Reyes v.

Comelec

Facts:

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to
support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder
of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's

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explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A.
No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC
as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September
2012.1âwphi1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to
this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she
reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make
reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the
records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This
statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born
Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this
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an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that,
since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was
never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by
the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the
oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

Ruling:

COMELEC Resolution is valid. "More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who
continues to argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT
ANY BASIS.

1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has already
denied for lack of merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that
CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18,
Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become final
and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that will
remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the
Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen.
Petitioner did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner
lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be
proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from

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the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her
recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of
candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable
injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before
and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to
her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a proclamation
in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory
five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that the
COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
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promulgation into becoming final and executory

JAPZON v. COMELEC

Note/s: the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in
the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip
G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held
that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986,
to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to
constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.

Facts:

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition5 to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition
that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,
Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA)
and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate
of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his

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Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also
failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter’s
Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer6 to Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to
the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California,
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USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ty’s application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006,
Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur,
in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5)
thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly
notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired
his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty
sought the dismissal of Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007
elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.

Issues: W/N Japzon is qualified in running for a local position?

Ruling: Yes. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a

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Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the
Constitution and existing laws.

Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide,
among other things, for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

The challenge against Ty’s qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said
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municipality.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"
but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)."18

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla,19 the Court
already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the
USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily
abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and
transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines?

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,20 the Court provided a summation of the different principles and
concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the
ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has
complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been
used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be
elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former
residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside
the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was
proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

EMPHASIZE: Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October
2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at
A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty
voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address

Eastern Samar.

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as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and
was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,

In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections. Japzon maintains that Ty’s trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from
14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no
intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The
COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact
that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said
trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
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There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered
a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute
loss of residence.24 The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14
May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty’s avowed intent in the instant case to
establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Maquiling v. COMELEC

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already
ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can
no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of
Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April
16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the
relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

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Ruling: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus
claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an
American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be presented as public documents of a foreign
country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof. "Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading
does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
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Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person
who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship
by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls
for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the
application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to
run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Codewhich disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To
allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates
the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named
therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the
solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the
oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".On the contrary, this Court

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has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino
citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon
this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at
least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which
found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used
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his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En
Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following
dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his
U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two
travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his
U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29
July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado
claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his
U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that he
presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were
never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce
their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
Bengzon III v. COMELEC

Facts:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
"no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,
1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.

Issue: W/N Respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon her reacquisition of PH Citizenship?

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Ruling: YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act
of Congress.15

Naturalization is the mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the
other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the
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Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5)
political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Tabasa v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When he was seven years old, petitioner
acquired American citizenship after his father became a naturalized citizen of the United States.

When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a “balikbayan”, he was arrested and detained by an agent of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and thereafter, investigated. It was found out as reported by the US
embassy that petitioner’s passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant
of arrest. He was subsequently ordered to be deported back to the US.

Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.

ISSUE:

!B
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of
political or economic necessity under RA 8171?

Ruling: He does not. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth and that he
acquired American citizenship when he was still a minor. He cannot claim that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.

Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was
his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization.
The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

Lewis v. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to
such applicants the right of suffrage... petitioners sought registration and certification as

"overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs... they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of... the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

in Macalintal vs. COMELEC

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality ..., it is the Commission's position that those who
have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL
was not enacted for them. Hence, as

Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and
jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency,
among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections... petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al.,[5] filed
on April 1, 2004 this petition for... certiorari and mandamus.

On May 20, 2004

OSG... stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of
suffrage, may do so", observing, however, that... the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition
moot and academic.

!B
The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e.,... the propriety of allowing "duals"
to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

Ruling: Yes. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor
for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee
may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an... exception to the residency prescription in the preceding
section, be allowed to vote.
JD
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL

Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the

Philippines and the following conditions:

1. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment... that 'duals' are most likely non-residents, grants under its
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,...
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:... intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who
reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as
voters for the first time.
Valles v. Comelec

Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and... came to settle in the Philippines.
June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila

Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as
well

Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No.
92-54, alleging as ground therefor her... alleged Australian citizenship... finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental.
Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification... contesting her Filipino... citizenship but the
said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor
of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections... questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No.
98-336

!B
COMELEC's First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition... petitioner herein has presented no
new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her
Filipino citizenship.

According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the...
mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public
office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of

Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to
run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
JD
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the
case under consideration

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent's
application for an Alien Certificate of

Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her
of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February

11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled

Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process
of repatriation holds no water.

Issue: W/N private respondent is allowed to run as a candidate?

Ruling: The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run for a public office... by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis... she was a Filipino citizen...
she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473... she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before... the Department
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled... there are
the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her... a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor
The petition is unmeritorious.

Historically, this was a year before... the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August

29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands... and their children born subsequent thereto,... shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands... all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of... the Philippine Islands

Private respondent's father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,... Camarines Norte, a fact
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at... the time of her birth, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino... citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien

!B
certificate of registration does not amount to an express... renunciation or repudiation of one's citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian... citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.

The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.

Principles:
JD
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines... nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Tecson v. Comelec

Facts: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy
on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila. Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

Issue: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

Ruling: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that
Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

Cabiling v. Commissioner Fernandez

Facts: Petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma are children of Felix
Yao Kong Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Silona Cabiling, a Filipina. They were born during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, and has been raised in the Philippines. Upon reaching the age of majority (21), they elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. As such, Balgamelo executed an affidavit of

!B
election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Felix Jr. and Valeriano
performed the same acts. Nevertheless, they failed to register the documents in the local civil registry in
accordance with Commonwealth Act. 625. They were only able to do so thirty years after their election.

In February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) received a complaint-affidavit from a certain Mat Catral,
alleging that Felix Sr. and his children were overstaying aliens. The Ma family considered the complaint as
politically motivated because they were supporting a certain candidate in the then upcoming elections.
Notwithstanding, the BOI charged them with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act (PIA) for failing to present
any valid document showing their status in the Philippines, and produce documents related to their election of
Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, the Board of BOI rendered its decision finding that Felix Sr. and his children
violated the PIA, rendering them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.
JD
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition of the Petitioners for failing to comply with the
requirements of the law for their continued stay in the Philippines. It ruled that it is required of the elector to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, and thereafter file the same with the nearest civil registry.
These procedures concerning citizenship is a constitutional mandate which must be adhered upon strictly.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners are Filipino citizens despite their failure to comply with registration
requirement under the law.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court held that registration refers to any entry made int he
books of the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. Simply
stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification. In contracts of partnership for example, the purpose of
registration is to give notice to third persons whereby failure to register said contracts do not affect the liability of
the partnership and of the partners to third persons. Neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical
personality. Thus, registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties for the
effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. It is a confirmation fo the existence of fact.

In the present case, registration is the confirmation of the election of the Petitioners on their Philippine citizenship.
Having performed the necessary obligations under the Constitution, their failure to register their election in the civil
registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. Thus, they
are Filipino citizens, and the lacking requirements thereof may still be complied subject to administrative penalties,
if any.

Republic v. Batugas

Facts: This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that granted
the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She
stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that
she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.

!B
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or
indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because
aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be
evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed
the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then
practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
JD
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have
five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals.

After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and
later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual
tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the Batuigas
spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473
or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A
third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is
found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.

Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found
no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was presented
to establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and
his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all
of which are public records.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is
to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:

!B
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a
citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other.

Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this
Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
JD
Poe v. Comelec

Facts: n her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after
her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her
bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

Ruling:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that

!B
only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are
typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is
99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents
are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
JD
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are
being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of
ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not
returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the
Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.