BAZIWE Gift Intervivos Land Must Be Written
BAZIWE Gift Intervivos Land Must Be Written
JUDGMENT
BEFORE: HON. LADY JUSTICE EVA K. LUSWATA
1. Introduction.
The appellant through his lawyers M/s Kaggwa-Owoyesigire& Co. Advocates filed this
appeal against the judgment and decision of Her Worship Nassozi Rehema Ssebbowa
delivered on the 27/11/14 on the following grounds;
1) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when she failed to attribute
acts of fraud to the respondent and consequently held that she was abonafide
purchaser for value without notice, hence rightful owner of the suit land.
2) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when in reaching her decision,
she engaged in conjuncture and speculation thereby basing her decision on
erroneous assumptions not supported by evidence on record.
3) The learned Magistrate misdirected herself on the law relating to award of
general damages without the report of the valuers, hence occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.
4) The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact when she evaluated the evidence of
the Plaintiff in isolation of that of the Defendants thereby occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.
5) The learned trial Magistrate misdirected herself when she held that the
Defendants had trespassed on the plaintiff’s land hence occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.
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2. Brief facts of the appeal
The facts of appeal as gathered from the judgment of the trial court can be briefly stated as
follows;
Namulondo Monica, the respondent sued the respondentsin the lower court for trespass with
respect to land measuring two acres situated at Mulama Magada Sub County in Namutumba
District, with a claim for general damages and an injuction. She claimed to have purchased the
suit land for the sum of Shs 1,050,000/= on 3/12/12 from one Samanya Joshua, brother of Wotali
Erina, the 1st appellant who had in turn received it from the late Ngobi Gulele and that an
agreement which was witnessed by Mukisa Issa the 2 nd respondent (among others) was executed
on the same day. That she was therefore abonafide purchaser for value and the respondents’
actions in May 2012 to enter upon the suit land and destroying her growing crops amounted to
trespass.
Wotali in contesting Namulondo’s claim stated that she was owned the land as a bequest of a
will which the clan handed over to her in 2009. On his part, the 2 nd appellant, Mukisa Issa a
cousin of both Samanya and Wotali, denied any connection or claim to the suit land. He however
admitted being present when Namulondo was purchasing the suit land and when the clan gave it
to Wotali.
In her decision, the trial Magistrate agreed with Namulondo’s evidence, in whose favour
judgment was entered, and thus this appeal.
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must then makeup its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but
carefully weighing and considering it…’’
I see no error in judgment on the fact that the Namulondo purchased the suit land from one
Samanya Joshua. A sale agreement dated 3/1/2012 and its English translation were introduced
into evidence as D.I D 1. It was properly executed and witnessed by many people including
Mukisa, His protestations that he signed a document which he did not understand was
unbelievable since there was evidence to show that it is him who acted as the broker and
introduced Namulondo to Samanya. It may well be doubtful that the LCs officially witnessed the
agreement but since there were other witnesses to it, it cannot be invalidated by that one fact.
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Beyond that, and with due respect, the decision of the Magistrate in particular relating to
property belonging to a decease’s estate was erroneous, and the following are my reasons:-
All the parties and their witnesses agreed to the fact that the suit land at same point belonged to
the late Ngobi Gulele (herein after referred to as the deceased) who passed on sometime in 2008.
Wotali claimed the deceased left the land as an inheritance to his seven daughters to be held
jointly by them, or at least land belonging jointlyto all the deceased’s children including
Samanya. She also admitted that Samanya had been born and resided on the suit land for all his
life. She produced a will, purported to have been attested by the deceased to support her
assertions.
Both Namulondo and Samanya contested the will. Samanya denied its existence, contents and
the fact that it was ever read out by the clan’s men following the deceased’s death. He argued
that the deceased distributed all his land amongst his three sons (him inclusive) and nothing was
given to the daughters. That after the distribution, one of his brothers sold to him his portion.
That he then sold his inheritance and what he had purchased to Namulondo, which was in his
right to do.
The decision of the Magistrate to reject the will was correct. Although attested by a thumb print,
it was not witnessed and there appeared to be no English translation. It is taken then that the
deceased died intestate, and his estate by law, should have been distributed as such.
Samanya agreed that the deceased had given him the suit land together with his brothers, that
evidence was supported by DW2 and DW3. |However none of them were clear when the gift was
actually made, and certainly no document was adduced to support that fact.
Only Musimami Fred (DW7) claimed to have been physically present on 21/3/2018. That after
introducing all his children to Musimani, the deceased the deceased proceeded to give Samanya
a portion of the suit land measuring two sticks of 12ft each. The other two sons Gulele and
Kakubagabe also received their portions and the balance of 1 ½ sticks was reserved for the
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daughters. That portion was then entrusted with Wotali for custody. That testimony would
seriously contest Samanya’s evidence that his sisters were not given any land.
Proof of a gift made in contemplation of death or a gift intervivos is proved through three ways:-
1) There must be a donative intention
2) There must be actual or constructive delivery to the donee during the donor’s lifetime to
strip himself of all dominion of the gift
3) There must be acceptance by the donee
See Black’s Law Dictionary 10th Edition paragraph 804
Ordinarily deeds of gift of land must be by deed and according to the decision in Noah Nassozi
&Anor Vs. George William Kalule HCCS 5/2012 followed in Namugambe Balopela& Ors
Vs. Fredrick Njuki & Anor HCCS 341/2013, our laws do not recognize a verbal gift of land.
Although Samanya’s long occupation of the land was not contested, Wotali argued that it was
due to the fact that he was the eldest child and had been born there. There was no evidence that
that occupation was exclusive to him as one who had received it as a gift and in fact, there was
considerable variance with respect to the size of his alleged portion. In fact, there was evidence
that Wotali did use the land after the deceased’s death during 2000s and later entrusted it to one
Akisofeli as a care taker.
That notwithstanding, no evidence was adduced to show that the deceased even executed a deed
of gift unequivocally entrusting the land to Samanya. In fact, Samanya and other witnesses
testified that the deceased continued to reside on and use the suit land right up to his death. The
alleged physical exercise of distribution would thus not suffice.
Having found so, it is wrong for the Learned Magistrate to hold that Samanya owned the suit
land and could sale it to Namulondo. In fact according to the LCI Chairperson, Samanya had
conceded to the fact that the suit land was clan land or at least, belonged to him and his siblings,
and even offered to refund the purchase price. He instead became evasive, which prompted
Namulondo to file the suit.
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On the other hand, the contestation by Wotali that the clansmen gave her the suit land in 2009
would also have no merit. I have found that the deceased did not leave the will and his estate was
therefore subject to intestate succession.
Neither Samanya nor the clan heads could deal with the suit land before a grant of Letters of
Administration was made with respect to the deceased’s estate. Even then, only the appointed
administrator had powers of administration, including equal distribution to all the deceased’s
lawful beneficiaries. Thus the actions by Samanya and the clansmen would amount to
intermeddling contrary to Section 268 of the Act. On the other land, the action of Wotali could
be tolerated because she proceeded to re-gain possession of the suit land and then referred the
matter to the concerned authorities and the dispute eventually ended up in Court. Such acts are
permitted if carried out by a beneficiary to protect their interest in an estate especially when done
to preserve its integrity and prevent waste.
In conclusion of these three grounds, I find that the question of fraud or bonafide purchase never
arose. Although she came to a wrong decision on the law, the Magistrate did not rely on
conjuncture and speculation. Her findings although erroneous, were properly supported by the
evidence on record. She equally and in a balanced manner weighed the evidence of the plaintiff
and defendants, but her decision was wrong, and certainly resulted into a miscarriage of justice.
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Namulondo could not be the rightful owner of the suit land, which originally formed part of an
intestate’s estate and for which no administration or formal distribution in accordance with the
law, had ever been done.
The Magistrate’s decision although erroneous was based on the available evidence, which was
evaluated as a whole. Ground two and four would thus fail.
Ground 3:
The learned Magistrate misdirected herself on the law relating to award of general
damages without the report of the valuers hence occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
The Magistrate made an award of Shs. 7,000,000/= in general damages. She relied solely on
Namulondo’s oral testimony. I have held that Samanya did not own the suit land in his own right
and Wotali’s entry upon it cannot be deemed as be trespass. Therefore, would be no basis to
make an award of general damages in trespass. Even then, even if an award was justified in the
circumstances, there ought to have been better particulars given either in a valuation report or by
Namulondo herself, to enable a proper assessment of fair general damages in the circumstances.
Ground 5:
The learned trial Magistrate misdirected herself when she held that the defendants had
trespassed on the Plaintiffs land hence occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
In the case of EMN Lutaya Vs Stirling Civil Engineering Company Civil Appeal No. 11 of
2002 (SC)
“ It was held that trespass to land occurs when a person makes an authorized entry upon
land, and there by interferes, or portends to interfere with another person’s lawful
possession of that land.
Needless to say, the tort of trespass to land is committed, not against land, but against the
person who is in actual or constructive possession of the land. At common law, the
cardinal rule is that only aperson in possession of the land has capacity to sue in
trespass.’’
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I have found that Namulondo purchased from a person who had no powers to sell property
belonging to an intestate’s estate. The agreement of sale notwithstanding, that sale was void and
she cannot be deemed to have constructive or legal possession the suit land.At page 41paragraph
1 of the record, Namulondo stated in her testimony that it is Wotali and her agents who are in
occupation. That is possession that I believe Wotali regained as a beneficiary of the deceased’s
estate. It was thus wrong for the Magistrate to have found that Wotali was in trespass. Monica
Namulondo’s remedy if she so wishes, would be to pursue a refund of the purchase price from
Samanya from whom it was proved she purchased the suit land
In conclusion, this Appeal has succeeded in part. However, the decision of the lower court is
dismissed as there was atotal disregard of the provisions of the Succession Act regarding
administration of the estate of an intestate. The following orders are made.
a) The suit land should revert to the estate of the late Ngobi Gulele.
b) An administrator be appointed to administer the estate and carry out its distribution
according to law.
c) Since the appeal only succeeded in part, the appellants are entitled to one half of the
costs of the appeal, and the full costs of the court below.
I so Order.
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EVA K. LUSWATA
JUDGE
20/12/2018
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