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FMDS0605
FMDS0605
Table of Contents
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6-5 Oil- and Gas-Fired Multiple Burner Boilers
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Typical fuel train for a gas-fired, multiple-burner boiler ..................................................................... 5
Fig. 2. Typical fuel train for light oil igniter system with heavy oil main burner fuel system ........................ 6
List of Tables
Table 1. Summary of Recommended Safety Controls and Interlocks ........................................................... 7
Table 2. Causes of Explosion Losses (FM Global Loss History, 2002-2012) .............................................. 16
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet is concerned primarily with the hazards associated with the firing of natural gas and standard
grades of fuel oil in multiple-burner boilers. Similar guidelines may also be applied to the firing of other liquid
or gaseous fuels. For example, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) such as propane, is sometimes used as a
backup fuel source. The recommendations in this data sheet for gaseous fuels also apply to LPG, with
additional guidance related to venting located in Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas. Each installation
must be carefully evaluated, with consideration given to the characteristics of the fuel, the hazards involved,
suitability of the equipment, and need for special protection.
The boilers addressed in this data sheet cover a broad range of sizes. In general, industrial boilers have a
steam capacity ranging from 50,000 lb/hr (22,000 kg/hr) to 200,000 lb/hr (9 x 104 kg/hr), and electric utility
boilers range from 500,000 lb/hr (220,000 kg/hr) to 7,000,000 lb/hr (3.2 x 106 kg/hr).
Single-burner boilers are covered in Data Sheet 6-4, Oil- and Gas-Fired Single-Burner Boilers.
1.1 Changes
October 2020. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
2.2 Protection
B. If fuel oil system components (e.g., tanks, pumps) are located within the boiler room, or the oil piping
system in the boiler room is not designed in accordance with this data sheet (see Section 2.3.1), provide
automatic sprinkler protection in accordance with Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations.
2.2.2.3 Provide standard response, ordinary temperature-rated, K5.6 (80) or larger sprinklers under any
obstruction that exceeds 3 ft (0.9 m) in width or diameter, or 10 ft2 (0.9 m2) in area. This includes obstructions
associated with the boiler face.
2.2.3 Provide FM Approved portable extinguishers in accordance with Data Sheet 4-5, Portable Extinguishers.
Refer to Data Sheet 4-5 to determine effective sizes and locations for the extinguishers.
C1 C2
B B
Q
PSH
T R
To other PSL
boilers
O2 R2 S S R1
K S PI Other main
PSH PSL PI PI burners
PSL
T O M T M D
Gas J A
F F
supply J Main
D1 Note 1 burner
Outside of boiler room I P
Igniter
C4
C5
S PI
G G
K
T F E
Q PSH Other
igniters
R PSL
Igniters (permanently
installed)
Note 1: Piping between fuel SSOV and burner/ingiter should be as short as possible.
Scavenging Y
medium
S PI
G Y
Note 2
N
Light oil
supply
T F E
Other
igniters
R PS Igniters
(permanently
installed)
Igniter
Main
Note 1 burner
Oil return
S PI Note 2
S1
B C
R PS PI
S
Y Y
PI
O TSL
A Scavenging
M D
T N medium
W Y Steam or
Oil supply F
air header
Other main
burners
A1 D1 PD
Z1
Z
T
Notes:
1. Distance from shutoff valve to main burner/igniter should be as short as possible. Trap
2. Entry of scavenging medium should be as close as possible to check valve.
Atomizing
medium
supply
Fig. 2. Typical fuel train for light oil igniter system with heavy oil main burner fuel system
2.3.3.1 Provide a timed preventilation period to purge the boiler enclosure prior to admitting fuel into the
boiler. Ensure the purge consists of at least five volume changes of the boiler enclosure, with fresh air for
a continuous period of not less than five minutes. Ensure the purge airflow rate is at least equal to 25% of
the full load volumetric flow. Simultaneously, purge (with not less than five volume changes) any other
components downstream of the boiler that contain an ignition source.
2.3.3.2 Provide a complete purge after an emergency shutdown or master fuel trip (MFT). If airflow is less
than the purge rate, maintain the existing rate for at least 5 minutes and then gradually increase to the purge
rate. If the airflow is higher than the purge rate, it can be gradually decreased to the purge rate. If any or
all fans need to be restarted to complete the purge, wait a minimum of 15 minutes before attempting to restart
the fan(s), then gradually increase the air flow to purge rate.
2.3.3.3 Ensure the purge period is controlled by the combustion safeguard so the ignition system will not
activate and the safety shutoff valves will not open before the purge has been completed. (On older systems,
an FM Approved time delay switch wired into the safety control circuit may be used.)
A manual reset of the MFT relay, which can only be done after purge has been completed, meets the intent
of this recommendation.
2.3.3.4 Provide interlocks to prove the following conditions are satisfied prior to initiating purge. If any
permissive interlock is lost during the purge timing, a re-initiation of the purge is needed.
A. Main fuel and igniter header safety shutoff valves, and all individual burner and igniter safety shutoff
valves are closed. When provided with FM supervisory cocks, all cocks must be proved closed prior to and
during the purge period. The FM cocks can be interlocked with the combustion safeguard, main safety
shutoff valve, or purge timer to serve as a purge permissive. Refer to Data Sheet 6-18, FM Cock
Safety-Control System.
B. All required burner registers or dampers are open to the purge position (for automatic boilers).
C. At least one set of induced-draft and forced-draft fans is running.
D. Air flow is not less than 25% of full load volumetric air flow.
2.3.5 Igniters
2.3.5.1 Provide permanently installed igniters that have sufficient capacity to ensure prompt ignition of the
main burner. Ignition energy requirements will vary depending on the location of igniter with respect to the
main burner, main burner fuel input, and the firing conditions for which igniter operation is required (i.e.,
interrupted, intermittent, or continuous operation). An igniter is a fixed device that provides the energy
required to ensure prompt ignition of the main burner. A pilot is a type of fuel-fired igniter.
2.3.5.2 Provide flame supervision for each fuel-fired igniter. Separate flame supervision from that used for
the main burner flame is required if a Class 2 igniter is operated beyond the trial-for-ignition period (i.e., flame
supervision of the main burner is positioned so as to not see igniter flame).
2.3.5.3 Install igniter(s) and flame sensing element(s) securely so the position of each with respect to the
others and the main flame will not change. Provide observation ports so these positions can be seen while
the igniter and/or main burner are firing. Ensure these units are readily accessible for inspection and
cleaning.
2.3.6.2.3 Install two SSOVs in the fuel line to each igniter. If an igniter is rated at 5,000,000 Btu/hr input or
higher, provide proof-of-closure on at least one of the SSOVs and, if rated 12,500,000 Btu/hr input or higher,
provide proof-of-closure on both SSOVs.
2.3.6.2.4 Use of an FM Approved automatic leak detection/leak tightness testing system can be used in lieu
of proof-of-closure.
2.3.6.2.5 It is permissible to gang burners or igniters together so they are placed into service simultaneously
from a single pair of safety shutoff valves. However, each burner and igniter of the group must be reliably
supervised so that failure of any one to light or remain lit will cause the fuel to the entire group to be shut off.
2.3.8.3 Ensure loss of flame at an individual burner flame envelope causes the safety shutoff valves for the
individual igniter or burner to trip.
Ensure total loss of flame trips all fuel to the unit and requires a complete furnace purge.
2.3.8.4 Install the combustion safeguard flame-sensing element(s) in accordance with manufacturer’s
instructions. Locate the main burner flame-sensing element so it reliably senses the main flame at all firing
rates. When an igniter is proved by a combustion safeguard, ensure supervision is at a location where the
igniter flame will effectively ignite the main burner or burner unit. Ensure the main burner is ignited immediately
by its igniter, even when the igniter is reduced to the minimum flame capable of holding the flame-sensing
relay of the combustion safeguard in the energized (flame-present) position.
2.3.8.5 Ensure the safe-start check for the combustion safeguard is not nullified by the action of operating
or limit controls.
2.3.8.6 When UV scanners are used, provide self-checking UV flame scanners on boilers that are in
continuous operation or where an operating cycle exceeds 24 hours. Non-self-checking UV flame scanners
can fail in an unsafe manner. Self-checking is not needed on electronic UV scanners that do not use UV
cells. Refer to Data Sheet 6-0, Elements of Industrial Heating Equipment.
2.3.8.7 Ensure clean air is supplied to flame scanner lenses for the purpose of cleaning or cooling where it
is found necessary. This will help to prevent nuisance tripping.
Upon actuation of any of these interlocks, close the FGR damper and, when the boiler cannot be operated
without the FGR system in operation, initiate a master fuel trip.
2.4.1 General
Provide adequate means of communication between the control room and the boiler burner front areas. This
is especially important on multi-burner, multi-tier boilers, and remotely controlled units. Explosions have
occurred because the activities of the equipment operator at the burners and the actions taken by the control
room operator were improperly coordinated during critical operation situations such as lighting off, bringing
the boiler up to pressure, or during upset operating conditions involving flame instability.
L. Boiler low water protection in accordance with Data Sheet 6-12, Low Water Protection for Boilers.
M. Operator manual emergency shutdown switch(es)
N. As required for oil-firing:
1. Disassemble and clean atomizers
2. Clean strainers
2.4.2.2 Upon completion, ensure covers of all safety controls are secured in place to minimize tampering
and the introduction of dust and dirt.
2.4.3 Maintenance
2.4.3.1 Keep the fuel free from all foreign matter, solid or liquid. Remove welding beads, chips, scale, dust,
and debris from both newly installed fuel piping and that which has been opened for alteration or maintenance.
Use inert gas, air, or steam to blow lines clean. Do not use natural gas. Refer to DS 7-54 for additional
information. Install suitable strainers, filters, drip legs, etc.
2.4.3.2 Maintain all equipment in good condition. Maintenance details and schedules depend on the
equipment, the operating conditions, and the environment. Follow a specific routine recommended by the
manufacturer and include (at scheduled intervals) maintenance of burner equipment, inspection and cleaning
of the electric igniter and/or pilot-burner assembly, and maintenance of all safety controls. Other important
maintenance items are (a) linkages and controllers of fuel-air-ratio control dampers and valves, and (b) flame
scanner cells, amplifiers, or other control equipment replaced as recommended by the manufacturer.
2.4.3.3 Examine flexible hoses carefully, as they are a likely place for a fuel leak to develop. Replace braided
oil hoses periodically, based on usage and consultation with the hose or boiler manufacturer. Older hoses
may not flex properly and cause leaks at threaded connections or result in hose breakage, especially if there
are 90 degree bends. Hoses that are bulged, stiff, or corroded need immediate replacement. Hoses are
subject to both tensile and compressive stresses, to internal pressure, and to the extremes of temperature,
vibration, corrosive atmospheres, and physical impact and reactive forces.
2.4.3.4 Inform operators if control adjustments are to be made by plant technicians or outside contractors,
and ensure they are on hand to assist and respond in the event of an upset. Upsets may occur when controls
are being maintained on-line, and it may be necessary to switch to manual boiler control if upsets occur.
2.4.3.5 Keep instrument air dry and clean. Water, oil, or dirt in a control air line can interfere with the proper
operation of pneumatically operated control devices. Alarm refrigeration-type dryers for high temperature,
and inspect automatic water traps on air pressure tanks for proper operation. Check and maintain desiccant
dryers, if used, as recommended by the manufacturer. If instrument air lines pass through an area subject
to freeze-ups, take appropriate precautions. Refer to Data Sheet 9-18/17-18, Prevention of Freeze-ups.
2.4.3.6 For oil firing, inspect oil burner tips periodically for cleanliness. Carbon deposits indicate poor
combustion, the cause of which needs to be determined. Test oil for sediment if this problem suddenly appears
on a boiler that has been burning efficiently.
2.4.3.7 Low load oil firing, which may occur during acid cleaning of boiler internals, often leads to oil deposits
inside furnaces. After such an operation, inspect and, if necessary, clean furnaces before reverting to high
firing.
2.4.3.8 Verify that manual gas valves are closed when the boiler is shutdown. This is especially important
when trouble-shooting a control system or other boiler components and when performing maintenance or hot
work on the boiler.
2.4.4.1 General
Two-burner boilers with a single fuel and air control and separate safety shutoff valves can present special
hazards involving fuel/air ratio upsets during light-off, fuel transfer, and trip of one burner. (The following
recommendations do not apply to boilers with two burners that operate as one with single controls and
common safety shutoff valves.)
Similar hazards and guidance apply to boilers with up to 12 burners, although the impact of a change in
operation (starting or tripping) of one burner becomes proportionately less. For boilers with more than 12
burners, the impact of a change in operation of one burner will usually be within the operating tolerance of
the remaining burners.
2.4.4.2 Interlocks
If a flame failure is sensed at either burner, ensure one of the following takes place:
A. Trip all fuel.
B. Trip the individual burner safety shutoff valve(s) for the burner experiencing flameout and reduce the
total fuel flow by 50%. Do not reduce the air flow to either burner.
C. Trip the individual safety shutoff valve(s) for the burner experiencing flameout and cut out air to that
burner. Ensure the fuel input to the other burner does not exceed the burner rating.
2.5 Training
2.5.1 Train operators in the proper operation of the boiler and the specific functions of the various safety
controls. Ensure training is ongoing and instructs operators on how to respond to various upset scenarios.
An upset can cause a rapid chain of events that require an immediate response. Operator awareness is
particularly important during the boiler warm-up period and also during shutdown and load changes. Fuel/air
ratio may be more difficult to control during these periods, and an explosion is more likely to occur than during
normal firing. Retrofitting with low NOX burner systems and other pollution control equipment requires
additional training for operators. Multiple-burner boiler operation involves more human interface than single
burner boiler operation, which is one reason why the human error factor is greater for these boilers than
malfunction or lack of safety controls.
2.5.2 Post operating instructions or keep them in the boiler room available for ready reference, and ensure
they are adhered to.
2.7 Electrical
2.7.1 Design electrical installations in accordance with the National Electrical Code or to the applicable local
code.
2.7.2 Ensure both ac and dc safety control circuits are two-wire with one side grounded. Limit all safety control
switching to the hot, ungrounded conductor.
2.7.3 Provide overcurrent and ground fault protection. In addition to circuit grounds, provide grounding for
non-current carrying metal parts, such as equipment enclosures and conduit.
2.7.4 In the Unites States and other countries where 120 volt circuits are used, limit control voltage to not
more than 120 volts.
2.7.5 In unusual cases where an ungrounded dc power supply cannot be avoided, locate all switching in
one conductor and provide ground fault detection.
1
The cause of the loss was not identified in approximately 1/3 of the losses occurring between 2002 and 2012. Most losses had more than
one factor. The percentages shown are based on the losses for which cause(s) were identified.
light-off of the burner by this igniter, boiler steam pressure continued to fall, rather than increase as it should
have. An operator was sent to the boiler to start the second burner. An explosion occurred as the operator
lit-off the second igniter.
The explosion caused refractory in the furnace area to crack and firebrick to be dislodged. In addition, the
rear and both sides of the boiler were deflected outward, the casing cracked in several places, and supporting
beams were bent. Explosion doors on the top of the furnace opened and relieved the overpressure, reducing
the extent of boiler damage. A follow-up investigation determined that the DCS, added in the late 1990s,
had a faulty module that resulted in a false indication of burner/igniter flame at the one igniter that was thought
to have been left in service. Poor operating procedures and operator error contributed to the loss by
permitting the use of a single igniter to keep the boiler in “operating mode” while paper machine repairs were
made, by relying solely on control room indication as confirmation that both the first igniter and burner were
operating, and by attempting to start the second burner without first investigating why steam pressure was
continuing to fall. Interruption to facility operation was minimized by a second boiler at the mill that was able
to meet plant steam demand.
3.2.2.1 Inadequate Segregation of Pump Room, Lack of Automatic Shutoff Valve for Pumping System,
and Impaired Sprinkler System Result in Significant Fire Damage
An electric power generating plant contained four conventional boiler-steam turbine-generator units, two of
which were not operational. The two boilers that were in service were both rated at 1,225,000 lbs steam/hr
(555,650 kg/hr).
The units operated on natural gas and/or No. 6 oil, which was supplied to a one-story pump room that
contained four positive displacement fuel pumps, oil heaters, and other related equipment. The pump area
was located along two exterior walls of the building. However, the interior walls of the room were open to the
rest of the boiler building with no fire-rated cutoffs, containment, or emergency drainage. Automatic sprinklers
were installed in the pump area, but the system was impaired while upgrades were being made to the fire
protection system control panel.
One of the turbine-generator units tripped due to a loss of excitation, which initiated a boiler master fuel oil
trip (MFT). Upon unit trip, power supply to the turbine generator was automatically transferred from an
auxiliary transformer to a starting transformer, which caused a voltage disturbance to the facility’s equipment.
This caused control air compressors to trip. The compressors were not provided with alarms, and operators
were not aware they had been shut down.
The MFT also caused all fuel supply to the boiler to shut via a control valve, while a recirculation valve was
installed to handle full oil pump flow. Upon unit trip, the fuel oil pump discharge pressure rose to approximately
430 psi (29.6 bar), which exceeded the 365 psi (25.2 bar) fuel oil relief valve setting, before the recirculation
valve fully opened to reduce the pressure. However, as a result of the tripping of the compressors, the
recirculation valve suddenly failed closed due to loss of control air. The oil pump discharge pressure rose
to 525 psi (36.2 bar), which cracked a threaded nipple and released oil into the pump room as an atomized
spray. The oil sprayed onto a large 480 V radiant ceiling-hung heater and ignited. Analysis performed
following the fire estimated the leak from the failed nipple released between 65 and 75 gpm (246 and 285
L/min).
Operators noticed heavy black smoke coming from the area, and the public fire service was called. Operators
attempted to put out the fire using portable extinguishers, but their efforts were unsuccessful. The fuel oil
supply was not shut down until approximately 15 minutes after the initial pipe failure, and the fire was
extinguished approximately 2 hours later.
The roof support steel in the pump room had sagged due to the fire, and all equipment within the area (pumps,
valves, heating equipment, etc.) was heavily damaged. Because the room was open to the rest of the
building, smoke and heat traveled through the entire 175 ft (53 m) height of the building, damaging an adjacent
elevator, buckling stairs, and damaging instrumentation, controls, and other equipment on the floors above
the fire origin. The building’s brick walls for the first two floors above the fire origin were damaged and required
replacement, while fuel oil and natural gas piping suffered heat damage and had to be replaced. The roof
of the boiler building (175 ft [53 m] above the level of fire origin) sustained minor heat damage, and smoke
damage was noted throughout the building.
4.0 REFERENCES
For more information, please refer to the following publications as cited in the text:
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 3-26, Fire Protection Water Demand for Nonstorage Sprinklered Properties
Data Sheet 4-5, Portable Extinguishers
Data Sheet 6-0, Elements of Industrial Heating Equipment
Data Sheet 6-4, Oil- and Gas-Fired Single-Burner Boilers
Data Sheet 6-6, Boiler Furnace Implosions
Data Sheet 6-12, Low-Water Protection for Boilers
Data Sheet 6-13, Waste Fuel-Fired Facilities
Data Sheet 6-18, FM Cock Safety-Control System
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-54, Natural Gas and Gas Piping
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Data Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks
Data Sheet 9-0, Maintenance and Inspection
Data Sheet 9-18/17-18, Prevention of Freeze-ups
Data Sheet 10-2, Emergency Response
4.2 Other
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1., Power Piping.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 31, Oil Burning Equipment.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 70, National Electric Code.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code.
6. Tables have been added summarizing new safety shutoff valve recommendations. The previous data
sheet recommended a safety shutoff valve for each main and igniter header and for each individual burner
and igniter. The new tables, one for gas-fired boilers and one for oil-fired boilers, describe the requirements
for manual, supervised manual, and automatic boilers. The recommendations are in agreement with NFPA
85C, with the exception of the automatic vent. Valve seal overtravel proof-of-closure SSOVs are
recommended for all main and igniter headers, for each main burner, and also for igniters depending on
size.
7. A table has been added for recommended safety controls and interlocks.
8. A recommendation has been added for a manual master fuel trip.
9. The importance of keeping control air clean and dry has been stressed.
10. Recommendations concerning loss of combustion air and damper position switches have been added.
11. Consideration for CO monitoring for the detection of off-ratio firing has been changed to a
recommendation.
12. Recommendations and reference material on flue gas recirculation (FGR) and low NOX burners have
been added.
13. Recommendations for burner front fire detection and protection have been added.
14. Information on classes of igniters has been added.
15. A recommendation on self-checking UV flame scanners (from TAB 6-0) has been added.
16. Testing frequency for safety controls has been added.
17. An alarm for loss of flame at individual burners when using a tangential firing arrangement has been
recommended.
18. A gas pressure relief valve downstream of gas pressure regulators has been recommended.
19. An allowance has been made for gas device vent piping to be connected to a single roof stack so that
only a single penetration through the roof deck is needed.
C.1.1 General
Well-trained operating personnel following proper procedures are essential to the safe operation of multiple
burner power boilers. A fundamental principle or operating procedure is the open-register or fuel-lean startup.
This procedure provides for a continuous and constant airflow rate through the unit during the purge, startup
and initial load-carrying period of operation. The same number of burner registers or burner dampers required
for purging the boiler are kept open at the normal firing position throughout the starting sequence. However,
as a specific burner is being started, its register or damper is usually readjusted to provide the proper, reduced
burner air flow just prior to lighting-off. After the burner flame is established, the register is returned to the
open position. For some units, modifications on specific burner dampers or registers opened during the startup
may be necessary to control temperatures in the boiler passes. However, such modifications should be made
only if determined necessary after operating the installed unit.
This open register procedure has the advantages of a highly fuel-lean furnace atmosphere which reduces
the probability of explosion if some malfunction occurs, such as burner flameout. It also minimizes the chance
of fuel-rich flameout during the startup, and, after the flow of purge air is established, only minor adjustments
are required as additional burners are placed in service. The number of manual operations is reduced,
decreasing the possibility of operating errors. The hazard of dead pockets of fuel in the boiler gas passes
is also minimized.
Follow the specific, detailed operating instructions of the boiler manufacturer. The following paragraphs outline
the principal objectives and procedures for safe operation:
C.1.2 Startup
1. Ensure the furnace is in good repair, free of foreign material and fuel accumulation, has been evacuated
by personnel, and access doors and inspection ports are closed. Set fan and burner dampers or registers
at recommended positions for purging and light-off. Establish proper water level or circulation. Ensure
combustibles or CO and oxygen analyzers, if provided, are in operation, indicating zero combustibles or CO
and normal atmospheric oxygen concentrations. Ensure power is available to safety control circuits.
2. Prove fuel header and individual burner valves are in the closed position.
3. Start I.D. fans, FD fans, and regenerative air heaters. Operate flue gas recirculation fans, if furnished, in
accordance with the boiler manufacturer’s instructions. It is desirable to perform the purge with the flue gas
recirculation fan not operating and the flue gas recirculation damper open, if possible. This permits a complete
system purge without the risk of recirculating flammable gases back into the boiler.
4. Provide a timed preventilation period to purge the boiler furnace, passes, horizontal breaching and stack.
The purge should consist of at least five volume changes of the boiler enclosure with fresh air for a continuous
period of not less than five minutes. Ensure the purge air flow rate is at least equal to 25% of that required
for firing at full load.
5. Following purge, operate recirculation fans and regenerative air heaters as recommended by the boiler
manufacturer to establish proper light-off conditions.
6. Open the main fuel header safety shutoff valve and prove that pressures are within limits for safe light-off.
7. For gas-fired units and oil-fired units with fuel-fired igniters, open the igniter fuel header safety shutoff
valve and prove that pressures are within established limits for safe light-off. Direct high energy spark igniters
may be used to light oil-fired burners.
8. Adjust the air register or damper on the burner to be lighted to the position recommended by the
manufacturer. Check that the burner element and igniter are properly positioned. For oil firing, ensure oil guns
are made up with proper tip and/or sprayer plate and properly coupled. Check that the atomizing medium
is available, and that oil temperature is within limits for proper atomization. Smooth light-off depends on proper
draft setting and proper throttling of the fuel input. Control the burner fuel and air supplies to give a smooth,
low-fire light-off.
9. Energize the ignition source and open the igniter shutoff valve on the burner to be lit. If flame on the first
igniter is not proven within ten seconds, close the igniter shutoff valve, then identify and correct the problem.
If air flow has been maintained at purge-air flow rate, a repurge is not required, but allow at least one minute
to elapse before attempting to relight this or any other igniter.
10. With oil-fired burners using direct electric igniters, the igniter must be proven to be in position and
energized prior to attempting main burner light-off.
11. With the igniter in service, open the main burner safety shutoff valve. Prove the main burner flame within
five seconds after fuel is admitted to the furnace. If it is not proven, the burner safety shutoff valve should
close; determine and correct the cause of failure to ignite. A repurge of the furnace is required if no other main
burners are firing. If other main burners are proven, allow at least one minute to elapse before attempting
to relight this or any other burner.
12. With ignition established and the burner fully lighted and stable, slowly open the burner’s air register or
damper to its normal operating position. (Make sure ignition is not lost in the process.)
13. Follow the same procedure to place additional burners with open registers in service as required to raise
steam pressure or carry additional load. Maintain the fuel flow to each burner at a rate that is compatible
with the air flow. Operating instructions should define a specific sequence in which burners should be lighted
or removed from service.
2. Keep individual burner shutoff valves in the full open or full closed position. Regulate the firing rate through
a single main fuel control valve rather than by throttling individual burner shutoff valves. Individual burner
fuel control is acceptable only when air and fuel to each burner can be measured and controlled.
3. When boilers are fired below approximately 30% of their rating, the number of burners in service must
be reduced to avoid having to turn down all burners below the minimum stable firing rate. The actual minimum
stable firing rate may vary with different fuel characteristics and fuel firing equipment.
4. Combustion control systems should be changed from automatic to manual operation at firing rates that
are too low for the equipment to automatically maintain a safe air-fuel ratio. This is usually necessary during
the initial lighting off cycles, extremely low load demand, and normal shutdown. Consult the equipment
manufacturer and conduct tests to determine the specific conditions under which changeover to manual
operation is necessary for an individual boiler.
5. Total furnace air flow should not be reduced below the minimum necessary for safe firing and the avoidance
of stagnant pockets as determined by the boiler manufacturer. This normally will be set at 25 percent of full
load volumetric air flow.
6. Loss of an individual burner flame should automatically initiate a trip of that burner’s fuel safety shutoff
valve.
7. Periodic soot blowing is necessary to maintain high thermal efficiency in oil-fired boilers. However, if this
operation is not performed with high carbon dioxide and low oxygen concentrations in the flue gases,
explosions are likely to occur from the formation and ignition of air-soot dust clouds within the boiler.
A. Operate soot blowers only while burners are firing at high rates to avoid extinguishing the burner flames.
The fuel-air ratio and combustion air should be adjusted to ensure a high carbon dioxide concentration
and low oxygen content in the flue gases so that the soot will not burn. The boiler manufacturer’s instruction
manual should be consulted to obtain specific recommended operating procedures when blowing soot.
B. If soot blowing must be done when the boiler is out of service, make certain the boiler is cold and there
is no other source of ignition. It is preferable to blow the soot in cold boilers with compressed air rather
than steam because condensing steam may dissolve the soot and corrode boiler tubes.
C.1.4 Shutdown
1. Normal shutdown should follow the reverse procedure of that used during startup. Burners should be
removed from service sequentially as the load is reduced. Burner registers should be left in the firing position
when approaching 25% load and all burners are going to be taken out of service. Fuel-air ratio control should
be shifted from boiler flow to burner flow basis.
2. To avoid the admission of unburned fuel, burner igniters should be placed into service prior to removing
the burner from service and purging of oil guns into the furnace. Igniters should not, however, be placed into
service without proof of main burner flame. Explosions have been caused by turning on igniters when there
has been a flameout of an operating burner.
3. With the igniter in service for an operating oil burner, the burner shutoff valve may be closed, and steam
or air clearing valves may be opened. After sufficient time has elapsed to remove oil from the burner gun,
the clearing valves may be closed and the igniter may be removed from service. When scavenging oil passes
into the furnace, igniters should be in service with ignition established.
4. The fuel header safety shutoff valve should trip following closure of the last burner safety shutoff valve.
5. A post-purge of the furnace and flue gas passages should be accomplished by maintaining an air flow of
not less than 25 percent of full load air flow for a period of not less than five minutes.
6. For gas-fired manually operated boilers and electric power generation boilers that use energize-to-trip
safety shutoff valves, the main manual shutoff valve should be closed after shutdown. Preferably, the manual
valve should be equipped with end switches which cause indication of the wide open and closed positions
in the control room. Otherwise, there should be documented procedures for manual verification of the valve
position. At least 2 people should verify that the valve is closed and report to the control room. Monitoring
gas meters will also help to indicate valve leakage.
C.3 Igniters
There are four classes of igniters: Class 1, 2, 3, and 3 Special.
A. Class 1 igniters are proven by test to reliably ignite any credible combination of fuel and air under any
light-off or operating condition. When a Class 1 igniter is operated in a continuous manner, it will be in
operation from the completion of the igniter trial-for-ignition through the entire operating cycle of the main
burner until it is shut down. Independent flame supervision of the main burner is not required when a
Class 1 igniter is used. Flame supervision of the igniter should be done in a manner that ensures that
when flame is detected it is of sufficient size and location to reliably ignite the main burner during all
operating and transient conditions. A Class 1 igniter may also be used as an intermittent or interrupted
igniter. An intermittent igniter can be operated beyond the trial-for ignition of the main burner, if desired,
to help stabilize combustion. An interrupted igniter does not remain in operation after the main burner
trial-for-ignition period. Typically, Class 1 igniters provide energy in excess of ten percent of burner fuel
input.
B. Class 2 igniters are smaller than Class 1 igniters and are proven by test to reliably ignite fuel under
normal light-off conditions. They can also help to support main burner ignition under low load and other
normal conditions that are within the normal operating range of the burner. Typically, Class 2 igniters
provide energy between four and ten percent of burner fuel input. Unlike Class 1 igniters, Class 2 igniters
do not have sufficient energy to reliably ignite any credible combination of fuel and air under any light-off
or operating condition. Class 2 igniters are generally operated intermittently; i.e., they may be operated
beyond the main burner trial-for-ignition period when desired. Separate flame supervision of the igniter and
main burner flames is required if a Class 2 igniter is operated beyond the trial-for-ignition period. The
main burner flame scanner is positioned so as to not detect igniter flame. The igniter flame scanner will
detect both igniter and main burner flames. Class 2 igniters also may be used as an interrupted pilot.
C. Class 3 igniters are small igniters designed to provide energy to reliably ignite main burner fuel under
prescribed light-off conditions. This type of igniter can only be operated as an interrupted igniter and must
shut off when the main burner trial-for-ignition time is ended. Class 3 igniters are typically less than four
percent of burner fuel input.
D. Class 3 Special (electric igniters) are high-voltage igniters that directly light off main burner fuel. Power
must be interrupted when the main burner trial-for-ignition is ended. If the igniter is a retractable type, it
must be interlocked to be proven fully inserted. Electric igniters require frequent maintenance to ensure a
high-energy spark.