as it
enables and reinforces the application of the other instruments of national power. Whether
in a primary or supporting role, strategic uses of a military force include assurance, both
forms of coercion (deter and compel), and forcible action (or force).

(1) Assure is using the military instrument of national power to demonstrate

commitment and support to allies and partners. Assuring often takes the form of SC,
combined exercises, and forward stationing of US forces.

(2) Deter is the prevention of undesired action by the existence of a credible

threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or the belief that the costs of action outweigh the
perceived benefits.

(3) Compel is the more complicated form of coercion since it requires precise
signaling and communication through actions. It is even more dependent than deterrence
on an accurate assessment of the adversary’s will. The United States often compels the
threat for limited ends or objectives achievable without sustained violence, occupation, or
regime change.

(4) Force is using pure military strength to achieve the objective directly by
subduing the enemy and imposing the United States’ will. Force does not depend on the
enemy’s decision not to comply—rather, the enemy’s choice of noncompliance is what
distinguishes forcible action from coercion.

For detailed discussion, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting.

c. Traditional Warfare and IW

(1) Joint doctrine distinguishes between traditional warfare and IW but

recognizes the strengths of employing them together in conjunction with appropriate
information activities. All military activities (or inactivities) are inherently communicative
and can affect behavior in the OE. Both traditional warfare and IW serve a fundamentally
discrete purpose that drives different approaches to its conduct. In practice, conducting
effective warfare requires creative, dynamic, and synergistic combinations of proper
information integrated with traditional warfare and IW.

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(2) Traditional warfare is between two or more conventional forces in armed

conflict. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting traditional warfare is to impose
its will on an enemy government and avoid the imposition of the enemy government’s will
on itself and its citizens. The law of war regulates the resort to armed conflict; the conduct
of hostilities and the protection of war victims in international and non-international
conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and
non-belligerent states. It is derived from the treaties and customary international law
binding on the United States. Other purposes of the law of war are to facilitate restoration
of peaceful conditions, assist military commanders in ensuring the disciplined and efficient
use of military force, and preserve the professionalism and humanity of combatants.

(3) In traditional warfare, nation-states (and state-like entities capable of waging

war) fight each other for various reasons to protect or advance their strategic interests.
Campaigns in traditional warfare normally focus on an enemy’s armed forces, their
capabilities, and seizing key terrain, ultimately, to force their government to concede. In
traditional warfare, enemies engage in combat against each other and employ a variety of
similar functions and capabilities throughout the OE. In today’s dynamic environment,
adversaries are challenging traditional views of warfare, in ways that blur distinctions of
traditional warfare and measures short of war.

(4) IW is a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and
affect legitimacy. It normally involves the participation of non-state armed groups, state-
controlled irregular forces, or nonmilitary entities. In IW, joint forces seek primarily to
influence populations and affect legitimacy, credibility, and will of sponsors and their
partners and opponents. IW often favors indirect approaches to competition and armed
conflict. IW includes a broad scope of lethal and nonlethal activities to subvert, erode, or
exhaust an enemy’s power, influence, and will. IW may include support to resistance and
the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, or surrogates, to achieve shared or
complementary objectives. Partners and surrogates are distinct entities. In short, the JFC
supports and cooperates with a partner, but one employs a surrogate. Use of irregular
forces, including resistance fighters opposing a government or an occupying power,
represent a form of IW. Additionally, IW requires operating in close and persistent
collaboration with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners to
achieve unity of effort without unity of command. IW is dependent on the USG to reinforce
the legitimacy, credibility, and effective governance of supported partners. In competition,
the conduct of IW is persistent and long-term. Joint forces conduct IW in permissive,
uncertain, and hostile environments and denied areas. One key to success is a healthy
relationship with the associated DOS chiefs of mission (COMs). Finally, IW includes the
employment of indirect, unorthodox, and asymmetric approaches and non-overt actions.

(5) In accordance with (IAW) Department of Defense Directive (DODD)

3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), IW requires the capabilities of the entire DOD, but it is
not exclusive to special operations forces (SOF). DOD IW operations and activities
include, but are not limited to:

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(a) Unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID),

counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization activities, countering
threat networks (CTN) (which includes counter threat finance [CTF] and countering
transnational criminal organizations), military information support operations (MISO), and
civil affairs operations (CAO).

(b) Those military engagement activities (which includes aspects of SC

programs, CMO, and interorganizational cooperation) that support IW.

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, for more information on traditional warfare

and IW and the instruments of national power.

d. Integrating Information in Joint Operations. All military activities and

operations have an inherent informational aspect, whether intended or not. The joint force
can leverage the power of information as a means to support achievement of its objectives.
The CCMD operational narrative and associated tactical sub-narratives targeted to specific
relevant actors propagate via media and human social networks to create cognitive effects
that may modify behavior in favor of JFC objectives. JFCs and their subordinate
commanders integrate information into their joint campaigns and operations to forge
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors that reinforce the legitimacy of US actions while
simultaneously challenging or undermining the perceived legitimacy of adversary and
enemy actions. Commanders integrate information into all military actions to create
favorable circumstances for friendly action, limit adversary and enemy actions, and
minimize unintended consequences. The use of information is key to preparing the OE
and understanding the political, social, cultural, and psychological drivers in a particular
OA.

For detailed discussion on integrating information into joint operations, see JP 3-04,
Information in Joint Operations.

e. Joint Campaigns and Operations

(1) Joint campaigns and operations is a general phrase that includes all the
different types of campaigns, such as GCPs, CCPs, and campaigns associated with military
operations short of armed conflict and armed conflict. The phrase includes all categories
of operations from limited contingency operations to major operations.

(2) In general, joint campaigns and operations pursue strategic objectives by

arranging and achieving operational-level objectives clearly linked to strategic objectives.
The operational design seeks to produce and translate operational success in support of
those strategic objectives. Major operations are a series of tactical activities orienting on
achieving operational-level objectives as a part of a campaign. In the context of armed
conflict, major operations synchronize and integrate large-scale combat forces. On the
other hand, major operations for cooperation and competition will probably not include
combat.

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(3) Individual joint operations focus on accomplishing specific military tasks.

They are the building blocks of a greater campaign. Mission statements with one or two
essential tasks drive the purpose of an individual operation. The operational design of any
individual operation requires precision, control, detail, and focus. Individual operations
make incremental progress toward operational-level objectives. Rarely does one operation
singularly achieve an operational-level objective; rather, it links within a series of
operations to achieve a strategic objective.

f. Operational and Strategic Objectives

(1) Operational and strategic objectives relate to one another but are uniquely
different. Operational objectives can be to occupy territory, affect behavior, or change
conditions. Robust policy and strategy can drive joint campaigns and operations that seek
broad, transregional, or even global outcomes, requiring many parallel actions and diverse
operational-level objectives. Successful campaign planning continuously interprets and
predicts potential requirements that originate from the commander’s vision to formulate
guidance for the operational design. Planners build operational objectives based on
reasoning. What emerges and matures is a coherent arrangement of prerequisite and
intermediate operational requirements that provide focus and flexibility for military and
military supported actions. Commanders arrange forces to achieve the operational
objectives. In execution, experience and assessment inform the JFCs’ adaptation to failure
and exploitation of success. JFCs’ understanding drives revisions in prioritization to the
operational objectives.

(2) Strategic objectives are based on strategic directions. The strategic objectives
or policy represent what the nation values and describe the desired outcomes. However,
policy and the value the nation assigns to the objective are rarely fixed but continually
adapt. These values evolve as a function of the gravity of the interests and risks. Orienting
on and pursuing these values requires a campaign approach, sophisticated organizing
framework, a well-developed assessment process, and precise terminology. Successful
joint campaigns and operations require careful development, pursuit, and achievement of
operational objectives that link and lead to achieving the strategic objectives.

g. Global Military Integration and Overcoming Institutional and Operational

Boundaries. Control measures and boundaries are necessary to delineate authorities,
responsibilities, and relationships between commanders and forces. Commanders plan and
exercise control measures to employ the unique qualities and advantages of their
organizations in the right place and time. Additionally, commanders delineate boundaries
and control measures, which are as situationally permissive as possible. A critical aspect
of global military integration is simultaneously leveraging the strengths of institutional
limits, operational boundaries, and coordination measures while overcoming their
constraints.

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JOINT COMMAND
 
1. Introduction

a. Command is the authority a commander in the armed forces exercises lawfully over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the
responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to
accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for the health, welfare,
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

b. While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of
command resides in the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance.
The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, empathy, intuition, situational
awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make insightful
decisions in complex situations. Commanders and staff can develop many of these
attributes over time through training, education, and experience. Joint training and joint
doctrine enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through
visualization, decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders combine judgment,
reason, and visualization with information management (IM), situational awareness, and a
sound battle rhythm to facilitate decision making.

2. Strategic Art

Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means
to implement policy and promote national interests. Strategic art and operational art are
mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to strategic objectives and
prioritizes resources. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs
to develop campaigns and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating
ends, ways, and means.

a. The CCDR’s Strategic Role

(1) Based on strategic direction, CCDRs implement the JSCP’s directed

campaigns and drive preparations for contingency plans. JSCP-directed campaign
planning efforts are continually revised and subject to assigned, allocated, and apportioned
force readiness constraints. CCMDs’ strategies are nominally broad but concise statements
of the CCDRs’ long-term vision for their AOR, how they would support a CCDR in another
AOR, or within the CCDR’s global functions. The CPG and JSCP provide guidance for
the CCDRs’ strategies, campaigns, and operations. A prerequisite to preparing a CCP is
the development of a strategic estimate containing factors and trends that influence the
CCDRs’ AOR or functional responsibilities. This estimate informs the relationship
between ends, ways, means, and risks involved in the pursuit of JSCP-directed objectives
within the campaign and drives preparations for follow-on actions.

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(2) CCDRs continually pursue multiple strategic objectives described by the

NDS and NMS. CCDRs also have a role in, and contribute to, achieving other CCMD’s
strategic objectives within the JSCP’s GCPs and their associated contingency plans. Some
strategic objectives are the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR. Other strategic
objectives require a more balanced use of many or all instruments of national power, with
CCDRs in support of other supported CCDRs or other USG departments and agencies. For
example, DOS is the department primarily responsible for achieving strategic-level foreign
policy goals and the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing the
Nation from many threats we face. DOS is not resourced like DOD, nor do they have the
same view of acceptable risk; this may leave DOD taking on DOS tasks that they view as
not feasible or acceptable. Supporting CCDRs coordinate and synchronize their supporting
plans with the supported commander’s plan. Supported CCDRs provide planning
guidance, assign missions and tasks, and organize forces and resources. CCDRs designate
objectives, establish operational limitations, implement policies, and create the concept of
operations (CONOPS) which integrate into plans and operation orders. In applying
military power, CCDRs give authoritative direction in the use of assigned, attached,
allocated, and supporting military forces. Military contributions are essential, as they
enable and reinforce the application of the other instruments of national power. Supporting
and supported CCDRs coordinate with each other across geographic boundaries and
functional responsibilities to facilitate mission accomplishment within the capabilities of
assigned, attached, allocated, and supporting military forces.

b. Joint Force Command

(1) A JFC’s perspective of challenges in the OE is broad and comprehensive due

to the interaction with USG civilian leaders; senior, peer, subordinate, and supporting
commanders; and interorganizational partners. Clear commander’s guidance and intent,
enriched by the commander’s experience and intuition, enable joint forces to achieve
objectives. Employing the “art of war,” which has been the commander’s central historical
command role, remains critical regardless of technological and informational
improvements in control—the “science of war.”

(2) Commanders interact with other leaders to build personal relationships and
develop trust and confidence. Developing these associations is a conscious, collaborative
act. Commanders build trust through words and actions and continue to reinforce it not
only during operations but also during training, education, and exercises. Trust and
confidence are essential to the joint force, interagency and multinational partners,
interorganizational partners, and other stakeholders. Commanders may also interact with
other political, societal, and economic leaders and other influential people who may impact
joint campaigns and operations. This interaction supports mission accomplishment. The
JFC emphasizes the importance of key leader engagement (KLE) to subordinate
commanders and encourages them to extend the process to lower levels, based on mission
requirements.

(3) Commanders provide subordinate commands adequate time to plan and

prepare. They do so by issuing warning orders to subordinates at the earliest opportunity.

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Collaborating with other commanders, agency leaders, and multinational partners helps
develop a clear understanding of the commander’s mission, intent, guidance, and priorities.
Commanders can resolve issues that are beyond the staff’s authority.

(4) Commanders collaborate with their seniors and peers to resolve differences
of interpretation of higher-level objectives and align ways and means to accomplish these
objectives. Strategic guidance can be vague, and it is imperative that the commander
interprets and clarifies guidance for the staff. While national leaders and CCDRs may have
a broader perspective of the problem, subordinate JFCs and their component commanders
often have a better understanding of the specific situation. Both perspectives are essential
to a sound solution. During a commander’s decision cycle, subordinate commanders
should aggressively share their perspectives with senior leaders to resolve issues as early
as possible.

(5) An essential skill of a JFC is the ability to integrate a components’ forces with
those of another component. Component missions should be mutually complementary and
offer support to enhance each other’s capabilities and mitigate vulnerabilities. Achieving
this synergy requires more than just understanding the capabilities and limitations of each
component. The JFC should also visualize operations holistically, identify the
preconditions that enable each component to optimize its contribution, and then determine
how the other components might help to produce them. The JFC assigns component
missions from the perspective of joint effectiveness, without Service parochialism. Joint
effectiveness also requires mutual trust among commanders that the missions assigned to
components will be consistent with their capabilities and limitations. JFCs do not risk these
capabilities for insufficient overall return. This perspective enables each component to
enhance the capabilities and limit the vulnerabilities of the others.

(6) Successful commanders encourage the exchange of information and ideas

throughout the staff to ensure decisions relate to the best understanding of the problem at
hand, the existing situation, and available options to address the problem. Such exchanges
promote critical reviews of assumptions; facilitate consideration of all aspects of the
situation, including cultural issues; stimulate broad consideration of military and
nonmilitary alternatives; and emphasize efforts to minimize organizational and human
sources of error and bias.

3. Operational Art – In Planning and Execution

a. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by

their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies,
campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends,
ways, means, and risks. Operational art is useful to the JFC in initial policy/strategy
formulation and planning. The commander’s judgment, decision making, and adaptation
to the changing OE may also draw upon operational art.

b. Policy and Strategy Formulation. The joint force conducts joint campaigns and
operations to achieve strategic objectives and further policy goals. Civil-military dialogue
is essential to ensure campaigns link to strategic objectives. Commanders and joint

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planners understand effective communication with national leaders and civilian national
security professionals is necessary to build a common perspective. Insights from
operational art and initial planning provide input to policy and strategy development. The
planning, execution, and assessment involve an iterative and continual dialogue (see
paragraph 7, “The Civil-Military Dialogue,” for further discussion).

c. Planning

(1) For planning, operational art provides a thought process to mitigate the
ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand.
Operational art promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staff to consider the
capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and
other interorganizational participants when they determine objectives, establish priorities,
and assign tasks to subordinate forces. In planning, operational art facilitates the
coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, the integration of military
operations with activities of other participants through the interagency process, thereby
promoting unity of effort.

(2) The foundation of operational art encompasses broad vision; the ability to
anticipate; and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and
their staffs organize their thoughts and envision the conditions necessary to accomplish the
mission at hand. In planning, operational art informs the deployment and employment of
forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

(3) In operational-level planning, the commander plays a primary role.

Commanders leverage their knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to focus effort
and achieve success. Operational art helps commanders broaden perspectives, deepen
understanding, and enable visualization. Through assessment, and informed by their own
experiences, commanders continually compare similarities of the existing situation with
earlier baselines, previous expectations, and history, to distinguish unique features and
gauge progress to adapt solutions to each situation.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for the details of operational art and operational design.

d. Execution and Decision Making

(1) In execution, operational art is making decisions before they are obvious or
easy choices and adapting to the unfolding circumstances. Guided by imperfect
information, commanders issue orders based on opaque circumstances, all the while
anticipating the lag between the decision and its impact on the enemy and future friendly
force operations and long before it is clear how those decisions will play out.

(2) A commander’s ability to visualize the fight beyond the immediate situation
and make decisions is one of the most important aspects of operational art. A commander
orchestrates operational success by recognizing what each tactical achievement means to
future operations and how follow-on actions contribute to strategic objectives. In

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OPERATIONAL ART IN EXECUTION

During the Solomons campaign from August 1942 to February 1943,

American commanders had to balance offensive, defensive, and
sustainment actions to gain the initiative and maintain freedom of action
for offensive military operations in the Pacific theater. Strategically, the
Solomons campaign was an opportunity for the Allies to prevent the
Japanese from interdicting the lines of communications between the
United States and Australia. One challenge in interdicting Japanese
reinforcement of its land forces on Guadalcanal was US commanders
were operating at the limits of American operational reach. While
strategic intelligence provided a general indicator of Japanese regional
movements, US and Allied land and maritime commanders had periods
of clarity and confusion regarding intelligence. Therefore, those
commanders and their subordinates had to make decisions guided by
incomplete, erroneous, and even contradictory information. Still, the
American commanders proved better than their Japanese counterparts
at making decisions based on imperfect intelligence.

Initially, the American commanders could not establish control of the

region. Therefore, they made difficult choices to seize and hold advance
force bases at Tulagi and Guadalcanal and gain maritime control around
the Solomons Islands, while preserving enough combat power to posture
the force for future operations. Achieving this balance required
commanders to exercise judgment on when to accept and pursue
engagement with the enemy based on theater-level considerations. The
naval battles around the Solomons focused on preserving Allied lines of
communications back to the homeland, and even when the outcomes
were tactically costly, they still contributed to the larger campaign and
attritted the Imperial Japanese Navy. Throughout the initial naval battles,
the Americans controlled the seas by day, while the Japanese ruled the
night. Over the course of the fight, American commanders adapted
quicker to the situation and forced the Japanese naval and ground forces
to culminate and withdraw. The maritime superiority and basing gained
from those operations enabled US and Allied forces to interdict the
Japanese forward naval bases at Rabaul and Truk. Achieving the
campaign’s operational-level objectives led to successful follow-on
campaigns within the Pacific theater that placed the Japanese homeland
at risk and eventually ended the war.

Joint History and Research Office (JHRO)

particular, the pursuit of tactical victory should occur within the context provided by those
strategic objectives.

(3) In planning and execution, a commander’s ability to think creatively, assess

situations, and determine how to adapt enhances the ability to develop a sound conceptual
approach and effectively wage joint operational-level warfare.

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4. Operational Design

a. Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning.

Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding
the OE. Additionally, operational design provides an iterative process that enables the
commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends, ways,
means, and risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations. The
operational design methodology helps the JFC and staff identify broad solutions for
mission accomplishment. Additional considerations for GCPs and CCPs, which augment
operational design, are strategic analysis/diagnosis, range of possible outcomes, the
anticipation of consequences, and the commander’s vision. Properly formulating
achievable strategic objectives and a corresponding and logical array of operational-level
objectives is essential.

b. Operational design works best when commanders encourage discourse and

leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems.
To that end, the commander should empower organizational learning and develop methods
to determine whether modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of
an operation or campaign. As appropriate to the situation, planners should integrate key
aspects of IW and operations in the information environment (OIE). This requires an
assessment that challenges understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of
actions addressing that problem.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for the details of operational design.

5. Joint Planning

a. Planning translates guidance into plans or orders to initiate necessary joint force
actions. JFCs plan for potential or actual threats or problems that may require a military
response. The joint planning process (JPP) underpins planning at all levels and across the
competition continuum. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to
component and subordinate commands when they participate in joint operations. JPP helps
commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common
understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and
orders. Planning should begin with specified strategic objectives that provide a unifying
purpose around which commanders can focus actions and resources. JPP aligns military
activities and resources with achieving strategic objectives. It enables commanders to
examine cost-benefit relationships, risks, and trade-offs to determine a preferred course of
action (COA) to achieve those specific objectives.

b. Joint planning consists of planning activities that help CCDRs and their subordinate
commanders transform national objectives into actions that mobilize, deploy, employ,
sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It ties the employment of the Armed Forces
of the United States to the achievement of national objectives across the competition
continuum. Based on understanding gained through the application of operational design,
more detailed planning takes place within the steps of JPP. JPP is an orderly, analytical

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set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare
alternative COAs; select the best COA; and develop a plan or order.

c. Key Planning Elements. Commanders participate in planning to the greatest

extent possible from early operational design through approval of the plan or order.
Regardless of the commander’s level of involvement, certain key planning elements
require the commander’s participation and decisions. These include the commander’s
planning guidance and operational approach.

(1) Commander’s Planning Guidance. JFCs guide the joint force’s actions
throughout planning and execution. However, the staff and component commanders
typically expect the JFC to issue initial guidance soon after receipt of a mission or tasks
from higher authority and provide more detailed planning guidance after the JFC approves
an operational approach. This guidance is an important input to subsequent mission
analysis and often includes the commander’s operational approach and vision statement.
Commander’s update their planning guidance based on mission analysis, additional
insights into the OE, and as conditions change.

(2) Operational Approach. The operational approach is a commander’s initial

visualization and description of the broad actions the force must take to solve the
overarching problem. It is the commander’s visualization of how the operation or
campaign should transform current conditions, which may include adversarial actions, into
the desired conditions and behaviors—the way the commander wants the OE to look in the
future. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the
challenge facing the JFC, which forms the base of the commander’s planning guidance and
defines the command’s narrative. For an operational approach with global implications,
the CCDR will collaborate with other CCDRs. Then, the CCDR consults with the JS for
integration and consultation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once SecDef or the
JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis to begin, continue, or complete detailed
planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach
as the OE, objectives, or problem change.

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(3) Mission and Vision Statements of GCPs. The CCDR and staff develop a
restated mission statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin
their own estimates and planning efforts for higher HQ concurrence. During campaign
planning, a single essential task is far too narrow for a coherent and comprehensive
campaigning effort. A CCDR’s global campaign may require a vision statement that
articulates a broad array of requirements. A vision statement is an overarching set of ideas
outlining a CCDR’s vision for using military power with an OE aligned with the other
instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. The approved mission
statement contains the elements of the operation’s purpose. The eventual CONOPS will
specify how the joint force will accomplish the mission. The mission statement forms the
basis for planning and includes the commander’s planning guidance, the planning directive,
staff estimates, the commander’s estimate, and the CONOPS.

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d. Create Freedom of Action. The JFC should not expect freedom of action and will
often initially have to operate without it. JFCs have to create it and commit forces to
maintain freedom of action. Freedom of action in the OA may enhance acting beyond the
OA. For example, operational reach, where the joint force can successfully employ
military forces, can extend far beyond the limits of a JFC’s authorities and capacity for
logistics throughput. Consequently, the joint force protects LOCs to ensure freedom of
action. Effective operational reach requires gaining and maintaining operational access in
the face of enemy A2/AD capabilities and actions. Likewise, the C2 and intelligence
functions depend on operations within the EMS, space, and cyberspace. JFCs should
expect that an enemy’s ability to operate effectively in the EMOEs, space, and cyberspace
will greatly diminish the JFC’s freedom of action. The JFC and staff should consider the
efforts required to create specific intervals and places of minimum necessary levels of
freedom of action from the outset of operations.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for more information on intelligence support and
planning.

Refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, for more information on special
operations planning. Refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support;
and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on fires and joint fire support planning.
Refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, for more information on cyberspace
operations (CO).

Refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations, for more information on space operations and
planning.

Refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for more information on

joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO)/EMS superiority. Refer to CJCSI
3162.02, Methodology for Combat Assessment, for more information. Refer to JP 4-0,
Joint Logistics, and other logistics-series publications, for more information on logistic
planning.

6. Assessment

a. Assessment is a continuous and actionable process that measures the overall

effectiveness of the joint force. The process involves monitoring and evaluating the current
situation and progress toward the objectives. The results can help determine whether an
activity contributes to the desired effects or progress toward an objective. Assessment
occurs on two distinct planes. First, the JFC continuously evaluates the approach and what
actions are necessary to succeed. Once the JFC determines the approach remains valid,
then the JFC can assess all the supporting activities. If the approach is no longer valid or
relevant, there is no reason to examine any of the supporting activities.

b. DOD and its components use a wide range of assessment tools and methods.
Across the competition continuum, assessments gauge the military instrument of national
power’s capability to prepare for and respond to national security challenges. Senior
military leaders assess campaigns and operations across the levels of warfare. At the

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strategic level, the CJCS conducts deliberate and continuous assessments, such as the
Annual Joint Assessment and the CJCS’s Readiness System, respectively. Theater-
strategic and operational-level assessments provide a methodology for joint commands and
Services to adjust planning and execution to be more effective, match the dynamic OE, and
better identify their risks and opportunities. At all levels, staff estimates, as part of the
overall operations assessment process, evaluate factors in staff sections’ functional areas
(e.g., information, intelligence, and logistics). Staff estimates are a critical component of
mission analysis that leads to plan development.

Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System; CJCSI 3141.01, Management
and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans; CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic
Campaign Plan (JSCP); and CJCSI 3162.01, Methodology for Combat Assessment, for
more information on CJCS and campaign assessments. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning,
for more information on staff estimates, integration of assessment during planning, and
conducting operation assessment during execution.

c. Operation assessment refers specifically to the process the JFC and staff use
during planning and execution to measure progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating
conditions or effects, and achieving objectives. Commanders continuously observe the OE
and the progress of operations, activities, and investments; compare the results to their
initial plan, understanding, and intent; and adjust planning and operations, activities, and
investments based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors that can influence operations
and provide the commander with the information to update the commander’s understanding
of the OE and assess progress toward the objectives. The fundamental aspects of
assessment apply in all types of joint operations. However, commanders and staff may
need to adjust the operation assessment process to fit the nature and requirements of a
specific operation. In operations that do not include combat, assessments can be more
complex.

d. The operation assessment process begins during mission analysis when the
commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it. Throughout COA
development, analysis, comparison, approval, and CONOPS finalization, the commander
and staff devise the operation assessment plan and process to incorporate in the overall
plan and order. They follow this process during plan development, refinement, adaptation,
and execution. Key operation assessment indicators can be resident in the commander’s
critical information requirement (CCIR) process to provide timely support to the
commander’s planning and execution decisions.

e. There is no uniform method by which joint forces assign management

responsibilities for the assessment. The chief of staff’s role varies according to the
commander’s desires. Often, the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), assisted by the
intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and training and education directorate of a joint
staff (J-7), develops the assessment plan during the planning process, while the operations
directorate of a joint staff (J-3), assisted by the J-2 and J-7, coordinates assessment
activities during execution. The assessment effort is a commander-led priority. Various
elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and J-

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5’s future plans. Formalizing assessment roles and responsibilities in each command and
leveraging expertise from across the staff is essential to an effective and efficient process.

f. During execution, assessments help commanders decide whether to revise their

operations, activities, and investments to align current and future action with the
campaign’s objectives. By including assessment key indicators within the CCIRs, the staff
can better advise the commander whether the original operational approach is still valid.

g. External influences can impact joint campaigns and operations. These influences
can include the threat, interorganizational participants, the civilian population, neutral non-
partner organizations, and other nations. Since assessment resources are limited, the
commander should prioritize assessment activities. This perspective typically requires
collaboration with interorganizational participants—preferably in a common and
acceptable process—in the interest of unified action. Since most of these organizations are
outside the JFC’s authority, the JFC is responsible only for assessments of the activities of
assigned, attached, and supporting military forces. Nevertheless, the JFC should grant
some joint force organizations authority to coordinate directly with organizations, such as
DOS and other CCMDs, to facilitate effective alignment and synchronization of assigned,
attached, and supporting military forces, as well as timely and effective assessments by
participants not under the JFC’s authority.

h. Operation Assessment and Levels of Warfare

(1) Interrelated and interdependent assessment occurs at all levels of warfare.

Although each level of warfare may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, they
form a hierarchical structure through which operation assessments interact. Typically,
assessments at the operational level concentrate on broader effects and objectives, while
assessments at the tactical level primarily focus on tasks. Properly focused analysis and
collection at each level of warfare reduces redundancy and enhances the effectiveness of
the overall assessment.

(2) Operation assessment is most effective when supported and supporting

actions and their assessments inform each other. As depicted in Figure II-1, each level of
assessment should link with adjacent levels, both to provide a conduit for guidance and
information. For instance, assessment plans at the tactical level should delineate how they
link to or support operational-level assessments. Similarly, guidance from the operational-
level JFC should specify the relationship and mechanisms that gather and synthesize
tactical-level assessment data into the operational-level assessment.

(3) JFCs and their staffs should consider assessment methodology during
planning, preparation, and execution. At all levels, commanders and staffs develop
operation assessment indicators to track progress toward accomplishment. An optimal
method for developing indicators is to identify key assessment indicators associated with
tasks, effects, and objectives for inclusion in the assessment design. The most critical
indicators of progress or regression should be in CCIRs to guide the collection and
assessment activity. These indicators include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and

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 Joint Command

Assessment Interaction
Levels of
Warfare Guidance

Strategic Priorities and Strategic

Objectives Assessment
Operational Approach
F
GCP Mission Areas/
Warplan LOEs
e
Operational
Objectives e
Effects d Assessment
Operational Approach
b
Missions
a
Tactical Objectives c
Tasks k
Operational Approach Assessment

Legend
GCP global campaign plan operations and intelligence report flow
LOE line of effort assessment report flow

Figure II-1. Assessment Interaction

measures of performance (MOPs). MOEs help answer the question, “Are we creating
effect(s) or conditions in the OE that we desire?” MOPs help answer the question, “Are
we accomplishing tasks to standard?”

(4) In armed conflict, the tactical-level assessment also uses MOEs and MOPs.
Tactical tasks are often physical activities, but they can affect higher-level functions and
systems. Tactical assessment may evaluate progress by the destruction of enemy forces;
control of key terrain, peoples, or resources; and other tasks. Combat assessment evaluates
the results of weapons engagement and the employment of capabilities to create lethal and
nonlethal effects and, thus, provides data for joint fires and the joint targeting processes at
all levels. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements that may result in a
reattack recommendation: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness
assessment, and collateral damage assessment. Tactical-level results provide JFCs
comprehensive, integrated information to link tactical actions to operational-level
objectives. Assessment of tactical results helps commanders determine progress at the
operational and strategic levels and can affect operational and strategic targeting and
engagement decisions.

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Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on operation assessment (e.g.,
integration of assessment design during the planning effort, roles and responsibilities,
tenets of an effective assessment, the assessment process, and development and use of
assessment indicators). Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat
assessment.

7. The Civil-Military Dialogue Within the Department of Defense

a. Effective civil-military dialogue is essential to ensure campaigns and operations

link to national interests. Therefore, senior military leaders understand that communication
with national leaders and civilian national security professionals is essential for a whole-
of-government approach. Iterative and continual dialogue integrates different civilian and
military perspectives that supports planning and execution.

b. Civilian leadership will often want to maintain maximum flexibility as long as

possible as the situation develops and understanding improves. Decisions are often
contingent on information from senior military leaders about the expected duration, cost,
and resource implications of the military plans. The civil-military relationship is by
necessity and design an unequal dialogue. Senior military leaders and commanders have
a unique responsibility and duty to provide information and options to civilian leaders and
national security professionals before the actual strategic objectives mature.

c. At the start of the civil-military dialogue, military commanders work with their
civilian counterparts to gain a shared understanding to begin to identify the problem or
problems they are facing. Commanders should explain their understanding of the problem
and articulate the assumptions they are making. One primary goal of the civil-military
dialogue is to confirm or refine the problem and necessary assumptions. Additionally,
effective dialogue identifies new considerations commanders should address based on
civilian leadership perspectives. The military leadership should clearly articulate what
actions military capabilities are capable of performing, the objectives these options can
achieve, the costs and risks associated with each option, and how those options address the
problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue matures, the specificity of civilian
leadership guidance will typically increase.

d. Commanders and joint planners should anticipate few opportunities and limited
time to coordinate with civilian leadership. Commanders and their staffs should augment
this communication by developing relationships with their civilian counterparts in other
USG departments and agencies and participating fully in low- and mid-level interagency
planning meetings. Information requests from civilian counterparts on the NSC Staff, in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or other USG departments and agencies may
indicate the options or objectives civilian leadership is considering. Staff officers should
use these conversations to enhance shared understanding. Commanders should encourage
cooperation and coordination at lower levels when possible. Doing so helps identify and
address issues before senior civilians and military leaders meet so they can focus their
efforts on the most important planning considerations.

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 Joint Command

e. When discussing options for initial action or revision of ongoing campaigns and
operations with civilian leadership, military leaders understand that the policy may not
always align with the anticipated level of commitment or acceptable risk. When discussing
options for either employment or revision with civilian and senior military leadership, JFCs
should determine risk based on what success may require and the assessment of the time
and forces required. Other considerations include the likely costs, potential for escalation,
likelihood of achieving strategic objectives, and, just as important, the enduring costs of
success or failure.

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Chapter II

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 CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. A joint function is a grouping of capabilities and activities that enable JFCs to

synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. A number of subordinate tasks,
missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some tasks and systems
could apply to more than one function.

b. There are seven joint functions common to joint operations: C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders
leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions
apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum and enable both traditional
warfare and IW, but to different degrees, conditions, and standards, while employing
different tactics, techniques, and procedures. The integration of activities across joint
functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

c. Joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the
joint functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For example, joint fires can
enhance the protection of a joint security area (JSA) by dispersing or disrupting enemy
assets threatening the JSA. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety
of joint and Service organizations, people, equipment, and technologies and combine them
in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how
the JFC uses military capabilities to perform tasks associated with each joint function.
Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple joint functions simultaneously or
sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.

d. JFCs and interagency partners synchronize, coordinate, and align military

operations with the activities of interorganizational participants to achieve unity of effort.
Military forces support the USG lead agency, department, or organization, which is usually
DOS for overseas operations and the Department of Homeland Security for domestic
operations. The joint force may leverage commercial capabilities to execute joint
functions. Commercial support has significant potential to support military operations.
However, the risk associated with using commercial capabilities must be assessed and
managed. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of
Services, recognizes commanders are responsible for the appropriate, efficient, and
effective acquisition of contracted services by their organizations.

2. Command and Control

a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over

assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational
vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses several
tasks, including:

(1) Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ.

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(2) Command subordinate forces.

(3) Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance.

(4) Establish command authorities among subordinate commanders.

(5) Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate OAs.

(6) Prioritize and allocate resources.

(7) Manage risk and force protection.

(8) Communicate across the staff and joint force.

(9) Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and

achieving objectives.

(10) Coordinate and control the employment of joint forces to create lethal and
nonlethal effects (i.e., the use of intermediate force capabilities incorporating both lethal
and nonlethal means) across the competition continuum.

(11) Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate, integrate joint operations

with the operations and activities of other participants.

(12) Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from a higher authority.

b. Command includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources lawfully
to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and
directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. The C2 function supports the
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces to accomplish the mission. Timely and relevant intelligence enables
commanders and national-level decision makers to make decisions and execute those
decisions more rapidly and effectively than the enemy. These informed decisions reduce
risk and enable the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.

c. Command Authority. JFCs exercise various command authorities (i.e.,

combatant command [command authority] {COCOM}, operational control [OPCON], and
tactical control [TACON]) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders
over assigned, allocated, and attached forces. Command relationship is a term that
describes the relationships established through the designation of these authorities. JP 1,
Volume 2, The Joint Force, provides details and summarizes each authority and their
relationships (see Figure III-1). Unity of command among US forces is through the
application of the various command relationships.

(1) COCOM is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10,

USC, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified CCMDs unless

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 Joint Functions

Command Relationships Synopsis

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

 Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
 Assignment of subordinate commanders
 Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
 Directive authority for logistics

Operational control when delegated

 Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
 Organize and employ commands and forces
 Assign command functions to subordinates
 Establish plans, priorities, and overall requirements for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
 Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

Tactical control when delegated Support relationship when assigned

Local direction and control of Aid, assist, protect, or sustain

movements or maneuvers to another organization
accomplish mission

Figure III-1. Command Relationships Synopsis

otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. COCOM is the authority of a CCDR, which
they cannot delegate, to perform those functions of command over assigned forces.
COCOM command functions include organizing and employing commands and forces;
assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects
of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions
assigned to the command. A CCDR should exercise COCOM through the commanders of
subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority works through subordinate JFCs and
Service and functional component commanders. Where situations require changing the
normal logistics process, the CCDRs’ directive authority for logistics (DAFL) enables
them to use the logistic capabilities of all forces assigned and attached to their commands
as necessary to accomplish their mission. The CCDR exercises DAFL consistent with the
limitations imposed by US law, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local
conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by SecDef or the CJCS.

(2) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegable within the command.
OPCON is command authority that commanders can exercise at any echelon at or below

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the level of CCMD to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces. It
involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should
be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through
subordinate JFCs and Service and functional component commanders. OPCON normally
provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the
commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in
and of itself, include DAFL or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization,
or unit training.

(3) TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON is an authority over assigned or

attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces, made available for tasking.
TACON limits a commander’s authority to the detailed direction and control of movements
or maneuvers within the OA necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON
provides enough authority for controlling and directing the application of forces or tactical
use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Commanders may
delegate TACON to subordinate commanders at any echelon at or below CCMD. TACON
does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and
logistic support or discipline (Uniform Code of Military Justice authority); the commander
of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless the establishing
directive specifies otherwise. Except for SOF, functional component commanders
typically exercise TACON over military capabilities or forces made available for tasking.

(4) Support. Establishing support relationships between components (as

described in JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force) is a useful option to accomplish needed
tasks. The JFC can establish support relationships among all functional and Service
component commanders, such as for the coordination of operations in depth involving the
joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the joint force air component
commander (JFACC). Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than one
supported commander simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and
provide support for different missions, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force
special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may support a direct-action (DA)
mission while simultaneously supporting a JFLCC for a raid. Similarly, a joint force
maritime component commander (JFMCC) may be a supported commander for maritime
missions while simultaneously supporting a JFACC to achieve control of the air throughout
the OA.

(5) Other authorities granted to commanders, and subordinates as required,

include administrative control, coordinating authority, directive authority for cyberspace
operations (DACO), and direct liaison authorized.

JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force, outlines the specific details for each command relationship.
See JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, for additional guidance on DACO.

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 Joint Functions

(6) The perceived benefits of executing operations with joint forces do not occur
naturally by virtue of established command relationships. The integration necessary for
effective joint operations requires explicit effort that can increase operational complexity
and require additional training and planning. Although effectiveness is typically more
important than efficiency in joint operations, the JFC and component commanders
determine when the potential benefits of joint integration cannot compensate for the
additional complicating factors. Synergy is a means to greater operational effectiveness,
not an end in itself. The principle of simplicity is always a key consideration.

d. Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and

functions consistent with a commander’s command authority. Control of forces and
functions helps commanders and staffs identify and assess requirements, allocate means,
and integrate efforts. For a commander, control is necessary to determine the status of
organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations
from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support
the mission and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control provides the
means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations
from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the OA. Ultimately,
it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

e. The C2 function is commander-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative

and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. Although joint forces have grown
accustomed to communicating freely without fear of jamming or interception, US enemies
and adversaries are likely to use technological advances in space and cyberspace and
vulnerabilities in the EMS to conduct cyberspace or electromagnetic (EM) attacks.
Commanders should prepare to operate in an environment degraded by electromagnetic
interference (EMI).

(1) Mission Command. If a commander loses reliable communications, mission

command enables military operations to continue through decentralized execution based
on mission-type orders. Mission command empowers subordinate military commanders
at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative, act aggressively, and independently
strive to accomplish the mission.

(2) Mission-Type Orders. Mission-type orders focus on the purpose of the

operation rather than details of how to perform assigned tasks. Commanders delegate
decisions to subordinates wherever possible, which minimizes detailed control and
empowers subordinates’ initiative to make decisions based on the commander’s guidance
rather than constant communications. Subordinates’ understanding of the commander’s
intent at every level of command is essential to mission command.

f. Area of Operations (AO) and Functional Considerations

(1) C2 in an AO. The land and maritime force commanders are the supported
commanders within their designated AOs. Through C2, JFLCCs and JFMCCs integrate
and synchronize movement and maneuver with information, intelligence, fires, protection,
and sustainment in supporting activities and operations. To facilitate this integration and

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synchronization, they have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of
fires within their AOs.

(a) The JFC establishes priorities guiding and informing decisions and
execution to synchronize efforts within and between the land, maritime, and SOF
commanders’ OAs. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s
overall joint air effort, while JFLCCs, JFMCCs, and JFSOCCs are the supported
commanders for interdiction in their designated OAs.

(b) In coordination with JFLCCs and JFMCCs, other commanders tasked by

the JFC to execute theater-wide or joint operations area (JOA)-wide operations have the
latitude to plan and execute operations within land and maritime AOs. Commanders
executing such operations within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation with
the appropriate commander to avoid adverse effects and friendly fire incidents. If planned
operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander
assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with
the land or maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime operations, refer to JP 3-30, Joint
Air Operations; JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.

(2) C2 of Joint Space Operations

(a) Commander, United States Space Command (CDRUSSPACECOM), is

the supported commander for operations that ensure availability of space capabilities to the
joint force. For these purposes, CDRUSSPACECOM exercises COCOM over forces
assigned and retains or delegates authorities, as required.

(b) CDRUSSPACECOM, in concert with allies and partners, is responsible

for planning and executing global space operations, activities, and missions. The
Combined Space Operations Center executes C2 of assigned forces to achieve theater and
global objectives. JFCs can request support using space support requests and via
coordination with embedded joint integrated space teams (JISTs).

(c) On behalf of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the

Combined Space Operations Center exercises C2 of offensive and defensive space operations
and provides a common operational picture (COP) to enable broad, shared awareness of the
space critical information requirements; status of forces; space domain awareness; and the
full range of military space activities arranged in time, space, and purpose.

(d) JISTs embed within CCMDs to assist the supported and supporting
commanders in planning, integrating, synchronizing, coordinating, executing, and
assessing space capabilities for the joint force.

For more information, see JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations.

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 Joint Functions

(3) C2 of Joint Air Operations. The JFC normally designates a JFACC to

establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. The JFC delegates
the JFACC the authority necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The JFC
may also establish support relationships between the JFACC and other components to
facilitate operations. The JFACC conducts joint air operations IAW the JFC’s intent and
CONOPS. The JFC may designate the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic
attack; air interdiction; personnel recovery (PR); and airborne intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) (among other missions). The JFACC plans, coordinates,
executes, and assesses these missions for the JFC. The JFC normally designates the
JFACC as the area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority (ACA)
because the three functions are integral to one another. When appropriate, the JFC may
designate a separate AADC or ACA. In joint operations with designated separate
commanders, close coordination is essential for the unity of effort, prevention of friendly
fire incidents, and deconfliction of joint air operations.

(a) ACA. The JFC is responsible for airspace control within the OA but
normally delegates the authority to the ACA. The ACA plans, coordinates, and
develops airspace control procedures and operates the airspace control system (ACS). The
ACA does not have the authority to approve or disapprove specific operations. That
authority is vested in operational commanders only. If the ACA and an affected
commander are unable to agree on an airspace issue, they refer the issue to the JFC for
resolution. The ACA establishes an ACS that is responsive to the JFC’s needs, integrates
the ACS with the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. The ACA
develops the airspace control plan (ACP) and coordinates it with Service and functional
component commanders. After JFC approval, the ACA distributes it to all airspace users
and airspace control elements operating within the OA. A JFC-approved ACP and airspace
control order (ACO) will express how the airspace will support mission accomplishment.
The ACP establishes guidance for the development of the ACS and distribution of the
ACO. The ACO implements the ACP. See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30,
Joint Air Operations, for more information.

(b) AADC. The AADC is responsible for defensive counterair (DCA)

(which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The AADC identifies those
volumes of airspace and control measures that support and enhance DCA operations,
identifies required airspace management systems, establishes procedures for systems to
operate within the airspace, and ensures they integrate into the ACS. The JFC may not
have enough defensive capabilities to defend everything within an OA, so the JFC provides
the AADC with inputs from the components, a prioritized critical asset list (CAL), and a
defended asset list (DAL) for each phase of an operation. For air defense operations
conducted in a large theater of operations, the AADC may recommend dividing the JOA
into separate air defense regions. Each region would have its own regional air defense
commander with responsibilities and decision-making authority for DCA operations within
their region. See JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, for more information.

(4) C2 of Joint Maritime Operations. JFCs establish maritime AOs to achieve

unity of command over the execution of maritime component operations involving the

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interrelated employment of joint air, surface, and subsurface forces. The maritime AO
should be of enough size to allow for movement, maneuver, and employment of weapons
systems and effective use of joint warfighting capabilities and provide operational depth
for sustainment and force protection. The JFMCC is the supported commander for
operations within the JFC-designated maritime AO. The AADC normally establishes a
congruent air defense region, covering the open ocean and littorals, with a regional air
defense commander with the decision-making authority for counterair operations within
the region. The maritime regional air defense commander and AADC coordinate to ensure
the JFACC can accomplish theater-wide responsibilities assigned by the JFC.

(5) C2 of Joint CO

(a) Commanders conduct CO to create and maintain freedom of maneuver

and action in cyberspace, achieve objectives, deny freedom of action to enemies, and
enable other operational activities. Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ to enable
CO include significant portions of JEMSO, C2, intelligence collection, and some space
mission areas.

(b) The CCDR may organize a joint cyberspace center (JCC) with a staff
capable of planning, synchronizing, and controlling CO in support of their assigned
mission. Each CCMD supports subordinate JFCs through their CO supporting staff.
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) establishes cyberspace operations-
integrated planning elements (CO-IPEs) at each CCMD in direct support of the CCDR.
Additionally, USCYBERCOM assigns a joint force HQ-cyberspace in general support of
each CCMD to plan and synchronize the full spectrum of CO that support the CCMD’s
objectives. Clear command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective
employment of cyberspace capabilities. Commander, United States Cyber Command
(CDRUSCYBERCOM), exercises DACO for security, operations, and defense of the
DODIN, overseeing all actions with CCMDs’ JCCs/cyberspace staffs, coordinated through
their CO-IPEs to facilitate unity of effort and mission accomplishment. The CCMD
JCC/CO planning staff coordinates and deconflicts their cyberspace missions with other
operations, including nationally tasked actions that require cyberspace actions in the
CCMD’s AOR. The CCMD coordinates and integrates the use of cyberspace capabilities
in the AOR and has primary responsibility for joint CO planning, to include determining
CO-related requirements for their assigned missions.

(c) Leveraging USCYBERCOM capacity, through the CO-IPE, the CCMD

integrates CO into plans, deconflicts and synchronizes supporting fires in cyberspace,
prepares the OE, and conducts operational assessments and readiness functions.
Additionally, in partnership with USCYBERCOM, the CCMD JCC/cyberspace staff
coordinates CO regionally with interagency partners and allied participants, as necessary.
They integrate command, planning, operations, intelligence, targeting, and readiness
processes for creating effects in cyberspace through three CO missions: offensive
cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DODIN
operations. The CCMD may have assigned or attached cyberspace forces, or cyberspace
forces operating in direct or general support, either embedded or operating remotely.

III-8 JP 3-0
 Joint Functions

CCMDs coordinate and deconflict with other CCMDs and USCYBERCOM when
initiating cyberspace actions with possible effects in another CCMD’s AOR.

For guidance on C2 of cyberspace forces, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

(d) DODIN Operations. The DODIN is the set of information capabilities

and associated processes to collect, process, store, disseminate, and manage information
on demand for warfighters, policymakers, and support personnel, whether interconnected
or stand-alone. The DODIN includes all of DOD’s owned or leased cyberspace and is the
platform from which all CO are conducted. CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported
commander for global DODIN operations and synchronizes planning for other CO.
USCYBERCOM directs security, operations, and defense of the DODIN through its
subordinate Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN. The Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN
commander exercises DACO when necessary to ensure the integrity of DOD cyberspace
and maintain the lethality of the joint force. CDRUSCYBERCOM is a supporting
commander for regional DODIN operations and provides DCO support to CCMDs,
Services, DOD agencies, and when ordered, other USG departments and agencies and PNs
impacted by threats in cyberspace.

For additional guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications

System, and JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

(6) C2 of JEMSO. JEMSO are activities consisting of electromagnetic warfare

(EW) and joint EMS management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage
the electromagnetic environment (EME) to achieve the commander’s objectives. The
electromagnetic attack control authority (EACA) develops guidance to execute an
electromagnetic attack (EA) on behalf of the JFC. JFCs should delegate EACA authority
through the component commanders, down to the lowest level possible. When so
authorized, the J-3 has primary staff responsibility to plan, coordinate, integrate, and
monitor the execution of joint force EW operations.

For additional guidance on the communications and intelligence systems support and
JEMSO, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations; and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

(7) C2 of Joint Operations Conducted in Areas for which COMs have the
USG Lead. Joint operations frequently occur in areas (countries) for which COMs are the
USG lead. When operating in these areas, joint forces are statutorily independent of COM
authority. However, the COM has the final decision concerning US activity in a specific
country. The very rare exception is when the President or SecDef directs otherwise. The
CCMD, DOS regional and functional bureaus, and COMs normally share a common
understanding of objectives and priorities. Interagency cooperation is most successful
when the supported CCDR and COM operate with unity of effort to achieve common
objectives. JFCs and staffs should coordinate their operations and activities with the
relevant US missions, align their operations and activities with US mission country
strategic plans, and keep the COM informed and involved.

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Chapter III

(8) C2 of Joint Operations Conducted in Denied Areas. A denied area is an

area under threat control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully
within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. However, SOF, cyberspace
forces, space-based capabilities, and intelligence elements can operate successfully in
denied areas. The C2 of these elements requires a C2 system that can function under
restrictive measures. The supporting communications system must avoid detection, not
merely to protect the content of the communications.

g. C2 System. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 system, which

consists of the facilities; equipment; communications; staff functions and procedures; and
personnel essential to plan, monitor, and assess operations. An effective C2 system enables
the JFC to maintain communication with higher, supporting, and subordinate commands
to control all aspects of current operations while planning for future operations.

(1) The JFC’s staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since the JFC understands,
plans, directs, and controls most aspects of operations through the staff’s expertise and
efforts.

(2) Liaison is an important aspect of C2. Commanders should exchange liaison

teams or individuals between higher, supporting, and subordinate commands as much as
possible. Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of the sending commander to
the receiving commander but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent
at both the sending and receiving HQ; they should report early during joint planning.
Liaison officers (LNOs), from supporting to supported commanders, are particularly
essential in ensuring supporting units receive required guidance, communicating
requirements for tasks, and coordinating supporting actions.

(3) Control and Coordination Measures. JFCs establish various maneuver and
movement control, airspace coordination, fire support coordination, and communication
measures. The intent of these control measures is greater effectiveness and safety.

For additional guidance on C2 of air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.
For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire
Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. See Military Standard-2525, Department of
Defense Interface Standard Joint Military Symbology, for additional guidance on the use
and discussion of graphic control measures and symbols for the joint force.

(4) Communications and intelligence systems provide communications,

intelligence, targeting data, and threat warnings. These systems exist to support effective
command across varying operational tempos by improving access to information and
enhancing a common perspective of the OE in a timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and
sustainable manner to all command levels. Communications and intelligence architecture
planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications the
intelligence joint function needs to collect, store, protect, process, exploit, and disseminate
information at critical times. These communications and sensor systems permit JFCs to
exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations.

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 Joint Functions

(a) Communications System Planning. The purpose of the joint

communications system is to assist the JFC in C2 of military operations. Effective
communications system planning is essential for effective C2 and integration and
leveraging the fullest extent of the joint force’s capabilities. The mission and structure of
the joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. These
requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the
communications system. Communications system planning should integrate and
synchronize with joint planning. The JFC can apply capabilities at the critical time and
place for mission success through effective communications system planning.
Communications system planning should enable collaboration, knowledge sharing, IM,
and information and intelligence sharing activities that are essential to assist the JFC. This
collaboration includes considerations and, when appropriate, accommodation of
communications links with relevant commanders and their C2. Interoperability, foreign
disclosure authorities, information sharing, and communications security planning with
these stakeholders is essential to ensure secure communications and protect sensitive
information. Routine communications and backup systems do not always function, and
civil authorities might have to rely on available military communications equipment.
Communications system planning also considers the transition of US involvement and
procedures to transfer communications system control to another agency, such as the
United Nations (UN). Planning should consider that it may be necessary to leave some
communications resources behind to continue support of the ongoing effort.

(b) Joint communications system management involves the employment and

technical control of assigned communications systems. Communications system planning
enables the planners to maintain an accurate and detailed status of the network down to the
modular level. The situation and mission drive the essential elements of the
communications system, the C2 organization, and location of forces available to the JFC.
Specific command relationships and the organization of units and staff drive the
interconnecting communications methods and means. The communications system
supports and provides the assured flow of information to and from commanders at all
levels.

(c) During execution, communications system planners ensure the

organization’s communications network can facilitate a rapid, unconstrained flow of
information from its source through intermediate collection and processing nodes to the
user. Typically, the combined system provides voice, data, and video communications
transmitted through radio frequency and cyberspace. Building the communications system
to support the JFC requires knowledge of the joint force organization, the commander’s
CONOPS, communications available, and concepts of employment. The ability to
command, control, and communicate with globally deployed forces is a key enabler for
protecting US national interests; therefore, communications systems are key targets for
adversaries. Thus, it is essential to consider risk and mitigation measures when developing
the plan. Key planning considerations include protecting the DODIN, which requires
cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions to protect, detect, respond to, restore,
and react to shield and preserve information and information systems. A related
consideration is to ensure the aggregation of data within the communications systems does

III-11
Chapter III

not compile information that raises it to a higher level of security than the system provides
(e.g., classified information on an unclassified system).

(d) In execution, the communications system is the primary means through

which intelligence flows to the JFC and throughout the OE. Communications system
planning should be done in close coordination with the intelligence community (IC) to
identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements for some types of
information.

(e) Homeland Security and Defense Communications System Planning.

DOD contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland
defense (HD), and DSCA. The disparity of communications systems, use of allocated
bandwidth (both civilian and military), and limited system interoperability hinder the
capability of collaborative incident management and response in the United States.
Commanders and communications system planners should conduct detailed planning and
analysis to determine US-based communications system requirements in support of
federal, state, and local agencies.

(f) DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel may

not be used for intelligence activities other than foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
(CI), unless SecDef specifically approves that use. Also, requests for direct DOD support
to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are separate approval processes to ensure
compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act. When approved, the use of intelligence
capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities focuses on incident awareness and
assessment. All incident awareness and assessment support within the United States are
subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence
Activities.

h. CCIRs

(1) CCIRs are elements of information the commander identifies as critical to

timely and effective decision making. CCIRs focus IM and help the commander assess the
OE and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the
commander. The CCIR list is normally short, so the staff can focus its efforts and allocate
scarce resources. But the CCIR list is not static; JFCs, primarily through operation
assessment, add, delete, adjust, and update CCIRs throughout planning and execution
based on the information they need to make decisions. At a minimum, commanders should
review and update CCIRs throughout execution.

(2) Categories. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force

information requirements (FFIRs) constitute the total list of CCIRs.

(a) PIRs. Commanders designate PIRs to focus available capacity for

collection and analysis of intelligence on the enemy, adversary, neutral, and potential
friendly actors, as well as relevant environmental factors in the OE, to provide the
intelligence required for decision making. All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs
that may support the JFC’s decision-making process. However, the J-2 consolidates the

III-12 JP 3-0
 Joint Functions

staff’s recommended PIRs to the commander. The J-2 continuously updates PIRs in
synchronization with the commander’s decision points. PIRs are subject to periodic review
to ensure they support execution and adaptation based on the OE and before execution and
transition to ensure the PIRs remain relevant to the commander’s anticipated decision
points.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for more information on PIRs.

(b) FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the
friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend FFIRs that
meet the JFC’s guidance. The J-5 typically consolidates FFIR nominations and provides
staff recommendations to the commander during planning and execution. JFC-approved
FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.

i. Battle Rhythm. The HQ battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle of briefings,
meetings, and report requirements. A stable battle rhythm facilitates effective decision
making, efficient staff actions, and useful management of information within the HQ and
with higher, supporting, and subordinate HQs. The commander and staff should develop
a battle rhythm that minimizes meeting requirements while providing venues for command
and staff interaction internal to the joint force HQ and subordinate commands. Joint and
component HQ’s battle rhythms should synchronize to operations in multiple time zones
and the battle rhythms of higher, subordinate, supporting, and adjacent commands. The
periodic information requirements and decision cycles of higher and supported HQs,
especially those with which information-system interoperability is minimal, receive key
consideration in the setting of each HQ’s battle rhythm. Other factors such as planning,
decision making, and operating cycles (i.e., intelligence collection, targeting, and joint air
tasking cycle) influence the battle rhythm. The CCMD staff synchronizes meetings of the
staff organizations. The chief of staff normally manages and continually assesses the joint
force HQ’s battle rhythm. When coordinating with other USG departments and agencies,
as well as multinational and domestic partners, the joint force HQ should consider that
those organizations often have limited capabilities, capacities, and restricted access to some
information.

For additional guidance on battle rhythm and other joint HQ management processes, refer
to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

j. Building Shared Understanding. Unified and synchronized actions, narratives,

and messaging are the most important products of the C2 function because they guide the
force toward objectives and mission accomplishment. Commanders and staff require not
only information to make these decisions but also the knowledge and shared understanding
that aid in the wisdom essential to sound decision making. Building shared understanding
results from the effective exercise of leadership and the ability to influence and inspire
others. To build a shared understanding, commanders provide vision, guidance, and
direction to the joint force. These collaborative processes and products vary across joint
commands based on the commander’s needs and preferences. Refer to paragraph 3,

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Chapter III

“Information,” for a discussion of these and other activities as they relate to the processes
of facilitating shared understanding.

k. Risk Management

(1) Risk management is a function of command and a key planning consideration

that focuses on designing, implementing, and monitoring risk decisions. Risk management
helps commanders preserve lives and resources; accept, avoid, or mitigate (reduce or
transfer) unnecessary risk; identify feasible and effective control measures where specific
standards do not exist; and develop valid COAs. Risk management is the process to
identify and assess hazards arising from operational factors and making decisions that
balance risk cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in making
informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness
and the probability of mission success. The commander determines the level of risk that
is acceptable for aspects of operations and should state this determination in the
commander’s intent. Understanding risk is one of the key outputs of mission analysis and
should be a topic at every successive step in JPP. The assessment of risk to mission
includes an overall risk to mission analysis (e.g., low, medium, high, or extremely high),
along with multiple criteria (e.g., authorities and permissions; policy; forces, basing, and
agreements; resources; dependency on commercial support and organic capabilities; PN
contributions; other USG support; and critical commercial capabilities). To assist in risk
management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management
process tailored to their mission or OA.

(2) Commanders at all levels use judgment to manage risk based upon the
mission, time, and other resources available. They approach risk management at the
appropriate application level, normally using a deliberate approach that is analytically
based and uses planning time efficiently. The joint risk analysis methodology described in
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis,
provides a consistent, standardized way to analyze and manage risk. Figure III-2 is a
generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

(3) Risk management does not inhibit a commander’s flexibility and initiative,
remove risk altogether, dictate a go/no-go decision to take a specific action, sanction or
justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Risk management is relevant for all joint campaigns and operations and their branches and
sequels and at all levels of command across the competition continuum. To mitigate risk,
commanders may take a variety of actions, such as changing the CONOPS, changing the
plan for employment of fires, executing a branch to the original plan, or employing
countermeasures.

(4) Safety preserves military power. High-tempo operations may increase the
risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation
measures, education, and training lessen that risk. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap
by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety
program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include

III-14 JP 3-0
 Joint Functions

Risk Management Process

Identify Hazards

Supervise and Assess Hazards

Evaluate

Implement Develop
Controls Controls

Figure III-2. Risk Management Process

geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, identification of
uncharted or uncleared minefields, and special equipment hazards.

(5) Operational contract support (OCS) may be used across many functional
areas to augment military forces. JFCs requiring these activities should assess and mitigate
risk associated with use of commercial capabilities.

For additional guidance on risk management, refer to CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk
Analysis.

For additional insight on risk associated with commercial support, refer to the CJCS Risk
Assessment on Commercial Support 2018 and 2019, available at
https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/ocs/SitePages/Reporting.aspx.

3. Information

a. The elevation of information as a joint function impacts all operations and signals
a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels within today’s complex OE.

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Chapter III

b. The information function encompasses the management and application of

information to support achievement of objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other
joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive
desired relevant actor behaviors and to support human and automated decision making.
The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the
prevalent nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military
operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to preserve friendly information and
leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve
the commander’s objectives. The information joint function provides an intellectual
framework to aid commanders in exerting one’s influence through the timely generation,
preservation, denial, or projection of information.

c. All military activities have an informational aspect since most military activities
are observable in the IE. Informational aspects are the features and details of military
activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those
aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The
JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage in the OE;
failing to leverage those aspects in a timely manner may cede this advantage to an
adversary or enemy. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities can support
achieving operational and strategic objectives. The information function also encompasses
the use of friendly information to influence foreign audiences and affect the legitimacy,
credibility, and influence of the USG, joint force, allies, and partners. Additionally, JFCs
use friendly information to counter, discredit, and render irrelevant the disinformation,
misinformation, and propaganda of other actors.

d. The information joint function helps commanders and their staffs understand and
leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application across
the competition continuum, to include its role in supporting human and automated decision
making. Information planners should consider coordination activities not only within the
information joint function but also among all other joint functions. The information joint
function organizes the tasks required to manage and apply information during all activities
and operations. The three tasks of the information joint function stress the requirement to
incorporate information as a foundational element during the planning and conduct of all
operations.

For more detailed discussion, see JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

e. Joint Force Capabilities, Operations, and Activities for Leveraging

Information. In addition to planning all operations to derive benefit from the inherent
informational aspects of physical actions and influence relevant actors, the JFC also has
additional means with which to leverage information in support of objectives. Leveraging
information involves the generation and use of information through tasks to inform relevant
actors; influence relevant actors; and/or attack information, information systems, and
information networks. Planning for OIE provides the means for the integrated employment
of military information. The JFC uses various forces, operations, and activities to reinforce
the actions of assigned or attached forces, support lines of operation (LOOs) or lines of

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 Joint Functions

effort (LOEs), or as the primary activity in an LOE to drive the behavior of selected target
audiences or decision makers.

(1) KLE. Most operations require commanders and other leaders to conduct KLE
with key local and regional leaders to affect their attitudes, gain their support, and cultivate
them as sources of information. Building relationships to the point of effective military
engagement and influence usually takes time. An organic or reliable indigenous language,
regional expertise, and cultural capability are critical for the successful conduct and
management of KLEs. Commanders can find it difficult to identify key leaders, develop
messages, establish dialogue, and determine other ways and means of delivery, especially
in societies where interpersonal relationships are paramount. Interaction opportunities
with friendly and neutral leaders could include face-to-face meetings, town meetings, and
community events. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, and
communication methods is essential. The J-2’s joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (JIPOE) process should identify key friendly, neutral, and threat
leaders who are not in the commander’s sphere of influence. The entire staff should
identify leaders relative to their functional areas. Leaders can include a broad range of
individuals, including those in nontraditional leadership roles. Special care should be taken
to consider the leadership roles women may hold in the community.

(2) Public Affairs (PA). Enemies and adversaries will make determined efforts
to discredit US military efforts. PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives
by truthfully informing US domestic and international audiences about US military
operations. PA ensures the clear communication of CCMD and joint force messaging
supports the strategic narrative and counters adverse disinformation, misinformation, and
propaganda. PA accomplishes this through the dissemination of accurate information that
is as transparent as possible without violating laws or policy. PA also supports operations
security (OPSEC) by ensuring information is appropriate for public release by working
with the OPSEC planners and program managers to prevent premature or inadvertent
public release of information damaging to OPSEC. Additionally, PA works closely with
other operational planners to integrate PA capabilities into OIE and educate the force on
current disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda threats. Also, PA builds
understanding with the media on the implications of premature release of operational
information or the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information identified in
CCIRs.

(a) With the speed of modern communication and the tempo of military
operations, competing sources can rapidly proliferate information about joint force
activities. Regardless of the means or speed of dissemination, information can be
incomplete, lack important context, and be intentionally biased or factually incorrect. PA
supports C2 efforts and capabilities by maintaining timely and appropriate messaging over
approved joint communication platforms.

(b) PA support is important throughout planning, execution, and assessment.

Public affairs officers (PAOs) carefully consider objectives to determine how JFCs should
leverage PA and other communication capabilities in conjunction with other capabilities in

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Chapter III

current and future operations. PAOs identify public information and visual information
requirements, as well as the means to acquire and move those products promptly. PA
provides input during planning, to include developing public communication COAs that
can ultimately shape relevant actor perceptions and behavior; identifying constraints,
restraints, and potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions;
providing an understanding of the nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts;
and developing and interpreting measures and indicators of effectiveness. Supporting
communication plans emphasize higher HQ guidance, narratives, and messages; identify
the communication problem or opportunity; segment key audiences; and define
communication objectives. Communication plans include measurable objectives to
achieve these goals and communication activities appropriate to the situation and desired
outcome. Throughout planning and operations, the PAO normally leads CCMD and JFC
narrative development and synchronization with operations, activities, and investments
using the communication synchronization process and supports staff alignment of strategic
and operational narrative with tactical-level actions and messaging. JFCs can use the
communication synchronization process to coordinate and synchronize operational
narrative, themes, messages, images, and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations).
It aligns communication between and among key USG and partner stakeholders who are
invested in the objectives determined in the operation or campaign plan with broader
national strategic narrative. Communication synchronization focuses USG efforts to
understand and communicate operations, actions, and investments across all levels of
command to reduce friction between actions and narrative (say-do gap). The
communication synchronization process is inherent in the information joint function and
associated staff activities during the planning and conduct of operations.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. For additional guidance
on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(3) CMO. CMO facilitates unified action in joint campaigns and operations.
They are activities that establish, maintain, influence, and exploit relationships between
military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions. Effective CMO results in the
integration of military and other instruments of national power to achieve commander’s
objectives and US interests.

(a) CMO usually include governmental organizations, NGOs, and allies and
partners in OAs. The range of CMO activities includes military government; support to
civil administration; populace and resources control; FHA; foreign assistance; and
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation.

(b) CAO are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed through
civil reconnaissance, network analysis, and network engagement to support, influence, or
leverage populations, governments, and other institutions. Their purpose is to expose
malign influence, counter coercion and subversion, and impose costs through conventional
and unconventional activities. Civil affairs units and personnel are the joint force
functional specialists who conduct CAO. Civil affairs integrate civilian considerations and
capabilities into US military operations and military considerations and capabilities into

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 Joint Functions

the operations of interorganizational partners. Civil affairs help organize and sustain
unified action in IW with interagency partners as well as key allies and partners. Civil
affairs augment DOD and USG stabilization and governance efforts across the competition
continuum.

For additional guidance on CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations,
and DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

(4) Military Deception (MILDEC). Commanders conduct MILDEC to mislead

enemy decision makers and commanders and cause them to take or not take specific
actions. The intent is to cause enemy commanders to form inaccurate impressions about
friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their
intelligence collection assets; and fail to employ their combat or support units effectively.
As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets enemy leaders and decision makers through the
manipulation of their intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems.
MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify deception targets, assist in developing
credible stories, identify and orient on appropriate receivers (i.e., the readers of the story),
and assess the effectiveness of the deception effort. Deception requires a thorough
knowledge of the enemy and their decision-making processes. During the formulation of
the CONOPS, planners determine how the JFC wants the enemy to act at critical points in
the operation. Those desired enemy actions then become the MILDEC objective.
MILDEC focuses on causing the enemy to act in a desired manner, not simply to mislead
them in their thinking.

DECEPTION AT NORMANDY

The Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France on 6 June 1944 was a

massive operation to land almost 133,000 soldiers in heavily defended
territory. To create the best possible chance of success, the Allies
initiated and implemented an elaborate deception scheme named
BODYGUARD beginning a year earlier. The aim of the Allies’ deception
was to reinforce the belief among those in the German high command
that the main Allied landings would be in the Pas-de-Calais, across the
Strait of Dover, not Normandy, where the invasion would begin. If
successful, the result would leave German forces poorly postured to
counterattack the invasion. Over the previous three years, the British
had practiced and refined their deception methods. At the outset of
Operation BODYGUARD, they recognized the foundation of all such
operations was to support and encourage the enemy's expectations. To
be effective, the deception had to reinforce what the enemy wanted to
believe. Furthermore, the deception scheme had to ensure the
information reached the highest levels of German command. Operation
QUICKSILVER was a major component of the plan. The key element of
Operation QUICKSILVER series was the creation in German minds of a

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fictitious United States 1st Army Group (FUSAG) commanded by

Lieutenant General George S. Patton. The Allies simulated all manner
of operations, including fake troop movements in England and Scotland,
as well as placement of fake trucks, tanks, and other materiel.
Intelligence units staged communiques, orders, wireless transmissions
and press conferences to support the appearance of serious military
preparations. Since the Germans knew and feared Patton as a
commander, his leadership of the effort enhanced its acceptance by
German authorities. Intercepted communications between Germany
and Japan confirmed that Operation QUICKSILVER was successfully
diverting German attention and resources. To strengthen the illusion of
the FUSAG preparing to embark, the Allies assembled and deployed
dummy landing craft in harbors and estuaries around the south-east
England, centered on Dover. These decoys were convincing when
viewed from a long distance and the air.

The Allies were assisted in this deception by two important factors. The
first of these was ULTRA – the codename for the intelligence received
from British intelligence where a crack team of codebreakers had
successfully broken the German secret coding system ENIGMA. The
Germans, convinced the Allies could not break the ENIGMA code,
remained unaware of this fact. Their consequent vulnerability allowed
Allies to check the success of any information or misinformation they
planted by intercepting and reading the decoded responses. The
second factor was Allied control of several double agents by British
intelligence. Their nuanced direction of these agents had the Germans
completely unaware that their situational awareness, behavior, and
operational decision making were being constantly manipulated. The
effectiveness of this operation yielded tangible benefits to Allied troops
as they secured a foothold in France in June of 1944. The most
noteworthy success of Operation BODYGUARD, and especially
Operation QUICKSILVER, was demonstrated by the German High
Command’s belief in the existence of FUSAG, weeks after the D-Day
landings. As a result, the Germans kept vital units away from the main
fighting front in Normandy, because they were still expecting a second,
larger invasion in the Calais area.

Various Sources

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(5) MISO

(a) MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective
reasoning and ultimately induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the
originator’s objectives. MISO may use all means of communication, distribution, and
message delivery as appropriate.

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 Joint Functions

(b) MISO have strategic, operational, and tactical applications and are a
critical informational/influence capability employed as a part of OIE across the competition
continuum. The conduct of MISO is an inherent responsibility of all JFCs within their
respective OAs to shape the OE in support of their assigned missions and integrate into
military operations as appropriate. Whether acting separately or as part of a larger military
operation, MISO planners and associated organizations have primary responsibility to
advise supported military commanders on MISO-related matters. This advice includes the
psychological effect and impact of military and MISO-specific actions. The advice also
includes clarifying the authority for development, production, distribution, and
dissemination of all products intended to influence approved foreign audiences. The JFC
secures the required authorities for MISO and seeks adjustments as necessary, delegating
the authorities down to the lowest level possible to ensure the prompt execution of MISO
integration and unity of effort.

(c) All DOD activities that constitute MISO, regardless of the organization
conducting those activities, must adhere to the parameters of an Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy-approved MISO Program or SecDef-approved order. In cooperation
and competition, MISO conducted outside an area of ongoing hostilities involving Armed
Forces of the United States is coordinated with the COM for each country where a targeted
audience can be reasonably expected to be affected. The concurrence of the COM is a
prerequisite to execution of MISO programs and activities in such areas, except when
directed by SecDef; where MISO is to be executed in multiple countries such that
coordination with all relevant COMs is impractical; when MISO is to be executed in
countries where no US diplomatic mission exists, MISO programs are coordinated with
the Central Intelligence Agency and a relevant DOS regional bureau(s); or when targeting
audiences in international waters or airspace.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support

Operations. MISO support to the non-US military is described in DODI O-3607.02,
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and CJCSI 3110.05, Military
Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(6) OPSEC

(a) OPSEC uses a process to preserve friendly essential secrecy by

identifying, controlling, and protecting critical information and indicators that would allow
enemies and adversaries to identify and exploit friendly vulnerabilities. The purpose of
OPSEC is to reduce vulnerabilities of the US and multinational forces to enemy and
adversary exploitation, and it applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces.
Even when there may be no clearly defined threat, US military operations should be
safeguarded. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the
possibility that coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical
information.

(b) The effective integration, coordination, and application of other joint

functions are critical components in the execution of OPSEC. Because a specified task is

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“to protect our own” information, OPSEC planners require complete situational awareness
regarding friendly activities to facilitate the safeguarding of critical information and
indicators. This kind of situational awareness exists within the joint force where a wide
range of planners work in concert to protect friendly information, information networks,
and systems. OPSEC practices should balance the responsibility to account to the
American public with the need to protect critical information and indicators. The need to
practice OPSEC should not be an excuse to deny noncritical information to the public.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(7) Signature Management. Signature management encompasses JFC actions to

adjust, modify, or manipulate signatures—the observable aspects of administrative,
technical, and physical joint force activities. JFCs oversee signature management in
concert with OPSEC to protect friendly force information, information networks, and
systems and to deliberately affect relevant actor decision making and behavior.
Contracting and host-nation support (HNS) should be approached in a manner that protects
controlled unclassified information and other sensitive information.

(8) EW. EW encompasses offensive and defensive military action to secure and
maintain freedom of action in the EMOE for friendly forces while exploiting or denying it
to enemies and adversaries. EW is an enabler for other activities that communicate or
maneuver through the EMOE, such as MISO, PA, or CO.

For additional guidance on EW, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

(9) Combat Camera (COMCAM). Imagery is one of the most powerful tools
available for informing internal and domestic audiences and for influencing foreign
audiences. COMCAM forces provide imagery capability to the JFC across the competition
continuum. COMCAM imagery supports capabilities that use imagery for their products
and efforts, including MISO, MILDEC, PA, and CMO. It provides critical operational
documentation to support JFC decision making, sensitive site exploitation, legal and
evidentiary requirements, and imagery for BDA/MOE analysis. Additionally, COMCAM
supports operational documentation and imagery to counter disinformation and support
narrative development during FHA operations and noncombatant evacuation operations.

(10) Historians. Historical reading and understanding are vital tools for
commanders. Maintaining a command history is a command responsibility. Historical
knowledge provides commanders the opportunity to learn through others’ experiences.
Military historians deployed into combat provide real-time support to commander
decisions, spark critical imagination and adaptation necessary for command leadership, and
complete critical documentation for future lessons on military operations. This
documentation may include a collection of operational records (e.g., plans, orders,
assessments, and correspondence), written narrative records of significant events, and oral
history interviews of participants in ongoing operations.

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 Joint Functions

(11) Space Operations. The cornerstone responsibilities of military space forces

are to preserve freedom of action, enable joint lethality and effectiveness, and provide
national leadership with independent military operations. Space operations support joint
operations throughout the OE by providing space offensive and defensive operations;
space-based surveillance and reconnaissance; missile warning; environmental monitoring;
satellite communications; space domain awareness; space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing (PNT); spacelift; satellite operations; and nuclear detonation detection. Space
operations integrate offensive and defensive actions to achieve and maintain freedom of
action in space. The joint force integrates military space operations as part of joint
operations and defends critical space assets. As necessary, space operations deny enemies
and adversaries benefits from their space capabilities. USSPACECOM provides combat
power by fully integrating offensive and defensive space operations. This integration and
synchronization of space capabilities and operations enable USSPACECOM, as part of the
joint force, to deter and, if necessary, defeat enemy aggression.

For additional guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations,
and United States Space Force’s Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower, Doctrine for
Space Forces.

(12) Special Technical Operations (STO). Commanders should deconflict and

synchronize other activities with STO. STO action officers at CCMD or Service
component HQs can provide military and civilian leadership with detailed information
related to STO and its contribution to joint force operations.

For additional guidance on STO, see CJCSI 3120.08, (U) Joint Special Technical
Operations.

(13) CO. CO employ cyberspace capabilities to achieve objectives in or through

cyberspace. Most DOD CO are routine uses of cyberspace to complete assigned tasks but
not necessarily one of the three CO missions. These uses include actions like e-mail or
researching information using the Internet. These activities do not require special
authorities for DOD personnel; however, they are the source of most vulnerabilities to the
DODIN when cybersecurity policies are not followed. The Cyber Mission Force and other
cyberspace forces conduct specific OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations missions. OCO
missions leverage adversary and enemy reliance on information, information technology,
and data to project power in and through cyberspace and can include cyberspace attack
actions (i.e., fires in cyberspace) when authorized. Refer to paragraph 7, “Protection,” for
additional discussion of DCO and DODIN operations.

For additional guidance on all CO missions, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations,
and for additional specific guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.

f. Information Use Across the Competition Continuum

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(1) Cooperative use of information. During day-to-day activities, the joint force
integrates information in SC and FHA activities by:

(a) Assuring and maintaining allies, widening/publicizing combined

exercises and other PN cooperation activities, encouraging neutral actors that the joint force
is the partner of choice or that they should remain neutral, and reminding partners of
benefits to maintain their support.

(b) Informing enemies and adversaries of benefits to friendly multinational

force membership and collective defense, informing enemies and adversaries that the joint
force is committed to its allies and security agreements, and concealing investment
priorities and costs.

(2) Competitive use of information. During competition, the joint force conducts
activities against state or non-state actors with incompatible interests that are below the
level of armed conflict. Competition can include military operations such as CO, special
operations, demonstrations of force, CTF, and ISR and often depends on the ability to
leverage the power of information through OIE. Expect additional time to coordinate and
obtain approval from DOD or other USG departments and agencies to use information due
to increased risk. Specific information tasks may include:

(a) Informing allies and partners of malign influence and antagonistic

behavior.

(b) Declassifying and sharing images that reveal or confirm enemy or

adversarial behavior, recommending allies and partners communicate to relevant audiences
within their areas of influence, and educating the joint force and allies about online
disinformation activities to build understanding and resilience against propaganda.

(c) Influencing adversary’s audiences to prevent escalation to armed conflict

by demonstrating joint force resolve, strength, and commitment, as well as the costs and
expectations of response actions.

(d) Targeting adversarial information, networks, and systems by temporarily

denying communication or Internet access, disrupting jamming of Internet access to its
internal population, and partnering with private-sector communication companies to
remove inappropriate enemy and adversarial recruiting and fundraising advertisements.

(3) Use of information in armed conflict. In addition to the above tasks, the joint
force can use information defensively or offensively. JFCs can employ information as
independent activities, integrated with joint force physical actions, or in support of other
instruments of national power. Many of these information activities require additional
authorities as they present larger strategic risks or risks to the joint force, though
capabilities like PA, which has the preponderance of public communication resources and
rarely requires additional authorities in armed conflict.

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 Joint Functions

(a) Defensive purposes. Basic defense activities include protecting data and
communications, movements, and locations of critical capabilities and activities. PA can
assist in countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. MILDEC
can help mask strengths, magnify feints, and distract attention to false locations. DCO can
defeat specific threats that attempt to bypass or breach cyberspace security measures. EW
can protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or
enemy use of the EMS. The management of EM signatures can mask friendly movements
and confuse enemy intelligence collectors. Finally, well-coordinated communication and
messaging activities not only minimize OPSEC violations but also increase the consistency
and alignment of joint force words, actions, and images. Conflicting messages or
remaining silent allows adversaries and enemies to exploit or monopolize the media and
propagate their agenda.

(b) Offensive purposes. Offensive information activities decrease enemy

and adversary effectiveness, increase ally and partner support and effectiveness, and reduce
interference from neutral audiences.

g. Exploit Informational Weaknesses of the Threat

(1) Communicate and provide images. JFCs expose illegal or malign activities
to international and enemy civilian audiences such as enemy human rights abuses, reveal
funding sources of enemies or adversaries, and demonstrate other actions inconsistent with
the law of war and the treaties and customary international law embodied in these
principles.

(2) Expose enemy decisions to their populaces that result in significant loss to
their resources, lives, and treasures.

(3) Increase exploitation of adversary rifts, beliefs, or perceptions by publicizing

enemy tactical failures, poor equipment readiness, inconsistent logistics, enemy surrenders,
populace skepticism, and other internal vulnerabilities that distract enemy leadership.

(4) Manipulate enemy messaging to confuse their supporters, allies, and partners.

(5) Conduct OCO to deny use or confidence in enemy communication networks,

information systems, or weapon systems.

(6) Disseminate messages to relevant enemy audiences to create or increase

ambiguity.

(7) Conduct MILDEC in support of friendly attacks to mislead adversaries or

foreign intelligence about friendly attack capabilities, locations, methods, and timing.

(8) Conduct physical movements or fires that support MILDEC by targeting

adversary communication, information, or weapon systems in support of feints,

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demonstrations, or ruses to create perceptions that a targeted area is a primary maneuver

objective.

(9) Destroy or nullify selected adversary intelligence collection capabilities.

(10) Conduct an EA to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EMS

via the employment of systems or weapons that use EM energy (e.g., jamming in the form
of EM disruption, degradation, denial, and deception).

(11) Employ systems or weapons that use radiated EM energy (to include
directed energy [DE]) as their primary disruptive or destructive mechanism.

(12) Conduct signature management to support OPSEC, MILDEC, and offensive

or defensive activities.

(13) Disseminate information that can reduce civilian interference, minimize

collateral damage, and help to reduce military and civilian casualties.

(14) Recommend targets and provide support to enable USG departments and
agencies to increase economic pressure activities. Examples include freezing enemy
finance support, exposing threat finance transactions, exposing illegal arms trading, and
exposing third-party financial and resource support to enemy activities.

(15) Conduct KLEs with international media, allied counterparts, and other third-
party communicators that echo the joint force narrative.

(16) Avoid targeting and messaging of cultural locations or issues that unite
enemy leadership and its citizens.

(17) Anticipate setbacks and opportunities by synchronizing and preapproving

senior leader response messages.

h. Key Considerations

(1) Intelligence Support to the Information Joint Function. Intelligence is critical

to the effectiveness of information activities. Intelligence facilitates understanding the
interrelationship of the informational, physical, and human aspects within the OE and the
IE. By providing a society-centric, sociocultural understanding of the OE, intelligence can
greatly assist the planning, integration, execution, and assessment of information activities
to create desired effects. Intelligence in support of information activities may require
longer lead times to establish behavior baselines for human decision making.

(2) Information in the Targeting Process. Planners integrate information

activities and capabilities into the targeting process during planning and execution to create
and synchronize effects in support of objectives. Many information activities and
capabilities have interagency coordination requirements. Targeting approval levels may

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 Joint Functions

increase the time required to plan, coordinate, and execute the process. Other USG
departments and agencies lack trained personnel and procedures to satisfy interagency
planning, execution, and assessment requirements. Fully analyzing and developing target
sets for nonlethal action may also increase coordination time required. Some information
activities such as STO may be compartmentalized. However, effective integration of
information activities and capabilities in the targeting process results in an improved
understanding of the entire joint and multinational force and increased opportunities to
achieve JFC objectives.

(3) Legal Considerations. US military activities, including OIE, must always be

in compliance with US laws and policies. Planners deal with diverse and complex legal
considerations. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ, given the complexity of
technologies involved, the significance of legal interests potentially affected, and the
challenges inherent for laws and policies to keep pace with the technological changes and
implementation. Policies are regularly added, amended, and rescinded to provide clarity.
As a result, legal restraints and constraints on information activities are dynamic.
Multinational considerations further complicate them since each nation has its laws,
policies, and processes for approving plans.

(4) The complexity of the IE. The JFC will not be the only voice in the IE.
Individuals, nongovernmental groups, or non-state actors can have outsize effects on JFC
operations due to the rapid and comprehensive (i.e., multiple media formats) nature of
traditional media and social media services. Consequently, the JFC’s information plan
should include social media services engagement as a form of information dissemination,
along with traditional media outlets.

(5) Leveraging relevant actors and the media they use to communicate is vital to
establishing legitimacy, credibility, and influence. During mission analysis, the JFC and
staff should identify relevant nonmilitary actors (e.g., indigenous formal and informal
leaders and influencers) and their respective influences on the OE. Identifying and
cultivating relevant actors and the media they use to communicate allows the joint force to
develop ways to leverage their influence to accomplish the joint force mission. JFCs and
staff should confirm or deny assumptions on relevant actors made during mission analysis
through CMO, military engagement, and network engagement.

(6) Proactive Communication Planning. The nature of the IE enables relevant

actors to receive and react to information in the OE before JFCs can react. Some relevant
actors create and leverage information to cause reactions. This reality leaves little time for
the joint force to craft and disseminate communication to respond. Instead of constantly
reacting to each negative or positive information event to gain an advantage in the IE,
commanders ensure the proactive development and dissemination of information in line
with communication plans. Additionally, the JFC needs to delegate information release
decisions to the lowest possible level to enable timely action in the IE.

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Chapter III

4. Intelligence

a. Understanding the OE is fundamental to joint operations. The intelligence function

informs JFCs about adversary intentions, capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), critical
factors, vulnerabilities, and future COAs and helps commanders and staffs understand
friendly, neutral, and threat networks. The JIPOE process includes integrating analysis,
production, collection management, and targeting processes to shape decision making and
enable operations. Using the continuous JIPOE analysis process, properly tailored JIPOE
products can enhance OE understanding and enable the JFC to act quickly and effectively.
Intelligence activities and assessments also occur while defending the homeland within the
guidelines of applicable regulations and laws. The intelligence joint function encompasses
the joint intelligence process. The joint intelligence process consists of six interrelated
categories of intelligence activities and operations:

(1) Planning and direction of intelligence activities.

(2) Collection.

(3) Processing and exploitation of collected exploitable material and other data
to produce relevant information.

(4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence.

(5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with plans and operations.

(6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.

b. JIPOE products support operational design. Throughout execution, tailored,

continuous JIPOE products capture the dynamic OE to facilitate risk management. Joint
forces may suffer health threats such as disease (infectious and noninfectious) and injuries
(combat, noncombat, or environmental hazards) that limit operational functions and
adversely affect combat power. Medical intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (MIPOE) products help decision makers devise protection measures to
mitigate these threats.

For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and the Joint Guide
for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. For further information
on MIPOE, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

c. Understanding the Human, Physical, and Inherent Informational Aspects of

Military Operations. Intelligence is critical to the JFC’s ability to leverage information
to affect behavior. People and organizations other than the enemy may positively or
negatively affect the friendly mission. These actors may include the civilian populace, the
HN government, potential opposition leaders, and diasporas. Other relevant actors may
include international organizations, non-state actors, religious leaders, and NGOs. By first
identifying the relevant actors and learning as much as possible about them and their
interrelationships, the JFC can develop an approach that facilitates decision making

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 Joint Functions

regarding relevant actors’ desired behavior (active or passive). Sociocultural analysis and
the development of identity intelligence (I2) enable a better understanding of the relevant
actors. Individuals may fit into more than one category of actor. For example, a tribal
leader may work as a district governor or religious leader, while also working behind the
scenes to provide financial and material support to an insurgency.

d. IC Collaboration

(1) JFCs use assigned and attached intelligence forces and coordinate with
supporting IC capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture, analyze the OE, and
anticipate future adversary or enemy action. These supporting capabilities include CSAs
(e.g., National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency), national intelligence agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency),
and Service intelligence centers. National intelligence support may provide the J-2
opportunity to integrate national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive intelligence
effort designed to support the joint force. Through the intelligence planning process, the
J-2 integrates these supporting capabilities through the National Intelligence Support Plan
with the efforts of the assigned and attached intelligence forces. Liaison personnel from
the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their
agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.

For additional guidance on the intelligence planning process, see JP 2-0, Joint
Intelligence, and CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning.

(2) As situations emerge that potentially require military action, JFCs examine
available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus intelligence
efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities,
dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the evolving situation.
They look for specific warning intelligence of imminent enemy activity that may require
an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to JIPOE, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence,
and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders are the key
participants in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just
consumers of intelligence. They integrate intelligence into their plans and operations.
They also distribute intelligence and information to subordinate commands and, when
appropriate, to authorized participants through established protocols and systems.
Commanders establish operational and intelligence requirements and continuous feedback
to ensure optimum intelligence support for planning and operations. This interface
supports the commander and operational planning and execution. It also mitigates surprise,
assists friendly deception efforts, and enables joint operation assessment.

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Chapter III

(2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and reconnaissance support

information collection throughout the OE. These activities focus on planned collection
requirements but are also sufficiently flexible to respond to time-sensitive and emerging
requirements. Commanders also require near real time surveillance that focuses on specific
targets and supports guidance and intent. ISR includes activities in cyberspace to gather
intelligence or information to support future operations. ISR activities require appropriate
deconfliction of capabilities.

(3) Collection Capabilities. JIPOE is the means through which the intelligence
analyst manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and
staff gain an understanding of the complex and interconnected OE. To address knowledge
gaps identified through the JIPOE process, JFCs require continuous data and information
collection. Collection capabilities enable intelligence analysts to develop and apply
appropriate analytical strategies to gain the knowledge necessary to define and understand
the OE. To obtain and derive information and intelligence, all-source intelligence analysts
rely on a variety of collection, including surveillance and reconnaissance activities.
Intelligence collection disciplines are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and
record or convey information of conditions, situations, threats, opportunities, and events.
Intelligence collection disciplines include CI, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence,
measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals intelligence,
intelligence collection in cyberspace, and technical intelligence.

(4) I2. I2 fuses identity attributes (e.g., biographical, biological, behavioral, and
reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence
associated with those attributes, collected across multiple activities, sources, and methods,
to identify, assess, and characterize threat actors and networks, their capabilities and
capacity, COGs, objectives, intent, and potential COAs. Identity attributes of individuals,
groups, networks, or populations of interest are gathered through identity tasks. Regional
and global trends have placed greater requirements on the JFC to recognize and
differentiate one person from another to support the joint functions, particularly the
protection and intelligence functions. I2 activities contribute to the exploitation of
collected information and subsequent all-source analysis that enables the joint force to
protect and control relevant populations. I2 products, such as biometric watch lists and
persons of interest overlays, assist US forces, the HN, and PNs to positively identify, track,
characterize, and disrupt threat actors.

For additional guidance on the intelligence joint function and intelligence disciplines, refer
to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

5. Fires

a. Fires is the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal
effects on a target or objects of influence IAW US and international law. Joint fires are
delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated
action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. This function
encompasses the fires associated with several tasks, missions, and processes, including:

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 Joint Functions

(1) Conduct Joint Targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and
matching the appropriate response to them, considering command objectives, operational
requirements, available capabilities, and rules of engagement (ROE).

(2) Provide Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist air, land,
maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control
territory, airspace, space, cyberspace, the EMS, and key waters and to influence
populations.

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates offensive and
defensive operations and capabilities to achieve and maintain freedom of action and force
protection. These operations destroy or negate enemy manned and unmanned aircraft and
missiles, both before and after launch.

(4) Interdict Hostile Capabilities. Interdiction during armed conflict diverts,

disrupts, delays, or destroys a threat’s surface capabilities before being used effectively
against friendly forces or otherwise achieving their objectives.

(5) Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive action against foreign
military, political, and economic targets to create effects against a high-payoff target.

(6) Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task assesses the effectiveness
of fires and their contribution to achieving of the objective.

b. Key Considerations. Employing fires in conjunction with other activities, such as

information activities, to create desired effects is a particularly important factor in
maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment. The following are key
considerations associated with the above tasks:

(1) Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of joint fires to
actions and tasks at the component, subordinate joint force, CCMD, and national level.
Commanders and their staffs consider strategic- and operational-level objectives, the
potential for friendly fire incidents and other undesired fires effects, and operational
limitations (e.g., constraints and restraints) when making targeting decisions. Commanders
should consider the impact on all systems in the OE during this process. Successful
integration of engagement options (e.g., cyberspace, EW, information, nonlethal weapons,
DE, and other intermediate force capabilities) to integrate nonlethal effects into the
targeting process is often important to mission accomplishment. Commanders assess
available engagement options and employ them as appropriate.

(a) Oversight. JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad targeting
oversight functions or delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically,
JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a
JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In
either case, the JTCB should include representatives from the staff, all components, and, if
required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to link target priorities,

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guidance, and the associated effects to the JFC’s objectives. JTCB participants should
ensure all components and applicable staff elements coordinate and synchronize targeting
efforts with intelligence and operations.

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC is responsible

for all aspects of the targeting process and may conduct joint targeting at the joint force
HQ level or assign the deputy JFC or component commander to chair the JTCB. When the
JFC does not delegate targeting authority and does not establish a JTCB, the JFC performs
this task at the joint force HQ. The JFC may approve the formation of a joint fires element
to provide recommendations to the J-3 and the JFC. Subordinate commands are part of the
JTCB. The JTCB chair should possess or have access to adequate C2 infrastructure,
adequate facilities, joint planning expertise, appropriate intelligence, and legal support.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is part
of the targeting process. The JFACC uses air apportionment to ensure the weight of joint
force air effort is consistent with the JFC’s intent and objectives. After consulting with
other component commanders, the JFACC recommends air apportionment to the JFC, who
makes the air apportionment decision. The JFACC’s rationale for the recommendation
may include priority or percentage of effort based on the JFC’s CONOPS, specific tasks
for which air assets are essential, and other factors such as the component commanders’
joint fires requirements. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, the JFACC
allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available.

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint fire support may include aircraft; naval surface fire support; artillery,
mortars, rockets, and missiles; cyberspace attack; offensive and defensive space
operations; EA; and messaging to create lethal and nonlethal effects.

(3) Close air support is a critical element of joint fire support that requires
detailed planning, coordination, and training of ground and supporting air forces for safe
and effective execution. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support
with the fire and maneuver of the supported force are essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. For
more information on close air support, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

(4) Countering Air and Missile Threats

(a) The JFC counters air and missile threats to help create friendly freedom
of action, provide protection, and deny the enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates
offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain the JFC’s desired degrees of
control in the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles,
both before and after launch. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and

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interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force contributes capabilities

necessary for mission success. Also, Service capability and force structure development
reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to maximize complementary and
reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and
interdependent nature, all components of the joint force normally conduct operations in
support of the counterair mission. The JFC normally designates an AADC and a JFACC
to enhance the unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and direction,
and decentralized execution for countering air and missile threats.

(b) Offensive counterair (OCA) operations are the preferred method of

countering air and missile threats. OCA typically seeks to operate in enemy airspace and
destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their
supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before and after launch. OCA
includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, and suppression of enemy air
defenses. DCA normally attempts to degrade, neutralize, or defeat enemy air and missile
attacks attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. Both OCA and DCA may also ensure
access and freedom of action in international airspace. These operations may use aircraft,
surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, artillery, ground forces, special
operations, cyberspace attack, and EA. Joint forces must be capable of countering the air
and missile threats during all operations.

(c) Control of the Air. Enemies will contest control of the air. Air
superiority is the degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its
operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile
threats. Air supremacy is the degree of control of the air wherein the opposing force is
incapable of effective interference within the OA using air and missile threats. The joint
force may have to fight for and maintain every aspect of freedom of action in the air.
Commanders prevent enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with
operations, thus facilitating freedom of action and movement. Commanders should not
assume they have control of the air. In the air, the degree of control can range from no
control to parity, where neither opponent can claim any level of control over the other, to
local air superiority, a dangerous situation that can quickly turn against the joint force, to
air supremacy over the entire OA. Control of the air may vary over time. It is important
to remember that the degree of control of the air can be bounded and limited in both
duration and geography (temporally, horizontally, and vertically), local or defined, in the
context of an entire theater. The desired degree of control is at the direction of the JFC and
based on the JFC’s CONOPS. Therefore, it is a priority objective of the JFACC and joint
air operations. Commanders should not expect air supremacy or superiority against a
capable enemy. Counterair operations occur throughout campaigns and major operations
to produce the desired degree of control of the air at the times and places chosen by the
JFC.

(d) Integrating Air and Missile Defense. While joint combat focuses on
operations within one or more OAs, threats to joint forces can come from well outside
assigned JOAs, even outside a CCMD’s AOR. An enemy’s missiles, hypersonics, and
long-range aircraft can pose significant challenges that require integrating defensive

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capabilities from both within and beyond a CCMD’s AOR. The CCMD integrates air and
missile defense capabilities and activities within the theater. In support, SecDef establishes
command relationships for global missile defense, strategic attack, global strike, and other
cross-AOR operations. Commander, United States Strategic Command
(CDRUSSTRATCOM), conducts global missile defense operations in coordination with
other CCMDs, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies;
advocates for and assesses missile defense capabilities; and ensures continuity of
operations (COOP), as required. The intended result is the integration of OCA attack
operations, DCA operations, and other capabilities as required to create the JFC’s desired
effects.

Refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, for additional guidance on
countering air and missile threats, and JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for discussion of
control of the air.

(5) Interdiction

(a) Interdiction operations during armed conflict include actions that divert,
disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface capability before it can be used effectively
against friendly forces or to achieve enemy objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at
such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFC plans and synchronizes the
overall interdiction effort in the assigned JOA. The JFACC is normally the supported
commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort; however, the JFLCC, JFMCC, and
JFSOCC are the supported commanders for interdiction within their OAs.

(b) Many elements of the joint force can conduct interdiction operations.
Air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces can conduct
interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission.

(c) In competition, air and maritime interception operations can be part of a

coercive measure to change or modify an adversary’s behavior. Joint fires through
interdiction can create tactical and operational advantages for the joint force, with
corresponding adverse effects on the enemy. Interdiction can have broad operational
effects, but joint fires executed closer to joint forces can have more immediate effects.
Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon fires and surface maneuvers, depending on the
situation.

Refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for more guidance on joint interdiction operations.

(6) Strategic Attack. A strategic attack (nuclear or nonnuclear) is a JFC offensive

action against a target, whether military or other, selected to achieve a strategic objective.
Strategic attacks usually target enemy strategic COGs or other strategic targets. These
attacks may be lethal or nonlethal. The purpose is to weaken the enemy’s ability or will to
engage or continue an undesirable activity. As directed by the President or SecDef, a

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 Joint Functions

“The air attacks were the most effective message. The soldiers who did see
the leaflets and then saw the air attacks knew the leaflets were true. They
believed the message after that, if they were still alive. Overall, they had a
terrible effect on us. I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we
had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the
desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces. When
my division pulled back across the Diyala Bridge, of the more than 500
armored vehicles assigned to me before the war, I was able to get fifty or so
across the bridge. Most were destroyed or abandoned on the east side of the
Diyala River.”

Source: Iraqi Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from

Saddam's Senior Leadership, Kevin M. Woods with Michael R. Pese, Mark E.
Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G Lacey Project interview of Abd Al-
Karim Jasim Nafus Al-Majid, Commander, Al Nida Armored Division,
21 November 2003

strategic attack can be an independent action or part of a campaign or major operation. All
components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks.

(7) Global Strike

(a) A global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and execute attacks on any
location, limited in duration and scope, to create precise lethal and nonlethal effects against
enemy assets. Global strike missions employ capabilities against a wide variety of targets.

(b) The UCP assigns CDRUSSTRATCOM the responsibility for global

strike. CDRUSSTRATCOM plans global strike in full partnership with appropriate
CCDRs. The CJCS or SecDef determines supporting and supported command
relationships for execution. In some circumstances, United States Strategic Command may
collaborate and support another CCMD for global strike planning and execution.

(8) Limiting Collateral Effects. Collateral damage and other collateral effects are
unintentional or incidental effects to persons or objects that would not be lawful military
targets based on the circumstances existing at the time. Causing collateral effects does not
violate the law of war so long as the damage or other effect is not excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. The law of war
recognizes that civilian casualties and civilian harm are unfortunate and tragic, but
unavoidable, consequences of armed conflict. Under the law of war, balancing military
necessity with collateral damage is central to the principle of proportionality. Limiting
collateral effects is often an operational or strategic imperative and will not only reduce
civilian claims but may also better support friendly and HN actions to influence the
population and promote operational success. Commanders conduct collateral damage
assessment during targeting. These assessments are especially important when considering
strikes against targets with potential for second- and third-order effects, such as WMD
storage and production targets.

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Chapter III

(9) Joint force capabilities can create nonlethal effects. Some capabilities can
produce nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and reduce
exploitation opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They may also reduce the
number of casualties associated with excessive use of force, limit reconstruction costs, and
maintain the goodwill of the local populace. Some capabilities are nonlethal by design and
include blunt impact and warning munitions, acoustic and optical warning devices, and
vehicle and vessel stopping systems.

(a) Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace attack actions create various direct

denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) or manipulation
that leads to denial that appears in the physical domains.

(b) EA. EA involves the use of EM energy, DE, or antiradiation weapons to

attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat
capability. EA can be against a computer when the attack occurs through the EMS.
Integration and synchronization of EA with maneuver, C2, and other joint fires are
essential. EW is a component of JEMSO used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the
EME to achieve the commander’s objectives. EW can be a primary capability or used to
facilitate OIE through the targeting process.

For additional guidance on cyberspace attack, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace

Operations.

For additional guidance on EA and JEMSO, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic

Spectrum Operations.

For additional guidance on JEMSO, refer to CJCSI 3320.01, (U) Joint Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations (JEMSO).

(c) MISO. MISO actions and messages can generate effects that gain
support for JFC objectives; reduce the will of the enemy, adversary, and sympathizer; and
decrease the combat effectiveness of enemy forces. MISO are effective throughout the
competition continuum. JFCs and their component commanders are the key players in
fully integrating MISO into their plans and operations. MISO require unique budget,
attribution, and authorities that are coordinated and approved prior to employment.
Commanders carefully review and approve MISO programs that comply with mission-
tailored, product approval guidelines from national-level authorities. An approved
program does not necessarily constitute authority to execute a mission. Commanders
obtain required authorities through a MISO-specific execute order (EXORD) or as a task
specified in an EXORD for an operation.

For more information on planning programs and conducting MISO, refer to CJCSI
3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan.

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 Joint Functions

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support

Operations. MISO support to the non-US military is in DODI O-3607.02, Military
Information Support Operations (MISO).

(d) Nonlethal Weapons as Intermediate Force Capabilities. Nonlethal

weapons can provide intermediate force capabilities to fill the gap between mere presence
and lethal effects. Nonlethal weapons are weapons, devices, and munitions that
incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately while minimizing fatalities,
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or
environment. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and
equipment. Planners should consider nonlethal weapons to enhance mission effectiveness;
facilitate lethal engagements by resolving complex situations and isolating the threat;
reduce risk to joint forces; and mitigate collateral damage, including civilian casualties.

For additional guidance on nonlethal weapons, refer to DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive
Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy; and the US Department of
Defense Non‐Lethal Weapons Program Executive Agent’s Planning Guidance:
Intermediate Force Capabilities Bridging the Gap Between Presence and Lethality.

6. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by

securing positional or informational advantages across the competition continuum and
exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Movement is
deploying forces or capabilities into an OA and relocating them within an OA without the
expectation of contact with the enemy. Maneuver is the employment of forces for offensive
and defensive purposes while in, or expecting, contact with the enemy. It also includes
assuring the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function
encompasses several tasks, including:

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and component force formations and
capabilities by multiple means or modes throughout the OE.

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy or

adversary.

(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver
without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.

(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations.

These actions include operations that employ obstacles (i.e., counter mobility), enforce
sanctions and embargoes, and conduct blockades.

(5) Control significant areas; deny, expand, and manipulate access to

information; and influence relevant populations relative to the objective whose access to
possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.

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Chapter III

b. Movement to Extend and Maintain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward or even multinational
forces specifically for the task at hand, can position within operational reach of enemy or
adversary COGs, critical factors, or decisive points. Operational reach is the distance and
duration across which a joint force can successfully employ its military capabilities. At
other times, mobilization and deployment processes can begin the movement of reinforcing
forces from the continental United States (CONUS) or other theaters to address any
unfavorable balance of forces at the appropriate time and place.

(2) JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to recommend
the formation and movement of multinational forces, taking into consideration A2/AD
threats, which can prevent or deny the deployment of friendly forces. At times, the
movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times, its
deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter or provoke
adversary or enemy aggression or threats, depending on the adversary’s or enemy’s
perception and cost-benefit analysis.

Refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for more information on the
deployment process.

(3) The use of SOF can extend a joint force’s operational reach into sensitive and
denied areas. When conducting clandestine operations, JFCs consider not only how to
penetrate hostile or unfriendly A2/AD systems but also how to mitigate the risk of their
detection and public exposure.

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces to gain a position of advantage with respect

to the enemy. The maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s
mission accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive
points to achieve surprise, create psychological effects, and generate physical momentum.
Maneuver may also enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage.

The goal of maneuver is to render an enemy incapable of resisting by shattering their
morale and physical cohesion (i.e., their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole)
by moving to the point of advantage to close with and destroy enemy forces, capability,
and will. Commanders may achieve this advantage by attacking enemy forces and
controlling territory, airspace, EMS, urban areas, key waters, critical assets, and LOCs
through air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace maneuver.

(2) There are multiple ways to gain a positional advantage. An amphibious force
with aircraft, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach
of an enemy’s COG, has the positional advantage. In like manner, land and air
expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and have the
means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have a positional

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 Joint Functions

advantage. Seeking a positional advantage facilitates freedom of action. See Chapter VII,
“Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict.”

(3) At all levels of warfare, successful maneuver requires not only fire and
movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations.
It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the
principles of mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying forces to an OA is a form of maneuver

if such movements seek to gain a positional advantage. This maneuver places forces in the
best position to deter enemy actions (e.g., flexible deterrent options [FDOs]), defend
against aggression, or initiate armed conflict.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the
terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations.
Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where
they are in a position of operational reach from which to achieve operational objectives.
The enemy may use AD actions to impede friendly operations when A2 actions fail. The
objective of an operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.

(c) At the tactical level, maneuver is a means by which component

commanders employ their forces in combination with the other joint functions to gain an
informational or positional advantage with respect to the enemy.

(4) Force posture (forces, footprints, and agreements) affects operational reach
and is an essential movement- and maneuver-related consideration. Force posture is a day-
to-day movement and maneuver activity that CCMDs, in conjunction with OSD and DOS,
can conduct as part of their global campaign to counter adversary actions without armed
conflict to achieve national objectives. Force posture includes organic capabilities and
commercial capabilities (infrastructure, services, and associated personnel). Force posture
is also the starting position from which planners determine additional basing requirements
to support specific contingency plans and potential and relevant responses to an array of
anticipated crises. These requirements directly support the development of operational
LOCs and LOOs and affect the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can
generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of temporary contingency bases
underwrite the ability of the joint force to project power by shielding its components from
enemy action and protecting critical factors such as sortie or resupply rates. Incomplete
planning for contingency base operations can unnecessarily increase the sustainment
requirements of the joint force, leading to unanticipated risk. Political and diplomatic
considerations, including authorizations to transit and overfly adjacent countries, can often
affect basing decisions. US force basing options span the range from permanently based
forces to temporary sea basing that accelerates the deployment and employment of
maritime forces independent of infrastructure ashore.

(5) JFCs should consider various ways and means to help maneuver forces gain
a positional advantage. Specifically, combat engineers provide mobility by breaching

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Chapter III

obstacles, while simultaneously countering the mobility of enemy forces by emplacing

obstacles and minimizing the effects of enemy actions on friendly forces. In addition to
embassy country teams, COMs work with nations in and around the JOA to ensure
overflight and transit authorizations are granted to enhance freedom of movement.

For additional guidance on posture planning, refer to DODI 3000.12, Management of US

Global Defense Posture (GDP), and CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and
Guidance.

7. Protection

a. Protection is all efforts to secure and defend the effectiveness and survivability of
mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and
infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given OA to
maintain mission effectiveness. The protection function encompasses force protection,
force health protection (FHP), and other protection activities.

b. The protection function includes a wide-ranging list of operations, tasks, and

activities required to protect the force. Some tasks in the protection function include:

(1) Provide air, missile (including hypersonics), and space defense (including all
space segments and counter-unmanned aircraft system [UAS] operations).

(2) Provide physical security to protect forces, bases, JSAs, posts, infrastructure
that enables power projection, and LOCs (including contractors and US civilians
accompanying the force).

(3) Protect friendly information. These activities include OPSEC, CI, defense
countermeasure operations, MILDEC in support of OPSEC, counter deception, and
counterpropaganda.

(4) Conduct cyberspace security, cyberspace defense, and electromagnetic

protection (EP) to protect information networks.

(5) Provide CBRN defense to minimize CBRN attacks and incidents.

(6) Provide engineering and explosive ordnance disposal support for counter-
improvised threat activities, such as counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED)
activities.

(7) Identify and neutralize insider threats.

(8) Conduct detainee operations.

(9) Conduct medical, environmental, and occupational surveillance activities.

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 Joint Functions

(10) Conduct law enforcement and criminal investigation activities to protect

personnel and assets.

(11) The function focuses on force protection, which preserves the joint force’s
fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that
protect the joint force, its information, and its bases; necessary infrastructure; and LOCs
from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly
forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Passive measures
reduce the probability and minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without
seeking the initiative. The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of
friendly fire incidents is equally important. Finally, emergency management and response
reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating events, accidents, health
threats, and natural disasters.

(12) Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect
against accidents, weather, or disease. FHP complements force protection efforts by
promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the behavioral or physical well-being of
Service members.

(13) As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond
force protection to encompass the protection of US noncombatants.

c. Protection considerations affect the planning of all joint campaigns and operations.
For cooperation and competition, commanders and their staffs consider protection
measures commensurate with potential risks, even in a permissive environment. Risk to
the joint force may include a wide range of threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises,
environmental threats and hazards, and space and cyberspace threats. In armed conflict,
campaigns and major operations involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy.
Commanders typically require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both
planning and execution. Continuous research and access to accurate, detailed information
about the OE, along with realistic training, can enhance protection activities.

d. Force protection is preventive measures taken to prevent or mitigate enemy and

insider threat actions against DOD personnel (to include family members and certain
contractor personnel), resources, facilities, and critical information. Developing and
demonstrating resilience (e.g., redundancy, alternatives, rapid recovery) may provide a
deterrent effect and reduce the need for protection during a crisis—both for organic and
partner capabilities. These actions preserve the force’s fighting potential for critical
employment time and place and incorporate integrated and synchronized offensive and
defensive measures that enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading
opportunities for the enemy. Force protection includes the tailored selection and
application of multilayered active and passive measures commensurate with the level of
risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an enemy or adversary’s
capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as information regarding force
protection considerations. Foreign and domestic LEAs can contribute to force protection
through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime and by sharing
information on criminal and terrorist organizations. I2 can identify threat networks in the

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Chapter III

OA, enhancing the commander’s ability to establish effective antiterrorism programs,

screening and vetting activities that mitigate vendor threats, and promoting lasting
relationships with the HN and local population.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Security. Security of forces and means enhances force protection by

identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.
Security operations protect forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs. Physical security includes
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to
equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process determines
vulnerabilities to known threats; applies appropriate deterrent, control, and denial
safeguarding techniques and measures; and responds to changing conditions. Functions in
physical security include facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations,
special land and maritime security areas, and other physical security operations like
military working dog operations, CI, or emergency and disaster response support.
Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off areas, land or maritime force patrols,
lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and
electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security
measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security
Operations in Theater.

(2) DCA. DCA supports protection using both active and passive air, air, missile,
and UASs defense measures.

(a) Active air and missile defense include all direct defensive actions taken
to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air, UASs, and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets.

(b) Passive air and missile defense include all measures, other than active air
and missile defense, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of
attack aircraft and missiles, reducing the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets.

(3) Global Missile Defense. Global missile defense encompasses operations that
affect more than one CCMD and requires synchronization among the affected commands
to coordinate effective allocation, deployment, and employment of capabilities necessary
to deter and prevent attacks, destroy enemy missiles, or nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of an attack.

For additional guidance on countering air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, Joint
Countering Air and Missile Threats.

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 Joint Functions

(4) OPSEC denies the adversary or enemy the information needed to assess
friendly capabilities and intentions correctly and is vital to enabling the protection of the
force by ensuring essential secrecy of joint operations. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce
the vulnerability of US and multinational forces to successful adversary or enemy
exploitation of critical information. The OPSEC process subsequently analyzes friendly
actions associated with military operations and other activities to:

(a) Identify those actions that adversary or enemy intelligence systems may
observe.

(b) Determine what specific indications adversaries or enemies could collect,

analyze, and interpret to derive critical information in time to be useful.

(c) As requiring activities develop and source requirements beyond the

organic force, assess the operational value of the information and potential need to protect it.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01, Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(5) DODIN operations missions are covered by standing orders to secure and
operate DOD’s cyberspace, including global terrestrial networks, satellite
communications, tactical wireless networks, information technology embedded in weapon
systems and critical infrastructure, and standalone systems. This security is established
based upon national and DOD cybersecurity policies and integrated layers of technology,
training, and personnel actions that make the DODIN less vulnerable to threats in
cyberspace, including insider threats.

For additional guidance on cybersecurity, refer to DODI 8500.01, Cybersecurity.

(6) DCO include actions internal and external to the protected cyberspace to
preserve friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, and net-centric
capabilities by hunting, monitoring, analyzing, detecting, and responding to ongoing or
imminent malicious cyberspace activity. When authorized, USCYBERCOM’s cyberspace
protection teams conduct DCO internal defensive measures missions inside non-DODIN
cyberspace, including USG networks, US critical infrastructure, and the systems of allies and
PNs.

(7) Defensive Use of EW. EP is the division of EW involving action taken to

protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of
the EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Defensive EA
activities use the EMS to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment.
Examples include self-protection and force protection measures such as the use of
expendables; jammers; towed decoys; DE infrared countermeasures systems; radio-
controlled, small UASs; and radio-controlled C-IED systems.

Refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for further guidance.

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(8) PR. PR missions use military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and
reintegrate isolated personnel. There are five PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover,
and reintegrate) necessary to achieve complete and coordinated recovery of US military
personnel, DOD civilians, DOD contractor personnel, and others designated by the
President or SecDef. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, and
multinational partner capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.

Refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the
Department of Defense, for further guidance on PR.

(9) CBRN Defense. CBRN defense focuses on assessing CBRN threats and
hazards (contamination), protecting individuals and units from CBRN hazards, and
mitigating effects to personnel and equipment to restore operational capability. Even when
an enemy does not possess CBRN material or WMD, access to materials such as radiation
sources and toxic industrial materials is a significant planning consideration.

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction; and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Response.

(10) Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing defensive

measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to
include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. These
programs also include personal security and defensive measures to protect Service
members, high-risk personnel, civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities,
information, and equipment.

Refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism, for additional guidance on antiterrorism.

(11) Combat identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate

characterization of detected objects in the OE to support an engagement decision. CID
supports force protection and enhances operations by helping minimize friendly fire
incidents and collateral damage. The CID process complements the identification process
to support application of weapons, resources, or other military operations.

(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID characterizations may

concern only “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown” and may be in terms of a
level of confidence in such characterization. In some situations, additional
characterizations may be necessary, including, class, type, nationality, and mission
configuration. When applied with CCDR’s ROE, CID characterizations enable
engagement decisions for the employment of fires.

(b) Early during planning, the staff develops CID procedures that are
consistent with ROE and that do not interfere with the ability of a unit or individual to

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 Joint Functions

engage enemy forces. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures, important
considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants.

Refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air and Missile Threats, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support,
for additional guidance on CID.

(12) Critical infrastructure protection programs support the identification and

mitigation of vulnerabilities to defense critical infrastructure, which includes DOD and
non-DOD domestic and foreign infrastructure essential to plan, mobilize, deploy, execute,
and sustain US military operations globally. Coordination between DOD entities and other
USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, tribal, and local governments; the private
sector; and equivalent foreign entities is key to protecting these critical assets.
Commanders remediate and mitigate vulnerabilities found in defense critical infrastructure
based on risk management decisions made by responsible authorities. These vulnerability
mitigation decisions should use all available program areas, including antiterrorism,
MILDEC, OPSEC, and force protection (e.g., promoting resilience).

For further guidance on critical infrastructure protection, refer to DODI 3020.45, Mission
Assurance (MA) Construct.

(13) CI counters or neutralizes foreign intelligence collection efforts through

collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis, production, and technical services and
support. CI is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit,
disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or
their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

For further guidance on CI missions, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(14) C-IED. C-IED activities reduce casualties and damage caused by

improvised explosive devices. Improvised explosive devices are a type of weapon that can
include common material or activities adapted for military or criminal use. C-IED
activities include measures to neutralize the infrastructure supporting the production and
employment of IEDs. These measures can include developing tactics, techniques, and
procedures to counter the improvised threat and the technical and forensic exploitation to
obtain information to support targeting, improve force protection, identify material
sourcing, and classify different weapon signatures.

For further guidance on C-IED, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks, and
JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

(15) Countering Small UASs. Small UAS platforms pervade today’s battlefields,
greatly adding to the complexity of the present-day OE. Small UASs, when adapted from
commercial uses or otherwise modified, can be an improvised threat. Often originally
designed for both hobby and commercial purposes, both state and non-state actors are
employing small UASs as force multipliers to create a multitude of effects with constantly
evolving technology and tactics. They can provide enemies increased surveillance and

III-45
Chapter III

standoff or penetrating attack capabilities. Joint force planners should understand how to
utilize material and nonmaterial means to construct a layered defense to mitigate small
UAS threats. This should be done in a synchronized and in-depth manner and should
address both risks of small UAS observation and targeting, as well as mitigating effects of
weaponized small UASs. Additional considerations include how terrain, the environment,
EMI, and enemy capabilities might degrade a counter-UAS capability.

For more information on countering small UASs, refer to JP 3-01, Joint Countering Air
and Missile Threats, and Army Techniques Publication 3-01.15/Marine Corps Tactical
Publication 10-10B/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-01.8/Air Force Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Air and Missile Defense.

(16) Identify and Neutralize Insider Threats. Insider threats (sometimes referred
to as “blue-on-blue,” “green-on-blue,” or “inside-the-wire” threats) may include active
shooters, bombers, spies, and other threats embedded within or working with US forces.
These threats are typically persons with authorized access who use that access to commit,
wittingly or unwittingly, a variety of illicit actions against friendly force personnel,
equipment, facilities, and information. Countering these threats involves coordinating and
sharing information among security, CO personnel, CI, law enforcement, and other
personnel and staff. I2 and all-source analysis support the identification of insider threats.
The joint force security coordinator establishes procedures to counter insider threats across
the joint force.

For further guidance on countering insider threats, see JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations
in Theater. For more information on I2 activities, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 3-
25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

f. FHP complements force protection efforts and includes all measures taken by the
JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and
physical well-being of DOD personnel. These capabilities enable a healthy and fit force,
prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. FHP functions include
casualty prevention, preventive medicine, health surveillance, combat and operational
stress control, preventive dentistry, vision readiness, hearing conservation, laboratory
services, and veterinary services. The JFC is responsible for allocating adequate
capabilities to identify health threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. Health
threats are a composite of ongoing or potential hostile actions; occupational,
environmental, geographical, and meteorological conditions; diseases (infectious and
noninfectious); and the employment of CBRN weapons or agents that reduce the
effectiveness of military forces. A robust health surveillance system is essential to FHP
measures. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying and
assessing hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or
mitigate exposures; and monitoring and reporting battle injury, disease, and nonbattle
injury trends and other health outcomes. Health surveillance includes veterinary services.
Occupational and environmental health surveillance enhances the joint force’s ability to
limit combat and operational stress casualties and all categories of injuries, including

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 Joint Functions

combat and operational stress, those related to exposure to CBRN, and/or explosive
hazards. Joint forces may operate in remote and austere locations beyond the operational
reach of the standard Military Health System. These forces require FHP and health service
support from medical personnel to provide routine health care and treat injuries and
illnesses for extended periods prior to medical evacuation. They may also have to rely on
foreign military or civilian health systems indigenous to their OA.

Refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for further guidance on FHP.

g. Protection of Civilians. In general, persons who are neither associated with an

armed force nor otherwise engaged in hostilities are civilians and have protected status
under the law of war.

(1) It is US policy that members of the DOD components comply with the law of
war during armed conflict, however characterized. In all other military operations, military
members of the DOD components will continue to act consistent with the law of war’s
fundamental principles and rules. Such compliance includes taking measures to protect
civilians. In addition, the accountability, credibility, and legitimacy of a joint operation;
the success of the overarching mission; and the achievement of US strategic objectives
depends on the joint forces’ ability to minimize harm to civilians in the course of their own
operations and, potentially, their ability to mitigate harm to arising from the actions of other
parties. Strategic objectives often involve strengthening security, stability, and civilian
well-being.

(2) Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a

supporting task. Protection of civilians from deliberate attack as a strategic or operational
imperative is distinct from the legal obligations of US forces to minimize harm to civilians
during the conduct of operations. Effective protection of civilians depends on a command
climate that emphasizes its importance and commanders who can make timely and
appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Joint forces’ planning
must have in place ROE that account for protection of civilians.

(3) Civilian casualty mitigation directly affects the success of the overall mission.
Even tactical actions can have strategic and second-order effects. Minimizing and
addressing civilian casualty incidents support strategic imperatives and are also at the heart
of the profession of arms. Failure to minimize civilian casualties can undermine national
policy objectives and the mission of joint forces while assisting the enemy. Civilian
casualties can incite increased opposition to joint forces. Focused attention on civilian
casualty mitigation can be an important investment to maintain legitimacy and accomplish
the mission.

See Department of Defense Law of War Manual regarding obligations for the protection
of civilians.

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Chapter III

8. Sustainment

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services support to maintain

operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment
gives the JFC the means for freedom of action and endurance and to extend operational
reach. Sustainment enables the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The
sustainment function includes tasks to:

(1) Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and other energy
requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.

(2) Provide for maintenance of equipment.

(3) Coordinate and provide base operations support for forces, including field
services; personnel services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious support
(RS); postal support; morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and legal
services.

(4) Build and maintain contingency bases.

(5) Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.

(6) Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.

(7) Provide common-user logistics support to other USG departments and

agencies, international organizations, NGOs, other nations, and contractors as authorized
by their contracts.

(8) Establish and coordinate movement services.

(9) Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain enduring detainee

operations.

b. JFCs should identify sustainment capabilities during planning. Sustainment should

be a priority consideration for the timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
Sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility to develop branches and sequels and to
refocus joint force efforts. Given mission objectives and adversary threats, the ultimate
goal is to execute a feasible, supportable, and efficient CONOPS that takes into account
the threat and defense of logistical forces. Before developing contingency plans, CCMDs
develop a theater logistics analysis, theater logistics overview, and distribution plan to
provide detailed mobility and distribution analysis to ensure enough capacity or planned
enhanced capability is available to support the CCP.

c. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It

concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the
theater while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and equipment to
support the JFC’s CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate

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 Joint Functions

against an enemy is a function of the nation’s capability and capacity to plan for, gain
access to, and deliver forces and equipment to the point of application. Logistics covers
the following core functions: supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint
health services, logistic services, engineering, and OCS. In association with these
functions, logistics includes aspects of military operations that deal with:

(1) Materiel acquisition, receipt, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,

evacuation, and disposition.

(2) In-transit visibility and asset visibility.

(3) Common-user logistics support to other USG departments and agencies,

international organizations, NGOs, other nations, and contractors as authorized by their
contracts.

(4) Overseeing logistic services (food, water, and ice; contingency basing; and
hygiene).

(5) OCS (contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor

management).

(6) Disposal operations.

(7) Engineering support (combat engineering, general engineering, geospatial

engineering).

(8) Facility and infrastructure acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation,

and disposition.

(9) The supervision of infrastructure assessment, repairs, and maintenance.

(10) Detention compounds (establish and sustain large scale to support enduring
detainee operations).

(11) HNS.

(12) Personnel movement, including patient movement, evacuation, and

hospitalization.

d. Personnel services are sustainment functions provided to personnel rather than to

systems and equipment. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and
coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel during joint operations. Thorough
planning and comprehensive personnel management enable the JFC to identify and
recommend allocating the right forces to achieve objectives.

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For further
guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. For further

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Chapter III

guidance on legal support, refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support. For further guidance on
religious affairs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and Joint Guide 1-05,
Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. For further guidance on financial management
support, refer to JP 3-80, Resource Management. For further guidance on OCS, refer to
JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support
(OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Employment of Logistic Forces. For some operations, logistic forces may
be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in
nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or be the only
forces deployed. Logistic forces may also continue to support other military personnel and
civilians after the departure of combat forces. Such cases require that they be familiar with
and adhere to applicable status-of-forces agreements and acquisition and cross-service
agreements to which the United States is a party. Given the potential complexity of OEs
and the specialized nature and unique authorities required, logistic forces familiarize
themselves with and adhere to legal, regulatory, and diplomatic/political restraints
governing US involvement in operations such as FHA.

(2) Protection. Logistics forces, like all other forces, are capable of self-defense,
particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces. However, the JFC
should view combat and logistics forces as a unit with a seamless mission and objective
and balance the allocation of security resources accordingly in support of the JFC’s
mission.

(3) Facilities. JFCs should plan for the early acquisition (leasing) of real estate
and facilities and bases for temporary occupancy or if the HN provides inadequate or no
property. Early acquisition of facilities can be critical to the flow of forces. The use of
automated planning tools can help forecast construction labor, machinery, and equipment
requirements in support of the JFC’s contingency basing plan.

(4) Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations are broader

than just the protection of the environment and environmental stewardship. They also
include continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more operationally focused
environmental considerations that affect US military forces and objectives. Military
operations do not generally focus on environmental compliance and environmental
protection. While complete protection of the environment is not always possible due to
competition with threats to the mission, JFCs protect the environment in which US military
forces operate to the greatest extent. Commanders comply with the command guidance on
environmental considerations specified in the plan or order and included in unit SOPs.
Environmental considerations link directly to risk management and the safety and health
of Service members. Commanders should clearly and accurately communicate all
significant risks of deploying DOD personnel to the chain of command. Environmental
considerations, risk management, and health risk communication are enabling elements for
the commander and an essential part of military planning, training, and operations. While

III-50 JP 3-0
 Joint Functions

complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be
possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations,
including legal aspects.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to DODI 4715.19, Use of

Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations; DODI 4715.22, Environmental
Management Policy for Contingency Locations; JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; and
JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(5) Operational Energy. Operational energy resources like bulk fuel and
electricity coupled with renewable energy resources provide power to the joint force during
the conduct of operations. The availability of renewable and rechargeable energy resources
enables the joint force to operate in austere and contested environments. Furthermore, the
efficient management of operational energy resources may increase the operational reach,
sustainability, and availability of combat forces for a variety of missions.

(6) Nonstandard Logistics. Nonstandard logistics supports joint operations

beyond the capabilities, authorities, and/or operational reach of standard logistics
organizations. Joint forces may require nonstandard logistics when they are operating in
austere and remote locations, or in a clandestine mode, or providing logistic support to
foreign irregular forces. Logisticians providing such support remain cognizant of standard
logistics principles, such as supply chain management, but they adapt existing tactics,
techniques, and procedures, or develop new ones, to meet the operational requirements of
the supported forces. These operational requirements may include higher levels of OPSEC;
procurement, manufacture, or maintenance of locally available materiel; and nonstandard
contracting, storage, funding, and distribution mechanisms.

(7) Joint Health Services. Joint health service support includes all support and
services performed, provided, and arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the
behavioral and physical well-being of military personnel. Joint health service support also
includes casualty care, which encompasses a number of health service support functions
that occur at all levels of command: casualty management, patient movement, medical
treatment (organic and area support), medical evacuation, hospitalization, medical
logistics, blood management, and health information management. Joint health services
also include the management of health service resources, such as human resources,
funding, and facilities. CCDRs are responsible for joint health services of forces assigned
or attached to their command and should establish joint health services policies and
programs. When supporting stabilization, efforts should support development and
restoration of local medical capabilities and services. Commanders should avoid providing
care as a replacement for or as a supplement to local capabilities whenever possible.

(a) Actions to obtain health threat information begin before deployment and
continue as forces deploy. Disease and injuries can quickly diminish combat effectiveness
and have a greater impact on operations when the forces employed are small and dispersed.

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Chapter III

(b) The early introduction of preventive medicine and veterinary services

personnel or units and public health measures into the theater helps protect US forces from
diseases and nonbattle injuries. It also permits a thorough assessment of the health threat
to and operational requirements of the mission. Operational public health support includes
education and training on personal hygiene and field sanitation, personal protective
measures, epidemiological investigations, immunization programs, pest management, and
inspection of water sources and supplies. For maximum effectiveness, public health
support should be provided to as many personnel as possible within the OA. Public health
support to US forces and unified action partners also includes analyzing the complexities
of epidemiologic interactions between disease-causing organisms, their reservoirs, and
hosts in different geographic, climatologic, and cultural settings. In addition to US forces,
preventive medicine should include multinational forces, HN civilians, and dislocated
civilians to the greatest feasible extent. JFCs and joint force surgeons shall identify legal
constraints unique to the OE and intended recipient of services. The JFC and staff should
review issues such as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies and human
resources, and provisions of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater.

(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in the OA and
rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing the quality of care. It
encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through rehabilitative care.

For further guidance on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For
further guidance on procedures for deployment health activities, refer to DODI 6490.03,
Deployment Health.

(8) HNS. JFCs interact with the HN government to establish procedures to

request support and negotiate support terms. Logistic planners should analyze the HN
economic capacity to supplement the logistic support to the US or multinational forces and
identify and limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis
should identify distribution requirements. The JFC should collaborate with the HN
government on analysis for support infrastructure regarding anticipated needs. The
systems analysis should evaluate airfields, seaports, rail and road networks, and energy
infrastructure, particularly in underdeveloped countries where their status is questionable.
Delaying this systems analysis can diminish the flow of strategic lift assets into the region.
Additional support forces may build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate
follow-on force closure, as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo.

(9) OCS. Logistics support can occur through contracts with commercial entities
inside and outside the OA. Most joint operations require a level of contracted support.
Certain contracted items or services could be essential to deploying, sustaining, and
redeploying joint forces effectively. OCS is the process of planning and obtaining supplies,
services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. OCS is
a multi-faceted joint activity executed by the CCMD and subordinate JFCs through boards,
centers, working groups, and associated lead Service or joint theater support contracting-
related activities. It includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and synchronize the provision
of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.

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 Joint Functions

For further information on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; DODI
3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational
Contract Support.

For more details, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

(10) Disposal Operations. Disposal of equipment, parts, and other materials, as

well as all waste streams generated by military forces, needs to be a consideration
throughout planning and operations. Inadequate understanding and application of disposal
regulations, policies, and procedures may result in adversaries obtaining items to use
against US forces, allies, and the public. It may also result in negative consequences for
the health of military forces and local populace, the local environment, operational
readiness and effectiveness, and disposal costs. Defense Logistics Agency Disposition
Services provide support to CCDR’s component commands with reutilization,
demilitarization, and disposal of equipment, property, materials, and hazardous waste.
Component commands are responsible for the proper, safe, and legal disposal of all other
waste streams, such as medical/biological waste, human waste, refuse, and radioactive
items, IAW DOD, Service, and theater-specific directives and procedures. Commanders
can be legally and financially culpable for disposal and remediation costs if disposal
operations violate US law or international law. Commanders follow regulations such as
DOD or Service directives, or theater-specific procedures, to avoid harm to personnel, the
public, and the environment, to the extent practicable.

(11) Legal Support. Legal support is important across all joint functions. Many
decisions and actions have potential legal implications. The JFC’s staff judge advocate
(SJA) and command legal advisors provide the full spectrum of legal support during all
joint operations through direct and reachback capabilities. A key member of the JFC’s
personal staff, the SJA provides legal advice regarding the laws, regulations, policies,
treaties, and agreements that affect joint operations. Legal advisors actively participate in
the planning process from mission analysis to execution, an essential function given the
complexity of the OE. Legal advisors also advise on fiscal activities, international law,
and many other factors that can affect operations, including identifying legal issues that
affect operational limitations. Further, the JFC should integrate HN legal personnel into
the legal command staff as soon as practical to obtain guidance on unique HN legal
practices and customs.

Refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support, for more detailed information and guidance on legal
support.

(12) Religious Affairs. The JOA requires both the provision of RS and
advisement of the impact of religion upon operations, morale, and ethics. The JFC’s RS
team provides required capabilities directly and virtually. As a member of the JFC’s
personal staff, the chaplain advises the commander on morals, ethics, and religion as they
pertain to the OE and the joint force.

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Chapter III

For more information on religious affairs, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, and Joint
Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

(13) Financial Management. Financial management encompasses resource

management and financial support. The joint force comptroller provides the elements of
finance operations. Resource management normally consists of costing functions and
leveraging fund sources. Finance operations provide funds to contract and limited pay
support. The joint force comptroller’s management of these elements provides the JFC
with many capabilities, from contracting and banking support to cost capturing and fund
control. Financial management support for contracting, subsistence, billeting,
transportation, communications, labor, and a myriad of other supplies and services,
particularly in austere environments, can enable mission accomplishment.

Refer to JP 3-80, Resource Management, for more detailed information and guidance on
financial management support.

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 CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZING AND PRACTICING GLOBAL INTEGRATION

1. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. The joint force campaigns in a complex, volatile, security environment

characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. National security threats are
transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional. Since each threat presents unique
challenges, the dilemmas caused by one event impact others, often with no regard for
distance and time. As threats gain access to advanced capabilities and contest US
advantages, competition and armed conflict are increasingly occurring across multiple
AORs and throughout the physical domains (land, maritime, air, and space), the IE (which
includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. These realities have eroded the US competitive
military advantage while global demand for the joint force continues to exceed resources.

b. As adversaries enhance their ability to compete at levels below armed conflict, they
become more adept at opposing US security goals by using nonmilitary means and
manipulating popular perceptions. For example, our adversaries are using commercial
capabilities to gain strategic advantage and compete below armed conflict. Adversarial
use of these capabilities, such as controlling key physical infrastructure and cyberspace
infrastructure, can limit US flexibility, limit freedom of maneuver, and erode US influence.
Adversaries can present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions,
domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. This shift,
along with adversaries’ increasing willingness to employ coercive measures that remain
below the threshold of armed conflict, has resulted in a contested international order,
challenges to established norms, and alternative views of reality. This situation underlines
the importance of activities in the IE. To remain vigilant, civilian and military leaders must
understand political and cultural drivers behind competing for strategic narratives to
provide early warnings, as well as to gain an overall sense of the competition surrounding
US interests.

c. The joint force exercises multifunctional integration across Service components to

protect and enable each other’s unique capabilities (involving C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) to maximize
outcomes. Commanders integrate the joint functional attributes and expertise from across
all the CCMDs to achieve unity of effort.

d. Aspects of the OE. Physical, informational, and human aspects help describe the
interactions that take place in an environment of cooperation, competition, and armed
conflict. Physical aspects reflect and influence critical elements of group identity and
frame how groups and communities form. Informational aspects reflect and influence how
populations interact and communicate with each other and among themselves. Human
aspects drive behavior and actions in a particular way. Understanding the interplay
between the physical, informational, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.

(1) Physical Aspects. Beyond just the physical terrain, these reflect how the
material characteristics of the OE, both natural and manufactured, create constraints on and

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Chapter IV

freedoms for the people and information systems that operate in it. They are critical
elements of group identity and frame how ethnic groupings and communities form.
Additionally, physical aspects enhance or inhibit how people exchange information.

(2) Informational Aspects. Informational aspects reflect the ways individuals,

information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information within the OE.
An observer uses these features and details of activities to interpret and assign meaning.
They include (but are not limited to) timing, platforms, location, and duration.
Informational aspects derived from sensory inputs that are physical in nature are generally
more impactful. All campaigns’ operations, activities, and investments create effects in
the IE. Such inherent informational aspects or effects of military actions occur whether the
joint force intends to create them. Simply because something can be done does not mean
that it should be done. In the strategic environment, CCDRs consider how to use
operations, actions, and investments to pursue policy aims while maximizing positive
effects.

(3) Human Aspects. All actions create effects in the IE as people perceive actions
and respond to them based on their individual or group perceptions. For this reason,
understanding, anticipating, and influencing human behavior through nonlethal means may
provide desirable alternatives to lethal options. Human aspects influence how people
perceive, process, and act upon information by affecting how the human mind applies
meaning to information. They reflect the worldview through which relevant actors
perceive situations, identify appropriate behaviors, and make decisions, as well as how they
interact with each other and their environment. Social, cultural, linguistic, and
psychological elements interact with the information and physical environments to evolve
this worldview and shape human behavior. Actions that are legal and appropriate for their
primary purpose may result in provocative and inappropriate unintended effects in the
human dimension.

e. A Systems Perspective

(1) The OE is a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive political, military,

economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems, each exerting pressure and
influence on the other (see Figure IV-1). The nature and interaction of these systems affect
how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC’s
international partners and other civilian participants regularly focus on systems other than
the military, so the JFC and staff should understand these systems and how military
operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other systems
can help or hinder the JFC’s mission. A shared understanding among stakeholders
involved in the operation can influence actions beyond the JFC’s directive authority and
promote a unified approach to achieve objectives. For example, global corporations
maintain global presence, unique capabilities, and influence throughout the OE. DOD must
often compete with interagency partners, multinational forces, NGOs, the local populace,
civil commerce, and enemy and/or adversaries for commercial capacity. Commercial
capabilities are also vulnerable to enemy and/or adversary disruption as well as market
factors.

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

Information

Infrastructure
Social
Military

Operational
COG
Economic
Strategic
COG Political

A systems perspective facilitates operational design and joint operation planning by providing
the joint force commander (JFC) and staff with a common frame of reference for collaboration
with interorganizational and multinational partners to determine and coordinate actions that are
beyond the JFC’s command authority.

Legend
COG center of gravity Decisive Point COG Node Node Link

Figure IV-1. A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

(2) Understanding sociopolitical systems within an OE and how the systems

interact and change increases the JFC’s knowledge of actions within a system and can
explain causal links between actions and effects. Planners develop and leverage the
perspective of competitors within these systems that influence the OE. Among other
benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources of warning
intelligence and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of
friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral systems, while identifying critical nodes and
vulnerabilities. A networked approach enables success in confronting problem sets and

IV-3
Chapter IV

addressing them comprehensively. Understanding competitors and how they relate to each
other helps identify potential levers to influence their behavior.

(3) An understanding of the OE builds through cross-functional participation.

The joint force staff collaborates with various intelligence organizations, USG departments
and agencies, local partners, and nongovernmental entities. The JFC should consider the
best way to manage or support this cross-functional effort, typically led by the J-2 through
the JIPOE process. A variety of factors, including planning time available, affect the
fidelity of a systems perspective.

(4) Network analysis and network engagement can build upon a systems
perspective by providing additional understanding of relationships among actors,
particularly in OEs or when dealing with networked threat environments. Network
engagement can provide a framework for understanding the interrelationships and
motivations of groups and networks. Network analysis also facilitates identification of
significant information that might otherwise go unnoticed. This insight can include
uncovering unrecognized positions of power within related groups, accounting for
structure and organization, finding individuals or nodes who are critical, and facilitating
measuring change over time. It can also help identify primary and secondary impacts
across networks and can help synchronize interactions, engagement, and targeting across
mission areas to avoid or minimize conflicts. Once the JFC identifies the networks in the
OE and understands their interrelationships, functions, motivations, and vulnerabilities, the
commander can tailor the force to apply the most effective tools to engage neutral networks
and counter the threat.

For further guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint
planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning. For additional information on network
engagement, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

2. Global Integration

a. Global integration enables DOD leadership to provide advice, make timely

decisions, and inform operational priorities and institutional investment choices across
CCMDs and multiple time horizons. Global integration requires a global perspective
organized around and against priority challenges with global campaigns and a posture to
execute contingency plans associated with each challenge. Within each GCP, CCDRs use
broad mission areas to structure how CCMDs can execute each global campaign. Within
each mission area of a global campaign, the joint force executes subordinate operations,
activities, and investments to address specific aspects of the priority challenges. The result
of integration is effective joint campaigns and operations employing cohesive military
actions arranged across time and multiple AORs to achieve strategic objectives and balance
strategic risk.

b. Competition between great powers encompasses the physical domains, the IE

(which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. This approach is necessary to address the
threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. Competition manifested by
malign influence and antagonistic behaviors has emerged as a central challenge to the joint

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force. Achieving strategic objectives requires the joint force to execute actions with a
global perspective, integrate joint functions across geographic boundaries and all domains,
and align the campaigning effort with interagency, multinational, and other
interorganizational partners. Campaigning is how the joint force integrates and balances
across time and AORs to achieve the objectives of military strategy within acceptable risk.
Global campaign planning occurs at the JS and CCMD levels. Global campaigns occur
across the competition continuum.

c. GCPs are identified in the JSCP and based on strategic guidance. The global
campaigns address the priority challenges identified in the national strategy. They integrate
joint force actions across geographic AOR boundaries and global missions. The CJCS also
addresses specific functional and regional challenges that span across geographic
boundaries, the physical domains, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE.
GCPs address threats and challenges requiring coordination across multiple CCMDs.

d. The joint force most often operates between peace and war. The competition
continuum (discussed further in Chapter V, “The Competition Continuum”) is a series of
overlapping states of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict to distinguish strategic
relationships between actors. In practice, commanders spend most of the time executing
campaign requirements within the cooperation and competition portions of the competition
continuum. Accomplishing global integration requires the joint force to employ a top-
down, CJCS-led approach that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, mitigates risk, and
assesses joint force progress toward strategic objectives for SecDef.

e. The joint force can achieve global integration when the following conditions are
met:

(1) Civilian and military leaders make timely decisions at the speed required to
outpace adversaries. Decision making requires a common intelligence picture and a shared
understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time; identify opportunities
to seize the initiative; and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs. Automation,
preplanned responses, and mission command are essential to act at the required speed of
relevance.

(2) Civilian and military leaders coordinate and nest military actions within a
whole-of-government approach and include our allies and PNs in global campaigns. In an
environment where requirements exceed inventory, force posture must reinforce our
strength, agility, and resilience across regions and throughout the OE. Once committed,
civilian and military leaders must rapidly confront enemies and adversaries, understand
global tradeoffs across CCMDs, and communicate risk with a global vice regional
perspective.

f. The CJCS provides clear options with acceptable global risk in the form of military
advice to SecDef that prioritizes GCPs and CCPs. SecDef gains an understanding of risk
through this process as guidance is prepared.

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g. The practice of global integration continuously informs decision making across

planning, force management and employment, and force development and design.
Achieving global integration requires the combination of the Services and CCMDs to
provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy
objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation
for this process.

h. Adversaries compete with increased efforts short of armed conflict, violating the
principle of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and blurring the lines between civil and
military goals. The joint force anticipates the adversary’s actions and leverages multiple
CCMDs’ support.

i. Global Force Management (GFM) and Dynamic Force Employment

Framework

(1) The GFM process aligns force apportionment, assignment, allocation, and
readiness methodologies in support of strategic guidance and force availability. This
strategic guidance validates CCDR requirements and allocates accordingly. These
requirements include forces identified for contingency campaigns and necessary to support
the execution of the global campaigns.

(2) The GFM process provides insight into the global posture of forces and the
availability of forces and capabilities for plans and operations. This insight provides senior
decision makers with a construct to assess impacts and risks associated with proposed
changes to posture and employment. GFM balances current demands with readiness
recovery to enable the force to execute contingency campaigns and improve performance
through force development. CCMDs execute their corresponding campaigns based on the
forces allocated through GFM. Additionally, contractors may comprise a portion of the
deployed force. They are not part of the GFM processes and do not report readiness. It is
essential to integrate them in planning and risk assessments as required by DODI 3000.12,
Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP). Commercial capabilities
(infrastructure, services, and associated personnel) align with organic posture elements
(footprint, agreements, and forces) and may enable or optimize each element.

(3) Global and contingency campaigns use current posture and force levels due
to the long timeline required to make posture adjustments. Force posture incorporates
expected future risk, campaign requirements, and force design. Optimizing posture
requires incorporating appropriate future scenario development that accounts for both
observed and anticipated shifts in friendly, partner, and adversary capabilities.

(4) The CJCS directs the JS to manage the JS’s global integration process;
coordinate dynamic force employment; and enable oversight, review, and refinement of
the enduring global campaigns during execution. Dynamic force employment is one of
DOD’s force employment initiatives for competition with primary threat challengers to
assure allies, counter coercive gradualism, and deter armed conflict. The joint force plans
and executes dynamic force employment in the context of ongoing global campaigns.

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Civilian and military leaders seek to execute dynamic force employment to take advantage
of strategic opportunities. These opportunities recognize chances or DAs to change the
strategic environment in the United States’ favor in terms of influence, position, or
leverage. The potential gain or achievement offered by the strategic opportunity might
require additional resources; a change of force disposition; a change of narrative, theme,
or message; or a change to the joint force’s task and purpose. Operationally, dynamic force
employment presents a global and all-domain challenge to an adversary. An effective
dynamic force employment activity may have the strategic effect of establishing initiative,
complicating or changing adversarial decision making relative to a specific contested
interest, demonstrating strategic agility and flexibility, or inducing strategic or operational
tempo. CCDRs employ forces in combination with strategic messaging, cyberspace, space,
and special access capabilities to compete globally.

(5) Dynamic Force Employment Cycle

(a) Iterations of dynamic force employment within a GCP have emerging

cycles. Successful iterations of dynamic force employment have patterns where CCDRs
begin by continuously observing the environment in the context of evaluating their
campaign’s progress. CCDRs and staff determine the emerging trends relative to the
current state of their campaigns and principal narratives. They also identify what
unforeseen activities have emerged. Civilian and military leaders then decide what
narratives and objectives need adjustment or reinforcement. Next, CCDRs determine
opportunities to advance campaign objectives, reinforce narratives, and gain or maintain
relative advantage through agile joint campaigns and operations. In the initial formulation
of dynamic force employment, CCDRs consider these questions:

1. Why is this circumstance an opportunity (cost/benefit)?

2. How will exploiting it reinforce narratives and advance objectives?

3. Will exploiting this opportunity improve US strategic or operational

leverage?

4. What is the potential intelligence loss/gain?

5. What limitations should we conceal/reveal?

6. What are the (opportunity) risks in doing/not doing it?

(b) CCDRs then consider military options in context with other instruments
of national power. They identify ways/means to exploit the opportunity (e.g., COAs).
Then CCDRs determine if dynamic force employment is the optimal choice. CCDRs
should decide how the dynamic force employment nests in their campaign by explaining
the implications to the overall campaign strategy. Next, they determine the forces,
capabilities, authorities, and support required for execution, collection, and assessment.
CCDRs identify the required forces beyond currently assigned and allocated forces and the

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required support. Then CCDRs choose the best COA. On many occasions, CCDRs request
force augmentation as required. In refining the request, CCDRs should ask these questions:

1. How long does the commander need the force to create the effect?

2. How will the CCMD employ the force?

3. What are the key indicators and collection requirements?

4. How will the CCDR know that the dynamic force employment did or
did not work? (Metrics to assess success.)

5. What are the anticipated adversary reactions/responses? What are the

options to modify or reinforce the dynamic force employment?

(c) Upon approval, the CCDR makes the necessary preparations to employ
the force and implement appropriate messaging. During execution of the dynamic force
employment, CCDRs ensure all necessary mechanisms are in place and aligned. Once in
transition, the CCDRs continue to observe the “new” environment. They determine what
has changed due to the action in the context of what the CCDR anticipated. Next, CCDRs
determine if the operation was successful (MOPs/MOEs). Finally, CCDRs decide how to
follow through on the dynamic force employment’s impact on the OE.

3. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

a. The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section
153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed
Forces of the United States. The JSCP provides the framework for military direction to the
joint force, implementing and augmenting the President’s and SecDef’s guidance found in
the NSS, UCP, CPG, and NDS, and in the CJCS’s guidance in the NMS. The JSCP
provides guidance for CCMDs, Services, the JS, and DOD agencies to prepare campaign
and contingency plans and establishes a common set of processes, products, roles, and
responsibilities to globally integrate the operations, activities, and investments of the joint
force. The CCDRs then operationalize and execute the campaign plan. The JSCP
establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to
integrate the joint force’s global operations, activities, and investments across the
competition continuum.

b. There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, FCPs, and CCPs.

(1) GCPs are an integral part of the revised JSPS. The JS develops and maintains
the GCPs for SecDef approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly
affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly
all, CCMDs. The JSCP identifies GCPs based on guidance in the NDS and NMS. GCPs
are the centerpiece of global integration and form the base of the JSCP.

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(2) FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are unbound

geographically but require coordination across multiple CCMDs. The CJCS directs FCP
planning through the JSCP or a planning order to CCMDs.

(3) The CCPs are the primary means through which the CCMDs collaboratively
develop operations, activities, and investments within their UCP-assigned mission/AOR.
CCMDs’ execution of CCPs orient on functional/theater objectives in support of objectives
directed by GCPs and, as applicable, FCPs.

c. The JSCP integrates the global campaigns by balancing capabilities between

campaign and contingency plans for resources and risks. This balancing effort ensures
global campaigns and their associated contingencies link with each other. The JSCP also
directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands on the CPG with specific
objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP
directs, and the CJCS further integrates, contingency plans within an ICP. Additionally,
the JSCP delineates support plans to foster joint force collaboration and coordination across
time and space. The coordinating authority assigns a joint force organization as a
collaborator that supports integrated planning. Where campaign plans support enduring
requirements, contingency plans support operations that react to crisis scenarios,
hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions
outside of crisis conditions. Campaign and contingency plans are not prepared or executed
in isolation from each other. Campaign plans develop the integrated deterrence, assurance,
and support activities that attempt to prevent contingencies from happening and establish
conditions to respond should deterrence fail.

4. Global Campaigning

a. The joint force campaigns across the competition continuum. GCPs and CCPs
encompass concurrent and related operations, activities, and investments to achieve
operational-level objectives that support achievement of strategic objectives. In concert
with other instruments of national power, these actions not only maintain or achieve
strategic objectives but also anticipate a future beyond those objectives. The actions
include many Service component operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of
military actions with interorganizational and multinational partners.

b. Policy drives campaigning to pursue strategic objectives that are broad,

transregional, and global, requiring many more parallel actions and substantially more
diverse operational-level objectives. Campaigning is the result of strategic discussion,
policy, and operational-level planning and execution. An effective and continual civilian-
military dialogue guides the process, ensuring integration between military operations
within DOD and alignment with other USG departments and agencies. Campaigning in
pursuit of GCP and CCP objectives occurs over many years. The President and SecDef
determine when GCPs or CCPs require revision.

c. Across the competition continuum, cooperation can require the employment of

numerous smaller military and nonmilitary efforts implemented and adjusted over long

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durations. For competition, success can require efforts to accomplish an array of diverse
activities across numerous OAs to gain influence, advantage, and leverage.

d. For global campaigning, success may be measured in the prevention of armed

conflict. However, success in armed conflict may require an overlapping series of
campaigns characterized with multiple iterations of enemy and friendly offensives,
counteroffensives, and transitions. Throughout armed conflict, commanders have to
confront and endure surprise and failure. In the aftermath of armed conflict, senior military
and civilian officials may direct joint forces to enforce the resulting military success
through a continued occupation of seized territory. JFCs continue supporting efforts to
ensure enemy compliance and maintain the strategic objectives after the transition of an
area to civil authority.

5. Global Campaign Considerations

a. Global campaigning requires additional considerations. While the elements of

operational design remain valid for all planning, this discussion elaborates on the issue of
global campaigns as enduring efforts that require an expanded perspective and array of
considerations.

b. Collectively, the array of considerations run throughout planning, execution,

assessment, and refinement. These considerations facilitate the link between the strategy
and the implementation and conduct of global campaign or required changes. These
considerations orient on outcomes beyond just military success, while recognizing that
national guidance continually evolves and that definitive conclusion and finality are rare
in most circumstances involving global campaign efforts.

c. These considerations for global campaigns may inform and enable effective
application of joint force capabilities beyond the context of a battle and strengthen the
alignment between instruments of national power. Determining favorable ends requires a
deep understanding of the strategic environment and shifting circumstances. The joint
force cannot succeed without a complete understanding of the adversary and all the relevant
actors. An inadequate understanding can lead to an incorrect or even flawed approach.
Additionally, when an emerging situation exceeds the scope, scale, or responsibility of a
single CCDR or global campaign, the joint forces’ senior leadership will determine an
appropriate response, including the likely supported and supporting commanders,
diagnosing the matter through the lens of the global campaign design considerations.

(1) Strategic Analysis. JFCs and staff develop and make decisions by fully
understanding the perspective of the adversary, reason for their actions, comprehensive
recognition of all their capabilities, actions that could convince them to change their
behavior, and the fundamental stakes and value that the United States assigns to the set of
contested interests. A complete analysis requires identifying the root causes, incentives,
and aspirations behind threat actions. This comprehension provides insight and
appreciation for the threat’s decision making. The diagnosis helps avoid mirror-imaging,
or the mistake of substituting their calculus with ours. This analysis is necessary to
formulate and implement a long-term competitive strategy to maintain an advantage, apply

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or counter coercion, and, if necessary, wage warfare. An effective global campaign

requires understanding what an adversary is doing and why they are doing it. The analysis
includes an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of various actors, involving a long-
term and comprehensive assessment. Assessments inform senior decision makers
responsible for long-range national security planning and frame the state of the competition
by identifying key long-term trends and major asymmetries of the competition.
Additionally, the assessment provides insight to the operational concepts and strategies of
the United States in contrast to adversaries, allies and partners, and other international
actors that are relevant to the competition. Effective competition and contingency planning
requires a deep and accurate perspective of a competitor’s decision-making process,
doctrine, and capabilities in the context of strengths and weaknesses relative to the joint
force.

(2) Range of Possible Outcomes. Successful global campaigns require the joint
force to maintain and continually update an appraisal of a range of possible outcomes for
cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The complexity of a contested environment
makes it likely that, in most cases, these evaluations will span a range of alternative futures,
each with a mix of favorable and unfavorable outcomes. In complex environments,
monitoring, evaluating, and learning how different approaches’ interactions may unfold
are critical to understanding the longer-term and broader impacts of actions and activities.
Considerations of criteria that run throughout planning, execution, and refinement include:

(a) Whether a valuable and attainable outcome exists that exceeds the long-
term opportunity costs.

(b) Whether failure would yield a tolerable condition, an armistice, or an

otherwise new but unstable and unfavorable regional or global homeostasis.

(c) Whether the nation can financially afford to embark upon the type of
operations required and for the necessary duration.

(d) Can the effort succeed if pursued under the worst foreseeable
circumstances?

(3) Anticipate the Consequences. While anticipation is key to effective

planning, successful global campaigns require the joint force to maintain and continually
update a realistic appraisal of the potential consequences. The appraisal includes
recognizing the risks incurred across other regions and interests, the inherent fragility and
sustainability of any gains we hope to realize, and re-characterized competitions that would
almost certainly emerge as a result of success. Additionally, the appraisal should recognize
how greater influence or strategic advantage in competition or, in the case of armed
conflict, “victory” and successful follow-through, might reshape the strategic environment
in unforeseen or unprecedented ways. Fundamental to global integration is a continuous
joint force assessment regarding the aggregate threat, policy refinements, posture, ongoing
activities, readiness, and prioritization. For any change of a CCDR’s GCP or CCP, there
is likely a cost and shift of risk.

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(4) Commander’s Vision. An overarching vision enables commanders and staff

to arrange military operations, activities, and actions so that they produce the desired
conditions, behaviors, and outcomes. An effective global campaign organizes around the
visualization of what is required to achieve the objectives and why it should succeed in
the face of uncertain reality. In complex environments, while past experiences and expert
opinion often provide the best starting points, ultimately the linkages between cause and
effect cannot be fully known. Initial assumptions may need validation through
understanding the results of activities and actions in that specific environment. The results
might change as underlying variables shift as a result of changes in the environment over
time. Thus, commanders re-assess and revalidate the initial logic of the approach as the
campaign progresses. These insights enable the campaign to account for all the adversary’s
foundational factors driving their decisions. Overall, the commander’s visualization
should provide conviction and confidence for the approach. JFCs having well-developed
relationships with other military advisors and policymakers are in the best position to
maintain the campaign’s relevance.

(5) Operational Direction. Successful global campaigns are a function of

commanders planning and directing relevant subordinate operations and activities. This
direction requires a comprehensive vision of the conditions and behaviors the joint force
must create and enables them to achieve strategic objectives. As an aspect of policy
formulation, the JFC envisions what CONOPS is necessary to reach those outcomes. This
context provides input in the formulation of the corresponding operational-level objectives.

(6) Campaign Narrative. As part of a global campaign, the CCDRs develop

nested narratives that reflect strategic objectives and target threats. These narratives
influence perceptions, behaviors, and, ideally, undermine and delegitimize adversary
narratives. Consequently, JFCs should avoid taking actions running contradictory to the
narrative. An effective narrative removes ambiguity and clarifies the US position,
providing a more compelling and believable alternative to the adversary’s narrative. In
practice, the use of force should support and reinforce the desired narrative, not replace it.

(7) Follow-Through and Enduring Efforts. To translate military success into

acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes, JFCs and staffs develop and implement a
long-term approach that focuses the global campaign over time and appreciates the
difference between cumulative military achievement and overall policy success.
Historically, the joint force has contributed toward both, or neither would have occurred.
The CJCS and CCDRs ensure the global campaign continues, just in different forms. In
many cases, these interests and influences are regional or at least external to previous
competition or armed conflict.

(8) Authorities. Policy enables the effective complementary employment of the

various instruments of national power. CCDRs understand how and when policy enables
successful global campaigns but must contend with tensions between policy aims and the
authority to pursue objectives. CCDRs continually advocate for the necessary authority
and permissions to achieve the objectives. More times than not, objectives are broad, while
the authorities to pursue those objectives are narrow or limited. The discussion
surrounding authorities helps CCDRs crystalize the opportunity costs of pursuing desired

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objectives. Commanders and staffs should collaborate with other USG departments and
agencies as many necessary authorities reside outside DOD. JFCs do not assume that, with
an EXORD, all necessary authorities and permissions naturally follow. JFCs identify
required authorities and permissions throughout global campaign design, implementation,
and refinement. JFCs describe the risk to achieving the strategic objectives should any
portion of authorities be withheld.

(9) Alignment. The USG’s ability to achieve strategic objectives depends on

employing the instruments of national power in effective combinations for all possible
situations. In practice, departmental and organizational boundaries often make full
integration of the instruments of national power an unachievable expectation. A more
realistic goal is to align efforts across departments, which, in most cases, is enough. The
nature of alignment varies with the situation. At the President’s direction,
interorganizational cooperation aligns military power with other instruments of national
power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. They also identify how
military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other to achieve national
security objectives.

(10) Resourcing. Successful global campaigns require synchronized,

prioritized, and deconflicted resourcing. The CJCS, CCDRs, and OSD align the resourcing
with the campaign plan. The perspective of resourcing should be clear about the costs to
achieve success and the opportunity costs to maintain any favorable outcome. With many
competing demands for resources, this is difficult at any given time. Over extended periods
of competition or protracted warfare, determining sustainable resourcing is even more
challenging. Nonetheless, achieving sustainable strategic outcomes requires a sustainable
level of resource effort. No JFC has unlimited resources available to do with as they please,
especially in the multinational realm. Rather, DOD and other nations make forces
available, and JFCs must coherently put them together. The resources, including people,
equipment, facilities, and time, have a major impact on the design of the global campaign.

(11) Force Architecture. Effective global campaigns require a force

architecture that enables the necessary C2 of joint forces. Whatever the nature and the
scale of the problem, an optimized operational architecture should enable each contributing
component to play an effective role. A sound force architecture leverages the full range of
skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment of the joint force’s leadership, as well as the
full suite of capabilities toward appropriate individual operations within the global
campaign’s design. Fundamentals include proper authority delegated to the appropriate
commanders to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among
subordinate organizations. A JFC may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint
force to avoid reducing subordinate commanders’ versatility, responsiveness, and
initiative.

6. Operational and Strategic Objectives

a. While operational and strategic objectives are uniquely different, they must link
with one another. Successful campaign planning continuously interprets and predicts
potential requirements that originate from the commander’s vision to formulate guidance

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for operational design. In following the commander’s vision throughout the process, forces
arrange to achieve the operational objectives. However, rapid adaptation to failure or
exploitation of success may drive numerous revisions and changes in prioritization of
operational objectives. Operational progress may temporarily constrain enemy actions;
complicate their choices; and shrink their relevant influence, relationships, capability, and
credibility.

b. Strategic objectives are expressions of national interests. In practice, some strategic

objectives are expressions of policy, not necessarily physical entities. The keys to
achieving strategic objectives can exist thousands of miles from any particular challenge,
in orbit around the Earth, reside as disaggregated sentiment spread across several
continents, or within information activities. Effective global campaigning reaches beyond
individual regions; otherwise, joint campaigns and operations address only symptoms.

c. As global campaigns include more than one strategic objective, these objectives
may require prioritization across the USG. Orienting on these objectives requires an
interorganizational approach, an organized framework, and precise terminology.

7. The Joint Operation

a. Joint operation is a general term that describes military actions conducted by joint
forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each
other. Any single joint operation may be subordinate to a campaign or part of a larger
campaign. A commander is responsible for the development and execution of an individual
operation. Most individual operations are a sum of tactical actions designed to accomplish
essential tasks leading to military objectives. Individual operations are typically sequential
and unfold by phases or branches as crafted by a commander. A commander may design
any number of phases to support mission execution. The phasing of discrete operations
remains an important organizational tool. When individual operations conclude or
terminate, commanders transition to the next operation or activity as appropriate. The
accomplishments of a single operation rarely equate to the entirety of an operational
objective or produce a strategic objective or policy outcome.

b. Successful individual operations incrementally advance toward operational-level

objectives. What matters in these individual operations is the ability to adapt to certain
circumstances by executing branches and sequels.

8. Phasing a Joint Operation

a. Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable

parts. The phases are unique for each operation as a tool to integrate and synchronize
related activities, in time and space within available resources, thereby enhancing C2 to
improve flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Phases in a plan are distinct and
sequential; however, activities often overlap between the phases. Within the phases
established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may
establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For example, the JFLCC or a
subordinate commander might have the following operations inside a single phase of a

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higher HQ: deploy, forcible entry, and defend the beachhead. One caution for
commanders is to avoid the tendency of forcing the actual OE and the situation it presents
to fit previously planned phases as circumstances unfold that can make the most brilliant
set of phases irrelevant. For example, planned phasing associated with the prelude or run-
up to armed conflict can artificially assume the situation presented by the adversary, the
force flow, the US national decision making, and the logic of the phases will all match,
align, and unfold together. In reality, these may not align, and adherence to the phases can
disrupt, constrain, and even set back the strategic discussion and policy formulation.
Operationally, arbitrary phases can artificially separate capabilities that must work
together. What matters in execution is adapting to the actual changes in the OE and enemy
actions.

(1) During planning, the JFC establishes the conditions, objectives, and
transitions from one phase to another. Additionally, JFCs plan sequels and branches for
potential contingencies. Phases often identify transitions in focus or main effort, enabling
the joint force to synchronize efforts. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities
presented by the enemy and operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

(2) A CCP may encompass all operations and activities for which the CCDR is
responsible, from relatively small-scale SC activities, deterrence activities, and actions
leading to transition to armed conflict and execution of large-scale combat operations.
However, use of the groups of activities for the purpose of phasing applies only to planning
and executing individual operations, whether small-scale contingencies or large-scale
combat operations that support the CCP. The groups of military activities associated with
phases can serve as a frame of reference that facilitates common understanding among
interagency partners, multinational partners, and supporting commanders of how a JFC
intends to execute a specific joint operation and progress during execution.

(3) Considerations for a Joint Operation. Most individual, large-scale joint

operations share certain activities or actions. There are general groups of military activities
that may typically occur in preparation for and during a single, large-scale joint operation.

(a) Shaping activities are usually ongoing and may continue during and after
the operation. The purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for successful
execution of the operation. Shaping operations and activities vary in magnitude, time,
intensity, and forces as the operation progresses by phase. At various points in time, each
specific group might characterize the main effort of the joint force. Some joint operations
below the level of large-scale combat will have distinguishable groups of activity.
However, JFCs may compress or not use some activities entirely according to the nature
of the operation. For example, the deployment of forces associated with seizing the
initiative may have a deterrent effect sufficient to dissuade an enemy from conducting
further operations, returning the OE to a more stable state. Shaping activities may include
long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, SC, and deterrence actions to
assure partners, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability.
Shaping activities drawn from a fundamental understanding of the OE help identify, deter,
counter, and/or mitigate competitor, adversary, and enemy actions that may challenge
country and regional stability. Knowledge gained and assessment of these activities

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provide a deeper, and common, understanding of the OE. Intelligence activities inform
planning, execution, and assessment, and improve the JFC’s understanding of the OE.
Shaping activities may occur through other interorganizational participants (e.g., USG
departments and agencies, PNs), with DOD in a supporting role. The joint community, in
concert with multinational and interagency partners, must maintain and exercise strong
regional partnerships to ensure the operational access that enables mission success. For
example, obtaining and maintaining rights of navigation and overflight help ensure global
reach and rapid projection of military power.

(b) Successful deterrence prevents an enemy’s or adversary’s undesirable

actions because the threat perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting. Commanders
weight deterrent actions toward protection and security activities characterized by
preparatory actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners and indicate the intent to
execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. A number of FDOs, flexible response
options (FROs), and force enhancements could be implemented to support deterrence. The
nature of these options varies according to the nature of the threat (e.g., traditional or
irregular, state or non-state), the threat’s actions, US strategic objectives, and other factors.
Once a crisis is definitive, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and
other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of
intelligence collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force
protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. CCDRs continue to
conduct military engagement with multinational partners to maintain access to areas,
thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Many deterrent actions build on SC
activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

(c) JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of
joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive activities at
the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the
conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be
required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny the enemy its
initial objectives. Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and expand friendly
freedom of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy
capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

(d) These actions focus on controlling the OE and in armed conflict breaking
the enemy’s will to resist. Joint force options include attacking weaknesses at the leading
edge of the enemy’s defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back and striking in-depth to
threaten the integrity of the enemy’s A2/AD systems, offensive weapons, force projection
capabilities, and defensive systems. Operations can range from large-scale combat to
various stabilization actions depending on the nature of the enemy.

(e) These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus
from sustained operations to stabilization activities. These operations help reestablish a
safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help restore local
political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may have the lead during

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

part or all of this period, but the JFC will typically provide significant supporting
capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local
governance (i.e., military government) and integrate the efforts of other supporting
interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The
JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for
remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.

(f) Joint force support to civil governance typically characterizes enabling

civil authority actions and activities. The commander provides this support by agreement
with the appropriate civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its
ability to govern and administer the services and other needs of the population. The
military end state is typically reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint
operation. CCMD involvement with other nations and other USG departments and
agencies beyond the end of the joint operation, such as CMO, lower-level stabilization
activities, and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.

For more information on stabilization activities, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

(4) Transitions

(a) During execution, a transition marks a change between phases or between

ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. This shift in focus by the joint
force often is accompanied by changes in command or support relationships and priorities
of effort. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. The
activities that are prevalent during a given phase rarely align with neatly definable break
or end points. Commanders identify the need to move into another phase by assessing that
a set of objectives has been achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires
a major change for the joint force. Thus, the transition to a new phase is usually driven by
events rather than time. An example is the shift from sustained combat operations to
stabilization activities to enable civil authority. Through continuous assessment, the staff
measures progress toward planned transitions so that the force prepares for and executes
them.

(b) An operation’s planned phases are conceptually distinct in time and

purpose from one another but must build upon or toward each other. The phases should
represent a natural progression and subdivision of the operation. Each phase should have
a set of starting conditions that define the initiation of the phase and satisfactory conditions
that mark a transition to the next phase. In planning, the ending conditions of one phase
are the starting conditions for the next phase. In execution, commanders rarely experience
this uniformly.

(c) Sometimes, the situation facing the JFC will change unexpectedly and
without apparent correlation to a planned transition. The JFC may choose to shift
operations to address unanticipated critical changes. The JFC must recognize fundamental
changes in the situation and respond quickly and smoothly. Failure to do so can cause the
joint force to lose momentum, miss important opportunities, experience setbacks, or fail to

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Chapter IV

accomplish the mission. Conversely, successful transitions enable the joint force to
maintain the initiative and quickly and efficiently garner favorable results. The JFC should
anticipate transformations, as well as plan shifts, during operations.

Refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, for additional information on
phasing UW operations. Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information on
SC’s role in helping set conditions for successful theater operations.

b. Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stabilization Activities

(1) Combat missions and tasks can vary widely depending on context of the
operation and the objective. Most combat operations will require the commander to
balance offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities. This is particularly evident in a
large-scale operation, where combat can occur during several phases and stabilization
activities may occur throughout the operation.

(2) In armed conflict, campaigns and major operations involve large-scale

combat operations that normally include offensive and defensive components (e.g.,
interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, countering air and missile threats,
DCO, base defense). Although defense may be the stronger form, offense is normally
decisive in combat. To achieve military objectives quickly and efficiently, JFCs normally
seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during
a sustained offensive, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend,
resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Accordingly, certain
defensive measures and protection activities (e.g., OPSEC) are required throughout each
joint operation phase. Joint forces at all levels should be capable of rapid transition
between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense
is a complementary one.

(3) Commanders conduct stabilization activities to maintain or reestablish a safe

and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. To achieve objectives, JFCs
integrate and synchronize stabilization activities with offense and defense, as necessary,
during the phases of an operation. Stabilization activities support USG stabilization efforts
and contribute to USG initiatives to build partnerships. These initiatives set the conditions
to interact with partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant
populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect
their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. The JFC will likely conduct stabilization
activities in coordination with or in support of interorganizational participants, the private
sector, or indigenous populations and institutions. Stabilization activities are conducted
outside the United States.

For further guidance on stabilization activities, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization

Activities. For further guidance on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation.

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

(4) Balance and Simultaneity

(a) Commanders strive to apply the many dimensions of military power

simultaneously throughout the OA. The challenge of balance and simultaneity affects all
operations involving combat, particularly within campaigns, due to their scope.
Consequently, JFCs often concentrate in some areas or on specific functions and require
economy of force in others. However, plans for campaigns and major operations will
normally exhibit a balance between offense, defense, and stabilization activities in various
phases. Planning for stabilization activities should begin when joint planning begins.

(b) If the focus of the CCMD’s ongoing campaign is on prevention and

preparation, any stabilization activities in the JFC’s proposed OA might continue, and
offense and defense activities may be limited or absent. Defensive activities might be
limited to providing an increased level of security. A similar balance applies to deterrence
activities, whether conducted as part of the CCP or on initiation of an operation plan
(OPLAN) since the intent is to limit escalation in the OA. A JFC might begin to limit
stabilization activities if an enemy’s or adversary’s potential hostile actions are imminent.
While conducting primarily offense or defense activities, the focus is destroying the enemy,
while stabilization activities may diminish or increase in more secure areas of the OA. As
the joint force achieves objectives and hostile acts abate, the focus shifts to actions to
stabilize the OA and enable civil authority or establish a temporary military government if
required. Stabilization activities increase or resume in proportion to the decrease in the
enemy’s hostile intent.

(c) Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to

assumption of responsibility by civil authority should begin during plan development and
continue throughout a joint operation. An unnecessarily narrow focus on planning
offensive and defensive operations may threaten stabilization and enabling civil authority
efforts, thus negatively affecting joint operation momentum. Even during sustained
combat operations, the joint force should establish or restore security and control and
provide humanitarian relief as areas are occupied, bypassed, or returned to civilian control.
Planning for FHA should be coordinated through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) (if it has mission presence) and shared with the senior
development advisor to the CCDR to avoid duplication of effort in the HN.

9. Organizing Operational Areas

a. General. While the UCP assigns AORs, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller
OAs (e.g., JOA and AO) temporarily. OAs have physical dimensions composed of some
combination of air, land, and maritime domains. While domains are useful constructs for
visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations unfold (the
OA), the use of the term “domain” does not imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2
of any domain. The appropriate JFC specifies authorities and responsibilities within an
OA. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and
staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components
and supporting commands. The size of an OA and types of forces employed depend on
the scope and nature of the mission. Every type of OA has an associated area of interest

IV-19
Chapter IV

(AOI) and area(s) of influence. Understanding the relationship between the AOI, area of
influence, and the assigned OA helps commanders and staffs order their thoughts during
both planning and execution.

(1) An AOI includes the area of influence and adjacent areas and extends into
hostile territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. An AOI focuses
intelligence support for monitoring activities pertinent to the OA that may affect
operations. The commander may describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting graphic
does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

(2) An area of influence is a geographic area wherein a commander is directly

capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the
commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes
the assigned OA. The extent of a subordinate command’s area of influence is one factor
the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate’s OA. Understanding the
command’s area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current
operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside the assigned OA. The
commander can describe the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does
not represent a boundary or other control measure for maneuver or fire support.

b. CCMD-Level Areas. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or CCDRs may

designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation (see Figure IV-
2). CCDRs can elect to control operations directly in these OAs or may establish
subordinate joint forces for that purpose while remaining focused on the broader AOR.
Operations that span CCMD boundaries may expose gaps in C2. DOD uses a mix of formal
and informal processes to synchronize actions between AORs.

(1) AOR. An AOR is a geographical area established by the UCP within which
a CCDR has the authority to plan for and conduct operations. CCDRs may operate forces
wherever required to accomplish approved missions. CCDRs must coordinate cross-AOR
operations among the affected CCMDs.

(2) Theater of War. The President, SecDef, or CCDR establishes a theater of

war, which is a geographic area for campaigns and major operations involving combat.
The United States establishes a theater of war when there is a formal declaration of war or
it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate
theater of operations) within a single boundary for C2, sustainment, protection, or mutual
support. A theater of war may not encompass a CCDR’s entire AOR but may cross the
boundaries of two or more AORs.

(3) Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is an OA defined by the

CCDR for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater of operations
is established primarily when the scope and scale of the operation or campaign exceeds
what a JOA can normally accommodate. More than one joint force HQ can exist in a
theater of operations. A CCDR may establish one or more theaters of operations. Different

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

Operational Areas within a Theater

AOR Theater of
War

JOA
Theater of
Operations
JSOA

This example depicts a combatant commander’s AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR,
the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two
theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant
commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will
operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Legend
AOR area of responsibility JSOA joint special operations area
JOA joint operations area

Figure IV-2. Operational Areas within a Theater

theaters will normally focus on different missions. A theater of operations typically is

smaller than a theater of war but is large enough to allow for operations in-depth and over
extended periods. Theaters of operations are normally associated with campaigns and
major operations and may cross the boundary of two or more AORs.

c. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or for specialized activities,
the commander can establish the following OAs.

(1) JOA. A JOA is an area of land, sea, airspace, and cyberspace defined by a
CCDR or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a commander, joint
task force [CJTF]) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs
are particularly useful when operations have a limited scope and geographic area or when
operations cross the boundaries of AORs or cover geography between two theaters (see
Figure IV-3).

(2) Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and
airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct special operations
activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet DA mission or may be

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Chapter IV

Typical Operational Areas

JOA

JSOA Land AO AOA

JSA

JSA Maritime
AO

Legend
AOA amphibious objective area Land AO area of operations assigned to a land
JOA joint operations area force commander
JSOA joint special operations area Maritime AO area of operations assigned to a maritime
JSA joint security area force commander

Figure IV-3. Typical Operational Areas

extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of UW operations. JFCs may use a
JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations. The
JFSOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(3) Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). An AOA is normally established by

the JFC or JFMCC for amphibious operations. The AOA is an area specifically for
amphibious force operations. This area should be of adequate size to accomplish the
amphibious force’s mission and must provide enough area for conducting necessary
maritime, air, and land operations.

For additional guidance on AOAs, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

(4) AO. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do not
typically encompass their entire OA but should be large enough for component
commanders to accomplish their missions (to include a designated amount of airspace) and
protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate
AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full
range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict

operations, and achieve unity of effort.

d. Contiguous and Noncontiguous OAs

(1) OAs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure IV-4). When they are
contiguous, a boundary separates them. When OAs are noncontiguous, subordinate
commands do not share a boundary. The higher HQ retains responsibility for the
unassigned portion of its OA.

(2) In some operations, a Service or functional component (typically the land

component) could have such a large OA that the component’s subordinate units operate in
a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually supporting range of each
other. In these cases, the JFC should consider options whereby joint capabilities are
allocated at the level and placed under the control of units that can employ them most
effectively.

e. Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an OA. The establishing

commander should activate an assigned OA at a specified date and time based on mission
and situation considerations addressed during COA analysis and wargaming. Common
considerations include C2, the IE, intelligence requirements, communications support,
protection, security, LOCs, terrain management, movement control, airspace control,
surveillance, reconnaissance, air and missile defense, PR, targeting and fires,
interorganizational coordination, and environmental issues.

10. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

a. In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward
enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. In linear operations, emphasis is on
maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces. From this
relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and the massing of forces can be
facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs
between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the
endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. A linear OA
organization may be best for some operations. Conditions that favor linear operations
include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations
or adequate forces. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed,
echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of
action. In these circumstances, linear operations enable commanders to concentrate and
synchronize combat power more efficiently.

b. In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference

to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on
multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize operations along multiple LOOs
from selected bases (ashore or afloat). In nonlinear operations, sustaining functions may
depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or aerial delivery. Noncombatants,

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Chapter IV

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

JSOA
ARFOR
AO
MARFOR
AO ARFOR MARFOR
AO AO

JSA
JSA

Contiguous Noncontiguous
Adjacent, subordinate command’s operational Subordinate commands are assigned operational
areas share boundaries. In this case, the higher areas that do not share boundaries. The higher
headquarters has assigned all of its operational headquarters retains responsibility for the portion
area to subordinate commands. of its operational area not assigned to subordinate
commands.
Legend
AO area of operations JSOA joint special operations area
ARFOR Army forces MARFOR Marine Corps forces
JSA joint security area

Figure IV-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

civilians, and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful judgment in clearing fires,
both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with precision fires, frees
commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive
points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock among enemy
forces and commanders. The joint forces orient more on their assigned objectives (e.g.,
destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers)
and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. For protection, individual
forces rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than
on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the communications, intelligence,
mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

(1) During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces must focus

offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum-essential combat
power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility to respond
where needed. JFCs may dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense.
Vulnerability increases as operations extend, and attacking forces operate over a larger OA.
Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

planning and preparation. The potential for friendly fire incidents increases with the fluid
nature of the nonlinear OA and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces.

(2) During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on destroying

enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful
nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs intent and
maintain a COP. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some
subordinates may conduct area defenses. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on
reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant
information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost
exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas. Although less
challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment security will still be a test.
Securing sustainment operations and infrastructure may require the allocation of combat
forces to protect LOCs and other high-risk functions or bases. The JFC must establish
clear command relationships to properly account for the added challenges to base, base
cluster, and LOC security.

c. AOs and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

(1) General. JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and

noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational
design. They choose the combination that fits the OE and the purpose of the operation.
Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations
creates the four combinations in Figure IV-5.

(2) Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs. Linear operations in contiguous

AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure IV-5) typify sustained offensive and defensive
operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. The
contiguous areas and continuous forward line of own troops focus on combat power and
protect sustainment functions.

(3) Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The upper right-hand pane of

Figure IV-5 depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component commanders conducting
linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that
portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.

(4) Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs. The lower left-hand pane in

Figure IV-5 illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned OA divided into subordinate AOs.
Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear operations within their
AOs. This combination is typically associated with stabilization activities and DSCA.

(5) Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The lower right-hand pane

of Figure IV-5 depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component commanders conducting
nonlinear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for
that portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.

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Chapter IV

Combinations of Areas of Operations and

Linear/Nonlinear Operations

Contiguous Areas of Operation Noncontiguous Areas of Operation

Linear Operations Linear Operations

XX
XXX
X X

II Rear
X
XX X XX Area
X XX
Forward Line Forward Line X
of Own Troops of Own Troops X

X Forward Edge X
Forward Edge
of the Battle X of the Battle X
Area X
Area
X X II
Rear
X
Area
XX
XXX
XXX

X X
XXX

 Operation  DESERT STORM  Hue City  URGENT FURY

OVERLORD

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

XX

XX X

XX X

XXX XXX

 Joint Task Force  Vietnam 1965-73  JUST CAUSE  RESTORE HOPE

Andrew

Figure IV-5. Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

11. Global Integration in Practice

a. Global integration includes the entire joint force’s actions, unfolding over different
time horizons, and begins with the CJCS. In execution, the joint force campaigns to
achieve operational-level objectives as described in the global campaigns, CCDR

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

campaigns, and standing EXORDs. To oversee execution and gauge the degree of effective
integration, the CJCS’s JS regularly examines and collaborates with each coordinating
authority’s ongoing campaign activities throughout the year of execution. Refinement and
adjustment of global campaigns are typical and normal. One important aspect of global
integration is to assess, understand, and evaluate the impact of how a proposed change in
an effort, force, or direction for one part of the overall global campaign will cascade across
the force. This evaluation includes not only impacts to ongoing operations for other global
campaigns but also across the planning and force development time horizons. Assessing
all the global campaigns enables senior military leadership to determine the validity and
utility of the current guidance and overall strategy. The regular interactions between the
CJCS’s JS and the coordinating authority can lead to refinements within the execution year
and provide input to annual assessments and considerations for future planning.

b. Global integration provides an opportunity to adjust, revise, and reinforce

individual operations, activities, and investments without modifying plans. Throughout
execution, senior military and civilian leaders use global integration to modify ongoing
campaign efforts across the globe. Global integration enables CCDRs to recommend shifts
in direction and effort for global campaigns by connecting annual campaign assessments
with force allocation planning and weave together operational and institutional
considerations such as investment choices. Each CCMDs’ annual campaign assessment,
CCDRs’ feedback, intelligence communities’ forecasts, and the JSPS assessments inform
readiness programming and investment choices for future force development and
employment.

12. The Global Campaign, Combatant Command Campaign, and Global

Integration Framework

a. Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to prepare strategic plans, as required,
and provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The CJCS provides
advice on ongoing military operations and the allocation and transfer of forces among
CCMDs. In performing this role in global integration, the CJCS is responsible for
operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of
the joint force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to SecDef
for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS, through the JSCP, assigns which sets of
global challenges require GCPs and GIFs.

(1) GCPs. GCPs globally integrate the activities of the joint force to campaign
against the priority challenges. GCPs contain linkages to key contingency plans, identify
responsibilities, define objectives, and assign tasks. The CCDR, with the preponderance
of responsibility for a GCP, generally serves as the coordinating authority.

(2) Coordinating Authority. To integrate CCMD planning for the global

campaigns, the CJCS, in fulfilling the responsibilities relating to global integration, assigns
a coordinating authority. A coordinating authority is generally a CCDR. The JSCP assigns
the CCMD with oversight over a GCP and the role of coordinating authority, which
provides collaborative authority to integrate planning from other CCMDs, CSAs, Services,
USG departments and agencies, allies, and partners, as the designated lead for the problem

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Chapter IV

set. The CCDR has the preponderance of responsibility aligned to a problem set. The
CCDR can direct collaborative planning but does not receive additional command authority
beyond that already assigned in the UCP or other foundational documents. A coordinating
authority does not have the authority to compel agreement or direct resource allocation
between CCMDs or Services.

For more information, see JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force; CJCSI 3141.01, Management
and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. Executing the Global Campaign

(1) GCPs are integrated plans that address threats and challenges that
significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across
all, or nearly all, CCMDs. As problem-focused plans, GCPs look across CCMD seams
and simultaneously provide direction to the CCDRs and military advice to SecDef. In
execution, the GCPs are the focal point for integrated assessment and resource decisions
regarding prioritization, posture, capabilities, risk, and risk mitigation measures.

(2) A coordinating authority performs three key functions: planning, assessing,

and recommending approaches to develop integrated plans. Coordinating authorities use
collaborative forums to support these functions and ensure multiple supported CCDRs’
equities are accounted for in global campaigns (see CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic
Planning System).

(3) A collaborator is a joint force organization assigned in the JSCP to support

integrated planning. The collaborator works with the coordinating authority to develop
and assess the viability of globally integrated plans from their organization’s perspective.
CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct and operationalize the JSCP.
CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs
and FCPs and support plan linkages, contingency plan linkages, and prioritization and risks
in balancing the requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command’s enduring
activities such as ongoing operations, military engagement, SC, deterrence, posture,
basing, and other cooperative and competitive activities. CCPs organize and align
operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives
and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify
the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those
resources to create a favorable security environment within the OE and support the national
strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make
recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated
with executing the command’s missions.

(4) Joint Campaigns and Operations in Contingencies

(a) The joint force implements contingency plans in response to changes in

the strategic environment. Contingency plans build and expand the global, functional,
regional, or CCMD campaigns already in execution. The Presidentially approved CPG

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

direct contingency plans address designated threats, potentially catastrophic events, and
contingent scenarios that can threaten one or more national interests and warrant military
response options. This guidance provides the basis for CCMD contingency plans and
global war planning.

(b) The JS develops GIFs to facilitate CJCS advice to SecDef and the
President on global risks, trade-offs, and opportunity costs across and within campaigns
during an emerging situation. A GIF provides considerations for modifications to a
particular GCP, as well as analysis associated with the joint force’s ability to meet global
requirements for a crisis or transition to armed conflict. GIFs also identify potential
President or SecDef decisions required to execute the global response to a priority
challenge. These decisions may include expanded actions within a GCP, risk mitigation
options, reallocation and escalation management decisions, and actions to preserve options.
GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute a global
response to a priority challenge.

(c) CCDRs prepare contingency plans to address anticipated situations. At

execution, CCDRs will likely have to modify plans to respond to the actual conditions at
the time. If an approved contingency plan closely resembles the emergent scenario,
CCDRs and their staff can refine or adapt it as necessary for execution. During a
contingency response and activation of an ICP, enduring campaigns continue in modified
form to account for changes in the OE and address resource allocation.

(d) After the contingency passes, the force transitions to face new
competitive challenges or re-characterized competitions and international conditions.
Post-contingency circumstances may require civilian and military leadership to reevaluate
existing strategies and campaigns to sustain new strategic conditions and objectives.

1. Contingency planning builds upon and expands the GCPs or FCPs

already in execution to address designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent
missions. Contingency planning efforts are directed in the UCP, CPG, and JSCP, or by the
CCDR. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP guide the development of plans to address potential
threats that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military
operations. Contingency plans account for the possibility that campaign activities could
fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or
respond to a natural disaster. An ICP coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time
and space to respond to a single contingency, which is in contrast to previous AOR-specific
scenarios.

2. If the contingency plan is associated with a GIF, initial planning has

been conducted to identify the requirements to reallocate and reassign forces across the
globe to meet the crisis or contingency execution requirements, including the impact of
executing the crisis or contingency on ongoing GCPs and FCPs. Even with this
preparation, all CCDRs and their planners must reassess the risk associated with cessation
of ongoing campaigning activities and ensure the CJCS is informed of changes in the
assessment.

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c. Readiness Reviews. Readiness reviews are detailed assessments of global

implications for the joint force in the event of contingency plan execution. Readiness
reviews begin with an examination of threats, threat capabilities, and likely enemy COAs.
A readiness review then analyzes the family of plans related to the designated contingency
plan to identify friendly resource requirements, potential shortfalls in readiness, resources,
and capabilities. The review also identifies ongoing operations and makes potential
recommendations for changes to ongoing operations and campaign plans to meet the
contingency plan requirements. The output of a readiness review is the GIF that identifies
priorities across the joint force while in conflict and outlines decisions required by the
President and SecDef for execution.

13. Global Effects Coordination

a. Armed conflict against peer competitors requires simultaneous

supporting/supported relationships between multiple CCDRs. Global effects coordination
employs global capabilities synchronized in time and tempo across multiple geographic
regions to achieve campaign objectives. A global coordination process to ensure a global
perspective; an appreciation of out-of-AOR threats; and the capability to coordinate and
integrate global capabilities, fires, operations, and information can facilitate global effects.
The outputs of global effects coordination among CCMDs via global battle rhythm
working groups feed the best military advice to the CJCS.

b. Global effects coordination focuses primarily on integration and synchronization

across the CCMDs to help prioritize lethal and nonlethal global effects. The global effects
coordination process seeks to improve situational awareness across CCMD theater and
functional responsibilities; identify opportunities, tensions, and consequences of joint force
action or inaction; and align CCMD global operations to generate desired effects. To meet
global campaign objectives and provide coordination of global effects, CCMDs
synchronize and deconflict diverse capabilities of the joint force across the globe through
multi-CCMD coordination working groups. Globally integrated planning and detailed
coordination are required to integrate and synchronize global effects. SecDef-designated
supported and supporting CCMD relationships define the roles and responsibilities for
global effects planning and execution. The supported CCDRs provide fire support
requirements for their AOR and/or missions to the supporting CCDRs. The supporting
CCDRs, given their unique capabilities and expertise with those systems, may have
competing views and objectives of the most effective use and tempo of those limited
resources. Although the supported and supporting CCDRs may see the situation in a
similar fashion, each CCDR may have different perspectives, high-payoff targets, and
global fires requirements. The global effects coordination process enables CCMDs to
continually assess the multiple supported CCMDs’ high-payoff target and global fires
requests in the context of evolving situations and make recommendations to the CCDRs
and, when necessary, the CJCS and SecDef, as the most effective employment of globally
integrated fires. The recommendations for global effects seek to optimize effectiveness of
fire support and mitigate risk to friendly forces and functions in the supported commands’
AORs, as well as risk to HD, strategic deterrence, and defense of national interests.

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c. Establishing global fire support requirements and synchronizing fire support

actions are cross-CCMD and cross-boundary efforts, requiring a great deal of
collaboration, close coordination, and information sharing. Effective cross-functional
collaboration occurs through appropriate organizational processes that organize into
elements, functional boards, and planning teams composed of representatives from across
the CCMDs. Some degree of synchronization is necessary at the operational level to align
actions and desired effects.

d. Commanders and their planners should identify desired lethal and nonlethal effects
early in the targeting and planning processes, and continuously thereafter. A clear
understanding of the problem, planning guidance, commander’s intent, and the operational
framework provide the necessary direction for the coherent integration of effects at the
operational level, while appropriately leaving synchronization and detailed execution to
subordinate tactical units.

e. Global battle rhythm working groups are key to providing global situational
awareness across the OEs to all CCMDs to facilitate global integration of operations at the
lowest echelon possible. The global battle rhythm meetings enable CCMD operations
staffs to understand multiple, supported CCMD priorities. Staffs make recommendations
for synchronizing operations across the globe that span multiple AORs and all domains. A
common set of inputs for these working groups to integrate global effects includes who is
requesting the effects support, who is providing the effects support, what are the desired
effects, what are the consequences of action/inaction, and any unresolvable tensions.

f. The Use of Information

(1) Advances in information technology and the ease with which people and
automated systems access and use information contribute to today’s threats becoming
increasingly sophisticated and dangerous. Within the OE, specific factors affect how
humans and automated systems derive meaning, act upon, and judge impacted from
information. The IE is the aggregate of these social, cultural, linguistic, psychological,
technical, and physical factors. The IE is not distinct from any OE. It is an intellectual
framework to help identify, understand, and describe how those often-intangible factors
may affect the employment of forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. The
informational factors that bear on the decisions of a commander are part of a commander’s
OE, just as the factors of the physical domains, cyberspace, and the EMS that affect the
employment of forces and bear on the decisions of a commander are part of a commander’s
OE. The joint force leverages its understanding of the IE and the inherent informational
aspects of military activities; improves the use of information to support decision making;
counters adverse disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda; and synchronizes and
unifies efforts across joint functions to create effects in the IE.

(2) Understanding the IE. Understanding the IE is critical to global integration

because information affects the OE at a faster pace than ever. The IE is more complex,
and threats are more global. Understanding adversarial perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviors toward their global influence objectives will help address the problem. The joint

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force improves its ability to conduct globally integrated operations by understanding the
relevant audiences. These audiences impact joint force outcomes. Understanding what
information drives those audiences’ behaviors is essential.

(a) Information capabilities and activities often require knowledge of

adversaries that is not common to traditional intelligence analysis and productions. OIE
require answers to questions such as: Which audiences are affecting joint force objectives
and why? Which audiences share joint force goals and objectives? What themes and
messages created under the base narrative or tactical narrative might help specific
audiences understand the threat they face from an adversary or threat? What information
is being concealed by autocratic leaders from their internal audiences, and why? Analysis
of influential audiences and the information and motivations that drive their beliefs and
behavior adds a deeper understanding of current intelligence reporting.

(b) Advances in today’s IE enable more options to monitor, analyze, assess,

and share information. Technologies that store and share large amounts of data facilitate
observation and measurement of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes on social media.
Information systems leave electronic signatures that indicate movement and other
behavior. Automated intelligence can improve the ability to measure effectiveness by
assessing the IE.

(3) Leverage. This section will provide considerations for how the joint force
leverages, integrates, and uses information throughout the competition continuum not
already discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” paragraph 3. “Information.” The joint
force must gain and maintain an advantage against global threats that effectively mislead
internal and external audiences and penetrate and disrupt friendly C2 networks and
information systems. The JFC counters these threats with communication to these same
audiences through messages, images, and actions. These activities are the sequence of
actions that use information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant
actor behavior.

(a) The JFC and staff use operational design by developing options and
COAs with select information capabilities and activities early, obtaining authorities and
execution pre-approval early, then arranging them in time, space, and purpose to achieve
desired objectives.

(b) Information sharing is key to unity of effort and to success. Sharing

information requires time, resources, and approvals. When executed better than the
adversary, information sharing is a combat multiplier and can lead to decision advantages.
Communication synchronization depends on information sharing. The process of aligning
our operations and communication is increasingly important for media-savvy audiences
looking for opportunities to de-legitimize the joint force.

(c) Risks also vary when using information (i.e., risks to OPSEC, risk of
mistakenly disseminating false information, risk of narratives reaching unintended or
insufficiently understood audiences, and risk of unknown second- and third-order
consequences of physical attacks on networks and systems).

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(4) Competitive use of information may require JFCs to deny and degrade
adversaries’ mobility and access. JFCs employ identity activities and leverage collected
identity information to inform global operations, HD, national screening, and vetting
activities with interagency partners.

g. Support to Human and Automated Decision Making. The joint force seeks to
gain and maintain an information advantage throughout the competition continuum.
Facilitating the use of all available data to accelerate decision cycles by leveraging artificial
intelligence, predictive analytics, information fusion, autonomous systems, and other data
models that are consistent with DOD policy. Interoperability between modern information
systems and legacy platforms enable the ability to share with allies, partners, and the
private sector.

h. Today’s technology requires a fundamental shift to treat information and data as a

critical resource that enables the joint force to exploit an improved understanding of
friendly forces, neutrals, the environment, and adversaries. The force must train and
exercise decision making in information-degraded environments. With a shared situational
understanding of relevant actors and their interconnections, commanders and their staffs
will have better and faster human and machine-aided decision making.

14. Mission Areas and Enduring Requirements

a. Introduction

(1) The mission areas constitute the framework of global campaigns. Within the
global campaigns, five mutually supporting mission areas describe the principal orientation
and way the joint force operates across the competition continuum and around the globe—
simultaneously in multiple regions with allies and partners and, as necessary, across UCP-
designated AORs and other military boundaries. The mission areas are:

(a) Deter strategic attack.

(b) Deter conventional attack.

(c) Assure allies and partners.

(d) Compete below the level of armed conflict (competition).

(e) Prepare/respond to threats.

(2) The mission areas within the global campaign entail coherent groupings of
interrelated operational-level objectives, each with its own associated and multiple LOEs,
tasks, and the many associated individual joint and Service component operations.

b. Deter Strategic Attack Mission Area. Deterring strategic attack is the highest
defense priority of the United States. There is no conceptual or operational starting or
stopping point for strategic deterrence—it is perpetual. Deterring nuclear and nonnuclear

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strategic attack of any scale, either regionally or against the United States itself, is an
essential and continuous aspect of global campaigns. The primary purpose of US strategic
deterrence is to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States, but this mission area also
includes dissuading strategic space, cyberspace, and EMS attacks. The deter strategic
attack mission orients on dissuading adversaries from conducting attacks that result in
strategic effects, particularly on the homeland. An adversary can create strategic effects
with weapons such as nuclear, chemical, biological, space-based, cyberspace, or even
conventional weapons, particularly on the homeland. Aligning and exercising all
instruments of national power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries
integrate their strategic military capabilities, expanding the range of potential challenges.
This alignment is particularly true regarding threats from potential adversaries of limited
nuclear escalation and non-nuclear strategic attack. Achieving the objectives within this
mission area relies on creating the adversary’s perception that the costs a response would
impose far outweigh the anticipated benefits of conducting a strategic attack. To be
effective, the operations and activities associated with deterring strategic attack must
impact an adversary’s decision making. Considering social, cultural, linguistic, and
psychological factors is essential to avoid mirror-imaging, understand an adversary’s
actual perspective, and thereby arrive at a true understanding of the deterrence potential of
friendly operations, activities, and investments. Neutrals and even friendlies may also be
deterred from undesired operations, activities, and investments. Regardless of the ebb and
flow of competition and uncertainty, the joint force must maintain a credible ability to
respond to a strategic attack and impose unacceptable costs on the adversary. The joint
force’s pursuit of the objectives within this mission area is open-ended and enduring. The
operations continue unabated through competition to armed conflict and the transitions
between the two. All actions and operations against nuclear-armed adversaries require
evaluation to address the risk of strategic deterrence failure.

c. Deter Conventional Attack Mission Area

(1) Deterring adversaries from territorial aggression and traditional warfare

through the threat of denial or punishment is a long-standing central theme of joint force
responsibilities. The objectives, operations, activities, and investments associated with the
deter conventional attack mission area are usually passive but credible and overt in their
signal to keep an adversary from both miscalculating and acting on their ambitions. The
intent of the objectives within the deter conventional attack mission area is to prevent an
adversary from considering armed conflict through the posturing of friendly capabilities
and demonstrating the will to use them. The actions and signals purposefully place the
initiative on an adversary to take the first actions. Through the posture and activities with
this mission area, national and military leadership may communicate and convince
adversaries that an attack is so unlikely to succeed that it is not even worth the attempt,
which is deterrence through denial. Senior leadership can also convince adversaries that
the effort required to accomplish its goals would be so costly there would be no real victory
or advantageous outcome, also known as deterrence through perceived costs. In either case,
the traditional assumption is US actions short of war can influence a rational adversary to
maintain the status quo. Senior military and civilian leaders orient the operations and
activities within the mission area toward security and preparatory measures to protect US

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and allied interests and to indicate the capability and intent to deny the enemy’s purpose
for aggression. Effectively executing the tasks and messaging in this mission area
discourages an enemy from initiating action. Commanders can greatly enhance the
prospects for success in their choice and implementation of deterrence objectives if they
view the escalatory events and their own reactive behavior from an empathetic perspective
of the opponents’ calculation of costs, benefits, and risks.

(2) Once an adversary decides and commits to pursuing objectives through armed
conflict, then there may not be an opportunity for deterrence. Adversaries make decisions
knowing full well the risks of war with the United States. If there is an opportunity to avert
armed conflict after the enemy commits to initiating war, then that opportunity will likely
have a very small window of time.

d. Assure Allies and Partners Mission Area. The operations, activities, and
investments within the assure mission area orient activities to develop and strengthen
partnerships. These partnerships encourage and enable allies and partners to defend their
sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity, and participate in multinational military
operations in support of mutually beneficial outcomes. By working together with allies
and partners, CCDRs create strength and momentum toward the long-term advancement
of our interests. The assure mission area objectives seek to link our capabilities and
interests with allies’ and partners’ complementary capabilities and forces along with their
unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve joint force
understanding of the OE. CCDRs seek to expand upon these opportunities. When
addressing a situation deemed as a mutual interest, allies and partners can provide access
to position and operate within the necessary areas/regions. The assure mission area
supports maintaining an optimal basing and logistics system, which is foundational for
global sustainment and reach. Operating and exercising with allies demonstrates our
cooperative commitment and promotes a level of interoperability across the competition
continuum. Together, these efforts enable key nations to establish or maintain their
sovereignty and domestic policies. Effectively assuring allies and partners minimizes the
probability of dramatic shifts in their policy, such as turning to an adversary for their
security partner of choice, miscalculating unilaterally, or overreacting to a common
adversary’s encroachment or provocation. The assure mission area’s objectives and efforts
seek to share responsibilities with like-minded allies and partners, resist authoritarian
expansionism through competition, contest radical ideologies, and conduct combined joint
warfighting in armed conflict. Maintaining and developing partnerships around the globe
based on shared interests reinforce regional coalitions and military cooperation. Successful
execution of the efforts within the assure mission area provides allies and partners with a
clear and consistent message of alliance and coalition commitment and confidence and
capability to face external threats.

e. Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict Mission Area (Adversarial

Competition). US strategic rivals want to shape a world consistent with authoritarian
views and seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions. These
adversaries strive to avoid war and accomplish their objectives at an acceptable level of
risk and a relatively low opportunity cost. Their actions manifest themselves as territorial

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encroachments, infringements of sovereignty, and violations of the rule of law that favor
the adversary’s interests. In some cases, these encroachments seek to influence and control
the internal domestic policy decisions of another country without having to seize or occupy
parts of it. With appropriate authorization, JFCs can counter adversarial actions and malign
influence through demonstration, strengthening and reinforcing allies and partners, global
repositioning of forces, air and maritime interception operations, establishing exclusion
zones, enforcing sanctions, supporting resistance partners, employing surrogate forces, and
ensuring compliance with treaties. This mission area is not deterrence re-imagined, nor is
it preparation or prelude to armed conflict. Adversarial competition is its own unique,
challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where many
aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are undeterrable. Within all the
global campaigns, the compete below the level of armed conflict mission area’s objectives
seek to proactively limit, counter, or even de-construct these coercive encroachments and
their harmful effects. In adversarial competition, JFCs maneuver to contest and counter
coercion and adversaries’ use of malign and/or antagonistic operations, activities, and
investments that encroach on matters of sovereignty or fall outside of international law and
norms. Through competition, revisionist powers and rogue regimes use coercive and
subversive measures such as corruption, predatory economic practices, disinformation and
propaganda, political and socioeconomic subversion, annexing foreign territory, and
deniable military force to change the environment in their favor. These nuanced
approaches are deliberate alternatives to armed conflict. Activities associated with
competition provide an alternative approach without armed conflict for countering our
adversaries’ use of malign and/or antagonistic activities intended to degrade US legitimacy,
credibility, influence, economic power, and national security. Senior military leaders
recognize these approaches and alternative uses of force short of war, to include working
with the DOS and other USG departments and agencies in a concerted and coordinated
effort to effectively compete.

f. Prepare for/Respond to Threats Mission Area. Responding to threats may

involve the application of military force against a threat to eliminate their cause or
motivation. The objectives and corresponding tasks and operations within the respond to
threats mission area promote enduring preparations, readiness, and adaptability. The
responses are all scalable and employed in the context of the specific situation. The
objectives may not be adversary-specific. This mission area also includes responding to
the hostile actions of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and other irregular threats.
JFCs may encourage and enable allies and partners to take leading roles against irregular
threats, with US forces in a supporting role. Within the global campaign, episodic or brief
uses of violent measures may be adequate. If not, then guided by the GIF and strategic
guidance, the CCDR can expand or recharacterize activities across all the mission areas.
The guidance may be for the CCDR to transition to one or more of the problem set’s
contingency plans. When one global campaign transitions to a family of contingency plans,
not only does the coordinating authority re-characterize the efforts across its mission areas
but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs may recommend modifications to all the
global campaigns. When a committed enemy threatens our national security with regard
to little else, then the United States can use military force to destroy the enemy’s activity,
capabilities, or seize territory. Joint forces can disrupt the sources of power, which give

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the enemy the will to continue to pursue their objectives. Additionally, joint forces can
attack the enemy’s strategic decision-making process. When the joint force engages an
enemy in armed conflict, there are three basic methods to prevail. The three methods are
exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Rarely employed in isolation from the others,
exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy’s will, attrition is the process of gradually reducing
their strength or effectiveness, and annihilation is the complete destruction of the enemy’s
means. Against a capable and determined enemy, the joint force should not expect any of
these methods to be easy, fast, or inexpensive. The joint force should not expect military
victory to be a foregone conclusion.

g. Additional Considerations

(1) Successful integrated deterrence, whether strategic or conventional attack,

relies upon similar logic, but the stakes are different. Both mission areas depend on several
critical functions. The first function is national leaders and commanders maintain real-
time awareness of adversaries that can conduct strategic attacks. This situational awareness
includes detailed insight into their intentions and interests, especially their importance.
Second, it requires a clear understanding and identification of the preliminary and interim
adversarial decisions leading to the use of strategic capabilities. Third, deterrence requires
developing and maintaining an understanding of an adversary’s calculations regarding the
alternative actions, as well as its perception of the deterrent threat’s credibility and cost.
Fourth, it requires the capability to influence some of the inputs to the adversary’s values
and perceptions relevant to their decision making. Fifth, deterrence requires an
understanding of the limits on the adversary’s cost-benefit analysis. These limits change
over time and vary among those potential adversaries who possess the capabilities of
strategic attack. As such, some adversaries are difficult to influence, given the nature of
their decision-making process or expectations of anticipated outcomes, the opportunity
costs of their actions, and their analysis of the costs denial or punishment threatened by
deterrence.

(2) If an emerging situation exceeds the existing authorities and resources of one
of the global campaigns, the joint force senior leadership (Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs)
analyzes the problem. Before determining and recommending an appropriate response, the
senior joint leadership diagnoses the situation. The considerations include determining the
range of possible outcomes and likely long-term consequences. As senior military leaders
come to their conclusions, they begin to form a globally integrated approach, which
includes the best uses of all the joint force.

15. Tailoring Headquarters and Forces

a. Organizing the Joint Force

(1) How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces affects the responsiveness
and versatility of joint operations. The JFC’s mission and operational approach, the principle
of unity of command, and a mission command philosophy are guiding principles to organize
the joint force for operations. JFCs can establish joint forces on a geographic or functional
basis. JFCs may centralize selected functions within the joint force but should not reduce

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the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow
Service and special operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities
to function as designed. However, against a peer enemy, the intended function may be
insufficient, irrelevant, or obsolete. All Service components contribute distinct capabilities
to joint operations that enable joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful
reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize their complementary
and reinforcing effects. The degree of interdependence varies with specific circumstances.
When JFCs organize their forces, they should also consider the degree of interoperability
among Service components, with multinational forces and other potential participants.
Complex or unclear command relationships are counterproductive to the synergy among
multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are essential. Similarly, JFCs
conducting domestic operations should consider overlapping responsibilities and
interoperability issues among the Active Component and Reserve Component forces.

(2) Understanding the OE

(a) The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and

influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the
commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and
space domains and the IE [which includes cyberspace]); EMOE; and other variables such
as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems that may be
present in the OE. The OE includes enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems
relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand
the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect
the joint task force (JTF) mission accomplishment.

(b) The JFC and staff can benefit from a comprehensive perspective of the
systems in the OE relevant to the mission and operation at hand. JIPOE is an analytic
process yielding tailored products that can assist the JFC in gaining a greater understanding
of the OE. Developing a systems view can promote a common understanding of the OE
among the joint force and other participating entities, thereby facilitating unified action. A
systems perspective of the OE strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems
relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety
of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective.
Understanding systems, their interaction with each other, and how systems’ relationships
will change over time is key. This understanding increases the JFC’s knowledge of how
actions within a system can affect other system components. A commonly shared dynamic
visual representation and associated Global Command and Control System-Joint data
management tools can help integrate and manage relevant data sources. This common
reference helps the commander and staff analyze COGs, critical vulnerabilities, critical
capabilities, and decisive points. Identifying decisive points helps commanders determine
LOOs and LOEs, refine objectives and desired and undesired effects, and provide planning
guidance for the operational approach.

(c) The JFC will face increasingly complex environments characterized by a

wide variety of participants, enemies using combinations of traditional warfare and IW,

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adversaries with capabilities to influence information, information flow, and global

interconnected relationships. The JIPOE products for an OE will assist the commander in
understanding and navigating the complex environment. This broader, more inclusive
approach to understanding the environment will assist in determining CCIRs and the
operation or campaign assessment activity.

For further information on the OE and systems perspective, refer to the Joint Guide for
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace
Operations; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) Physical Areas. The fundamental physical area in the OE is the JFC’s
assigned OA. This term encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which
joint forces conduct military operations. OAs include such descriptors as AOR, theater of
war, theater of operations, JOA, AOA, JSOA, and AO.

(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider many factors, to include
terrain (including urban settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and
other environmental conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment to the
OA and employment of joint capabilities; the location of and access to bases, ports, and
other supporting infrastructure; the physical results of armed conflicts; and both friendly
and enemy forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations
and sustainment. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and
ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions.
Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the
JFC determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic

Operations.

(3) Urban Areas. Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural
landscape, coupled with man-made construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting
in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military
operations in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban
areas, however, is not the infrastructure but the density of civilians. For example, industrial
areas and port facilities often are collocated with highly populated areas, creating the
opportunity for accidental or deliberate release of toxic industrial materials, which could
impact military operations. During military operations in an urban environment, joint
forces may not focus only on destruction of enemy forces but may also be required to take
steps necessary to protect and support civilians and their infrastructure from which they
receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE may be more restrictive than for
other types of operations. When planning for operations in an urban environment, the JFC
and staff should consider the impact of military operations on civilians, to include their
culture, values, and infrastructure, thereby viewing the urban area as a dynamic and
complex system—not solely as terrain. This insight implies the joint force should be

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capable of understanding the specific urban environment; sensing, locating, and isolating
the enemy among civilians; and applying combat power precisely and discriminately.

(4) Littoral Areas. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area
from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore.
Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended
directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime superiority.
Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, and forces to
achieve the JFC’s objectives. These operations facilitate the entry and movement of other
elements of the joint force through the seizure of an enemy’s port, naval base, or airbase.
Friendly access and freedom of maneuver within the littorals depend on the enemy’s
A2/AD actions and capabilities, such as the use of long-range fires and mines. The ability
to avoid detection and maneuver to evade can be reduced in the littorals due to the
proximity to enemy sensors and the lack of maneuver space, thus increasing risk.
Depending on the situation, mine warfare may be critical to control of the littoral areas.

(5) Orbital Areas. The space domain contains numerous physical hazards and
presents a dynamic and hostile environment. Earth’s atmosphere extends well above the
lower threshold for sustained orbital flight, expanding and contracting based on changes in
solar activity. Space was once a sanctuary from attack, but the emergence, advanced
development, and proliferation of a wide range of demonstrated counterspace weapons by
adversaries have reversed this paradigm. Today, threats can contest the United States in
space, like any other part of the OE, due to the increasing threat to orbiting assets by
adversary weapons systems.

c. Cultural, Political, and Socioeconomic Factors. The JFC and staff should
identify human factors and gain a deep understanding of the cultural, political, and
economic factors that may impact operations. These include:

(1) Cultural factors. These factors encompass the ethnic and religious aspects of
the populations within the OE. JFCs should understand how segregated or integrated these
groups are with each other. These factors should include the location of important religious
sites; physical and living cultural icons; and cultural controversies between regions, ethnic
groups, and religious groups. These factors include religious beliefs and sectarian
ideologies that motivate indigenous groups and influence their perceptions of the root
causes of their struggles.

(2) Political issues. These issues include major local and regional political issues,
to include existing or potential separatist or secessionist issues, historical ethnic or religious
animosities, gender perspectives, and cultural conflicts.

(3) Economic factors. These factors include historical, legal, and illicit trade
routes; food and water distribution channels; the condition of economic assets in the OE;
and the conditions of road, rail, and water transportation networks. Economic factors may
include the location and condition of local industries, farmlands, crops, access to markets,

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

SPACE AS AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Spacecraft operating beyond the protection of Earth’s magnetosphere

are not impacted by atmospheric drag but are exposed to solar wind.
Originating from the sun, solar wind presents a constant barrage of
radiation and charged particles capable of severely damaging a
spacecraft’s physical and electrical components. Space debris poses a
further risk to human activity in space. As the concentration of space
debris grows, debris-generating collisions become more prevalent,
further jeopardizing orbital flight safety and compromising the utility of
the space domain. There is no forward edge of the battle area behind
which military spacecraft can reconstitute and recover. Spacecraft
remain in orbit through all terrestrial circumstance where they are
potentially at risk from adversary counterspace capabilities and the
hostile space environment.

Various Sources

and sources and distributions of wealth. Other factors are matters that impact the health
and welfare perceptions of the local population.

(4) Sociocultural factors. Human factors and conditions are the foundation of
sociocultural analysis. Sociocultural analysis enables understanding of the threat’s cultural
nuances, to include age, gender, ethnic mix, religion, and other social factors present in the
OE.

(a) Gender. Gender is a component of sociocultural analysis due to its

influence on other identity activities between men and women in the OE, which are often
difficult to detect.

(b) Gender Perspective. Implementing a gender perspective can only be

done following a sociocultural analysis of the human aspects within the OA. A gender
perspective enables commanders to examine risks and trade-offs to determine COAs with
fewer unintended consequences to the HN population.

(c) Human Security. Human security emphasizes preventing, mitigating,

relieving, or reducing human suffering. JFCs consider human security during military
operations, such as stabilization activities, special operations, and FHA.

For more information on sociocultural analysis, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

d. IE. The IE comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, informational,

technical, and physical attributes that impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, and world
view. The IE also includes technical systems and their use of data. The IE is a factor
analyzed for its effect on a commander’s OE or OA. The OA may be comprised of one or
more commands. The JFC and staff consider the effects of all physical and informational
activities within their OE. Additionally, the JFC and staff consider time and space factors

IV-41
Chapter IV

of the operation or campaign on the operational and IEs to determine what is, or is not,
relevant at any given time and any given location.

(1) Information is pervasive throughout the OE and inseparable from military

activities. As competitors, adversaries, and enemies have become increasingly capable and
emboldened, they create political, social, and military advantages that exceed their
formerly assessed combat power. To address these complex challenges successfully,
commanders, planners, and operators must be competent warfighters in both the OE and
IE. The skill sets required to achieve success in either and both environments are co-
dependent and require understanding of the interrelationship of the informational, physical,
and human aspects within the OE and the IE. Informational aspects reflect the way
individuals, information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information.
Physical aspects are the material characteristics of the environment that create limitations
on and freedoms for the people and information systems that operate in it. Finally, human
perceptions frame the OE. Understanding the interplay between the informational,
physical, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.

(2) Cyberspace has a global reach that permeates all of the physical domains. It
consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on
cyberspace, which reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries—much of it
residing outside of US control—and integrates with the operation of critical infrastructures
and the conduct of commerce, governance, and national security. When commanders plan
and organize for operations, they should consider their critical dependencies on
information and cyberspace, including factors such as degradations to confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of information and information systems.

(3) Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace,

accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, and
enable other operational activities. CO rely on links and nodes in the physical domains
and perform functions in cyberspace and the physical domains. Similarly, activities in the
physical domains can create effects in and through cyberspace by affecting the EMS or the
physical infrastructure.

For more information on CO and the IE, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

e. EMS. The EMS is a maneuver space consisting of all frequencies of EM radiation

(oscillating electric and magnetic fields characterized by frequency and wavelength). The
EMS organizes by frequency bands, based on certain physical characteristics. The EMS
includes radio waves, microwaves, infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-
rays, and gamma rays. Over the last few decades, advances in EMS technologies have led
to an exponential increase in civil, commercial, and military EMS-enabled and dependent
capabilities. This proliferation, coupled with the US military’s heavy reliance on the EMS
and the low entry costs for adversaries, poses significant military challenges to the JFC.
JEMSO help achieve success, and EMS parity is essential to all joint operations.

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

For more information on the EMS and JEMSO operations, see JP 3-85, Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

f. Joint Force Organizational Options

(1) CCMDs. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad,

continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the
President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Unified
commands conduct broad, continuing missions requiring execution by significant forces of
two or more MILDEPs to achieve national objectives or other criteria found in JP 1,
Volume 1, Joint Warfighting; and Volume 2, The Joint Force. Specified commands are
normally composed of forces from one MILDEP but may include units and staff
representation from other MILDEPs. The UCP establishes missions, responsibilities, and
geographic AORs and functions to CCMDs. CCMDs have the authority to employ forces
within their commands to carry out assigned missions. They act as the coordinating
authority for planning and the supported commander in executing these missions. They
may simultaneously be a supporting commander to other CCDRs for planning and
executing the other CCDR’s missions. In addition, United States Special Operations
Command serves as SOF joint force provider and USCYBERCOM is a joint force provider
for cyberspace forces. United States Transportation Command serves as joint force
provider for mobility forces and joint enabling capabilities. USSPACECOM is a joint
force provider for space operations.

(2) Subordinate Unified Commands. When authorized by SecDef through the

CJCS, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands to
conduct operations continually IAW the criteria set forth for unified commands. DOD may
establish a subordinate unified command on a geographic area or functional basis.
Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities as those
of the commanders of unified commands. They exercise OPCON of assigned commands
and forces and normally of attached forces in the assigned operational or functional area.

(3) JTFs. A JTF is a joint force constituted and designated by SecDef, a CCDR,
a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing CJTF, to accomplish missions
with specific objectives, which do not require centralized control of logistics. However,
there may be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common support
capabilities delegated by the CCDR. CCDRs may establish JTFs on a geographical area
or functional basis. CCDRs can also establish JTFs based on a security challenge that
focuses on specific threats that cross AOR boundaries or multiple noncontiguous
geographic areas. The proper authority stands down a JTF when the JTF achieves the
assigned objectives or receives a change of mission. A joint task force-state (JTF-State)
may also establish under the C2 of their respective governor. This JTF-State will normally
be a subordinate element under a National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state.

(4) There are several ways to form a JTF HQ. Normally, a CCMD may employ
a Service component HQ or one of the Service component’s existing subordinate HQs (e.g.,
Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet, or Marine expeditionary force) as the
core of a JTF HQ and then augment that core with personnel and capabilities primarily

IV-43
Chapter IV

from the Services comprising the JTF and selected joint enablers. Also, the theater special
operations command (TSOC) or a subordinate SOF HQ with the C2 capability can form
the foundation for a JTF HQ. CCDRs verify the readiness of assigned Service HQ staff to
establish, organize, and operate as a JTF-capable HQ. JTF HQ basing depends on the JTF
mission, OE, and available capabilities and support. A JTF HQ can be land- or sea-based,
with transitions between both basing options. CCDRs normally assign a JOA to a JTF.
JTFs must be able to integrate effectively with USG departments and agencies,
multinational partners, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. When direct
participation by USG departments and agencies other than DOD is significant, the task
force (TF) establishing authority may designate it as a joint interagency TF. The
designation typically occurs when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal
authority, and the JFC provides supporting capabilities, such as FHA and DSCA.

g. Forming and training the joint force HQ and task organizing the joint force can be
challenging, particularly in escalatory and reactive situations. Joint forces must quickly
adjust both operations and organization in response to planned operational transitions or
unexpected situational transitions. Similarly, the JFC’s mission will affect the echelon at
which joint capabilities are best employed. Advances in areas ranging from
communications and information sharing to munitions effectiveness make it possible to
synchronize lower echelons of command in some situations without the risks and
inefficiencies associated with fragmenting the assets themselves. JFCs should exploit such
opportunities.

For further guidance on the formation and employment of a JTF HQ, refer to JP 3-33,
Joint Force Headquarters.

h. Component Options. CCDRs and subordinate unified commanders conduct either

single-Service or joint operations to accomplish a mission. All JFCs may conduct
operations through their Service component commanders, lower-echelon Service force
commanders, and functional component commanders. Further, functional and Service
components of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations,
not independent campaigns.

i. Service Components. Regardless of the organization and command arrangements

within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain
Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal
administration, personnel support, training, sustainment, and Service intelligence
operations. Conducting operations through Service components can provide certain
advantages up to a point, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. This
arrangement can be appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range
planning, with a relatively narrow scope of operations, dictate organizational integrity of
Service components. While sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are
exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed
common-user logistics lead Service, or DOD agency responsibilities.

j. Functional Components. The JFC can establish functional component commands

to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same

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 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions
apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of
forces from more than one Service closely relate to objectives, and unity of command is a
primary consideration. For example, functionally oriented components are useful when
the scope of operations is large and the JFC’s attention divides between major operations
or phases of operations that are functionally specific. Functionally oriented components
are useful when the scope of the campaign’s subordinate operations is broad. Functional
component commands are subordinate components of a joint force. Except for the joint
force special operations component and joint special operations TF, functional components
do not constitute a joint force with a JFC’s authorities and responsibilities, even when
composed of forces from two or more MILDEPs.

k. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them

primarily to coordinate selected functions. The JFC will normally designate the Service
component commander who has the preponderance of forces and the ability to exercise C2
over them as the functional component commander. However, the JFC considers the
mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and C2 capabilities when
selecting a commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must
not affect the command relationship between Service component commanders and the JFC.

l. The functional component commander’s staff composition should reflect the

command’s composition, so the staff has the required expertise to help the commander
effectively employ the component’s forces. Functional component staffs require advanced
planning, certification, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations.
Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination and support.
Individual augmentees fill staff billets and when the commander forms the functional
component staff for exercises and actual operations. The number of staff personnel should
be appropriate for the mission and nature of the operation. The staff structure should be
flexible enough to add or delete personnel and capabilities in changing conditions without
losing effectiveness.

m. The JFC designates forces and military capabilities that will be available for
tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command
relationship(s). JFCs may also establish a support relationship between components to
facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and
responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS, and the JFC
may alter their authority and responsibilities during an operation.

n. Combinations. JFCs often organize their joint forces with a combination of

Service and functional components. For example, joint forces organized with Service
components normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC, while their conventional air
forces are organized under a JFACC. The JFC designates the authorities and
responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS.

o. SOF Employment Options

IV-45
Chapter IV

(1) JFCs use SOF independently, with conventional force support (since USC
limits SOF combat support and combat service support) or integrated with conventional
forces. SOF provides strategic options for national leaders and the CCMDs. In execution,
SOF works through a global network that fully integrates military, interagency, and
international partners. SOF is most effective when special operations integrate into the
plan, and the execution of special operations is through proper SOF C2 elements employed
intact.

(2) Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM),

synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides SOF to support persistent,
networked, and distributed CCMD operations to protect and advance national interests.

(3) CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM of all SOF. CCDRs exercise OPCON

of their supporting TSOCs and most often exercise OPCON of SOF deployed in their
AORs. The establishing directive will define the command relationships between the
special operations commands and JTF/TF commanders. A TSOC commander can be the
JTF commander.

For more information on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special
Operations. For joint HQ augmentation options, there are various options available to
augment a joint HQ that is forming for joint operations. See JP 3-33, Joint Force
Headquarters, for more information.

p. Organizing the Joint Force HQ. Joint force HQs include those for unified,
subordinate unified, and specified commands and JTFs. While each HQ organizes to
accommodate the nature of the JFC’s OA, mission, tasks, and preferences, all generally
follow a traditional functional staff alignment (i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations,
logistics, plans, and communications). The primary staff functional areas are also generally
consistent with those at Service component HQs, which facilitate higher, lower, and lateral
cross-command staff coordination and collaboration. Some HQs may combine functions
under a staff principal, while other HQs may add staff principals. Based on the mission
and other factors, some joint HQs may have additional primary staff organizations focused
on areas such as engineering, force structure, resource, assessment, and CMO.

16. Partner Alignment

a. The US military cannot achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic objectives

acting alone. Allies and partners are an important aspect of the global campaigns. In the
conduct of military activities, the joint force may rely on partners to increase capacity,
access unique capabilities and authorities, share intelligence, and extend operational reach
to achieve objectives. However, many strategic challenges exist that military force cannot
solve alone—especially in competition but also during post-combat consolidation and
stabilization activities. Global integration uses a comprehensive approach, to include
considerations of nonmilitary means to address these challenges and achieve operation-
level objectives. Interorganizational partnerships are the sources of these means. The term
“by, with, and through” describes how the joint force achieves military objectives
alongside allies and partners. The partners may operate independently, with other allies

IV-46 JP 3-0
 Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

and partners cooperating in the same OE, and indirectly, and often non-overtly, through
bilateral support to and cooperation with resistance partners, and unilaterally by employing
surrogates operating under the direction and control of the JFC.

b. Collaborating with partners can increase the capability and capacity of the joint
force and partners to achieve the JFC’s objectives. Partnering is often a response to a
problem, crisis, or opportunity that individual countries cannot respond to or address on
their own. Furthermore, problems that are complex can motivate partnering to further
understanding and collective problem solving. Successful partnering and collective action
can change the direction of a complex, uncertain, and evolving situation. Partners are
especially important in identifying and influencing HN attitudes toward friendly forces and
threats. Partners can have information, intelligence, or established relationships that are
essential to mission accomplishment.

c. Effective partnering achieves unity of effort. This partnering can include the ability
to conduct operations and activities. Partnering can increase the effectiveness of
interagency partners, international partners, and relations with HN groups who can provide
assistance. The ability to leverage established relationships with domestic and foreign
institutions, countries, or populations is often essential to the joint force accomplishing
assigned missions. Partnering can potentially foster innovations by linking partners who
may approach problems differently. Partnerships can also allow for greater responsiveness
and flexibility, as partners may have greater authority or autonomy to respond to certain
issues or quicker decision-making processes. This is enabled through sharing information,
communications, and trust-based ownership of the problem. Best practices are shared
among partners, and efforts should be made to identify shortfalls early and ensure
accountability across partners.

d. The understanding and analysis of partners and friendly networks can be as

important as it is for threats. While successful collaboration may not be sufficient to ensure
success, lack of it can often ensure failure. It is essential to understand how partners assess
threats (or the threat networks) and how they may prioritize them in the context of any
other threats. This mapping may provide assessments of overlap and/or divergence of
interests up front.

e. DOD facilitates and supports the participation of essential partners by embedding

liaison elements to strengthen relationships, improve communication and information
flow, and accelerate decision making. Beyond the USG, the joint force aligns efforts with
allies and partners by developing common tactical, operational, and strategic approaches;
conducting regular combined training and exercises; and assigning liaisons who are
culturally astute and fluent in the partner’s language. A commander’s training and
education reinforces a culture of collaboration. Training and education provide methods
for building partnerships, absent the authority to compel teamwork. Partnership with the
private sector is particularly important for CO, logistic support, and transportation. Partner
alignment builds a common understanding and trust that facilitates global integration.
Commercial support to operations can provide significant capability but may also pose
inherent risk. Commercial capabilities support all layers of the global campaign such as

IV-47
Chapter IV

compete below the level of armed conflict, surge forces, defeat adversary aggression, and
defend the homeland. JFCs should not expect assured access to commercial capabilities as
the commercial sector is competitive and congested. Commanders using commercial
support must assess and mitigate risk accordingly.

f. Resilience. Enemy capabilities have increased the need for a resilient joint force.
The joint force achieves resiliency through iterations of experience, training, and
education. Examples include professional military education and development, force
protection measures, depth, exchangeability, interoperability, and dispersal so that a single
attack cannot disable it. Depth provides the ability to replace capacity and capability with
reserves and the industrial base to produce new assets. Exchangeability is substituting an
asset for a lost one. JFCs employ multifunctional units and equipment. These units are
modular and scalable, which increases exchangeability and operational flexibility.
Dispersal eliminates vulnerability to a single point of failure. These considerations extend
to the commercial infrastructure on which the joint force heavily depends, at home and
abroad.

g. Force protection includes hardening physical barriers against attack and virtual
barriers to protect against malicious cyberspace activity, EM pulse, and other disruptions.

IV-48 JP 3-0
 CHAPTER V
THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM
 
1. Introduction

a. Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As state and non-

state actors seek to protect and advance their interests, they continually compete over
incompatible aims. The Cold War was a clear example of the many facets of international
competition. Rather than engaging in direct armed conflict with the other, each state fought
through and with surrogates as an indirect means to achieve their strategic objectives. Yet,
the two superpowers also cooperated, such as when both backed actions in the UN Security
Council. Just as competitors can cooperate, friendly states can compete. Within an
alliance, individual nations naturally seek to tilt policy in the direction most advantageous
for their interests. Diplomats, trade representatives, and other members of the USG who
regularly interact with foreign counterparts intuitively recognize that any strategic
relationship mixes elements of both competition and cooperation. In general, competition
is the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, advantage, and leverage
necessary to advance and protect their respective interests. Competition is continuous
because the conditions that define an acceptable state are constantly changing. Success
requires perpetual adaptation in the application of all instruments of national power. There
are four core elements of competition. The primary element is a nation’s interests and the
interrelated aspects are influence, advantage, and leverage through which a nation advances
and protects its interests.

(1) Interests are qualities, principles, matters of self-preservation, and concepts

that a nation or actor values and seeks to protect or achieve concerning other competitors.
Interests are contextual and may include the maintenance of physical security, economic
prosperity, continuity of government and culture at home, and value projection in the
geopolitical environment, as well as emotional triggers (e.g., fear, honor, glory), and other
drivers (e.g., virtual, cognitive) that animate action. Campaigning and interagency actions
support a strategy framed by national interests that enables the USG to identify adversaries,
threats, and opportunities to promote and protect those interests. An interest-led
orientation, including understanding adversary interests more thoroughly, is the
cornerstone of a comprehensive approach to competition.

(2) Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways.
An actor can accumulate, spend, or lose influence. JFCs require informed assessments
about the degrees of influence over another actor’s understanding, locus of power,
populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic matters.

(3) Advantage is superiority of position or condition. States may create an

advantage by the accumulation of influence toward the desired effect or acceptable
condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage through the exercise of the
instruments of national power. An advantage may be comprised of physical or virtual
aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as
more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, morale, and skill).

V-1
Chapter V

Commanders establish advantage partially through activities generating recognizable

qualitative or quantitative competitive advantage, such as during the Cold War strategic
arms race.

(4) Leverage is the application of advantage gained to create an effect or exploit

an opportunity. From a position of leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and
protecting its interests. Leverage also involves applying deep understanding of other actors
and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success.

b. Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other major
powers take form through nonmilitary and noncoercive activities. Competitors are seeking
influence and control over developments both within their regions and within peripheries.
To do this, they can implement strategies of co-optation and attraction as they are often
more effective than coercion. These actions may present or appear to be altruistic but
always serve the initiator’s interests, even when the recipient benefits. Moreover, some
activities provide leverage in both categories—a form of attraction that can become
coercive if necessary. The core US strategy in the Cold War reflects this complex mixture
of approaches. In its most fundamental aspects, it was attractive. The United States offered
access to an economic market, including the leading economies of the world, a powerful
source of cultural appeal, democratic values, and other factors that created a gravitational
effect for countries pursuing their economic and political self-interest.

c. A comprehensive approach to competition recognizes the importance of

noncoercive strategies in gaining a competitive advantage. Targeting only a rival’s
coercive activities is not enough. If a peer competitor has success with attractive measures,
it will rarely need to apply coercive measures. Successful competition requires clear
strategies and tools optimized to oppose the attractive aspects of an adversary’s approach
as well as counter their coercive measures and intimidation.

ATTRACTION: A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

A traditional message is that association with the United States and our
alliances and trade agreements offer a far more attractive option for a
nation’s security and prosperity. Attraction can be a powerful message
and an effective approach. Currently, the United States faces
competitors that are doing their best to create a version of the same
attractive strategy. Their core approach to competition is through
economic means, using the magnet of their markets and the trading
relationships and more targeted benefits of their foreign direct
investments and foreign aid. Adversaries can turn these same tools into
coercive means through economic sanctions and hostile information
campaigns. A preferred approach is one of assurance, persuasion,
attraction, and mutual benefit rather than coercion, subversion, or
intimidation.

Various Sources

V-2 JP 3-0
 The Competition Continuum

d. The current OE requires a more nuanced consideration than a simple peace and war
binary model. Strategic competitors, operating below the threshold of armed conflict,
employ a mixture of instruments of national power to achieve significant strategic
advantages. They act in a manner calculated not only to avoid triggering a legal right to
respond by force but to attract and persuade other states to align with their interests.
Civilian and military leadership need to recognize and understand how to describe and
participate in this competitive OE effectively.

2. Competition Continuum Overview

a. The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted

through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. These descriptors refer
to the relationship between the United States and another strategic actor (state or non-state)
concerning a set of specific policy objectives. This description allows for simultaneous
interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition
continuum. For instance, the United States might be in a state of competition with a
strategic competitor regarding some interests, such as freedom of navigation in disputed
areas, and cooperation in others, such as counter-piracy. By providing a lexicon to describe
this complexity, the competition continuum facilitates shared understanding, both within
DOD and with the interagency partners who often have a leading role. The lexicon enables
better and more precise communication, planning, and decision making.

b. Elements of the Competition Continuum

(1) Cooperation. Situations in which joint forces take actions with another
strategic partner in pursuit of policy objectives. Cooperation does not preclude some
element of competition or even armed conflict when their objectives are not in complete
alignment. Within cooperation, joint force actions may include SC activities, multinational
training and exercises, information sharing, personnel exchange programs, and other
military engagement activities. Military cooperation may also occur in the form of
multinational operations and activities during armed conflict or competition.

(2) Competition. Competition is when joint forces or multinational forces take

actions outside of armed conflict against a state or non-state adversary in pursuit of policy
objectives, but neither seeks armed conflict. These actions are typically nonviolent and
conducted under greater legal or policy constraints than in armed conflict but can include
lethal and nonlethal actions by the joint force or sponsorship of surrogates or partners.
Competition does not preclude some cooperation in other areas. Competition may include
diplomatic and economic activities, political subversion, intelligence and CI activities, CO,
OIE, special operations, and other nonviolent or intermediate force activities to achieve
mutually incompatible objectives while seeking to avoid armed conflict. Joint force actions
may include combinations of offense, defense, and stabilization activities; SC activities;
MISO; freedom of navigation exercises; and other nonviolent military engagement
activities. Competition does not preclude armed conflict or cooperation in other areas.
Concurrent with competition, state or non-state forces may engage in forms of armed
conflict (e.g., external support of an insurgency, COIN, or resistance movement).

V-3
Chapter V

(3) Armed Conflict/War. Armed conflict/war occurs when military forces take
actions against an enemy in hostilities or declared war. International law distinguishes
armed conflict from disturbances (e.g., riots, violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict
and the organization of the parties.

c. The competition continuum describes, from the joint force perspective, the
environment in which the United States applies the instruments of national power (i.e.,
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve objectives. In practice, all
instruments of national power should function together as an interrelated and integrated
whole.

d. Cooperation, competition, and armed conflict can, and often do, occur
simultaneously. Cooperation is a feature of nearly every significant military action because
the joint force rarely operates unilaterally in any significant operation or campaign. In an
interconnected world, there are few circumstances in which a major joint force activity
does not have some ramifications for competition with at least one of the US’s global or
regional rivals. Cooperation and competition are always occurring, and the presence or
absence of armed conflict is normally the only variable element. In either case, the joint
force will be conducting cooperative activities with partners and competitive activities
below armed conflict to counter adversaries who are seeking to turn the competition or
conflict to their advantage. The joint force is never solely in cooperation but instead
campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict calculated to
achieve the desired strategic objectives.

e. Description of Key Terms

(1) Cooperation

(a) Collaborate Selectively. Cooperate with a partner (who is often a

competitor elsewhere) to achieve a specific objective.

(b) Maintain. Sustain an open-ended cooperative relationship with an ally

or partner and secure bilateral advantage but without a significant increase in resources or
commitment.

(c) Advance. Establish and improve an open-ended cooperative relationship

with an ally or partner by significantly increasing resources or commitment.

(2) Competition

(a) Counter. Proactively challenge and prevent the competitor from

achieving incompatible objectives, without causing an escalation to armed conflict.

(b) Enhance. Actively seek to achieve strategic objectives; improve relative

strategic or military advantage.

V-4 JP 3-0
 The Competition Continuum

(c) Contest. Maintain relative strategic or military advantage to ensure the

competitor achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the US advantage, when
possible, with existing resources and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests
elsewhere.

(d) Limit. Minimize the adversary’s gains. Achieve the best possible
strategic objective within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser
objective entails the risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

(3) Armed Conflict

(a) Defeat. Create a temporary condition where the enemy cannot achieve
its operational-level objectives due to loss of capability or will.

(b) Deny. Frustrate the strategic objectives of the enemy.

(c) Degrade. To the greatest extent possible, reduce the enemy’s ability and
will, within resource constraints and acceptable risk.

(d) Disrupt. Temporarily interrupt the enemy’s activities or the effectiveness

of enemy organizations.

3. Cooperation

a. Cooperation can be an enduring activity where the relationship with the ally or
partner is in place and will continue for the foreseeable future. However, cooperation in
specific areas with a partner whose overall relationship with the United States is neutral or
even adversarial may be necessary. Cooperative activities can take many forms, like
counterpiracy activities, capability and capacity building through security force assistance
(SFA) or conducting multinational operations in armed conflict. The common thread is
that joint campaigns and operations through cooperation are purposeful activities to
achieve or maintain policy objectives.

b. Joint campaigns and operations during cooperation require productive

relationships. A partnership is unlikely to reach its potential if the joint force approaches
military engagement as discrete events rather than as part of a deliberate, continuous
process. Commanders and staffs develop an understanding of the OE, a realistic appraisal
of the partners’ objectives, and the nature of the partners’ relationship with the United
States to derive a range of feasible and productive military and nonmilitary options that
lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes. If done well, the resulting relationships can
yield immediate tactical and operational benefits as well as enduring benefits, such as the
increased commitment of a foreign military to the rule of law or greater willingness to
assist US efforts. Though the immediate benefits of cooperative relationships are not
always apparent, history demonstrates that long-term relationships can pay dividends in
unanticipated ways.

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Chapter V

c. Cooperation aids efforts in competition and armed conflict by integrating the

contributions of partners and allies. Cooperation is not subordinate to competition. If
credible, these actions reassure the partner of US capability and intentions, making the
partner more likely to deepen the cooperation. This can lead to increased intelligence
sharing, allowing greater US presence, or more closely integrating its air defenses into a
regional network. If cooperation creates a more favorable situation in the region, then it
counters the adversary’s pursuit of their objectives. Simply put, cooperation is the US
asymmetric response to competition. Rather than exchanging like-for-like responses with
adversaries that operate under fewer restrictions on their actions, cooperation exploits the
joint forces’ competitive advantages as a partner of choice.

4. Competition

a. Competition tends to occur over extended periods of time. In comparison to armed

conflict, actions are often more indirect, risks are different, and the expenditure of
resources less intense, thus allowing for a more protracted effort. Generally, successful
competition requires an appropriate alignment and blend of multiple instruments of
national power. As an inherently constrained and measured approach, coercion is not
generally used by competitors requiring quick results. For the joint force to successfully
campaign through competition, it may adopt a similar long-term approach but one nuanced
and flexible enough to react to rapid changes in the strategic environment. These
competing demands create challenges for commanders and staffs who work through
processes to employ military forces that operate on different, and often stringent, time
horizons. The JFCs identify and request authorities and permissions for actions, activities,
additional access, sharing information, and coordination with interorganizational partners.
JFCs set conditions to enable the maximum range of options to accommodate and respond
to changing political and diplomatic situations.

b. The methods employed in competition will vary with the situation, but successful
action will feature several characteristics. First, the joint force begins with the best possible
understanding of the relevant actors and how they will perceive the action. Second, the
joint force and its partners should conduct a broad array of activities: dynamic force
employment, establish access to critical areas, forward position units, establish an
appropriate and timely presence, organize exercises, share intelligence, prepare the OE for
a response to a contingency, and conduct OIE, to include efforts to counter and undermine
the adversary’s narrative. Third, the joint force and its partners ensure the creative and
flexible conduct of activities within a fluid situation. Fourth, the joint force conducts
continual assessment of the adversary’s intentions and capabilities, as these aspects will
change over time. To have tangible effects on an adversary’s behavior, it is essential to
have a deep understanding of their perceptions and decision making. Additionally, the
joint force facilitates the close alignment of diplomatic, informational, and military efforts.
Finally, in comparison to armed conflict, competition can use indirect rather than direct
use of military power.

c. The enduring nature of competition poses unique challenges for the consolidation
of strategic objectives. Local successes rarely mean the end of the larger competition and
few gains are reliably permanent. In this context, consolidation is an ongoing effort to

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 The Competition Continuum

protect and advance national interests and position the joint force for the next evolution of
competition.

d. Competition reflects a choice by the USG to pursue policy objectives while

constraining military actions, so they remain short of armed conflict. Though this
competition will typically be against an adversary that has also resolved to compete below
armed conflict, the two competitors will rarely be equal in willingness to commit resources
and accept risk. This policy asymmetry is a defining feature of competition below armed
conflict. When the United States is more committed than the adversary, the joint force
seeks to translate the operational advantage of greater resources and risk acceptance to
achieve strategic objectives. When the adversary is willing to exert greater effort than the
United States, the joint force seeks the best possible outcome under the circumstances.

5. Armed Conflict/War

a. Armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale,

scope, and totality. Joint forces integrate capabilities across CCMDs to conduct combat
operations and defeat the enemy’s capabilities, strategy, and will. However, even during
periods of armed conflict, success depends on the effective conduct of ongoing cooperative
and competitive activities. Commanders and staff recognize the interrelated nature of these
various elements. Civilian and military leaders should regard these elements as an
integrated effort. In some instances, this might mean adopting what would normally be a
suboptimal military COA in relation to armed conflict to bolster the US position within a
cooperative relationship with an ally or concerning a third-party competitor.

b. The joint force should also campaign in armed conflict with a long-term view
toward the transition period following the end of the main period of armed conflict. Rarely
do wars cease with an immediate and complete end of armed conflict. Wars disrupt
political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions, so it is often
impossible to return to a pre-conflict state. Destruction of government and societal
institutions can create conditions for intense competition among internal, regional, and
global actors seeking to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a new
order. Thus, the joint force might fight in an armed conflict against enemy combatants
who become guerrillas, warlords, or criminal militias. Global or regional competitors can
then exploit these conditions by supporting these groups as partners or surrogates to
continue the armed conflict. Therefore, the immediate “post-war” period still requires the
joint force to campaign through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed
conflict, and armed conflict. Violent, chaotic transitions are more difficult when significant
resources withdraw and redeploy because perceptions of an idealistic “peace” has returned.
Another significant complication is that ongoing military activities may be essential to
maintaining an acceptable security situation but may support the activities of other USG
departments or agencies or interorganizational partners.

6. The Competition Continuum and Deterrence

a. Deterrence applies across the competition continuum, though in different fashions

according to the situation. Deterrence applies to cooperation. US cooperation with various

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allies and partners can serve as a deterrent of aggression by others. This cooperation ideally
serves to deter subversion, coercion, or open aggression against the United States and
potentially against others within the partnership or network through an understanding or
perception of the potential negative implications of their actions.

b. Deterrence in competition has a similar nuance and may be harder to judge. For
instance, if an adversary supports a surrogate in a neighboring country, this is not proof
that deterrence has failed. The adversary might have preferred to make an overt incursion
but concluded the risks were too great. In that case, successful integrated deterrence of
armed conflict led to competition. Perhaps the adversary might have employed surrogates
or partners, but successful intelligence and SC between the United States and an ally caused
them to conclude such operations would be fruitless, so they confined their actions to
propaganda to discredit the United States. Once again, the act of competition may be the
result of successful deterrence rather than its failure. In addition, as with armed conflict,
the joint force can deter future actions in competition below armed conflict by effectively
responding to current challenges. If the United States’ counter to an adversary’s use of
surrogates or partners drives failure, then other adversaries might not resort to similar
methods in the future.

c. During armed conflict, integrated deterrence continues and requires effort and
consideration. In other instances, integrated deterrence must unfold over extended periods.
The joint force seeks to deter a conventional attack against a partner or ally. However,
even if that occurs, it is still possible to deter the attacker from expanding the war
geographically (by attacking US installations elsewhere) or using certain forms of weapons
(e.g., WMD). In some cases, deterrence may fail because an adversary miscalculates the
United States’ will or capability. If the adversary’s actions stall or collapse, the deterrence
might influence future adversaries from taking similar risks.

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 CHAPTER VI
JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN COOPERATION AND
ADVERSARIAL COMPETITION

1. Introduction

a. The joint force rarely operates unilaterally. In any significant campaign,

cooperation is a feature of nearly every substantive military action. In an interconnected
world, most major joint force activity includes some ramifications for competition with a
global or regional rival or adversary. Cooperation and competition are perpetual. The joint
force conducts cooperative activities with allies and partners and competitive activities to
counter adversaries who seek to turn the competition to their advantage. Competition
between states is the natural order and may not always have adversarial or malign
characteristics. Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other
major powers can be attractive and noncoercive activities. As competitors seek to
influence and control developments both within their regions and periphery, proposals of
collaboration and attraction are often more effective than coercion. No matter how
rewarding the offer seems, these actions are not altruistic and serve the initiator’s interests.
In many cases, these overtures provide leverage that can become coercive, such as threats
to decrease aid or to reduce trade. A comprehensive approach to competition should
account for the importance of noncoercive strategies in gaining a competitive advantage.
Targeting only an adversary’s coercive activities is not enough. Successful cooperation
and competition require clear strategies and tools optimized to increase resilience,
influence, advantage, and leverage while countering adversaries’ strategies of appeal and
coercion. The role of the joint force in cooperation and competition may be to support
USG efforts to compete successfully. The joint force’s primary responsibility is to achieve
operational objectives that establish conditions that enable other USG departments and
agencies to achieve strategic objectives.

b. Cooperative elements of global campaigns are typically enduring activities without

discrete start or endpoints. Cooperation may entail some combination of strengthening ties
with an ally or partner and advancing a broader theater or global strategy. The joint force
typically consolidates gains in cooperation through sustained military engagement with
partners. In some cases, however, limited or selective interaction might be either necessary
or preferable. JFCs should apply best practices as broadly applicable, even as the statutory
and policy guidance governing SC continues to evolve.

c. Competition arises when one actor chooses to challenge the status quo or existing
norms while another chooses to resist. The intensity with which either chooses to press the
competition will often change in response to their perceptions of the other’s intent and will.
Thus, a rigid, pre-determined course of military action will often be unsuitable for
competition, which can drive rapid shifts in the OE. These shifts create numerous
challenges for the joint force as establishing the necessary conditions for employing
military forces—administrative and logistical preparations. Effective actions in
competition include the granting of appropriate authorities and orders, securing access,

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coordination with interorganizational partners, and securing and executing funds, which
requires considerable time.

2. Global Integration of Cooperation and Competition

a. JFCs account for external considerations such as the desired conditions that
cooperation should create the nature of the relevant relationships and the potential partner’s
willingness and capacity. Commanders also account for internal considerations such as the
interests, objectives, and priorities of other contributing USG departments and agencies;
resource limitations; relevant statutory or policy restrictions on the amount, categories, and
purposes of US SC expenditure; and other policy on SC that is relevant to the specific
situation. Just as in armed conflict, the employment of the military instrument of national
power, in concert with interagency partner efforts, seeks to achieve operational objectives
in pursuit of strategic objectives. The duration is important because the most productive
cooperative relationships take time to build and are unlikely to reach their potential if
conducted as a series of episodic or discrete events.

b. As the force campaigns through cooperation, military leaders and planners

understand and assess the character of the US relationship with each partner. In practice,
bilateral relations are complex and include many subordinate elements. As they span many
different activities, these relationships may be multifaceted. For instance, with a smaller,
developing country, intelligence agencies might have a deliberately distant relationship,
while the Air Force might have a limited relationship based on partner capacity. In
contrast, the Army might have an extensive relationship due to partner contributions to
international efforts aligned with the United States.

c. Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of international

waters, international airspace, orbital space, and cyberspace. Cooperation helps assure
allies and maintain operational access despite changing US overseas defense posture and
the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. A CCMD can promote favorable
conditions across the globe by aligning interests and pursuing mutual objectives. Relevant
CCMD activities include KLEs, such as bilateral and multinational exercises, and missions
to train, advise, and equip foreign forces to improve their capability, capacity, and national
institutions. Negotiations to secure basing and transit rights can help establish relationships
and formalize support agreements. The use of grants and contracts to improve relationships
can enhance resiliency, cooperative planning conferences, and multinational plans.

(1) Assessment of CCPs adds to DOD’s depth of understanding of an

environment; a partner’s viewpoint of that OE; and where the United States, allies, and
partners have common interests. This understanding allows the United States to use the
relationships effectively across the OE. These initiatives help advance national security
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk
of employing US military forces in a conflict.

(2) Partnerships can enhance the USG understanding of an adversary’s

capabilities and intent. In the best case, the USG and PNs cooperative action can avert the
rise and diminish the risk of armed conflict.

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3. Considerations for Cooperation

a. Cooperation enables and reinforces adversarial competition and armed conflict by

integrating the contributions of partners and allies. When, in discussion with allies and
partners, commanders identify mutual concerns and opportunities to pursue beneficial
pursuits between states surrounding a specific interest or set of interests and adjust details
for implementation. JFCs leverage the interrelations of different groups and organizations
and their impact on relevant cooperative activities within a broader political, economic,
and cultural context. JFCs determine a cooperative approach and identify the most
effective tools and how best to employ those tools to support mutual concerns. As
situations continue to evolve, so do the discussion and adaptation of mutual concerns
between states. Cooperation enables competition and armed conflict. Particularly where
an adversary seeks to overturn the existing security order, efforts to limit or counter these
actions are more effective through cooperation with partners that seek to build resilience
against subversion and capacity to resist coercion and deter violent attack. Through
cooperative measures, the joint force ensures the continuance of mutual pursuits with
established allies or supports the initiation of new partnerships. In this role, commanders
do not seek to coerce an adversary or intervene in a situation in any martial way. The joint
force’s presence and a JFC’s actions are a signal to adversaries. Presence for cooperation
seeks to reduce the likelihood of a crisis and mitigate the consequences if one occurs. In
cooperation, joint force employment should not represent a show of support to one partner
over other cooperative partners. Through cooperation, the joint force symbolizes and
manifests a desire or willingness to obtain, strengthen, or solidify a relationship. The
degree and tempo of individual operations, activities, and investments with a specific state
represent the relationship’s level of maturity. These cooperative relationships have unique
qualities and provide great value. Just as important, cooperative arrangements provide
essential contributions in adversarial competition below armed conflict and armed conflict
for both the United States and the partner.

b. Cooperative activities include a broad scope of military engagement and SC

activities within the CCP. Cooperation may also involve FHA and CMO. United States
Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command may cooperate with federal,
state, and interorganizational authorities while performing DSCA. These activities
generally occur continuously in a CCMD’s AOR in parallel with other ongoing operations.
In many instances, the military cooperates to support efforts of interagency partners and
international organizations to achieve broader USG objectives. Military engagement and
SC activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities aligned with
the efforts of interorganizational participants. The joint force executes these activities as
part of a CCP and country plan objectives.

c. Cooperation includes mutually beneficial relationships with strategic partners with

similar or compatible interests. Although interests will rarely be in complete alignment,
fundamentally cooperative relations are strategically important for the United States
because they underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to ensure
access, enable burden sharing, and deter conflict. In cooperation, the joint force works
conscientiously and purposefully with others to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.
Efforts intended to strengthen ties and improve the security capabilities of allies and

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partners support objectives of the GCPs and CCPs. Considerations for effective
cooperative activities include:

(1) Identification of the conditions JFCs can create within the security
environment that favor US interests.

(2) Recognition of the state and character of US partner relationships.

(3) Determination of our partners’ propensity, likelihood, and capacity to act in a

manner aligned with our interests.

(4) Conduct interest mapping with allies and partners over mutual concerns and
opportunities.

(5) Comprehension of other USG departments and agencies’ interests, objectives,

and priorities with respect to the specific circumstance.

(6) Understanding the amount, scope, categories, and purposes of all the US
foreign assistance funding Congress planned for the relevant area(s).

(7) Analysis of how the joint force can most aptly apply the existing authorities
and resources to the specific area and issue.

d. There is nothing routine concerning cooperation. The environment is dynamic and

demands critical understanding and constant reassessment of the targets, objectives, and
the results of cooperative efforts. These considerations enable JFCs to organize a campaign
in these conditions and run throughout preparation, execution, and assessment. They
underpin and characterize proactive methods and measures. A detailed description of each
consideration follows.

(1) Identify Future Conditions. Commanders identify the required future

conditions that favor US interests. Additionally, commanders develop expectations for
cooperation with allies and partners. Purposes for cooperation are usually in the context
of seeking favorable and beneficial conditions of a specific security environment. These
are:

(a) Cooperate selectively. When cooperation may be transactional,

commanders critically assess the objective of the cooperation and the conditions under
which the United States chooses to cooperate. Cooperation can be to maintain a broader
relationship, transactionally targeted toward the maintenance of a critical US objective or
a combination where the interests of partners may diverge with the sole aim of achieving
US objectives when the maintenance of a larger relationship with the partner is not
desirable or worthwhile.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

(b) Maintain. Cooperate to maintain relationships and secure bilateral

advantage but without a significant increase in resources or commitment unless strictly in
accord with overriding US interests.

(c) Advance. Expand cooperative activities most appropriately (e.g.,

building partner capacity, increasing interoperability, and expanding joint force access) to
achieve US objectives while also enabling or advancing partner interests.

(2) Recognizing the Character of Current Relationships. In addition to

determining the desired condition, military leaders and planners will normally exercise
long-standing or emerging relationships to pursue those conditions. Many relationships
are mature and enduring, while others are nascent or merely transactional. Recognizing
the state or character of those relationships relative to the United States and the preferred
condition is key. At other times, the United States realizes it does not have the necessary
relationship to address a certain interest, and therefore, must establish one.

(3) State of Partners’ National Power and Propensities. CCDRs determine

whether a partner’s propensity has a strong tendency to take action that aligns with US
interests. CCDRs establish expectations based on a partner’s similar interests. This
propensity may be a function of a state’s control over its sovereignty and the capacity of
its governing institutions. The propensity ranges from a well-established state to a fragile
state with little to no functioning institutions and whose sovereignty is under duress from
both internal and external influences.

(4) Identify Mutual Concerns. JFCs conduct interest mapping with allies and
partners over mutual concerns and opportunities. Interest mapping is recognizing mutual
concerns and beneficial pursuits between states surrounding a specific interest or set of
interests. Successful mapping aids JFCs in negotiating and adjusting details for
implementation. Military and civilian leaders focus on the interrelations of different groups
and organizations and their impact on relevant cooperative activities. Interest mapping
considers the competing priorities of allies and partners that may override their mutual
interest with the joint force and recognize likely situations when and where this might
occur. Interest mapping informs the cooperative approach and identifies the most effective
tools and how best to employ those tools. As situations continually evolve, commanders
should consider interest mapping as a continuous aspect of execution and assessment.

(5) Understand and align with other USG Departments and Agencies’ Interests.
Other USG departments and agencies will have direct or indirect interests, objectives, and
priorities concerning the objectives. The integration of activities across the interagency
partners is a normal occurrence. The key is being able to understand and appreciate other
USG priorities, objectives, and their associated activities that may well have a bearing on
the joint force’s desired outcomes. For greater cooperation, the joint force may assure an
ally or partner, enhance interoperability to meet mutually agreed upon security objectives,
collectively deter an adversary, or even prepare for conflict.

(6) Understanding US Foreign Assistance Funding. The United States provides

foreign assistance in response to global needs, assists people overseas struggling to build a

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better life, and makes the world safer. Commanders comprehend where the United States
is committing foreign assistance funding and effort in a manner or region that affects
regional security situations. Foreign assistance is aid given by the United States to other
countries to support global cooperation, security, and development efforts and, when
necessary, provide humanitarian response and relief. The joint force has a role in
implementing or maintaining the conditions to implement these programs effectively. In
simpler terms, foreign assistance is the unilateral transfers of US resources (funds, goods,
and services) by the USG to or for the benefit of foreign entities (including international
and regional organizations) without any reciprocal payment or transfer of resources from
the foreign entities. Foreign assistance is not merely funds or commodities; it also includes
the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, training, education, and other
services, as well as the direct costs required to implement foreign assistance. JFCs
understand the DOD SC guidelines and determine which of these applies to the
circumstance and the condition the joint force will pursue. These areas contract and expand
over time. Current guidance outlines these focus areas, but the USG can revise these at
any time. Typical and historical programs for cooperation are:

(a) Capacity building.

(b) Operational capacity and capability building.

(c) Human capacity and human capital development.

(d) Institutional capacity and security sector reform (SSR).

(e) Support for institutional capacity and civil-sector capacity building.

(f) Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization.

(g) Facilitating access and relationships.

(h) Gaining operational access and global freedom of action.

(i) Intelligence and information sharing.

(j) Assurance and regional confidence building.

(k) International armaments cooperation.

(l) International suasion and collaboration.

(7) Apply Existing Authorities and Resources to Specific Situations. CCDRs

analyze how best to apply existing authorities and resources toward specific GCP and CCP
objectives, enabling the joint force to organize the essential and optimal capabilities to
foster favorable conditions, leverage initiative to take advantage of opportunities,
anticipate and preclude deteriorating conditions, and respond to malign influences or

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dramatic shifts to international order. As such, joint force efforts can, over time, help
inoculate against and build resilience within these environments to detrimental
consequences.

e. Military Engagement

(1) Military engagement is the deliberate contact and interaction between

individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another
nation’s armed forces or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. The purpose
is to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and
maintain influence. Military engagement occurs across the competition continuum. DOD
engages its interorganizational partners as a component of national engagement efforts
among individuals and/or elements of the USG to interact with foreign partners to protect
and advance shared or complementary strategic interests. In addition to supporting CCPs,
DOD military engagement supports national-level engagement strategies and plans. It also
aligns with the engagement plans and programs of DOS, USAID, and other USG
departments and agencies.

(2) Military engagement includes SC, CMO, and other interactions with foreign
security forces (FSF), institutions, populations, and other relevant foreign actors;
interagency partners and US domestic civilian authorities and populations; international
organizations and NGOs; and the private sector. Military engagement activities usually
involve coordinating, synchronizing, or integrating a combination of military forces and
capabilities with the efforts of interorganizational partners.

(3) CCMDs seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover
areas of common interest and tension. This military engagement increases the knowledge
base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can
reduce tensions. If armed conflict is unavoidable, long-term military engagement may
enable a more informed USG to face any conflict with stronger alliances or coalitions.

f. SC

(1) SC encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments

that promote specific US security interests. JFCs use SC to develop allied and PN military
and security capabilities for self-defense, facilitate multinational operations, and provide
US forces with routine and contingency access to allied and PNs.

(2) SC typically occurs within USG security sector assistance (SSA) with allies
and partners. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, Security Sector Assistance,
establishes DOS as the lead integrator for all interagency assistance provided to a PN. SSA
requires DOD to coordinate its SC policies, programs, and activities with DOS and other
USG representatives to ensure unity of effort toward US strategic objectives. SSR, by
contrast, is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an ally or partner undertakes
to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice in its security sector. When

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assisting an ally or partner that is carrying out SSR, the USG views this support as SSA.
Hence, SC is DOD’s contribution to USG SSA efforts.

For more information on SSA and SSR, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(3) SC is a key element of cooperative activities and communication

synchronization at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Throughout the
competition continuum, the joint force relies on allies and partners to apply their
capabilities, provide access, or promote US interests. DOD brings about these outcomes
through SC activities that include military engagements and developmental activities
(organize, train, equip, build, and advise), as well as by administering various SC and
security assistance (SA) programs that enable these activities. SC activities and the
programs that support them are reinforcing and complementary, which CCDRs employ at
all points along the competition continuum.

(a) Military Engagements. Joint forces conduct military engagements with

FSF and their supporting institutions to improve relationships, interoperability, and
decision making at the appropriate levels; military engagements also include joint force
interactions with interagency or other stakeholders to enable SC.

(b) Developmental Activities. These activities occur in cooperation with

FSF—from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level.

1. SFA. SFA is the set of DOD SC activities that support the

development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting institutions,
whether of a PN or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in
support of US objectives.

2. Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). ICB comprises SC activities

typically conducted at the department, staff/Service HQ, and related agency/supporting
entity level to develop the strategic and operational aspects of the security institution. ICB
is development that improves the FSF’s ability to plan, develop, fund, acquire, man,
employ, and sustain capabilities that can address shared challenges that are of mutual
benefit to the United States and the ally or partner.

(c) Enabling SC Programs (to include SA programs).

1. SC programs represent an established joint process or plan allowed

by authorization or appropriation, or group of authorizations and appropriations, which
enable the use of DOD components in support of objectives. These programs include
defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchanges, combined exercises and
training, train-and-equip/provision defense articles, and operational support, as well as
defense ICB.

2. SA is a group of programs that provides defense articles, military

training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to foreign

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

allies and partners to advance national policies and objectives. SA programs are funded
and authorized through DOS and administered by DOD through the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency.

(d) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The primary

purpose of CWMD is to enable PNs to plan and build indigenous capabilities that deter
WMD threats and incidents, conduct operational preparation of the environment, and
response preparation. JFCs orient CWMD efforts toward the three areas of preventing
acquisition, containing and reducing threats, and preparing to respond to a crisis. The
JFCs’ efforts include activities conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or
attack the United States, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

For more information, see JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(e) Counterdrug (CD) Operations. CD operations provide DOD support to

LEAs to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.
DOD supports federal, state, and local LEAs. JFCs provide support to CD operations.
JFCs follow specific DOD authorities that pertain to CD activities and operations contained
in Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 371-382. Discussion of similar authorities can be found
in DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

(4) SC Execution

(a) CCDRs’ orders initiate execution of the CCP, which includes the
country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans and supporting components’
plans. The order may not authorize the entire execution of all SC activities. Collaborative
planning among the security cooperation organization (SCO), PN, DOD component(s),
OSD, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DOS regional and functional bureaus,
COMs, and CCMD results in the timely release of authorities and orders for synchronized
execution of the approved and funded SC activities throughout a CCMD’s AOR. Effective
monitoring provides situational awareness of the status and progress of SC activities.
Evaluation is a systematic process that analyzes the overall effectiveness of investing USG
resources into building a partner’s capacity or capability. Preparation and site surveys
require authorities and funds for execution such as deployment, movement, sustainment,
protection, C2, and other preparations months before the actual SC activities begin with
the PN.

1. Campaign orders and supporting fragmentary orders issued by

CCDRs or a component commander can update or adjust the execution of a CCP and its
supporting component plans. CCMDs work with the other DOD components which
provide forces, funds, and other resources, in coordination with the SCO and Defense
Security Cooperation Agency. The CCMDs provide necessary direction, assessment,
monitoring, evaluation, and, when possible, any adjustments to the planned SC activities.

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The COM, JFC, and component commanders normally use the SCO as a point of contact
for coordinating with the PN representatives before direct coordination between the United
States and PN participants. The supported and supporting JFCs and component
commanders ensure a chain of command with appropriate command relationships and
reporting procedures. Once granted direct liaison authority by the CCMD through the
component commands, the forces executing SC activities will normally work directly with
the PN and SCO, keeping their parent and Service HQ informed. At the tactical level,
forces plan and execute SC under the coordination authority of the SCOs, which will
coordinate with the supported CCMD and keep the COM and country team informed.
Forces will likely provide situation reports to and through their units and higher HQ to the
component command HQ and the supporting CCMD, as required. Socium is the mandated
system of record for SC and is a tool for collaborative planning, executing, evaluating, and
assessing of SC activities.

2. The CCMD, DOS regional and functional bureaus, and COMs

normally share a common understanding of objectives and priorities, but they have
institutional perspectives on how to do things. The COM has the final decision concerning
US activity in a specific country. The COM focuses primarily on the PN, while the CCMD
focuses on the AOR; coordination for the planning and execution of SC activities must
consider a balance of these perspectives and interests. The CCMD should coordinate SC
efforts, to include planning and execution timelines, at least annually among the country
teams with the SCOs, the component commands, PNs, and others who may contribute to
SC-related activities (e.g., allies and international organizations).

3. Implementing organizations execute SC activities under the direction

of the component command plans in support of the CCP objectives. Implementing
organizations may be individuals or any component element or combination of elements
of a joint force—military forces from the Active Component or Reserve Component, USG
civilians, and contractors. While implementing organizations may plan and coordinate
their activities with the component command HQ and the CCMD, they will normally work
directly with the SCO during execution.

(b) Services

1. The Services’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities to organize, train, equip,

and resource Service component commands enable and support the conduct of SC
activities. The Services support their Service component commands’ execution of SC
activities in support of CCMD objectives based on the available Service capabilities and
resources. The CCMD should work together with service components in establishing the
objectives and priorities of the CCP. These activities include senior leader defense contacts
and familiarization, foreign participation or attendance at Service schools, cooperative
research and development programs, foreign comparative testing, and equipping activities.

2. Various Service-to-Service memoranda of understanding and

memoranda of agreement govern, inform, or shape Service SC activities with PNs. These
include agreements governing exchange for LNOs, charters for Service-led staff talks, or

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other activities. Service SC activities may follow established timelines known years in
advance, such as recurring Service-to-Service staff talks, or may present more
extemporaneously, such as official office calls, port visits, or Service chief or senior leader
attendance at trade shows or regional conferences.

3. Campaign support plans (CSPs) may be developed by the Services,

NGB, and DOD agencies that integrate the appropriate USG activities and programs,
describe how they will support the CCMD campaigns, and articulate institutional or
component-specific guidance. A Service CSP further explains how the Service, according
to Title 10, USC, organizes, trains, and equips forces to support CCMD objectives,
maintain readiness, and execute SC activities. Service CSPs are coordinated with CCMDs
through the Service component commands and address topics such as exercises, readiness,
interoperability, and capabilities development, as they may impact the CCPs. Service
execution of SC is important to shape, build, train, and equip forces capable of operating
in coalition environments, as needed, to augment CCDR efforts.

4. Services should coordinate with the CCMDs for the theater SC

activities, as well as with their respective Service component commands.

(c) CCMDs. Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their

staffs continually use the operation assessment activities of monitor, evaluate,
recommend, and direct to inform decision making at appropriate levels. The planning
initiation step of joint planning coincides with an operation assessment, which provides a
process to measure the effectiveness of SC activities and establishes continuity through
execution. This provides the opportunity for correction and adaptation during planning
and execution. CCDRs may collaborate with interorganizational stakeholders such as DOS
country teams, to include allies and partners during any aspect of the operation assessment.
The operation assessment enables the implementation of DOD policy for assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of SC activities. At the same time, the component
commands do the same with their supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution
of specific SC activities occurs as planned unless a circumstance unfolds that affect US
forces and the PN, precluding completion of those SC activities. SC activities normally
take place through bilateral agreements that constitute binding legal obligations for both
the USG and PN. As a result, any deviation from the terms of a bilateral agreement likely
requires the consent of both governments. Consequently, major changes are unlikely
during the execution of a specific SC activity. The absence of a governing bilateral
agreement may result in several fiscal years of SC activities undergoing various stages of
planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment during any given calendar year.

For more information on the harmonization of the operation assessment and AM&E policy,
see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

1. Monitor. CCMDs work with a variety of stakeholders, including

allies and partners, to observe and analyze indicators of performance or effectiveness and
conditions in the OE that affect those indicators. Monitoring begins with knowing the
baseline of each indicator. As a matter of policy, CCMDs conduct initial assessments of

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existing PN conditions that typically precede SC activities that involve the development of
an FSF. These conditions include capability gaps, absorptive capacity, political stability,
and other opportunities and risks. Initial assessments provide a baseline against which to
monitor SC activities to inform requirements, resources, and program planning. In some
cases, a CCDR establishes the target (to be state) of an indicator that is necessary for
improving performance and effectiveness of a FSF or creating a desired condition in the
OE.

2. Evaluate. The evaluate task is principally a CCDR function but can

occur at any level. CCMDs use indicators to judge progress of SC activities toward desired
conditions and determine why the current degree of progress exists. A single SC activity
rarely achieves a strategic objective in isolation, and it is often difficult to determine the
extent to which a specific DOD activity influences a PN. SC generally requires multiple
activities, executed over time, to achieve strategic objectives.

3. Recommend. Based on evaluations, CCDRs integrate relevant SC

information to inform decision making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,
which includes informing interorganizational stakeholders, such as DOS or allies and
partners.

4. Direct. This task is inherent to the authority of CCDRs to organize

and employ joint forces as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned tasks and missions.
Based on the results of CCMD assessment, the outcomes of a combined assessment with
an ally or partner, or from strategic guidance and direction, a CCDR may direct changes to
SC plans or activities in the AOR.

For more information on monitoring, evaluating, recommending, and directing during the
planning and execution of SC activities, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(d) Service Component Commands

1. Depending on the resources available, the DOD components, in

collaboration with the CCMD and PN, decide which activities to conduct in the following
year and which activities to modify, postpone, or cancel. Modifications may involve
combining activities or reducing the scale or scope of the original activity. Examples
include combining a United States Air Force exercise with a United States Navy exercise
or turning a face-to-face seminar into a virtual meeting. Component planners need to
document how the gap between the resources they requested and the resources they
received affected the country plan and, specifically, the achievement of component
objectives.

2. The next step is executing the SC activity. The primary role of the
component planner is to ensure appropriate tasking of activities to organizations within the
component and appropriate coordination of activities with organizations outside of the
executing component/agency. Early coordination of the SC activity during planning helps
facilitate coordination during execution. With the activities properly assigned and

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coordinated, the component planner monitors the execution and can help deconflict
activities, as necessary. Many components and most SCOs maintain a calendar to help
them keep track of activities and other important events in their countries. For example,
Socium can document, track, and synchronize SC events and activities.

g. Other Considerations for Cooperative Operations and Activities

(1) Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental Organizations and

HN Coordination. JFCs work with interorganizational and HN authorities to plan and
conduct military engagement, SC, and deterrence operations and activities. Liaison
organizations such as a JIACG can promote interaction and cooperation among diverse
agencies. Consensus building improves each agency’s understanding of the capabilities
and limitations, as well as any constraints of partner agencies. Establishing an atmosphere
of trust and cooperation promotes the unity of effort.

For further discussion on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation.

(2) Information Sharing. NGOs and international organizations, by their

nature, become familiar with the culture, language, sensitivities, and status of the populace,
as well as the infrastructure in a region. This information is valuable to commanders and
staffs, who may not have physical access or the most current information. NGOs and
international organizations may also need information from commanders and staff
concerning hazards in the OE and on local populace humanitarian needs. However, these
organizations typically hold neutrality as a fundamental principle and often as the basis for
the security in operating in hostile environments. Many NGOs and international
organizations will resist any perception of serving as sources of intelligence, even if the
information sought is completely benign, and they may be hesitant to associate with the
military. Discreet coordination can sometimes alleviate these concerns. JFCs may elect to
establish mechanisms like a CMOC, or a similar organization, to coordinate activities and
facilitate information sharing. Sometimes information can flow through third parties, such
as the UN or PN institutions. International organizations and NGOs are more likely to
participate if they perceive that mutual sharing of information aids their work and is not a
threat to their neutrality. USAID, when it has a mission presence in-country, usually has
the strongest network of contacts and information on international organizations. CCMDs
should consult NGOs and local partners. However, NGOs and local partners may not be
perfect sources of information. USAID missions require sharing their country
development cooperation strategies with CCMDs, and conversely, CCMDs share their
CCPs with USAID missions in their AOR to enhance collaboration.

(3) Cultural Awareness. Military support and operations intended to support an

HN should build an in-depth understanding of the HN’s cultural, social, gender, economic,
and political realities. The JFC may augment Service-language and cultural awareness
training and tailor supplemental training to the JOA and mission. Also, intelligence
products and military engagement actions continuously update cultural, social, gender,
economic, and political information. The beliefs, perceptions, lifestyles, and economic

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underpinnings of the society, among other considerations, influence the OE and may affect
planning and execution. Further, it is important to monitor perceptions and reactions of
populations in the areas of influence and AOI, as these factors also affect current and future
operations, activities, and planning. SC activities will likely impact nations throughout a
region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring nations and hostility toward the United
States may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing rivals
may perceive the action as upsetting the regional balance or favoritism. While such factors
do not dictate US policy, CCMDs should account for these ramifications.

(4) Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). BPC programs encompass SC and

SA activities funded with USG appropriations. JFCs administer these programs as cases
within the foreign military sales infrastructure. These programs may provide defense
articles and/or services to other USG departments and agencies under the authority of the
Economy Act of 1932 or other transfer authorities. The purpose of building the capacity
of PN security forces is to enhance their capability to conduct CT, CD, and COIN
operations or to support US military operations, multilateral peace operations, and other
programs. BPC with PNs is frequently associated with supporting allies and partners to
reach one or more shared objectives. BPC should be part of the planning process to ensure
that the readiness and capabilities of friendly networks can appropriately address a crisis
or an emerging threat network with minimal shortfalls. The goals of BPC include working
to develop improved information sharing, which can include standardized reporting,
collection data, lexicons, data exchange, terminology, common intelligence and
operational pictures, and common operating standards to improve interoperability. BPC to
counter threats can enable PNs to conduct more effective operations with reduced or no
joint force assistance. Building long-term and self-sustaining PN capacities is critical to
counter threats on an enduring basis. Partner capabilities that are not sustained present the
risk of the threat adapting and then seizing the opportunity to re-assert itself once the PN
capabilities are reduced.

(5) Women. Engaging women as key stakeholders in the OA is necessary for

gaining a comprehensive understanding of human aspects of the OE. Importantly, HN
women are not a homogenous group. Their behavior, decision making, and participation
depend upon their culture and identity, intersecting characteristics that can be further
examined through sociocultural analysis. This analysis yields information that informs
tailored engagements with different women in the OE as individuals, organizations, and
participants in formal and informal systems. When women engage as a key stakeholder
group, the commander and staff gain information on the human security needs of the HN
civilian population, and specifically the distinct security needs of women. Notably, civil-
military relations should revolve around positive, often mutually supportive, relationships
with nonmilitary stakeholders.

4. Typical Cooperative Operations and Activities

a. Stabilization. Stabilization is an inherently cooperative endeavor that requires

aligning USG efforts (e.g., diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense) to
create conditions for local legitimate authorities and systems to manage unstable
environments effectively. DOS, USAID, and DOD cooperate to stabilize these fragile

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countries of strategic importance to the United States. DOS is the overall lead federal
agency for US stabilization efforts. USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-
security US stabilization assistance. DOD is a supporting element, including providing
requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with
available statutory authorities.

(1) To the extent authorized by law, DOD plans and conducts stabilization in
support of mission partners across the competition continuum to counter subversion,
prevent and mitigate conflict, and consolidate military gains to achieve objectives. DOD
emphasizes small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization that works with and through local
and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives.

(2) DOD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the
civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities,
primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the
immediate needs of the conflict-affected population.

(a) When required to achieve US stabilization objectives, and to the extent

authorized by law, DOD will reinforce and complement civilian-led stabilization efforts.
Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants
of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for
the return of displaced people and longer-term development.

(b) If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DOD will lead USG
stabilization efforts in extreme situations until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility
to other USG departments and agencies.

(3) Although stabilization is distinct from FHA, DOD FHA activities may
complement USG stabilization efforts.

For further information on defense support to stabilization, refer to DODD 3000.05,

Stabilization, and JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

b. National Emergency Preparedness (Domestic Operations). Emergency

preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of
life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a
comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response,
and recovery. National-level emergency preparedness encompasses those planning
activities such as continuity capabilities, undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures,
and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a designated national
security emergency.

(1) Continuity capability refers to the ability of DOD to continue to perform its
mission-essential functions, through COOP and continuity of government programs, to
preserve the current form of government and the continued performance of the national
essential functions under all conditions. Leadership, staff, communications, and facilities
are the pillars of a continuity capability.

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(2) COOP ensures continuous conduct of essential functions, tasks, or duties by

USG departments and agencies, or other organizations necessary, to accomplish a military
action or mission supporting the strategy. Continuity capabilities include the authorities
and duties of a commander and the supporting functions of staff and others under the
authority and direction of the commander. If the President directs additional support, DOD
may task the joint force additional missions relating to emergency preparedness.

(3) Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort within each USG

branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue national
essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency.

c. Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament. Commanders and staffs

oversee activities of military personnel involved in arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament activities. These activities include verifying arms control treaties, seizing and
securing WMD, and escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials.
Commanders and staffs seek to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conduct
and host site inspections; participate in military data exchanges; implement armament
reductions; or dismantle, destroy, or dispose of weapons and hazardous material.

(1) Arms control generally refers to those bilateral and multilateral treaties in
which states agree to reduce the numbers, types, performance characteristics, proliferation,
testing, or other aspects of certain categories of weapons. The goals of arms control are
generally to reduce the likelihood, consequences, and the costs of preparing for armed
conflict. A state could also seek to take advantage of technological advances in new
weapon system areas, facilitate sources and methods of intelligence gathering, or negate a
potential adversary’s first strike capabilities.

(2) Nonproliferation includes the use of military capabilities in conjunction with

a whole-of-government effort. JFCs act within a nation’s legal authorities to deter and
prevent the acquisition of WMD. JFCs and partners conduct nonproliferation by
dissuading or impeding access and distribution of sensitive technologies, material, and
expertise by state and non-state actors. Usually, the UN establishes sanctions through UN
Security Council resolutions. However, states may view the need to unilaterally, or in
concert, sanction certain military equipment as essential to their national interests.

(3) Disarmament is one of three elements in a program designed to bring peace

in conflict zones. This program is called disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR). DDR is the process that contributes to security and stability during and after
conflict by removing weapons from the hands of state and non-state combatants. It also
takes the combatants out of military structures and helps them integrate socially and
economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. It often contains details about
the reduction of a military establishment’s aggregate capabilities such as numbers of
weapons and forces to a specified limit set by international agreement. Although
disarmament always involves the reduction of military forces or weapons, arms control
does not. Arms control agreements sometimes allow for the increase of weapons by one
or more parties to a treaty. Disarmament requires a high degree of trust (permissive OE),
and disarmament operations are unlikely between hostile nations.

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d. Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is an aspect of protection and involves defensive

measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include
limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Antiterrorism
programs form the foundation to combat terrorism. The USG may provide antiterrorism
assistance to foreign nations under Title 22, USC (Chapter 32, Part VIII, Antiterrorism
Assistance).

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

e. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by Title 10, USC, Section
401. This assistance is in conjunction with military operations and exercises to fulfill unit
training requirements while incidentally creating humanitarian benefit to the local
populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, humanitarian
and civic assistance programs encompass planned activities in the following categories:

(1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country
that are rural or underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals,
respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care
provided.

(2) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.

(3) Well, drilling, and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

f. HD and DSCA. Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG’s top
responsibility and is a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as
state, tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the United States and its
territories, though limited in many respects, accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA.
HD is the protection of US sovereign territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the
President. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies,
to defend against external threats and aggression. However, against internal threats, DOD
may be in support of another USG department or agency. When ordered to conduct HD
operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with other government
agencies. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support
CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security. These include
invasion, cyberspace attack, attack in space, and air and missile attacks. Support to HD
provided by the NG will be IAW DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted
by the National Guard.

(1) DSCA is the support provided by US federal military forces, DOD civilians,
DOD contract personnel, DOD components, and NG forces (when SecDef, in coordination
with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32,
USC, status) respond to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic

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emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying
entities for special events. For DSCA operations, DOD supports and does not supplant
civil authorities. The majority of DSCA operations are IAW the NRF, which establishes a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. Within a
state, the governor is the key decision maker and commands the state’s NG forces when
they are not in federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the NG, it will
most often be under state active duty when supporting civil authorities.

(2) Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, support to national special
security events, and support to civilian law enforcement IAW specific DOD policies and
US law. Commanders and staffs consider the legal and policy limits on intelligence
activities in support of LEAs; intelligence activities involving US citizens; and intelligence
oversight regulations, policies, and executive orders.

(3) PPD-8, National Preparedness, describes the Nation’s approach to preparing

for the threats and hazards posing the greatest risk to the security of the United States.
National preparedness is a shared responsibility of our whole community. The national
preparedness goal describes what it means for the whole community to prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats, hazards, disasters, and emergencies.
These threats and risks include events such as natural disasters, disease pandemics,
chemical spills and other human-made hazards, terrorist attacks, and cyberspace attacks.
In addition to stating the goal, PPD-8 describes Title 32, USC, core capabilities that address
the greatest risks to the Nation.

(4) Commander, United States Northern Command, and Commander, United

States Indo-Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. These
responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their assigned
AORs, as directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is global
and is a responsibility of all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward
regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and deter threats to the homeland
before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible when so directed. Identity
activities help identify threats and limit their mobility and access across the OE and
transnationally.

For more information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and
for detailed guidance on DSCA, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA).

For more information on NG support, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA); DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support
of Civil Authorities; and Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction 3000.04, National
Guard Bureau Domestic Operations.

For detailed guidance on HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

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g. Support to Civilian LEAs. When requested, DOD may provide support to federal,
state, territory, tribal, insular areas, and local law enforcement organizations reacting to
civil disturbances, conducting border security and CD missions, preparing for antiterrorism
operations, and participating in other related law enforcement activities. The requested
support must be consistent with the limits Congress placed on military support to law
enforcement through the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws. Unless specifically
authorized by law, no DOD personnel in a Title 10, USC, status will become involved in
direct civilian law enforcement activities, including, but not limited to, search, seizure,
arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, surveillance, pursuit, interrogation, investigation,
evidence collection, security functions, traffic or crowd control, or similar activities, except
in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the President, Constitution, or
act of Congress.

(1) Countering transnational organized crime (which includes CD operations)

encompasses the actions taken by a government, international organization, or armed group
to detect, identify, expose, disrupt, degrade, and neutralize designated criminal networks
to mitigate their adverse effects on the strategic interests of the party taking the actions.

(2) Support for CD operations is in subparagraph 9.j.(11), “Support for CD

Operations.”

For further guidance on DOD support to civilian LEAs, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint
Counterdrug Operations; JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks; and JP 3-28,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

h. FHA. FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or

privation in countries outside the United States. These operations are different from
foreign assistance primarily because they occur on short notice as a contingency operation
to provide aid in a specific scenario or similar events rather than as more deliberate foreign
assistance programs to promote long-term stability. DOS or the COM is responsible for
confirming the HN’s declaration of a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA. FHA
provided by US forces generally has a limit in scope and duration. Actions supplement or
complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for
assisting. DOD assists when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the
humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to respond effectively.

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance.

i. Recovery Operations. Recovery operations may search for, locate, identify,

recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national
security, or human remains. For example, JTF FULL ACCOUNTING had the mission to
achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans listed as missing or prisoners of war
from all past wars and conflicts. Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery
operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning to execute.

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Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt, depending on whether the OE is

hostile, uncertain, or permissive.

5. Responding to Crises

a. A crisis is an incident or emerging situation involving a possible threat to the United

States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests. A crisis can develop rapidly and create
a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that national leaders
consider a commitment of military forces and resources. A crisis can occur anywhere
across the competition continuum and the response can include almost any type of joint
operation. The response may evolve into a limited contingency operation or even expand
into large-scale combat operations. The joint force may respond to a crisis such as
international and national humanitarian and natural disasters, deteriorating situations
involving the safety of US citizens, or threats to allies or vital interests. JFCs may respond
with lethal or nonlethal force as applicable and in compliance with ROE. In responding to
a crisis generated by an adversary’s provocations, the joint force may deploy forces to
establish exclusion zones, enforce UN Security Council resolutions, or conduct strikes to
respond to the adversary’s behavior.

b. Where along the competition continuum the crisis occurs has little bearing on the
scope, scale, or duration of a response to crisis. For example, FHA can employ
considerable resources and can continue for many months. Countering adversarial
behavior during competition below armed conflict can unfold on a massive scale. The joint
force’s contribution to the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were part
of national mobilizations. The joint force’s deployments and changes in posture were clear
evidence of the US commitment, narrative, and strategic guidance. Successful crisis
response involves the ability to deploy the joint force rapidly with required capabilities. If
ordered by the President or SecDef, JFCs have the capability to conduct offensive
operations with lethal or nonlethal force. Readiness is the key to a credible crisis response.

c. With proper authorization, the joint force may respond to a crisis with types of
lethal force normally associated with armed conflict. These strikes are typically punitive
in nature, and actions address a previous action. In circumstances where OEs are rapidly
becoming fragile, when armed conflict is imminent, or adversary-supported irregular
forces threaten a nation’s sovereignty or regional stability, US forces may intervene to
bolster internal defense, conduct offensive or defensive operations, or support stabilization
efforts. A prompt crisis response may preclude escalation of the situation. Effective early
intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor and achieve their
objectives. Overall, the joint force can respond to a crisis in a broad or specific manner
with a wide range of capabilities.

6. Adversarial Competition Below Armed Conflict: Foundation and Practice

a. Introduction

(1) Adversarial competition surrounds a persistent and long-term struggle

between actors seeking to achieve incompatible strategic objectives while avoiding armed

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conflict. In adversarial competition, nations or non-state actors apply their instruments of

power over extended periods and throughout the OE to either initiate or counter malign or
antagonistic behavior against their adversaries. The strategic purpose of these activities is
to gain and sustain long-term comparative advantages (and mitigate disadvantages)
indefinitely.

(2) A nation that competes successfully sets the terms of differing international
pursuits to advance its own interests. A nation’s successful competitive action drives
others to do more of what it wants, at the times of its choosing, in the manner it prefers.
The most successful competitor achieves objectives without invading, occupying, or
destroying their adversaries but rather by subordinating, minimizing, and influencing their
choices and decisions. Exercising international leadership is thus the risk, cost, and reward
of successful competition. Competition is the work of establishing rules, attracting and
convincing as many actors to adhere to them as much of the time as possible, incentivizing
compliance, and penalizing defiance, so the rules remain intact. The prize is in the system’s
structural privileging of that nation’s interests over those of others. This prioritization can
incorporate the nature, type, and activities of multinational regimes and institutions but
might be less formal. The nation’s preferred prioritization can be evident in recognized
norms without legal or organizational form, in loosely associated but common patterns of
behavior, and in the simple requirement of considering how the dominant state will
perceive and address a specific action relative to a contested interest.

(3) Some states may not accept this prioritization or follow the rules set by a
competitor in the absence of a good reason. Other states may agree because they find the
rules attractive, suit their interests, or align with their values. For all other nations or states,
to be compelling and durable, the rules’ structure must promise and deliver adequate
benefit for good behavior or adequate consequence for noncompliance. This promise
means that the rule-setting competitor must have the legitimacy, credibility, capability, and
the will to give and to take away benefits and equities, as required, to assert and enforce
standards and expectations upon other states.

(4) In adversarial competition, the joint force is primarily concerned with long-
term strategies and programs, attraction, influence, and, when directed, the restrained use of
force to counter coercion. The United States has experience with all these aspects of
competition. Military institutional procurement programs focus on attaining and maintaining
a credible force by fielding capabilities that provide relative advantages for extended periods.
Concurrently, employing force in competition orients on maintaining and modifying other
actors’ behaviors without resorting to armed conflict. Adversarial competition is its own
unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where
many aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are simply undeterrable.

(5) The United States has a history of confronting adversaries and reinforcing
allies and partners by blending the instruments of national power to change adversarial
behavior. An effective use of the military instrument of national power within a broader
foreign policy does not always require armed conflict to protect strategic interests. The
United States depends on the military’s ability to control waters, territory, air space,

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THE CONSTANT OF COMPETITION

In the mid-1990s, successive editions of the United States' national

security strategy (NSS) discarded the hard-earned appreciation and
philosophy of countering communist expansionism accumulated
throughout the course of the Cold War. In fact, these NSS(s) essentially
declared that returning to great power competition and spheres of
influence were not in the United States' interest. The reality today is that
great-power competition is back and it has gathered concern and worry
across the national security community. One of the foundational
premises of almost all theories seeking to explain why countries act
toward each other as they do is that, although much can be achieved by
cooperating, the international environment is inherently competitive
when differing values or interests clash. Competition among nations is
a constant and nations perpetually strive to gain influence, leverage, and
advantage. Sometimes these contests unfold in ways that are direct and
obvious cases of confrontation and brinksmanship. Other situations
emerge as nuanced encroachments over diplomatic norms and
standards, human rights, environmental considerations, trade, core
values, and the rule of law. To complicate matters, nations can wrap and
disguise their measures in plausible denial. Above all, the strategic
purpose of a rules-based international system is to establish and
enforce rules and norms on these competitions.

Various Sources

cyberspace, orbital space, and influence people under conditions other than armed conflict
to help to maintain economic and political freedoms. Enemies and adversaries continually
probe the United States and its allies, seeking to modify norms and gain influence. Military
forces support policy objectives through demonstration, regional repositioning, air and
maritime interception operations, global deployments, establishing exclusion zones,
enforcing sanctions, supporting resistance partners, employing surrogate forces, and
ensuring compliance with treaties. JFCs recognize these circumstances where the joint
force must contribute and coherently campaign to advance and protect US interests.

b. Foundation

(1) Coercion is a broad concept that encompasses two distinct forms of

intimidation: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo
before an adversary shifts policy or takes undesired actions. Compellence seeks to modify
behavior or persuade an adversary to desist an ongoing behavior, cease an action they have
begun, or do something they would rather not do. While deterrence constitutes groupings
of passive threats and activities to keep an adversary from encroaching, compelling
behavior requires active measures to drive an adversary out of a position previously
established and maintained through an encroachment. Compelling behavior typically
requires more than just rhetoric. Coercing a change in behavior centers on the action, not
simply a threat or signal.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

(2) In calculating the efficacy or viability of coercion, whether deterring or

compelling behavior, a state requires a detailed understanding of an adversary’s
determination, stake in the interest at hand, strengths, and vulnerabilities. A competitor
state’s analysis of coercive options demands a careful knowledge of the adversary’s value
system. Coercing behavior works by manipulating anticipated values and costs, and it is
the adversary’s perception of the values and costs that matters. JFCs should realize the
fundamental considerations of coercing behavior.

(a) Developing an Accurate Understanding. States make calculations

based on an understanding of the adversary and all the influences, motivations, capabilities,
and long-term interests driving their decision making and behavior. Senior civilian and
military leaders seek to know what an adversary deems vital and how much pressure they
will endure before parting with it. Indeed, coercion can enable even a weak country to gain
a more favorable outcome than a stronger state. A lack of understanding of the adversary’s
values and goals and a corresponding lack of understanding of what motivates its decision
makers reduces the likelihood of coercive success from the outset.

COMPELLING BEHAVIOR WITH DEGREES OF FORCE

Compelling behavior through coercive measures can occur through

three modes. First, a state can coerce through threats or an amplified
narrative regarding a contested interest without employing force. This
mode does not have a high success rate. However, in 1970 after
discovering the Soviet navy was establishing a submarine base in
Cienfuegos, Cuba, the United States exposed and threatened the
Soviets to the degree that they abandoned the project. Second, a state
can use force short of armed conflict. The best example is the Cuban
Missile Crises in 1962, where the US changes in force posture and
missions helped convince the Soviets to remove its nuclear weapons
from Cuba voluntarily. Third, the employment of measured violent force.
An example is where in 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to achieve a set of
limited objectives. NATO was not seeking to depose President
Slobodan Milosevic or occupy Serbia. NATO’s objective was for Serbian
forces to cease their violent retribution against the Kosovo Liberation
Army. For compellence, the point is the choice of compliance remains
with the adversary. In each of the three cases, the adversary may not
have liked the choices, but the United States (and its Allies) imposed
costs with restraint, leaving the decision up to the adversary.
Alternatively, when using forcible action, a state no longer cares what
the enemy chooses to do. The state does what it can and takes the
necessary action to make the enemy succumb to its will. These
necessary actions may include combinations of attrition, exhaustion,
and annihilation.

Various Sources

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Chapter VI

(b) Formulating the Demand. The clarity in what a state seeks to achieve
through coercion or protection against an encroachment and what CCDRs can provide is
essential, as it ultimately forms the objective. First, broad threats regarding the contested
interest are counterproductive. Scoping enables policymakers and military commanders to
formulate and choose from multiple, viable approaches. Second, clarity and consistency
in a state’s demands help persuade the adversary of the strength of purpose, especially
when the commitment of force aligns and reinforces the narrative. Alternatively,
nonspecific demands decrease the likelihood of coercive success. Vague or unclear
narratives increase the likelihood of misinterpretation, confusion, and the inadvertent
defiance of unintentional escalation. Unclear demands can suggest the state’s policy
position is not firm but malleable under the pressure of intentional defiance. This lack of
presenting clear and consistent objectives severely constrains the possibilities for
productive bargaining with the adversary.

(c) Determining Asymmetry of Interest. As important as a state’s

perceptions of its stakes might be, recognizing the two-sided nature of motivation within
the competition is essential. An asymmetry exists when the United States or its competitors
are willing to sacrifice far more to succeed or are simply unwilling to bear the costs of
driving their adversary from an established position or modifying an antagonistic behavior.
An asymmetry of interest held or created by one of the actors may favor or drive a particular
approach. Asymmetry may allow one side to keep the benefit at a relatively low
opportunity cost. Of course, the competitor’s relative motivation plays an important role
in determining the outcome of coercive action. The state’s approach is more likely to be
successful if it is more motivated than the adversary regarding the interest at stake. What
is critical is that the adversary believes the United States is more motivated to achieve its
objective. In some cases, the nature of the circumstance tends to scope and fix the two
sides’ relative motivation. The state’s senior civilian and military leaders carefully assess
both sides’ relative interests and recognize an asymmetry of interests where one actor
values the object more than the other.

(d) Formulating Credible Resolve. To succeed, a state must demonstrate

a heightened level of commitment, especially when there are no apparent crises or urgent
matters. In many cases, there is a military aspect that serves or supports the coercive effort.
The motivation must be strong and accompany the acceptance of the costs and risks
inherent in steadfastly pursuing or countering coercion. When a state’s national leadership
makes key decisions, articulation and perception of the depth of national interest involved
is essential. Secondly, the adversary must perceive the state’s decisions and actions as
unwavering commitment. Projecting sentiments or behaviors that raise the adversary’s
questions and skepticism about the state’s commitment can be counterproductive.
Presenting and communicating strong motivation to eliminate the threat should be obvious
from the beginning. In many cases, a state must take added risk to communicate the
strength of their commitment by placing forces in harm’s way and potentially deploying
additional forces later to reinforce both the perception of resolve and the original forces
placed at risk.

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(e) Determining Aversion to Escalation. The state can increase the scale
of its coercive actions if the initial activities and communications arouse fear of escalation.
This creation of fear is particularly effective if the adversary perceives the consequences
would lead to less acceptable circumstances than complying with the state’s demands.
However, the adversary may fear the competitor state’s coercive action more than armed
conflict. The state’s coercive measures, once enacted, may constitute an escalation of itself
that the adversary finds unacceptable. The adversary may not regard one of their options
or choices as compliance with the state’s demands. Counter to the state’s intentions, the
adversary may see escalation as preferable to acquiescing and abandoning their foreign
policy pursuits. The adversary may see their options as limited to circumnavigating the
competitor’s coercive mechanism or going to war. In some cases, determining an
adversary’s aversion or affinity to escalation is more complex than a choice between
compliance or war. Developing this understanding is a function of many variables, such
as past experiences of both competitors, internal domestic pressure, and external support
structures. The calculation of the adversary’s aversion or preference for armed conflict
requires a fingertip feel and expertise in their decision making.

(f) Crafting and Ensuring a Settlement. Specific demands by the state are
important, but they may not suffice. In some cases, the state must formulate specific terms
for resolution of the circumstances. The joint forces’ strategic uses of military force give
equal emphasis to the credibility of assurance that the coercive action will cease or that the
United States will abstain from carrying out the threat if the adversary complies with the
demand. The parties must agree and establish procedures for instituting these terms and
verifying their implementation. Specifying the terms of settlement in advance of formal
agreement can be of major importance to the adversary. The adversary may want precise
settlement terms to safeguard against the possibility that the state has a broader
interpretation of the proposed resolution. For agreement and compliance, the adversary
will need convincing that the state will not renew pressure and push for even greater
concessions after the initial agreement. The adversary who contemplates succumbing to
coercive diplomacy may need specific and reliable assurances that the state will carry out
its part of the agreement.

KNOWING THE ADVERSARY: AVERSION OR PREFERENCE FOR

ESCALATION?

By 1941, the Japanese determined that despite the many risks involved,
continuing to seek alternative sources of raw materials at the expense
of other states and waging war was preferable to modifying their
behavior. The Japanese decided that attacking the United States and
other Western powers in the Pacific was more acceptable than curtailing
their expansionist ambitions in China because of the suffocating oil
embargo. Japan’s motivation to expand its sphere of influence was
more powerful than avoiding armed conflict.

Various Sources

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Chapter VI

(g) Follow Through. The interaction and competition between a state and
its adversary can continue indefinitely. While resolving an episode of coercion may require
a great deal of the CCDRs’ effort, energy, and commitment, it is likely just a single event
in a continuing interactive relationship. The JFCs continually protect and monitor the
advantages created and norms reestablished as these accomplishments are fragile and
temporary. On the other hand, the adversary will quickly seek to pursue another facet of
influence, point of leverage, or advantage. For adversarial competition, there are no
permanent achievements or finality in inoculating a state’s sovereignty and sociopolitical
systems against all the measures and encroachments available to a committed adversary.

7. Patterns of Coercion and Determinants of Success

a. The Known Patterns

(1) Introduction. The United States has used its military power in adversarial
competition and in the competitions that always emerge after armed conflict. Most of these
cases involved both a diplomatic and economic dimension implemented to influence the
perceptions and behavior of foreign countries’ political leaders. JFCs posture and employ
military forces in discrete ways for specific objectives. JFCs recognize successful
employment is different for each situation. Evaluating these discrete activities requires
considering the full range of uses of the armed forces in adversarial competition.
Understanding the adversarial mechanisms that ultimately drive a US response is equally
important. Finally, JFCs understand how the armed forces can maximize their unique role
and what options can be most successful.

(2) Estimating Adversary’s Resolve Is Challenging. One aspect of developing

and implementing a coercive approach is estimating an adversary’s resolve. Resolve refers
to the strength of an adversary’s will to prevail, and comparative resolve refers to whose
will, the adversary’s or the state’s, is the stronger. Before a circumstance emerges, CCDRs
can never know for certain whether their resolve is stronger than the adversary. Indeed,
this discovery of will is the function of the confrontation, produced and revealed by the
resort to coercive action to test the relative strength of each party’s resolve. Estimating
comparative resolve attempts to determine who cares more about the objectives. Making
a solid estimation is a delicate assignment and easy to get wrong. JIPOE is critical in
making an accurate estimation. As making decisions based on an accurate understanding
is essential, determining resolve is a serious pursuit of the IC. Even with an accurate
estimate, there is no guarantee the parties’ comparative resolve will remain constant, as the
competition will evolve. Resolve is not static once interaction between the competitors
unfolds; commitments can change, often initially toward greater firmness. Typically,
adversaries entrench as the contest gets underway to see how strongly the United States
cares. When an adversary employs aspects of limited force, both sides are likely to harden
their positions even more. Finally, the interaction can have an inherent dynamic toward
escalation before the circumstances level out because neither party will either admit
complicity or acquiesce at the first offer.

(3) Coercing Behavior Is Difficult. Developing a sound appreciation of an

adversary’s resolve and ability to resist is essential, but JFCs recognize that coercing an

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adversary to choose an acceptable behavior is difficult. JFCs know it is intrinsically more

difficult to get an adversary to change its behavior than to maintain and accept the status
quo. Compelling successfully requires that the adversary alter a highlighted behavior that
is evident to the affected parties as a response to the United States’ declared initiative. In
contrast, deterrent threats are easier for the adversary to pretend to ignore or to comply
without great loss of face. In deterrent situations, the adversary can claim plausible
deniability, maintaining that it did not intend to change its behavior in the first place, or it
can simply appear to ignore deterrent threats while not changing its behavior. In changing
behavior, one barrier to success is that it usually requires the adversary’s overt submission.
An adversary can resist coercive attempts in imaginative and unexpected ways even when
the state has substantial leverage. The state can find the difference between the application
of force and the achievement of the objective, anything but direct, linear, and mechanical.
In practice, coercing behavior instead of imposing an outcome requires a favorable decision
by the adversary, thus making the next step of the contest a function of the adversary’s
decision making. The adversary loses standing and a sense of honor when under pressure;
it reverses a policy to which it has committed its prestige and devoted resources compared
with when it simply persists in the same behavior. Finally, coercing behavior enthralls the
passions of the adversary. Due to the external humiliation inflicted upon the adversary,
elicited passions can produce effects antithetical to the state’s objectives. These emotional
responses can cause the state to mobilize domestic support for the adversary’s government.
The risk and irony being the adversary becomes less susceptible to coercion. This risk is
part of a complex OE, and convincing or leveraging an adversary to make choices favorable
to the state is the essence of competition and art of countering coercion. The deliberate
decision by an adversary to cease an antagonistic behavior or policy characterizes and
distinguishes successful coercion from more direct use of power, such as forcible action.

(4) Long-Term Credibility, Legitimacy, and Power Are the Actual Stakes

(a) Coercing an adversary’s behavior and choice is normally more than a

matter of one-time acquiescence for the adversary. Accepting a demand is difficult, as the
adversary must worry about the effects of a failed confrontation on its internal and external
credibility and its power stakes. An adversary’s perception of its legitimacy and credibility
concerning its reputation, power stakes, and capabilities are difficult to discern, but the
adversary contemplates all these considerations in its decision to stand firm or give way to
a competitor state. The adversary’s deliberation of credibility and legitimacy make
compromise difficult and acquiescence demanding because the compromise may involve
long-term national issues and consequences. The adversary may see any capitulation as a
sign of weakness, which could encourage its rival to demand a long series of concessions
and take more aggressive action. Actions in the present set precedent and expectations for
the future. The adversary can never ignore how its reactions to pressures from others will
affect its reputation regarding legitimacy and credibility.

(b) Perceptions of power now and in the future are equally at stake. Giving
way to the United States may come with an opportunity cost to an adversary’s relative
strength. If, in deciding to accept the state’s demands, the adversary perceives its range of
future choices can significantly diminish, its natural incentives will be to stand firm.

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Chapter VI

Acquiescing to a competitor presents more than a discrete issue for the adversary because
a capitulation undercuts both its reputation for resolve and its ability to stand firm in the
future.

(5) Encroachments Are Vulnerable to Information. An adversarial

encroachment is a manifestation of coercive intent that breaks laws, violates treaties, and
trespasses upon matters of sovereignty. These actions can be intimidating but vulnerable
to a state’s manipulation and exploitation of information, regardless of the adversary’s
narrative’s sophistication and method. These vulnerabilities have several facets. An
encroachment creates victims or “net losers.” Information can create sympathy for the
victims, expose the adversary’s actions and delegitimize their narrative. Additionally,
information can dilute the adversary’s commitment, cast doubt on whether the coercion
will succeed, steer the adversary’s power base’s perceptions, provide a voice to the
disaffected, and articulate a better alternative for the future. The adversary’s competitive
pursuit serves their interests, of course, but one opportunity cost of implementation and
initial success is it creates a set of net losers or victims. In the context of the encroachment,
these victims may be geographically dislocated or isolated but likely have a broader ethnic
or religious constituency and connection with a larger regional or even global community
of interest.

(a) JFCs use information to create sympathy and supporting sentiment from
a broader community. JFCs recognize that sentiment can cascade across regions and
boundaries and create international pressure against the adversary’s policy and actions.
JFCs use of information highlights the injustice and perpetually keeps the topic in the
global media’s headlines across the victims’ associated communities. Ultimately, this
helps alienate and isolate the adversaries from the rest of the world. This isolation can
ultimately constrain the adversary’s other foreign and domestic policy objectives as well
as economic opportunities.

(b) Information activities can create separation between the adversary

leadership’s power base and the general population regarding the adversary’s coercion and
subversion. In most cases, the association between the general population and a nation’s
leadership is indirect but influential. Over time, the separation provides influence and
requires unanticipated effort and resources to manage the coercive policy.

(c) Information can segregate the adversary’s decision makers who

generated the encroachment from their base of support. The regime’s power base has many
interests and equity at stake in the adversary regime’s success and viability. Information
can convince the power base the regime’s endeavor puts their interests at risk. Once
convinced of the risk, the power base’s influence will begin to pressure the regime to
modify its behavior regarding the coercion.

(d) Information activities can create doubt in the mind of the adversary’s
decision makers, as to the encroachments’ viability and efficacy. Regarding the victimized
population, information provides a global voice and platform to the disaffected persons and
solidifies and advances the perception of illegitimacy, injustice, and grievance. Providing
a voice to the disaffected group is another form of exposure. Information does more than

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merely counter the adversaries’ narrative; it also provides a more compelling alternative
vision for the future.

(6) Adversaries Seek to Counter the Coercive Measures

(a) As the state employs coercive measures, the adversary will likely seek to
counter the move. If the adversary believes it can foil or significantly mitigate these
measures it will respond through counter-coercion techniques. The adversary can
implement these actions using any form or combination of national power and may signal
that the adversary is not likely to give way easily. Rather than simply seeking to minimize
the effect of the competitor’s coercive threats, an adversary may try to impose additional
costs on that state. The adversary can escalate militarily or attempt to drive a diplomatic
wedge between nations aligned against it. The adversary’s reasoning is that it can convince
the state to back down and withdraw its imposition. An assessment of the United States’
approach should focus on the perceived costs the action creates. In examining a coercive
interaction as a continual and dynamic exchange, the United States’ assessment should
consider the adversary’s ability to neutralize those costs, or at least its perception that it
can, as well as the effect of other threats bearing down on the adversary at any point in
time.

(b) The state prepares for the adversary’s likely counter-coercion methods to
undermine the coercive measure once it begins. If the adversary adapts and responds in
kind; both actors will likely persist in their responses, pouring more into their respective
efforts. In short, the dynamics of crisis behavior take over, and the confrontation can
escalate from threats and exemplary uses to armed conflict. Thus, when an adversary
believes that it possesses effective counter-coercion techniques, it will not immediately
respond to the state’s threats or actual use of force short of war. Matters become even more
vexing in situations where the adversary does not reveal its counter-coercion methods for
fear that doing so will negate their effectiveness. Foreknowledge does not necessarily
undermine the adversary’s counter-coercion capabilities. There are often strong incentives
to make such measures known ahead of time if doing so will deter the state from
undertaking such actions.

(7) States Can Fail to Understand the Competition’s Context and Means

(a) USG leaders and JFCs recognize that knowing the adversary is essential
but anticipating how the use of force affects adversary behavior is more demanding. How
effectively the state diplomatically and informationally shapes the international landscape
is an essential consideration of forming a viable approach and indicator of how well joint
force activity might influence an adversary’s choices. Considering the military,
diplomatic, and informational efforts as distinct and separate makes for easy but flawed
calculations of success or failure. Civilian and military leaders avoid trying to determine
success in narrow terms of the quantity of military force used and when. Instead, they
examine and anticipate the likelihood of success in how the multiple instruments of
national power work together and why. A tenuous assumption is that the greater

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Chapter VI

demonstration of force overall, especially sooner in the confrontation, actually sends a

stronger signal of US resolve. Absent a broad diplomatic effort, this may not be valid.

(b) A second consideration is whether less force ultimately can be effective

overall. A third consideration for a state is whether it can avoid the risk of violence entirely,
and if not, then at least minimize the risk of armed conflict and still achieve its objectives.

(c) A key disconnect can occur when a state fails to recognize a mismatch of
interests with an adversary. The state may have only modest interests regarding a contested
issue, while the adversary’s perceptions may be that the issue is existential. These
examples serve as a reminder that messages filter through the actor’s strategic culture;
domestic political culture; and their leadership’s temperament, experiences, and
predispositions. Messaging is inherently vulnerable to misinterpretation. The likelihood
of success decreases when an adversary perceives the state’s principal narrative is
inconsistent or lacks specific demands.

(d) JFCs know success begins with recognizing how any military approach
inextricably links with the nation’s ability to create the international and domestic political
conditions to signal resolve. Just as importantly, JFCs link these conditions to the military
approach. Together, the international diplomatic efforts, domestic consultation, and sound
approach send a strong signal of commitment, resolve, and willingness to accept costs as
well as impose them.

(8) Adversaries Can Employ Surrogates. Adversaries often employ surrogates

in adversarial competition to indirectly achieve their objectives when direct involvement
is infeasible, inappropriate, or unacceptable. The adversary will work indirectly through
its agent, or surrogate, to achieve an objective in pursuit of the principal’s interests. A
surrogate works or acts on behalf of, and in the direction of, the principal to accomplish
tasks the principal cannot perform or chooses not to perform. The principal-surrogate
relationship is dynamic because the principal and surrogate typically cooperate not as a
partnership with shared objectives but for divergent reasons. This divergence often
generates problems associated with agency and risk sharing. Problems occur when ulterior
objectives of the principal and surrogate come into conflict with one another. Risk-sharing
problems occur when one party wants the other party to accept more risk than the other
party is willing to accept. Changes in strategic and military risk affect the relationship
differently, depending on the relationship’s strength and character. The unacceptable
strategic risk may cause the principal to sever the relationship with the surrogate, or
unacceptable operational risk may cause the surrogate to sever the relationship with the
principal.

(9) Multiple States and Multiple Adversaries Complicate Coercion.

Coercion becomes even more demanding in situations in which more than a pair of states
compete against each other. Often, a multinational force is united in their overall view of
a needed response against an adversary, but members may disagree over the approach to
achieve their shared objectives. Sometimes the multinational force will even disagree on
the objective itself. This is where commanders can leverage interest mapping. If either is

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the case, then the multinational force members with the most power or stake relative to the
circumstance will have to exert energy to keep other members united in their effort. The
multinational force must balance the actions required to hold the multinational force
together and to counter the adversary’s coercive action. On the other hand, the joint force
may find that countering the coercive action is infeasible without the multinational force.
Likewise, a multinational force of adversaries can face similar difficulties. However, if
several adversaries are present, it becomes more difficult to design actions that counter all
their activities. Sometimes steps that coerce one of the parties can encourage the other
adversaries to resist. Other times it may be necessary to favor one of the adversaries to
induce the others to cooperate. Success in these types of situations requires finesse,
diplomacy, patience, compromise, and often, duplicity.

b. Determinants of Success

(1) The United States can align appropriate instruments of national power,
demonstrate effectively the extent of its commitment to policy objectives, and make
believable the tacit and overt threats of military force. Typically, the United States assesses
situations, takes counsel of collective wisdom, and endeavors to use all available foreign
policy tools to reinforce its credibility and convince adversaries of its resolve. However,
other states have attempted to convince an adversary of its resolve without the benefit of
information about whether the chosen tools are the right ones, for use in the right ways, in
the right combinations, or at the right times. These other state’s leaders likely made choices
based on many inputs and advice, and perhaps, intuition. Subjective assessments of risks,
resource constraints, and ethical considerations, which seem outwardly reasonable, do not
always speak how best to create positive coercive effects. In these circumstances, the result
can be an inadvertent use of foreign policy tools at times and in combinations that work at
cross-purposes, muddle communications, and provide inadequate context to the
characteristics and values of the adversary.

(2) When the adversary understands the state’s position, their choices of
submission, defiance, or something in-between are a function of its calculation of the costs,
benefits, and risks of the set of actions available. When the adversary does not accurately
understand the state’s position or commitment, the action or inaction distorts the state’s
calculation of the probabilities of the adversary choosing further defiance or capitulation.
This distortion makes it much harder to predict what the adversary will do and, after the
fact, to understand why it did so. An adversary’s defiance, for example, may certainly be
by design, or it may be unintentional if it did not understand what the state is demanding
or what the state was threatening. In practice, when its demands are highly specific, the
state has a greater likelihood of success than when its demands are vague. At the very
least, clarity minimizes the adversaries’ potential to misunderstand the state’s preferences
and so to behave defiantly by accident. At the very most, a lack of clarity might suggest
to the adversary that the state’s position is not mature, much less firm. A state’s ambiguity
may be due to a lack of internal political consensus or apprehension that the public is not
prepared to support a military intervention. This perception of a tenuous and weak
commitment may encourage the adversary to continue the encroachment, pressure the state
through noncompliance, or exploit other possible vulnerabilities.

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Chapter VI

COERCIVE ACTION IN HISTORY

In many cases, the United States has successfully applied coercive

action to advance and protect its interests. Three major examples
follow. In each case, the adversaries were capable and even the
preeminent great powers of the era. There are many cases where the
United States has prevailed.

a. During the Civil War, President Lincoln sidelined Great Britain

and France from trading with the Confederacy through a deft
combination of international law, information, and widening the Civil
War’s aims.

b. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States

convinced the Soviets to remove their nuclear weapons from the
western hemisphere in exchange for a similar compromise within the
Soviet sphere.

c. Over the decade of the 1980s, the United States cooperated with
a diverse set of states, each with little in common with one another to
sponsor and support a surrogate, the Afghan rebels, to frustrate and
disrupt the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

Various Source

(3) In many cases of US efforts at coercing behavior or countering an adversary’s

coercive action, the joint force operates in a supporting role to enable, protect, and provide
credibility to other instruments of national power. In adversarial competition, civilian and
military leaders rarely employ military efforts by themselves. When military force does
not underpin other instruments of national power, these tools can be just as irrelevant or
ineffective. The United States’ most effective pursuits in countering coercion include
actions that weave together informational, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts.
When coercive action includes military force, JFCs must consider and recommend how to
organize around the adversaries’ coercive mechanism and their associated decision
making. Along with demonstrating the commitment and resolve to prevail, the
combination of tools and measures implemented together with military force that provide
the highest probabilities for success are:

(a) Lead with a deliberate narrative that discredits the adversary’s narrative
and articulates the importance and significance of the event or circumstance relative to US
values and interests. Once the narrative establishes intent, it can credibly levy highly
specific demands compared with when the interests are unclear and demands are
diffused or weak. Vague and nonspecific demands decrease the likelihood of coercive
success. This decrease in the likelihood of success may be because unclear demands
increase the likelihood of misinterpretation, confusion, and, therefore, inadvertent
defiance. Even worse, they suggest the state’s policy position is not firm but potentially
moveable under the pressure of intentional defiance.

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(b) Determine the objectives and decisions for implementation based on a

sound, accurate understanding of why the adversary is behaving in a malign or antagonistic
manner. A sophisticated diagnosis and estimate of the adversary should drive the decision
making and approach. A poor understanding of what is motivating the adversary decision
maker’s behavior reduces the likelihood of coercive success. When implementing policy
and military support of the action, commanders often must begin with incomplete
knowledge about possible outcomes. It may be that only through US and joint force
interaction with the adversary increases the knowledge increase surrounding a
circumstance. JFCs cannot predict perfectly what they can achieve in advance; however,
commitment to sound diagnosis is essential. JFCs can accumulate more information only
through action. Many key aspects of information can only become known in the process
of the coercive act, where the United States attempts to get the most out of a situation. In
setting objectives, the opportunities for and risks to success will wax and wane throughout
the coercive event, and commanders should expect the policy guidance to evolve. As the
situation dictates modifications to the approach and its expectations, a state must counter
tendencies to steer toward an overly conservative approach and avoid a reluctance to push
for relevant gains against seemingly difficult odds. The state should resist the tendency to
pursue only objectives that seem highly feasible and likely achievable. The risk is that
minimalist objectives may be achievable but irrelevant. The risk of timid and cautious
action can portray a lack of commitment and conviction and may miss cultural-specific
signals. In the end, the state compels through the manipulation of anticipated costs, and it
is the target’s perception of costs that matters.

(c) Create leverage and solidarity with like-minded multinational partners to

build commitments and overt effort where and when possible, to leverage treaties and other
diplomatic efforts. Solidarity can also be a function of legitimacy, which is an important
factor in both exposing and countering an adversary’s unwanted behavior.

(d) Project military forces from outside the theater to address the adversary’s
unacceptable behavior. Attempting to solve the problem with only in-theater forces often
provides a reduced probability of success. Moving in forces from outside the theater of
contest significantly increases the likelihood of success, as it is a good indicator of resolve.
This characteristic is true regardless of other factors, such as the level of forces permanently
assigned or already deployed in the region at the time. Experience shows that moving
forces from outside the AOR into the contested region has a positive effect regardless of
the composition of those forces. This dynamic global employment gives policymakers
considerable flexibility when designing force packages for coercive operations.

(e) Create a sense of asymmetry in the joint force’s favor or strive to reduce
or equalize the asymmetric advantage in motivation over the contested interest. In some
situations, the state may create an asymmetry of motivation in its favor in four ways. First,
the United States should demand the adversary do what is essential to qualify as no longer
threatening its vital interests. Second, the state should balance that demand to avoid
making demands that encroach upon the adversary’s vital interests. Third, the state should
offer incentives that reduce the adversary’s motivation to resist the demands and make it
easier to comply. Fourth, to increase the probability of success, the state should craft
demands that allow the adversary to maintain a perception of status and legitimacy while

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giving in. Effective commanders try to use all four levers to create an asymmetry of
motivation in their favor. The success of coercive threats depends upon an understanding
of how mixing these influences creates this type of leverage.

(f) Align the military actions against values and interests of higher priority
to the adversary than the values and interests in the dispute. In coercing behavior, success
depends on making the costs of nonperformance undesirable enough to convince the
adversary to adjust. Telegraphing to the adversary the intended military action is not
compromising but necessary. The uncertainty and vagueness about the nature and extent
of potential costs are not reinforcing and can be counterproductive. The misperception of
an adversary’s motives and incentives can negatively affect our ability to manipulate its
cost-benefit analysis. When the state does not target important interests, the costs of
defiance are acceptable to the adversary. This miscalculation can result in failure,
prolonging the coercive exchange until the state modifies the approach and shifts the
adversary’s calculation of the balance of costs or worse, an unnecessary escalation to armed
conflict.

(g) Leverage information effectively for situational awareness and

efficiency. An adversarial encroachment is usually vulnerable to manipulation and
exploitation of information, regardless of the adversary actions’ level of sophistication and
methods of employment. These vulnerabilities have several facets. Information can create
sympathy for the victims, expose and discredit the adversary’s actions and delegitimize
their narrative. Furthermore, information can also dilute the adversary’s commitment, cast
doubt on whether the coercion will succeed, steer the adversary’s power base’s perceptions,
provide a voice to the disaffected, and articulate a better alternative for the future.

(h) Build, leverage, and sustain networks of interorganizational partners to

add diplomatic, economic, and military weight to coercive or defensive demands. The
participation of NATO Allies and regional partners in a military coalition is far preferable
to undertaking a coercive or defensive military action unilaterally. The key to success is
an accurate assessment of partner authorities, capabilities, posture, limitations, and will.

(i) Ensure continuity and consolidation for follow-on missions. Effective

follow-through of joint force success against an adversary does not normally lead to the
conclusion of the overall competition. Following through on the gains and adjusting to the
setbacks is a fundamental requirement. The result may change the overall character of the
competition. JFCs should anticipate the continual ebbs and flows of adversarial
competition over time. Joint forces capitalize on success by consolidating the gains. As
no accomplishment in competition has permanence, commanders ensure continuity of
effort through activities to secure and protect the coercive action’s success and maintain
the behaviors and conditions to perpetuate the advantage or interest. Consolidating gains
is an integral part of succeeding in competition and winning in armed conflict.

8. Considerations for Countering Coercion and Malign Influence

a. When directed, the joint force has traditionally exercised influence over key
territories in conditions less than armed conflict to maintain and advance US national

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interests. Now, the situation can become more complex as threats have challenged the
United States in orbital and cyberspace. Within enduring competitions, actors continually
probe and seek to gain an advantage. Previous strategic guidance has directed military
forces to counter these provocations on many occasions. The US and joint force
experiences have exceeded the scope of most anecdotal coercion theories. For example,
some situations include more than two actors that bear on the situation and its outcome.
With the inclusion of multiple actors, an effective response requires a holistic framework
where multiple power struggles may be in play concurrently. In the US experience, general
deterrence is broad and continuous throughout the competition continuum. Alternatively,
the United States normally tailors its use of force to compel behavior short of war only in
specific circumstances.

b. The impact of the use of military force in these circumstances reinforces and
empowers current narratives, expands and leverages existing treaties and partnerships, and
provides credibility and teeth to other elements of national and allied power. In almost
every case, the joint force provides the backbone and connective tissue to bring to bear
other instruments of national power effectively. Civilian leaders have depended upon the
joint force in the wake of military victory to determine, create, and enforce a new and
preferred international landscape. When militaries do not effectively enable this political
leverage, abstract but real and powerful forces, previously unforeseen, dormant, or
sidelined, emerge and bring to bear new and expanded political stakes and circumstances.
In these cases, there is no readily apparent finality or conclusion for the military.

c. When the existing character of relations between two nations regarding a specific
contested interest is hostile, nations can call upon armed forces to coerce behavior. Nations
use military force in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to present a
threat to an adversary to:

(1) Deter the adversary from taking an undesired action or from stopping or
preventing a desired action. There may be actors that are currently not complicit in or
supportive of the antagonistic behavior but that could make the situation far worse or
complicated. The joint force may contribute to actions that ensure those actors remain
neutral or not involved.

(2) Compel the adversary to do or to stop doing an action. Armed forces are used
to organize around the problem by providing support to a neutral actor(s) or potential ally.

(3) Assure or reinforce other relevant actors so they will continue positive
behavior or begin to make positive contributions. Another aspect of assurance is in
signaling that compliance by the adversary will not lead to further demands.

(4) Induce a hesitant actor to either initiate positive contributions or refrain from
harmful behavior. Policy formulation should consider, and JFCs account for, all the actors
involved that can substantially bear on the situation.

d. Regardless of the circumstance, joint forces can coerce behaviors either directly or
indirectly. Direct use of military force occurs when the activities orient on an adversary

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without intermediaries. Sometimes, JFCs compel behavior indirectly through partners. In

these cases, the joint force does not confront the primary adversary with action; only the
adversary’s allies feel pressure directly. JFCs can coerce an adversary indirectly to the
degree that they are concerned with their client’s well-being if they find the US action
credible. For example, the United States deployed a Marine expeditionary brigade to
Thailand in 1962 to induce the Soviet Union and China to compel their indigenous Laotian
surrogates to change their antagonistic behavior.

e. Civilian leaders can use the joint force indirectly to achieve strategic objectives. In
such instances, the signaling to the adversary may include changes in the disposition of
military units. While these actions may demonstrate US concern to all parties, US civilian
leaders may make no specific attempt to communicate the relationship between the military
activity and the desired behavior of an adversary within the circumstance. Success requires
the adversary to anticipate, observe, or otherwise become aware of the military activity.

f. Precipitation of Coercion

(1) Coercive circumstances begin to unfold when an actor disrupts an established

framework of relations among several nations or an internal domestic political
configuration, by injecting sentiment, attitudes, or overt action that is unexpected or at least
unwelcome. Once the actor or adversary identifies an opportunity or vulnerability, they
pursue and exploit it through unattributable, nuanced, or overt coercive measures, while
violating principles of sovereignty. The adversary leverages ambiguity and deliberately
blurs truth from fiction. These encroachments may manifest themselves as a domestic
upheaval, a new departure in a major power’s foreign policy, or perhaps an unexpected
armed clash between the military units of hostile states. Regardless of the cause, the
encroachment often creates uncertainties and a distinct and pervasive psychological unease
among interested parties. The adversary’s objectives can be subtle or surprising—modest
or bold.

(2) The choices made by foreign decision makers have their own domestic and
external limitations. As a group of variables, the perceptions, sources of motivation,
strength of commitment to an interest, and many other influences significantly impact those
decisions. Although a state might want to clearly signal a willing or imminent threat of the
use of force, a foreign leader may perceive only a weak commitment. Domestic
considerations and internal pressure may drive an adversary to act against their better
judgment. Different scenarios present different degrees of difficulty. The degree of
success of the joint force and other US policy efforts depends upon how effectively the
designed effort penetrates the complex and layered set of variables driving an adversary’s
decision making.

(3) In implementing a mechanism to counter the adversaries’ advances, JFCs

must consider how to organize against the adversaries’ decision-making mechanisms. One
method is to identify all the actions and behaviors needed to confront the encroachment.
These fall largely into two categories. First, the behaviors that the joint force’s efforts need
to ensure, and second, the behaviors the joint force must change. For example, for any

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single problem set, there are probably several behaviors the joint force needs to help
continue and several behaviors commanders will need to stop.

g. Determining the Approach and Objectives for a Specific Interest/Adversarial

Behavior

(1) In developing an approach, national leaders will likely have to consider and
decide five questions. The first is what to demand of the adversary regarding curtailment
of the encroachment. The second is how to create a sense of necessity for the adversary to
comply with the demand. The third is how to determine what measures will be effective
against the adversary’s existing encroachment and convey relevant and increasing costs for
continued noncompliance. Fourth, how the US and joint force will recognize whether the
implemented approach is working. Fifth and finally, how to communicate an assurance of
settlement when the adversary complies. Together, these five decisions lead to formulating
a demand that is credible and potent enough in the adversary’s mind that they choose
compliance rather than noncompliance and its consequences. The more far-reaching the
demand on the adversary, the stronger its motivation to resist and the more difficult the
task of the coercive diplomacy. The point is in striving to know the adversary and avoiding
the tendency to mirror-image how we might react given a reversal of roles.

(2) Depending on the answers the policymakers provide, there will be different
variants of the approach. There are three major variants and JFCs can provide essential
contributions for each. The first is the ultimatum, which is a deadline that the state gives
for compliance, backed by actions associated with denial or imposing costs for
noncompliance. The second is gradualism, which pushes for compliance backed only with
the threat of incremental increases of military force over time. The third type of approach
is through experimentation. Initially, this may be a minimalist approach that may not have
a substantive opportunity cost but likely lack mechanisms for both creating a sense of
urgency for compliance and a clear threat of military force for noncompliance. Only on
rare occasions will an adversary respond to incentives or promises of beneficial overtures.

(3) The purposes of these different approaches are typically:

(a) Denial approaches seek to change an adversary’s behavior by thwarting

its approach or denying implementation. Denial focuses on the actual conduct or
implementation of the encroachment. Denial confronts the actual coercive mechanism to
undercut its effectiveness, seeking to stalemate these forces rather than bring outright
military victory over them. A successful denial approach is one that prevents the adversary
from achieving their objectives with its approach.

(b) Forfeiture or cost-imposing approaches seek to change an adversary’s

behavior by raising the costs of its continued antagonistic behavior. Forfeiture imposes
costs, either directly to the adversary’s power base or population, or pressures assets that
are important for the population’s or to the leadership’s values or quality of life. A
successful approach is one that causes the adversary to give way, not because the
competitor thwarts the military approach but because the opportunity costs of continuing

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are too great or the impact on the adversary’s internal structures or population has become
too negative.

(c) Risk-based approaches seek to change an adversary’s behavior by

raising the probability that it will suffer increasing costs in the future if it fails to comply.
Risk means escalation and threatens greater costs to the adversary’s valued power base and
key assets.

1. A successful risk-based approach causes the adversary to acquiesce

because it becomes convinced the costs it will suffer from looming coercive action are not
worth the objectives it seeks. To the extent force produces risk, coercive action can be
inherently difficult to pull off because risk-based approaches are inherently complex. Risk-
based approaches can be successful to the extent that they create, in the adversary’s mind,
the fear that future military actions will be sufficiently costly that the adversary changes its
behavior. However, costs suffered from coercive measures in the present carry more
influence than the potential costs imagined from coercion in the future.

2. JFCs should calculate and conceive risk as anticipated future costs.

Imagined future opportunity costs hurt less than present costs. Based on the circumstances,
JFCs may apply a risk-based approach incrementally, gradually ratcheting up the costs.
However, this can produce contrary effects. Especially if the adversary has time to adapt
its tactics to reduce the damage, adjust to the costs, and mobilize domestic opinion against
the United States—all of which make the adversary better able to tolerate the imposed
costs. Finally, a coercive risk approach is less effective when the state only threatens or
severely limits the action against the adversary.

3. For similar reasons, denial approaches are difficult to execute with

coercive diplomacy. After all, it is hard to inflict much damage with coercive diplomacy:
the limited use of force produces only limited results. Delivering limited military actions
is not likely to cause an adversary that cares deeply about its objectives to change course.
Similarly, the threat to deny is not actual denial, and limited use of force can produce only
limited denial. Strictly speaking, coercive diplomacy cannot employ denial in the sense
that it cannot use enough force to stalemate an adversary. Through limited military action,
the joint force can, if it chooses, undercut the effectiveness of the adversary’s encroachment
but without making it stop.

4. Whether the state intends to employ its military power to manipulate

risk, impose costs, or execute denial, all three goals can be difficult to achieve with only
limited employment of military force. For the state, it expects its threats and measures
signal firm resolve to escalate the use of force unless the adversary bends. However, the
adversary, especially a highly motivated one, can just as easily perceive the threats and
limited use of force as signaling weakness. A demonstration of determination can actually
appear as an unwillingness or inability to employ large forces or engage in armed conflict.
Threats and limited use of force are not unequivocal in their meaning; the adversary can
interpret either firmness or weakness in resolve, depending upon their perspective and
gathered information.

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(4) Regional partners may welcome an imminent change in US policy or overt

indications of enforcing an existing one because the US action protects or advances their
national interests. In these instances, these partners may be willing participants. The
challenge and opportunity are to create solidarity regarding the interests at stake with
multiple like-minded actors. This unity requires precisely aligning a common view of the
encroachment, the combined interests of countering the adversary, and the individual
efforts and goals between the United States and all the participants. Other actors may be
inclined toward or favor the interests of the adversary. Their involvement or participation
can complicate the situation, increase the effort the United States has to exert, and reduce
the probability of success. In these instances, the joint force and interdepartmental leaders
take measures to ensure these actors refrain from action that supports the adversary. These
aspects of the effort may be heavy-handed and even coercive. The efforts must sideline
these potentially harmful actors and incentivize them to at least remain neutral. Together,
these actions prepare the international framework that favors the United States and isolates
the adversary.

(a) Successful coercion causes the adversary to choose to change or modify

its behaviors. For example, a nation may initially take a neutral position or seek to remain
uninvolved. However, that nation’s participation may be essential to the CCDR’s
campaign design, such as providing essential access, basing, or overflight permissions, as
well as denying those to the adversary. The United States may well have to provide
cooperative incentives, many being military, such as SC investments. These incentives are
another aspect of isolating the adversary and its encroachment.

(b) Next, the national leadership can direct departmental, agency, and joint
force actions to organize around and against the adversary’s encroachment with the intent
of coercing a change in that behavior and then rolling back its gains through a mix of
activities and measures. Senior military leaders form and apply discrete mixes against
specific actors and narrow, but relevant, aspects of the overall circumstance. Across
regions, the campaign design may require numerous, precise applications of blended US
powers to pursue and achieve the operational-level behavioral objectives, either reinforcing
or compelling action. In most cases, these contested interests are transregional and require
contributions of several CCMDs. For example, one CCMD may have to initiate and align
efforts to maintain solidarity and assure two or three partners and take action to keep an
unhelpful actor on the sidelines. Another CCMD may work with partners to facilitate a
behavior necessary for success with irregular and conventional force. At the same time, a
third CCMD focuses on multiple forms of military force to compel alongside other coercive
diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to compel the
adversary to acquiesce to US demands. A fourth CCMD’s actual contribution may be
establishing an exclusion zone, interdicting LOCs, or supporting a violent surrogate.

(c) When countering an adversary’s coercive actions, JFCs should account

for specific friendly and adversary behaviors: those that should continue and those that
should change. The approach must organize around the problem and contested interest(s)
by employing combinations of activities and measures toward multiple instances of the
desired behaviors. The campaign design and execution may have to present and leverage
unique combinations of US national power. For each necessary behavior, the campaign

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should employ actions and measures consisting of diplomatic incentives or pressures,

irregular and traditional warfare, and economic measures that promote or constrain a
competitor. The combination of actions and measure can be rich with incentives; light
pressures for hesitant, but needed, contributors; and a full and complex array of strong
pressures aimed at the adversary. The importance of making decisions and choices based
on understanding the adversary’s perspective and developing a causal link between action
and behavior for each actor is essential. These incentives and light pressures must resonate
and impact all the involved parties’ perception of options and subsequent decision making.

(d) Finally, policy guidance will likely drive the operational objectives.
Initially, the level of effort may be minimal. The policy intentions and corresponding
military approach may only seek to limit the adversary’s actions. Based on the evolving
situation, this level of effort and the goals may scale up or down. Of course, the joint
force’s actions toward coercing a single antagonistic behavior by a single actor occurs
within global integration’s systematic decision making and recommendation process.
Potential policy goals include counter, enhance, contest, and limit. These can change
rapidly throughout the GCP or CCP.

1. Counter. Proactively challenge and prevent the adversary from

achieving incompatible objectives without causing an escalation to armed conflict but
seeking to roll back the adversary’s gains and coerce the adversary to abandon the behavior
and policy.

2. Enhance. Actively seek to achieve strategic objectives; improve

relative strategic or military advantage.

3. Contest. Maintain relative strategic or military advantage to ensure

the adversary achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the US advantage as much
as possible with existing resources and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests
elsewhere.

4. Limit. Minimize the adversary’s gains. Achieve the best possible

strategic objective within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser
objective entails the risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

h. Joint Operations, Tasks, and Investments in Adversarial Competition. The

clearest signal of US commitment is the deployment and employment of military forces in
response to the unacceptable behavior of an adversary. The most effective means of
communicating to an adversary the seriousness of US intent is the visible commitment of
resources: spending the money required to project power, accepting the opportunity costs
of not using capabilities in other ways, and putting military assets and Service members in
potentially dangerous environments. When the principal narrative makes clear the United
States values the object and stakes surrounding the contested interest, the decision to move
forces from outside the region into the AOR is an effective signal of US resolve. This type
of signaling is effective for many situations, across many types and sizes of deployments,
despite differences in the size and longevity of any prior permanent presence. Cost is a

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good indicator of value, and vulnerability is a good indicator of commitment. The United
States has considerable flexibility in selecting which combinations of air, maritime, land,
space, and cyberspace forces to use when it wishes to demonstrate its resolve. The types
of joint operations associated with adversarial competition include:

(1) Sanction Enforcement is any operation that employs coercive measures to

control the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.
Maritime interception operations can be efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant
vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations, such as those in
support of the UN Security Council or other legitimate sanctioning body’s resolutions, and
prevent the transport of restricted goods. The strategic objective is to compel a nation or
group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the operational objective
focuses on establishing a selective barrier that allows only authorized goods to enter or
exit. Depending on the terrain, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination
of forces operating in multiple domains across AORs. Assigned forces should be capable
of complementary mutual support and full communications interoperability.

(2) Establishing/Enforcing Exclusion Zones. A sanctioning body establishes

an exclusion zone to prohibit specified activities in a specific area. With appropriate
authorization and subject to law and policy, joint forces may monitor and enforce exclusion
zones for breaches or flagrant violations of international law regarding the conduct of
nations, treaty compliance, protection or safety of civilians, or force protection. There are
different types of exclusion zones that the JFC can establish. These zones can emanate
from the air, on the water, or the land. An exclusion zone’s purpose may be to persuade
nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or
face the continued imposition of sanctions, or signal a credible threat of the use of force.
Such measures can be resolutions by the UN or mandates by another international body of
which the United States is a member, although the United States may unilaterally impose
them (e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis Oct 1962, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq,
initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 1993 to
December 1995).

(3) Interdiction. In adversarial competition, with proper authorization,

interdiction can include activities to support law enforcement and divert, disrupt, delay,
intercept, board, detain, or destroy with lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people,
cargo, and money. For example, joint forces have much experience in conducting air and
maritime interception operations in support of a wide range of UN Security Council
resolutions. Additionally, Title 10, USC, and state NG military forces also provide DSCA
to USG departments or agencies responsible for domestic law enforcement interdiction
activities when requested and approved by SecDef or the President.

(4) Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping. Peace enforcement operations

(PEO) and peacekeeping operations (PKO) are important coercive actions that orient on
adversarial behaviors. They are important tools and can make significant contributions in
adversarial competition. PEO and PKO can be multiagency and multinational operations.
PEO and PKO can provide a humanitarian response or coerce a cessation of violent actions.

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They can involve all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian

and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain armed conflict, force a change
in antagonistic behavior, create an environment of reconciliation and rebuilding, and
facilitate the transition from fragile to effective governance. For the joint force, this
typically includes PKO, PEO, and deterrence. JFCs conduct PKO or PEO in conjunction
with various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts to achieve strategic objectives.
JFCs tailor PKO/PEO to each situation and may support diplomatic activities before,
during, or after conflict. PKO/PEO support national/multinational strategic objectives.
Military support improves the chances for success in the negotiation process by lending
credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political
settlements.

For additional guidance on peace operations, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

(5) Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of navigation operations

protect US navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas, against
excessive maritime claims. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right accorded by
international law.

(a) International law recognizes that a coastal nation may exercise

jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner it can exercise
sovereignty over its land territory, subject to the right of “innocent” passage, which permits
ships to pass continuously and expeditiously through another nation’s territorial waters.
The passage is “innocent” if it is not prejudicial to the stability, good order, or security of
the coastal nation. All ships and aircraft enjoy complete freedom of movement and
operation on and over the high seas, subject only to the requirement to have due regard for
the rights of other nations and safe conduct and operation of other ships and aircraft.

(b) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a

well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups
through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms
will result in a measured legal response, appropriate to the situation. The International
Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the UN, codifies the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of
international air transport to ensure safe and orderly use of international airspace.

(6) Freedom of Overflight. Space is the only physical domain that allows a
globally persistent and legal overflight of any location on the Earth. This global persistence
is achieved by combining the high-altitude perspective of space with the enduring
longevity of spacecraft, and an international legal regime affords unique opportunities for
military power. Orbital flight extends LOCs into the most desolate and remote OAs. Joint
forces at every echelon capitalize on this capability to share information beyond their line-
of-sight, synchronizing global power projection. Space operations can overcome denied
area access in that space-based ISR provides the foundational intelligence to analyze
adversary capabilities, COAs, and intent to deliver predictive intelligence for space domain
awareness and JFC decision making. With this positional advantage, military forces can

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monitor and begin response to contingencies around the world before establishing an in-
theater footprint.

(7) Protection of Shipping. When necessary, US forces protect US-flag vessels,

US citizens (whether embarked in the United States or foreign vessels), and US property
against unlawful violence in and over international waters. This protection may extend to
foreign-flag vessels under international law and with the consent of the flag state (such as
Operation EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships reflagged under the US flag in 1987).
Actions to protect shipping include coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security,
countermine operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high
seas, including escort duties and area operations. JFCs may decide to execute these
operations individually or in combination. Protection of shipping, which is a critical
element in the fight against piracy, requires the coordinated employment of surface, air,
space, subsurface units, sensors, weapons, and a command structure both ashore and afloat
with a logistic base.

(8) Show of Force. Commanders conduct show of force operations to

demonstrate the US resolve. They involve the appearance of a credible military force to
attempt to modify a specific actor’s behavior or defuse a situation that, if allowed to
continue, may be detrimental to US interests. These operations also underscore US
commitment to our multinational partners.

(a) The United States deploys forces abroad to lend credibility to its promises
and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use
military force if necessary. SecDef may order a show of force to bolster and reassure
friends and allies. Show of force operations are military but often serve both diplomatic
and military purposes. These operations may influence other governments or political-
military organizations to change or modify antagonistic behavior or refrain from belligerent
acts.

(b) Diplomatic concerns influence a show of force operation, and as such,

military forces are often under significant legal and diplomatic constraints and restraints.
The military force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of
force can involve a wide scope of military forces, including joint US or multinational
forces. Forces conducting a show of force operation are also capable of FDOs, FROs, and
transitioning to humanitarian response or limited contingency activities.

(9) Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Irregular Threats

(a) Irregular Threats. Adversaries may use irregular approaches indirectly

through surrogates to gain the advantage over a targeted government or international
audiences and organizations. These adversaries balance the appropriate level of resistance
and violence, striving for substantive effects while avoiding armed conflict by design. In
this context, irregular threats challenge and compete against US and partner interests and
others in the international community by threatening stability, norms, and the rule of law.

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1. Irregular threats employ techniques of resistance, influence, and

violence against vulnerable US allies and partners while purposefully avoiding armed
conflict with the United States. Irregular threats can promote both nonviolent and violent
resistance among the populations they aim to influence. Irregular threats use many forms
of unlawful violence or threats of violence to further a variety of political, social, criminal,
economic, and religious ideologies. Terrorists threaten the national power, sovereignty,
and interests of the United States and our allies. The JFC should expect an array of actions
and activities that challenge USG policy, counter-information efforts to erode legitimacy,
and influence local groups and populations to protest US intervention. Irregular threats
often avoid conflict and war with the USG but will utilize violence to counter US influence
and policy. Increasingly, nation-state adversaries employ traditional and irregular
strategies or work through surrogates or partners to compete against US policy and wield
influence. Non-state actors primarily employ irregular strategies to achieve the same
results through aggressive competition activities and violent opposition to US interests.
Irregular threats operate clandestinely to avoid detection, foster and promote deniability,
or blur and veil encroachments of norms and laws to create political and legal dilemmas
for the USG and joint force.

2. An adversary’s use of irregular threats can frustrate and contest US

policy and the joint force actions. Irregular threats can engage and operate across the
competition continuum, from cooperation through armed conflict. Irregular threats include
surrogates, mercenaries, insurgents, subjugated or disenfranchised supporters, and criminal
networks that support smuggling, illicit trafficking, and finance networks. These threats
often operate in weak, failing, or failed states, illicitly around the world and nation-states
that sponsor threats or provide sanctuary.

(b) Considerations for Campaigning Against Irregular Threats

1. Design campaigns around US, allies, and partner interests.

CCDRs evaluate threats and opportunities by how they impact the United States, our allies,
and our partners’ interests. CCDRs advance and protect US interests by translating them
into operational objectives within the GCPs mission areas and CCPs. CCDRs promote the
interests of intergovernmental partners and allies through coordination and integrating
strategies, plans, and actions to increase the probability of success. JFCs identify mutual
concerns, interests, and goals. JFCs characterize how actors threaten those interests or
efforts to exploit opportunities for advancing the US, allied, and partner interests relative
to the actor. JFCs orient objectives on maintaining or creating an environment more
favorable to shared interests. As the JFC visualizes a favorable or acceptable environment,
one critical element for influence is an objective focused on the population and measures
of the effects of information activities. JFCs consider allied and partner interests,
especially where they align and inform the development of coalitions and shared
responsibilities. This type of approach is a challenge for the joint force in balancing
requirements between US global and theater interests. This balancing requires a
coordinated prioritization process to manage potential constrained resources and
capability.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

2. Employ irregular and unorthodox methods. Irregular and

unorthodox methods do not follow past practices or traditions of military activities or
actions. When the threat applies irregular or asymmetrical methods against the United
States or allies, they are attempting to thwart and challenge traditional approaches to
competition, stability, and security. The JFC can implement an irregular or nontraditional
approach to challenge the actions of the adversary and frustrate their plans and goals.
Employing nontraditional methods against irregular threats includes countering their
surreptitious movements, revealing or exposing their concealment in sanctuaries, refuting
and opposing their information narrative or efforts, and, on rare occasion, violent actions.
Employing irregular and nontraditional methods can frustrate the threat’s ability to identify
or anticipate the JFC’s plans and degrade the threat’s efforts to counter future US military
activities. Plan for the development of operational infrastructure early in the campaign to
support future actions and the flexibility to employ multiple capabilities against the
adversary. In areas at risk without operational infrastructure, JFCs coordinate with
multinational partners and allies to expand opportunities through their assistance and
influence. During competition, subject to proper authorization, SOF may focus on
employing unorthodox methods to influence local conditions, enhance integrated
deterrence, or provide the JFC with risk-sensitive offensive options to advance US interests
short of armed conflict.

3. Exploit asymmetries and leverage indirect approaches.

Campaigns should incorporate a strategic and operational understanding of asymmetries
that exist between US and adversaries’ interests, strategies, cultures, postures, capabilities,
and relationships. This analysis will illuminate adversary strengths, vulnerabilities,
decisions, and red lines to help identify cost- or risk-sensitive opportunities to build
advantage and create dilemmas. One tool for the JFC is to develop understanding through
the preparation and ongoing assessment of the OE. A campaign plan can direct efforts
against the threat’s asymmetries through sequencing joint force actions and activities to
frustrate or stall the operational momentum of the adversary.

4. Coordinate information to influence both globally and locally.

Information is a powerful tool that can garner global support for US and partner efforts,
build trust and address concerns for legitimacy, and influence local opinion against the
adversary and counter its propaganda. The campaign should integrate the employment of
credible global messaging and counter-messaging capability that is iterative; is repeatable;
and promotes cross-CCMD, interorganizational, and multinational coordination to
leverage overwhelming influence against the adversary. The JFC’s information approach
should promote legitimacy through activities directed against those areas and populations
where irregular threats leverage economic, ideological, and logistical support. The JFC
analyzes the OE to identify US resource requirements and areas where populations may be
vulnerable to radicalization to support violence and terror. The JFC anticipates an
adversary’s operations and activities, while counter-messaging continuously throughout
the campaign to frustrate the adversary’s ability to influence opinion or increase support.
JFCs integrate information fluency to strengthen the joint force advantage through
knowledge of the joint force information capabilities and those information capabilities of
its enemies and adversaries. Commanders assess the effectiveness of targeted influence

VI-45
Chapter VI

efforts to plan future information actions and can modify or continue future efforts
depending on the assessment results.

5. Conduct global campaigning. Actions against irregular threats

should reflect the relationship of SOF and conventional forces with the joint force to
achieve an optimized effort through multifunctional capabilities employed throughout the
OE. The two integral aspects of this method are how SOF and other forces enable the core
joint warfighting functions. Irregular threats require expanded interorganizational
cooperation, combined with efforts to create powerful influence at the right time and place.
CCDRs integrate campaigns by coordinating with other collaborating CCMDs and
recommending sequencing USG actions and activities throughout the competition
continuum, emphasizing cooperation and adversarial competition. A globally integrated
force campaigns across multiple theaters against irregular threats. As the joint force
campaigns in cooperation, success requires a partner-building methodology that contests
threat networks through prioritizing how and when to assist allies and partners. The CCDR
and staff plan to maintain those current partners with mutual interests affected by irregular
threats and advance selected partners in capability, interoperability, and desired US access.
During competition, the JFC envisions how to improve the US and allies’ strategic position,
contest adversary gains, and employ actions to impose costs and create dilemmas for the
irregular threats and their sponsors.

(c) Operations and Activities for Countering Irregular Threats

1. FID. FID is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces

of a foreign government or international organization in any of the programs and activities
undertaken by an HN government to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other irregular threats to its internal security and
the strategic interests of the sponsoring party.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

2. CTN. CTN is a subset of network engagement. CTN consists of the

aggregation of activities across the DOD and USG departments and agencies that identifies
and neutralizes, degrades, disrupts, or defeats designated threat networks. Irregular threats
use licit and illicit networks to increase their operational reach and conduct, direct, support,
and inspire malign activities directed against the interests of the United States and its allies
and partners. In cooperation with interagency, intergovernmental, and foreign partner law
enforcement and intelligence organizations, the joint force conducts CTN activities to
dismantle these threat networks. CTF is a component of CTN. CTF encompasses activities
conducted to degrade, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and
use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary’s ability to affect US interests
negatively. Joint forces conduct CTF activities to interdict the clandestine transfer and
storage of funds to finance malign activities.

For additional guidance on CTN, network engagement and CTF activities, refer to JP 3-
25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Cooperation and Adversarial Competition

(10) Support to Resistance Partners/Insurgency

(a) Support to resistance is a USG policy option to support a foreign

resistance movement that offers an alternative to a direct US military intervention or formal
political engagement in a conflict. The USG may determine to support the resistance in
various situations and under many different conditions. Once USG sponsorship is
determined, the resistance becomes a partner where the USG shares policy and resistance
goals. Resistance activities can remain nonviolent in the early stages and progress to
violence to coerce or disrupt the oppressive government or occupying power’s behavior if
it does not change or adapt.

(b) A resistance partner has mutually established agreements with the USG
to cooperate for some specified time in pursuit of specific objectives. A resistance partner
acts on their own accord. They are not subordinates under formal command. A surrogate
is someone who acts on behalf of another. A surrogate is an employee or subordinate that
a friendly force commands and controls and whose actions the friendly force bears some
legal and moral responsibility. While the terms surrogate and proxy are terms of
international relations taxonomy as a policy perspective, such usage does not obviate the
importance of the proper distinction for UW regarding support to resistance partners versus
employment of surrogates. JFCs emphasize that decision makers’ and practitioners’
expectations of “control” over a resistance partner is not a guarantee.

(c) The United States may support insurgencies that oppose oppressive
regimes or resistance movements that oppose an occupying power. The United States
coordinates this support with its allies and partners. US military support in this manner is
through UW. UW is an effort by the USG to enable an indigenous resistance movement
or insurgency in denied areas. UW can enable resistance movements to disrupt, coerce, or
overthrow a hostile government or occupying power through auxiliary, underground, and
guerrilla elements to protect or advance US interests. SOF are well-suited to conduct UW
but require joint, interagency, and multinational support to be successful. Within SOF,
United States Army Special Operations Command is CDRUSSOCOM’s lead proponent
for UW and Army Special Forces are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW capabilities. Conventional forces have
functional specialties that also may contribute to or enable the UW mission.

(d) US forces may sponsor and support resistance forces providing logistic
and training support, as they did for the Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan during the
Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In certain circumstances, the United States can provide
direct combat support, such as support to European and Chinese resistance movements in
World War II, the NATO support to Kosovo separatist insurgents in 1999, and the
insurgent Afghanistan Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban in 2001-2002.

(e) UW is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or

insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating
through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Joint forces
support friendly insurgent and resistance organizations opposing a government or

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Chapter VI

PRINCIPAL AND SURROGATE RELATIONSHIPS

As an adversary, Iranian surrogates throughout the Shia Crescent are

an example of this type of relationship. Iran uses cultural ties.
Generally, the Shite branch of Islam, seeks to build strong-bonded
surrogates throughout the Middle East. Today, Iran’s most notable
surrogates are Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah.
However, Iran also supports Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas throughout
the Middle East, and Shia militia groups in Syria and Iraq. The tight
cultural bond between principal and agent results in a strong principal-
surrogate relationship resilient to high levels of risk. 
 
Various Sources

occupying power hostile to US national interests. In adversarial competition, USG UW

efforts will normally be clandestine and US personnel may be restricted from operating in
the targeted country. Instead, they may operate from outside the OA to assist partner
forces.

For further guidance on UW, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(11) Support for CD Operations. The joint force supports federal, state, and
local LEAs in their effort to disrupt the illicit transport and transfer of illegal drugs into
the United States. Specific DOD authorities that pertain to CD operations are in Title 10,
USC, Sections 124 and 271-284. Discussion of similar authorities is in DODI 3025.21,
Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

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 CHAPTER VII
JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICT

SECTION I
 
1. Introduction

a. Armed conflict or war is a violent conflict between nations, state-like entities, or

armed organizations. A nation with a central government or occupying power opposed by
insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups engage in armed conflict. Additionally, armed
groups that do not recognize national borders may fight wars in semiautonomous regions.
The situation presented by an enemy often drives CCDRs’ conduct of joint warfighting to
pursue a complex array of overlapping operational objectives across numerous AORs.
Along with conventional forces, the enemy may employ coercion, irregular tactics,
terrorism, criminal activity, and information warfare to complicate operations. Joint
campaigns and operations in armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort
in terms of scale, tempo, and scope of capabilities. Prevailing against the enemy requires
senior military and civilian leadership to transition the force’s posture optimized for the
global campaign to a disposition for joint warfighting. Additionally, commanders integrate
capabilities from across the CCMDs to conduct joint warfighting and defeat the enemy’s
will, strategy, and capabilities. CCDRs synchronize their campaigns’ operations and
activities with other CCDRs over time and across multiple AORs. Success requires JFCs
to adapt continually based on evolving situations and opportunities presented by the enemy.

b. The transition to armed conflict presents a significant challenge for the joint force.
The CCDRs prepare for rapid transition from global campaigning to campaigns that
include large-scale combat operations. The transition often requires assessment and
reallocation of forces across the globe. As the situation evolves, JFCs expand their efforts
to prevent aggression alongside allies and partners. This will likely increase as
multinational forces begin operating against the common enemy. CCDRs may expand
their competitive activities to neutralize irregular threats and coerce other adversaries from
supporting the enemy. Joint warfighting often requires multiple supported commands
operating together in numerous AORs and across all domains. Against a peer enemy, unity
of effort may be more important than unity of command. Warfare against a peer enemy
may not be the purview of a single JTF operating in one JOA. Success requires the CCMDs
to cooperate through integrated and mutually supporting campaigns executed across
multiple AORs and functions based on strategic direction from the President and SecDef.
Effective joint warfighting requires joint forces to avoid and survive the enemy’s strengths
and employ capabilities through cycles of offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions.
CCDRs seek to avoid protracted periods of inconclusive warfare or stalemate. At some
point, CCDRs conduct counteroffensive operations to regain the initiative and defeat the
enemy militarily through attrition, exhaustion, or annihilation. CCDRs either impose or
help negotiate a settlement, but the wartime effort will be far from over. Defeating the
enemy militarily is necessary, but insufficient to achieve strategic objectives. Influencing
the enemy’s behaviors and establishing conditions for strategic objectives typically
requires CCDRs to continue campaigning long past the cessation of sustained hostilities.

VII-1
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Throughout the aftermath and consequences of armed conflict, JFCs recognize the
opportunities to cooperate with new partners and necessity to counter coercion in the new
and re-characterized competitions. These competitions can emerge and complicate the
United States’ vision for the future. JFCs maintain preparedness to employ force short of
war or occasional episodes of violent action to secure and perpetuate the gains after the
cessation of hostilities.

c. The Challenges of Armed Conflict. The most demanding scenario is an attack on

the United States homeland. Another challenge may begin with the enemy’s
miscalculation regarding the commitment of the United States to defend another nation.
When a significant asymmetry of interest or commitment exists, such as fighting within
the enemy’s sphere of influence, the enemy will likely endure a great deal of hardship and
casualties before modifying their ambition and actions. One daunting challenge the joint
force could face would be to absorb an initial enemy offensive on another continent, protect
other threatened forces and infrastructure, commit additional forces from across the globe,
and simultaneously secure the US homeland. As difficult as this scenario may seem, the
joint force would be fighting with only forward and initial response forces. Those forces
would have to deny the enemy offensive’s initial operational-level objectives and transition
to the counteroffensive at the first opportunity. A counteroffensive is an attack made in
response to an enemy, typically on a large scale or for a prolonged period. JFCs initiate
counteroffensives with forces previously in a defensive or deterrence posture. The JFCs
orient on establishing the initiative and disrupting the enemy offensive. Then, JFCs aim
on controlling or seizing areas or terrain and creating a cycle of deterioration that can force
the enemy to abandon their objectives or even lead to their disintegration.

d. JFCs of forward forces avoid the enemy’s strengths and maneuver to attack
vulnerabilities to defeat the enemy. As the counteroffensive progresses, JFCs continually
transition and adapt to the situation and the enemy’s reactions for as long as required to
defeat their capability and will to wage armed conflict. This offensive-counteroffensive-
transition cycle is demanding and may repeat itself many times throughout the conflict and
before a cessation of hostilities. The joint force has a tradition of persevering through the
initial enemy assault, then projecting and sustaining substantial combat forces across the
globe to fight the enemy close to their geographic periphery. Adaptation to dynamic
change in the OE is essential. Military institutions can fail to anticipate the changing
character of warfare because new information and experiences that should prompt
reconsideration of methods and organizations are not compelling enough. Cultural ideas
about warfighting can serve as barriers to adaptation and remain intact even after costly
interactions with the enemy make the requirement to change obvious. The French failure
to anticipate and adjust to the German blitzkrieg is a classic example. JFCs expect and
anticipate all this as today’s joint force would have to overcome significant challenges to
prevail in armed conflict against a peer enemy.

e. Global Integration Enables Multiple Supported and Supporting CCMDs. In

armed conflict, CCDRs integrate the full range of capabilities and expertise through
multiple supported and supporting CCMDs in multiple AORs. The foundation of US joint
warfighting capability is the joint force’s ability to integrate capabilities throughout the OE

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

to create military advantages. The joint force campaigns as a globally integrated force, not
as individual CCMDs. CCDRs conduct operations by using common approaches.
Globally integrated C2 and responsiveness increases the ability for JFCs to successfully
integrate many capabilities to improve the effectiveness of campaigns and major
operations.

f. JFCs synchronize forces and effects to defeat the enemy’s initial offensive and then
seek to penetrate the enemy’s layered defenses, first with nonlethal and then lethal
capabilities to disrupt the redundancy and resilience of the enemy’s confederated systems.
JFCs can then establish limited freedom of maneuver to consistently bring to bear combat
power against the enemy for longer durations. Afterward, JFCs begin to exploit the
advantages to defeat the enemy’s capabilities and will. In waging warfare, JFCs adapt
continuously to the enemy and the dilemmas they present. Timely adaptation is essential
to effective joint warfighting. While this may appear straightforward, JFCs do not expect
to initially have freedom of maneuver, control over where and when the fight occurs,
complete influence over the fight’s tempo, or uncontested force deployments and
sustainment. To successfully defeat the enemy, JFCs ensure joint forces:

(1) Forward-deployed survive the enemy’s initial attack. Commanders

protect and conserve the fighting and enabling capabilities of the force. Forward-
positioned forces may have to quickly transition to armed conflict and survive the
concentrated assault. These forces must deny the enemy their objectives and protect
infrastructure and LOCs. Forward-deployed forces include other capabilities such as
basing, operating locations, and logistic networks, which must continue to perform their
missions even under heavy and sustained enemy attacks. Allied and HN infrastructure,
logistic support, and contracted support are key to force projection and sustainment of the
force.

(2) Prioritize joint warfighting across multiple AORs and all domains. An
operational approach that focuses on a single region or alternates among domains allows
the enemy to adapt or react and is unlikely to overwhelm its capacity. JFCs prepare and
employ measures of traditional warfare and IW along with the use of information activities
and expertise from multiple CCMDs. These measures will include enabling activities such
as OCO, space operations, deception events, and EW. JFCs may converge complementary
effects from across all domains at decisive points to create temporary avenues of approach
and assailable flanks in the enemy’s attack. Leveraging joint synergy enables the joint
force to isolate critical enemy elements and create local overmatch. Joint forces then
maneuver through these temporary breaches in the enemy’s defenses and attack to disrupt
the enemy offensive.

(3) Defeat enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting

systems. Joint forces reduce the effectiveness of enemy long-range surveillance and
reconnaissance by employing deception and dispersion measures. An enemy’s national-
level ISR collects targeting information on fixed sites, detects predictable friendly patterns
of operations, and monitors changes to friendly force posture. The enemy depends upon
its space-based ISR in cyberspace, SOF sympathizers, open-source collection, ground-

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Chapter VII

based signal intercept platforms, and the communications networks that link these sensors
to their HQs. The enemy maintains these capabilities at the national and regional levels.
Together, these systems enable long-range strikes and attacks with ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, cyberspace attack capabilities, and SOF. Joint forces develop intelligence and
targeting data to attack not only the enemy’s command, control, communications,
computing, and ISR infrastructure but also the links that enable their associated kill chains.
Once degraded, commanders identify and exploit specific vulnerabilities of the enemy’s
sensors and networks to continue to deny the enemy’s intelligence and training capabilities.
Identification and exploitation of these vulnerabilities enable joint forces to attrit the
enemy’s protection past the point of enemy re-organization. Finally, practicing OPSEC by
identifying and controlling publicly available information and operational indicators
defeats the enemies’ open-source collection efforts that provide the pieces of the puzzle for
intelligence users to derive our intent.

(4) Disrupt C2 systems. Joint forces exploit weaknesses in the enemy’s C2

systems, facilities, and logistics to isolate the enemy for two reasons. The first is to disrupt
them and make it easier to attack. The second is to disrupt the enemy’s ability to attack
(e.g., execute fires, move forces). JFCs employ joint fires (e.g., interdiction, strategic
attack) and information activities (e.g., OCO and EW) to affect enemy C2 and information
systems. The purpose of attacking the enemy’s C2 and information systems is to influence,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the enemy’s decision-making processes. The objectives include
casting doubt in the adversary’s mind.

(5) Defeat elements of A2/AD systems. Peer enemies protect their forces and
capabilities with redundant A2/AD capabilities to prevent the joint force from gaining
operational access and closing with their formations. These systems safeguard their
operational forces and critical infrastructure. Even if these systems fail to deter the United
States from intervening, they are valuable and provide an advantage. These systems would
at least disrupt, degrade, and delay any US response for long enough that the enemy could
seize its objectives before the United States and its allies and partners respond effectively.
Additionally, the enemy’s deployment of these systems seeks to create the perception that
the necessary effort and cost of defeating these capabilities outweigh the benefit of
intervening. To prevent the enemy from achieving their objective, JFCs identify and defeat
the necessary nodes of the enemy’s A2/AD systems. JFCs recognize defeating an enemy’s
A2/AD systems is key, but it is only a prerequisite. After defeating necessary aspects of
the enemies’ A2/AD capabilities, JFCs attack critical enemy vulnerabilities to disrupt their
warfighting capabilities.

(6) Attack operational COGs and critical vulnerabilities and capabilities.

The joint force attacks COGs prior to the enemy achieving their operational objectives.
Against peer enemies, JFCs do not assume the joint force can control the tempo at all times
or has the capability to establish superiority in any domain for lengthy time intervals. JFCs
target the enemy’s operational forces and critical infrastructure as soon as possible to
degrade its capability, erode their will and commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion
of their military. Penetrating A2 systems is necessary but is only an enabling step. The

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

purpose of penetrating the layers of enemy A2 capabilities and attriting redundant AD

systems is to attack and defeat the enemy’s operational capabilities or other COGs.

(7) Maintain freedom of action in space. More than most nations, the United
States relies on space-based capabilities to project and employ power on a global scale.
Threats may seek to deceive, disrupt, degrade, destroy, or deny access to space-based
capabilities to gain an advantage at the outset of conflict. Adversaries are developing,
testing, and fielding capabilities to deny the US advantages gained from space systems.
Space capabilities provide JFCs ISR data, missile warning, satellite communications, and
PNT, in addition to several other critical capabilities. These space systems consist of three
related segments: terrestrial, link, and orbit, which are all vulnerable to attack. Enemies
can gain an advantage using conventional and unconventional forces, DE weapons,
cyberspace attack, or a combination to attack one or more of the space segments. The loss
of any segment will degrade the joint force’s technological advantages, adding friction to
operations. The challenge increases because ground, space, and link segments cut across
multiple AORs. To retain freedom of action in space, JFCs understand the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of space-based systems and how these systems synchronize and integrate
with the rest of the joint force.

(8) Continue to campaign after the cessation of hostilities. Campaigns that

achieve war objectives require a great deal of effort and continuity long past military
victory or cessation of hostilities. In most cases, the continuing effort goes on for years,
even decades. JFCs do not view armed conflict’s aftermath as something distinct from
armed conflict. The consequences of even the most successful examples of joint
warfighting are enduring and inseparable from armed conflict. As much as strategy, plans,
and institutional concepts seek to define and orient on a moment of clear conclusion,
commanders know that the situation that follows war could be volatile, success can be
fragile, and completion is often illusory. Successful campaigning is more a long series of
informed and deliberate transitions and adjustments. How effectively the joint force
consolidates gains determines, in large part, how enduring the overall results of all
campaigns and major operations will be and the duration and cost of attaining them. Failure
to effectively consolidate gains and react to the enemy’s continuing pursuits reduces
options for senior military leaders and policymakers and contributes to inconclusive long-
term results.

2. Joint Force Preparation and Transition to Armed Conflict

a. Preparation. While commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial

competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict. In many cases, the preparations
enhance bonds between multinational partners, increase understanding of the AOR, help
ensure access when required, and strengthen the capability for future multinational
operations. All these qualities can help deter armed conflict. As CCDRs compete for
access and influence across their AORs, they simultaneously set conditions to avoid armed
conflict and ensure the joint force postures to respond to adversary actions and execute
operations. CCDRs’ GCPs’ “prepare/respond to threats” mission area provides
considerations for setting the theater for armed conflict. Preparing multiple geographic
theaters or regions for armed conflict requires investment in leadership, diplomacy, and

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Chapter VII

long-term programming, which includes institutional planning, resources, and activities.

JFCs consider how these investments will enable arriving forces, maintain operational
access to key infrastructure, provide logistics and contractor support, maintain awareness
and disseminate intelligence, and protect an expanding operational posture.

(1) Organizing and Training Forces. Leadership in organizing and training of

forces to conduct armed conflict is foundational. CCMDs, JTFs, and components should
exercise their wartime missions and roles frequently IAW their joint mission-essential task
list (JMETL). JFCs certify their subordinate organizations, leaders, and staff. Staff should
train for planning, preparing, and controlling joint and multinational operations. The
composition of joint force staffs should reflect the assembled force. The reason is to ensure
JFCs employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and
limitations. When possible, CCMDs and their staff should invite non-DOD agencies to
participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and build a working
relationship before actual execution. Commanders must continue to refine interactions
with interagency partners they work with most often and develop common procedures to
improve interoperability. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of
employment, as with US-based forces with multiple tasks, commanders should make
maximum use of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus
for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be from the CCDR’s JMETL.

(2) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).

When possible, the commander and staff may incorporate theater-specific or operationally
relevant training into JRSOI. This training provides an opportunity for forces that may not
operate together on a recurring basis to familiarize and establish SOPs. In situations with
multiple partners, a multiple partner environment familiarization is critical to enhancing
interoperability. JRSOI activities frequently leverage commercial capabilities. The joint
force deconflicts requirements with partners to promote access to infrastructure and ensure
sufficient capacity.

(3) Train Forces. Leaders should exercise JTFs and components for large-scale
combat operations regularly. Equally important, leaders design multinational exercises to
enhance interoperability between disparate forces. CCDRs and JFCs should develop
robust, operational-level, multinational exercise programs. Multinational exercises are key
components within developmental activities of SC and can inform ICB efforts.

(4) Rehearsals. Rehearsals provide an opportunity to learn, understand, and

practice a plan or parts of the plan before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and
sustainment actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation, visualize the
plan, and identify possible friction points. This process orients joint and multinational
forces to surroundings and other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum
for subordinates to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan.
The commander’s staff must coordinate changes throughout the chain of command to
prevent errors in integration and synchronization. HQs at the tactical level often conduct
rehearsals involving the participation of maneuver forces positioned on terrain (physically
or virtually) that mirror the OE. HQs at the operational level rehearse key aspects of a plan

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While

the joint force may not be able to rehearse all aspects of armed conflict, JFCs should
identify essential elements for rehearsal.

(5) Establishing and Maintaining Operational Access. JFCs establish operational

access for the most demanding wartime scenarios by establishing and maintaining freedom
of action in all domains. The state or level of operational access is usually a work in
progress. Maintaining the existing level of operational access to key infrastructure,
logistics, and communications nodes is the greatest priority for the CCDR and JFC before
the initiation of armed conflict. Access to commercial capabilities is not assured. The joint
force competes with partners, civil use, and adversaries for commercial capabilities

(6) Conditions. An essential step in setting the theater’s conditions for armed
conflict involves organizing assigned and allocated forces for employment. Clear
command relationships between current and projected units are essential. CCDRs expect
the relationships between supporting and supported commands may change based on
evolving situations.

b. Transition to Armed Conflict

(1) Remain vigilant and ready: recognition. The joint force and interagency
partners must remain ready to defeat an initial enemy offensive, overcome surprise, and
recover from loss of initiative. The enemy can employ a mix of irregular, traditional, and
informational activities that may not present a triggering event until their operation or
campaign is well underway. An enemy may leverage nonmilitary aspects of power and
covert, clandestine, and coercive activities to confound assumptions of warning
intelligence. If successful, the enemy may achieve its initial objectives without resorting
to armed conflict and tilt the probability of overall success in their favor. JFCs continually
fight for and collect relevant intelligence and focus on clear indications to determine
whether an attack is imminent or underway. JFCs could simultaneously have to combat
forms of enemy IW measures and counter misinformation, propaganda, and deception, and
determining when to transition to armed conflict is essential.

(2) Establish command relationships. Armed conflict may require multiple

supported CCMDs quickly shifting main efforts between them. Command relationships
have trade-offs, but proper balance is essential. When command relationships are less than
optimal, they can create operational gaps and unnecessary risk. CCDRs organize forces to
implement strategic direction and pursue campaign objectives. JFCs should provide
direction and guidance to subordinate commanders and establish command relationships to
enable an effective span of control, responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection.
CCDRs direct C2 architectures for their component commanders and supporting
organizations. The CCDRs’ subordinate organizations’ C2 provide for unity of command
and flexibility. JFCs have full authority, within established directives, to assign missions,
redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs task-organize
their forces and generally allow Service, SOF, and cyberspace tactical and operational units

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to function as they were designed and organized. However, initial C2 designs and purposes
may prove incomplete or insufficient and commanders should expect to adapt.

(3) Local Superiority. Air and maritime commanders have a key role in the
transition to armed conflict. By maintaining control of the air and sea in the transition to
armed conflict, the JFC is able to set the conditions for successful engagements early in a
conflict. In particular, the JFACC has significant roles in the ACA and AADC.

(4) Other Considerations

(a) Littoral areas offer positions from which to begin, sustain, and
support joint operations. Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral
operations provide JFCs with opportunities to gain leverage over the enemy by operational
maneuver from the sea. JFCs can gain and maintain the initiative through the ability to
project fires and employ forces from sea-based forces. Maritime forces operating in littoral
areas can dominate coastal areas and rapidly generate combat power at times and in
locations required by JFCs. Maritime forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to
position these forces where they can strike enemy forces.

(b) JFCs can operate from an HQ platform at sea. Depending on the

nature of the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or JFACC. A
sea base provides JFCs with the ability to C2 forces and conduct select functions and tasks
at sea without dependence on infrastructure ashore.

(c) Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed planning, active

liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple
movement of commanders and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change
of joint force HQ. The new joint force HQ may use personnel and equipment, especially
communications equipment, from the old HQ, or it may require augmentation from
different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in stages. Another technique is for the
JFC to use the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new HQ is fully
prepared. However the transition occurs, staff should develop checklists to address the C2
requirements and timing of the transfer.

(d) SOF-conventional force integration. The JFC, using SOF

independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized
capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be possible. The integration
enables the JFC to take the fullest advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies.
SOF provide an array of C2 options that enable effective mission command throughout the
competition continuum, which spans daily activities supporting a GCP, competitive
activities against adversaries, and conflict. Special operations commanders also provide
liaison to component commands to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict SOF and
conventional force operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force LNOs is essential
to enhance situational awareness and reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

(e) Stabilization activities. Stabilization activities provide an opportunity to

support objectives and create the conditions to achieve strategic- and operational-level
objectives. Allies and partners may offer support. Stabilization activities can take place
during all military operations, in contested spaces and conflict-affected areas. The largest
benefits to the USG from stabilization activities accrue before conflict in contested spaces and
potentially prevent conflict. In armed conflict, stabilization activities occur in liberated and
occupied territories and in conflict-affected friendly areas. JFCs plan and prepare for a
stabilization level of effort appropriate for the circumstances. Stabilization efforts may
include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing
critical infrastructure, and other activities that establish a foundation for the return of displaced
people. The joint force will lead USG stabilization efforts in combat areas until it is feasible
to transition lead responsibility to civil authorities. Civil affairs can coordinate stabilization
projects and humanitarian assistance to support military and strategic objectives as funding
and policy permit. Civil affairs gather and integrate information on civil considerations such
as various elements of the local populace, their potential vulnerabilities, and humanitarian
needs in support of the JFC’s planning and decision making. Civil affairs conduct
engagements with government, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to
coordinate and deconflict US stabilization efforts. MISO used to influence the behavior of
approved foreign target audiences in support of operational-level objectives can ease the
situation encountered when armed conflict transitions to competition. In coordination with
interorganizational participants, the JFC must arrange for necessary financial support of these
operations well in advance. Additionally, OCS can leverage contracts to help build the local
economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and contribute to long-term HN
economic growth and stability. But it requires active participation and ownership of
requirements from concept to creation of effects.

For more information, see JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities, and DODD 3000.05,
Stabilization.

(f) Protection Considerations. The JFC may designate a JSA as the

operational footprint expands to accommodate the forces required for armed conflict. The
JSA should include key logistics nodes and infrastructure such as aerial ports of
debarkation and seaports of debarkation. Additionally, a JSA should provide JRSOI
facilities, sustainment bases, and life support facilities for the US and multinational forces.
The JSA activities should seek to protect the force from the threat of long-range enemy
fires and special purpose forces. The JFC may assign a joint security coordinator (JSC) to
manage the overall security of the JSA. The JSC may need to leverage PN or HN assets
and capabilities to aid in securing the JSA.

(g) Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents. Without limiting boldness or

initiative, JFCs should make every preparation and effort to reduce the potential for the
killing or wounding of friendly and neutral personnel, damaging friendly and neutral
property, and degrading friendly and neutral capabilities. Airspace control and air defense
are no less critical than the focus on ground-based friendly fire. Commanders should be
aware of situations that increase the risk of friendly fire incidents and institute appropriate
preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing friendly fire incidents are

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Chapter VII

command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component

commands and multinational partners, SOPs, training and exercises, technology solutions,
rehearsals, effective CID, and enhanced awareness of the OE. CCMDs should consult with
USAID when it has a mission presence to determine locations of friendly international
organizations, NGOs, and local partners operating in the targeted area to avoid friendly fire
incidents.

(h) Logistics Support and Sustainment. The scale of operational-level

warfare traditionally requires significant logistics and sustainment support. CCDRs and
subordinate commanders identify logistical and sustainment requirements and
shortcomings for forces assigned and allocated to the theater. This identification includes
planning for the sustainment needs of multinational partners. The sustainment demands of
armed conflict may exceed the capacity of DOD, and CCDRs may need to utilize
contractors and multinational partners to sustain the force. As such, commanders and staffs
should review and update contracts as early as possible in the planning cycle to ensure
resources are available as forces enter the theater. The CCDR and JFC must also review
applicable acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) as they coordinate with
PNs to support the joint force. An ACSA is an agreement that allows US forces to
exchange the most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation,
ammunition, and equipment, with countries or international organizations. If existing
ACSAs are insufficient, the CCDR may work with interagency staff or mission partners to
update existing or draft new agreements. Finally, CCMDs should review, inspect, and
prepare DOD prepositioned stocks for use, with shortcomings or deficiencies addressed
through the J-4 [logistics directorate of a joint staff] to the JS as appropriate. JFCs must
maintain access to OAs where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing,
the resiliency of combat power after enemy action, freedom of navigation, and cooperation
with allied and multinational force nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort
is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater LOCs. Supporting
CCDRs can greatly enhance maintaining intertheater LOCs.

(i) Space Considerations. Space is a contested environment where

commanders anticipate and mitigate hostile actions that may affect friendly space
operations and impact the ability to create effects from space. Commanders should also
anticipate enemy and adversary use of commercial space capabilities. CCDRs may request
CDRUSSPACECOM assistance in integrating space forces, capabilities, and
considerations in preparation for armed conflict. Due to the limited resources in space,
coordination between CCDRs is critical to deconflict the competing requirements in
various AORs. Integrating space operations into the campaign is essential as they provide
essential capabilities to JFCs (e.g., PNT, ISR, missile warning, and communications).
Space operations can also negate some enemy or adversary advantages gained from their
access to space. Space operations require robust planning and skilled employment to
synchronize and integrate space operations effectively within the campaign. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon the CCDRs to request space support early in the planning process to
allow USSPACECOM to deconflict competing requirements. Space capabilities help
shape the OE in a variety of ways, including providing intelligence and communications
necessary to keep commanders and leaders informed worldwide. JFCs and their

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

components should request space support as early in the planning process as possible to
ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. Timely planning helps ensure the
effective and efficient use of limited space assets.

For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations.

(j) JEMSO. The joint force is critically dependent on the EMS for
operations across all joint functions and throughout the OE. For example, modern C2
requires the operation of EMS-dependent sensing and communication systems, while
advanced weapons rely on PNT information transmitted through the EMOE. The joint
force should strive for local EMS superiority before executing joint operations, but it
should not be an expectation. EMS superiority is the degree of dominance in the EMS that
permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
while affecting an enemy’s ability to do the same. Against capable enemies, EMS
superiority is difficult and temporary. Achieving EMS parity and short intervals of
superiority is achievable but complicated by increasing joint EMS-use requirements, EME
congestion, and proliferation of EMS threats. Joint forces execute JEMSO, facilitated by
EM battle management, to achieve the necessary unity of effort for EMS opportunity.

For further information on EMS/JEMSO, see JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum

Operations.

(k) Cooperative Activities. Activities before armed conflict may focus on

continued planning and preparation for anticipated stabilization activities. These activities
should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-
military effort; confirming the feasibility of pertinent objectives; and providing for
adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Joint force
stabilization activities may be a part of the USG’s SSA to restore security and infrastructure
eventually. Stabilization activities can also provide humanitarian relief in select portions
of the OA to dissuade further adversary actions and help gain and maintain access and
future success.

(l) Targeting. As the CCDR and JFC define the JOA, establish a JTF, and
set the theater for potential armed conflict, they must refine or begin target identification,
prioritization, and analysis per existing contingency plans, guidance, and the situation.
Given the complexities, scale, and scope of armed conflict, target identification and
prioritization cannot wait until combat has commenced. Updating or drafting a joint
integrated priority collection list will facilitate the rapid development of a joint integrated
priority target list and will aid in prioritizing collection assets across the theater. These
early efforts should seek to identify the enemy’s COG, critical requirements, and critical
vulnerabilities. Target development may focus on the enemy’s C2 mechanisms, A2/AD
capabilities, or their sustainment infrastructure.

(m) Informational Considerations. Leveraging the IE to set conditions for

success during armed conflict begins with the JFC and staff identifying relevant platforms
for information dissemination in the OE. Also, JFCs identify the essential information the

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force must protect to ensure mission success. The staff should identify key information
outlets in the OE and then establish relationships with these entities. Before initiating
armed conflict, JFCs may use these key information outlets to facilitate civil IM operations
to mitigate the effects of combat on the civilian population and enable joint operations.
Early considerations for planners for capabilities such as CMO, PA, and MISO may include
reducing the adversary’s will to fight and identifying and directing civilians to potential
shelters, evacuation routes, medical treatment facilities, and humanitarian aid centers.
Identifying and obscuring indicators or the aspects of transition (e.g., timing, methods, and
locations) maintains surprise and protects future operations.

c. Preparing the OE

(1) JIPOE products facilitate the joint force in preparing the OE for operations.
Conventional forces conduct, promote, and anticipate enduring preparations and readiness
based on JIPOE. The objectives may or may not be threat-specific. Of course, the
responses are all scalable and employed in the context of the specific situation.

(2) Special Operations. SOF may contribute to preparing the environment by

creating conditions that mitigate risk and facilitate successful operations. The regional
focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF
provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is
unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide operational leverage by
gathering critical information; undermining an enemy’s will or capacity to wage war; and
enhancing the capabilities of conventional US and multinational forces, indigenous
resistance organizations, and employed surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM synchronizes
planning for global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other
CCMDs, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. In
coordination with CCMDs and the supported JFC, CDRUSSOCOM plans and executes or
synchronizes the execution of activities related to preparing the OE or provides SOF to
other CCMDs.

For further guidance on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special
Operations.

(3) Cooperative Activities. In the transition to armed conflict, commanders

prepare to employ SC activities to reinforce and restore partner capacity. On the other
hand, cooperative stability activities may play a different role in armed conflict and the
subsequent competition against an enemy. Assumptions based on recent experiences in
stabilizing and reconstituting a defeated force may prove inadequate in waging armed
conflict against a different enemy. Planning and execution of SC operations conducted
before the commencement of hostilities can help establish a sound foundation for the
resilience of allied nations and PNs.

d. Considerations for Isolating a Peer Enemy

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

(1) As guided by strategic direction, the United States and the joint force strive
to isolate enemies by denying them access to allies and sanctuary. The purpose of isolation
is to strip away as much of the enemy’s external support or freedom of action as possible.
Isolating an enemy is an important aspect of waging warfare at the strategic level. These
actions can limit the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation and enable joint
force freedom. CCDRs may support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. US
senior civilian leaders accomplish isolation of an enemy through narrative, diplomacy, and
multinational coalitions, alliances, and partnerships. However, peer enemies have strategic
depth and global reach. The issue is that a peer enemy can match the United States’
informational, economic, and diplomatic influence. These enemies can intertwine with
adjacent nations and enjoy more levers of relevant influence than the United States does.
In either case, peer enemies have a variety of economic and diplomatic tools to offset US
and multinational nonmilitary strengths. First, a peer enemy is likely a member of the UN
Security Council, giving them veto power over any attempt by the United States or other
members of the UN Security Council to invoke the powers of the forum to address and
delegitimize their actions. While hurdles in the UN might not directly constrain US
actions, they dilute legitimacy and excuse states that wish to remain on the fence during a
conflict. Second, capable enemies maintain deep economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties
with states on their periphery, which they could use to deny US forces access and
overflight. In leveraging these advantages, a peer enemy could use various incentives and
punitive measures to induce or coerce regional states to stay on the sidelines, delegitimize
US actions, or even support their operations. A lack of support from these key states might
call into question the willingness of the United States to intervene in regional disputes. The
United States may use economic coercion such as sanctions, trade embargoes, or exclusion
zones to pressure the enemy. The cost of this coercion could also fall on the US economy
and economies of key US allies and partners. These facts do not invalidate such an
approach, but they may significantly complicate and reduce the effort’s potential impact,
as other states may avoid aligning with the United States. For example, an enemy could
threaten to curtail energy exports to susceptible peripheral states. Such a strategy may not
stop a US-led intervention, but it would weaken the multinational force and raise the costs
of intervening.

(2) Often possessing the most robust presence and resources within a given
theater, the CCDRs can maneuver and uniquely position the force to assure allies or
partners and influence nonaligned governments. As such, the CCDR or JFC may be the
primary leader for creating new partnerships and influencing existing ones. These
relationships are often necessary to enable nonmilitary measures such as economic
sanctions and informational support to campaigns. In this capacity, the CCDR or JFC
performs an integrating function across the instruments of national power. These
relationships may prove critical by providing access, basing, and support requirements to
commence armed conflict.

(3) Joint forces also seek to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic
leadership and supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be successful in using
information and the physical interdiction of LOCs or denying resources affecting the
enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the

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enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership
and military from their public support.

(4) Rather than enjoying a significant asymmetric advantage in strategic

information, the United States might be at a relative disadvantage. While this disadvantage
may have a direct impact on the force, the indirect impact may be larger and more
challenging. By targeting the governments and populations of allies and partners in the
multinational force, an enemy’s aggressive information activities could deny US forces
access or support. The solutions to many of these nonmilitary aspects of power may lie
outside the military sphere. Nevertheless, the transition to armed conflict should proceed
with the assumption that the main challenge is bringing our absolute advantage across all
instruments of national power to bear through a whole-of-government strategy. Isolating
an enemy is not a given, but it is a worthwhile pursuit. The impact is that in some scenarios,
the isolation effort will place an added burden on JFCs.

e. Initial Response and Employing FDOs and FROs. The joint force executes
FDOs and FROs to respond to situations by leveraging capabilities and options to counter
coercion or disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or deceive as appropriate. Both provide the
ability to escalate or de-escalate based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions
and reactions. CCDRs employ FDOs to prevent the situation from worsening and allow
for de-escalation. Whereas FROs are generally reactive and punitive. However, in
heightened situations where armed conflict with an adversary is possible, the leaders do
not expect that an individual or single response options will influence the adversary or
resolve the situation. Rather, supporting CCDRs use multiple and flexible options to
influence the adversary and provide additional protection and joint combat power to the
supported CCDR.

(1) FDOs. FDOs can be extemporaneous or preplanned, deterrence-oriented

actions tailored to help resolve an issue without armed conflict. CCDRs use both military
and nonmilitary FDOs to dissuade an adversary before an anticipated crisis arises or to
deter further aggression during a contingency. Senior military and civilian leadership
develop FDOs from across each instrument of national power, but they are most effective
when used in combination. FDOs should provide the ability for both sides to de-escalate
while establishing conditions that allow the United States to escalate if required.

(a) Military FDOs. CCDRs can initiate FDOs before or after unambiguous
warning of adversarial actions. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for
a rapid, early response, generally require an economy of force; however, military FDOs
should not increase the risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired
effect. CCDRs seek to optimize the timing, efficiency, and effectiveness of military FDOs.
They can rapidly improve the military balance in the OA, especially in terms of early
warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO, and
protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Commanders should
avoid measures resulting in undesired effects such as eliciting a violent and destabilizing
response. An adversary may perceive that friendly military FDOs as preparation for an
attack. FDOs should identify the opportunity cost and expected reaction from both allies
and partners and the adversary to conduct risk analysis and make informed decisions.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

(b) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions the United States
takes to try to dissuade an enemy or adversary from initiating hostilities. Senior military
and civilian leadership coordinate and synchronize military and nonmilitary FDOs to
present a consistent message. In some situations, commercial support may provide support
to a nonmilitary FDO. Alternatively, ad hoc identification of requirements for commercial
support, at the point of need, will limit value to tactical forces support, increase cost, and
create risks for adversary exploitation. Military leaders may align their efforts with
nonmilitary partners to degrade an enemy’s alliances, partnerships, and sources of support,
while safeguarding and strengthening those that enable the friendly effort.

(2) FROs. Military and civilian leadership use FROs to respond to an enemy’s
action. The purpose of a FRO is to preempt, respond to, or prepare for additional attacks
against US interests and signal US resolve. Military and civilian leaders develop FROs to
facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully
tailored to produce desired effects, congruent with national security policy objectives. A
FRO can be various military capabilities available to the President and SecDef, with actions
appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any threat or attack.

(3) CCDRs can employ response activities with capabilities from across the force
to present unique challenges and opportunities to influence the enemy through military
FDOs.

For further guidance on planning FDOs and FROs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(a) Maritime Considerations. Maritime FROs and access to key littoral areas
are often critical in the transition to armed conflict. Positioning forces off a belligerent’s
coast can have a powerful deterrent effect while simultaneously offering the national
command authority a variety of FROs. CCDRs can also rapidly scale back maritime
operations without high cost as the situation de-escalates. Examples of potential maritime
operations include show-of-force actions, airborne ISR operations, multinational exercises,
and increased active protection measures.

(b) Land Considerations. FROs conducted with land forces present the
greatest resolve and commitment; however, deploying and sustaining an expeditionary
land force not only exposes that force to risk but also incurs the greatest cost. These
operations generally require access, basing, and sustainment arrangements with HNs and
partners, making them contingent on diplomatic agreements. Because of this, these FROs
may not always be available or may prove too unresponsive to create the desired effect.
Commanders must also consider the unintended consequences of deploying a land force
into a volatile region. However, multinational exercises and rehearsals are often necessary.

(c) Air Considerations. Like maritime FROs, air FROs offer rapid and
responsive ways to position the force to transition to armed conflict and communicate US
intent. Given the joint force’s global reach, these FROs may be the only way of
demonstrating US resolve and commitment in highly contested or denied areas. However,
like other FROs, air operations may be contingent on overflight permissions and support

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agreements with other nations, making them difficult in some situations. They also offer
the greatest risk of misinterpretation and may inadvertently escalate a situation beyond the
desired threshold.

(d) Information Considerations. A defining feature of the security

environment is how competitors, adversaries, and enemies use information to compete to
gain relative advantage over the joint force. JFCs execute a communication strategy that
facilitates the transition to armed conflict within the strategic context and supports the
USG’s policy aims, overarching narrative, and objectives. Key to this transition is the joint
force’s ability to maneuver in the IE through the integrated employment of informational
capabilities in concert with other LOOs and LOEs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp
the decision making of adversaries and enemies. The joint force looks for opportunities to
mass informational effects at decisive times and places. Although targeted at specific
audiences, planners should recognize that all joint force activities produce inherent
informational aspects that shape the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of various
audiences and relevant actor behavior. Leveraging information expands the JFC’s range
of options. These options include the ability to operate in environments where the use of
lethal force is not appropriate or authorized. Commanders can use information to
communicate and reinforce the intent and capabilities of joint force activities, enhance the
psychological effects of physical force, and avoid or mitigate any undesired psychological
effects of physical force. Commanders at all levels should deconflict messaging. The JFC
combats the enemy’s narrative by providing a viable alternative narrative that dispels
misinformation or rumors and contributes to shaping the OE for continued friendly
operations. To the wider audience, OIE should build credibility through transparency,
demonstrating consistency in actions and messages.

(e) Cyberspace Considerations. The pace of CO requires significant

collaboration during preparation and constant vigilance after initiation for effective
coordination and deconfliction throughout the OE. Keys to this synchronization are
maintaining cyberspace situational awareness and assessing the potential impacts to the
joint force of any planned CO, including the protection posture of the DODIN, changes
from normal network configuration, or observed indications of malicious cyberspace
activity. The timing of planned CO should be determined based on a realistic assessment
of their ability to create effects and support operations throughout the OE. This may require
the use of cyberspace capabilities earlier than the use of other types of capabilities.
Planners and operators should also understand how other operations within the OE may
impact CO. For example, the joint force uses fire support coordination measures in air,
land, and maritime operations to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. CO deconfliction and coordination
efforts with other operations should include similar measures.

(f) Space-based Intelligence Considerations. Space-based intelligence

collection synchronizes and integrates sensors, assets, and systems for gathering data and
information on an object or in an AOI on a persistent, event-driven, or scheduled basis.
Intelligence collection managers conduct space-based ISR tasking and collection to ensure
the effective operations of high-demand assets. These tasks include warning (to include

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

ballistic missile activity), targeting analysis, threat capability assessment, space domain
awareness, BDA, and characterization of the OE. Space assets are capable of collecting
diverse information that supports military, diplomatic, and economic intelligence. Space-
based collection platforms, delivering globally persistent and legal overflight of any
location on Earth, increase the probability of attributing nefarious activities. While space-
based systems may be able to provide worldwide coverage, the demands on individual
space-based systems may exceed their capacity and their associated orbital characteristics
may limit the ability to meet operational requirements.

f. Protection. CCDRs and staff should consider introducing protection assets into the
theater early and integrate with HN defenses. The additional protection assets enable
expanding the JSA and mitigate the threat of enemy actions.

g. Preparation to Execution. The circumstances surrounding armed conflict rarely

unfold as imagined. Regardless of how much time and effort went into anticipating,
planning, and wargaming wartime scenarios, commanders recognize that the existing plan
will likely need changes as the force transitions from competition to armed conflict. The
context of the decision to employ military force will often be significantly different from
the original planning guidance or assumptions. Planning provides a significant head start
prior to orders to deploy the military. Assessments should recognize the nuance and reality
of the problem if required and inform the applicability of, or necessary modifications to,
the plan in response to changes in the environment.

(1) Effective preparation enables transition. During planning, an integrated staff

effort ensures the plan is a team effort and shares the knowledge gained across the staff.
Integrated staff work assists in identifying changes in the environment and guidance,
speeding transition to execution.

(2) Detailed planning provides an analysis of the threat. The knowledge and
understanding gained enable a well-trained staff to quickly identify the difference between
their plan and current conditions and make recommendations based on their prior work.

(3) Detailed concept plans (CONPLANs) or OPLANs (Level 3 or 4) may require

more significant changes due to their specificity. Forces identified in the plan may not be
available, assumptions may be invalid, and policy decisions (and the decision timeline)
may change or not support the original concept. The extra time spent on analysis provides
a deeper understanding of the deploying forces’ OE, threats, and technical issues.

(4) Less-detailed plans (Level 1 or 2) may be more readily adaptable to execution

due to their generality. However, they may require significantly more analysis to provide
the detail required to enable decisions at the strategic level and ensure the plan’s relevance
for the problem at hand.

(5) Exercises, Rehearsals, and Transition Drills. Actions and measures preparing
the commanders and staff certify subordinate units, increase the situational awareness of

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subordinate commanders and the staff, and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan.
Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

(6) Plan Implementation. Military plans and orders should be prepared to

facilitate implementation and transition to execution. For plan implementation, the
following products and activities must occur:

(a) Confirm assumptions. Analyze the current OE and establish as fact any
assumptions made during plan development.

(b) Model the TPFDD to confirm mobility force sourcing and transportation
feasibility assessment. Validate that force and mobility resources used during plan
development are currently available. Many critical capabilities reside in the reserve
components (e.g., port opening), so planners need to know the mobilization authorities as
they relate to deployment timelines. As reserve units deactivate due to force structure
changes, CCMD staffs must revalidate TPFDD requirements.

(c) Establish execution timings. JFCs must set timelines to initiate

operations to enable synchronization of execution.

(d) Conduct execution sourcing with assigned forces. If force requirements

exceed the capability and capacity of assigned forces, submit an emergent request for
forces through the GFM process which facilitates a risk-informed SecDef decision to
allocate forces IAW the current CJCSM 3130.06, Global Force Management Allocation
Policies and Procedures, and GFMIG. Develop new assumptions, if required.

(e) Issue necessary orders and authorities for execution. The CJCS issues
orders implementing the directions of the President or SecDef to conduct military
operations. CCDRs subsequently issue their orders directing the activities of subordinate
commanders.

(f) The decision for execution resides with civilian administration officials
based on senior military officials presenting and examining a range of options in response
to a developing crisis or actions by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather
than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN.

1. If an existing plan is appropriate, the commander and staff should

review and update the plan.

2. If no existing plan meets the guidance, the commander and staff

initiate and conduct planning. Often, the commander and staff have conducted some
previous analysis of the OE, which will speed the planning process.

h. Types of Transition. There are three likely circumstances for transitioning from
competition to armed conflict.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

(1) Contingency Plan Execution

(a) Contingency plans typically address a demanding, anticipated scenario.

If an approved contingency plan closely resembles the emergent scenario, leaders can
refine or adapt that plan as necessary for execution.

(b) The planning team should be a key participant in updating the plan for
the current (given) conditions. Being a participant enables the command to make effective
use of the understanding gained by the staff during the planning process. The operations
team should be the co-lead for the plan update to ensure they understand the decision
processes and reasoning used in the development of the operational approach and COAs.
The understanding will speed plan updates, ease the transition, and minimize the time
required to revisit the issues that arose during the initial plan development.

(c) GIF. When the contingency plans are associated with a GIF, initial
planning identifies decisions the SecDef may have to make, including requirements to
reallocate and reassign forces. These forces may reposition from across the globe to meet
the contingency execution requirements. The reallocation will impact executing the
contingency plan along with the ongoing GCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs
and their planners must assess the risk associated with changes to ongoing global campaign
activities and ensure the DOD senior military and civilian leadership recognizes the
opportunity costs. The CJCS, in his role in global integration, recommends to SecDef and
the President any changes to ongoing operations, activities, and investments and prepares
orders directing the movement of forces.

(2) Planning to Execution. CCDRs and staffs conduct planning when an

emergent situation arises. The planning team analyzes approved contingency plans with
like scenarios to determine if an existing plan applies. If a contingency plan is appropriate
to the situation, SecDef can direct execution and tailor unique authorizations through an
EXORD or fragmentary order to initiate movement. In a contingency, planning usually
transitions rapidly to execution, so there is a limited deviation between the plan and initial
execution. CCDRs assist the planning through their planning expertise and knowledge
gained in other situations and from the OE during similar planning efforts.

(3) During execution, commanders often must consider updating the operational
approach. Significant events can drive changes to the understanding of the OE and
problem, validation or invalidation of assumptions made during planning, identifying
(through continuous assessment process) that the tactical actions are not resulting in the
expected effects, and changes in the conditions of the environment. The commander may
determine one of three ways ahead:

(a) The current contingency plan is adequate, with either no change or minor
change; the existing operational approach remains feasible.

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Chapter VII

(b) The contingency plan’s mission and objectives are sound, but the
operational approach is no longer feasible or acceptable—the situation requires a new
operational approach.

(c) When the mission and objectives are no longer valid, CCDRs require a
new operational approach to support further detailed planning.

(4) An assessment could cause the JFC to shift the focus of the operation, which
the JFC would initiate with a new visualization manifested through new planning guidance
for an adjusted operation or campaign plan.

i. Gain Operational Access

(1) US forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN

to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or using forcible entry operations.
Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base
or support facility. CCDRs can introduce forces during cooperative activities such as SC,
military engagement, establishing an expeditionary advance base, or bilateral exercises.
The CCDRs employ immediately available forces and request appropriate FROs. When
these forces and actions are not enough, additional forces may ensue and deploy and
integrate from across the globe. Consequently, the CCDR sequences, enables, and protects
the deployment of these additional forces. A peer enemy may affect the deployment of
combat and logistic forces from bases to ports of embarkation. The CCDR may have to
adjust the TPFDD to meet a changing OE. The enemy will likely contest deployment of
forces from across the globe and oppose entry to the OA.

(2) JFCs may have to rely on strategic attack, global strike, interdiction, and
maritime fires to set conditions for joint forcible entry operations. Gaining operational
access in contested or denied environments may require JFCs to seize and defend lodgment
areas by amphibious, airborne, or air assault forces. The purpose of the access is to
establish initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of follow-on forces
and material into the theater. As such, the JFC must analyze and adjust the TPFDD
accordingly to ensure enabling assets, such as port opening, engineer, and specialized
logistics units, are available to exploit these initial seizures. However, these operations
rest on neutralizing long-range enemy fires to provide the time and space necessary to gain
operational access. Joint forcible entry operations require a versatile mix of forces
organized to operate in a high-threat environment. When these forces and actions are
inadequate, follow-on strikes and the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater
and the use of multinational forces may be necessary.

j. Force Projection

(1) Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of the

international waters, international airspace, orbital space, the IE (which includes
cyberspace), and the EMS to gain operational access. The ability to freely maneuver to
position and sustain our forces is vital to our national interests and those of our PNs. US

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an

operating base in or near the conflict or use forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements,
and activities that occur may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility.

(2) For example, the ability to generate enough combat power through long-range
air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of
timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations may require a forcible entry
capability. In other cases, CCDRs and staffs can project force rapidly by forcible entry
operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For
example, amphibious forces’ seizure and defense of lodgment areas would then serve as
initial entry points for additional follow-on forces. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of
forces to respond quickly.

(3) During force projection, JFCs protect US forces and ports of debarkation.
JFCs should introduce forces in a manner that provides security for rapid force buildup.
Early entry forces should deploy with necessary organic and supporting capabilities to
preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or
likely threats. Early entry forces should also include a deployable joint C2 capability to
rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

(4) JRSOI occurs in the OA and comprises the essential processes required to
transition arriving personnel, equipment, and supplies into forces capable of meeting
operational requirements. Forces are vulnerable during JRSOI, so planning must include
force protection requirements.

For further information on JRSOI, refer to JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment
Operations.

k. While access operations focus on enabling access to the OA, entry operations focus
on actions within the OA. Joint forces conduct entry operations for various purposes,
including to defeat threats to the access and use of portions of the OE; to control, defeat,
disable, and dispose of specific WMD threats; to assist populations and groups; to establish
a lodgment; and to conduct other limited-duration missions.

l. Entry operations may be unopposed or opposed. Unopposed entry operations often,

but not always, follow unopposed access. These circumstances generally allow orderly
deployment into the OA in preparation for follow-on operations. Forcible entry is a joint
operation to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the
continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at the enemy
COGs and open new avenues for other military operations.

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault
operations or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple
dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. Commanders
employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net
result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the enemy before they have time to

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Chapter VII

react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat of any enemy reaction
and facilitates follow-on operations if required.

(2) Forcible entry is normally complex and risky and should be as simple as
possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination,
innovation, and flexibility. All the participants understand the schemes of maneuver and
coordination between the various forces. JFCs tailor echeloned forces for the mission and
to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When JFCs decide to combine
airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals are
a critical part of the preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared
to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence
capabilities to move with the forward elements.

(3) JFCs prepare the forcible entry force to transition to follow-on operations
immediately and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur in both
singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward presence,
preparing the OA, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, receiving
follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and
conducting offensive operations.

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the enemy and ease forcible
entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. The actions, themes, and
messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to be believable.

(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, establish, or
modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial
lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire
support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing
airfields or conducting surveillance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They
may conduct special reconnaissance and DA well beyond the lodgment to identify,
interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force.

(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations
can be formidable, but JFCs must not let them become such an overriding concern that it
jeopardizes the forcible entry operation. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction of
sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to
establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment, as well as forces required to transition to
follow-on operations.

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint
Forcible Entry Operations.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

3. Joint Warfighting – Offensives, Counteroffensives, and Transitions

a. The Enemy Offensive

(1) Commanders posture forces and their enabling capabilities so they are able to
survive the enemy’s anticipated initial attack. This posture should have support from
sustainment and replacement forces through HN and allied infrastructure and logistic
support. Forward forces and survivable infrastructure cast doubt on the viability of the
enemy’s approach. Enemy A2 capabilities limit the joint force’s flexibility to initiate the
offensive but can interdict forces entering an OA. Enemy A2 systems provide multiple
layers of stand-off defenses that seek to deny the joint force access to the JOA. Therefore,
the joint forces’ successful penetration of the initial layer of A2 systems is just a first step.
Initial penetration requires the joint forces to create temporary geographic and temporal
avenues of approach to attack a series of high pay-off vulnerable A2 enabling capabilities,
such as C2 and intelligence capabilities. The challenge for JFCs is the enemy’s A2
enabling intelligence, and collection systems may be a confederated network of both
military and civilian aviation, maritime, cyberspace, and space systems. Civilian systems
may include civil aviation traffic control networks and other dual-use capabilities. They
can pose threats to the joint force. Friendly civilian airports and seaports will most likely
be the first areas an enemy will target. The enemy will simultaneously employ a full range
of capabilities to achieve its objectives.

(2) Attack operational COGs and supporting structures. Essential to joint

warfighting and prevailing in armed conflict, the JFCs attack the COGs prior to the enemy
seizing their geographic objectives. Engaging and defeating multiple operational COGs
are challenges the joint force should expect. Enemies protect these COGs with redundant
integrated air defense systems (IADSs) and long-range fires to prevent the joint force from
attacking operational COGs. As difficult as it may be, joint forces must attack the enemy’s
operational forces and critical infrastructure to degrade its capability, erode its will and
commitment to fight, and disrupt the cohesion of its military. Penetrating A2 systems and
networks is necessary but is not an end to itself. The purpose of penetrating the layers of
enemy A2 capabilities and attrit redundant AD systems is to attack to defeat the enemy’s
offensive and initiate the counteroffensive as soon as possible. JFCs prepare the force to
defeat an enemy’s strategy and plans by striking and suppressing key enabling nodes and
operational COGs, while withstanding the first strike and continue fighting effectively.

b. Drive the Enemy to Culmination

(1) Create Local Air and Maritime Freedom of Movement. Achieving local air
and maritime superiority allows joint forces to penetrate the enemy’s A2/AD systems,
secure a JSA or lodgment, and close the strategic and operational distance. Control of the
air is a critical enabler because it allows joint forces freedom from attack and freedom to
maneuver. JFCs employ complementary weapon systems and sensors to achieve air and
maritime superiority using both defensive and offensive

(2) Disrupt Portions of Enemy IADSs and A2/AD Systems. JFCs, through their
JFACCs and JFMCCs, cannot achieve necessary air and maritime superiority without

VII-23
Chapter VII

neutralizing some aspects of enemy A2/AD systems and IADSs. Early in the transition to
armed conflict, CCDRs employ joint fires throughout multiple AORs to begin neutralizing
the enemy’s multi-layered standoff capabilities. The joint force accomplishes this by
receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy long-range systems from orbital
space, high-altitude surveillance or low-observable air platforms, and cyberspace, enabling
rapid strikes to eliminate critical A2/AD capabilities and IADS assets. Joint fires may
originate from multiple platforms to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and prevent
their effective response.

(a) In armed conflict, superiority within any portion of the OE is by no means

a certainty. JFCs expect to spend effort and resources to create sufficient times and areas
of local and temporary superiority.

(b) Land forces must move as quickly as possible into an area to prevent the
enemy from inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational
advantage. The rapid deployment and employment of land forces (with support of other
components) is essential.

(c) Space operations and capabilities must support creating freedom of

action. Achieving space superiority sets the conditions to prevail in armed conflict by
enabling a JFC’s freedom of action. To win against increasingly capable threats,
USSPACECOM provides combat power by fully integrating offensive and defensive
operations alongside our longstanding allies and partners. USSPACECOM conducts
offensive space and counter-space operations to deny the enemy its primary means of long-
range surveillance. Proactively countering enemy space surveillance is particularly
important during the transition to armed conflict as the large number of targets spread
throughout the JOA may exceed the enemy’s strategic reconnaissance capabilities. There
are threats that can contest the joint force in the space domain. These threats will seek to
prevent our unfettered access to space and deny our freedom of action with their
capabilities. Cyberspace attacks, antisatellite weapons, rapidly developing laser
technology, and other new technologies can place US assets and forces at risk. Terrestrial
forces that rely on space platforms for a variety of critical support may become vulnerable
if the enemy interrupts or destroys vital space systems. Effectively countering the enemy’s
space-based ISR capabilities causes the enemy to either accept more risk with strategic
reconnaissance assets or shift to commercial space surveillance. The JFC can exploit both
actions. During armed conflict, a CCMD may be a supported command, with
USSPACECOM in a supporting role providing requested regional effects in and from
space. However, USSPACECOM will continue to be the supported command for space
operations across the rest of the globe. The protection and continuity of US, allied, and
partner space activities is critical to terrestrial operations. Ensuring temporary periods of
space superiority is critical to denying a threat’s prohibitive interference with JFC access
to communications, environmental monitoring, PNT, strategic and theater missile warning,
and intelligence collection assets. CDRUSSPACECOM plans and executes global space
operations activities and missions as directed and in coordination with other CCMDs, the
Services, DOD agencies, allies, and partners. All other CCMDs should coordinate desired

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

space effects with CDRUSSPACECOM by providing temporal and spatial requirements

for the creation of those effects.

(d) OIE (which includes CO) are vital in defeating A2/AD capabilities. OIE
degrades the enemy’s C2 while enabling the joint fore to maximize friendly C2 capabilities.
Information also enables the JFC to understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and
future actions. Additionally, OIE can influence foreign attitudes and perceptions of the
operation.

(e) JEMSO. Commanders employ EA capabilities, including DE, to

disrupt, degrade, and destroy targeted enemy personnel, facilities, or equipment. Key
targets that enable and protect enemy offensive operations are sensors and C2 nodes
because their destruction strongly influences the enemy’s perceptions and ability to
coordinate actions. Additionally, enemy space and cyberspace assets are potential targets.
EW, through EM support, enables destruction by providing actionable target locations
and/or information. Just as important, commanders employ DE weapons, devices, and
countermeasures to incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities,
and/or personnel; or determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EMS.
Commanders integrate radio frequency countermeasures that employ technology to impair
the effectiveness of enemy activity (e.g., precision-guided or radio-controlled weapons,
communications equipment, and sensor systems). Furthermore, JEMSO facilitate joint
force C2 while simultaneously denying EMS access to enemies. This facilitates efforts to
dictate operational tempo in support of commander’s objectives. Based upon accurate,
timely, and shared understanding of the EMOE, coordinated operational-level JEMSO can
more effectively target enemies while minimizing mutual interference of friendly and
neutral systems within a congested and contested EMS.

For more information on JEMSO, see JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum

Operations.

(3) Close the Strategic and Operational Distance. Closing the strategic and
operational distance requires contesting enemy maneuver forces to deny their objectives
and degrade enemy long-range ISR capabilities. As the joint force achieves all-domain
parity and degrades enemy ISR, the JFC must capitalize on these gains by closing the
strategic and operational distance. Closing the strategic and operational distance negates
the enemy’s multi-layered standoff and facilitates the introduction of additional forces into
the theater. Mitigating the enemy’s standoff capabilities enables freedom of action and
sets conditions for the suppression of enemy air and maritime defenses and denial of enemy
A2/AD systems and long-range fires.

(a) Neutralize Enemy Long-Range Fires. Enemy long-range fires present a

direct threat and can interdict joint forces from gaining and maintaining operational access.
The JFC must leverage ISR and long-range joint fires to identify and destroy enemy
intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles, long-range rocket artillery, and cruise
missiles. Attacking long-range enemy fires requires resilience in C2 across all
components, provided through redundant means of communication, flexible command

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Chapter VII

relationships, and control measures designed to withstand degraded communications. The

JFC may also rely on SOF to identify and neutralize key elements of the enemy’s integrated
fires complex. SOF may operate deep beyond the range of conventional forces to conduct
DA, special reconnaissance, intelligence operations, target identification, and airspace
control to coordinate joint fires.

(b) Leverage Accurate and Precise Intelligence. Identifying and neutralizing

long-range enemy fires is not possible without current and accurate ISR to enable targeting.
In a denied, disconnected, intermittent, or limited environment, the JFC and staff must
develop a layered ISR plan, which accounts for the enemy’s ability to contest friendly ISR
in various domains, times, and locations. The ISR plan should leverage capabilities across
the joint force to ensure redundancy and provide component commanders an accurate COP
and common intelligence picture.

(c) Contest Enemy Maneuver to Deny Objectives. The JFC must contest the
enemy attack by immediately imposing losses on the enemy to delay its objectives and
prevent its consolidation of gains. Through reconnaissance, prepared defenses with
forward-positioned forces, JFCs delay the enemy’s arrival of follow-on forces. The JFCs
employ joint fires, deception activities, and CO to present the enemy with multiple
dilemmas and prevent the massing of lethal effects on the joint force.

c. Protect and Expand the JSA. The JFC must exploit the advantages achieved by
closing the strategic and operational distance to protect and expand the JSA. This
exploitation enables the deployment and sustainment of expeditionary forces to support
follow-on operations and secures operational access within the theater. The JFC and the
JSC protect and expand the JSA through dispersion and deception operations and by
hardening key nodes and infrastructure.

(1) Dispersion. Expanding the JSA protects the joint force by dispersing
assembly areas, sustainment bases, and prepositioned stocks that remain within the range
of long-range enemy fires and A2/AD systems. The JFC can use the enlarged JSA to
conduct JRSOI of expeditionary forces arriving in theater at multiple points and can then
disperse these forces to multiple assembly areas. Dispersion and expansion in joint forcible
entry operations can open additional LOOs or initial entry points within the theater. By
appearing operationally unpredictable, JFCs’ joint forcible entry operations present the
enemy with multiple dilemmas.

(2) Deception Operations. Although employed throughout the OA, the JFC and
JSC protect the JSA by developing a deception plan that conceals the JSA’s footprint. The
deception plan should employ multiple means to present a combination of real, false, and
exaggerated capabilities throughout the OE. Deception operations intend to mislead the
enemy’s ISR capabilities or assessments to identify the JSA’s actual footprint and
capabilities.

(3) Protect Key Nodes and Infrastructure. As additional assets arrive in theater,
the JFC and JSC, using the CAL/DAL, protect critical nodes and infrastructure across the

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

JSA. This protection can include local/HN resources that the joint force/HN will use,
which may include private, commercial, and government property. The JSC protects these
key assets and locations from long-range enemy fires, special-purpose forces, and A2/AD
systems in concert with the AADC. However, they balance this enhanced protection with
the need to rapidly field or issue equipment and supplies to arriving units. JFCs ensure
protection measures do not impede combat demands.

(4) C2. Controlled littoral areas often offer the best position from which to C2
the early stages of joint operations, especially in JOAs with limited or poor infrastructure
for supporting operations ashore. Depending on the situation, a maritime commander can
serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC. Initially, the operation may be primarily
maritime, but commanders should prepare the command structure to shift that command
ashore if the operation shifts landward IAW the JFC’s CONOPS. In denied or contested
environments, maritime or littoral areas may be the only option for JFCs to establish and
conduct C2. However, as the joint force gains operational access in the land OA, the JFC
may need to transition C2 from ship to shore.

(5) Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the

joint/multinational force at the onset of armed conflicts. Further, HN infrastructure and
logistic support are key to force projection and sustainment and critical to protection. JFCs
counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult
to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and fires by
using various physical and informational measures. OPSEC and MILDEC are key
elements of this effort. Protection includes activities to gain air, space, maritime, and EMS
parity. Protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also
contribute significantly to force protection at the onset of armed conflicts.

d. Counteroffensive

(1) Synchronizing and integrating joint functions. As soon as possible, JFCs

initiate offensive operations; when conducted in response to enemy attacks, they are
referred to as counteroffensives. Counteroffensives are broad cycles of iterative attacks
conducted to defeat and destroy attacking enemy forces. The counteroffensive may seek
to penetrate enemy formations; seize terrain; or control geographic areas, resources, and
population centers, but the primary orientation is on the enemy. Against a capable and
adaptive enemy, an offensive or counteroffensive is the most direct and sure means to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve operational-level objectives. Executing an
offensive or counteroffensive compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing weakness
the entire attacking joint force can exploit. A successful counteroffensive or offensive can
place tremendous pressure on the enemy forces, creating a cycle of deterioration that can
lead to their disintegration. Long-range joint fires and capabilities unique to Service
components, including land- and maritime-based missiles and strike aircraft, should
provide cross-boundary offensive action to protect and enable continuous attacks.
Protection remains critical and includes certain defensive measures to continue throughout
the duration of the counteroffensive. Counteroffensives (and offensives) can include
flanking attacks and envelopments, leading to a penetration(s). Successful

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Chapter VII

counteroffensives create and sustain penetrations and transition to exploitations and

pursuits. Effective exploitation can begin to fracture the enemy’s coherence and ability to
respond but only temporarily. Successful counteroffensives can force the enemy to
abandon their objectives or even lead to their defeat. JFCs recognize that defeating an
enemy is a temporary condition where the enemy force cannot achieve its operational-level
objectives due to loss of capability or will. JFCs achieve these conditions through
combinations of successful tactical and operational-level actions against an enemy. During
this transient period, the enemy cannot significantly interfere with the actions of a friendly
force. JFCs recognize defeating an enemy is not an end unto itself but provides the
opportunity to continue to pursue strategic objectives that extend far beyond the battlefield.

(2) During a counteroffensive within a specific theater, JFCs simultaneously

employ conventional forces, SOF, information, orbital space, and cyberspace capabilities.
Over time, the JFC may prioritize one LOE or LOO over others. As the situation unfolds
and the enemy reacts, the JFC will likely shift prioritization. Regardless of the
prioritization or designation of a main effort, other operations must continue
simultaneously to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action, or informational
advantage. Shifting some operations as appropriate while executing other concurrent
missions can degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion. When joint operations prevent
the enemy from concentrating forces, JFCs can isolate critical capabilities. At other times,
JFCs can take actions to cause the enemy to concentrate their forces, facilitating the attack
by friendly forces. Regardless of the shifting priorities, JFCs must orient joint warfighting
on enemy COGs. In attacking enemy COGs, JFCs should time their actions to coincide
with actions of other operations of the joint force and vice versa to degrade not only the
enemy’s capabilities but also their conviction to continue to wage war. The integration of
the joint functions supports all military operations.

e. Joint Warfighting - Integrating Capabilities and Synchronizing Action

(1) Commanders must integrate the capabilities and synchronize the operations
of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces, along with JEMSO, to defeat peer
enemies. JFCs should consider intelligence collection, providing joint fire support,
maneuvering to close with the enemy, and protecting the force, for example, as separate
operations but complementary joint actions executed to create necessary effects against the
enemy. Potential enemy responses to integrated and synchronized joint warfighting can
create multiple dilemmas. If the enemy attempts to counter the capabilities of intelligence
or maneuver, enemy forces may expose themselves to unacceptable losses from
interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such losses from joint fires, enemy
forces may not be able to evade intelligence or counter the maneuver. All components can
conduct intelligence collection, maneuver, and employ fires to close with enemy forces,
interdict enemy capability before, and protect the force from enemy attack. The synergy
assists commanders in conducting joint operations by integrating and synchronizing all
joint functions and unique capabilities from across the force.

(2) The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities reflected in mission assignments
and coordinating arrangements enable subordinates to fully exploit the military potential

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements.

Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviates such friction. As an
example, JOA-wide requirements for cyberspace, space, and airborne ISR support will
often exceed the means available, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. The JFACC
will have to balance priorities for protection and counter-air with delivering joint fires.
Commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing joint functions within their
OAs should prosecute the JFC priorities and work to synchronize and balance operations
with commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and JOA-wide functions. JFCs
can effectively synchronize efforts across the JOA through the CONOPS and clear
statements of intent for JOA-wide operations conducted in concert with joint operations
specific to an OA. In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of
the joint force contribute to achieving objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of
techniques to identify requirements and apply capabilities to meet them. JFCs must
exercise command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make
apportionment decisions.

(3) Within the JOA, all joint force component operations must contribute to the
achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish
OAs for subordinate commands. Integration and synchronization of intelligence, joint fire
support, and maneuver are essential to successful armed conflict. Synchronization and
integration of the joint functions are critical within the land or maritime AOs, especially
when JFCs task other component commanders to execute JOA-wide functions.

(a) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize the execution of
land and maritime operations. The JFC bases the size, shape, and positioning of land or
maritime AOs on the operational requirements. Within these AOs, the JFC designates the
land and maritime commanders as the supported commander for integrating and
synchronizing maneuver, fires, and other joint functions and capabilities. Accordingly,
land and maritime commanders designate the CONOPS, which includes the target priority,
effects, and timing for combat operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with
the land and maritime commander, commanders designated as the supported commander
for a theater/JOA-wide responsibility have latitude in planning and executing JFC
prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO. If theater or JOA-wide operations
would have adverse effects within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting
those operations must adjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component
commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

(b) Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operations. The battlefield framework

for armed conflict is usually either contiguous or noncontiguous. Contiguous operations
are those where subordinate forces’ AOs share one or more common boundaries, and a
forward line helps identify friendly forces. Noncontiguous operations are those where one
or more of the JFC’s subordinate forces’ AOs do not share a common boundary. JFCs
conduct simultaneous operations from multiple bases or base clusters, either ashore or
afloat.

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1. In contiguous operations, the JFLCC or the land component

commander emphasizes maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other
friendly forces. This relative positioning of forces enhances security and facilitates the
massing of forces. Also inherent in contiguous operations is the security of the JSA,
especially LOCs between support bases and fighting forces.

2. In noncontiguous operations, joint forces with AOs that often do not

share a common boundary orient more on assigned objectives (e.g., destroying an enemy
force, seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their
geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, forces operating
in a noncontiguous framework rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages,
and freedom of action than mass. Noncontiguous operations place a premium on C2,
mobility, and nonstandard means for sustainment.

(c) The land or maritime component commander’s intent and CONOPS

should clearly state how joint functions will enable or enhance their operation in the AO.
Once adjacent commanders understand the concept, other commanders with JOA-wide
responsibilities can normally plan and execute operations with only that coordination
required with the land or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander
should provide commanders with cross JOA responsibilities as much latitude as possible
in the planning and execution of their specific function within the AO. For example, joint
fires with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime operations normally support
maneuver. Successful operations in the aggregate may depend on successful interdiction;
for instance, to isolate a battle or weaken the enemy force before it is within direct fire
contact or indirect fires range of friendly forces.

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral AOs often require additional
coordination among the maritime commander and other commanders because of the highly
specialized nature of some maritime operations, such as antisubmarine and mine warfare.
This type of coordination requires that other commanders of an AO or JOA-wide function
maintain communication with the maritime commander. As in all operations, a lack of
close coordination among commanders in maritime AOs can result in friendly fire incidents
and failed missions. The same principle applies concerning air component mining
operations in the land or maritime AOs.

(4) Land, maritime, and special operations commanders may use joint fires to
attack targets with the support of commanders with JOA-wide missions. Target
nomination procedures should include through which land or maritime force commanders
can specifically identify emerging targets that could affect planned or ongoing operations
that they are unable to engage with organic assets. Commanders with JOA-wide missions
depend upon the AO-specific commanders to support the JOA-wide efforts—sometimes
by action within their AOs and sometimes by support to adjacent commanders. Special
operations, land, or maritime commanders employ the capabilities of one another through
cross-boundary actions. Commanders may identify these targets individually or by
category, specified geographically, or tied to the desired effect or period. The JFACC
considers interdiction target priorities within the land, maritime, or special operations OAs

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

along with theater and JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air
apportionment decision. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute
the theater- and JOA-wide air interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to
afford added visibility to and allow JFCs to give priority to targets supporting air, land, or
maritime commanders’ operations.

(5) Effective coordination of intelligence, maneuver, and joint fires supports

defeating critical portions of the enemy A2/AD systems’ coverage, maneuver forces, C2
networks, and integrated fires complex. The JFC relies on both airborne ISR and
information to identify high-value targets within the JOA and then maneuvers forces to
seize key terrain, isolate enemy forces, stimulate the enemy’s mid-range or short-range
fires systems, or force the enemy to reposition. These operations expose the enemy to
additional intelligence, maneuver, and fires efforts. The result of synchronization and
effective employment is to increase freedom of movement.

(6) Converging intelligence, maneuver, fires, EW, and deception, the JFC can
isolate and defeat enemy forces by massing the fires to create lethal and nonlethal effects.
Success is a result of creating the right effect at critical times and locations. The JFCs
concentrate effects at enemy LOCs, sustainment, reserves, and enablers to further isolate
enemy forces. The result is an enemy force that is isolated and vulnerable to sustained
attack by joint forces. The JFC then exploits the freedom of action to defeat the enemy’s
operational COG or fix and destroy remaining forces.

(7) Sustainment and Operational Reach. Campaigns and major operations in

armed conflict place great demands on intertheater and intratheater logistics and
sustainment systems. Prolonged combat has the potential to exhaust sustainment reserves
within theater, thereby restricting the JFC’s freedom of action and operational reach. To
avoid this, the JFC and staff must plan for the provision of personnel, logistics, and other
support to enable prolonged combat until operations are successful or the CCDR revises
the objectives. Unique to armed conflict, the JFC and staff must also plan for reconstitution
operations as forces and equipment availability drops. Sustainment plays a pivotal role in
both offensive and defensive operations; however, the demands on personnel replacement,
Class III (e.g., petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (e.g., ammunition) will be more
severe during offensive operations. As with achieving air and maritime superiority,
sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility and operational reach to develop required
branches and sequels as the operation evolves.

(8) CWMD. JFCs should prepare to conduct activities to curtail the development,
possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD. When planning or executing
operations and activities to counter WMD, JFCs coordinate and cooperate with not only
other USG departments and agencies but also local, tribal, and state organizations, in
addition to multinational partners. With numerous stakeholders in the CWMD mission
area, it is critical JFCs understand and consider the capabilities and responsibilities of
various interorganizational partners when defining command relationships and
coordinating interorganizational activities. Operations to counter WMD may require the
formation of a functional JTF for that purpose.

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(9) Stabilization activities provide security, food, water, shelter, and medical
treatment. If no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then JFCs and their
staffs resource essential stabilization tasks. When demand for resources exceeds the JFC’s
capability, higher-level joint commanders should provide additional resources. JFCs at all
levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct
essential stabilization tasks and what risk they can accept in accomplishment of the tasks.

For more information, see JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities, and DODD 3000.05,
Stabilization.

(10) IAW the law of war, detention operations involve the detainment of certain
categories of persons, to include prisoners of war and civilian internees. These operations
control the movement and activities of a specific population for reasons of security, safety,
or intelligence gathering. The Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for
detainee operations and long-term confinement. Detention operations may also include
supporting HN correction reform.

(a) During armed conflict, enemy units, separated and disorganized by the
shock of intensive combat, may fall capture to US forces. The numbers involved may place
a tremendous burden on friendly forces as they divert tactical units to handle detainees.
The term detainee includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control
of DOD personnel.

(b) Detainee operations is a broad term that encompasses the capture, initial
detention, screening, transportation, treatment, protection, housing, transfer, and release of
the wide range of persons categorized as detainees. Actions at the point of capture, custody,
and beyond can directly affect mission success and could have a lasting impact on the
pursuit of strategic objectives.

(c) International law requires the safe and humane treatment of detainees.
Commanders ensure all detainees are treated humanely and with respect for their dignity,
IAW applicable US law, policy, and the law of war. Failure to conduct detainee operations
humanely and lawfully can result in significant adverse strategic impacts for the joint force.

For more information, see DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program; DODD 2311.01, DOD
Law of War Program; and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

f. Transition and Adaptation

(1) Commanders adapt continuously and transition as necessary as they

anticipate the enemy’s future actions. At some point during the joint force’s initial
offensive or counteroffensive, the attack will culminate or pause. This action will be by
design or enemy response. Still, there should be no reason to believe the enemy will
abandon their objectives after the first iteration of offensive-counteroffensive.
Commanders expect to transition through multiple iterations where the side that adapts to
the enemy and adjusts to the OE quicker realizes an advantage. Commanders know that

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on every occasion the United States has engaged in sustained armed conflict against a peer
enemy; the joint force has had to change warfighting methods, organizations, and
capabilities to succeed in the new environment. Until this adaptation occurred, the military
could not bring effective force to bear against the enemy. Essential to joint warfighting,
adaptation is identifying and taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by enemy
actions, recognizing chance combinations of circumstances to prevail or taking necessary
action to prevent stalemate, protraction, or failure. Commanders recognize the difference
between the anticipated enemy method of warfare with the actual manifestation and adjust
to reality. JFCs may not be able to anticipate environmental changes perfectly or predict
the precise actions of an enemy, but the pursuit is continuous. Every campaign presents
unforeseen challenges or circumstances. Joint leaders and military organizations must be
able to adjust to warfighting challenges in a timely manner to effectively exploit, or seize,
opportunities presented by the enemy’s lapses in anticipation. One of the most powerful
expressions of operational art is the ability to adapt to new and changed circumstances.
Observations and interactions will likely include changes to specific tactics, techniques,
and procedures as well. Military leadership should consider this required transformation
while waging armed conflict, not as a phenomenon, but a normal characteristic and
necessary aspect of warfare. The side that adapts its warfighting concepts and capabilities
more quickly and effectively once conflict begins will have a decided advantage.

(2) Commanders who understand the results of recent actions and adapt the
quickest will gain the advantage for follow-on actions. The important aspects of adapting
are in preparing for the threat’s reaction, adjusting to the most recent battle, consolidating
the gains, and transitioning to follow-on offensive or other appropriate action. The initial
assumptions may have been insufficient; therefore, JFCs adjust their CONOPS with
branches to meet the enemy and situation. These advantages accumulate across the OE
and commanders maintain awareness of how they interact to support their scheme of
maneuver. At some point, JFCs may drive the enemy to a cessation of hostilities, but the
conflict may not be over; therefore, JFCs create and implement sequels.

(3) As the joint force continues to campaign, JFCs begin to impose their will
through some combination of exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation as diplomats seek to
negotiate a settlement. Regardless, JFCs maintain a long-term view toward the transition
following armed conflict. Rarely do wars end with a cessation of armed conflict. Wars
disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions to a point
where it is often impossible to return to the previous international order. Armed conflict’s
destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense
competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking to retain, reestablish, or
gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a new order. Global or regional
competitors can then exploit these conditions by supporting these groups as resistance
partners or surrogates to continue to pursue their objectives in other ways. The transition
period requires the joint force to campaign through a mixture of cooperation, competition
below armed conflict, and armed conflict.

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4. The Transition from Armed Conflict into the New Competition

a. Introduction
(1) Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be elusive. To make a
military victory meaningful, CCDRs take on the timeless challenge of translating the
military success in the OE into enduring and favorable outcomes. There is no strict
rulebook for translating military achievement into favorable strategic objectives. Still,
there are recognizable patterns for navigating the difficulties. Regardless of the impetus of
the transition away from armed conflict toward new opportunities for cooperation and
challenges for competition, CCDRs must ensure continuity of effort long after the cessation
of hostilities to achieve and perpetuate the strategic objectives. To successfully transition
from armed conflict to address and influence the new competition, CCDRs must avoid
characterizing the continuing effort as merely a minimalist endeavor. Successful transition
requires a mindset, posture, and readiness to continue offensive operations, if necessary.
JFCs continue to orient on the enemy and new adversaries.

(2) As a function of the cessation of armed conflict with an enemy, the United
States may impose terms, negotiate a settlement, or accept nothing short of regime change.
Forcing an imposed settlement may occur through the selective destruction of critical
functions or assets, such as C2, infrastructure, or otherwise making the enemy unable to
resist the US will and resolve. Even for limited objectives, this can be by the threat of or
actual occupation of a portion of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Second, a
negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic
actions convinces an enemy that yielding will be less painful than continuing to resist. In
addition to imposed and negotiated settlement, there may be an armistice or truce, which
is a negotiated intermission of armed conflict, not a reconciliation. In effect, it provides a
way to gain time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of
operations. Senior military and civilian leaders must weigh the efficacy of an armistice or
truce against the potential damage done by relieving pressure on the threat. Whether the
Unites States imposes or negotiates a settlement, or the warring parties merely reach an
armistice, the CCDRs’ continuity of effort will have different characterizations depending
on the situation. For example, in the case of an imposed settlement, the joint force will
likely have to maintain an offensive-like posture and coercive action while communicating
both compellence and deterrence type threats. CCDRs maintain a similar mindset for an
armistice, which in many cases may endure but evolve into a contentious cease-fire. In a
negotiated settlement, over time, the joint force may be able to transition to a more
defensive posture; however, continuing to confront the enemy may require maintaining
significant combat forces forward. Even when the war’s objectives only constitute a minor
adjustment to the international order, success requires a great deal of effort, persistence,
and legitimacy. In the case of regime change, only a comprehensive, long-term effort and
committed follow-through can deliver strategic objectives. For each of these impositions,
new competitions will emerge and challenge all operational and strategic
accomplishments; the joint force cannot simply walk away or expect any level of
permanence. JFCs should expect the moment that the joint force ceases protecting the
wartime gains, enemies, and adversaries alike will begin to probe, assault, and undo the
hard-won achievements.

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(3) Consolidating and maintaining gains is an integral part of succeeding in

armed conflict. Consolidating gains is not a phase, it is continuous during the conduct of
operations. For joint warfighting, JFCs see it as essential to retaining the initiative over
enemies and adversaries. Success requires a continuing opportunity cost of military effort.
Any notion of completeness or resolution suggested by a military victory can be completely
irrelevant. CCDRs anticipate the magnitude and attributes of effort required to achieve the
appropriate measures of success, translate success into national policy outcomes, and
prepare for future repercussions. Recognizing that no success is permanent, JFCs view
consolidating gains as making temporary operational success enduring to the degree
possible and setting the conditions for a stable and sustainable environment. JFCs know
consolidating gains is an integral part of prevailing in armed conflict.

(4) Joint forces deliberately plan and prepare for the transition to capitalize on
operational success. Planning considerations can include changes to the task organization
and the additional assets required. These assets may include engineers, military police,
civil affairs, and medical support, especially those assets required for the potential increase
in stabilization tasks. In some instances, JFCs lead the integrating and synchronizing
activities. In other situations, the joint force will be in support. The CCDRs’ capability
and capacity enable the conduct of critical activities associated with consolidating gains.

(5) When leading and directing actions during the transition, commanders
establish and sustain security throughout the transition. Joint forces conduct continuous
reconnaissance and, if necessary, gain or maintain contact with the enemy to defeat or
preempt enemy action and retain the initiative. Consolidating gains may include
eliminating or neutralizing isolated or bypassed threat forces to increase area security and
protect LOCs. Commanders must ensure forces organize and prepare to confront enemy
forces while simultaneously consolidating gains. Commanders maintain communication
with the population to assist in understanding the overall goal of military actions and how
those actions benefit the population. Psychological operations forces, PA, civil affairs
forces, CMO, and COMCAM can assist in this effort.

(6) JFCs should understand that activities for consolidating gains may occur over
a significant time. Gradually, JFCs shift emphasis from ensuring the defeat of remaining
threat forces to measures that address the needs of the urban population and manage their
perceptions. This shift could allow the responsibility to shift from joint forces to
organizations such as local governing groups, interorganizational groups, or interagency
partners. There may be interim transitions during consolidating gains when joint forces
may transition various tasks to another military force that task-organizes to sustain
consolidating gains or to a civilian agency to conduct various tasks. If joint forces occupy
territory and governmental institutions are dysfunctional, belligerent, or nonexistent,
commanders may organize and execute governance operations. Over time, overall control
of the joint force may transfer responsibility to an interim civilian government or a form of
reconstituted government.

(7) During the transition, JFCs are responsible for accomplishing both the
minimum-essential stabilization tasks and the joint primary stabilization tasks.

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Commanders must quickly ensure the provision of minimum-essential stabilization tasks

of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks
are a legal responsibility of joint forces. However, commanders may not need to have joint
forces conduct all essential tasks if a military unit or appropriate civilian organizations exist
that can adequately conduct those tasks. For example, there may be enough civilian or
military governance in place to ensure the population has adequate food and medical care.
However, joint forces will continue consolidating gains by conducting the joint force’s
primary stabilization tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential
services, support to governance, and support economic and infrastructure development.
The tasks associated with primary stabilization tasks will evolve. The military will
continue to establish civil security through the conduct of SFA.

b. Operations, Activities, and Investments

(1) To effectively campaign throughout the transition from armed conflict to

competition, joint forces take specific actions that:

(a) Establish security from external threats. These threats include the
previous enemy combatant. Commanders use coercive force to allow a transition to occur
without disruption from previous or nascent threats. To demonstrate and communicate
these threats, the joint force may maintain a posture and overt orientation on continuing
the offensive, if necessary. Commanders maintain and employ the necessary capabilities
to defeat all potential forms of enemy resistance as a fundamental part of any operational
approach seeking to achieve enduring strategic objectives.

(b) Execute governance over occupied territories to establish a military

government in occupied territory (e.g., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions,
the law of war). The execution of military governance has proven an inescapable, crucial
aspect of warfare that senior military and civilian leaders must consider. JFCs plan and
prepare for the execution of military governance before, during, and after armed conflicts.
As required, joint forces implement organizational and command structures to enable
leaders to conduct the governance operations that can inevitably become their
responsibility and necessary to link military actions to strategic objectives. This type of
planning deserves the same level of preparation as waging armed conflict as it is an
essential aspect—a leadership failure to prepare results in the type of ad hoc approach that
characterized previous US experiences. Although difficult, it may be necessary for US
forces to establish a military government in the absence of governing entities by providing
support to civil administration or asserting transitional military authority. Various
international agreements outline the US obligations to take all measures in its power to
restore public order and safety while respecting the laws and governments in the occupied
territories.

(c) Coerce adversaries from behaving in a malign or detrimental manner by

rewarding appropriate behavior and imposing costs for malign or antagonistic behavior.

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

(d) Influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, decision

making, and behavior of adversaries’ leadership, security forces, and civil society and other
foreign audiences and inform domestic audiences to create desired psychological effects.

(e) Influence adversaries’ risk assessments to reduce their willingness to

engage in malign or antagonistic behavior.

(f) Counter or contest adversaries’ operations, activities, and investments to

deny or delay their operational success.

(g) Continually seek to gain and sustain long-term competitive advantages

as the new adversarial competition will go on indefinitely or until the former combatants,
now competitors reach a mutually acceptable political settlement. Commanders must
recognize that former combatants do not always arrive at mutual settlements.

(h) Conduct security tasks to protect friendly forces, installation routes,

critical infrastructure, populations, and actions within an assigned OA.

(i) Execute stabilization activities. Against the enemy, stabilization efforts

surrounding infrastructure reconstruction will likely go toward allies and partners in need.
In occupied territory, forces first conduct minimum-essential stabilization tasks, then
provide essential governmental services, emergency, and humanitarian relief IAW the law
of war.

(j) Establish influence over local and regional audiences (as authorized).
Commanders develop and communicate supporting and credible narratives to the intended
population to assist them in understanding the overall goal of military actions and the
benefits of those actions for the population.

(k) Establish, maintain, and sustain large-scale detention compounds and

sustain enduring detainee operations.

(l) Execute PEO. PEO and PKO are coercive actions that orient on
adversarial behaviors. In at least one theater or JOA, the transition from armed conflict to
competition may involve ongoing operations that have a significant combat component,
including COIN operations, antiterrorism, and countering adversarial competition. As the
campaign continues, some operations may include a large stabilization component that is
essentially a PEO mission. PEO provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that
offers hope to the HN populace. Joint force coercive and persuasive measures establish
the conditions that enable PEO to succeed. PEO promotes reconciliation, strengthens and
rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic
reconstruction and an environment favorable to US interests.

(2) After protecting vulnerable states from external influences and threats,
reestablishing internal stability can increase in priority. In many cases, stabilization effort
must help capitalize on the direct effects of other types of military operations. Integrating
stabilization activities into the execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended

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consequences, helps translates short-term gains into enduring progress, and provides a
bridge linking operational objectives with broader strategic goals. Maintaining or
reestablishing stability in friendly nations and occupied territories in the aftermath of armed
conflict is often integral to the overall campaign’s pursuit of strategic objectives. In
reconstituting the capacity of partners to protect themselves from hostile foreign influence,
JFCs must contain adversarial states and follow through armed conflict against a hostile
regime, achieving strategic objectives.

(3) Legal issues may require commanders to account for and provide for the
protection and well-being of the civilian populations in the area they control for extended
periods. Generally, the responsibility for providing for people’s basic needs rests with the
government institutions of the occupied territories. When not possible, military forces may
need to provide necessary levels of civil security and restoration of essential services to the
local populace until a civil authority or the HN is able. These actions provide minimum
levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. JFCs should make every
effort to ensure that if no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then the
military forces under their control conduct these actions.

(4) JFCs must continually assess resources available against the mission to
determine how best to conduct these stabilization tasks and what risk they can accept. If
unable to resource these stabilization tasks, then JFCs should seek additional capabilities
or capacities, including leveraging the capabilities and resources of interorganizational
stakeholders to achieve the objectives.

SECTION II

5. Joint Campaigns and Operations Against Violent Extremist Organizations

a. Introduction. IW is a struggle among state or non-state actors to influence

populations and affect legitimacy. The term irregular highlights the nontraditional
methods that state and non-state actors incorporate through their actions, information
efforts, activities, and operations to gain the broadest and most impactful influence and
effects. Nontraditional methods coalesce political ideology, propaganda, nonviolent, and
violent efforts to establish or promote regional and international sympathies and garner
legitimacy for their actions. They strive to create dilemmas, influence targeted groups, or
coerce leaders through various means other than the use of military dominance. These
nontraditional methods, often used by weaker adversaries such as non-state actors, can
disrupt, influence, or neutralize a more capable military or the security forces of a
recognized political authority.

b. VEOs. VEOs include individual terrorists that align with a group, terrorist
organizations, and ideologically driven groups that promote violence. A sound global
approach for countering terrorism outlines a strategic vision built around an international
effort. The aim orients on defeating violent extremism, which threatens the way of life for
free and open societies and creating a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists
and their supporters. VEOs challenge the joint force by promoting their ideology
transregionally across CCMD boundaries, responsibilities, and functional seams. VEOs

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 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

conduct activities transregionally and in the OE to disrupt US and international interests to

cultivate legitimacy, credibility, sympathy, and influence to achieve their strategic
objectives. VEOs employ violent methods, but they also conduct competitive activities
and messaging to gain sympathies for their ideology and challenge or discredit their
enemies’ legitimacy, credibility, and influence.

c. Combating Terrorism (CbT). CbT involves actions to oppose terrorism from all
threats. CbT encompasses antiterrorism, which is defensive measures taken to reduce
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These actions include rapid
containment by local military and civilian forces and CT, which are activities and
operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks. CbT
activities include operations to render terrorists incapable of using violence to instill fear
and coerce governments or societies. CT is primarily a special operations core activity,
which includes DAs against terrorist networks, indirect actions to influence global and
regional environments, making them inhospitable to terrorist networks. Normally, CT
operations require specially trained and equipped personnel capable of swift and effective
action. IAW DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), CT is a DOD activity or operation
associated with IW. However, terrorists also operate during large-scale traditional combat,
forcing commanders to integrate CT with these operations. Enemies using irregular
methods often will use terrorist tactics to wage prolonged operations to break the will to
fight and influence relevant populations. At the same time, terrorists and insurgents also
seek to bolster their legitimacy and credibility with those same populations. CbT efforts
should include all instruments of national power to undermine enemy power, will,
credibility, and legitimacy, thereby diminishing its ability to influence the relevant
population. COIN operations can become much more extensive than a limited contingency
and may involve major operations.

For further details concerning CbT and special operations, refer to JP 3-26, Joint
Combating Terrorism, and JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. For US policy
on CT, refer to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America.

For more information on IW, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and for more
information on threat networks or VEOs, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks,
and JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

d. Understanding the Contemporary Environment. Radicalism, extremism, and

the associated violence they foster have become commonplace and a globally persistent
condition. Radicalization and extremism are trends that can frustrate US strategy, policy,
and DOD security efforts but also are precursors to violence and conflict. Commanders
and planners anticipate when joint forces transition from armed conflict to competition.
As the transition unfolds, VEOs may continue to resort to coercion and violence to exploit
a newly formed transitional government’s fragility. The JFC also anticipates enemy trends
that either surge or reduce extremist behavior and activities incorporating violence and
conflict. The JFC assesses the OE before, during, and after campaign development,
identifying trends and informing operational approaches and supporting efforts. The JFC
leverages unified action through interorganizational cooperation with international

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organizations and HN partners for the US, multinational, and HN security actions. Friendly
information efforts coalesce and transmit the USG and international condemnation to
counter threat trends. The JFC analyzes and assesses the OE influenced by urbanization,
demographic insecurity, and competition for diminishing resources. The leaders of the
VEO will promote civil unrest through the expansion of ideological radicalization and fuel
extremism to encourage violence. JFCs and their staff must assess VEO motives, means,
and innovations to understand and address extremism trends:

(1) VEOs will continue to operate during armed conflict. They may increase the
tempo and scope of their activities to exploit the root causes of the armed conflict. These
activities can force JFCs to divert resources to the CT mission and integrate CT with
traditional warfare activities and operations against an enemy cooperating with VEOs.

(2) Enemies using irregular methods often will use terrorist tactics to wage
prolonged operations to break the US political will and influence relevant populations. At
the same time, terrorists and insurgents also seek to bolster their legitimacy and credibility
with those same populations. Therefore, CT efforts should include the application of all
instruments of national power to the struggle for legitimacy, credibility, and influence.

(3) Antagonize, induce, and exploit existing grievances to mobilize support for
violent change.

(4) Find, influence, and mobilize populations locally, regionally, and globally.

(5) Spread information and disinformation to elicit tacit and active support or
acceptance of their views and actions.

(6) Conduct, direct, support, or inspire a mix of lethal and nonlethal actions to
achieve physical and psychological objectives, gain notoriety, garner attention, sustain,
increase their base, finance and advance their cause.

e. Joint Campaigns and Operations Against VEOs. Successful campaigns and

operations against VEOs require an integrated USG strategy that establishes relevant
strategic objectives. A GCP for countering VEOs translates USG policy and strategy into
a set of strategic- and operational-level military objectives necessary to establish the
conditions necessary to achieve the desired strategic objective. Planning involves
identifying strategic and operational objectives and developing supporting LOEs and
LOOs that achieve operational-level objectives. The CJCS and coordinating authority
integrate and synchronize transregional campaigns and operations to ensure unity of effort
with other CCDRs, affected COMs, and other interorganizational partners. The CCP
requires a more extensive framework than those employed for tactical operations,
particularly in situations where the United States is in long-term competition with global
or transregional adversaries. The CCDR coordinates transregional and theater activities
that clearly understand the OE and wield greater influence over affected populations. The
assessment of the OE informs campaign development, and continuous monitoring leads to
adapting the operational approach against identified VEOs. Campaigns can include

VII-40 JP 3-0
 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

aggressive and lethal actions against the threat itself while incorporating less aggressive
activities against supporting cultural groups, sympathetic local and international
populations, or a nation-state threat sponsor.

f. Address threats globally, transregionally, and over time. VEOs operate from
sanctuaries, move, and conduct actions surreptitiously while employing information and
disinformation. A global campaign approach requires an agile and more capable
(synchronized lethal and nonlethal) force to support a requesting CCDR with a full
spectrum of options. A CCP may require the CCDR to employ forces and functional
capabilities for each region synchronized with information activities to ensure the
appropriate impact across different populations and relevant actors. The distribution and
activities of the joint force should reflect a comprehensive understanding of campaign
objectives with implementing forces employed in time and space. The OE is subject to
influence by transregional or global features that enable the movement of VEOs. A
campaign may incorporate supporting plans that promote the long-term development of
human and operational infrastructure to support competition activities, challenge the
threat’s agility, and impede a potential escalation to violence.

For more information on VEO, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

6. The Limited Contingency

a. Introduction. CCDRs tailor and conduct operations within a limited contingency

to achieve a specific objective. Limited contingency operations have a unique and typically
narrow scope, scale, and focus. Under the authoritative direction of the CCDR, a
subordinate command or JFC may execute a limited contingency as a stand-alone operation
or reflect the initial effort of an expanding or greater, more complex effort.

b. Limited Contingency Operations

(1) CCDRs prepare for various responses to situations that require military
actions, activities, and operations. Through competition, commanders seek to improve
positions of advantage to counter adversary and enemy actions or activities or to impose
costs. Additionally, commanders create dilemmas for our adversaries, terrorists,
subversives, or other contingencies as directed by an appropriate authority. The level of
complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency
operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests. Many of these operations
involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation
with interorganizational participants. Commanders seek to integrate and execute within
one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort. The timing of the transition from planning
and preparation to execution can change rapidly, as necessary.

(2) When contentious situations develop, and the President or SecDef directs
action, CCDRs respond. If internal forces within a nation create threats to sovereignty or
regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Prompt
deployment of necessary forces can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later.
Effective early intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor

VII-41
Chapter VII

and achieve their objectives. Deploying a credible force is one step in countering coercion
or responding to aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success.
Successfully countering coercion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed
force can conduct offensive operations. Additionally, the perception that the national
leadership is willing to employ that force and deploy more forces if necessary is critical.

(3) Two important aspects of limited contingency operations stand out. CCDRs
must provide an initial focus for the effort but remain vigilant of the evolving
circumstances. First, understanding the purpose of the use of force and objective helps
avoid actions that have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some
operations, such as compelling compliance in peace enforcement, for subordinate
commanders to make decisions that have significant implications. Second, commanders
remain aware of changes in the operational situation and at the strategic level that may
warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious, much
less directed. Commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually
lead to disconnects between evolving strategic objectives and military operations. Failure
to recognize changes within implied strategic direction may lead to ineffective or
counterproductive military efforts.

(4) Strategic direction and the evolving OE may require JFCs to simultaneously
maintain and prepare capabilities for limited contingency operations and support other joint
campaigns and operations. JFCs recognize these operations will vary in duration,
frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of limited
contingency operations may lend itself to using small elements like SOF in coordination,
preferably in concert with allies and PNs. Initially, SOF may lead these operations as an
economy of force measure to enable continuity of effort.

7. Direct Action

a. DA. DA entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions

conducted in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments. DA employs
military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated
targets in hostile, denied, high-risk, or diplomatically and politically sensitive
environments. DA differs from other offensive actions in the level of diplomatic or
political risk, the operational techniques employed, and the degree of precise use of force
to achieve specific objectives. JFCs may take DA through raids, ambushes, or other direct
assault tactics; standoff attacks by fire from the air, land, or maritime forces; provision of
terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; independent sabotage; and special anti-
ship operations or maritime interception operations.

(1) SOF conducting DA usually withdraw from the planned objective area as
quickly as possible to limit the operation’s scope and duration. DA can provide specific
and often time-sensitive results at operational and strategic levels of warfare.

(2) SOF may conduct DA independently or as part of a larger joint operation or

campaign. Although normally considered close combat, DA also includes precision
marksmanship and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. JFCs

VII-42 JP 3-0
 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

employ standoff attacks when the target can be damaged or destroyed from a distance.
SOF employs close combat tactics and techniques when the mission requires precise or
discriminate use of force.

(3) DA missions may also involve locating and capturing or seizing selected
high-value targets or materiel in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These missions
usually result from situations involving diplomatic and political sensitivity or military
criticality of the enemy personnel or materiel exfiltrated from remote or hostile
environments.

(4) DA supports PR (including unconventional and nonconventional assisted

recovery) by use of dedicated land combat elements, unconventional techniques, precise
intelligence on isolated personnel, and indigenous resistance or surrogate assistance.

(5) Maritime DA can include across-the-beach operations; near-simultaneous,

underway, nighttime ship boarding; underwater attack against ships or other targets; harbor
attack; and gas and oil platform assault.

b. Strikes and Raids

(1) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or capability.

Consistent with the requirements of international law, strikes may compel offending
nations or groups to desist or prevent those nations or groups from launching attacks.
Strikes may punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or prevent those
nations or groups from launching attacks. Although often tactical concerning the ways and
means used and duration of the operation, strikes can help achieve objectives.

(2) Raids are operations to seize an area temporarily, usually through forcible
entry, to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy
an objective or capability. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the
assigned mission.

8. Counterinsurgency

a. Introduction

(1) COIN consists of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to

simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. When the United
States conducts COIN, it refers to US military personal taking the lead in COIN operations.
When US forces support an HN or PN, and the HN/PN are in the lead, our support falls
under the FID category. While many commanders may not embrace the possibility of
waging a future COIN campaign, history has shown repeatedly the folly of abandoning the
hard-learned lessons of COIN, in favor of traditional state on state warfare. JFCs are aware
they may have to face large-scale combat operations and COIN activities or operations
simultaneously. Therefore, the joint operation maintains this capability and prepares the
force appropriately.

VII-43
Chapter VII

(2) Insurgencies are the most common form of conflict around the world and
often are transnational, not isolated to one state. An insurgency is a political-military
struggle by a predominantly indigenous group or movement designed to weaken, subvert,
or displace the control of an established government. Insurgencies have always been and
are currently a reality within the contemporary OE. Long-standing external and internal
tensions tend to create or exacerbate core grievances of a segment of a population, which
can result in political strife and instability. Some groups can exploit these grievances to
gain political advantage. Some transnational criminals or terrorists with radical political
and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider,
more networked threat. Insurgents will typically solicit or offer external support or
sanctuary from state or non-state actors.

For more information on COIN, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(3) An effective COIN operation utilizes all instruments of national power to

integrate and synchronize political, security, legal, economic, development, and
psychological activities carried out by the HN. CCDRs also leverage applicable USG and
multinational partners to create a holistic approach to resolve core grievances where able
and for those irreconcilables remaining in the insurgency, weakening their cause for
violence.

(4) The United States could get involved in a COIN operation or campaign in two
common ways. The first is at the request of a PN faced with an insurgency, which it cannot
control. The second way is after a major conventional conflict whereby the United States
disestablishes the standing government of a threat nation and assumes the role of
reestablishing a new government and security. In this case, the JFC should prepare for an
insurgency from disgruntled former regime members. The joint force can also conduct a
COIN operation through foreign assistance and SC activities to prevent or disrupt insurgent
threats. SC activities, which include SA, are a part of CCPs. DOD may conduct SC
activities in conjunction with a contingency plan involving a PN in a limited contingency.
The FID program is an important USG tool to fight insurgencies. Where a friendly nation
appears vulnerable to an insurgency, many times it is in the best interest of the USG to help
it mitigate that insurgency. In these cases, the USG can support the affected HN’s internal
defense and development strategy and program through FID efforts.

For more information on COIN, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency. For more information
about SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation. For more information on FID, see JP 3-22,
Foreign Internal Defense.

b. Approach to COIN

(1) COIN Strategy. The JFC and staff develop a population-centric COIN
strategy focused on the root causes of the armed insurgency. To develop an effective
COIN strategy, the JFC must have a comprehensive understanding of the armed conflict
from the perspectives of the insurgents, other armed groups, and the indigenous
populations. The strategy must align US interests against the interests of the population

VII-44 JP 3-0
 Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict

the joint force is defending from the insurgency. COIN seeks to simultaneously protect
the population from insurgent violence and isolate the insurgents physically,
psychologically, politically, socially, and economically from the indigenous population.
Ultimately, the indigenous population will determine whether to provide its loyalty and
support to the insurgents or to the United States and its indigenous partners. All efforts
are to address the perceived and actual political imbalance the insurgent leadership has
exploited. The USG never intends to conduct COIN indefinitely but rather desires to
transition responsibility to a legitimate and credible HN government as soon as the
situation allows. The HN will require long-term USG support to sustain COIN successes
and attain an acceptable strategic end state.

(2) COIN Mindset. COIN focuses on the protection of the population and
addressing the core grievances of both the insurgents and the population from which they
draw support and recruits. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to gain or maintain
control or influence over the population’s support through political, psychological, and
economic methods.

9. Global Integration and the Joint Force’s Enduring Role in Competition

a. Arranging and accomplishing global integration’s actions are essential. For the
joint force to prevail against a peer enemy, it is imperative for JFCs to implement the
directed prioritization of effort and integrate capabilities that work together to create
advantages. If CCDRs are unsuccessful in executing these essential operations, then the
war effort could face costly protraction, stalemate, or even worse. CCDRs achieve success
by continually denying the enemy’s objectives, attriting and dismantling enemy A2/AD
defense networks, targeting C2 systems, and isolating the enemy’s forces from their
strategic infrastructure. Simultaneously, CCDRs continue protecting the force and
accumulating combat power from across the globe. As the campaigns and major operations
begin to create diplomatic and political leverage and advantage, national leaders can begin
to either impose or negotiate a settlement.

b. CCDRs translate military success into acceptable and sustainable strategic

outcomes. CCDRs expect the transition to a new competition to occur over extended
periods and implement long-term approaches that maintain their campaigns’ focus over
time. These activities might have to be successful across several AORs and multiple
JOAs. Regarding results, whether in circumstances of cooperation, competition, or
armed conflict, CCDRs assess results with a cumulative perspective and as decisive
when it achieves policy’s overarching objectives and provides a footing to accommodate
future circumstances. CCDRs effectively guide and influence the competition while
creating and enabling the necessary behaviors and conditions to achieve and maintain
the strategic objectives. CCDRs continue to guide a stable diplomatic/political situation
and an expanding network of like-minded allies and partners on terms that are
compatible with and promote US interests. If not, then the war and war’s objectives
were meaningless. Maintaining this favorable situation within the new competition
likely requires a continuing opportunity cost of an enduring military effort. At some
point, the United States will likely normalize relations for the political and military
affairs of the states previously involved in armed conflict to another authority (e.g., UN

VII-45
Chapter VII

observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or NATO). This normalization will

probably occur after an extended period of establishing and protecting a new
international dynamic. Normalizing relations can occur quickly but will likely occur in
stages as it may include situations across multiple theaters. Either way, the joint force
will continue to campaign and prepare for future circumstances.

VII-46 JP 3-0
 APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

The principles are relevant to how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat
power across the competition continuum. Classic military study of war traditionally
involved nine basic principles, collectively and classically known as the principles of war.
While the basic nature of war is immutable, the conduct of warfare continues to evolve,
and the methods of warfare will vary based on the situation. Experience in both traditional
warfare and IW identifies three additional principles, restraint, perseverance, and
legitimacy, that together with the principles of war comprise the 12 principles of joint
operations. The principles do not apply equally in all circumstances. Most principles, if
not all, are relevant in combat. Some principles, such as offensive, maneuver, and surprise,
may not apply in some situations like FHA. However, principles such as the unity of
command, objective, and legitimacy are important in all situations.

2. Traditional Principles of War

a. Objective

(1) The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct military action toward a
clearly defined and achievable goal.

(2) The purpose of using military power is to achieve strategic objectives.

Achieving strategic objectives frequently involves the destruction of the enemies’
capabilities and their will to fight. The objectives not involving this destruction might be
more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives
must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of military action.
Ultimately, each action must contribute to achieving strategic objectives. JFCs should
avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

(3) Changes to strategic objectives may occur because national and military
leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation
changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in national objectives necessitating
changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, the
achievement of the operational objectives may no longer support the strategic objectives,
legitimacy undermined, and force security compromised.

b. Offensive

(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

(2) Offensive action is the most effective and determinant way to achieve a
clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are how a military force seizes and exploits
the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving meaningful objectives.
The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of warfare.

A-1
Appendix A

(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must
seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent
in the conduct of all defensive operations.

c. Mass

(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most
advantageous place and time to produce results.

(2) To achieve mass, JFCs integrate and synchronize where they can have a
forceful effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired
effect. Massing effects of combat power (lethal and nonlethal), rather than concentrating
forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and
minimize human losses and waste of resources. The joint force maneuvers to mass effects
in competitive spaces (i.e., land, maritime, air, and space domains; as well as in the IE,
which includes cyberspace; and the EMS) to gain and maintain advantage relative to a
competitor, adversary, or enemy. Maneuver and mass are complementary and mutually
supporting principles designed to concentrate the effects of overwhelming power at the
decisive place and time.

d. Maneuver

(1) The purpose of maneuver is to place an adversary or enemy in a position of

disadvantage.

(2) Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to competitor, adversary, or

enemy actions to secure or retain a positional and/or informational advantage, usually to
deliver—or threaten the delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.
Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects the friendly force. It
contributes materially and psychologically in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of
action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

e. Economy of Force

(1) The purpose of an economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat

power (lethal and nonlethal) on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat
power on primary efforts.

(2) Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces IAW
the commander’s intent and mission requirements. The measured allocation of available
combat power for tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde
operations is to achieve mass at the decisive point and time. Although the principle of
economy of force suggests the use of force, it also recommends guarding against overkill.
This is particularly relevant when excessive force can diminish the legitimacy and support
for an operation—an inherent informational aspect of military activities.

A-2 JP 3-0
 Principles of Joint Operations

f. Unity of Command

(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one
responsible commander for every objective.

(2) Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with
the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity
of command may not be possible during coordination with multinational and interagency
partners, but the requirement for unity of effort is paramount. Unity of effort—the
coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not
necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product of successful unified
action.

g. Security

(1) The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring an unexpected
advantage.

(2) Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to

hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by
commanders to protect their forces, the population, or other critical priorities. Staff
planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine enhance security.
Risk is inherent in military action. The application of this principle includes risk
management, not undue caution.

h. Surprise

(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place where the enemy is
unprepared.

(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus
achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to
surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement;
effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and
variations in tactics and methods of operation.

i. Simplicity

(1) The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability of success in execution

by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

(2) Simplicity contributes to successful action. Simple plans and clear, concise
orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the
simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution
planning at all echelons. Simplicity, a common lexicon, and clarity of expression greatly

A-3
Appendix A

facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexities of modern
combat and are especially critical to success in modern operations.

3. Additional Principles of Joint Operations

a. Restraint

(1) The purpose of restraint is to prevent the excessive use of force.

(2) A single act could cause significant military and diplomatic/political

consequences, so the judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and
disciplined balancing of the need for security, the military necessities of the operation, and
the pursuit of the objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby
damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the
legitimacy of the opposing party. Nonlethal weapons provide intermediate force, which is
an active measure that enables mission success through the creation of proportionate
nonlethal effects allowing for effective action consistent with the principle of restraint.

b. Perseverance

(1) The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to

achieve strategic objectives.

(2) Perseverance involves preparation for protracted and enduring operations

and/or campaigns in pursuit of strategic objectives. Some operations and campaigns may
require years or even decades before establishing a favorable situation. The underlying
causes of the circumstance may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve resolution. The
patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to
success. This commitment will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and
informational measures to supplement military efforts. Forward-deployed forces shape the
security environment, signal US resolve, deter conflict, and promote global prosperity.
Persistent forward presence builds trust, which cannot be generated suddenly in response
to a looming conflict. Sustained engagement develops partnerships and builds partner
capacity.

c. Legitimacy

(1) The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority.

(2) Legitimacy, which can be a key factor, is based on the actual and perceived
legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of relevant
actors, stakeholders, and other interested audiences. These audiences will include our
national leadership and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations in the
OA and nations and organizations around the world.

(3) Committed forces sustain the legitimacy and cooperation of the host
government, where applicable. Commanders balance security actions of the joint force

A-4 JP 3-0
 Principles of Joint Operations

with perceptions of legitimacy. Commanders consider all actions as potentially competing

requirements. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the
international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation and to
perceptions of fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force,
restructuring the type of forces employed, protecting civilians, and ensuring the disciplined
conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy. The consistent integration of
operations, actions, words, and images will support the commander’s ability to establish
and maintain necessary credibility, legitimacy, and trust with relevant actors.

(4) Another aspect is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through
the perception of the populace that it governs. FHA and CMO help develop a sense of
legitimacy for the supported government. When the populace perceives the government
has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider
that government as legitimate, especially when coupled with successful efforts to build the
capability and capacity of the supported government’s institutions. In a situation where
perceptions of government legitimacy do not exist, leaders must use extreme caution to
avoid inadvertently legitimizing individuals and organizations whose agendas may be
counterproductive to the HN and US strategic objectives.

A-5
Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-6 JP 3-0
 APPENDIX B
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-0 considers the following primary references:

1. General

a. Title 10, USC.

b. 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

c. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021.

d. (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge.

e. (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.

f. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

g. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.

h. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

i. National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America.

j. National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel of the United States of America.

k. National Response Framework.

l. Unified Command Plan.

m. FY 2023-FY 2027 Defense Planning Guidance.

n. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.

o. National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National

Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees.

p. UN Charter.

q. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.

r. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY 2019-2020.

B-1
Appendix B

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. 2018-2020 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).

b. Defense Space Strategy.

c. Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy: A Call to Action.

d. DODD 2310.01, DOD Detainee Program.

e. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.

f. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
NLW Policy.

g. DODD 3000.05, Stabilization.

h. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW).

i. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.

j. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

k. DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard.

l. DODD 5205.02E, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.

m. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

n. DODI 3000.12, Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP).

o. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).

p. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

q. DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.

r. DODI 4715.19, Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations.

s. DODI 4715.22, Environmental Management Policy for Contingency Locations.

t. DODI 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of Services.

u. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

v. DODI 8500.01, Cybersecurity.

B-2 JP 3-0
 References

w. DOD Manual 5240-01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence

Activities.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System.

b. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

c. CJCSI 3110.05F, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan.

d. CJCSI 3120.08D, (U) Joint Special Technical Operations.

e. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.

f. CJCSI 3126.01A, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability

Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.

g. CJCSI 3141.01F, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.

h. CJCSI 3150.25G, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

i. CJCSI 3162.02, Methodology for Combat Assessment.

j. CJCSI 3213.01D, Joint Operations Security.

k. CJCSI 3320.01D, (U) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO).

l. CJCSI 3500.01J, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

m. CJCSI 5715.01C, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

n. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

o. CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

p. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

q. CJCSM 3122.05, Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES)-Information Systems (IS) Governance.

r. CJCSM 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance.

s. CJCSM 3130.06C, Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

B-3
Appendix B

t. CJCSM 3150.03D, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports.

u. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

v. JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting.

w. JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force.

x. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

y. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

z. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

aa. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

bb. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

cc. JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

dd. JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

ee. JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

ff. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

gg. JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

hh. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

ii. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

jj. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

kk. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

ll. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environments.

mm. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

nn. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

oo. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

pp. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

B-4 JP 3-0
 References

qq. JP 3-14, Joint Space Operations.

rr. JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Activities.

ss. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

tt. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

uu. JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

vv. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

ww. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

xx. JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

yy. JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

zz. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

aaa. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

bbb. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

ccc. JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

ddd. JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.

eee. JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.

fff. JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

ggg. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

hhh. JP 3-36, Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations.

iii. JP 3-40, Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

jjj. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

kkk. JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

lll. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

mmm. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

nnn. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

B-5
Appendix B

ooo. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

ppp. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

qqq. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

rrr. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

sss. JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

ttt. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

uuu. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

vvv. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

www. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

xxx. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Allied Joint Publications

a. AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine.

b. AJP-3(C), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

5. Multi-Service Publications

a. Army Techniques Publication 3-22.40 (Field Manual 3-22.40)/Marine Corps

Tactical Publication 10-10A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.3.2/Air Force
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Employment of
Nonlethal Weapons.

b. Army Techniques Publication 3-01.15/Marine Corps Tactical Publication 10-

10B/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3- 01.8/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air and Missile
Defense.

c. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.38B/Marine Corps Order

3500.26A/Commandant Instruction M3500.1B, Universal Naval Task List [UNTL].

d. Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction 3000.04, National Guard Bureau

Domestic Operations.

B-6 JP 3-0
 References

e. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.11M/Coast Guard Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.3/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.04, Visit,
Board, Search, and Seizure Operations.

f. Navy Warfare Publication 3-07/Commandant Instruction M3120.11/Marine Corps

Interim Publication 3-33.02, Maritime Stability Operations.

B-7
Appendix B

Intentionally Blank

B-8 JP 3-0
 APPENDIX C
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
[email protected]. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Operations (J-3).
The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for
Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Scott
T. Kendrick, Integrated Operations Division, Future Operations (J-35), Joint Staff
Directorate for Operations (J-3); Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Scott Kendrick,
Integrated Operations Division, Future Operations (J-35), Joint Staff Directorate for
Operations (J-3); Mr. John Gniadek, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch, Joint Staff J-7; and
LtCol Matthew T. James, Joint Doctrine Branch, Joint Staff J-7. Mr. Johnny R. Raney,
United States Marine Corps, is also recognized for his invaluable contributions throughout
the revision cycle of this publication

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating

Change 1, 22 October 2018.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
[email protected].

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

C-1
Appendix C

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of observations, best practices, and lessons learned to
improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint
doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing insights and lessons
learned derived from operations, exercises, war games, and other events. As these inputs
are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major
goal of the JLLP. Insights and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into
draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Web site can
be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or https://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

LIMITED. This JP is approved for limited release. The authors of this publication
have concluded that information in this publication should be disseminated on an as-needed
basis and is limited to common access cardholders. Requests for distribution to
noncommon access cardholders should be directed to the Joint Staff J-7.

7. Printing and Distribution

Before distributing this JP, please e-mail the Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch, at
[email protected], or call 703-692-7273/DSN 692-7273, or
contact the lead agent or Joint Staff doctrine sponsor.

a. The Joint Staff does not print hard copies of JPs for distribution. An electronic
version of this JP is available on:

(1) NIPRNET Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (limited to .mil and .gov users with a DOD common
access card) and

(2) SIPRNET JEL+ at https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp.

b. Access to this unclassified publication is limited. This JP can be locally reproduced

for use within the combatant commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, Joint Staff, and
combat support agencies. However, reproduction authorization for this JP must be IAW
lead agent/Joint Staff doctrine sponsor guidance.

C-2 JP 3-0
 GLOSSARY
PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS
(ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)

A2 antiaccess
AADC area air defense commander
ACA airspace control authority
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACS airspace control system
ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AD area denial
AJP Allied joint publication
AM&E assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility

BDA battle damage assessment

BPC building partnership capacity

C2 command and control

CAL critical asset list
CAO civil affairs operations
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CbT combating terrorism
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCMD combatant command
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CD counterdrug
CDRUSCYBERCOM Commander, United States Cyber Command
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSPACECOM Commander, United States Space Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command
CI counterintelligence
CID combat identification
C-IED counter-improvised explosive device
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF commander, joint task force
CMO civil-military operation
CMOC civil-military operations center
CO cyberspace operations

GL-1
Glossary

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COG center of gravity
COIN counterinsurgency
CO-IPE cyberspace operations-integrated planning element
COM chief of mission
COMCAM combat camera
CONOPS concept of operations
CONPLAN concept plan
CONUS continental United States
COOP continuity of operations
COP common operational picture
CPG contingency planning guidance
CSA combat support agency
CSP campaign support plan
CT counterterrorism
CTF counter threat finance
CTN countering threat networks
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction

DA direct action
DACO directive authority for cyberspace operations
DAFL directive authority for logistics
DAL defended asset list
DCA defensive counterair
DCO defensive cyberspace operations
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DE directed energy
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODIN Department of Defense information network
DOS Department of State
DPG defense planning guidance
DSCA defense support of civil authorities

EA electromagnetic attack
EACA electromagnetic attack control authority
EM electromagnetic
EME electromagnetic environment
EMI electromagnetic interference
EMOE electromagnetic operational environment
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EP electromagnetic protection
EW electromagnetic warfare
EXORD execute order

GL-2 JP 3-0
 Glossary

FCP functional campaign plan

FDO flexible deterrent option
FFIR friendly force information requirement
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FID foreign internal defense
FRO flexible response option
FSF foreign security forces

GCP global campaign plan

GFM global force management
GFMIG Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
GIF global integration framework

HD homeland defense
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters

I2 identity intelligence
IADS integrated air defense system
IAW in accordance with
IC intelligence community
ICB institutional capacity building
ICP integrated contingency plan
IE information environment
IM information management
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-7 training and education directorate of a joint staff
JCC joint cyberspace center
JEMSO joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment

GL-3
Glossary

JIST joint integrated space team

JMETL joint mission-essential task list
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPP joint planning process
JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JS Joint Staff
JSA joint security area
JSC joint security coordinator
JSOA joint special operations area
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
JTF-State joint task force-state

KLE key leader engagement

LEA law enforcement agency

LNO liaison officer
LOC line of communications
LOE line of effort
LOO line of operation

MILDEC military deception

MILDEP Military Department
MIPOE medical intelligence preparation of the
operational environment
MISO military information support operations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS national defense strategy
NG National Guard
NGB National Guard Bureau
NGO nongovernmental organization
NMS national military strategy
NRF National Response Framework
NSC National Security Council
NSS national security strategy

OA operational area
OCA offensive counterair
OCO offensive cyberspace operations
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment

GL-4 JP 3-0
 Glossary

OIE operations in the information environment

OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PEO peace enforcement operations
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PKO peacekeeping operations
PN partner nation
PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
PPD Presidential policy directive
PR personnel recovery

ROE rules of engagement

RS religious support

SA security assistance
SC security cooperation
SCO security cooperation organization
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SFA security force assistance
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces
SOP standard operating procedure
SSA security sector assistance
SSR security sector reform
STO special technical operations

TACON tactical control

TF task force
TPFDD timed-phased force and deployment data
TSOC theater special operations command

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UCP Unified Command Plan
UN United Nations
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USG United States Government
USSPACECOM United States Space Command
UW unconventional warfare

GL-5
Glossary

VEO violent extremist organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-6 JP 3-0
 PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, 18 June 2022, Active Terms and
Definitions

activity. 1. A unit, organization, or installation performing a function or mission. 2. A

function, mission, action, or collection of actions. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against

which the use of force may be envisaged. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

air apportionment. The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by
percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a
given period of time. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

antiaccess. Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an

advancing enemy force from entering an operational area. Also called A2. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area denial. Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy
force’s freedom of action within an operational area. Also called AD. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of influence. An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein
a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information
normally under the commander’s command or control. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary.)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence,
areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. Also called AOI. (Approved
for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

area of operations. An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime
force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called
AO. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing

capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of
the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity.
4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective
employees or “agents.” (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively

permanent and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or
personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or
personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or

GL-7
Glossary

functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (Source: JP 3-0) (Definition #1

approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement

is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where
such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional
damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application
of fires. Also called BDA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination
and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

campaigning. The persistent conduct of related operations, activities, and investments that
align military actions with the other instruments of national power, supporting global
integration across the competition continuum in pursuit of strategic objectives.
(Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0).

combat power. The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military
unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

commander’s critical information requirement. Specific information identified by the

commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making. Also called CCIR.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

commander’s intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and
the desired objectives and military end state. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

common operational picture. A single, identical display of relevant information shared

by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all
echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

condition. 1. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit,

system, or individual operates and that may affect performance. 2. A physical or
behavioral state of a system that is necessary for the achievement of an objective.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-8 JP 3-0
 Glossary

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of

functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in
carrying out the national military strategy. Also called COOP. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over
part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1, Vol 2) 2. In mapping,
charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on
the Earth, a map, or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have been
or will be determined. (JP 2-0) 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with
the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 3-0) 4. In
intelligence usage, an indicator governing the distribution and use of documents,
information, or material. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 2-0)

crisis. An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States,
its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a
condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of
military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic
objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

cyberspace operations. The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary

purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Also called CO. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

deterrence. The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable

counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

economy of force. The employment and distribution of forces to allocate the maximum
possible combat power on primary efforts. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of
actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A
change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s
objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

engagement. 1. An attack against an air or missile threat. (JP 3-01) 2. A tactical conflict,
usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

exclusion zone. A defined area, established by a sanctioning body, where specific

activities are prohibited. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-9
Glossary

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign

country. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by commanders to facilitate

the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly
forces. Also called FSCM. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the
United States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against

Department of Defense personnel (including family members), resources, facilities,
and critical information. Also called FP. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

foreign assistance. Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development
assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

freedom of navigation operations. Actions conducted to protect United States

navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas. (Approved
for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to
understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

hostile environment. An operational environment where the freedom of movement is

contested. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

information management. The function of managing an organization’s information

resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different
systems, individuals, and organizations. Also called IM. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD Dictionary.)

interagency coordination. The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur

between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States
Government departments and agencies. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

interoperability. 1. The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to

achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition
achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-

GL-10 JP 3-0
 Glossary

electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and

satisfactorily between them and/or their users. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components
in coordinated action to create desired effects in support of a common objective.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist the joint force in creating effects and achieving
objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint force. A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and
made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions. Also called JFACC. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and
made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions. Also called JFLCC. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and
coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions. Also
called JFMCC. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified
command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and made-available-for-tasking special operations forces and assets;
planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational
missions. Also called JFSOCC. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

joint function. A grouping of capabilities and activities that enable joint force
commanders to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. (Approved for
replacement of “joint functions” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-11
Glossary

joint operations. Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces
employed in specified command relationships with each other, which, of themselves,
do not establish joint forces. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint operations area. The airspace, land area, and maritime area defined by a combatant
commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander
directs military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force
commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. Also called JSOA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In

communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications
facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route,
that connects any two or more routes. (Definition #3 approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)

major operation. A series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces, coordinated in

time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

military engagement. Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the

Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or
foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence,
share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (Approved
for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

military intervention. The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its
military forces into the course of an existing controversy. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

mission. 1. The essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the
action to be taken and the reason for the action. (JP 3-0) 2. The dispatching of one
or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 3-30) (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

mission area. In campaign planning and execution, a grouping of related operational-level

objectives within a campaign structure that may include multiple lines of effort,
tactical tasks, individual operations and activities, and investments. (Approved for
inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

neutral. In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose
characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor
opposing friendly forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

GL-12 JP 3-0
 Glossary

neutrality. In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war adopted
by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the belligerent,
which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerent. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated,

processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-36) 2. In communications and
computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and
gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 6-0) 3. An element of
a network that represents a person, place, or physical object. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme.

(JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a military mission. (JP 3-0)
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operational access. The ability to project military force into an operational area with
sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as

area of responsibility and joint operations area) of locations for the conduct of military
operations. Also called OA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their

skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies,
campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends,
ways, and means. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational environment. The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.
Also called OE. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operational level of warfare. The level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support
achievement of strategic objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a force can successfully
employ military capabilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

permissive environment. Uncontested conditions in which joint forces have freedom of

movement. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations,

GL-13
Glossary

material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage,
and theft. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

protection. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military

and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure
deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force, when necessary, for the protection
of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in
United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an enemy,

capture personnel or equipment or destroy a capability culminating with a planned
withdrawal. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

religious advisement. The practice of informing the commander on the impact of religion
on operations, to include worship, rituals, customs, and practices of United States
military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population, as well as the
impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in the
operational area. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

religious support. Chaplain-facilitated free exercise of religion through worship, religious

and pastoral counseling services, ceremonial honors for the fallen, individual and
family intervention, and advice to the commander on ethical and moral issues and
morale. Also called RS. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

religious support team. A team comprising at least one chaplain and one enlisted
religious affairs person. Also called RST. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

risk management. The process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions
that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.).

sanction enforcement. Operations that employ coercive measures to control the

movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

show of force. An operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve that involves
increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific
situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or
national objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

stabilization activities. Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside
the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain

GL-14 JP 3-0
 Glossary

or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Approved
for the replacement of “stability activities” in the DOD Dictionary.)

strategic attack. An offensive action against a target—whether military, political,

economic, or other—that is specifically selected to achieve national or military
strategic objectives. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

strategic level of warfare. The level of warfare at which a nation determines national or
multinational guidance, develops strategic objectives, then develops and commits
national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

strategy. An idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational
objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (DOD Dictionary.

Source: JP 3-0)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects
of a task assigned. 2. In the context of joint planning, the commander who prepares
operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. In the context of a support command relationship, the
commander who receives assistance from another commander, and who is responsible
for ensuring the supporting commander understands the assistance required.
(Definitions #1 and #3 approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides actions and other directed

support to a supported commander. 2. In the context of a support command
relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another
commander’s force and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the
supported commander. (Definition #1 approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface

areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and
prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly

interacting or interdependent elements that form a unified whole. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-15
Glossary

tactical level of warfare. The level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles
and engagements to achieve military objectives. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the combatant commander for the
conduct or support of specific military operations. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary.)

theater of war. Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the combatant

commander as the area of air, land, and sea that is, or may become, directly involved
in the conduct of campaigns and major operations involving combat. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

uncertain environment. A condition in which the joint force’s freedom of movement

may be contested. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

unity of command. The direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander
who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment,
materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable)
required for self-sufficiency. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

2. Terms Removed from the DOD Dictionary

 Supersession of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, Incorporating

Change 1, 22 October 2018: alliance; combatant command chaplain; command
chaplain; exercise; full-spectrum superiority; joint force chaplain; maneuver;
neutralize; religious affairs; religious discrimination; termination criteria; theater
strategy

GL-16 JP 3-0
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-0 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

l JP published and continuously l Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
l Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following l Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
l Revision begins 3.5 years l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
l Each JP revision is completed l Program directive (PD) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing/joint working group
signature l PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
l JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)

Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION

Approval Development

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 l LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
l JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l JSDS prepares JS staffing package
l FD comment matrix adjudication
l JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature l JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
l Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
l FC joint working group