Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy
Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy
and his
Deccan Policy
(r.1658 – 1707)
C10 Internal Assignment
Name - Md Naseer
UG II, Semester IV
Registration no - 21106160050
Roll no.- HIST050
Department of History
Paper name - History of India VI (c.1605-1750)
Paper code – HIST-C10
Course Instructor - Dr. Sajjad Alam Rizvi
The sixth Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb, is renowned for his
imperialistic approaches and rigid commitment to Islamic law. During his rule,
he set out on a mission to increase and bolster the empire's holdings, which
resulted in numerous conquests across various regions of India. His Deccan
Policy, an aggressive drive to conquer southern India in order to attain his
ultimate objective of consolidating the Mughal Empire under his supreme rule,
was one of his most important initiatives. A much more comprehensive
political, theological, and economic strategy that would solidify Aurangzeb as
India's absolute ruler lay behind his conquest of the Deccan region.
The goals of Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy included strengthening
the Mughal Empire's control over the area, highlighting Mughal dominance,
putting an end to the political opposition from Muslims and Hindus, and
reducing the authority of the Deccan's local leaders. The Mughal Empire's
security and continued existence would be guaranteed as well as a
considerable boost in money as a result of the conquest of the Deccan.
Beginning in 1681, Aurangzeb's Deccan War saw the Mughal army initially
succeed until coming to a standstill against the Maratha Confederacy, a
formidable and well-coordinated force of Hindu warriors from Maharashtra. 1
The nearly 26-year-long battle was a disastrous military
undertaking for the Mughals, depleting their resources and revealing their
weaknesses. Significant instability and uprisings were caused by Aurangzeb's
religious intolerance toward Hindus and Deccan Muslims, making it difficult for
the Mughals to maintain dominance in the area. Aurangzeb persevered in his
1 Chandra, Satish. 2016. Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals. Part 2, Mughal Empire (1526-1748).
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
The First Phase (1658-68)
The Deccan policy, an aggressive campaign designed to subdue
the southern kingdoms and solidify Mughal dominance over the whole Indian
Subcontinent, characterized the first ten years of Aurangzeb's leadership. His
Deccan Policy would influence both the fortunes of the Mughal Empire and the
course of his reign, bringing about both its apogee and eventual fall. Shah
Jahan personally abandoned the contract of 1636, which stipulated that the
Mughals would never conquer Bijapur and Golconda in exchange for his
withholding help for the Marathas and giving up one-third of the territories of
Ahmednagar state. Golconda and Bijapur were in danger of disappearing in
1657–1658.
The Nizam Shah's domains, which had been ceded to Bijapur in
1636, had to be surrendered, and Golconda had to pay a hefty compensation.
After becoming emperor, Aurangzeb had to deal with two issues: convincing
Bijapur to give up the lands that had been given to it by the treaty of 1636, and
Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj's growing authority. Kalyani and Bider had been
safely enclosed in 1657. In 1660, Parenda was obtained through bribery. Adil
Shah's unwillingness to cooperate infuriated Aurangzeb, who gave Jai Singh the
command to punish both Adil Shah and Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. Jai Singh
was a wise political figure.4
It would be foolish to confront both of these fools at once, he
advised Aurangzeb. Twenty years later, Aurangzeb eventually agreed with Jai
4 Ibid
Singh's conclusion that the Maratha problem could not be resolved without a
forward policy in the Deccan. The emperor would need to be present during
the lengthy and arduous campaign to conquer the Deccan, as well as vast
army. But Aurangzeb couldn't afford to leave on a far-off campaign as long as
Shah Jahan was still Alinejad Singh's Bijapur campaign in 1665 was doomed to
failure given his meagre resources. The campaign re-enacted the Deccani
states' united front against the Mughals since Qutb Shah dispatched a sizable
force to support Bijapur. 5
Guerrilla tactics were used by the Deccanis to lure Jai Singh to
Bijapur while destroying the countryside to prevent the Mughals from
obtaining supplies. Because he had not brought siege guns, Jai Singh
discovered that he had no way to attack the city and that he could not take the
city by force. Jai Singh did not conquer any new land during the Deccani
campaign Singh's death was hastened by his failure to succeed and
Aurangzeb's criticisms; he passed away in 1667.The Mughals used bribery in
1668 to force Sholapur's capitulation. The strengthening of Mughal control in
the area and successful military expeditions were the defining features of
Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy's initial stage.6
The mounting unhappiness among the Hindu population and
the financial pressures on the Mughal treasury were two signs of the policy
changes, though. The second phase of the program, which lasted for more
than two decades and was characterized by defeats, betrayal, and a final
5 Ibid
6 Richards, John F. “The Mughal Empire,” March 18, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511584060
dismantling of the Mughal Empire, was driven by Aurangzeb's unshakable
determination to conquer the Deccan. Thus, the first stage was complete.
The Second Phase (1668-84)
After Ali Adil Shah's death in 1672, Bijapur experienced rapid
internal decay, creating a new circumstance. Aurangzeb had three possibilities
given his belief that Shivaji was unreliable and ambitious, and that it was
impossible to come to a firm accord with him:(i) to adopt a policy of strict
neutrality towards the Deccan states, even if it implied Shivaji's conquest or
dominance of Bijapur, either alone or in alliance with Golconda; (ii) to attempt
to shore up Bijapur against Marathas incursions, even against its wishes, by
finding a dependable instrument or faction at the Bijapur court to support this
policy, and if possible, to persuade Golconda to join though never seriously
considered due to its impossibility, the first option's adoption may not have
been as detrimental as the others after all. 7
Even though one of the Deccan's stable and prosperous states,
Bijapur, was ruled by the Marathas, the Mughals might not have been
significantly harmed by this. However, the developments starting in 1656, the
character of the Mughal state, and Aurangzeb's desire for a forceful strategy—
including, if necessary, annexation—prevented a strategy of masterly
inactivity. When Aurangzeb was eventually persuaded, based on his own
experience, that the Deccan states would never join forces with him to utterly
7 Ibid
smash the Marathas, he drifted to the second option until finally abandoning it
in favour of the third in 1684.8
During this time, the ascent to power of Madanna and
Akhanna in Golconda was a novel factor. After Abul Hasan's accession in 1672,
Madanna Pandit, a Teleg brahman who had served as Saiyid
Muzaltar9 ,secretary and personal assistant, was named wazir and Bestwaby.
These two brothers practically held power in Golconda from 1672 until the
state's dissolution in 1687. The brothers pursued a strategy of attempting to
forge an alliance between Golconda, Biapur, and Shivaji. Due to his
dissatisfaction with these meagre victories, Diler Khan, Aurangzeb's lieutenant,
took over as Bahadur Khan's leader.
Diler Khan reversed Bahadur Khan's strategy of siding with the
Deccani party and Bijapur against the Afghans. Diler Khan listened to Bahlol
Khan's eloquent argument in favour of a combined attack on Golkonda and
subsequently jointly destroying Shivaji. The Golconda expedition, however,
was a disgraceful failure (1677) that did nothing but forward Madanna and
Ahhanna's strategy of forging a cohesive front of Deccani strength against the
Mughals.
Mandanna and Shivaji had already signed a subsidiary
agreement in which Mandanna promised Shivaji a yearly payment of 15,000
huns for the realm's defence’s Mughal-Bijapur invasion in 1677 also failed as a
result of Mandanna and Akhana's strong leadership. Diler Khan nevertheless
8 The Deccan states like Bijapur and Golconda was supported by the Marathas against Emperor Aurangzeb and
10 Ibid
under siege for 18 months, with Aurangzeb being present during the last few
weeks. 11
The earlier failures of Jai Singh (1665) and Diler Khan (1679–
80) are well justified by this. After Bijapur's fall, a campaign against Golconda
was unavoidable. There were too many "sins" committed by the Outb Shah to
be forgiven. He had granted the unbelievers Madanna and Akhanna absolute
power and had frequently aided Shivaji. His most recent "treachery" involved
defying Aurangzeb's warning and dispatching 40,00 soldiers to aid Bijapur.
Despite fierce resistance, the Mughals had taken control of Golconda by 1083.
12
In exchange for a sizable stipend, the ceding of some
territories, and the removal of Mandanna and Akhanna, the emperor had
consented to pardon the Qutub Shah. Qutub Shah Had sins and Akhanna were
killed in the streets after being taken there in 1686.However, the Qutub Shahi
monarchy was not able to be saved by this crime. After Bijapur fell, Aurangzeb
made the decision to make amends with the Qutub Shah. Early in 1687, the
siege began, and after more than six months of fighting, the fort was
abandoned due to betrayal and corruption. Even though Aurangzeb had
succeeded, he soon realized that his problems hadn't ended with the
destruction of Bijapur and Golconda.13
The Last Phase (1687-1707)
11 Ibid
12 Following the downfall of Bijapur, a campaign against Golconda was inevitable. In 1685, despite stiff
14 Ibid
15 From this point of time, the Marathas could be called the real rulers of the Deccan as the power was