SLCU

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Page 1 Sunday, June 11, 2023

Printed For: Navisha 1020181960, Himachal Pradesh National Law University
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11th SLCU National Moot, 2020

Best Team Memorial - Petitioners
11th School of Law, Christ University, Bengaluru

National Moot Court Competition Competition, 2020
Before
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of the Union of Meluha
W.P (C) No. ____/2020
State of Chalukya and Another … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of Meluha … Respondent.
Clubbed With
W.P (C) No. ____/2020
State of Chalukya … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of Meluha … Respondent.
And
W.P (C) No. ____/2020
Siobhan Roy … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of India … Respondent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS V
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS X
ISSUES RAISED XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1
I. THAT THE ORDERS DATED 15.05.2020 AND 19.07.2020 1
ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID
1.1. THE SLOVID-19 IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH UNDER 1
THE S TATE LIST
1.1.1. Pith And Substance Of The Impugned Orders 2
Are Public Health Management
1.1.2. The Impugned Order Dated 19.07.2020 Is In- 2
Severable From The Impugned Order Dated
15.05.2020
1.2. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 3
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CAN LEGISLATE I N THE MATTER OF STATE LIST WERE

ABSENT
1.2.1. Conditions Under Art. 249 Are Not Fulfilled 3
1.3. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT I S NOT EMPOWERED TO 4
RESTRICT I NTRA-STATE MOVEMENTS USING ENTRY 29 OF
LIST III
II. THAT THE ARTICLE 279A OF THE 101ST 5
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS IN VIOLATION TO THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
2.1. THE I MPUGNED ARTICLE I S I N VIOLATION OF FEDERALISM 5
OF THE CONSTITUTION
2.1.1. The Impugned Article Is A Colourable 6
Legislation Because Powers Conferred IS Beyond
Centre's Legislative Competency
2.1.1.1. The Impugned Article Gives A 6
Transgressing Power To The Centre In Taxing
Matters Concerned With State.
2.1.1.2. The Impugned Article Gives Centre The 7
Majority Power In Deciding The Grievances Of
The States.
2.1.2. The Impugned Article Violates The Principle Of 8
Fiscal Federalism And State's Autonomy
2.2. THE I MPUGNED ARTICLE ABROGATES THE SCOPE OF 8
JUDICIAL REVIEW I N ANY DISPUTE
2.2.1. The Impugned Art. And Teesta Case Damages 9
The Judicial Review
2.2.2. Teesta Case Is Per Incuriam Judgement Of The 9
Principle Of Judicial Review.
III. THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GST COUNCIL ARE 10
BINDING ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
3.1. APPLICATION OF THE GOLDEN RULE OF I NTERPRETATION 10
3.1.1. The Intent Of The Legislature Is To Make 10
Recommendations Binding As No Other Alternative
Is Provided.
3.1.2. The Recommendations Should Be Binding As To 11
Give A Meaning To The Legislature Otherwise The
Gst Structure Will Collapse.
3.2. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS 12
CONSTRUCTION
IV. THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE UNION GOVERNMENT 12
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REQUIRING STATES TO BORROW UNDER ITS OWN NAME

BE QUASHED AND THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE CENTRE
TO BE THE PRINCIPAL BORROWER OF GST COMPENSATION
4.1. THE LEGISLATION FOR GST COMPENSATION MAKES CENTRE 13
SOLELY LIABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS I NCURRED BY
THE STATES.
4.1.1. Section 18 Of The 101st Amendment Act and 13
Preamble Of GST Compensation Act Puts An
Obligation On The Centre To Compensate The
States.
4.1.2. Section 10(2) Of GST Compensation Act Does 14
Not Bar Centre From Compensating Through Other
Means.
4.1.3. States do not have any obligation to borrow for 14
compensation under the GST Compensation Act,
2017
4.2. DIRECTION OF THE CENTRE REQUIRING THE STATES TO 15
BORROW UNDER I TS OWN NAME PUTS A BORROWING
RESTRICTION ON THE STATE AND I NFRINGES THEIR FISCAL
AUTONOMY.
4.3. CENTRE HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY AND OBLIGATION 15
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS I NCURRED BY THE STATES.
V. THAT THE INSERTION OF TWO PARAGRAPHS IN THE 16
GOVERNOR'S SPEECH, IT'S CONTENT & THE RESOLUTIONS
PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF CHALUKYA ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
5.1. INSERTION OF THE TWO PARAGRAPHS I S VALID 16
5.2. CONTENT OF SPEECH I S CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID 16
5.2.1. The Act Of The Central Govt Is Against 17
Federalism
5.2.2 State Government Can Approach Supreme Court 18
To Challenge Central Laws
5.2.3. The State Can Seek The President's Accent 18
5.3. THE RESOLUTION PASSED I S VALID 19
PRAYER XIV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Bom Bombay
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CAL Calcutta
Co. Company
Const. Constitution
ed. Edition
GST Goods and Services Tax
Hon'ble Honourable
i.e. That is
Ltd. Limited
NEA National Executive Authority
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Sec./S./§ Section
UOI Union of India
Vs/V/V. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 : AIR 1950 2
SC 27
A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 2
Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana, (2004) 2 SCC 657 10
Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 498 6
Berubari Union (I), Re, (1960) 3 SCR 250 4
CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2002) 7 SCC 705 : AIR 2002 12
SC 3491
Collector of Customs v. Digvijaysinhji Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd., 11
AIR 1961 SC 1549
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. 6
Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119
E.M.S. Nambudiripad v. T.N. Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325 : 8
AIR 1970 SC 2015
G. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717 : 11
AIR 1972 SC 2284
Ganga Ram Moolchandani v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 17
SCC 89
I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1 9
Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 10
589
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1 : AIR 5, 7
1975 SC 2299
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International Tourism Corporation v. State of Haryana, 1

(1981) 2 SCC 318 : AIR 1981 SC 774
ITC Ltd. v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee 5
Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743 3
Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 1, 6, 8
Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1 5, 7
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 11
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : 5, 9,
AIR 1973 SC 1461. 17, 19
Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : AIR 3
1993 SC 412
Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande v. Land Tribunal Dharwad, 4
(1993) 1 SCC 287
Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 18
1978 SC 597
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 8, 9
Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. v. State of West 2
Bengal, 2001 SCC OnLine Cal 676
Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395 12
Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., AIR 2
1947 PC 60
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 10
Punjab Agricultural University Teachers Association v. State 4
of Punjab, (2006) 3 SLR 615 (DB)
R. v. Allen (Henry), (1865-72) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 367 11
R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 3
Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 6
1563
Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088 10
S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124 9
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 5, 8
Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Must. Mazirunnessa, AIR 1962 SC 6
137
South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 11
SC 346
Sri K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 6
SC 375
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 12
255
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501 1
State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608 : AIR 18
1978 SC 68
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State of Kerala v. Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001) 9 SCC 11

673
State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276 10
State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201 4, 8
Syed Abdul v. Speaker, W.B. Legislative Assembly,AIR 1966 16
Cal 363
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 10, 12
481
Teesta Distributors v. Union of India, AIR 2019 Cal 87 8
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 10
3 SCC 709
Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, (1955) 2 SCR 457 10
Union of India v. Mohit Mineral, (2019) 2 SCC 599 13,
14, 15
Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, (1979) 3 SCC 4
324, 343, 349
UOI v. Raghubhir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 : AIR 1989 SC 5
1933
Yedida Chakradhararao v. State of A.P., (1990) 2 SCC 523 10
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
India Const passim
The Fiscal Responsibility And Budget Management Act, 2003 15
The Goods And Services Tax (Compensation To States) Act, 13, 14
2017
BOOKS
1 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th ed., 2014) 1, 2,
3, 6
Dr. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, (57th ed., 2020) 3
JOURNALS/ARTICLES
Anisha Jhawar, Distribution Of Revenue In The Light Of The 15
Constitution of India: Taxation Provisions, Racolb Legal (Oct.
14, 2016), https://racolblegal.com/distribution-of-revenue-in
-the-light-of-the-constitution-of-india-taxation-provisions/
P.B. Mukharji, Resolutions Of Parliament And State 19
Legislatures-A Study Of Their Legal And Constitutional
Character, 4 JILI (1962) 309, 329
Prasanna Kumar, For a Mess of Potage : The GST's Promise of 7
Increased Revenue to States comes at the Cost of the Federal
Structure of the Constitution, 28 NLSI REV. (2016)
Varun Kannan & Prashant Shukla, Analysing The Working Of 17
The GST Council From The Perspective Of Fiscal Autonomy Of
The States, India Law Journal,
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https://indialawjournal.org/analysing-the-working-of-gst-
council.php
Varun Kannan, Coronavirus and the Constitution − XXXV : 13
Examining the GST Compensation Crisis, Indian
Constitutional Law and Philosophy (Sep. 8, 2020),
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/gst/
Vibhor Mohan, Punjab CM moves Resolution against Centre's 19
farm laws, Times Of India (Aug. 29, 2020),
https://m.timesofindia.com/city/chandigarh/punjab-house-
resolution-rejects-farm
ordinances/amp_articleshow/77815564.cms
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon'ble Court has Jurisdiction to hear the instant matter under
Art. 131 and 32 of the Constitution of Meluha, 1950.
Art. 131 of the Constitution of Meluha reads as:
Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.— Subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the
exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute—
(a) between the Government of India and one or more States; or
(b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one
side and one or more othe States on the other; or
(c) between two or more States,
If and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law
or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.
Art. 32 of the Constitution of Meluha reads as:
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.—(1)
The right to move the Supreme
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may
be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme
Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any
other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or
any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause
(2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended
except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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1. On 15.08.1947 the nation of Meluha declared independence from

the British Empire. Many princely states joined the Union of Meluha.
The princely state of Chalukya had high social and economic growth
indicators. The state was against becoming the part of Union of Meluha,
but eventually executed the Instrument of Accession with a clause for
implementation of principles of Cooperative Federalism. The
Constitution of Meluha was framed on the basis of the promise that the
states shall possess and retain the status of autonomous units,
together with residuary powers.
2. The key aspect of the Centre-State relations enshrined in the
Constitution of Meluha was the freedom to levy tax by the Centre and
the State. The states under the Constitution had the power to levy
multiple indirect taxes. In the year 2017, a unified tax structure was
introduced named Goods & Services Tax through the 101st
Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016, where the tax would be collected
by Union and then given to states. The amendment also established a
GST Council. Chalukya opposed GST as it was against the tenet of
Federalism, and also raised concerns of the Centre-State dispute
resolution framework in a ‘Centre dominated tax structure’. GST
(Compensation to States) Act, 2017 was enacted, which casted an
obligation on the Central Government to bridge the deficit incurred due
to the implementation of the GST Act for a period of 5 years.
3. In March 2020 in the backdrop of weak economic performance of
the Central Government, Meluha along with the rest of the world faced
an unprecedented global health emergency with the outbreak of Slovid-
19. The Centre declared Slovid-19 a disaster. The States of Chalukya
and Pakshala, owing to their past investments in public health, began
showing signs of recoveries from Slovid-19,and were keen to open the
market but the order of the National Executive Authority came its way.
The NEA on 15.05.2020 classified all districts as red, orange or green
zone to lift lockdown in an area-specific manner. The states of Chalukya
and Pakashala publicly voiced their objection to this order and pointed
out that there was no need to keep economic activity on hold in an
entire district when Slovid-19 cases had been reported only from a
small portion of that district. The NEA passed an order of rejected on
19.07.2020.
4. Slovid-19 impacted the GST revenue of states and Union. Union of
Meluha tried to avoid its duty to compensate states as per the GST
Compensation Act, and offered two options to the state to compensate
the losses. First option being, Chalukya would borrow 9000 Cr out of
total 17000 Cr shortfall and Union would pay the principal and interest.
The second option being Chalukya would borrow 17000 Cr and the
union would pay both principal & interest for the 9000 Cr but only pay
principal of the rest 8000 Cr.
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5. Under both the options the principal borrower are the State
Governments. They felt Union was reneging on its federal obligations.
Many states, mostly of Central opposition, brought the matter before
the GST Council but it was overruled. The states began to realize that
the structure of the GST council may not be reflective of the principles
of cooperative federalism. The state of Chalukya approached the
Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of article 279A of
the 101st Constitutional Amendment and sought the Supreme Court to
order the Union to borrow the GST deficit. It also requested the court to
declare the recommendations of GST Council to be binding on the
Union.
6. Meanwhile in the Legislative Assembly of Chalukya, the Governor
in her speech mentions that the Union has breached the tenet of
Federalism and the state may consider leaving the framework of GST. It
also passed 2 resolutions in the House rejecting the two options and
resolved that the Union should borrow to compensate the states. A suit
was filed by Dr. Siobhan Roy against the State of Chalukya challenging
the insertion of the two paragraphs in the Governor's speech and the
Resolution passed.
7. The Supreme Court felt that the nation was heading towards a
Constitutional break down. Hence it decided to club all petitions. Hence
the Petition.
ISSUES RAISED
-I-
WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED 15.05.2020 AND 19.07.2020 ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY I NVALID?
-II-
WHETHER THE ARTICLE 279 A OF THE 101ST CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT I S
I N VIOLATION TO
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
-III-
WHETHER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GST COUNCIL ARE BINDING ON THE
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT?
-IV-
WHETHER THE DECISIONS OF THE UNION GOVERNMENT REQUIRING STATES TO
BORROW UNDER
I TS OWN NAME BE QUASHED AND THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE CENTRE TO
BE THE
PRINCIPAL BORROWER OF GST COMPENSATION?
-V-
WHETHER THE I NSERTION OF TWO PARAGRAPHS I N THE GOVERNOR SPEECH &
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THE RESOLUTION PASSESD BY THE LEGISLATURE OF CHALUKYA ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. Whether the orders dated 15.05.2020 and 19.07.2020 are
constitutionally valid?
It is humbly submitted that the orders dated 15.05.2020 and
19.07.2020 violate the principles of Cooperative Federalism as Slovid-
19 is a matter of Public Health, which is in the State List, and the
conditions under which the Union can legislate in the matters of State
List were not fulfilled, and the Central Government is not empowered to
restrict intra-state movements using Entry 29 of List III.
II. Whether the Article 279A of the 101st constitutional
amendment is in violation of the basic structure of the
Constitution?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the impugned
art. the impugned article takes away taxing powers from the State
which is in violation of the federalism of the Constitution and the
impugned article also abrogates the scope of judicial review.
III. Whether the recommendations of the GST Council are
binding on the Central Government?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the word
‘recommendations’ should be read by applying the Golden Rule of
interpretation, as well as provisions are in contradiction to each other so
the doctrine of harmonious construction should be applied.
IV. Whether the decisions of the Union Government requiring
States to borrow under its own name be quashed and the Court
should direct the Centre to be the principal borrower of GST
compensation?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the legislation
for GST Compensation makes Centre solely liable to compensate for the
loss incurred by the States, the direction of the Centre requiring the
states to borrow under its own name infringes their fiscal autonomy and
the Centre has a constitutional duty and obligation to compensate for
the loss incurred by the states.
V. Whether the insertion of two paragraphs in the Governor's
speech, its content & the resolution passed by the legislature of
Chalukya are constitutionally valid?
It is humbly submitted before the Honourable Court that the state of
Chalukya exercised its constitutional right with the insertion of two
paragraphs in the speech of the Governor of Chalukya, the content of
the speech is constitutionally valid and the resolution passed by the
Legislature of Chalukya are under the ambit of the Constitution of
Meluha.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. THAT THE ORDERS DATED 15.05.2020 AND 19.07.2020 ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID.
1. Federalism as envisaged in the Constitution of India is a basic
feature.1 The distribution of legislative powers between the centre and
the states is the most important characteristic, rather the core, of any
federal system.2 The idea behind the cooperative federalism is
negotiation and coordination so as to iron out the differences which
may arise between the Union and the State Government in their
respective pursuit of development.3
2. The relationship between the Union of Meluha and the State of
Chalukya is based on the principles of Cooperative Federalism and
Economic Cooperation between the Centre and the State.4 The States
are autonomous units with residuary powers.5 It is humbly submitted
that the orders dated 15.05.2020 and 19.07.2020 violate the principles
of Cooperative Federalism as Slovid-19 is a matter of Public Health,
which is in the State List [1.1], and the conditions under which the
Union can legislate in the matters of State List were not fulfilled [1.2],
and the Central Government is not empowered to restrict intra-state
movements using Entry 29 of List III[1.3].
1.1. THE SLOVID-19 IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH UNDER THE STATE
LIST.
3. The Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for
such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule.6 Public Health,
Sanitation, Hospitals and Dispensaries are Subjects in the State List.7
The Entry in the State List must be given a broad and plentiful
interpretation and should not be interpreted in favour of Centre by
resorting to the residuary power.8 The Constitution must be interpreted
in a manner that does not whittle down the powers of the State
Legislature.9
4. It is humbly submitted that Slovid-19 is an unprecedented health
emergency,10 and falls under the ambit of Entry 6 of the State List. If a
particular matter falls within the exclusive competence of the States,
i.e. List II, that represents the prohibited field for the Centre.11 Any
invasion by one level of government on the area assigned to the other
level of government is a breach of the Constitution.12 Every law of
Parliament must conform to the provisions of the Constitution and if it
does not, it must be unconstitutional and must be so declared by the
courts.13 Therefore, the orders dated 15.05.2020 and 19.07.2020 are
unconstitutional.
1.1.1. PITH AND SUBSTANCE OF THE IMPUGNED ORDERS ARE PUBLIC
HEALTH MANAGEMENT.
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5. What is pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which

complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be
found.14 In order to ascertain the true character of the legislation, one
must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its object and to the
scope and effect of its provisions.15 It is the true nature and character,
i.e. pith and substance of legislation, and not its consequences, which
shall determine to which entry the legislation belongs.16
6. It is humbly submitted that the order dated 15.05.2020 was to
combat the Slovid-19 outbreak, and to prevent people from getting
infected by the virus. The pith and substance of the order comes under
the ambit of public health, and not under disaster management. If a
subject falls exclusively in List II, and in no other List, then the power
to legislate exclusively vests in the State Legislature.17 Therefore, it is
further submitted that the order dated 15.05.2020 is unconstitutional.
1.1.2. THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 19.07.2020 IS IN-SEVERABLE
FROM THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 15.05.2020.
7. When a legislation falls in part within the area allotted to it and in
part outside it, it is undoubtedly void as to the latter, but does it on
that become necessarily void depend on whether what is valid could be
separated from what is invalid, and that is a question which has to be
decided by the Court on a consideration of the provisions of the Act.18
The test of severability requires the Court to ascertain whether the
legislature would at all have enacted the law if severed part was not the
part of the law.19 If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably
mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the
invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its
entirety.20
8. It is humbly submitted that the order dated 19.07.2020 would
not have been passed if the order dated 15.05.2020 was not in
existence. Both the orders are in-severable. Therefore, it is also
submitted that the order dated 19.05.2020 is also invalid, as it cannot
be separated from the order dated 15.05.2020, which is
unconstitutional.
1.2. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAN
LEGISLATE IN THE MATTER OF STATE LIST WERE ABSENT.
9. The distribution of powers must be strictly maintained.21 But, a
number of constitutional provisions enable Parliament to legislate in the
State sphere from time to time.22 It is humbly submitted that
conditions that are required for the Parliament to legislate in the State
List are absent in the present case. Therefore, it is submitted that the
orders dated 15.05.2020 and 19.07.2020 are constitutionally invalid, as
Slovid-19 is a matter of State List.
1.2.1. CONDITIONS UNDER ART. 249 ARE NOT FULFILLED.
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10. Art. 249 enables the Parliament to legislate in State Subject in

the national interest if the Rajya Sabha declares, by a resolution
supported by not less than ⅔rd of its members present and voting.23
11. It is submitted that no resolution was passed by the Rajya
Sabha in the present case. Therefore, the Central Government has not
passed the impugned orders under Art. 249.
12. The Parliament can legislate on a matter contained in the State
List during the proclamation of emergency under art. 250.24 Restrictions
on the legislative authority of the Union Parliament in relation to the
subjects enumerated in the State List are removed during the period a
proclamation of emergency is in operation.25
13. It is submitted that no proclamation of emergency was in
operation when the impugned orders were passed.
14. The power to legislate is vested in the Parliament under Art. 252
only if two or more state legislatures think it desirable to have a law
enacted by the Parliament on such matters in List II.26 The effect of
passing of a resolution under art. 252 (1) is that Parliament, which has
no power to legislate with respect to the matters which is the subject of
the resolution, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to it.27
15. It is submitted that no resolution was passed by any state
asking the Parliament to legislate in the matter of Public Health.
16. According to art. 253 the legislative power of the States can be
taken over by the Parliament.28 The Parliament has legislative
competence to legislate about any treaty, agreement or convention and
to give effect to such agreement or convention.29
It is submitted that the Central Government did not pass the
impugned orders to implement any international treaty, agreement or
convention.
1.3. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT EMPOWERED TO RESTRICT
INTRA-STATE MOVEMENTS USING ENTRY 29 OF LIST III.
17. Concurrent List, Entry 29, takes care of the inter-state element
in public health.30 It includes the prevention of the extension from one
State to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting
men, animals or plants.31
18. It is humbly submitted that Entry 29 of List III is concerned
with the inter-state element in public health. The Parliament cannot use
it to restrict intra-state activities, as they fall under the ambit of Entry
6 of the List II. And, the fundamental feature of federalism is that
within each list, each legislature is supreme.32 The impugned orders
dated 15.05.2020 and 19.07.2020 restricted intra-state activities.33
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Therefore, it is further submitted that the impugned orders are

unconstitutional.
II. THAT THE ARTICLE 279 A OF THE 101ST CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT IS IN VIOLATION TO THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
19. Democracy and federalism are the essential features of our
Constitution and are part of its basic structure.34 Judicial review as a
part of the basic features of the Constitution is intended to ensure that
every institution acts within its bounds and limits.35 It has been
repeatedly held that no constitutional amendment can be sustained
which violates the basic structure of the Constitution.36
20. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the
impugned art. is in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution
laid down in Kesavananda Bharati37 case by the Hon'ble Court. The
impugned article takes away taxing powers from the State which is in
violation of the federalism of the Constitution [2.1] and the impugned
article also abrogates the scope of judicial review [2.2].
2.1. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE IS IN VIOLATION OF FEDERALISM OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the States is
the most important characteristic, rather the core, of any federal
system.38 The Centre has exceed its legislative competency through the
impugned art. Therefore it is a piece of colourable legislation and the
impugned art. Also takes away the State's autonomy by putting a
constraint on levying taxes and hence violating the principle of fiscal
federalism.
2.1.1. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE IS A COLOURABLE LEGISLATION
BECAUSE POWERS CONFERRED IS BEYOND CENTRE'S LEGISLATIVE
COMPETENCY.
22. The doctrine of colourable legislation really postulates that
legislation attempts to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.39 It is
only when a legislature which has no power to legislate frames a
legislation so camouflaging it as to appear to be within its competence
when it knows it is not, it can be said that the legislation so enacted is
colourable legislation.40 If the legislature has transgressed the limits of
its powers and if such transgression is indirect, covert or disguised,
such a legislation is described as colourable in legal parlance.41
23. In relation to constitutional prohibitions binding a legislature it is
clear that the legislature cannot disobey the prohibitions merely by
employing indirect method of achieving exactly the same result.42 In
K.C. Gajapati43 case, Court stated that under the guise and pretence of
assisting a State with money, the real substance and purpose of the Act
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is to violate discrimination in regard to taxation. To give the Centre a

veto over the plenary power of the State to levy the tax would
completely distort the Centre-State balance and cooperative
federalism.44 The Act which purports to be a taxing Act is a colourable
exercise of the legislative power of the legislature, then that would be
an independent ground on which the Act can be struck down.45
2.1.1.1. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE GIVES A TRANSGRESSING POWER TO
THE CENTRE IN TAXING MATTERS CONCERNED WITH STATE.
24. The decisions of the GST Council should be taken with the
majority of three-fourth of the members present and voting out of
which Centre will have the weightage of one-third of the total votes
cast while the States present and voting will have the weightage of two
-third.46 With the requirement for majority being three-fourths of the
votes cast, this effectively gives the Centre a veto over all
“recommendations” of the Council as it is mathematically impossible to
attain the required three-fourths majority if the Union does not vote for
it.47
impugned art indirectly confers the majority powers to the Centre in
the form of GST Council which indirectly transgresses upon the taxing
power of States. Under the principle of Federalism State and Centre are
prohibited to legislate in the legislation fields of others but the
impugned art. In the camouflage of cooperative federalism gives the
competency to the Centre to legislate beyond its legislative
competency. Therefore, the impugned provision is a colourable
legislation and should be struck down.
2.1.1.2. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE GIVES CENTRE THE MAJORITY POWER
IN DECIDING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE STATES.
26. The exercise by the legislature of what is purely and indubitably
a judicial function is impossible to sustain in the context even of our
cooperative federalism which contains no rigid distribution of powers
but which provides a system of salutary checks and balances.48 The
disputes between inter-States or Union-State shall be adjudicated
through a mechanism devised by the GST Council49 in which centre has
the transgressing power.
addressing of disputes regarding taxing matters does not come under
the legislative competency of the Centre. Being the super-majority
power in the Council Centre will have the power to enforce its decision
on the States and thus indirectly transgressing in the powers of the
State which were earlier exclusively held by States under State List but
now it are held by Centre concurrently in name of cooperative
federalism. Therefore, the impugned art is a piece of colourable
legislation which in name of assisting the state in money matters
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indirectly takes away the powers of the State.

2.1.2. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM AND STATE'S AUTONOMY.
28. The States have an independent constitutional existence and
they have as important a role to play in the political, social, educational
and cultural life of the people as the Union.50 They are neither satellites
nor agents of the Centre.51 The interpretation of Part XIII must ensure
that the autonomy of the States in the fields assigned to them is not
eroded.52 Any fetters on the power of the State to generate revenue
through taxes have a direct impact on the autonomy and governance of
the State.53 Any conscious whittling down of the powers of the State
can be guarded against by the Courts.54
29. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that each State
have different needs and requirements for which they were provided
with autonomous powers to legislate in their territory55 which is also
applicable in the field of taxation. But the impugned provision takes
away this autonomous power and dilutes it in the collective decision of
the GST Council where Centre has the veto power and if a fiscal policy
which is against the requirements of the State gets the majority then
the State would have to implement it. Therefore the impugned
provision damages the principle of fiscal federalism and the autonomy
of the State.
2.2. THE IMPUGNED ARTICLE ABROGATES THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN ANY DISPUTE.
30. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our
constitutional system and without it there will be no Government laws
and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of
unreality.56 Judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it
cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the
Constitution.57
31. In Teesta Distributors58 case, it has been stated by the Court
that the State cannot challenge any decision of GST Council as they
were present in the meeting themselves and the resolution was carried
with requisite majority however, the GST Council meeting can be
adjudicated through writ petition if it violates fundamental right or any
provision of the Constitution.
2.2.1. THE IMPUGNED ART. AND TEESTA CASE DAMAGES THE JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
32. Judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the
Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its
constituent power can abrogate it or take it away.59 The constitutional
amendments are subject to limitations and if the question of limitation
is to be decided by Parliament itself which enacts the impugned
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amendments and gives that law a complete immunity, it would disturb

the checks and balances in the Constitution.60
33. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that Art. 279A
implicitly excludes SC's jurisdiction over the decisions of GST Council,
specifically under Art. 131 relating to Union-State or inter-State
disputes, by itself addressing all the disputes through a dispute
resolution mechanism. As well in Teesta judgement the Court denied
the permission to States to challenge the decision of the Council as it
was passed by requisite majority. This can be likely seen as abrogation
of judicial review as the aggrieved State or States in this case will not
have any legal remedy. Therefore, this provision debarring judicial
review would be open to attack on the ground that it is unconstitutional
and void as damaging or destroying the basic structure.61
2.2.2. TEESTA CASE IS PER INCURIAM JUDGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
exclusion by the legislature, including a State Legislature, of even that
limited judicial review strikes at the basic structure of the
Constitution.62 While the impugned judgement destroys the judicial
review it is also per incuriam of the previous precedents where even the
limited exclusion of the judicial review is held to be violative of basic
structure. Therefore, the Court judgement of not reviewing the plea of
aggrieved States is per incarium of the principle of judicial review.
III. THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GST COUNCIL ARE BINDING
ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
35. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the words
‘recommendations’ should be interpreted in the light of the context in
which they occur.63 When two meanings, one making the statute
absolutely vague, wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless and
the other leading to certainty and a meaningful interpretation, are
given, in such an event the latter should be followed.64 When
constitutional provisions are interpreted, it has to be borne in mind that
the interpretation should be such as to further the object of their
incorporation.65
36. It is further contended before this Hon'ble Court that the word
‘recommendations’ or its variations used in the context of GST Council
when interpreted in its ordinary meaning lead to an uncertainty and
defeat the intention for which GST council was constituted so it should
be read by applying the Golden Rule of interpretation [3.1], as well as
provisions are in contradiction to each other so the doctrine of
harmonious construction should be applied [3.2].
3.1. APPLICATION OF THE GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION.
37. Though the word “may” might connote merely an enabling or
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permissive power in the sense of the usual phrase “it shall be lawful”, it
is also capable of being construed as referring to a compellable duty.66
It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or
injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it
which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the
sentence.67
3.1.1. THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS BINDING AS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS PROVIDED.
38. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention
of the legislature enacting it, other methods of extracting the meaning
can be resorted to if the language is contradictory, ambiguous or leads
really to absurd results so as to keep at the real sense and meaning.68
An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided.69
legislature has not provided any alternative other than accepting the
recommendations of the GST Council, if the legislature has an intention
for doing so it would have provided it in 101st Constitutional
(Amendment) Act, 2016. Therefore, the objective of giving the GST
Council a constitutional status clearly specifies the intent of the
legislature. Hence, the intent of the legislature to make the
recommendations binding should be adhered and any other
interpretation should be avoided.
3.1.2. THE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE BINDING AS TO GIVE A
MEANING TO THE LEGISLATURE OTHERWISE THE GST STRUCTURE WILL
COLLAPSE.
40. Where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative
is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the
system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that
alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or
confusion into the working of the system.70 A statutory enactment shall
be so construed as to make the remedy coextensive with the mischief it
is intended to prevent.71
41. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the role of
the GST is to make a unified tax structure which could subsume the
multiple indirect taxes levied by the Centre and the State,72 if the GST
Council can't make binding recommendations, the entire structure of
the GST will collapse, as each State will have a different and possibly
conflicting tax levy and collection mechanism.73 Therefore to give the
proper meaning and to resolve all the ambiguities from the legislature
the recommendations of the GST Council should be binding.
3.2. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.
42. The result then is that there are two provisions of equal
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
authority, neither of them being subject to the other.74 Under the

Constitution, it is the duty of this Court to give a harmonious
construction to both the provisions so that full effect may be given to
both, without the one excluding the other.75 They cannot be read in
isolation and have to be read harmoniously to provide meaning and
purpose.76 Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that
reduces one provision to a useless number or dead is not harmonious
construction.77
43. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that if
recommendations mentioned in Art. 269A(1), 279A(1), 279A(5) and
279A(11) of GST Council are merely recommendatory and not binding
on the centre and states, then both have no legal obligation as such to
follow these recommendations and therefore no dispute will arise due to
which the provision for dispute resolution mechanism provided by GST
Council under Art. 279A(11) will be of no use and will be considered
dead. Therefore in order to give all these provisions full effect the Court
should provide harmonious construction in which the recommendations
of GST Council should be binding.
IV. THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE UNION GOVERNMENT REQUIRING
STATES TO BORROW UNDER ITS OWN NAME BE QUASHED AND THE
COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE CENTRE TO BE THE PRINCIPAL BORROWER
OF GST COMPENSATION.
44. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the
decision of the Union Government requiring states to borrow under its
own name is arbitrary and unconstitutional and the Court should direct
the Centre to borrow under its own name because the legislation for
GST Compensation makes Centre solely liable to compensate for the
loss incurred by the States [4.1], the direction of the Centre requiring
the states to borrow under its own name puts a financial constrain on
the state and infringes their fiscal autonomy [4.2] and the Centre has a
constitutional duty and obligation to compensate for the loss incurred
by the states [4.3], therefore it's the Centre who should be the
principal borrower.
4.1. THE LEGISLATION FOR GST COMPENSATION MAKES CENTRE SOLELY
LIABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS INCURRED BY THE STATES.
enactment of GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 casted an
obligation on the Centre to bridge the deficit incurred due to the
implementation of GST Act78 so the Centre has an obligation to
compensate the States as Sec. 18 of 101st Amendment Act and
preamble of compensation to States Act puts an obligation on Centre to
compensate, the Centre is not barred for compensating States through
other means and the compensation to State Act nowhere lies the
burden on State to borrow.
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4.1.1. SECTION 18 OF THE 101ST AMENDMENT ACT AND PREAMBLE OF

GST COMPENSATION ACT PUTS AN OBLIGATION ON THE CENTRE TO
COMPENSATE THE STATES.
46. Parliament shall, by law, on the recommendation of the Goods
and Services Tax Council, provide for compensation to the States for
loss of revenue arising on account of implementation of the goods and
services tax for a period of five years.79 The Court in Mohit Mineral80
case stated that the expression “law” used in Sec. 18 is of wide import
and includes cess levied through Compensation to States Act. An Act to
provide for compensation to the States for the loss of revenue arising
on account of implementation of the goods and services tax in
pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution (One Hundred and First
Amendment) Act, 2016 (emphasis added).81 As the Preamble indicate
the Compensation to States Act, 2017 was enacted in pursuance of the
provisions of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act,
2016.82
47. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that both
Section 18 and the Preamble unambiguously mention that States are
entitled to compensation for the loss of revenue, which arises on
account of GST implementation.83 The main contention of the States
before they ceded their autonomy in formulating taxing policies to the
Centre was that they will be compensated by the Centre for any
revenue loss arising due to the implementation of GST and if the States
were not assured for this they would have never accepted the GST
reform. Therefore, the States are entitled to receive the compensation
and that is to be paid by the Centre solely.
4.1.2. SECTION 10(2) OF GST COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT BAR
CENTRE FROM COMPENSATING THROUGH OTHER MEANS.
48. All amounts payable to the States under section 7 shall be paid
out of the Fund.84 Section 10(2) of the Compensation Act does not bar
the Centre from tapping into other sources of funds to compensate the
States.85 Section 10(2) only states that all amounts payable to the
States under Section 7 of the statute shall be out of the GST
Compensation Fund, and does not in any way state that if there is a
shortfall, the Centre can evade its primary obligation to the States.86
49. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that under the
GST Compensation Act, the Centre has the prime obligation of
compensating the states for the losses due to the implementation of
the GST in the Constitution. Sec. 10(2) of GST Compensation Act does
not prohibits the Centre in developing any other method to compensate
the States. Therefore, Centre can even use its own source or can borrow
itself on security of its own funds for providing the compensation to
States.
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4.1.3. STATES DO NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO BORROW FOR

COMPENSATION UNDER THE GST COMPENSATION ACT , 2017.
50. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that on
collective reading of the provisions of GST Compensation Act it results
that that the compensation is to be paid by the Central Government to
the States, and it nowhere mentions that the States shall borrow the
compensation amount in their own name. Further, the GST
Compensation Act, 2017 expressly mentions the Act to provide for
compensation to the States for the loss of revenue arising on account of
implementation of GST.87 Therefore, it is submitted that the options
given by the Central Government to the States is in violation of the
federal obligations, and should be quashed.
4.2. DIRECTION OF THE CENTRE REQUIRING THE STATES TO BORROW
UNDER ITS OWN NAME PUTS A BORROWING RESTRICTION ON THE STATE
AND INFRINGES THEIR FISCAL AUTONOMY.
51. The States have been provided with the power of borrowing in
the Constitution under certain restrictions.88 Apart from these States
are also restricted in their borrowing limit by Centre through fiscal
management principles.89
52. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the States
can borrow up to a limited amount and if State borrows' under Centre's
direction then it will reduce the borrowing limit by which State will be
unable to borrow for itself if any deficit arises in front of the State. As
the State revenue is already in downfall90 and then directing it take a
debt to will make a financial constrain on the States. Therefore, the
directions of the Centre to the States to borrow under their own name
will reduce the borrowing limit of the State i.e. will infringe the States'
fiscal autonomy as well as it will put a financial constrain on already
economically weakened States.
4.3. CENTRE HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY AND OBLIGATION TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS INCURRED BY THE STATES.
53. Indian Federalism could be very well reflected by the manner it
lays down the provisions regarding Distribution of Revenues between
the Centre and the States.91 In Mohit Mineral92 case, the Court stated
that Art. 270, specifically empowers Parliament to levy GST
Compensation cess. Constitution makes it the duty of the Centre to
collect the cess and provide it to the States in prescribed manner.93
Centre through Finance Commission can provide for principles which
should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the
Consolidated Fund of India.94
54. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the Centre
has a Constitutional obligation and duty to provide the States with
revenues assigned to them by any law and also to help the States in
the financial problems by providing them aids out of the consolidated
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fund but the Centre is trying to hide its failure on economic platform
using this pandemic as it was unable to pay the compensation to the
States earlier also.95 There is no provision related to ‘Act of God’ in the
Constitution. Therefore, the reasoning behind the two options and
differentiation due to pandemic is not in accordance with the
constitution.
V. THAT THE INSERTION OF TWO PARAGRAPHS IN THE GOVERNOR'S
SPEECH, IT'S CONTENT & THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE
LEGISLATURE OF CHALUKYA ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
55. It is humbly submitted before the Honourable Court that the
state of Chalukya exercised its constitutional right with the insertion of
two paragraphs in the speech of the Governor of Chalukya [5.1], the
content of the speech is constitutionally valid [5.2] and the resolution
passed by the Legislature of Chalukya are under the ambit of the
Constitution of Meluha [5.3].
5.1. INSERTION OF THE TWO PARAGRAPHS IS VALID.
56. At the commencement of first session of the Legislative
Assembly's new financial year, the Governor of that state is supposed
to address the Legislative Assembly.96 The Governor is also authorised
to address any Houses, any time and to require the attendance of the
members for the purpose.97 In the present case, the speech by the
Governor is on the first day of business of the state's legislature.98
57. If the Governor comes to the assembly and still is not able to
complete his address due to disturbance within the House, the speech
is laid on the Table of the House and the Governor walks out or if the
Governor reads part of his speech, the House considers the speech as
read.99
5.2. CONTENT OF SPEECH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
58. Federalism is a key element of the Constitution of Meluha and is
defined as form of government where power is divided between the
Central Government and the State Governments.100
59. It is humbly presented before the court that content of the
Governor's speech is valid as the Central Government has failed the
basic tenets of Federalism, which was a key foundation for the
integration of the Princely state of Chalukya to the Nation of Meluha.
5.2.1. THE ACT OF THE CENTRAL GOVT IS AGAINST FEDERALISM
60. It is humbly presented before the court that the country of
Meluha follows federal form of governance, which divides policy making
power between the state and the central government. The distribution
of power between the Union and State governments101 is divided into
three lists. The Supreme Court has defined Federalism as a part of the
Basic Structure of the Constitution.102 Taxation comes under the
Concurrent list.103 In the101st Amendment of the Constitution to bring
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and implement Goods and Services Tax, the Government also formed a
body of GST Council.104
61. The GST Council has a voting system which effectively gives final
deciding power to the Central government,105 as they can use their veto
power to implement what the Union government prefers. The GST
Council comprises total of 33 members, 31 State Finance Ministers
(including Delhi & Pondicherry) and 2 representatives from the Central
government i.e. the Finance Minister and the Minister of State for
Finance,106 in the present case, the Union government through GST
Council, has negated the proposal brought by the state of Chalukya.107
62. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that when all
the State Finance Ministers support a new tax change only then the
cumulative weighed vote of all States is around 21 votes (two-third
weightage), the States shall in this scenario have a collective veto over
the Centre, the probability of it happening is very rare as many state
governments can be of same Political party as that of the Central
Government.
5.2.2 STATE GOVERNMENT CAN APPROACH SUPREME COURT TO
CHALLENGE CENTRAL LAWS.
63. A state can file a suit in the Supreme Court in case of any
dispute that it may have with the Central government, invoking the
court's “original jurisdiction”.108 In 1997, a Constitutional Bench of the
Supreme Court observed:
64. “When differences arise between the representatives of the State
and those of the whole people of India on questions of interpretation of
the Constitution, which must affect the welfare of the whole people,
and particularly that of the people of the State concerned, it appears to
be, with great respect, to be too technical an argument to be accepted
by us that a suit does not lie in such a case under Article 131 of the
Constitution.”109
65. It is humbly pleaded before the Hon'ble Court that the second
paragraph in the speech of the Governor of Chalukya refereed to the
legal right of a state to approach the Supreme Court as per Article 131
of the Indian Constitution. The state can file a suit deeming the 101st
Constitutional Amendment as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
observed that the Basic Structure doctrine is as important as to any
parliamentary legislation.110 Hence the GST act breaks the basic tenet
of Basic Structure doctrine enshrined in the Constitution.
5.2.3. THE STATE CAN SEEK THE PRESIDENT'S ACCENT.
66. When a law made by a state legislature concerning any matter
that falls in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the
provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law, with
respect to that matter. In such a case, the law made by the state
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legislature will prevail, provided it is reserved for the consideration of

the President of India and receives his assent.111 The state government
would seek the accent of the President.
5.3. THE RESOLUTION PASSED IS VALID.
67. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Resolution
is defined as an Opinion of the Legislative.112 In any dispute of state
and union it represents the voice of the legislature.113 The Supreme
Court has held Federalism as a key feature of the Constitution's Basic
Structure Doctrine.114 In the present case, the resolution passed by the
legislature of Chalukya represents the collective voice of the state of
Chalukya against the proposal of the Union government of Meluha.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the arguments advanced and authorities
citied, the Petitioners humbly submit that the Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The Orders Dated 15.05.2020 And 19.07.2020 Are
Constitutionally Invalid.
2. The Article 279 A of The 101st Constitutional Amendment Is In
Violation To The Basic Structure of the Constitution.
3. The Recommendations Of The GST Council Are Binding On The
Central Government.
4. The decisions of the Union Government requiring states to borrow
under their own name can be quashed, and the Hon'ble Supreme
Court should direct the Centre to be the principal borrower for
payment of GST Compensation.
5. The insertion of two paragraphs in the Governor's speech, its
contents and the resolution passed by the Legislature of Chalukya
are constitutionally valid.
AND
That the court may issue any other order as the court deems fit in
the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Petitioners shall be duty bound forever.
———
1 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501.
2
1 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 555 (7th ed., 2014).
3 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501.
4 Moot Proposition, ¶ E.
5
Moot Proposition, ¶ F.
6 INDIA CONST . Art. 246(3).

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7 INDIA CONST . Schedule, List II, Entry 6.
8
International Tourism Corporation v. State of Haryana, (1981) 2 SCC 318 : AIR 1981 SC
774.
9 Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1.
10 Moot Proposition, ¶ M.
11
Jain, supra 2, at 560.
12 Jain, supra 2, at 555.
13 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 : AIR 1950 SC 27.
14
Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., AIR 1947 PC 60.
15 A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297.
16 Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2001 SCC OnLine Cal
676.
17
18 R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
19
Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 : AIR 1993 SC 412.
20
21 Dr. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, 719 (57th ed., 2020).
22 Jain, supra 2, at 630.
23
Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743.
24 Punjab Agricultural University Teachers Association v. State of Punjab, (2006) 3 SLR 615
(DB).
25 INDIA CONST . Art. 352.
26
Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande v. Land Tribunal Dharwad, (1993) 1 SCC 287.
27 Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, (1979) 3 SCC 324, 343, 349.
28 State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201.
29
Berubari Union (I), Re, (1960) 3 SCR 250.
30 Sujata Pawar, State responsibility for ensuring health care : Assam leads the way!, PL,
Jan. 2011, at S-2.
31 INDIA CONST . Seventh Schedule, List III, Entry 29.
32
ITC Ltd. v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee, (2002) 9 SCC 232.
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33 Moot Proposition, ¶ P.
34 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
35 Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1.
36 UOI v. Raghubhir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 : AIR 1989 SC 1933; Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,
1975 Supp SCC 1 : AIR 1975 SC 2299.
37 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
38
39 Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Must. Mazirunnessa, AIR 1962 SC 137.
40 Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 498.
41 Id.
42 Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119.
43 Sri K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375.
44 Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1.
45
Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1563.
46 INDIA CONST . Art. 279A(9).
47
Prasanna Kumar, For a Mess of Potage : The GST's Promise of Increased Revenue to
States comes at the Cost of the Federal Structure of the Constitution, 28 NLSI Rev. 97, 108
(2016).
48 Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975
Supp SCC 1 : AIR 1975 SC 2299.
50 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
51 Id.
52
Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1.
53 Id.
54
State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201.
56 E.M.S. Nambudiripad v. T.N. Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325 : AIR 1970 SC 2015.
57 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
58 Teesta Distributors v. Union of India, AIR 2019 Cal 87.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124.
60 I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1.
61 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
62 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
63
Yedida Chakradhararao v. State of A.P., (1990) 2 SCC 523.
64 Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd.
v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709; Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana, (2004) 2 SCC 657;
Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 589.
65
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
66 Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088.
67 State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276; Tirath Singh v. Bachittar
Singh, (1955) 2 SCR 457.
68 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569; South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.
Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 346; G. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717 :
AIR 1972 SC 2284.
69 State of Kerala v. Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001) 9 SCC 673.
70 Collector of Customs v. Digvijaysinhji Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1549.
71 R. v. Allen (Henry), (1865-72) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 367.
72 Moot Proposition, ¶ I.
73 Kumar, supra 47, at 108.
74 Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
75 Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395.
76 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
77 CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2002) 7 SCC 705 : AIR 2002 SC 3491.
78 Moot Proposition, ¶ K.
79 101st Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 2016, Act No. 55, Act of Parliament, § 18.
80 Union of India v. Mohit Mineral, (2019) 2 SCC 599.
81
The Goods And Services Tax (Compensation To States) Act, 2017, Act No. 15, Act of
Parliament, Preamble.
82
Union of India v. Mohit Mineral, (2019) 2 SCC 599.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
83 Varun Kannan, Coronavirus and the Constitution − XXXV : Examining the GST Compensation
Crisis, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy (Sep. 8, 2020),
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/gst/.
84 The Goods And Services Tax (Compensation To States) Act, 2017, Act No. 15, Act of
Parliament, §10(2).
85 Kannan, supra 83.
86 Kannan, supra 83.
87
88
INDIA CONST . Art. 293.
89 The Fiscal Responsibility And Budget Management Act, 2003, Act No.39, Act of Parliament,
§ 4.
90
Moot Proposition, ¶ Q.
91 Anisha Jhawar, Distribution Of Revenue In The Light Of The Constitution of India : Taxation
Provisions, Racolb Legal (Oct. 14, 2016), https://racolblegal.com/distribution-of-revenue-in-
the-light-of-the-constitution-of-india-taxation-provisions/.
92
93
INDIA CONST . Art. 270.
94 INDIA CONST . Art. 280(3)(b).
95 Moot Proposition, ¶ L.
96
INDIA CONST . Art. 176(1).
98 Moot Proposition, ¶ U.
99
Syed Abdul v. Speaker, W.B. Legislative Assembly, AIR 1966 Cal 363.
100 Ganga Ram Moolchandani v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 89.
101 INDIA CONST . Art. 246.
102
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
103 INDIA CONST . Seventh Schedule.
105
Varun Kannan & Prashant Shukla, Analysing The Working Of The GST Council From The
Perspective Of Fiscal Autonomy Of The States, India Law Journal,
https://indialawjournal.org/analysing-the-working-of-gst-council.php.
106
Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
107
Moot Propoition, ¶ S
108
INDIA CONST . Art. 131(a).
109 State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608 : AIR 1978 SC 68.
110 Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597.
111
INDIA CONST . Art. 254(2).
112 P.B. Mukharji, Resolutions Of Parliament And State Legislatures-A Study Of Their Legal And
Constitutional Character, 4 JILI (1962) 309, 329.
113 Vibhor Mohan, Punjab CM moves Resolution against Centre's farm laws, Times Of India
(Aug. 29, 2020), https://m.timesofindia.com/city/chandigarh/punjab-house-resolution-rejects
-farm ordinances/amp_articleshow/77815564.cms.
114
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/
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liable in any manner by reason of any mistake or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice
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disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The authenticity of
this text must be verified from the original source.

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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Sunday, June 11, 2023

11th SLCU National Moot, 2020

11th School of Law, Christ University, Bengaluru

CAN LEGISLATE I N THE MATTER OF STATE LIST WERE

REQUIRING STATES TO BORROW UNDER ITS OWN NAME

International Tourism Corporation v. State of Haryana, 1

State of Kerala v. Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001) 9 SCC 11

1. On 15.08.1947 the nation of Meluha declared independence from

THE RESOLUTION PASSESD BY THE LEGISLATURE OF CHALUKYA ARE

5. What is pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which

10. Art. 249 enables the Parliament to legislate in State Subject in

Therefore, it is further submitted that the impugned orders are

is to violate discrimination in regard to taxation. To give the Centre a

indirectly takes away the powers of the State.

amendments and gives that law a complete immunity, it would disturb

authority, neither of them being subject to the other.74 Under the

4.1.1. SECTION 18 OF THE 101ST AMENDMENT ACT AND PREAMBLE OF

4.1.3. STATES DO NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO BORROW FOR

legislature will prevail, provided it is reserved for the consideration of

3 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501.

6 INDIA CONST . Art. 246(3).

7 INDIA CONST . Schedule, List II, Entry 6.

9 Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1.

12 Jain, supra 2, at 555.

15 A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297.

18 R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.

22 Jain, supra 2, at 630.

25 INDIA CONST . Art. 352.

28 State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201.

31 INDIA CONST . Seventh Schedule, List III, Entry 29.

34 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

35 Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1.

39 Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Must. Mazirunnessa, AIR 1962 SC 137.

40 Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 498.

44 Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1.

46 INDIA CONST . Art. 279A(9).

49 INDIA CONST . Art. 279A(11).

50 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

55 INDIA CONST . Art. 245(1).

57 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.

58 Teesta Distributors v. Union of India, AIR 2019 Cal 87.

59 S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124.

60 I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1.

61 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.

66 Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088.

69 State of Kerala v. Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001) 9 SCC 673.

71 R. v. Allen (Henry), (1865-72) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 367.

73 Kumar, supra 47, at 108.

74 Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.

75 Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395.

76 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.

80 Union of India v. Mohit Mineral, (2019) 2 SCC 599.

85 Kannan, supra 83.

86 Kannan, supra 83.

94 INDIA CONST . Art. 280(3)(b).

97 INDIA CONST . Art. 175(1).

100 Ganga Ram Moolchandani v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 89.

101 INDIA CONST . Art. 246.

103 INDIA CONST . Seventh Schedule.

104 INDIA CONST . Art. 274A(1).

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