Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 30 (1976)
Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 30 (1976)
● petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases to wit: (a) Order of
denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and
acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New
Trial; (b) Order denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental
Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp
Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa,
Rizal.
● It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further
proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
● By Resolution of this Court, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer .A temporary
restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-
mentioned criminal cases.
● The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines.
● the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition
- that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's
decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice ... .
- Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-
charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them,
- that respondent Judge "appeared to have been unmindful of the repeated admonition addressed
to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment"
- "that the case should be remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with
instruction to receive additional evidence offered by the accused with the right of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may be warranted"
● private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the
respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.
● the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of
the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant
proceedings,hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
● The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part
in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor
General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings (NO)
RULING: the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with
that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was
delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General
in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means
to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors
could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended party, with respect to
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or
reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or
by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended
party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly
reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene
upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an
offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to
the direction and control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the
"intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the
case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the
fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the
prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal action and not of demanding
punishment of the accused.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense
charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in
criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. (Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General)
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the
People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they
cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the
provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
WoN the cases should be remanded to the trial court (YES)
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the case to the trial
court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the
decision and the resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion
of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated: (a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was
illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners
herein; (b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received,
through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle
of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal; (c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short
talk with respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of
wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly contained "something else
inside"; (d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum of the
prosecution which was literally copied in said decision although with some corrections; and (e) After an
alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in the
two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the double murder
charge against the petitioners to the death penalty.
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially
without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice
Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A
judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state
of mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It
must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to
whether or not he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases
has already become moot.
LEGAL BASIS:
10
As explained in People v. Orais: 11
... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal
because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the
People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the
proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal
proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in
his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the
offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding.
Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent
Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court
grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense
ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the
offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the
prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his
right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated
that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the
offended party of his right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint or information,
which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44
of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to
appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon
petition of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the
direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited
section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.
Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The
office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTES:
PURSPOSE WHY THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES IS PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF PROSECUTING
OFFICER:
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State , it is but
natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez
v. Platon, et al., 3the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an absolute
necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their
evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer
and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the
accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the
prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in
order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly
on the basis of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.