How Africa Trades
How Africa Trades
HOW
Africa must not go unheeded. This is a must-read for all interested in the crucial
role of trade in Africa’s economic development.”
Fatima Haram Acyl, Vice President of the Economic and Monetary Commission Edited by
for the Central African States, Former Commissioner of Trade and Industry at the
African Union Commission David Luke
AFRICA
“This is an authoritative book on what needs to be done to make Africa’s
undersized and underperforming trade become an engine of development,
poverty reduction, industrialisation and economic transformation. A must read
for anyone concerned about the future of Africa and the world.”
Professor Justin Yifu Lin, Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking
University, Former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, World Bank
TRADES
How Africa Trades
Edited by
David Luke
Published by
LSE Press
10 Portugal Street
London WC2A 2HD
press.lse.ac.uk
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.hat
The full text of this book has been peer-reviewed to ensure high academic
standards. For our full publishing ethics policies, see https://press.lse.ac.uk
Suggested citation:
Luke, David (ed) (2023) How Africa Trades, London: LSE Press.
https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.hatLicense: CC-BY-NC 4.0
To read the free, open access version of this book online, visit
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Contents
Figures
1.1 Sources of African foreign exchange flows: exports,
FDI inflows, remittances and DAC overseas development
assistance (ODA), constant 2020 US$ 2
1.2 Africa’s exports as a share of world trade: 1960 to 2020 3
1.3 Composition of Africa’s exports, constant 2020 US$ 4
1.4 Composition of Africa’s imports, constant 2020 US$ 5
1.5 Africa’s exports, by country, $ billions 6
1.6 Origin of Africa’s imports, constant 2020 US$ 8
1.7 Share of Africa’s imports, three-year average (2018–2020) 8
1.8 Destination of Africa’s exports, constant 2020 US$ 9
1.9 Share of Africa’s exports, three-year average (2018–2020) 9
1.10 Relative importance of Africa to its top trading partners,
share of Africa in total trade, by partner 10
1.11 Africa’s inward foreign direct investment stock, constant
2020 US$ 10
1.12 US outward foreign direct investment stock in Africa as
compared to US investment stock in all countries,
by sector, 2020 11
1.13 EU net direct investments abroad in Africa as compared
to EU investments in all countries, by sector, 2013–20 12
1.14 China outward foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan
Africa, by sector 12
1.15 Regional contribution to Africa’s services exports, 2020 13
1.16 Africa’s services exports over time, 2005–2020 14
1.17 Composition of Africa’s services exports, constant 2020 US$ 14
1.18 Composition of Africa’s exports, by destination, five-year
average (2016–2020) 16
1.19 Phases of the negotiations cycle within the context
of trade policy 17
1.20 Good governance principles for trade policymaking 18
1.21 Negotiation stratagems for effective trade policy 19
2.1 A giant fragmented market: African countries by population 25
2.2 A growing, and maturing, market: African population
and middle-class share, 2000–2060 26
2.3 Exports within the continent are more conducive
to development: intra- and extra-African exports,
composition, 2018–2020 26
2.4 Industry to gain most: distribution of absolute gains
in intra-African trade, by main sectors, with AfCFTA,
implemented as compared to baseline (i.e. without
AfCFTA) – US$ billions and % – 2045 27
2.5 Missed deadlines: is the AfCFTA stuck between negotiations
and implementation? 29
2.6 AfCFTA ecosystem of projects, programmes and activities 33
2.7 Overlapping REC memberships and mandates 41
3.1 EU trade regimes by African country 53
3.2 Top 10 countries and regions in China’s imports (percentage
share), 2021 67
4.1 US aid-for-trade disbursements to African countries,
2010–2019, US$ billions 79
4.2 US imports from Africa, constant 2020 US$ 81
4.3 US direct investment positions in Africa,
constant 2020 US$ 81
4.4 US direct investment positions in Africa, by industry, 2020 82
4.5 Single- versus double-transformation rules of origin for
AGOA-qualifying apparel exporters, constant 2020 US$ 83
4.6 Beside AGOA: trade policies and complementary programmes 91
4.7 Timeline for the signature of UK EPAs with African countries 95
5.1 Number of disputes participated in as a complainant,
by country 130
5.2 Number of disputes participated in as a respondent,
by country 130
5.3 Number of disputes participated in as a third party,
by country 132
5.4 Number of disputes participated in as a panellist, by country 132
6.1 Composition of Africa’s exports 142
6.2 Price developments for Africa’s top exports through
Covid-19 (Dec 2019 =100) 143
6.3 Africa’s international travel closures: scale of 0 to 4
(white to blue), January 2020 to March 2022 144
6.4 Composition of Africa’s imports by supplier 147
6.5 Stringency of lockdowns in Africa’s import partners,
January 2020 to March 2022 147
6.6 Africa’s exports to the world, compared to equivalent
month in 2019, percentage change 149
6.7 Intra-African exports, compared to equivalent month
in 2019, percentage change 149
6.8 Individual African countries, change in annual exports,
2020 as compared to 2019, percentage change 151
6.9 African country groupings, annual change in exports,
2020 and 2021 as compared to 2019, percentage change 152
6.10 Africa’s imports, compared to equivalent month in 2019,
percentage change 152
6.11 Contribution of BPM6 sectors to total African trade in
services exports, 2019 153
6.12 Africa’s services exports, sector indices, Q4 2019 = 100 153
6.13 Africa’s exports relative to selected regions through
Covid-19: exports indexed to January 2020 156
6.14 Covid-19 relative to other economic crises: impact
on Africa’s exports, by month into crisis 157
6.15 African imports of intermediary goods from main partners
(average 2018–2019 and 2020–2021) 160
6.16 African countries manufactured value-added growth
and total imports in 2020 161
6.17 AfCFTA negotiation meetings, by subject and level,
October 2019 to November 2021 165
6.18 Cumulative number of AfCFTA ratifications over time 167
6.19 Covid-19 response strategies, by business size 170
7.1 Evolution of Covid-19 mobility restrictions – Africa,
February 2020 (left) and February 2022 (right) 181
7.2 Covid-19 mobility restrictions, West Africa, 2022 181
7.3 The STR ecosystem 187
7.4 Ugandan informal exports, quarterly, $ millions 189
7.5 Internet coverage rates: share of population covered
by at least 3G 195
7.6 Internet usage: share of population using the internet 195
7.7 Inequalities in the African digital economy: internet
usage rates, by analytical grouping 196
7.8 Number of digital platforms per country, 2020 197
7.9 Average digital platform traffic per country, 2020 197
7.10 Trends in ‘online’-something searches, for example
‘online-shopping’, in 2020 198
7.11 Digital platform internet traffic index (January 2017 = 100) 200
7.12 More sophisticated ‘transactional’ platforms have
weathered the Covid-19 storm better than simple ‘
classifieds’ (index January 2017 = 100) 200
7.13 Jumia – Africa’s publicly listed tech bellwether: bumpy
stock performance 201
Tables
1.1 Economic concentration of Africa’s exports, by country 6
2.1 The importance of looking beyond tariffs: AfCFTA benefits
by impact channels in different models (percentages) 27
2.2 African RECs’ performance in continental and global trade
(average 2018–2020), percentage 39
2.3 Categorisation of the status of the 11 RECS 40
2.4 Main pillars in RECs vision frameworks 43
3.1 China’s financing commitments (loans and grants)
announced at the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), 2006–2021 65
3.2 Summary of key China–Africa trade policy measures 68
4.1 Comparative analysis of US and Kenya FTA negotiating
objectives86
4.2 African countries party to an FTA with the UK 97
4.3 African countries that are beneficiaries of the UK’s GSP 97
4.4 Partner summits with African countries 106
5.1 Connecting the principled narrative to the positions
of African countries 122
5.2 Overview of African countries that have signed on
to the JSIs (April 2022) 125
5.3 Outcome of the 2022 WTO Ministerial Conference 127
5A.1 Linking the principled narrative to statements made
by the LDC, Africa Group and G90 135
6.1 Logistic challenges in sub-Saharan Africa 163
6.2 AfCFTA national implementation strategies: progress
by March 2022 169
7.1 Consumer banking behaviour: consumer pulse survey
reported changes in consumer behaviour, percentage, 2020 199
Boxes
3.1 2022 EU–AU Summit 60
3.2 The Belt and Road Initiative: vested interests and African
incentives65
3.3 Kenya freezes up over avocado exports 69
4.1 UK trade and investment support institutions 99
6.1 Lessons from the rise of domestic tourism in China 155
7.1 Inter-agency harmonisation: the DRC and its neighbours 183
7.2 Short-sighted public health measures: Zimbabwe 184
7.3 The hidden costs of groupage: informal traders subject
to duties 190
7.4 Digitalising border processes in the Democratic
Republic of Congo 202
Contributors
Contributors xv
Acronyms xvii
Preface
David Luke
Preface xxiii
options in the light of the central role of trade in Africa’s aspirations for
economic transformation.
researchers who may wish to dive deeper into the issues covered in this book,
most of the sources cited can be accessed on the internet and are not shielded
by paywalls. Comments and feedback provided by readers are welcome and
useful, and advance open social science. Please send this to [email protected].
Engaging with the material covered in the book through posts on Twitter
(@AfricaAtLSE), Facebook and other social media is also welcome.
Acknowledgements
It takes a village to start a research programme and get a book out. Gener-
ous financial support was provided by the London School of Economics and
Political Science Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa (FLIA), the LSE Ruth Glass
Fellowship Fund, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Geneva Office. Tim
Allen, Martha Geiger Mwenitete, Fadil Elobeid, Tosin Adebisi, Mark Briggs,
Laurence Radford and Ikenna Acholonu of the FLIA are unswerving cham-
pions of the Africa Trade Policy Programme. Hansjörg ‘Hajo’ Lanz, Yvonne
Bartmann and Sabine Dörfler at FES Geneva readily backed the vision behind
pro-development research on African trade policy. Rashid Kaukab of CUTS
Geneva, Michelle Moraa Mokaya of TULIP Consulting, Nick Westcott of the
Royal African Society and the School of Oriental and African Studies, Lennart
Oestergaard of FES Berlin Office, Melaku Desta of the Economic Commission
for Africa, Parasram Gopaul of the Mauritius Permanent Mission in Geneva,
Michael Amoah, Fadil Elobaid, Elitsa Garnizova, Aggrey Nyondwa and Lau-
rence Radford of LSE joined the editor, contributors and the FES Geneva
team at one or both of the workshops that discussed preliminary research
findings. several African officials including WTO ambassadors, trade experts
at the AfCFTA Secretariat, EAC, ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC, and a vari-
ety of specialists on issues covered in the book gave generously of their time
for interviews as part of the research. Marios Tokas, a legal consultant, Robert
Brock Burton of TULIP Consulting and Michelle Moraa Mokaya helped with
inputs for the chapter on the WTO. Melaku Desta, Lennart Oestergaard and
Franklyn Lisk of Warwick University read the entire manuscript and provided
constructive feedback. Aggrey Nyondwa, Nellie Anderson and Jonathan Ter-
refe at FLIA assisted in compiling the references. Patrick Dunleavy, Alice
Park, Lucy Lambe and Ellie Potts at LSE Press offered valuable insights on the
merits of open access publishing and guided the manuscript to publication.
1. Trade and investment flows and a
perspective for analysing trade policy in
Africa
Jamie MacLeod and David Luke
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (2022), UNCTAD (2022), OECD DAC-ODA
(2022), Knomad (2022).1
Trade and investment flows 3
oils in recent years. Two of the top 10 largest exporters of liquified natural gas
were African in 2021, with the continent considered to be well positioned to
replace Russian gas sources in Europe following the war in Ukraine if infra-
structural capacities can be upgraded (Gbadamosi 2022). Africa is also home
to many critical minerals increasingly required of emerging digital and green
technologies, such as cobalt (which is needed for batteries) and caesium and
rubidium (used in mobile cellular global positioning systems). An estimated
42 of the 63 elements used by low-carbon technologies and the so-called
Fourth Industrial Revolution are found in Africa (United Nations University
– Institute for Natural Resources in Africa 2019).
The other side of trade, besides exports, is of course imports. Though access
to imports is important, it attracts less policy attention than exports. Policy-
makers tend to care more about boosting exports and the foreign exchange
earned by them than about increasing the imports on which that foreign
exchange is spent. Imports are seen more as an expression of what a country
needs but cannot source domestically, such as refined fuels or stable foods,
than the economic structure of that country. As Africa’s exports of fuels
increased from 2003, so too did Africa’s import bill for manufactures. The
three ascending ‘humps’ seen in Africa’s exports (Figure 1.3) are replicated in
the shape of three softer humps of imports in this period (Figure 1.4). Though
admittedly an oversimplification, compounded by other balance of payment
flows, Africa’s trade represents in general an exchange with the rest of the
world of primary fuels, ores and metals in exchange for manufactures, and to
a lesser extent foodstuffs.
their exports have been fuels. This category comprises several large exporters,
including Nigeria, Algeria and Angola, but also smaller oil-dependent export-
ers, such as Chad, South Sudan and Equatorial Guinea. Seventeen African
countries have export portfolios concentrated in ores and metals and another
17 in foodstuffs. These non-oil-exporting countries tend to account for much
smaller values of exports, and include most of the ‘remaining 36’ countries
mentioned in Figure 1.5. A final eight African countries have achieved a
degree of industrialisation, allowing manufacturing to represent the largest
economic sector in their exports. This latter category comprises a mix of large
industrial economies – such as South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia –
but also smaller ones that have managed to develop export bases or integrate
Trade and investment flows 7
into the industrial value chains of their larger neighbours, including Lesotho,
Eswatini, Mauritius and Djibouti.
Industrialisation remains the exception for African countries, but also a
prevailing goal. Unfortunately, the picture of over-concentration found in
Africa’s aggregate trade is reflected at the disaggregated level for most African
countries. Too many have export portfolios that are highly concentrated in
the primary sectors, though in different instances these comprise not just the
fuel sector but also ores and metals, and foodstuffs too. The largest African
exporters tend to be those that have achieved a degree of industrialisation, or
merely found themselves host to large stocks of hydrocarbons.
repeated shocks, notably in 2009, 2015 and 2020 (Figure 1.8). These
correspond with oil price shocks and belie the heavy concentration of African
exports in petroleum fuels. This explains, too, the declining share of
African exports destined for the US, which, since the early 2010s, have been
replaced by domestic US sources of shale oil.
Despite accounting for around 17 per cent of the total world population,
only about 3 per cent of global GDP occurs in the African continent. Africa
is, economically, a small portion of the global economy. Accordingly, in few
partner markets is Africa a major export destination or import supplier.
Africa accounts for just 3.9 per cent of China’s trade, 2.2 per cent of the EU’s
trade, 2.2 per cent of the UK’s trade and 1.1 per cent of US trade (Figure 1.10).
Trade and investment flows 9
Though comprehensive investment data from all sources does not exist, a
demonstrative vignette can be seen through three large economies, the US,
the EU and China, which issue bilateral and sectorally disaggregated FDI
stock and net flows data. Investment stocks, in the case of African countries,
mirror trade statistics, reflecting a concentration in the mining and extractive
Trade and investment flows 11
sectors, associated with fuels and metals. The mining sector is the main sec-
toral destination for US investments in Africa, accounting for 32 per cent of
all US investments in the continent, despite mining accounting for only 3
per cent of outward US investments in all countries (Figure 1.12). In most
instances, investment stock is also concentrated in just a small number of
African countries. Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa alone account for 59 per
cent of US investment stock on the continent.
EU investments into Africa are similarly concentrated in the mining sector,
which accounted for almost half of all EU net direct investments abroad in
Africa between 2013 and 2020 (Figure 1.13). By comparison, just 7 per cent
of EU investments in all other countries are in the mining sector. EU invest-
ments into African countries are, however, relatively better represented than
investments from the US in Africa’s manufacturing sector, which accounted
for 41 per cent of all EU net direct investments abroad in Africa between 2013
and 2020. The vignette expressed by Chinese outward foreign direct invest-
ment data in sub-Saharan Africa is similar, being heavily concentrated in the
energy and metals sectors, but also transport (Figure 1.14).
Africa’s share of world investment stocks continues to be undersized and
concentrated in the extractive primary sectors. As such, prevailing investment
flows in general reinforce Africa’s commodity dependency rather than con-
tribute to its structural transformation and sustainable development. This is
also reflected in evidence that suggests that the impact of FDI in the extractive
sector on the number of jobs created is on a downward trajectory, which is
mainly due to the capital-intensity of the investments (Keppel 2021).
12 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Source: Yu (2021).
Figure 1.19: Phases of the negotiations cycle within the context of trade
policy
4. Implementation 3. Negotiations
Inclusive participation
Incorporation of the opinions, input and feedback from citizens and
businesses into designing and implementing trade policies; inclusive
participation should be in place in all phases of the trade policy cycle
Accountability
Authorities being held responsible for their actions and omissions,
not only by those actors and institutions from which they received
their mandate (traditional view of accountability) but also from the
citizens in general (stakeholder view of accountability)
Efficiency
Effective and timely delivery of what is needed based on clear
objectives. Effectiveness also depends on implementing policies in a
proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the most
appropriate level
Appropriateness
From the conception of policy to its implementation, the choice of
instruments used must be in proportion to the objectives pursued.
Guidelines or toolkits could be better suited to certain issues, for
instance, than legal treaties
identifying red flags. To begin with, the trade policymaking process must be
open and transparent to allow stakeholders – such as businesses, civil soci-
ety organisations, researchers and other areas of government – to understand
the issues at stake and the decisions being made on their behalf. Inclusive-
ness ensures that, once they are aware of trade policy issues, the opinions of
stakeholders are integrated into each phase of trade policy, while accountabil-
ity anchors decisions made by authorities therein onto the interests of those
stakeholders. Trade policy, and particularly trade negotiations, are prone to
delays; efficiency demands promptness in achieving trade outcomes. Finally,
the appropriateness of instruments used to realise trade policy is important.
Badly chosen tools – such as a binding treaty when guidelines would have
suited – can result in poorly performing trade policy outcomes.
Finally, the analytical perspective deployed in the book also strives to pro-
vide a performative assessment of African trade policy. Here the focus moves
from the normative perspective of what should be the policy orientation to the
effectiveness in how policy is delivered. Figure 1.21 provides a demonstrative
array of stratagems that might be used in effectively delivering the negotiations
part of trade policy. When African trade policy is performing well, it shapes
and influences outcomes such as impactful decisions and treaties or, for that
matter, deflects away from unhelpful trivialities and distractions. Doing so skil-
fully, however, requires considerable negotiating resources and capacities that
are lacking in most least-developed and even developing countries. In prac-
tice, owing to their level of development and available resources, African coun-
tries can often find themselves on the back foot, fielding trade policy priorities
advanced by other partners rather than articulating and achieving their own.
Summary
Though trade can be a powerful economic tool, it underperforms in the African
continent in contributing to development. Africa’s share of world trade con-
tinues to be undersized, despite growing in recent years. It critically remains
concentrated in the primary sectors, and particularly fuels, and as such strug-
gles to contribute to structural transformation and sustainable development
in the continent. This scenario is mirrored by foreign direct investments into
Africa, which are similarly undersized and concentrated in the mining and
fuel industries. African trade flows must change, and it is trade policy that can
be the instrument of this change. This chapter concluded by introducing the
analytical perspective for trade policy analysis used throughout the rest of
the book to identify what is working, and what is not, in African trade policy.
By better understanding African trade policy, its interactions with the policies
of trading partners, and its successes and failures, we hope to lead to improve-
ments in it to better service African development.
Notes
1
FDI inflow data is available, and so presented, only from 1970 and
remittance data from 1980.
2
Foodstuffs is SITC 0 + 1 + 22 + 4, ores and metals is SITC 27 + 28 + 68 +
667 + 971, manufactures is SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68, and fuels is SITC 3.
3
Foodstuffs is SITC 0 + 1 + 22 + 4, ores and metals is SITC 27 + 28 + 68 +
667 + 971, manufactures is SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68, and fuels is SITC 3.
4
Foodstuffs is SITC 0 + 1 + 22 + 4, ores and metals is SITC 27 + 28 + 68 +
667 + 971, manufactures is SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68, and fuels is SITC 3.
5
As cited in Gerout (2022).
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Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment
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Governing Regional Integration for Development, London: Routledge.
Devereau, Charan; Lawrence, Robert; and Watkins, Michael (2006)
‘Negotiating Trade Agreements’, in Case Studies in US Trade Negotiations:
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2. The AfCFTA and regional trade
Jamie MacLeod, David Luke and Geoffroy Guepie
output’. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 2021) found that ‘approx-
imately two-thirds of the intra-African trade gains would be realized in the
manufacturing sector’ (Figure 2.4), while UNCTAD (2017) reported that
‘the largest employment growth rates are found in manufacturing industry’.
This is a significant finding in view of the demographic pressure for jobs.
Trade and investment flows 27
Source: ECA and the Centre for International Research and Economic Modelling (CIREM)
of the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Information Internationales (CEPII) calculations
based on MIRAGE CGE model, as cited in ECA (2021).2
World Bank
(real income) IMF (welfare)
Tariffs 0.22% 0.07%
Tariffs + NTBs 2.4% 2.6%
Tariffs + NTBs + trade facilitation 7%
The fourth part of the rationale for the AfCFTA speaks to its form. The
AfCFTA is a deep trade agreement, extending beyond merely tariff reductions
that might amount to a traditional free trade agreement. Instead, the AfCFTA
includes provisions on trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers, trade in services,
and behind-the-border regulatory issues such as competition policy, invest-
ment and intellectual property rights.
While the average tariff encountered on intra-African exports amounts to
about 6.1 per cent, the ad valorem equivalent for non-tariff barriers is much
larger, at an estimated 14.3 per cent (ECA, UNCTAD, AUC and AfDB 2019).
It is unsurprising, therefore, that most of the models that estimate the impact
of the AfCFTA attribute relatively more importance to trade facilitation and
addressing non-tariff barriers than to tariff reductions. The World Bank
(2020) expects the combined effect of a reduction in tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers to amount to more than 10 times the increase in real income that would
be expected by a reduction in tariffs alone. Approaching the question in a
different way methodologically, the IMF (2019) estimates the effect of reduc-
ing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to be 37 times the increase in welfare that
would result from a reduction in tariffs alone (Table 2.1). Not all aspects of
the AfCFTA can be easily or reliably modelled. Yet, as the modelled estimates
suggest, the agreement is about far more than a reduction in tariffs. While
28 HOW AFRICA TRADES
some of the issues that extend beyond tariffs may take longer to negotiate and
implement, dealing with them amounts to core parts of the AfCFTA offering.
The fifth and final part of the rationale for the AfCFTA is that it can be
a tool for cohering Africa trade policy. As the economic significance of the
African continent has grown, third parties have increasingly looked to for-
malise their economic engagements with African countries through trade and
other arrangements. Notable examples include the EU’s economic partnership
agreements, the United States’ bilateral negotiations with Kenya, and a free
trade agreement between Mauritius and China and Mauritius and India. To
use the language of the AU’s Agenda 2063, in pursuit of ‘the Africa we want’,
it is argued that Africa can achieve more if it will ‘speak with one voice and
act collectively to promote our common interests and positions in the inter-
national arena’. With a single voice, Africa has the economic heft and pooled
technical capacities to negotiate trade deals better than individual countries
alone can. An example can be drawn from the ASEAN group of 10 Southeast
Asian countries. As a group, it found itself more attractive to partners seeking
trade agreements, providing the impetus for negotiating various ASEAN+1
agreements (Mikic and Shang 2019). The consolidated economic size of a
country grouping in negotiations makes it more attractive to partners, giving
it clout with which to press for more preferential negotiated outcomes.
origin within a ‘built-in agenda’ by the next AU summit in July 2018. Con-
secutive AU summits granted six-month extensions to this deadline (or those
for the submission of tariff schedules of concessions that depended upon the
rules of origin) until May 2020, at which point the focus of the continent was
on Covid-19. The December 2020 summit, which announced the commence-
ment of trading under the AfCFTA, further reissued another six-month dead-
line for the finalisation of the rules of origin by May 2021, which was again
missed. In February 2022, the AfCFTA Council of Ministers granted another
deadline extension – the seventh in four years – until September 2022 for the
conclusion of the rules of origin.
Given the persistence of delays to finalise the remaining rules of origin,
efforts have been made to circumvent them. The December 2020 AU summit,
which intended to launch the start of trading under the AfCFTA, aimed to
do so based on only the ‘agreed rules of origin’ at the time, which amounted
to around 81 per cent of tariff lines. The February 2022 AU summit reiter-
ated that decision, endorsing the ‘Provisional Application of Rules of Origin’.
But this circumvention approach – to move ahead with implementation with
incomplete rules of origin – makes it difficult for countries to submit tariff
offers that comply fully with the modalities for tariff liberalisation that require
countries to liberalise 90 per cent of tariff lines. Negotiators are hesitant to
submit schedules for tariff lines for which they do not yet know the rules of
origin that will govern all the products covered by those offers.
It is mainly for this reason that only 29 countries, as of December 2022,
had been able to submit tariff offers that complied fully with the modalities
for tariff liberalisation. The relatively low number of tariff offers implied that
30 HOW AFRICA TRADES
many countries had been hesitant to commit fully in the absence of clarity
on what the rules of origin would entail for the remaining products. In turn,
the 29 countries that had submitted compliant tariff offers at that point were
hesitant to progress towards the implementation of those offers until they
were matched by the remaining countries. At least some of the countries
that were yet to ratify the AfCFTA Agreement were hesitant to do so until they
knew the concluded rules of origin. As policy attention remained on these tech-
nical components of the phase I negotiations, the focus shifted during 2022 to
the phase II negotiating issues. By the end of the year, protocols on intellectual
property rights, investment and competition policy were in the final stages
of completion.
Why have these rules of origin issues proven so problematic to conclude?
The breadth of pre-existing rules of origin governing intra-African trade
within different regional economic communities already varied consider-
ably prior to the commencement of the AfCFTA negotiations, indicating a
divergence in ‘starting positions’. In 2018, negotiators also opted to negotiate
product-specific rules of origin rather than general ones. Such specific rules
were always going to prove more ‘time consuming to negotiate, potentially
adding several years to the time taken to negotiate the [Af]CFTA]’ (ECA,
AUC and AfDB 2017). Negotiators also decided against the approach of using
‘temporary’ general rules of origin until more detailed product-specific rules
could be determined, as would have followed the approach used in the nego-
tiations for the Greater Arab Free Trade Area that involved several North
African countries that were also negotiating the AfCFTA. In theory, ‘hybrid’
transitional rules of origin were permitted in the language of the agreement
(Protocol on Trade in Goods, Annex II, Article 42I), though they were never
substantively operationalised in practice.
Negotiators knew of the complexity and time-consuming process required
to negotiate product-specific rules of origin. They would also have been aware
that such rules can be more protective and complex to implement. Many
would have decided that these costs were outweighed by the opportunity
for greater nuance in designing rules that would cover particularly sensitive
products. In many instances, we can identify exactly where these sensitivities
have been by where the rules of origin negotiations have dragged on longest.
Negotiations have persisted over specific rules of origin for a notably small
number of highly sensitive sectors, including textiles and apparel, automo-
biles, sugar and edible oils. Tariffs on these products tend to be higher (Gour-
don et al 2021), meaning that there is more that negotiators may be sensitive
about protecting. Even with product-specific rules of origin, the sensitivity of
these sectors has made compromise difficult. Negotiators, struggling to make
concessions in these areas, have instead erred towards brinkmanship – hold-
ing fast to entrenched positions. Yet the risk of this approach, as shown in
Figure 2.5, has been continual slippages in implementation, and the erosion
of the momentum behind the AfCFTA.
Unlocking regional leadership could offer a solution. In their regional
economic communities, economic powers such as Kenya and South Africa
Trade and investment flows 31
AfCFTA Secretariat
Operational instruments Implementation tools
initiatives
These include the AU Trade Observatory (ATO) and the Pan-African Pay-
ment Settlement System (PAPSS). A beta version of the ATO was made oper-
ational in December 2020, while the PAPSS was commercially launched in
January 2022.
This wider orbit of tools was expanded in the February 2022 AU sum-
mit with the ‘AfCFTA Implementation Tools’, which additionally include an
AfCFTA Adjustment Facility, AfCFTA Automotive Fund, Intra-African Trade
Fair, and Trade and Industrial Development Advisory Council. The AfCFTA
Adjustment Facility, designed and financed by the African Export–Import
Bank (Afreximbank), was launched in February 2022 to help countries to
implement the AfCFTA and adjust to trade under it. The AfCFTA Automo-
tive Fund, which was originally proposed to unlock concessions in the nego-
tiations for rules of origin for automobiles, involves an Afreximbank-spon-
sored $1 billion sector-specific fund. The Intra-African Trade Fair, in its third
iteration, has established a business trade show platform. The Trade and
Industrial Development Advisory Council provides technical advice to the
AfCFTA Secretariat.
The AfCFTA Secretariat itself also manages its own growing set of projects
and initiatives. These include an E-Tariff Book, showing verified tariffs for
products under the AfCFTA, an AfCFTA Business Forum, an AfCFTA Pri-
vate Sector Strategy, an AfCFTA Hub Platform, and efforts to support trade
specifically on the Lagos–Abidjan corridor. The most notable addition to
the AfCFTA Secretariat’s toolkit of initiatives was the Guided Trade Initia-
tive, announced by the AfCFTA Secretariat in July 2022. Covering Ghana,
Kenya, Cameroon, Tanzania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tunisia and Egypt, and
notably no Southern African countries, it seeks to provide hands-on support
34 HOW AFRICA TRADES
to businesses to get trade flowing under the AfCFTA. Its stated objectives
include ‘demonstrat[ing] that the AfCFTA is functioning’ and to ‘giv[ing]
hope to the continent that trading under the AfCFTA is achievable’ (AfCFTA
Secretariat 2022a). It amounts to a deliberate ‘solutions-based approach’ to
unblock the lack of trade under the AfCFTA through ‘matchmaking busi-
nesses and products for export and import between interested State Parties
in coordination with their national AfCFTA Implementation Committees’
(AfCFTA Secretariat 2022b).
The Guided Trade Initiative officially launched on 7 October 2022
(though the first consignments under it were shipped in the preceding weeks).
The first goods to be traded under the Guided Trade Initiative were coffee,
from Rwanda to Ghana, and batteries, from Kenya to Ghana (AfCFTA Sec-
retariat 2022b). The expressed intention of the AfCFTA Secretariat with the
Guided Trade Initiative has been to ‘prompt’ and provide a ‘gateway’ for offi-
cial trade under the AfCFTA using the formal AfCFTA trading documents,
such as certificates of origin and import–export declaration forms (AfCFTA
Secretariat 2022b). It also aims to be a learning device for ‘feedback on the
effectiveness of the legal and institutional national systems in the participat-
ing countries’, to ‘test the readiness of the private sector to participate in trade
under the AfCFTA’ and to ‘identify possible future interventions’ (AfCFTA
Secretariat 2022c).
Principally the initiative helps to show that (at least some heavily assisted)
trade can begin to flow in some form under the AfCFTA. In the words of the
AfCFTA Secretariat, ‘the Guided Trade Initiative has proven that AfCFTA is
truly operational’ (AfCFTA Secretariat 2022c). Yet the Guided Trade Initiative
is not the AfCFTA regime provided for in the AfCFTA Agreement (Tralac
2022). The AfCFTA cannot substantively operate at scale until the remaining
technical parts of the agreement are concluded (Tralac 2022).
The negotiations on the remaining technical aspects of the AfCFTA phase
I negotiations must be finished for substantial volumes of trade to flow under
the AfCFTA, and for it to contribute to transformative development. The
Guided Trade Initiative can benefit by providing a ‘demonstrative effect’ to
show that the AfCFTA can work that there is appetite for trade under it. It can
also help to take pressure away from negotiators and the AfCFTA Secretariat
in the slightly embarrassing situation in which heads of state had announced
the commencement of trade under the AfCFTA on 1 January 2021, only for
that trade not to flow. Care should be taken, however, that, by giving negotia-
tors space to breathe, the Guided Trade Initiative does not allow them to fur-
ther procrastinate. Care must also be taken to ensure that the Guided Trade
Initiative does not become the new reality for continent-wide trade in goods
in place of the more substantial actual AfCFTA regime (Tralac 2022).
Beyond these initiatives launched at AU summits, the AfCFTA continues
to be the centre of an expanding range of other complementary initiatives.
An African Collaborative Transit Guarantee Scheme was launched by Afrex-
imbank in March 2021 to help mitigate cross-border transport frictions. The
Trade and investment flows 35
and cement its own relationships. In March 2021, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) and the AfCFTA Secretariat signed a new
partnership to bring in UNDP expertise to support implementation of the
AfCFTA (UNDP 2021). The AfCFTA Secretariat has since signed additional
agreements with the UK on 16 September 2021, the China Ministry of Com-
merce on 25 October 2021, the African Regional Standards Organisation on
30 November 2021, the World Customs Organization on 22 February 2022,
and the International Trade Centre on 25 May 2022. This expansion of formal
partners with the AfCFTA Secretariat reflects growing trust in, and popularity
of, the AfCFTA among donors and the organisations they work through. It is
also demonstrative of a clear shift away from the AUC towards the AfCFTA
Secretariat as the central node in the expanding AfCFTA-related universe of
projects, initiatives and programmes.
The inherently sensitive nature of trade negotiations makes it difficult for
development partners to support the AfCFTA negotiations directly, other
than through arm’s length support provided via technical partners or the Sec-
retariat to the negotiations. Where donors can provide more direct and vis-
ible support is at the country level. The AfCFTA is ultimately an agreement
between states, each of which must contend with national-level implementa-
tion challenges alongside specific actions to take advantage of the agreement.
Nevertheless, and despite the recent growth of interested donors and partners,
the mandate of the AfCFTA Secretariat is large. Substantively more support
will be required to achieve all that the AfCFTA promises to offer. As is always
the case in issues that attract a breadth of supportive partners, coordination
among and between partners will become an increasingly important job for
the AfCFTA Secretariat to manage. Donors should take care to not make this
more difficult than needs be, including by acceding to the direction of the
AfCFTA Secretariat rather than by enforcing donor priorities that can unduly
distract scarce coordinating resources.
According to trade modelling, the AfCFTA offers opportunities to all
African countries – including those that are less developed or in more fragile
economic contexts (Songwe, MacLeod and Karingi 2021; World Bank 2020).
What those models cannot reflect, however, is that many of African’s lesser-de-
veloped countries will face bigger challenges in utilising these opportunities.
Africa’s development partners have a continuing role to play in supporting
the lesser-developed countries of the continent to design, and more crucially
implement, strategies to seize market opportunities created by the AfCFTA.
assessment of the RECs in relation to the framework for trade policy analysis
outlined in the previous chapter.
Customs
and General
monetary Customs Free economic
REC Legacy union union trade area cooperation
AMU X
CEMAC X X X
CEN-SAD X
COMESA X X
EAC X X
ECCAS X X
ECOWAS X X
IGAD X
SACU X X X X
SADC X X
WAEMU X X X
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Eleven RECs can be identified and categorised into monetary unions, cus-
toms unions, free trade areas, and general economic cooperation arrange-
ments (see Table 2.3). Two of the 11, ECCAS and SADC, are FTAs and
three, COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC, have evolved over time into customs
unions. Three, CEN-SAD, IGAD and UMA, are general economic coopera-
tion arrangements that incorporate trade integration among their objectives.
Some also serve as forums for coordinating political and diplomatic objec-
tives such as regional peace and security. In three cases, the monetary and
customs unions are coterminous. These are the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Economic and Monetary Union of Central
Africa (CEMAC) and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). WAEMU
and CEMAC are legacy arrangements and operate among the former French
colonies in West and Central Africa. SACU is also a legacy arrangement of
Apartheid South Africa’s regional sphere of influence. However, one of its
members, Botswana, does not participate in the monetary union.
Under a 2008 Protocol on the Relations between the African Union and
the Regional Economic Communities, eight of the 11 were officially rec-
ognised by the African Union as building blocks of economic integration.
These are AMU, COMESA, CEN-SAD, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and
SADC. (African Union 2008). A close reading of the protocol and its 2021
revision (African Union 2021) suggests that conferment of this recognition
was aimed at establishing a representative group of the RECs with which the
AU could engage on a range of policy matters. To be sure, the eight that were
Figure 2.7: Overlapping REC memberships and mandates
Libya
UMA COMESA
ECOWAS Algeria Egypt IGAD
Somalia
Mauritania Djibouti
Morocco Eritrea
Tunisia Ethiopia
Eswatini SACU
Sudan Namibia
South Africa
S.Sudan Malawi
Cabo Verde Kenya Botswana
Zimbabwe Lesotho
Uganda
Gambia Zambia
Ghana Tanzania Mauritius
Rwanda
Benin DRC Madagascar
Guinea
Seychelles
Nigeria Burkina
Comoros
C te d’Ivoire Burundi
Liberia
Guinea-Bissau
Sierra Leone
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
CAR Angola
Senegal SADC
Chad
Togo
Gabon Tanzania
Equatorial-Guinea
Cameroon
Rwanda
Congo
WAEMU EAC
ECCAS
CEN-SAD CEMAC
41
Trade and investment flows 41
r ecognised are representative of the regions. But they still exhibit a ‘spaghetti
bowl’ (Bhagwati 1995) or perhaps ‘rice bowl’ effect, with overlapping REC
memberships and mandates, as shown in Figure 2.7.
minus the total financing available from all sources) in the range of $68–$108
billion. The shortfall extends across energy, transportation, and water and
sanitation infrastructure (Economic Commission for Africa 2021). Despite
that, the plans provide insights into the RECs’ prioritisation of the challenges
they face. The EAC’s Vision 2050, for example, identifies:
As shown in Table 2.4, the SADC, ECOWAS and EAC vision documents have
almost identical architectures with prominent pillars on interconnectivity and
infrastructure, sustainable development and industrialisation.
On some projects and sectors, progress is being achieved. The Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA), for example, reports that the roads in the
Trans-African Highway – a network with nine highways amounting to 56,683
kilometres connecting all regions of the continent – are about 60 per cent
complete, and the remaining 40 per cent comprises missing links. Africa’s
transport corridors are mainly road-based, although recent years have seen an
increase in the rehabilitation and development of railways. The ECA estimates
WAEMU and ECOWAS in West Africa are examples where the former’s
common external tariff has been aligned with that of the latter to ensure the
coherence of the ECOWAS customs union. However, Burundi and Rwanda in
EAC and ECCAS, which are respectively a customs union and an FTA (with
negotiations for a common external tariff at an advanced stage in ECCAS,
which will make it a customs union), are examples of the challenges to
the coherence of customs unions arising out of overlapping memberships. The
FTAs and customs unions are also littered with carve-outs for sensitive prod-
ucts that challenge the expected norms. As will be discussed in Chapters 3
and 4, bilateral partners are sometimes complicit in compounding the pol-
icy and regulatory difficulties faced by the RECs by pursuing trade deals that
result in picking regional arrangements apart.
However, while the legacy RECs, FTAs and customs unions have reached an
advanced stage in trade policy cooperation, CEN-SAD, IGAD and UMA can
be located at the design stage. With political momentum behind the AfCFTA,
46 HOW AFRICA TRADES
it is not clear what added value CEN-SAD can offer its member states since the
original vision was to create a preferential trade area encompassing countries
north and south of the Sahara.9 IGAD has veered towards a broad economic
cooperation agenda. UMA remains stunted by a long-running diplomatic
stand-off between Algeria and Morocco over the status of the Western Sahara.
Summary
Intra-African trade and integration are long held objectives of policy leaders
on the African continent. Though the inaugural summit of the Organisation of
African Unity in 1963 spoke about ‘the possibility of establishing a free trade
area’ (OAU 1963), the AfCFTA, which was established 55 years later, marks
the greatest practical effort towards this goal. The AfCFTA is a flagship project
of the AU Agenda 2063, to boost intra-African trade and through doing so
diversify African economies, while contributing to their long-overdue indus-
trialisation. It amounts to the crystallisation of decades of policy deliberation
into an actionable and legally enforceable instrument.
As we have seen, the RECs have a practical function in enabling trade inte-
gration and connecting a continent that is as vast in size as Africa. They are
massively under-resourced, but they help to find and apply common solutions
to mutual supply constraints. In the preamble to the AfCFTA Treaty, and again
in Article 5 of the AfCFTA Framework Agreement, the eight AU-recognised
RECs are designated as the AfCFTA’s ‘building blocks’, meaning that their
best practices and achievements are to be followed and incorporated into
AfCFTA implementation. Article 12 confers an advisory role on them
in AfCFTA deliberations. This complements the role accorded to the RECs as
partners in the implementation of AU programmes.
However, the ignition of the AfCFTA project is stutter-starting. Several
‘launch’ attempts and an increasing breadth of complementary projects,
tools and initiatives within the growing AfCFTA ecosystem conceal the fact
that trade is yet to substantively flow under the arrangement. The Guided
Trade Initiative is to be welcomed as a gateway for formal trade under the
AfCFTA but is not a substitute. The real risk of this is to the remarkable polit-
ical momentum behind the AfCFTA, which, having weathered the Covid-19
storm, remains strong.
Notes
1
Primary commodities is SITC 2 + 3 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971, food items is SITC
0 + 1 + 22 + 4 and manufactured goods is SITC 5 to 8, less 667 and 68.
2
The choice to present the results in 2045 is justified by the fact that the
AfCFTA reform is implemented over time between 2021 and 2035 but
also to give enough time for all the variables to adjust following full
implementation of the AfCFTA reforms in the model.
Trade and investment flows 47
3
The distinction between ‘operational instruments’ and ‘implementation
tools’ is not always clear. The African Union Assembly Decision Assembly/
AU/Dec. 831(XXXV) of 6 February 2022 identifies four ‘Implementation
Tools’: (1) the AfCFTA Adjustment Fund, (2) the Pan-African Payments
and Settlement System, (3) the AfCFTA Automotive Fund and (4) the
Inter-African Trade Fair. The African Union Assembly Decision Assembly/
AU/4(XXXIII) of 10 February 2020 identifies five ‘operational tools’: (1)
rules of origin, (2) the AU Trade Observatory, (3) the Trade in Goods Pass-
word Protected Dashboard, (4) the Pan-African Payments and Settlements
System and (5) the NTB Monitoring, Reporting and Elimination Mecha-
nism. The AU-AfCFTA website lists four ‘operational Instruments’: (1) the
Pan-African Payments and Settlement System, (2) non-tariff barriers tools,
(3) the AfCFTA Adjustment Fund and (4) the Automotive Fund.
4
Trade = imports + exports.
5
See https://www.integrate-africa.org for more details.
6
The composite infrastructure index is an African Development Bank
Index, which is a composite index of nine indicators grouped within four
pillars (transport, electricity, ICT, water and sanitation).
7
See www.trademarkafrica.com
8
Calculation based on WTO-OECD Balanced Trade in Services Dataset
(BaTiS) – BPM6.
9
This point also applies to the Tripartite Free Trade Area initiative
between COMESA, ECA and SADC.
References
Abrego, Lisandro; Amado, Maria Alejandra; Gursoy, Tunc; Nicholls, Garth;
and Perez-Saiz, Hector (2019) ‘The African Continental Free Trade
Agreement: Welfare Gain Estimates from a General Equilibrium Model’,
IMF, Working Paper WP/19/124. https://perma.cc/2QF8-XGY6
AfCFTA Secretariat (2022a) ‘The AfCFTA Initiative on Guided Trade’, Press
Release https://perma.cc/4384-NU3C
AfCFTA Secretariat (2022b) ‘What Is the AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative
All About?’, Press Release. https://perma.cc/N4F8-4K8T
AfCFTA Secretariat (2022c) ‘Towards the Commencement of Commer-
cially Meaningful Trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA)’, Information Note.
AfDB (African Development Bank) (2011) ‘Africa in 50 Years’ Time: The
Road towards Inclusive Growth’, African Development Bank Group,
Tunisia. https://perma.cc/F5MH-CMRX
48 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Pan-Euro Mediterranean Convention (PEM) Everything but Arms (EBA) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
Generalised Scheme of Preferences plus (GSP)+ Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
The EPAs are reciprocal but include asymmetrical aspects that accord
a small degree of special differential treatment to participating African
countries.
• Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)-Plus: a scheme valid until
2023 applicable to the Cabo Verde islands on Africa’s north-west coast,
which, as a recently graduated LDC, is not eligible for EBA. The market
access arrangements are like EBA but require the beneficiary country
to implement international human rights, labour and environmental
conventions.
• GSP: applicable to the Republic of Congo, Kenya and Nigeria and pro-
vides for full or partial removal of customs duties on two-thirds of
tariff lines on products within the EU market.
• Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: country-specific and
applying to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Like the EPAs, they
are reciprocal, semi-asymmetrical free trade area agreements.
• Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) (WTO terms): applying to Libya and
Gabon.
The rules of origin underpinning market access for trade in goods are mod-
erate but differing under the preferential arrangements. For instance, the EU
grants more liberal rules of origin in the textile and apparel sector to countries
that are trading under interim or regional EPAs. Most EU agreements do not
grant ‘cumulation’, in which the value from inputs of other African countries
54 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Where does this leave the African Continental Free Trade Area
and the continent-to-continent approach and where does it
leave the local and regional attempts to strengthen intra-African
56 HOW AFRICA TRADES
The other priorities identified in the Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade
Policy communication complete the EU’s ‘positive agenda’ for engaging with
its trading partners. These are WTO reform, updated rules for the digital
economy including digital delivery of trade in services, and maintaining lead-
ership in global regulatory cooperation.
The PCA has four main parts: an umbrella agreement with general objec-
tives and principles and three region-specific protocols for each of the three
regional parties: Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The umbrella agree-
ment addresses trade in broad and hortatory terms in relation to the posi-
tive benefits of trade and sustainability, trade in services, trade facilitation,
business environment, investment, and private sector development. It calls
for a ‘high level of environmental, social and labour protection’ in their trade
relations and developing low-carbon productive capacities. It reaffirms the
desire of the parties to ‘build on their existing preferential trade arrangements
and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as instruments of their trade
cooperation’ and ‘broadening the scope of EPAs and encouraging the acces-
sion of new Member States’.
The Africa Protocol commits the parties to ‘support … the implementation
of the African Continental Free Trade Area’ while also claiming that:
Under the same article, the parties agreed to support financial sector reforms
through measures that promote the improvement of access to finance and
financial services, especially for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
(MSMEs), the development and interconnectivity of financial markets, and
the integration of capital markets to ensure the efficient allocation of savings
58 HOW AFRICA TRADES
to productive investment and the private sector. They agreed to foster com-
petition between financial service providers, to develop viable banking and
non-banking financial sectors and to strengthen mobile and digital financial
services in view of increasing access to finance, especially for MSMEs. The
agreement recognises African industrial development aspirations, noting in
Article 14 that:
The reforms that are proposed are in line with Africa’s industrial development
aspirations and can help to drive diversification and ramp up exports. But
the agreement contains no specific commitments on investment flows, which
is perhaps the most critical factor for driving economic transformation. The
Global Gateway Initiative provides for a financial envelope to support the
agenda outlined in the PCA and its Africa Protocol. But this, too, is vague on
actual commitments.
The Global Gateway will bring together the EU, Member States with
their financial and development institutions, including the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) and seek to mobilise the pri-
vate sector in order to leverage investments for a transformational
impact. The EU Delegations around the world, working with Team
Europe on the ground, will play a key role to identify and coordi-
nate Global Gateway projects in partner countries.
Half of the amount pledged for the Global Gateway (€150 billion) is ear-
marked for Africa, according to announcements made at an EU–AU summit
in February 2022 (see Box 3.1). It is noteworthy that trade was conspicuously
absent from the seven clusters of the summit agenda. How the Global Gate-
way funds will be accessed and disbursed remains unclear and the impact that
the initiative will make on the ground remains to be seen.
60 HOW AFRICA TRADES
However, what has become clear is that the renewal of the Atlantic Alliance
under the Biden administration includes an allied effort to counter China’s
dominant role in infrastructure investment and delivery in the developing
world. Hence,
sustainable value chains, industrial development, and soft and hard infra-
structure. These commitments in the Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade
Policy, in the Africa Protocol of the PCA, and in the Global Gateway are sta-
ples in the diet of African aspirations, as can be found in manifestoes such as
Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (AU Commission 2015). What is missing
from EU policy are the trade arrangements that are essential to deliver the
desired outcomes.
In the multiple trade regimes that are in place, the EU and (most) African
countries have established a structured framework for their trade relations.
However, the EU trade arrangements are neither efficient nor appropriate
from a development perspective. The effect of the EU’s varying trade regimes
is a fragmentation of African markets, with gaps in coverage and hard borders
for EU trade between African countries within the same customs union. This
is the case, for example, in the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), which has achieved the status of a customs union, with its 15
member states implementing a common external trade regime. Côte d’Ivoire
and Ghana concluded separate interim EPAs with the EU, thereby undermin-
ing ECOWAS’s, and indirectly the continent’s, integration programme.
Similarly in the case of the South African Development Community
(SADC), the EPA group within this REC contains only seven of the 16 SADC
member states that are implementing an EPA. The different rules of origin
that apply to the different trade regimes do not help to foster integrated supply
chains between countries. On top of this, the EU has begun to move forward
into deepening its reciprocal trade regimes with the North African and EPA
countries to encompass services, intellectual property rights and government
procurement. The risk is that, if care is not taken, this will deepen divisions
between trade regimes among African countries, making African trade policy
harmonisation even more difficult (Luke, Mevel and Desta 2020; Luke, Mevel
and Desta 2021; Luke and Suominen 2019).
This matters because, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, intra-African trade,
although accounting for only a small share of Africa’s total trade, is more
diversified and with higher value-added content than Africa’s exports to the
EU and other trading partners outside the continent. It follows that, as a mat-
ter of sequencing, the harmonisation of trade rules between African countries
must first be achieved to underpin intra-African trade with predictability and
certainty and to incentivise trade growth and smoother trade flows. This is
indeed the rationale of the AfCFTA, which aims to create a preferential trade
area throughout the African continent.
The Africa Protocol of the PCA makes the claim that the EU’s trade
arrangements with African countries are ‘complementary and mutually sup-
portive’ and contribute to the ‘deepening of the regional and continental
integration process as part of the AU’s trade and structural transformation
agenda’. The empirical evidence does not support this. Analysis by the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (ECA) based on economic modelling for trade
in goods found that implementation of the EU reciprocal agreements ahead
of the AfCFTA would result in losses in trade – or trade diversion – between
62 HOW AFRICA TRADES
frican countries. On the other hand, if the AfCFTA were fully implemented
A
before the reciprocal agreements, this negative impact would be mitigated.
Trade gains by both African countries and the EU would be preserved while
intra-African trade would expand, significantly benefitting trade in industrial
goods. This points to the need for a strategic sequencing of trade policy, pri-
oritising the AfCFTA first (Mevel et al. 2015).
The 2021 ECA modelling results, which took liberalisation of trade in goods
and services along with reduction of non-tariff measures into account, fur-
ther affirms the need for correct sequencing. This study found that the share
of intra-African trade would nearly double following the AfCFTA reforms.
Most of the gains will accrue to the industrial and agri-food sectors as well
as services, which are critical for Africa’s transformation (UNECA 2021). As
such, AfCFTA implementation should be prioritised over reciprocal trade
deals with third parties. In time, this approach will ensure substantial benefits
for both Africa and its advanced country partners. The challenge for Africa
is to find an alternative pathway that better aligns incentives and sequences
trade openings with the EU and other advanced partners. Two considerations
should illuminate any such pathway.
First, as shown in Chapter 1, the EU’s trade relationship with Africa is
highly asymmetrical. The EU accounts for a much larger share of Africa’s
exports than Africa represents in the EU’s exports, but Africa’s exports to
the EU are overly concentrated in fuels and metals. For a transitional period
benchmarked against milestones in AfCFTA implementation and the gains
emerging from it, a good development case can be made for unilateral market
access that is duty-free and quota-free to all African countries, with cumu-
lative rules of origin regime. This will require multilateral legitimisation
through a new WTO waiver. One element in overcoming the current paraly-
sis at the WTO, which is discussed in Chapter 5, must be recognition that its
‘one size fits all’ rules require reimagination to meet the 21st-century realities
and challenges facing late developers, such as African countries. Given the
weight of the combined number of EU and African members of the WTO,
and the precedent established by the US’s African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA), which provides sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free
access to the US market (discussed in Chapter 4), securing a waiver should
not be an insurmountable feat. In AGOA, the United States, in contrast to the
EU, applies a uniform preferential trade regime for all sub-Saharan countries
that meet the eligibility criteria. However, the US approach also maintains
different trade arrangements with North African countries.
Concessions to Africa, as the world’s least-developed continent, that allow
non-reciprocal access to the EU and other advanced country markets for a
fixed transitional period are strongly pro-development. They incentivise
African countries to seek trade opportunities with each other and mitigate
the risks of trade diversion. By ensuring the right sequencing for the AfCFTA,
this will also help Africa to build productive capacities and achieve its
potential for strong and diverse growth in intra-African trade with inclusive
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 63
Members believe that the EU needs a whole new basis for its eco-
nomic partnership with Africa, based on a level playing field, equal-
ity, mutual respect and understanding. This is a unique opportunity
to re-launch trade relations between the two continents, to engage
in a renewed, mutually beneficial and sustainable partnership based
on solidarity and cooperation, and to reshape economic and trade
relations with a view to empowering Africa. (European Parliament
2022)
is in place for facilitating trade and investment flows between China and
African countries. This is not withstanding the rapid trade growth that has
seen China rise to become Africa’s second most important trade partner after
the EU, as shown in Chapter 1.
On the African side, trade policy interest has centred mainly in trade pro-
motion and access to technology for boosting productive capacities. This
includes clarification of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations, the
setting up of ‘green lanes’ to fast-track agricultural exports to China, and
emerging e-commerce initiatives, along with securing access to China’s tech-
nological know-how in sectors such as transport, energy and telecommuni-
cations. On China’s side, its trade interests follow the well-established pattern
of engagement through an overwhelming concentration on natural resource
imports from Africa (see Chapter 1) and export of manufactures. But Chinese
financing and response to demand for infrastructure development support,
along with investment in manufacturing, have been a prominent part of the
relationship, which other partners are almost enviously trying to emulate.
As a ‘late developer’ itself, there is understandable appreciation in China of
the contribution that good infrastructure and affordable energy can make to
competitiveness and industrial development. Forty-three African countries
signed up to China’s flagship trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China–Africa trade relations is the focus of this section, with issues such as
finance and manufacturing only touched upon as part of framing the high-
lights of the trade relationship. It is a relationship that has evolved from what
may be described as ‘speed dating’ to a ‘steady courtship’. This is the result
of both China’s reassessment of its global economic strategy and African
countries’ awakening to the geopolitical stakes at play in their relationship
with China.
China trades more with countries in Asia ($3.06 trillion) than anywhere
else in the world. Asia accounts for more than half of China’s total trade.
Africa’s share of China’s $6 trillion global trade in 2021 was only 4 per
cent, according to China Customs Administration data (Olander 2022; see
Figure 3.2). China satisfies its appetite for commodities through imports
from across the world – not just Africa. Except for a handful of select com-
modities with strategic importance for the digital and green economy, such
as cobalt and manganese, that are in high demand for Chinese manufactur-
ing, it does not rely on Africa’s natural resources as a single supply source for
its industry. However, nearly all of China’s imports of cobalt and manganese
are from Africa.
While commodity trade remains dominant, a subset of China’s trade rela-
tions with Africa is Chinese investment in manufacturing in several coun-
tries mainly driven by relatively lower labour costs (Calabrese, Huang and
Nadin 2021; Oya 2021). Some investments in the manufacturing sector have
been criticised for their trade diversion, value capture and opportunistic use
of preferential agreements such as AGOA and EBAs, as opposed to contrib-
uting to industrial upgrading and domestic value addition for African firms
and enterprises (Calabrese and Tang 2020). But the picture is more complex:
not all Chinese ‘geese’ are seeking new locations in Africa for production as
part of global networks and value chains. Some firms in the flock are local
market-seeking geese producing specifically for the regional market and
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 67
African countries are generally in the initial trade policy design stage, with a
focus on clarifying basic regulatory issues such as SPS, ‘green lane’ schemes
to speed up inspection and quarantine processes for African produce,
e-commerce transactions and the establishment and operation of SEZs (see
Table 3.2).
As previously noted, only the most basic framework is in place for trade
engagement between Africa and China. These are, first, the obligatory WTO
most favoured nation (MFN) privileges that cover both China and African
countries that are WTO members. Second are the concessional arrangements
for the least-developed countries through the duty-free, quota-free (DFQF)
initiative for these countries. Third is a free trade area agreement signed in
2021 between China and Mauritius. Since it considers itself a developing
country, China does not offer a GSP preferential trade scheme to the African
countries that are not classified by the UN as least developed. Indeed, until
2014, China itself was a beneficiary of the GSP schemes offered by s everal
OECD countries. Today, New Zealand, Australia and Norway still grant
China GSP status (Huld 2021).
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 69
China’s SPS rules have been a thorny issue in its trade relationship with
Africa. Although Chinese SPS requirements are implemented in line with
WTO approved SPS protocols, many African exporters lack the capacity to
meet additional measures required by Chinese importers and formalised in
Chinese customs processes (Anam 2021; see Box 3.3). This has proved to be
such an irritation on the African side that President Xi was forced to address
it at the 2021 FOFAC. Some African countries have SPS arrangements with
China to export fresh agricultural products. Since 1998, 11 African countries
have signed such agreements (Development Reimagined 2021a).
The Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) scheme for 33 African LDCs1 with
diplomatic relations with China was established in 2010 (UNCTAD 2012).
It covers up to 97 per cent of tariff lines with rules of origin that require
regional value cumulation of no less than 40 per cent (UNCTAD 2016). Since
China has no preferential scheme for non-LDCs, meeting the RVC require-
ment presents a challenge for supply chains that connect African LDCs
and non-LDCs. Another issue is that the same product from an African
LDC and non-LDC may face different tariffs. For example, there is a 10 per
cent duty on floriculture, horticulture and other agricultural produce from
Kenya, making them more expensive and less competitive than the same
products exported by neighbouring Ethiopia, which qualifies for duty-free
status (Olander 2021).
For developing African countries, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and South
Africa, which do not qualify for the DFQF scheme and do not have an FTA
with China as Mauritius does, there are no trade concessions. What China has
offered to them is improvements to its importing process through ‘green lanes’,
but not preferential treatment. This is in sharp contrast to the p referential
schemes offered to African countries by the US, the EU, the UK, Canada and
other OECD countries, which tend to include at least some offerings for both
developing and least-developed African countries. On the other hand, not
only do Asian LDCs benefit from China’s DFQF scheme but almost all Asian
non-LDCs have preferential access to the Chinese market.
In 2021, Mauritius signed an FTA with China. It is a reciprocal agreement
that will cover 96 per cent of traded items when fully phased in. However,
Mauritius already maintains a highly liberalised trade regime, with zero
tariffs on almost all products (Ancharaz and Nathoo 2022). The agreement
includes provisions to promote the development of a renminbi clearing
and settlement facility in Mauritius, expand Mauritius’s high-tech indus-
tries and financial services, and protect its fisheries. Crucially, it positions
Mauritius as a future ‘offshore’ location for Chinese investments and firms
interested in the African continent. Rules of origin exclude products that
contain non-originating Mauritian materials that exceed 10 per cent. This is
more restrictive than what is offered by the US under AGOA and its accom-
modative third-country fabric provision, which is of significant benefit
to Mauritius’s clothing and textile industry (Development Reimagined
2021a). Mauritius’s liberalised trade regime is unlike most African countries.
Others typically protect large sectors of their economy and demand long
transition periods for trade liberalisation in agreements with partners, such
as is the case with the EU and UK economic partnership agreements. The
Mauritius example of an FTA with China is therefore not likely to be widely
followed by other African countries.
Africa is improving, with significant spillovers for boosting trade (Fu and
Eguegu 2021). Similarly, China’s foray into manufacturing and the intro-
duction of special economic zones (SEZs) in Africa exposed the diversity of
‘geese’ in its flock but also validated the central role of industrial development
in economic transformation. Over 20 China-supported SEZs that provide
infrastructure and logistical support for manufacturing are in operation or
planned in almost as many African countries. Production in these SEZs is also
aimed at the continent-wide market that is being created under the AfCFTA.
The ubiquitous spread of China’s digital hard- and software is unlocking new
opportunities for e-commerce across sectors.
However, China’s trade offer to Africa falls below expectations. While
there is increasing uptake by African LDCs of China’s DFQF market access,
China is alone among the leading economies in not offering a generalised
system of preferences or a comparable programme such as the US’s AGOA
(US–Africa trade is discussed and assessed in Chapter 4). This is an anom-
aly that needs to be fixed. It also highlights the need for coordination and
prioritisation among African countries in dealing with China. To date, no
African country has published a China strategy. There is more coherence
in the Chinese approach towards African countries than there is within the
African Union on China (Anam and Ryder 2021; Lisk 2017; Soulé 2021).
Though there has been an African Union Office in China since 2018, and
a long-standing and active African Ambassadors Group in Beijing, with 51
representatives out of 55 AU members, there remains little evidence of stra-
tegic coordination.
As China’s relationship with Africa settles into a mature courtship, along
with the withdrawal of the former’s ‘going out’ policy and rebalancing of its
priorities and interests, there is scope for African countries to ramp up their
collaboration as China’s preferred modality appears to be bilateral engage-
ment with individual African countries (Mboya 2021). An AGOA-style pref-
erential programme should be a key priority. This matters in the face of the
competition Africa faces in the Chinese market from Asian countries that
have better market access arrangements with China. The ambition announced
at the 2021 FOFAC by President Xi to triple African non-oil exports to China
within three years by 2024 provides a basis for coordinated initiatives on the
African side to establish modalities for achieving this target. If achieved,
the target will provide a major boost not only for Africa’s exports to China
but also for intra-African supply and value chains. The potential spillover for
intra-African trade will require China to put a preferential scheme in place
for Africa’s non-LDCs to complement the DFQF scheme for African LDCs.
As a collective forum that meets periodically, FOCAC does not itself provide
an institutional framework for follow up and monitoring its outcomes. How-
ever, a coordinated approach on the African side to overcome the bottlenecks
for exporting successfully to China is more likely to achieve the benefits of
increased trade with China.
72 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Summary
In reviewing and assessing Africa–EU and Africa–China trade arrange-
ments, we can conclude that the trade offers of these partners fall short of
Africa’s development needs. If the EU has been zealous in devising multiple
trade regimes for Africa, China on the other hand offers only a basic pol-
icy framework for guiding its trade with Africa. The harmonisation of trade
rules between African countries is the rationale of the AfCFTA. This incen-
tivises African countries to seek trade opportunities with each other across
the continent and derive benefits from economies of scale. By ensuring the
right sequencing for the AfCFTA to be implemented before Africa enters
reciprocal trade deals, the risk of trade diversion is mitigated. Empirical evi-
dence from economic modelling suggests that trade gains with advanced
partners such as the EU and China would be preserved, while intra-African
trade would expand significantly benefitting trade in industrial goods. This
will help Africa to achieve its potential for strong and diversified growth in
intra-African trade. With all but one AU member state to date, signatories
to the AfCFTA, a trade offer to all AfCFTA parties by the EU and China that
is modelled after the positive elements of the US’s AGOA, such as non-rec-
iprocity and uniformity, will overcome the divisions associated with the EU
trade arrangements and enable China to extend preferential market access
to African countries that are not LDCs. As was the case with AGOA, WTO
backing can be sought for such an offer from the EU and China as a conces-
sion to the world’s least-developed continent.
Note
1
The countries currently covered by the scheme in Africa are the 33 LDCs
in Africa – namely: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 73
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Anam, Patrick (2021) ‘ATPR Key Informant Interview’.
Anam, Patrick and Ryder, Hannah (2021) ‘Reimagining FOCAC Going
Forwards’, Development Reimagined. https://perma.cc/2LEY-23E9
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of Chinese ‘Geese’ Are Flying to Africa? Evidence from Chinese Manu-
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74 HOW AFRICA TRADES
This book’s metaphorical zoom lens scans out in this chapter to focus on the
US, the UK and other selected trading partners. These are all significant but
not dominating partners within Africa’s trade, with each accounting for up to
5 per cent of Africa’s trade. They are, however, countries with substantial and
evolving trade policies with Africa. The US’s importance to Africa’s trade goes
far beyond the modest level of trade flows. Not only does US trade policy shape
its bilateral trade and investment relationship with African countries, it also
influences the global trade policy environment in which African countries
operate. The centrepiece of US–Africa trade policy is America’s 2001 African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). For all its shortcomings, it provides
a model that could be emulated by other partners to allow the sequencing of
trade reforms and building of productive sector capacities (including through
implementation of the AfCFTA and other trade reforms) before Africa enters
reciprocal trade deals.
For the UK, Brexit, or its withdrawal from the European Union on 31 Janu-
ary 2020, is the pivotal event that is driving its trade with Africa. While inside
the EU, the UK was bound by the former’s trade policy, the main pillars of
which were discussed in Chapter 3. With Brexit, the UK can design its own
trade policies and strategies. Disappointingly, the UK mainly replicated these
agreements to which it had been a party in the EU to ensure continuity in its
trading arrangements. Besides Africa’s trade relations with the EU, China, the
US and the UK, it is also worth highlighting some notable features in other
bilateral trade relationships. India, Turkey, Japan, Russia and Brazil are con-
sidered in brief notes in this chapter.
of state under Biden, explicitly clarified that ‘[US] Africa policy is about
Africa, not about China’, but nevertheless retained oblique references to debt
repayment and investment malpractices targeted at China (Hudson 2021).
China was restated (alongside Russia) as representing strategic interests of
‘contrast’ in the continent in the 2022 US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Posi-
tion Data (2022).
were granted more lenient rules of origin (known as the third-country fabric
provision). These rules allowed qualifying countries to benefit from AGOA
preferences on clothes made from imported fabrics (single-transformation
rules of origin). In practice, this allowed them to import fabrics from the
most competitive fabric producers, such as China, so that they could in turn
be more competitive in downstream manufactures of clothing and apparel
products. In most other US preferential arrangements, such as the US–Mex-
ico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the US requires countries to comply
with the considerably more onerous requirement of using locally sourced
fabric or even yarn (double-transformation or triple-transformation rules of
origin). As Figure 4.5 indicates, the African countries that benefitted from
the third-country fabric provision were able to better weather the expiry of the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005, which increased competi-
tion in the sector by removing long-existing import quotas that had restrained
imports from more competitive suppliers. The African countries that did not
benefit from the third-country fabric provision conversely saw their textile
and apparel exports to the US virtually disappear after 2005. Critics of the
third-country fabric provision have, however, argued that it has nevertheless
been insufficient to substantively transform textile and apparel production in
these countries, with beneficiary countries remaining only in the downstream
part of the value chain (Condon and Stern 2011). Nevertheless, the experience
of African exporters under AGOA demonstrates the critical importance of
technical parts of the regime, and particularly rules of origin, for its success.
The challenges confronting AGOA have been well evaluated. Understand-
ing these helps to consider not just redesigns of the AGOA initiative but also
comparable initiatives by other countries. These challenges with AGOA can
be divided into four categories: issues with the AGOA regime itself, with US
trade market requirements more broadly, and with the policy environment in
African countries, and limitations in eligibility.
Beyond AGOA
With AGOA set to expire in 2025, the United States has since the Obama
administration considered the possibility of replacing the regime with recip-
rocal free trade agreements with interested African countries. The special
interest is a perceived competitive scramble with China, which overtook the
US as a supplier of Africa’s imports in 2004, and the EU, which has recip-
rocal trade agreements of varying forms in place with 20 African countries
(Pecquet 2021). Several African ministers of trade have pushed for a solution
before AGOA expires. Alan Ganoo, Mauritian minister for foreign affairs,
regional integration and international trade, remarked at the 2021 annual
AGOA ministerial conference that ‘both sides need to work together on a
mutually acceptable solution before AGOA expires’ (Pecquet 2021). The US
thinking on post-2025 trade policy with African countries was first publicly
outlined in the USTR’s ‘Beyond AGOA’ report of 2016 and has persisted since
then to guide the next steps in this policy area through the Trump administra-
tion. The report identified four main options (USTR 2016):
amounting to Kenya’s third most important export market after Uganda and
Pakistan (Ogutu 2020). In recent years, Kenyan exports that have utilised the
AGOA preferences have amounted to $500 million annually, predominantly
in the apparel and accessories sector (AGOA.info 2020).
Kenya also sought, in its published negotiating objectives, to address
non-tariff challenges in accessing the US market, targeting a coopera-
tion agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical barriers
to trade and trade facilitation. Beyond this, Kenya expressed in its specific
88 HOW AFRICA TRADES
US for the UN General Assembly (Pecquet 2021). Efforts should now focus
on ensuring that a renewed AGOA is even more effective than its previous
iterations. Here the US seems to be receptive, with US Trade Representative
Katherine Tai saying that ‘[AGOA] is no longer enough to boost [African
countries’] development and a focus on improving investment is needed’ and
that AGOA needs an ‘honest assessment’ to ‘increase utilisation rates’, sug-
gesting openness to its redesign in some form.
There are three categories of ways in which a better AGOA could be
achieved. The first is through addressing problems with the programme itself,
such as eliminating gaps in the product coverage of the AGOA programme
and expanding the country coverage of AGOA to include North African
countries. The latter may be possible if African countries can build a convinc-
ing case and link to the August 2022 US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,
which calls for the US to ‘address the artificial bureaucratic division between
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa’. The second way to improve AGOA is
with complementary measures, recognising that, for many of Africa’s poorest
countries, market access provisions in themselves are insufficient to motivate
change. These complementary measures include the abovementioned pro-
grammes like Prosper Africa and Power Africa and support for the design and
implementation of African countries’ national AGOA utilisation strategies,
as well as using trade and investment fairs and the US ‘deal teams’ within US
embassies to boost practical trade and investment opportunities, alongside
trade and investment facilitation services and trade capacity-building ini-
tiatives (Erasmus 2020). The final way in which AGOA could be improved
is through linking it explicitly to Africa’s regional integration initiatives
and the AfCFTA, which is viewed favourably by the Biden administration.
That would provide an opening for articulating a continental approach on
trade that could link a beyond-AGOA deal to the AfCFTA (May and Mold
2021). That might also allow African countries more clout and influence in
shaping the discussion than they could manage individually with such a large
partner. Practical first steps would involve introducing supportive elements
into AGOA, such as a cumulative rule of origin to encourage regional value
chains across the continent.
Summary
AGOA is a generous offer, with positive elements such as non-reciprocity
and uniform coverage among the eligible African countries. However, AGOA
is limited to the countries south of the Sahara and, as a unilateral initiative,
it comes with conditionalities that are determined by the US. As noted, the
empirical evidence on the impact of AGOA is mixed. AGOA will expire in
2025. The US has been in an introspective phase on the role of trade in its
foreign policy against the background of the Russia—Ukraine war and the geo-
political tensions associated with the rise of China. Various options are under
consideration for a successor arrangement to AGOA. The signals suggest a
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 93
lack of interest in the Biden administration in emulating the EU’s EPAs and a
reluctance in continuing the FTA negotiations with Kenya that were started
by the Trump administration. It is also telling that Kenya’s negotiation menu
revealed a preference for trade and investment cooperation frameworks,
rather than binding rules. The main Kenyan negotiating objective was to
retain US market access while diluting Kenyan commitments through aspects
of asymmetry and special and differential treatment, in which it would be
held, as a less developed country, to lighter commitments than the US. Ken-
ya’s caution illustrates the unease of African countries in making reciprocal
trade commitments at this stage of their development. The downgrading of
the US–Kenya negotiations to a strategic trade and investment partnership
allows Kenya to avoid difficult reciprocal commitments but also forgoes the
Kenyan objective of securing continued US market access.
AGOA enjoys rare bipartisan support in the US Congress. As suggested, the
US should use the opportunity for the renewal of AGOA to retain its positive
features instead of replacing it with divisive bilateral agreements that would
risk fracturing the continent and embryonic value chains. The US should
establish a more conducive continent-to-continent arrangement. This would
importantly include North Africa. For both the US and African countries, this
would require greater vision and ambition. But, most significantly, it would
require unity and consistency among African countries to work collectively
and expeditiously. The African side should begin to lobby the US Congress,
where Africa’s small share of global trade flows is not seen as a threat and
where ‘trade not aid’ is the basis of an already-broad consensus on the role
that trade can and should play in Africa’s development. They would need to
show that such collective negotiations are possible, and beneficial. In AGOA,
the generosity of the US’s trade offer is unmatched by the EU, China, the UK
and other partners. In the realm of geopolitics and geoeconomics, AGOA is
surprisingly under-leveraged. A reformed AGOA along with a diversification
of US investment flows would provide a model for the others to follow.
Figure 4.7: Timeline for the signature of UK EPAs with African countries
Economic – Cameroon
partnership – Côte d’Ivoire
agreements (EPA) – Ghana
– Kenya
– ESA EPA: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles,
Zimbabwe
– SACU-M EPA: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table 4.3: African countries that are beneficiaries of the UK’s GSP
We will more effectively combine our diplomacy and aid with trade,
working with our partners to adapt our offer. As governments
become able to finance their own development priorities, we will
gradually move towards providing UK expertise in place of grants
using a variety of financing models to tackle regional challenges in
our mutual interests. (UK Government 2021)
Summary
In relation to the framework for analysing African trade policy outlined in
Chapter 1, UK–Africa trade relations can be considered to be in the design
stage at this early point of the UK’s post-Brexit journey. Relatively low scores
can be given for openness and transparency and inclusive participation since
little attention has been given to these issues from both the UK and African
perspectives. Some improvements in the DCTS were noted. But the scheme is
essentially modelled after the EU’s trade arrangements, which have a divisive
effect on Africa’s trade integration efforts. The priority has been efficiency. The
UK and its partners in Africa strove for a roll-over of pre-existing EU regimes,
like the EPAs, and the avoidance of a ‘cliff edge’ end to EU regimes to which
the UK was a party. In imitating the EU’s trade arrangements, the UK lost an
opportunity to overcome the divisive implications of multiple trade regimes
for Africa.
With the UK’s investment in Africa highly concentrated in a few countries
and sectors, the investment conferences highlighted new investment oppor-
tunities (Ottoway 2021). There is much that can be commended in the con-
ceptual thought behind the design of the UK trade and investment support.
But it is still too early to assess these initiatives for impact. However, it should
be kept in perspective that through the ‘invisible trade’ of remittances it is the
African diaspora in the UK that is the largest and most dynamic contributor
to UK–Africa trade flows. This was estimated to be an annual $6.5 billion in
2015 (Westcott 2022), with scope for scale-up if transfer costs can be con-
tained (FSD 2017; ODI 2022).
AFRICA'S TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE US, THE UK AND OTHERS 101
India
Since the early years of the 21st century, Africa’s trade with India has climbed
steadily upwards, with exports rising from just over 2 per cent of total exports
by value in 2001 to 7.6 per cent in 2021 (IMF 2022). Similarly, imports into
Africa from India have increased from 1.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent by value of
total imports. India has a trade preferential scheme in place for LDCs since
2008 that allows duty-free entry for up to 98 per cent of tariff lines. Exports
from Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Zambia and Mozambique have increased
under the scheme (Afrexim Bank and India Exim Bank 2018). However, the
structure of this trade follows the familiar pattern of Africa’s exports consist-
ing mainly of fuels, minerals and precious stones and imports of manufactures
such as clothing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, cereals, chemicals and machinery.
Services are a prominent feature of India’s exports including health care and
digital and agriculture services (Karingi and Naliaka 2022). The Indian dias-
pora in Africa plays a key role in forging economic ties. Three Africa–India
summits were held between 2008 and 2015 and frequent meetings at the min-
isterial level promote further engagement.
Indian investment in Africa also shows an upward trajectory, with the stock
of Indian FDI rising from $11.9 billion to $15.2 billion between 2010 and
2014 (Afrexim Bank and India Exim Bank 2018). Distribution is fairly diver-
sified covering natural resources, oil and natural gas (Côte d’Ivoire, Libya,
Mozambique, Libya, South Sudan and Sudan); coal (Mozambique and Zam-
bia) and copper (Zambia); agriculture, including tea production (Uganda and
Rwanda) and floriculture (Ethiopia and Kenya); services, such as telecom-
munications and health care (Kenya), information technology (Ethiopia and
South Africa) banking (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa,
Uganda, Zambia and Mauritius); manufacturing (Ghana and Nigeria); and
pharmaceuticals (Nigeria) (Afrexim Bank and India Exim Bank 2018).
In the other direction, between 2010 and 2014, the stock of African FDI in
India increased from $57 billion to $73.3 billion. This is mainly from Mau-
ritius, which is a widely used conduit for Indian inward and outward FDI,
owing to its low tax rates. Eswatini, South Africa, Seychelles and Morocco
are among the other largest African investors in India. Investments from
South Africa include Tiger Brands, Airports Company South Africa & Bid-
vest, SAB Miller, FirstRand Bank, Standard Bank, Old Mutual, Balela Leisure,
Anglo-American, Sasol and Nandos Group Holdings. Morocco has invested
in the production of phosphates in India, with Zuari Maroc Phosphore hold-
ing a 74 per cent stake in the previously state-run Paradeep Phosphate Ltd
(Afrexim Bank and India Exim Bank 2018).
102 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Turkey
Turkey’s engagement with Africa is a strategic objective of its foreign policy
(Orakçi 2022). According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry:
AFRICA'S TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE US, THE UK AND OTHERS 103
Japan
Both preferential trade and high-level summits feature in Japan’s trade rela-
tions with African countries. Japan offers duty-free, quota-free and GSP and
concessions to African LDCs and developing countries, respectively, for
qualified products. Rules of origin are moderate but cumulation that allows
for sourcing inputs between African countries is restrictive, which is a dis-
incentive for fostering supply chains. Japan’s main interest in Africa follows
a well-trodden path of importing strategic minerals (from South Africa and
other countries) and petroleum (particularly from Algeria and Nigeria). This
is driven by the need for Japan to diversify its energy sources in the wake
of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Pajon 2020; Pathirana 2021). Japanese
exports are mainly chemicals, machinery, automobiles and other transport
equipment. Japan accounted for 4 per cent of Africa’s imports in 2001, fall-
ing to 1.8 per cent in 2021 (IMF 2022). Japan accounted for 1.6 per cent of
Africa’s exports in 2001, rising to 2.1 per cent in 2021 (IMF 2022).
Japan barely makes the list of top 10 overseas development assistance pro-
viders to Africa (ranking ninth, just ahead of the UAE), providing $1.5 bil-
lion in 2019 or 3 per cent of ODA disbursements, according to the OECD.
However, Japan is active in some infrastructure projects such as upgrading
the ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Nacala in Mozambique and connectiv-
ity along the corridors served by these ports (Pajon 2020). Since 1993, Japan
has sponsored the Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD) as a regular forum for dialogue on economic cooperation. These
forums are co-organised with the African Union, UNDP and the World Bank
to provide a high-level platform for Japan’s multilateral development frame-
works and norms. At TICAD VII in 2019, attended by 42 African heads of
state, $20 billion was set as a target for Japanese private sector investment in
the period up to 2022, with a strong emphasis placed on business and invest-
ment partnerships. This will build upon the activities of Japanese entities
such as the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, whose invest-
ment ceiling in natural gas and energy projects has increased, and the Japan
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which has provided infrastruc-
ture financing and promoted Japanese commercial operations through loans,
equity and investment guarantees.
104 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Russia
Measured against Africa’s relatively small bilateral trade flows, Africa’s trade
with Russia is even more modest, accounting for just 0.2 per cent of African
exports and 1.8 per cent of African imports in 2021. Bilateral trade between
the two parties has evolved over the past decades, from $1.4 billion in total
goods trade in 2000 to $10.3 billion in 2021. Africa mainly exports horti-
cultural and other agricultural produce, minerals and precious stones and
imports arms and cereal grains. Wheat accounts for 95 per cent of formal
imports (although less thoroughly recorded weapons trade is also large) from
Russia, making it crucial for food security, as the Russia–Ukraine war has
revealed. Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa
are the main importers (Agence Ecofin 2022). By comparison, the main
importers of wheat from Ukraine are Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (Mille-
camps and Toulemonde 2022).
While the Soviet Union was active in Africa during the Cold War years,
including through backing liberation movements and leftist regimes, its suc-
cessor, the Russian Federation, reduced its engagement. However, parading
as a significant player on the geopolitical stage, Russian interest in Africa has
grown in recent years including through paramilitary interventions in con-
flict situations in the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Mali. On
the diplomatic front, Russia convened the first Russia–Africa Summit, which
took place in Sochi, from 23 to 24 October 2019 (Panara 2019). Attended by
43 heads of state and government, it was a diplomatic success, although con-
crete deliverables in the key areas identified for cooperation such as h
igh-tech
extraction and processing of mineral resources, agriculture, and infrastruc-
ture development are yet to materialise (Foy 2019; Roscongress 2021). With
extensive economic sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of
Ukraine in 2022 and with 28 out of 54 African countries supporting a UN
resolution that condemned the invasion (with most of the rest abstaining), the
prospects for economic cooperation as envisaged at the summit have dimin-
ished (White and Holtz 2022). A second summit that had been planned for
2022 did not materialise (Devonshire-Ellis 2021).
Brazil
The Lusophone African countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe) were traditionally the leading trad-
ing partners with Brazil, with which they share historical and cultural ties.
From 2003, under President Lula da Silva, who pursued an active ‘South–
South’ foreign policy, this expanded to new trading partners such as Nige-
ria, Ghana, Mali and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) countries
(Freitas 2016; Oloruntoba 2014). An FTA between the Common Market of
the South (MERCOSUR), of which Brazil (along with Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay) is a member, and SACU (which includes Botswana, Eswatini,
Africa’stradearrangementswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina 105
AFRICA'S TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE US, THE UK AND OTHERS 105
Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa) was signed on 15 December 2008 and
entered into force on 1 April 2016 (Tralac 2016). Agricultural and industrial
sectors are covered but the spread of the preferential margin is w ide-ranging,
between 100 and 10 per cent. The threshold for rules of origin is high, requiring
that non-originating materials do not exceed 40 per cent of value. Although
trade flows remain small, two-way trade between the parties appear to have
been given a nudge by the agreement. South Africa, for example, was able to
increase its exports to Brazil by 37 per cent, going from $483 million in 2017
to $663 million in 2018 (DTIC 2019). A joint administration c ommittee of the
parties provides an institutional framework for monitoring the agreement.
Summary
Trade flows between Africa and what might be considered its important, but
‘second tier’, trading partners are modest, with trade relations at a nascent
stage of trade policy design. A few FTAs are in place. These are limited in
geographical coverage and generally arise out of specific circumstances. This
is the case of the India–Mauritius FTA, with close ties between the two coun-
tries combined with Mauritius’s general openness to trade liberalisation (see
Chapter 3, which covers the China–Mauritius FTA). Turkey’s FTA with North
African countries is mainly a result of its membership of the EU customs
union, which requires alignment with the bloc’s trade arrangements. The
MERCOSUR–SACU FTA has been led by Brazil’s efforts to engage African
countries, driven by a ‘South–South’ foreign policy launched by Brazil in 2003.
India, Turkey, Japan and Russia offer duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access
to the African LDCs but each places restrictions on what can be exported from
the African countries. For India, the exceptions are meat and dairy products,
vegetables, coffee, tobacco, iron and steel products, and copper products. For
Japan it is rice, sugar, fishery products and leather products. For Russia it is
petroleum products, copper, iron ores, leather products, apparel and cloth-
ing. Indeed, Russia’s DFQF scheme only covers 36.3 per cent of tariff lines,
compared to most others, which are over 90 per cent (WTO 2015). Turkey
has no significant restrictions except arms and ammunition, replicating the
EU’s Everything But Arms offer to LDCs. In all cases, market access is further
restricted by rules of origin and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements.
The strategic and symbolic importance attached to engagement with Africa
by the partners is reflected in the institutional arrangements in various for-
mats to facilitate discussions with African countries on common approaches
to development, trade and investment. Japan’s TICAD and the comparable
efforts of India, Turkey and Russia (see Table.4.4) provide a forum for mutual
geopolitical diplomacy between African leaders and the partners. The results
of these partnerships so far have been modest, with an overwhelming focus
on short-term trade and investment issues and interests. A strategic vision on
how these partnerships (and others not reviewed in this section) can be
106 HOW AFRICA TRADES
AFRICA'S TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE US, THE UK AND OTHERS 107
EU’s various regimes, and under China’s DFQF regime, show that more is
needed. African businesses struggle with non-tariff barriers, such as prod-
uct standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical standards.
African businesspeople sometimes face challenges in obtaining visas, making
it difficult for them – and especially smaller businesses – to meet business
partners and strike deals. The policy environment in African countries them-
selves is often not supportive either. Many African countries have sub-par
trade infrastructure, trade facilitation efforts, institutional quality and unsta-
ble macroeconomics.
Africa’s trade partners can help by buttressing their trade preferences to
Africa with a set of complementary measures. First among these are deliberate
efforts to boost investments in African countries, but also to improve the type
of investment, diversifying away from that disproportionately concentrated
in extractive resources to instead those in agriculture and industry. Second
are initiatives to ease the ability of African businesses to overcome non-tariff
barriers. China has shown the value of deliberate, value-chain specific, ‘green
lanes’ to fast-track agricultural exports, for instance. Third is the alignment of
development assistance with trade. In programmes such as the EU’s Global
Gateway, China’s Belt and Road, the US’s Prosper Africa and Power Africa, the
UK’s British International Investment and British Support for Infrastructure
Projects, and the multi-partner Trade Mark Africa, Africa’s advanced country
partners have recognised the need for investments to help unlock supply side
constraints in infrastructure, energy, transport, education, health, research,
and digitalisation, among others. Yet Africa’s deficits in these areas persist and
more support is needed.
As a ‘late developer’, Africa requires efforts to level the playing field if it is
ever to catch up and achieve key elements of economic convergence. With
strategic sequencing that would offer unilateral preferential access for African
exporters now, and deeper reciprocal trade deals only when African econo-
mies are better integrated and ready, the world can create the right trade envi-
ronment for the continent. Buttressed with complementary support meas-
ures, Africa’s development partners can help unlock trade as the tool it should
be to African sustainable development. By following the right sequencing for
AfCFTA implementation prior to reciprocal deals, Africa will be given the
opportunity to build productive capacities and achieve its potential for strong
and diverse growth in intra-African trade, with inclusive and transforma-
tional consequences.
Note
1
See, for example, Article 3.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum on the
Interim Agreement Establishing an Economic Partnership Agreement
between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Cameroon.
108 HOW AFRICA TRADES
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WTO trade regime as ‘the tide that lifts all boats’, the key principles compris-
ing the multilateral trade system, including discrimination, enhanced trans-
parency and lower trade barriers, are believed to generate strong development
outcomes. This may also be described as the neo-liberal or ‘establishment’
narrative. Conversely, those who consider WTO rules to be inherently unfair
and constraining, limiting opportunities for agricultural development, indus-
trialisation and catch-up growth, will emphasise the importance of securing
flexibilities and exemptions from existing rules. This may be described as the
‘principled’ narrative.
At the risk of oversimplification, the current gridlock at the WTO can be
seen as a stand-off between these two narratives, with developed countries
predominantly pointing to trade’s development benefits, while developing
and least-developed countries highlight the system’s constrains. But it is also
possible to draw upon elements from these two perspectives – some of which
are intertwined – to construct a third narrative as a strategy for action. This
may be labelled the ‘pragmatic’ narrative. A pragmatic narrative would focus
on results over principles and procedural niceties, technical analysis over ide-
ological positioning, and would be future-oriented.
This chapter addresses two main themes. The first two sections outline the
main elements in the two narratives to set the scene for the second half of
the chapter, which assesses African member states’ record of engagement
with the WTO. The assessment is conducted from three perspectives: in rela-
tion to the deliberative bodies that oversee the WTO regime; negotiations that
establish the rules of the regime; and in the settlement of disputes that arise
in the application of the rules. African agency has in a few areas been effec-
tive in pursuing African interests. In other areas, Africa has failed to obtain
desired results. Moreover, in relation to the analytical framework for assessing
the trade policy cycle outlined in Chapter 1, African engagement at the WTO
presents a mixed record given the gaps with respect to openness, transparency,
inclusive participation, accountability and efficiency. But Africa’s capacity and
resource limitations must also be recognised. These issues are taken up in the
concluding section of the chapter. Inspired by the framework established in Six
Faces of Globalization (Roberts and Lamp 2021), a deconstruction of the nar-
ratives that dominate discussions about the WTO helps to explain diverging
views about how African countries can maximise the benefit of WTO mem-
bership. It also enables an approach to the question of African engagement
at the WTO from an analytical as opposed to an ideological perspective. The
merits of the ‘establishment’ and ‘principled’ narratives are now considered.
even further. Free trade is the starting point. Specifically, free trade has enabled
countries to specialise, allowing economic actors to focus on their compara-
tive advantage and to exchange products (and services) that they are good and
efficient at making with products (and services) in which other countries have
a comparative advantage. By creating new markets, free trade has also led to
advances in technology and productivity. With respect to development, the
economist Paul Krugman, for example, argued that:
Narrative Position
Process is unfair due to unfinished Principled opposition to any new
Doha Round which sought to rebalance negotiations; emphasis to adhere to
the outcome of the Uruguay Round Doha Decisions and Ministerial
Declarations
Rules selectively applied to areas in Amend rules (e.g. domestic support in
which industrialised countries have agriculture)
comparative advantage; protectionism
prevails in other areas (agriculture)
Rules limit policy space, thereby Seek exemptions from rules; extend
limiting industrialisation opportunities transition phases; do not make new
commitments
Difficult to comply with rules because of Seek exemptions, provide technical
capacity constraints assistance, capacity-building; make
compliance contingent on provision of
technical assistance
Future rules could prevent Seek exemption from the rules; ensure
countries from taking advantage of rules apply only to a targeted group of
economic opportunities that were avail- WTO members
able to other countries (e.g. fisheries
subsidies negotiations)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
example, the LDC Ministerial Declaration for the WTO’s 12th Ministerial
Conference (MC 12) called for an agreement on fishery disciplines that are
‘balanced and proportionate to the responsibility of Members’ and notes that
‘LDCs are not the contributors to overfishing and overcapacity and there-
fore should be exempted from such subsidy disciplines’ (LDC Group 2021).
Environmental concerns will increasingly feature in WTO initiatives and cli-
mate-justice arguments can be expected to become more prominent in the
principled narrative.
Having outlined the narratives that define the current impasse at the WTO,
the focus now shifts to the record of African agency at the WTO in secur-
ing results that are in its interest. Three specific areas of WTO operations are
assessed: the deliberative bodies that oversee the WTO regime; negotiations
that establish the rules of the regime; and the settlement of disputes that arise
in the application of the rules.
WTO’s purview. The WTO operates on a consensus basis, which means that
each member state technically has a veto. There is provision for voting, but
this is rarely utilised as consensus decision-making is the practice. This is
important as the WTO has few means of pressing unwilling governments to
obey its decisions (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009). As a member-driven organ-
isation, the deliberative bodies administer the WTO’s rules and disciplines,
with the Secretariat providing back-office support and technical advice.
Except for key bodies that are of obvious strategic interest, African mem-
bers’ attendance and participation in WTO deliberations are generally low.
This reflects both capacity constraints and the high cost of maintaining diplo-
matic missions in Geneva. Typically, African diplomatic missions are under-
staffed, with concurrent responsibility for covering deliberations at other
international organisations in Geneva like the UN Human Rights Council,
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). This,
in turn, necessitates prioritisation. Participation in WTO committees is not
always at the top of the list (van der Ven 2018a).
However, with the African diplomatic missions stretched thin, the Africa
Group at the WTO – which comprises African countries that are WTO
members and observers – provides a forum for coordinating African partic-
ipation in the committees and for aligning negotiating positions. The Africa
Group typically assigns a member to follow specific issues and report back.
This helps with keeping abreast of the latest developments. The same can be
said for other groupings that operate at the WTO, in which African countries
participate such as the Least Developed Country (LDC) Group, the Africa,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group and the G90.
Aside from the General Council, which is the WTO’s main forum for deci-
sion-making between ministerial summits, where African attendance and
participation are high, the deliberative bodies that attract the highest level of
African participation are the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD)
and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council. The for-
mer is responsible for oversight of development matters that impact WTO
rules and trade capacity development initiatives, among other concerns. The
latter deals with the sensitive issue of intellectual property rights. At the CTD,
for example, African members in coalition with other developing countries
continue to press the question of fair rules and a level playing field includ-
ing through provisions for SDT. The Aid for Trade initiative that provides
a framework for development partners’ accountability for support to trade
development is monitored by the CTD with strong backing from African
members. At the TRIPS Council, African members helped to put through
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement that entered into force in 2017. This
secured a legal pathway for developing countries to obtain access to generic
medicines. African members led by South Africa have been instrumental in
pressing for a waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to facil-
itate access to vaccines and medicines for the prevention, containment and
treatment of Covid-19.
124 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Zambia
6 20 4 2 4 6 23
do not cover controversial matters such as market access but focus on facil-
itating investment through rules on streamlining bureaucratic requirements
and processes.
Several factors explain the general lack of engagement in most of the JSIs
that address so-called ‘new issues’, such as e-commerce or services domestic
regulation, which are meant to update the WTO rulebook. These include a
lack of trust in that agreeing to an additional set of rules would further limit
developing countries’ policy space; the perception that the new initiatives
favour the interests of the developed economies at the expense of developing
countries and LDCs; the disincentive provided by the WTOs most favoured
nation (MFN) provision, envisioned to be included in some JSIs, which would
enable African countries to ‘free ride’ on the benefits without having to make
concessions; and questions about whether the WTO is the right institution to
engage in some of the issues (e.g. e-commerce and MSMEs). In addition, on
grounds of both principle and procedural rectitude, most African members
are reluctant to engage fully in the JSIs and other new issues until the core
subjects of the Doha Round are addressed.
Even so, African countries registered some consequential results at the MC
12 that took place in June 2022. For example, led by South Africa, African
members obtained a waiver to the TRIPS Agreement to override patents and
produce vaccines to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. A multilateral agree-
ment on fishery subsidies, one of the major outcomes the ministerial confer-
ence, also includes some gains for African members. Table 5.3 summarises
key outcomes of the ministerial conference, and highlights how this relates
to known positions of the Africa Group, LDCs and/or ACP Group. These
outcomes demonstrate that negotiating breakthroughs, technical solutions
and results that are development-friendly are possible even in a systemically
biased and polarised WTO.
provisions relating to grant of submission seeking a TRIPS waiver for copyrights, South Africa draft waiver, which was co-spon-
compulsory licences and patents over industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed sored by many African countries, was included in
Covid-19 vaccines information with regard to vaccines, diagnostics and the declaration, namely
127
(Continued)
Table 5.3: (Continued)
Issue/topic/outcome Known position of Africa Group/LDCs/ACP Group Comments
128
Ministerial Declaration on the WTO African countries sought to address the impact of the The ministerial declaration contained only minor
Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic Covid-19 pandemic and services challenges and references to these issues, and did not identify
and Preparedness for Future opportunities, especially in the travel, tourism, any particular commitment or action plan
129
Africa in the World Trade Organization 129
are limited by their imports comprising only a small share of the respondent’s
total exports. Given that retaliation rights must be equivalent to the cost of
damage, retaliation might not present a sufficiently strong incentive for the
respondent to bring its measures into compliance if this is the outcome of
the adjudication (Bartels 2013). As underlined in the Africa Group commu-
nication, systemic biases like these must be addressed in dispute settlement
reform procedures.
Until 2022, Tunisia was the only African country ever to have filed a dis-
pute as a complainant (Figure 5.1). This concerned a case against Morocco on
anti-dumping measures on school exercise books. In July 2022, South Africa
filed a complaint against EU phytosanitary requirements on its fruit exports.
On the respondent side, only three African countries (Egypt, Morocco
and South Africa) have been sued, being subject to a total of 13 disputes
(Figure 5.2). Most of these disputes concerned anti-dumping claims and were
resolved in the consultation phase. Two disputes advanced to the panel stage
and, in one, Morocco filed an appeal that it later withdrew. Unsurprisingly,
the three African countries that have been subject to disputes are among the
largest economies on the continent.
With respect to third-party participation, a total of 19 African countries
had reserved their rights to participate as third parties in various disputes
by the end of 2020 (Figure 5.3). These countries participated as third parties
104 times, out of a total of 3,311 participating third parties. Since African
countries comprise over a quarter of WTO membership, this is relatively low.
The African countries concerned had a direct commercial or strategic inter-
ests in the cases, which included sugar and cotton subsidies, bananas, tobacco
advertisement laws, trade remedies, and trade and environmental issues in
relation to extraterritoriality.
Another indicator of African participation in the WTO dispute settlement
concerns the appointment of African panellists. These are the assessors who
review complaints. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, African panellists’ participa-
tion is low and concentrated in a handful of countries. Prior to 2010, African
panellists originated exclusively from three countries: South Africa, Egypt
and Morocco. Since 2011, however, this list has expanded to include Bot-
swana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tunisia. This reflects a long-standing
practice of drawing panellists from traditional regional pools. This could be
remedied by concerted effort to enhance diversity in the composition of pan-
els (Apecu 2013). Overall, African participation in the WTO’s dispute settle-
ment processes has mainly been as third parties in cases of interest. But, even
here, African countries account for less than 5 per cent of participation as
third parties.
Low levels of participation in the core functions of the WTO suggests that
African members are not sufficiently linking development priorities to their
rights and obligations under the WTO framework. It also reflects systemic
biases against small economies, such as in dispute settlement, and severe
capacity constraints. With respect to negotiations, low levels of participation
132 HOW AFRICA TRADES
reflect adherence to the Doha Round procedural rectitude and the belief that
signing up to additional rules and commitments will be detrimental to A
frica’s
development. At the same time, where major interests are perceived to be at
stake, African agency has been exerted in pursuing them in the deliberative
Africa in the World Trade Organization 133
Summary
The main conclusion from this examination of African agency at the WTO
must be that overall performance is mixed as measured against the steps
of the trade policy cycle outlined in Chapter 1. Results have been meagre
but significant. With limited resources and capacity constraints in Geneva
and the capitals, African members have worked in coalitions, including the
Africa Group, but also with other developing or least-developed countries.
This achieves both a pooling of resources and an amalgamation of economic
clout and influence. However, the downside of coalitions involving both Afri-
can and other developing countries’ groups is that this does not allow for
sufficient differentiation of Africa’s specific needs. On some SDT issues, for
example, emerging economies or higher-income developing countries that
have already acquired substantial market share in some sectors are unlikely
to be granted policy space flexibilities, having already climbed some distance
‘up the ladder’. Here, it should be noted that China and other emerging econ-
omies still claim developing country status at the WTO. Refusal of advanced
countries to accept this is another driver of paralysis at the WTO. As the
region with the smallest (and declining – see Chapter 1) share of world trade,
and having seen that technical solutions are possible, African members can
differentiate their needs better and pinpoint with finer clarity where SDT is
required to support their growth (Bacchus and Manak 2021).
The red lines that were established by African countries have been clear and
consistent in the two decades since the Doha Round was launched, despite
pressure from other parties. They have balanced offensive and defensive
interests by sticking to their red lines. But procedural rectitude and ideolog-
ical positioning have limited their engagement in the JSIs that address ‘new
issues’ to update the WTO rulebook in a changing global economy. Here
ideology trumped pragmatism. The latter would have entailed reliance on
empirical evidence and analysis for guidance on how JSI proposals are likely
to impact development concerns and formulating negotiation priorities and
strategies accordingly.
All the same, African countries have registered some results, for example
in securing the first ever substantive amendment of a WTO agreement. The
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement concerned new disciplines to secure
access to medicines to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The experience from
this episode emboldened the African members led by South Africa to pursue
a waiver to the TRIPS Agreement to override patents and produce vaccines to
combat the Covid-19 pandemic as was noted.
Capacity and resource constraints being a perennial challenge, however,
implementation of WTO obligations has not always been straightforward,
134 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Note
1
The Ministerial Declaration on Gender has the highest number of partic-
ipating African countries, but this does not have the status of a JSI.
Annex 1
Table 5A.1: Linking the principled narrative to statements made by the LDC, Africa Group and G90
(Continued)
Table 5A.1: (Continued)
LDC proposal for G90 Declaration on Ag/204 12 July (TWN, on WTO Issues
Narrative Position MC12 SDT (G90, 2021) 2021) 8 Jan 2019
Rules limit Seek Reaffirmation of the ‘WTO rules must give space Reaffirm SDT, to address
policy space, exemptions importance of SDT for economic actors to grow development needs in line
thereby limiting from rules; for LDCs to achieve local production capacities, with Africa’s industrial
industrialisation extent structural economic thereby energizing local, development priorities as
opportunities transition transformation and take domestic, and regional set out in Agenda 2063 on
phases; do full advantage of markets and economies, structural transformation
HOW AFRICA TRADES
not make new international trade and improving the quality and industrialisation;
commitments of employment and living various reiterations of
standards.’ importance of SDT
tunities that were targeted group from overfishing and sary to strengthen fishing
available to other of WTO overcapacity disciplines industries and capacities
countries (e.g. members necessary for economic
137
negotiations)
138 HOW AFRICA TRADES
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/poldev.1492
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and Differential Treatment in Trade, London: Routledge.
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LDC Group (2021) ‘LDC Ministerial Declaration’.
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Perspectives on Trade and the WTO: Domestic Reforms, Structural
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Africa in the World Trade Organization 139
The word ‘crisis’ comes from the Greek ‘to separate, to decide’, marking a point
at which a choice must be determined at a highly consequential turning point
between continued or unchecked decline on the one hand, or recovery on
the other. Implicit in this is that crises create powerful inflection points. This
chapter sets out what actually happened to trade in Africa over the course
of the Covid-19 crisis, focusing on three stories concerning Africa’s formal
trade. First, African countries’ overall trade continued to be dominated by
fluctuations in commodities and tourism, where volatility in prices and the
collapse of travel strongly shaped trade performance. However, this meant
nuanced and differentiated consequences across different parts of the con-
tinent. Second, manufacturing trade faced a potential turning point with
whether Covid-19 would help to ‘localise’ production within the continent.
Finally, did Covid-19 change trade policymaking itself in Africa, especially
with the AfCFTA negotiations?
An overarching issue in any such period of intense disruption is to gauge
the ‘sticking power’ of these changes. Which policies affected by Covid-19 will
persist, and which will wither, as trade in Africa slowly re-establishes a new
normal? We seek to assess the ‘sticking power’ of changes imposed by Covid-
19 and in doing so to challenge the prevailing (sometimes lazy) narratives
about Covid-19 in Africa, showing that realities were often more nuanced and
complex. Commodity prices collapsed but also surged, and at different times
and across different products, affecting countries across the continent differ-
entially. While some manufacturing value chains did seem to localise, there is
evidence that this was often merely transitory. The chapter highlights aspects
of Africa’s commodities and manufacturing trade that remain entrenched,
despite the tumult of the Covid-19 pandemic. It also, however, demonstrates
resiliency in African policymaking. The cumulative story is one of – in
general – determined African trade policymaking.1
Sources: Based on ITC TradeMap Data, FAO and Trading Economics, May 2022.
Notes: Composition of Africa’s exports based on three-year average from 2016 to 2018.
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 143
Figure 6.2: Price developments for Africa’s top exports through Covid-19
(Dec 2019 =100)
Sources: Based on ITC TradeMap Data, FAO and Trading Economics, May 2022.
Notes: Metals Index is the LME Index. Cotton prices are included as a (very) rough indica-
tive proxy for textile prices.
pandemic, most African countries benefitted from elevated prices for their
major commodity exports. Though such volatility may seem to ‘balance out’
over a longer time horizon, it exacerbates budgetary planning and investment
(World Bank 2021a). It also erodes policymaking interest in fixing the per-
vading challenges of commodity dependency.
The second major disruptor impacting Africa’s trade over the course
of the pandemic was the lockdowns induced by Covid-19. As elsewhere
in the world, these lockdowns severely – by design – restricted internal
mobility, reduced economic activity, and closed borders to varying degrees.
Figure 6.3 highlights the specific aspect of international travel closures that
formed the most trade-relevant part of lockdowns. It shows how these varied
across A frican countries and over time. Most African countries introduced,
and then strengthened, lockdown restrictions beginning in late March 2020
and into early April 2020, as the extent of the Covid-19 pandemic became
apparent. Lockdown restrictions then tended to gradually ease across Africa
before stabilising between November 2020 and June 2021 (with some country
idiosyncrasy). Travel closures were most prevalent and strict in the months of
April to July 2020.
At that point, most major ports throughout the continent experienced delays
and congestion as port authorities and maritime shippers reacted to additional
health screening measures and port congestion (UNECA 2020a). Passenger
144 HOW AFRICA TRADES
flights, which usually carry commercial cargo in their holds, declined precipi-
tously in number and were wholly banned from many countries. Land borders
became congested due to mandatory testing, the sanitisation of trucks and
limits on crew numbers, and in some cases were completely closed between
neighbouring countries (UNECA 2020a). As these measures were introduced
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 145
2021 2022
35 per cent of their total exports, and gold exporters if gold accounts for at
least 35 per cent of their total exports (Figure 6.8). The former group of Afri-
can petroleum oil-exporting countries suffered a net 34 per cent fall in the
value of their exports in 2020, while the latter gold exporting group enjoyed a
20 per cent increase. This bifurcated response is clearly driven by commodity
prices, with major gold exporters benefitting from exceptionally high prices
as petroleum exporters suffered from price troughs. Though it is not the
entire story, the most important determinant of trade performance for Afri-
can countries in the course of Covid-19 would appear to be their particular
commodity dependencies.
Figure 6.9 aggregates the data presented in Figure 6.8 into African coun-
try groupings while showing the difference between exports to the world
and intra-African exports. It is again clear that the impact of Covid-19 on
exports is driven, to a large extent, by the commodities that individual Afri-
can countries export. The West, Central and North African regions that are
host to most of Africa’s major petroleum oil-exporting countries experienced
the poorest export performance in 2020. While intra-African exports proved
marginally more resilient than exports to the world in total, there was vari-
ance across African regions.
So far, the data presented has considered only exports. As Figure 6.10
shows, Africa’s imports also fell in 2020 before rising in 2021 as compared
to 2019. The impact of Covid-19 on Africa’s imports has been broadly in line
with the impact on exports – following the same ‘J-shaped’ curve. Imports
into African countries were similarly constrained by the Covid-19 restrictions
to movements, disruptions to supply chains, and reduced foreign exchange
revenues with which to fund imports.
Early in the pandemic crisis, Africa’s trade structure – which disproportion-
ately involves exporting commodities and importing finished goods – threat-
ened African countries’ access to the medical supplies, personal protective
equipment and medicines needed to fight Covid-19, as scores of countries
that produced these goods instituted export restrictions and bans (UNECA
2020a; UNECA 2020b). As concern over the pandemic rose, some countries
imposed additional bans or restrictions on food exports. Fortunately, local
solutions emerged to address supply gaps in the case of simple products, such
as disinfectants, facemasks and personal protective equipment, although
African countries still struggled with access to complex equipment, such as
ventilators (Financial Times 2020). The African Medical Supplies Platform,
championed by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and developed by
the African Union, Africa CDC, Afreximbank and UNECA, further provided
a pan-African solution, allowing for pooled government procurement of
Covid-19 medical supplies across African countries.
pandemic as can be seen in Figure 6.12, which shows service sector export
indices quarterly between 2019 and 2021. These two sectors are, further-
more, the most important service exports for the continent in terms of value
(Figure 6.11). The extent of the collapse in travel services was dramatic, falling
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 153
89 per cent by the second quarter of 2020 as compared to the last quarter of
2019. Only a small rebound was experienced by the second quarter of 2020,
the most recent data point available at the time of writing. As dramatic as this
was, it was not wildly inconsistent with the experience in other regions of
the world.
Exports of goods-related services and other services held up more strongly,
likely owing to their lower dependency on cross-border movements of people.
The former includes manufacturing services on physical inputs belonging to
other countries and maintenance and repair services, but accounts for only
about 2 per cent of total African services exports. The latter – ‘other services’
– in the African context includes primarily ‘Other business services’, such as
research and development services, professional and management consult-
ing services, and technical, trade-related and other business services, but
also telecommunications services and government services. Clearly these are
more resilient to border closures than services such as travel and tourism.
These remained relatively more stable in the course of 2020, with telecommu-
nications services, in fact, actually growing by about 11 per cent.
In normal years, tourism and travel account for about 42 per cent of Afri-
can service exports, 6.9 per cent of Africa’s GDP (equivalent to about $173
billion) and 6.5 per cent of total Africa’s employment. It is also an important
employer of women (UNWTC 2019; WTTC 2021). While tourism is a sig-
nificant foreign exchange earner for large African economies, such as South
Africa (where it accounts for one in 10 jobs), Kenya, Egypt and Morocco, it
is most important for Africa’s small island economies, notably the Seychelles
and Cabo Verde, where tourism accounts for an estimated 26 per cent and
18 per cent of total GDP, respectively (World Bank 2021b; WTTC 2021). The
crisis exposed Africa’s dependency on foreign travellers for tourism. With
fewer domestic tourists to absorb local tourism services, the impact on this
sector was more pronounced than in other places, such as Europe or the US,
where domestic tourism was able to replace international travellers to a cer-
tain extent. Domestic tourism as a share of total tourism is lower in Africa
than any other region, accounting for around 55 per cent of travel and tour-
ism spending in Africa, as compared to 83 per cent in North America, 64 per
cent in Europe and 74 per cent in the Asia-Pacific (WTTC 2017). This has
been particularly pronounced in Eastern and Southern Africa, with tourism
offerings like safaris more oriented towards European, American and Asian
visitors. Yet policy changes may be underfoot: Kenya launch a Domestic Tour-
ism Recovery Strategy in 2020, focusing on, among others, marketing, infra-
structure, and product diversification with their domestic market.
Both transport and tourism are included in the five priority sectors for ser-
vices liberalisation under the AfCFTA. This creates an opportunity for pro-
moting intra-African investments as African countries begin to recover from
Covid-19 to accompany increased intra-African trade flows. In the words of
Wayne Godwin, senior vice-president of JLL Hotels & Hospitality Group for
Sub-Saharan Africa,
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 155
Doing so could be the catalyst African countries need to follow the successes
of more developed countries like China, which, with an emerging middle class
armed with increasing disposable incomes, experienced a fourfold increase in
domestic travel and tourism spending in a decade, from $208 billion in 2008
to $836 billion by 2019 (see Box 6.1; WTTC 2017; WTTC 2021).
Comparative perspectives
Covid-19 hit African trade harder than most other regions. Using January
2020 as a baseline, Africa’s exports fell by 46 per cent by April 2020 – a fall
that was more severe than any other region, with the exception of the Middle
East and Central Asia, exports from which also fell by 46 per cent by May
2020 (see Figure 6.13). All of these regions are notable petroleum oil pro-
ducers and struggled with the sharp decline in oil prices throughout 2020,
before recovering in 2021. However, exports from the Middle East and Cen-
tral Asia recovered much more strongly than those from Africa in the second
half of 2021. A sharp contrast is drawn with the Emerging and Developing
Asia region, which, after an initial contraction in February 2020, recovered
strongly from the pandemic crisis – with the East Asia region even managing
to record GDP growth of 0.9 percentage points in 2020, and among the fastest
growth in 2021 too. This recovery was led by impressive control of the virus
in many Asian economies in 2020, such as China and Vietnam, which rode
the subsequent wave of rising world demand to boost manufacturing exports.
The economic crisis surrounding Covid-19 marks only the most recent in
a succession of global crises that have undermined development in African
countries. Falling export receipts followed the global financial crisis of 2008
and 2009 and the East Asia crisis in 1997 and 1998, as well as a commodity
prices recession in 1984 to 1986. In each of these instances, African trade was
weighed down by crumbling commodity prices. The Covid-19 crisis in its
impact on Africa’s exports is notable for its brevity, compared to those preced-
ing crises (see Figure 6.14). Despite comprising one of the greatest economic
upsets in recent history, and imposing a particularly sharp drop in Africa’s
exports, it was characterised by a notably swift recovery. Africa’s exports had
returned to their January 2020 level just 14 months later, before then growing
substantially as commodity prices continued to rise. It was an unusually rapid
recovery for African exports, in comparison to other major economic troughs
of recent decades. However, this recovery cannot be considered to have been
delivered by much more than the commodity price rebound, which saw
prices for most of Africa’s traditional commodities soar. The African econ-
omy, in aggregate, remains structurally unchanged from its overconcentration
in metals, ores and petroleum oils.
Great crises create moments in which entrenched outcomes within p olitical
economies can be revisited and changed. The risk of Africa’s rapid trade
recovery from Covid-19 is that it removes the incentives and impetus to
structurally change African trade, leaving it persisting in its dependence on
too few commodity products and their prices. High prices may help buoy
government finances and foreign exchange reserves, for the African countries
that export them, but will undermine the type of trade transformation that
would better create jobs and sustainable development over the longer term.
With commodity prices having recovered, Africa’s export structure seems
likely to continue in its persisting over-concentration in fuels and metals
unless trade policy changes.
Source: Authors calculations based on UN Comtrade database and the System of Nation-
al Accounts (SNA) classifications of goods.
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 161
despite these countries facing severe Covid-19 crises. However, looking at these
figures alongside manufactured value added changes the perspective. Manu-
facturing value-added growth6 in sub-Saharan Africa remains very low and
in fact declined between 2010 and 2019, from 4.8 per cent to 3 per cent. With
Covid-19 reducing the supply of industrial inputs, the average growth rate of
manufacturing value added on the continent plummeted to −4.5 per cent in
2020. One driver of this decline was disrupted supply of intermediate products.
The phenomenon of declining manufacturing value added was not univer-
sal across the continent. Some African countries, such as the Central African
Republic, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso and Cameroon,
observed positive manufacturing value-added growth in 2020. While this
seems to imply that the manufacturing sector in these countries has been
more resilient than in other African countries, it does not mean that the
manufacturing value added of these countries was entirely unaffected.7 Nev-
ertheless, many of these economies continue to be less integrated into global
supply chains. Figure 6.16 clearly illustrates the relationship between integra-
tion into the world economy and manufacturing value-added growth. Many
of the African countries that import the least experienced positive growth in
manufacturing value added in 2020. But the countries most open to the rest of
the world (except for Egypt) experienced negative growth in manufacturing
value added. The manufacturing sectors in these countries suffered relatively
more when their more globally integrated supply chains were disrupted by the
Covid-19 pandemic.
Digitisation can also help to bridge the information gap within and outside
of the continent. For example, the continent has the lowest internet penetra-
tion (standing at around 30 per cent), far below the global average, which was
twice as high in 2020. Digital tools such as digital platforms can also be used
to leverage human capital productivity in logistics activities. Indeed, one of
the biggest challenges facing logistics managers and professionals is the level
of competence and professionalism of their workers (Kuteyi and Winkler
2022). To benefit from the diversification of supply chains and to locate them
on the continent, African countries should invest in infrastructure and logis-
tics. For example, the expected gain from supply chain digitisation will not
happen if the continent is not able to be supplied with electricity. Investment
in energy supply in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by more than 30 per cent
since 2011, leaving an estimated 600 million people without access to electric-
ity on the continent and needs to increase two and a half times through 2040
(IEA 2019). African countries face many logistical challenges that need to
be addressed to increase trade and encourage regional companies to localise
production and eventually enter the export market. These challenges include
inefficient gateways and transport facilitation, among others (see Table 6.1).
The regulatory environment should evolve to better support the industrial
sector to stimulate the regional supply chain. A weak regulatory environ-
Inefficiency Examples
Gateway • Cheaper demurrage than warehouse storage costs encourage
inefficiencies longer dwell times at ports
• Cumbersome custom clearance process and lack of single
window
• Poor GPS tracking systems
Trucking • Low market transparency and excessive wait times
inefficiencies • Poor inland road quality
• ‘Black box’ pricing models with mostly fixed costs and
limited variable costs due to powerful transporter unions
• Old fleet operated by poorly qualified truckers
• Current incentives are to strip containers and overload trucks
• Scarce backload due to more imports than exports
• More demand for transport of high-value products than
supply which is readily available during most of the year
ment can discourage companies from locating in the continent. In this con-
text, the African Continental Free Trade Area can play a role in harmonising
rules and then developing and implementing continental business and sup-
ply chain standards. This will give African companies a major role in global
supply chains. The continent’s particularity lies in the flexibility and an often
non-existent regulatory environment, which allows for different forms of inno-
vation in some respects. This phenomenon, referred to as ‘reverse innovation’
by Oke, Boso and Marfo (2022), is illustrated by the example of businesses like
Zipline drone technology, in Rwanda. This company took advantage of the
relative paucity of regulation in Rwanda, compared to more developed mar-
kets in Europe or the US, to develop and reach a critical size before starting
its activities in the United States. In conclusion, when it comes to regulation,
African governments should make a trade-off between the establishment of
clear rules governing supply chains and the flexible nature of regulation so as
not to harm innovation and then the value chain on the continent.
Phase 1 Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Trade in Goods
Trade in Services
Phase 2
Investment
Competition
Source: Compiled by authors from AfCFTA Secretariat and AUC meeting reports and communications.
Notes: Negotiating meetings are shaded in accordance with three levels of hierarchy: capacity-building training or workshop (lightest); sub-committee,
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade
technical working group, or expert working group (medium); and committee or negotiating forum (darkest). If more than one meeting took place in a week,
shading is accorded to the highest level.
165
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 165
166 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Yet not all prerequisites for the effective commencement of trade under the
AfCFTA could be finalised in this timeframe. The obstacle of Covid-19 per-
haps also revealed some of the unrecognised opportunities in virtual nego-
tiating methods. In his closing remarks at the Third Meeting of the AfCFTA
Council of Ministers, in November 2020, the secretary-general of the AfCFTA
Secretariat informed the meeting that, for future meetings, ‘the hybrid virtual
and in-person Meetings will be the mode of operation’.10 This helps improve
the accessibility to the negotiations of less well-resourced, capacity stretched,
and remote countries in the continuing negotiating processes while allowing
face-to-face discussions over the most sensitive issues.
Source: ITC (2020). SME Competitiveness Outlook: Covid-19: The Great Lockdown and Its
Impact on Small Business.
While fewer businesses may have been bullishly expanding into new prod-
ucts and markets, regional trade was reported to have emerged as an impor-
tant ‘backup’ in business resilience strategies. In an ECA and IEC survey of
206 African businesses in June to July 2020, 56 per cent reported to have
switched to national and regional suppliers in response to international sup-
ply shortages (UNECA and IEC 2020). Two-thirds of the surveyed firms fur-
ther identified new opportunities in reaction to the crisis, of which ‘growth in
markets’ was the most frequently cited.
Many African economies have been those least scathed, at least in economic
terms, by Covid-19: of the 31 countries that remarkably experienced positive
GDP growth in 2020, 16 were African (IMF 2022). African countries also have
impressive medium-term market fundamentals, including a rapidly increas-
ing, urbanising and maturing consumer population. Regional trade has been
a legitimate solution to African business survival, recovery and longer-term
growth post-Covid-19.
AfCFTA leadership
‘When a state finds itself in crisis, it does not see beyond its nose’, lamented
Adebayo Adedeji in surveying the lost opportunities of Africa under the
plague of economic crises it faced in the 1980s (United Nations African
Renewal 2002). One of the lost opportunities at that time was economic inte-
gration; the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action – a systematic political programme
for integration – collapsed as policymaking attention refocused on commod-
ity price and debt stability challenges (Gérout, MacLeod and Desta 2019).
Covid-19 likewise diverted the attention of leaders onto Covid-19 health and
economic shocks, including (initially) falling commodity prices, domestic
production and imported access to essential medical equipment, tax reve-
nue, debt sustainability and unemployment. Policy attention consumed itself
with new budgeting and funding priorities and crisis management, rather
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 171
Africa does not need a Marshall Plan to ride out the ongoing
coronavirus crisis. It has a more powerful tool in the African Con-
tinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to use in accelerating regional
and economic integration and prepare for uncertain times. (Vera
Songwe, executive secretary of the ECA and under-secretary-gen-
eral for the UN, cited in Tralac 2020)
As of December 2022, with 44 African Union member states having now rat-
ified the AfCFTA Agreement – and 42 having submitted their initial tariff
offers – it appears that Africa’s leaders agree as to the significant role of the
AfCFTA in Africa’s Covid-19 recovery.
Though it is likely that more progress on the AfCFTA may have been made
without the Covid-19 distractions to policymaking attention, that such a cri-
sis failed to upend the momentum of the AfCFTA is impressive. Covid-19
also enabled the introduction of new working practices such as the option of
remote participation in negotiations, which has persisted even after physical
travel became possible, and offers new possibilities for improved participa-
tion for some countries. The history of failed African economic integration
under the economic crises of the 1980s fortunately appears to have been
averted. The challenges of Covid-19 in Africa in 2020 reveal a story of the
perseverance of African leadership and commitment to transformative eco-
nomic policies.
172 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Summary
Covid-19 created a sharp, but relatively short, crisis in African trade. The
main determinant of the trade performance of African countries is revealing
of their continued structural weaknesses. Successes, and failures, in exports
from African countries closely charted the ebbing and flow of just a few
commodity prices, and especially the prices of petroleum oil and gold. These
goods and other metals continue to account for more than 60 per cent of
Africa’s exports. Africa’s exports of services embodied a similar dependency
challenge, being heavily concentrated in travel and tourism services, which
plummeted in the crisis. A drought in international travel precipitated by the
pandemic could not, as was the case in other countries in Europe and the US,
be replaced by domestic tourism, which remains overly nascent in most of the
continent. The brevity of the impact of Covid-19 on African trade, at least in
commodities trade, and the rapid rebound in the value of African commodity
exports, undermines the opportunity that the crisis could have created for
deciding upon meaningful change. As commodity prices soared, they rein-
forced and entrenched the commodity dependencies of African countries that
do little to serve longer-term goals of structural transformation, jobs creation
and sustainable economic development.
Excitement over the potential for Covid-19 to shorten supply chains, local-
ise production and bring some manufacturing from Asia to Africa appears
to have been – in general – premature. Though Covid-19 did disrupt more
complex global supply chains, such as those in the manufacturing sector,
producers are reported to have considered many these changes to have been
merely transitory. Covid-19 catalysed some investments by pharmaceutical
companies for production facilities within the continent, but there have been
challenges due to a reluctance of developed countries over the TRIPS waiver
at the WTO and free Covid-19 vaccine donations, which undermined local
production efforts. Further efforts are still needed to improve the business
environment and better attract diversified export-oriented businesses to
Africa. In summary, the Covid-19 crisis does not appear to have catalysed
the substantial transformation of Africa’s trade. Covid-19 is, however, also a
story of African trade policymaking focus and persistence. The AfCFTA, as
an initiative, amounts to a longer-term and slower-burning economic pol-
icy, rather than a ‘quick fix’. That is exactly the kind of project that is most at
risk of being forgotten in the throes of the sorts of emergency crises pressed
upon African countries during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the redirec-
tion of policy and business attention towards health and economic urgencies,
the longer-term vision of continental economic integration embodied by the
AfCFTA has persisted. The momentum behind the AfCFTA has weathered a
considerable storm, suggesting that this time policymakers have held fast and
committed to its promise of economic development. African policymakers
have also shown the willingness and value of policy efforts at the continental
level. Pooled medical supplies procurement across the continent helped to
How the Covid-19 crisis affected formal trade 173
alleviate the difficulties African countries, as some of the poorest in the world,
faced in the global scramble for vaccines, medicines and medical products.
Notes
1
Early versions of some figures in this chapter were first published in
Luke, David and MacLeod, Jamie (2021) ‘The impact of COVID-19
on trade in Africa’, Africa at LSE blog. 3 December.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/12/03/the-impact-of-covid-19
-pandemic-on-trade-africa-afcfta/
2
Authors’ calculations based on ITC TradeMap Data.
3
The Russian Federation, Vietnam and Myanmar, among others see (ECA
2020)
4
Survey of 206 businesses with operations covering all 54 African
countries over the period of 16 June to 20 July
5
Manufactured value-added growth data comes from World Bank
development indicators.
6
Manufactured value-added growth data comes from World Bank
development indicators.
7
In the case of Benin, for example, we observe a decline in the growth of
added value between 2019 and 2020 (11.25 per cent vs 3.36 per cent).
8
List of participants. Sixth Meeting of the Continental Free Trade Area
Negotiating Forum, 5–16 June 2017, Niamey, Niger.
9
Average excludes the host country Niger.
10
Report of the Third Meeting of the AfCFTA Council of Ministers, Accra,
Ghana, 20 November 2020, AfCFTA/CoM/3/Decns 11.
11
Updates on progress with the development of national AfCFTA strategies
were supplied by Judith Ameso of the African Trade Policy Centre, at the
UN Economic Commission for Africa, in November 2020.
References
Adepoju, Paul (2022) ‘Lack of Orders Could Halt COVID-19 Vaccine Pro-
duction in South Africa’, Devex, 14 April. https://perma.cc/EWR5-H448
AmCham (2020) ‘2020 China Business Report’.
Baffes, John and Nagle, Peter (2020) ‘The Commodity Markets Outlook
in Eight Charts’, World Bank Blogs, 22 October.
https://perma.cc/P4LS-8XVR
174 HOW AFRICA TRADES
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 179
The value of ICBT is significant across all African sub-regions but the avail-
ability of continent-wide data is weak by virtue of its inherent informality
(Byiers et al. 2021). Recent estimates have found ICBT to be between 7 and
16 per cent of formal intra-African trade flows, and 30 and 72 per cent of
formal trade between neighbouring countries – the equivalent of around
$10 billion to $24 billion in pre-pandemic years (Gaarder, Luke and Sommer
2021). While the individual consignments of informal traders might be small
in volume and value, the large number of daily transactions means that the
aggregate value of imports and exports can sometimes exceeds formal trade
(World Bank 2020a).
Policy responses to Covid-19 in Africa depended on capacity levels across
both trade and health policy. Policy interactions between trade and health are
not new; neither are weaknesses in their coordination. Trade-health policy
enforcement at the border was often weak pre-pandemic, particularly in terms
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In many instances, this stemmed
from the prevalence and character of informal trade, the porosity of borders,
and the sparsity of formal crossing points, or the relative ease with which for-
mal crossings could be circumvented. The issuance of health certificates prior
to the pandemic was in many instances more of a revenue-raising activity
than a health measure (Gaarder 2022). With many traders and goods crossing
unofficially, the effectiveness of such measures and safe trade more generally
risked being undermined by the large presence of informal trade (Gaarder
2022). With this weak ‘safe’ trade regulatory backdrop that pre-existed the
pandemic, new policy interventions during the crisis had a lot to make up for.
The stringency of Covid-19 health policy measures varied between A frican
countries and evolved over time (see Chapter 6). Many lockdowns were
announced with little notice given to traders about the timelines for lock-
downs and this lack of communication did not consider the impact on the
livelihoods of traders. Different types of measures had different impacts on
traders (Resnick, Spencer and Siwale 2020). Some responses focused on creat-
ing an enabling environment in some cases, while others involved restrictive
policies that worsened outcomes for traders. Informal traders in Africa had
to navigate uneven enforcement of travel bans, border closures and testing
across the borders of the countries where they operated. Health policy was
often prioritised over trade activity, primarily due to the fragility of availa-
ble health infrastructure. But some of the pressure to impose such stringent
measures was external:
181
periods. Zimbabwe only opened the borders for ICBT in February 2022.
In essence, ‘safe trade’ here was taken to mean no trade at all for informal
traders. This was not the case for other countries in Southern Africa: South
Africa, Zambia and Botswana opened their borders much earlier. This trend
cut across many borders in Africa: while border restrictions reduced in the
course of 2020, aided by ‘safe trade’ facilitative measures, they remained
more burdensome than pre-pandemic times in other countries (Luke and
MacLeod 2021).
Border closures, delays and increased costs of trading drove informal trad-
ers to pivot to unregulated and more precarious informal crossing points in
182 HOW AFRICA TRADES
‘no man’s lands’ (Mvungu and Kunaka 2021). Increased trade costs have been
a severe non-tariff barrier to informal traders. In the Great Lakes Region,
pre-pandemic, a ‘jeton’ (day pass) was previously issued to small traders for
free, but this was replaced with a ‘laissez passer’, which cost roughly US$10.00
for small traders crossing the borders between the DRC and Rwanda
and 10,000 Uganda shillings (about US$2.75) for Ugandan small traders and
US$5.00 for DRC small traders crossing the borders between the DRC and
Uganda (Mvungu and Kunaka 2021). These circumstances were not isolated
to Eastern Africa; in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, where the borders are
quite porous, ICBT might appear to have dramatically fallen during the pan-
demic because it was absent at formal border posts. In reality, it displaced to
informal, ‘illegal’ entry points owing to expensive compliance measures that
acted as disincentives for informal traders (Mafurutu 2022).
Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) introduced a series of
trade-health guidelines to harmonise measures. These were largely directed
at large-scale formal trade and failed to appropriately integrate informal
traders. In the initial stages, SADC, COMESA and the EAC developed
regional guidelines to facilitate trade, which was followed by guidelines
developed at the tripartite level. Some of the measures enforced by COMESA
member states were recognised as punitive, especially towards small-scale
traders, and, in response, the COMESA Secretariat developed guidelines
to facilitate the movement of essential commodities, PPE and foodstuffs
for member states (Onyango 2022). Most of the REC guidelines included
regulations covering mandatory testing, sanitising trucks and limiting crew
numbers, and were primarily focused on facilitating the movement of emer-
gency essential supplies. One of the major shortcomings of these regionally
articulated guidelines was how informal traders were overlooked in these
trade-health policy responses – they did not tailor specific policy interven-
tions to cater to, and assist the livelihoods of, informal traders (Onyango
2022; Sommer 2022).
The African Union took up the task of working towards a continental set of
guidelines in 2020 that would better integrate small-scale cross-border trade
facilitation – a task that had yet to be fulfilled by December 2022, with the
guidelines remaining a work in progress, and increasingly irrelevant, more
than two years on. The position of ICBT still had not received sufficient atten-
tion within the AU: ‘Right now to tell you the truth, we did not have any
activities focused on informal traders but the guidelines [recognise the need]
to deal with small scale traders’ (Kassee 2022). The AU guidelines were pre-
sented to the heads of customs authorities in 2021, who managed the trade
facilitation component, and were then endorsed by the ministerial meeting
responsible for trade in late 2021. While they focused on the broader scope
of trade (beyond land borders and maritime trade), they did not dedicate a
specific set of policy interventions for informal traders – ‘we are not saying
they are the best guidelines but at least we tried to come up with something’
(Kassee 2022). The AU guidelines are perhaps better viewed as a ‘live docu-
HowtheCovid-19crisisaffectedinformalanddigitaltrade 183
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 183
early 2022, borders had reopened in most cases but, overall, many health reg-
ulations remained in place, and time was needed for traders, customs author-
ities and immigration officials to familiarise themselves with new regulations
(Sommer 2022). In some countries, Covid-19 ‘safe trade’ border restrictions
were lifted or adjusted. For example, law enforcement become more relaxed
in Uganda: travellers still needed to present a negative Covid-19 test issued
no more than 120 hours before travel, but in practice this was not enforced
for small-scale traders and cross-border mobility improved (Titeca 2021).
In some cases, ‘safe trade’ measures helped to improve the enabling envi-
ronment for informal traders, especially in marketplaces during the height
of the pandemic (Resnick, Spencer and Siwale 2020, p.6). For example, in
response to market traders, who tend to operate in crowded environments
in border communities, authorities emphasised decongesting markets and
ensuring they operate with new health protocols. In Ghana, a partial lock-
down exempted actors in the food value chain and markets in all regions (not
just cross-border communities). Marketplaces were cleaned and disinfected,
with some districts following an ‘alternate products for alternate days’ system.
This adaptation depended on building trust and dialogue with Ghana’s ‘mar-
ket queens’ – influential female traders in the wholesale/retail distribution of
food commodities (Resnick, Spencer and Siwale 2020). Measures were not
always adapted to the needs of informal traders (Box 7.2). In the DRC, infor-
mal traders were not able to take advantage of the facilitation measures put
in place by certain governments to mitigate the negative effects of Covid-19
on the country’s economy, such as the three-month exemption of VAT on
the importation and sale of ‘basic’ goods and a financing scheme from the
Industry Promotion Fund (FPI – Fonds de Promotion de l’Industrie). These
were aimed at larger-scale traders (Bashi 2022a).
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 185
Many of these ‘safe trade’ measures are likely to persist. In the words of one
interviewee, ‘the thing about bureaucracy is that once you’ve introduced it, it’s
really hard to get rid of ’ (Gaarder 2022). Two years on since the announce-
ment of land border closures, it had become standard practice to comply with
sanitisation measures, Covid-19 testing and vaccination certification in order
to trade across many borders. It would take more effort to debureaucratise
this entire ecosystem, especially once parts of it had become digitally inte-
grated with cross-border trade – among the positive longer-term policy out-
comes of this period.
Did the STR ecosystem buffer informal traders from the pandemic?
Simplified trade regimes (STRs) are currently operational in two RECS: the
EAC and COMESA. These intend to facilitate small-scale cross-border trade,
by way of simplified clearance procedures (such as forgoing the requirement
for a certificate of origin) for low-value consignments (for example, less than
US$2,000) on applicable products. In COMESA these products are included
in several ‘common lists’, which are bilaterally agreed upon between partici-
pating countries, whereas in the EAC products are agreed unilaterally. In real-
ity, the STR merely ‘eliminates a duty that those traders should not have been
paying anyways’ (Gaarder 2022). Traders still have to pay VAT, excise duty,
obtain immigration documents and comply with a range of standards in order
to benefit from the STRs.
Prior to the pandemic, STRs faced implementation weaknesses. In the EAC,
many small-scale traders were unable take advantage of the STR owing to
limited awareness of the procedures and regulations and inconsistent com-
pliance by customs officers (Osoro 2022). In COMESA, the thresholds for
goods were not harmonised across member states; for example, Zimbabwe
applied the STR to consignments under $1,000, whereas Malawi applied the
STR to consignments under $2,000. STR desk officers in Zambia and Zimba-
bwe spotlighted these challenges and the fact that the goods covered under
the regime were last reviewed in 2013 (Mafurutu 2022). The utilisation rates
of the STR by informal traders is hard to quantify owing to a lack of data but
the picture across border posts is uneven. For example, the STR worked well
at the Chirundu border between Zimbabwe and Zambia, but:
the main reason it works there is pretty basic: the Zambezi River
separates the two countries, the formal border crossing point is on
the other side of a bridge, and it’s in the middle of a national park
with lions and elephants, incentivising people to trade formally.
(Gaarder 2022)
Was the impact of Covid-19 less severe on informal traders who traded within
the STRs? If it was the case that those borders with STRs affected informal
traders less adversely during the pandemic, then this may well form a strong
186 HOW AFRICA TRADES
case to push for the roll out of STRs across the continent. The picture is not so
simple. In the EAC, as long as informal traders were registered with associa-
tions and complied with the STR by passing official check points, they could
benefit from the STR during the pandemic after the initial shock border clo-
sures (Osoro 2022). Yet, with the absence of testing facilities at the border
posts, informal traders were still greatly affected, and the lack of appropriate
decentralised safe trade measures hindered the abilities of informal traders to
conduct trade officially through the STR.
In Southern Africa, the ‘STR did not change anything’ and for a signifi-
cant period of time three countries belonging to this STR still banned the
movement of informal traders despite the presence of an STR (Mafurutu
2022). In Zimbabwe, it took two years to open the formal border to informal
traders, so it was impossible for them to benefit from preferential treatment
despite the provisions for clearing of goods remaining in place throughout the
entire pandemic for formal cross-border trade. Regardless of how simplified
the trade regime is, if the ‘safe trade’ policy is border closure, the only thing
this is going to simplify is the decision of informal traders to take more infor-
mal and possibly even illegal routes.
The STR ecosystem is made up of several components (Figure 7.3). TIDOs
function to help small-scale traders understand the benefits of the STR and are
sometimes embedded inside ICBT associations but are rarely self-funded by
those associations. The impact of Covid-19 was often not less severe on infor-
mal traders at borders because STRs were in place. Rather, STR ecosystems
(border agencies, TIDOs and CBTAs) helped foster creative solutions, such as
the rise of ‘groupage’ trade in some regions. With the growth of aggregated pat-
terns of ICBT, this improved the monitoring of small cross-border trade, since
the more efficient flow of aggregated goods across borders allowed c ustoms
administrations to better identify goods from small cross-border trade and to
apply the preferential tariff provided for them under the STR (Bashi 2022a).
Informal cross-border trade has not transformed because of Covid-19.
While the substance of trade did not radically change, the aggregate value
increased, groupage trade emerged, and traders pivoted and found new
routes to access border markets, oftentimes resorting to more dangerous
routes. The means by which a substantive proportion of ICBT was carried
out did become more ‘formalised’ through the groupage mechanisms and
‘formal patterns of informal trade’ emerged. While some informal traders
adopted more formal mechanisms to continue operating during the Covid-
19 pandemic, ‘for every trader that formalised in response to the crisis, there
was another trader that became even more informal’ (Gaarder 2022). The
impact was especially gendered: ‘safe trade’ measures designed to buffer
shocks to Covid-19 disproportionately impacted women engaged more fre-
quently in informal trade than large-scale commercial traders. For example,
at the height of the pandemic in the EAC’s six member states, around 21.2
per cent of 260 women traders sampled reported that they were using infor-
mal routes to circumvent the existing Covid-19 measures in EAC partner
states (TradeMark East Africa 2021, p.12).
HowtheCovid-19crisisaffectedinformalanddigitaltrade 187
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 187
Trade
is being
recorded
Trade Information
Desks share
information with
ICBTs and focal
point to update
cross-border traders
associations
Overall, the experience of Covid-19 revealed that, when traders could not
easily pivot into new sectors/low-skilled employment/services or retrofit their
consignments, they diverted trade through less safe routes or through grou-
page. Where borders were shut, some informal traders pivoted towards the
scarce border posts that remained open, while others circumvented official
border posts altogether. For example, in Malawi many informal traders piv-
oted towards the Mchinji border, between Malawi and Zambia. Two factors
help to explain this: first, the Mchinji border is the nearest-to-destination bor-
der, so it is convenient to traders and, second, throughout the duration of the
pandemic, the other key border posts such as Mwanza faced strict closures
because of the measures taken by the destination countries. According to the
TIDO, the increase in small-scale traders’ passing through the Mchinji bor-
der post over recent years can also be attributed to the introduction of the
188 HOW AFRICA TRADES
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 189
imports during the pandemic. During the second quarter of 2020, an unex-
pected recovery took place in the eastern DRC, which recorded a 22 per cent
increase in 2020 levels, compared to 2019 (Bashi 2022b). Goods imported
using the groupage method were more closely monitored by customs admin-
istrations than had previously been the case for smaller informal consign-
ments. The administration was less incentivised to disaggregate the flow of
goods from small cross-border trade as ‘informal’ or ‘formal’ and blanket clas-
sified them as ‘large’ or ‘commercial’:
The customs directorate were all so proud. Everyone was telling us:
Covid-19 is going to crash our external trade and we’re going to be
in trouble. But look at the numbers, we even did better than 2019!
But when asked how much is coming from informal groupage
versus large-scale traders, they did not know, they just knew the
numbers were good. (Bashi 2022a)
Elsewhere, the picture varied. For example, in Uganda, where ICBT was reg-
ularly recorded pre-pandemic, and stringent border health measures were
imposed, the total ICBT in the second quarter of 2020 was a mere $3 million,
a considerable drop from the $125 million recorded during the same period
in 2019 (Gaarder, Luke and Sommer 2021, p.6), as shown in Figure 7.4.
Groupage cannot be taken as synonymous with formal trade as many infor-
mal traders engaged in groupage schemes were still not officially registered:
‘by the end of our groupage trade facilitation project in the [DRC], less than
20 per cent had registered with the state’ (Bashi 2022a). Incentives play a
strong driving factor in this type of data collection for governments: first, to
improve official trade flow statistics and the overall trade deficit, and, sec-
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 191
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 193
chases from – a variety of international buyers (Lanz et al. 2018; Sandberg and
Hakansson 2014; World Bank 2016). ‘Developing countries, which exhibit
the highest costs and biggest impediments to trade, stand to gain the most’,
according to the World Bank (2020b).
On the other hand, the same such businesses face a stark ‘digital divide’
and may risk being left behind by more sophisticated competitors (Foster
et al. 2018). There are concerns that digital trade embodies network effects
that can lead to market concentration and anti-competitive markets, meriting
new approaches to cross-border competition regulation (Khan 2016; UNC-
TAD 2019). Digital trade may facilitate the distortion by international com-
panies of their taxable income through transfer pricing (Banga 2019; OECD
2014). And, as unionisation potentially becomes less effective in fragmented
and transitional work environments, digital trade may require greater policy
involvement to ensure living wages and working standards (Graham, Hjorth
and Lehdonvirta 2017; Vandaele 2018).
Digital trade governance gained prominence in the lead-up to the 11th
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in 2017, with an
escalation of controversial proposals for the negotiation of new multilateral
rules in this area (Ismail 2020; MacLeod 2017). However, the seeds of those
proposals emanated from earlier bilateral and regional trade negotiations,
particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Regional Comprehensive and
Economic Partnership and the Trade in Services Agreement negotiations
(Berka 2017; Ismail 2020; Wolfe 2019). Three different visions for global digi-
tal trade governance can be considered to have since evolved. The first, led by
the United States, emphasises openness and liberalisation (Azmeh, Foster and
Echavarri 2020; Janow and Mavroidis 2019). The second, pushed principally
by the European Union, prioritises consumer rights and protections, such as
data privacy and cybersecurity (Aaronson and Leblond 2018). And the third,
from China and Russia, promotes a narrower view of digital trade eschewing
liberalisation and ensuring scope for substantive government interventions
for purposes of surveillance and national security (Ferracane and Lee-Maki-
yama 2017; Gao 2018). This leaves a final camp, comprising many developing
countries, including those in Africa, left falling in line with those respective
visions, trying to define their own priorities or simply deferring commitment
to different digital visions (Banga et al. 2020).2
It matters how African businesses, policymakers and traders engage with
the digital economy and shape it on the continent. It is likely that it will not
just increasingly reflect the way trade happens but also throw up unique chal-
lenges and opportunities that need to be addressed. Four characteristics help
to understand the nature of the digital economy in Africa. Even before Covid-
19, the digital economy had been, on average, growing rapidly in A frican
countries, but doing so from a relatively low baseline compared to other
regions. The breadth and depth of the use of the internet provides a straight-
forward but useful metric of the extent of digitalisation within an economy.
By this measure, digitalisation in Africa is far behind that of the other regions
194 HOW AFRICA TRADES
of the world but it has been catching up rapidly. As Figure 7.5 shows, internet
coverage across the continent has recently strengthened: 82 out of every 100
people in Africa were covered by at least 3G internet in 2021, up from 51
out of 100 in 2015. However, usage rates were lower. Nevertheless, Figure 7.6
shows that the share of the population actually using the internet in African
countries remains much lower than all other world regions, even if it has been
growing rapidly in recent years.
The second key characteristic to understand the African digital economy
is the presence of stark inequalities within countries. There is a large digital
divide, with urban individuals considerably more likely than rural popula-
tions to have access to, and use, the internet. To a smaller but noteworthy
degree, there are also digital divides facing women and older demographic
groupings, with men and youth (aged 15 to 24) significantly more likely to be
internet users (see Figure 7.7). Increasingly addressing these gaps will be vital
for the development of an equitable digital economy.
The third key characteristic is divisions between countries. The African dig-
ital economy remains geographically concentrated, with much more highly
advanced hubs emerging in certain corners of the continent. Figures 7.8
and 7.9 give an impression of this by using data from the International Trade
Centre on the presence and use of e-commerce platforms. The first simply
shows the number of digital platforms present in each African countries in
2020, to demonstrate the breadth of e-commerce platforms. The second shows
the average digital platform traffic for each country in the same year, to show
a gauge of the usage of these platforms. Together they demonstrate consid-
erable unevenness: outside of North Africa, and a few bright lights in South
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria, Africa’s digital economy remains in the dark.
The fourth key characteristic of the digital economy is its distinct form.
African consumers are mobile-first digital adopters. Internet-enabled
smartphone handsets are the most affordable and accessible avenue through
which consumers can access and utilise the internet. Consumers can do this
in the absence of fixed broadband connections and, because they are battery
powered, even throughout intermittent electricity availability (Pankomera
and van Greunen 2019). This in turn shapes the type of e-commerce that
emerges within it, with mobile-optimised applications dominating growth in
consumer usage.
The mobile digital economy does not always involve complex platforms
with integrated delivery, payments or management services, like Amazon or
Alibaba. In its most basic form, it involves vendors piggybacking on exist-
ing communications platforms – such as WhatsApp or Facebook – to market
goods and communicate with prospective clients, before closing deals with
physical goods and arranging transportation offline (BFA Global 2017). In
parts of countries where internet coverage is limited, slow or comparatively
expensive, mobile-first use can entail even simpler technologies, such as the
use of USSD (unstructured supplementary service data) or basic telephony
operations. In Niger, for example, the rollout of mobile phones to remote
HowtheCovid-19crisisaffectedinformalanddigitaltrade 195
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 195
previously noted, about 2.17 billion visits occurred on African marketplaces in 2019. The following maps
w the number of online marketplaces, the total web traffic on these marketplaces and the levels of web
How
ic growth across Africa inthe Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade
2017–19. 197
e: Data from 2019.Source: International Trade Centre (2020), p.6, reproduced with permission.
rce: ITC Africa Marketplace Explorer 2020 and SimilarWeb.
Figure 7.9: Average digital platform traffic per country, 2020
ure 2 Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa have most e-commerce traffic
221_final_Hi-res.pdf 18 12/2
Source:
e: Data from 2019. International
Figures Trade Centre
refer to the number (2020),
of visits p.7, reproduced
to e-commerce with permission.
websites.
rce: ITC Africa Marketplace Explorer 2020 and SimilarWeb.
198 HOW AFRICA TRADES
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 199
150
100
50
0
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Download Data
Trends in Marketplace traffic in Africa
Figure 7.12: More sophisticated ‘transactional’ platforms
© International
have
Trade Centre (2021)
weathered
FIRST ITEM the Covid-19
SECOND ITEM THIRD ITEM storm
FOURTH ITEM better
FITFT ITEM thanTREND LINE
simple ‘classifieds’
GRANULARITY January(index
2017 to December..
150
100
50
0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
Classified site
Transactional marketplace
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 201
There is no doubt that 2020 was a watershed year for the digital
transition. (Oxford Business Group, April 2021)
Since the start of the pandemic, the African Union Commission has launched
a Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa 2020–2030. Negotiations for a
protocol on e-commerce under the AfCFTA were effectively fast-tracked. The
First Africa Heads of State Summit on Cybersecurity was held in March 2022.
At the continental level, Covid-19 does seem to have brought the importance
of digitalisation and digital trade into the policymaking spheres of attention.
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 203
Digital solutions have also played a role in enabling ‘safe trade’, reducing the
need for physical human contact at borders (Box 7.4). These have ranged from
the digitalisation of permits and certificates to cashless payments at the border.
While the motivation was to improve public health measures, these govern-
ment initiatives often entailed secondary benefits, such as improved efficiency
or transparency. In some countries processes such as pre-registrations and
pre-arrival clearance of consignments were adopted to enable a trader to reg-
ister and enter goods for clearance on a mobile app ahead of arriving at the
border (Mvunga and Kunaka 2021, p.8).
Summary
The prevailing stories thrown up by Covid-19 in African countries are of cre-
ativity, ingenuity and resourcefulness, and in general demonstrate a capacity
for African trade policy to evolve and to be delivered nimbly. As the pandemic
necessitated border health measures, ‘safe trade’ practices emerged to enable
goods trade to flow. When those practices diverged, and made trade difficult
between neighbouring countries, regional economic communities demon-
strated their agility in harmonising such measures. That provides a lesson for
trade policymaking at the continental level, where similar efforts for AU har-
monised guidelines on safe trade measures did not deliver on time. If efforts
to consolidate African trade policymaking at the continental level are to be
successful, they will have to evolve to be more responsive.
Covid-19 interventions did not always work seamlessly or without issues.
Safe trade measures frequently overlooked the importance of informal
cross-border trade, despite this trade continuing to be a critical feature of
intra-African trade and a source of livelihoods. With borders either closed
or requiring stringent health measures to be satisfied, some of these infor-
mal traders adapted by aggregating their goods into more formalised ‘pooled’
consignments, while others were pushed to even more perilous informal
crossings points to circumvent those measures. These changes seem unlikely
to have a substantial and persisting ‘sticking power’ beyond Covid-19, with
traders reportedly likely to return to informal trade routes to reduce tax and
regulatory burdens.
Enthusiasm over the opportunity of Covid-19 for accelerating digitalisation
and e-commerce – which appeared valid in many more developed parts of
the world – seems in African countries to have put the cart before the horse.
Covid-19 shifted digital narratives and sparked policy and business attention,
possibly more than it transformed digital realities, outside of a few potent
examples. Yet that shift in policy attention may yet be harnessed to build
momentum and effectively change policies to boost digitalisation in African
countries, as demonstrated by the fast-tracking of the AfCFTA negotiations
on digital trade and the efforts to adopt digital trade facilitation measures at
border points across Africa.
204 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Notes
1
Early versions of some figures in this chapter were first published in
Luke, David and MacLeod, Jamie (2021) ‘The impact of COVID-19 on
trade in Africa’, Africa at LSE blog. 3 December.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/12/03/the-impact-of-covid-19
-pandemic-on-trade-africa-afcfta/
2
See Statement by the Africa Group, ‘The Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce: 20 October 2017’, JOB/GC/144 (20 October 2017).
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HowtheCovid-19crisisaffectedinformalanddigitaltrade 205
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 205
How the Covid-19 crisis affected informal and digital trade 207
This book set out to examine what Africa trades, with whom, where and
under which trade regimes, and also to assess and explain how the Covid-
19 pandemic impacted how Africa trades. A normative framework that
is pro-development and pro-equity provided the prism through which the
issues were considered. This was complemented by an approach to trade pol-
icy analysis as applied to stages within the trade policy cycle to help identify
what is working and what is not, and to concentrate analysis on the pressing
issues at each stage.
We first set out the data on what Africa trades (Chapter 1) before reviewing
the regimes, agreements and arrangements at continental, regional, bilateral
and multilateral levels under which Africa trades (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).
Chapters 6 and 7 then explained the effect of Covid-19 on Africa’s trade.
Throughout the book, insights have demonstrated why Africa’s trade is under-
sized and underperforms in contributing to the continent’s development
aspirations for industrialisation and economic transformation. The inher-
ent limitations of commodity concentration in Africa’s trade were weighed
against the relative diversification of intra-African trade. This is why there
has been so much interest in the AfCFTA, which entered into force on 30
May 2019. Yet the AfCFTA project is stutter-starting and to date trade has not
substantively flowed under the arrangement as envisaged in the agreement.
The asymmetrical trade relationship between Africa and its main trading
partners and the WTO’s ‘one size fit all’ rules raise questions of what conces-
sions might be essential for Africa – the world’s least-developed continent,
accounting for only a tiny fraction of world trade – to help change its trade
underperformance. Two key questions arise from these insights. First, what
is the ideal trade deal that Africa requires from its partners and at the WTO
to boost intra-African trade and incentivise trade deconcentration? Second,
what are the most critical policy initiatives and reforms that are required from
African stakeholders?
Conclusion 211
countries south of the Sahara. This has limited the incentives for the nascent
intra-African supply chains that criss-cross the continent to be fully leveraged
to boost internal and external trade. As a unilateral initiative, AGOA comes
with political conditionalities that are determined by the US. This ushers an
element of uncertainty into the deal. The other bilateral trade relationships
that were briefly surveyed, such as Africa’s trade with India, Turkey, Japan,
Russia and Brazil, lacked ambition for leveraging trade for development.
The insights from the review of these trade relationships suggest that new
trade deals are needed for Africa. Africa is the world’s least-developed con-
tinent with the lowest global trade shares. It needs trade arrangements that
incentivise and reward reduced commodity dependence, expanded produc-
tive capacities, interconnected supply chains, and diversified trade growth.
The empirical evidence suggests that, for these goals to be met, two comple-
mentary measures are required: the right sequencing of trade policy that pri-
oritises intra-African trade, which is already more diversified than Africa’s
external trade, and liberalised trade with harmonised trade rules between
African countries as offered by the AfCFTA initiative. Evidence from eco-
nomic modelling at the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was cited
to illustrate this point in regard to Africa’s trade arrangements with its biggest
partner, the EU.
This evidence suggests that implementation of the EU (and other advanced
country) reciprocal agreements ahead of the AfCFTA would result in losses
in trade – or trade diversion – between African countries. On the other hand,
if the AfCFTA were fully implemented before the reciprocal agreements, this
negative impact would be mitigated. Trade gains by both African countries
and the EU would be preserved, while intra-African trade would expand
significantly, benefitting trade in industrial goods. African integration is in
the world’s interest. Reduced non-tariff barriers, lower intra-African tariffs,
improved trade facilitation and integrated markets create a large, prosperous,
peaceful and more dynamic environment for trade and investment opportu-
nities for Africa’s trading partners, as well as for African own enterprises to
grow. This points to the need for strategic sequencing that prioritise imple-
mentation of the AfCFTA first.
The main elements of the ideal trade deal for Africa at this stage of its devel-
opment can be sketched along the following lines: for a transitional period
benchmarked against milestones in AfCFTA implementation and the gains
emerging from it, a good development case can be made for Africa’s trading
partners to offer to all African countries unilateral market access that is duty-
free and quota-free with a cumulative rules of origin regime. Concessions
to Africa, as the world’s poorest continent, that allow non-reciprocal access
in goods and services to partner markets for a fixed transitional period, are
strongly pro-development. With external market access secured for Africa’s
exports, they incentivise African countries to seek trade opportunities with
each other and mitigate the risks of trade diversion. By ensuring such a
212 HOW AFRICA TRADES
deliberate sequencing for the AfCFTA, this will help Africa to build produc-
tive capacities and achieve its potential for strong and diversified growth in
intra-African trade, with inclusive and transformational consequences. The
ideal trade deal for Africa raises three immediate questions, centring on what
might constitute a sufficient transition period, the justification for the inclu-
sion of North African countries, and possible obstacles to a WTO waiver that
would allow special treatment for Africa as a whole.
On the first question, of a sufficient transition period, the first clue is the
AU’s Agenda 2063, which envisages significant transformation of African
economies by that year. The EU’s Post-Cotonou Agreement (PCA), which
was reviewed in Chapter 3, provides another clue. The EU’s existing bilateral
trade deal with sub-Saharan countries is for a period of 20 years from 2021.
This suggests that, in the minds of the negotiators, it may take up to two dec-
ades for significant changes in Africa’s trade to emerge, which at that point
would warrant a review of the PCA. As regards the US’s AGOA, 10 years from
2025 is understood to be the timeframe that is, as of late 2022, being consid-
ered for a renewal of this trade concession. Yet another clue comes from ECA
modelling, cited earlier, which projects that, after full implementation of the
AfCFTA, gains for Africa would essentially be concentrated in intra-African
trade, which could see an increase of up to 33.8 per cent by 2045, as compared
to a baseline without the AfCFTA. The data-driven ECA projection may be
considered to be a judicious timeframe for the transition period.
On the second question, of the inclusion of North African countries, as was
noted in Chapter 4, the August 2022 US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa
announced by the Biden administration calls for the US to ‘address the artifi-
cial bureaucratic division between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa’. The
EU too, with the 2018 Jean-Claude Juncker State of the Union address, raised
the prospect of a ‘continent-to-continent free trade agreement as an economic
partnership between equals’. This appreciates that the value chains that are
developing across the continent outdo artificial divisions and that trade inte-
gration on the continent as a whole provides a more dynamic market for both
imports and exports. Egypt and Tunisia are already members of COMESA
and Mauritania is in ECOWAS, while Morocco has sought ECOWAS mem-
bership. Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have ratified the
AfCFTA Agreement, while at this point Libya has only signed it. It should also
be noted that the ECA modelling results assume continent-wide implemen-
tation of the AfCFTA.
On the third question, of multilateral legitimisation through a WTO
waiver, the precedent established by the US’s AGOA in obtaining a
WTO waiver suggests that this is not an insurmountable feat. Here it must
be recognised that the WTO’s ‘one size fits all’ rules require reimagination to
meet the 21st-century realities and challenges facing late developers, such as
African countries. As a member-driven organisation, with African countries
accounting for a quarter of its membership, consensus on a special deal for
Africa may not prove too difficult to achieve.
Conclusion 213
Conclusion 213
The ideal trade deal that assures non-reciprocal market access as sketched
out above is conscious of the fact that African countries do not pose a threat
to any of their trading partners in both goods and services. African countries
account for just 2.3 per cent of world trade. This is underscored by the low
levels of African participation in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, which
were discussed in Chapter 5. With insignificant shares of international trade,
low-income countries have less economic heft to back up settlements whether
as complainants or respondents in retaliating or absorbing retaliatory meas-
ures. This is compounded by the expense involved in litigation and by techni-
cal and capacity constraints at the African diplomatic missions in Geneva and
at home in the capitals. The international trading system can accommodate a
special trade deal for Africa with negligible systemic effect.
It further follows that African countries should rethink the merits of work-
ing through coalitions at the WTO that include other developing countries’
groups such as the G90 or the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States (OACPS) as this does not allow for sufficient differentiation of Africa’s
specific needs. On some special and differential treatment (SDT) issues, for
example, emerging economies or higher-income developing countries that
have already acquired substantial market share in some sectors are unlikely
to be granted policy space flexibilities, having already climbed some distance
‘up the ladder’. As the region with the smallest (and declining share of world
trade), African members should differentiate and pinpoint with finer clarity
where SDT is required to support their growth. A related question concerns
the distinction between ‘least-developed countries’ (LDCs) and ‘developing
countries’. With continental trade integration as the main strategy for boost-
ing intra-African trade and global trade shares, this distinction between
African countries is no longer tenable as it transcends the outworking of
value chains on the ground. This is recognised in the AfCFTA protocols
that require all signatories to assume the same obligations, with only a rel-
atively short transition period granted to LDCs specifically with regard to
the schedule for the liberalisation of trade in goods. In practice however,
customs unions such as ECOWAS and EAC that encompass both LDCs and
developing countries are following the same schedule for the liberalisation
of trade in goods, which underscores the artificial distinction between the
two categories of countries with respect to trade policy measures. Yet it is
increasingly recognised by African policymakers that merely created excep-
tions to the general WTO rules, through SDT, has not in itself worked and is
not sufficient (See communication of the Africa Group to the WTO General
Council, WT/GC/W/868). The WTO needs to be wielded more proactively
by African countries. This will involve pushing for provisions to the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to encourage
technological transfer, particularly of vital technologies needed for fight-
ing climate change and catching up with digitalisation. African countries,
as relatively small countries, must also fight for the equalising potential of
the WTO in a world in which unilateralism is increasingly prevailing, even
214 HOW AFRICA TRADES
AfCFTA implementation
The rationale of the AfCFTA is clear: it aims to boost intra-African trade and
through doing so to diversify African economies, while contributing to their
long-overdue industrialisation. It provides a platform for ambitious reforms
that include elimination of nearly all tariffs, disciplining non-tariff barriers,
harmonising approaches to services liberalisation and regulatory regimes,
and ushering in a rules-based arrangement for trade governance across the
continent. The AfCFTA enjoys broad consensus and strong political back-
ing as a flagship project of the AU Agenda 2063, as discussed in Chapters 2
and 6. Covid-19 revealed the commitment of Africa’s trade policymakers to
the AfCFTA initiative, despite the considerable policy distractions of a global
pandemic. With that commitment proven, it should be leveraged to broker
the compromises needed to get the AfCFTA working to substantively trans-
form trade in Africa.
The AfCFTA amounts to the crystallisation of decades of policy delibera-
tion into an actionable and legally enforceable trade agreement. An increas-
ing breadth of complementary projects, tools and initiatives such as the
Pan-African Payments System and the Guided Trade Initiative have been
put in place within the growing AfCFTA ecosystem to support implemen-
tation of the deal. However, with the start of trading stuck on technicalities,
the AfCFTA is yet to substantively take off (beyond the products supported
through the Guided Trade Initiative). Unlocking regional leadership could
offer a solution, as has been the case with Kenya and South Africa in leading
integration within EAC and SADC, respectively. Along with these countries,
Egypt and Nigeria played a key role in bringing about the success that was
achieved in the earlier phases of the AfCFTA negotiations. Rwanda, Senegal
Conclusion 215
Conclusion 215
and Uganda were also active in these phases in brokering compromises. The
message here is the need for leadership, creativity and compromise in real-
ising the start of trade under the AfCFTA to help generate the momentum
needed to get trade flowing across and transforming the continent.
AfCFTA implementation should take account of the RECs, which have a
practical function in enabling trade integration and connecting a continent
that is as vast as Africa. As also discussed in Chapter 2, the RECs are mas-
sively under-resourced, but they help to find and apply common solutions to
mutual supply constraints. As was also seen in Chapters 6 and 7, it was at the
level of the RECs that safe trade measures were designed and rapidly rolled
out during the Covid-19 pandemic. In the preamble to the AfCFTA Treaty,
and in Article 5 of the AfCFTA Framework Agreement, the eight AU-recog-
nised RECs are designated as the AfCFTA’s ‘building blocks’, meaning that
their best practices and achievements are to be followed and incorporated
into AfCFTA implementation. Article 12 confers an advisory role on them in
AfCFTA deliberations. This complements the role accorded to the RECs as
partners in the implementation of AU programmes.
As the AfCFTA is implemented, informal cross-border trade must not be
overlooked, particularly in policymaking circles, as a critical source of trade
and livelihoods. This was shown again during the Covid-19 crisis as border
health measures often disregarded such traders, as discussed in Chapter 7.
Frequently, trade policy measures are designed and implemented without suf-
ficient assessment of the implications for these valuable traders. They can be
better brought into each stage of the trade policymaking cycle. Improving and
developing the existing simplified trade regimes provides the ideal avenue to
use policy to interact with, and support, informal cross-border traders.
Behind-the-border reform
Turning now to behind-the-border measures which are also related to
AfCFTA implementation, as discussed in Chapter 3, the insights from the
Post-Cotonou Agreement (PCA) provide a ready-made agenda for policy and
institutional reform. The PCA gives prominence to business environment
reforms along with implementing effective competition policies, simplifying
business regulations and processes including non-tariff measures, reduc-
ing and streamlining administrative formalities and other customs mod-
ernisation reforms, compliance with trade facilitation commitments, sani-
tary, phytosanitary and other standards, and more generally reducing trade
costs. These are important reforms that should be complemented with open,
transparent and clear regulatory frameworks for business and investment
along with protection for property rights. The AfCFTA provisions on trade
facilitation and protocols on investment, competition policy and intellectual
property rights that were adopted in November 2022, if fully implemented,
will lock in c ommon obligations and requirements and provide a basis for
benchmarking best practices.
216 HOW AFRICA TRADES
Financial sector reforms are also crucial for improving trade performance
as recognised in the PCA. In particular, sustainable and responsible invest-
ment – from domestic and foreign, public and private sources that focus on
sectors that are essential for economic development – has high potential for
job creation in value-adding sectors and foster environmental sustainability.
At the same time appropriate measures are required that promote improved
access to finance and financial services, especially for micro, small and medi-
um-sized enterprises (MSMEs), the development and interconnectivity of
financial markets, and the integration of capital markets to ensure the effi-
cient allocation of savings to productive investment. Competition between
financial service providers and strengthened mobile and digital financial ser-
vices further helps to enhance access to finance, especially for MSMEs. Access
to affordable finance is one of the drivers of the formalisation of informal
cross-border trade (ICBT). As discussed in Chapter 7, the Covid-19 pandemic
provided insights on how scale efficiencies can drive and transform ICBT.
There is evidence to suggest that African countries that work towards sys-
tematic improvements of behind-the-border measures are also performing
better as traders. With regard to AGOA, for example, as discussed in Chapter 4,
the strength of the trade support environment in African countries has
determined whether or not they have been able to take advantage of AGOA.
Countries with AGOA utilisation strategies have performed better. It is in
this regard commendable that over 40 African countries are participating
in programmes designed to enhance performance under the AfCFTA through
national implementation schemes.
Strategic coordination
African Union resolutions frequently call upon its member states to consist-
ently apply their own resolutions agreed under AU auspices ‘to engage external
partners as one … speaking with one voice’. As was noted, summits between
African leaders in an AU configuration and partners now occur with regular
frequency. In recent years, and in particular since 2013 when the AU’s Agenda
2063 was adopted, the focus has turned towards how these partnerships can
be leveraged to support long-term economic transformation in Africa. This
can be seen in the increasing attention to support for overcoming supply-side
constraints such as infrastructure, energy, human development and sustain-
ability. Since Agenda 2063 shares many of the same aspirations as the UN’s
SDGs, it provides a ready-made basis for achieving consensus on priorities
between Africa and its partners. Yet the AU Commission has no mandate to
act on behalf of member states in trade negotiations or indeed in climate talks,
although it is well established that Africa is disadvantaged in these two policy
areas. Only ad hoc arrangements are put in place to coordinate negotiations.
Although the African Union maintains diplomatic representation
in key capitals such as Washington, DC, Brussels and Beijing, African
diplomatic missions struggle to engage strategically and coherently, and so
Conclusion 217
Conclusion 217
nderperform. Washington, DC, and Brussels offer multiple entry points for
u
engagement through the diverse agencies of the US executive branch, the
congressional caucus and committee system, and the EU Council, Commis-
sion and Parliament, respectively. Such pluralism may not be present in Bei-
jing, but its concentrated power structures should perhaps make the task less
onerous for coordinated African diplomatic activity. In Geneva, where an
African Union office is also in place, as noted in Chapter 5, it lacks capacity
to provide technical services to the WTO Africa Group including in draft-
ing proposals and preparing responses to proposals from interlocutors. To
enhance the role of the African Union in Geneva, it was suggested that it is
essential it is given observer status at the WTO, which it is currently denied.
It was recommended that to help ensure that African countries engage pro-
actively on current and future questions that arise at the WTO, the African
Union should set up a dedicated think tank on WTO issues to provide its
member states with policy options that support African interests. One of the
emerging issues that will impact how Africa trades concerns initiatives to
decarbonise national economies and the role that border adjustment meas-
ures can play in reducing the risk of carbon leakage. It is essential that, from
this early stage, African countries are able to shape new global rules on trade
and climate.
Without effective coordination, African countries are vulnerable to being
outmanoeuvred in trade negotiations and in their engagement with partners.
In geoeconomics and geopolitics, individual African countries lack influence
on their own to achieve meaningful outcomes that impact their development
prospects. They should work together. The AU Commission must be given a
mandate, direction and resources to secure outcomes that meet African aspi-
rations. The stakes are high. A reliable revenue stream from trade is critical for
development finance and sustainable debt management. Transforming how
Africa trades will unlock structural changes in African economies that have
proved elusive so far.
Final word
Informed deliberations on African trade policy need not be an activity for
‘experts’ alone. Trade affects the lives of ordinary Africans, shapes develop-
ment outcomes, and impacts the continent’s aspirations for economic trans-
formation. How Africa Trades is packed with insights for interrogating the
undersized and underperforming state of Africa’s trade. The book is published
on an open access basis to make it easily accessible and to enrich discussion
and engagement on issues of trade policy reform. Researchers are encouraged
to go deeper into the issues covered in this book. For teachers and educators,
the book can be used in interdisciplinary courses on international develop-
ment and across several disciplines in the social sciences including econom-
ics, law, politics and international relations. Most importantly, it is hoped that
this book will help to bring about change in how Africa trades.
HOWAFRICA TRADES
HOW
Africa must not go unheeded. This is a must-read for all interested in the crucial
role of trade in Africa’s economic development.”
Fatima Haram Acyl, Vice President of the Economic and Monetary Commission Edited by
for the Central African States, Former Commissioner of Trade and Industry at the
African Union Commission David Luke
AFRICA
“This is an authoritative book on what needs to be done to make Africa’s
undersized and underperforming trade become an engine of development,
poverty reduction, industrialisation and economic transformation. A must read
for anyone concerned about the future of Africa and the world.”
Professor Justin Yifu Lin, Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking
University, Former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, World Bank
TRADES