G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012

[ G.R. Nos.
120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
689 Phil. 75
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ]

SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 122677]
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES AND VIRGILIO A.
MANGUERRA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 122776]
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. AND ERNESTO PUNO,
PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A “shoot first,
think later” disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide
or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the
cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613
and 16614 – cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder,
respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay
Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup)
and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
(Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were
members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the Sindalan Substation in
San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were
barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres
Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson
(Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in
Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder,
multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory
portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/assets/dtSearch/dtSearch_syste…7+3ca3+3ca4+&SearchForm=C%3a%5celibrev2%5csearch%5csearch%5fform Page 1 of 29
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent
to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons
by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S.
Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on
the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death
of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill,
attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V.
Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera,
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission
of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder
by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking
the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having
performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder, but
which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ will, namely,
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,[6]
the accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and Yapyuco who was
then allegedly indisposed[8] – entered individual pleas of not guilty.[9] A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered
a negative plea.[10] In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson,
Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.[11]
Said motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution
and the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at
said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.[12] On May
10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.[13] Yapyuco
likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991.
[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest.
[16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of
evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores,
Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the
barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at
around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all
inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and
watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and
the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly
proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a
curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were
both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not
see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a sketch[19]
depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of
Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road
right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be
that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at
him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted
that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out
of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of
Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his
companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved
them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried
out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were
wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the scene,
he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded
into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by Villanueva
who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby
St. Francis Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly
succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the
defense would say.[22] He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also
aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each
holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his
companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney
immediately drove off together with his two armed companions.[23] He further narrated
that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the
latter expired on April 7, 1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been
known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his
wife’s uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for
that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the bullet
holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other
bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence
of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated
Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He
recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house
and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed
when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly
followed by Flores’ frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his
bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house where,
inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize.
[27] At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the
Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but
before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-
type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he
remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed
he spent the night at his mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for
him with whom, however, he was not able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in
front of Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the
neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was
Yapyuco’s group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the
hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified
by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp
Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been
used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She
could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could
she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the
gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the
other accused because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She
affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on
it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and
perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward
in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road.[30] Additionally,
Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial
Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to members of the local
police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts
for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and
Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the
injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel
from the occipital region of Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior aspect of his
chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between
10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right
thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of
the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground
and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailant’s waist; but if the victim was
seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his
front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would
come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a
lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient,
he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head – one consistent with
being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds
the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front:
one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of
the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right
forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the
stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat
as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in front
of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found
that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and
exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licup’s
left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm,
then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his position as a reaction to
the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a
bullet fired at the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting
any hard surface prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have been caused by a
bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing,
he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might
have changed position following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more
than one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney;
however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position
especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licup’s
three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was
delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and
stoop down with his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had
been administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the
subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly Porqueriño,
stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case,
Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he
had previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the sketch
showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at
the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for
consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with
the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan
and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as
the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the
superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction
included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of
April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly
received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by
Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan.
Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed
his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who
told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up
their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario
Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there
were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the
victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan
announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him,
allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping,
the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow
police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued
pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously,
gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron’s house directly at the
subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco
and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two
injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis
Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and
look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw
jeepney was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time
was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who
had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the
barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein.[42] That
night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised
of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team composed of
Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted
that all of them, including himself, were armed.[44] He denied that they had committed an
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been
killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did
not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members
assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the
jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.[46]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that
his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando,
but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.[47] He admitted an
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been
ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were
exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently conducted by their
station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where
members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said
that he himself has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel
elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation
plant, and that he has accordingly conducted “clearing operations” in sugarcane plantations
in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already
been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a report on
it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuan’s statement referring to Flores
as being “married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan” and found after surveillance to be
“frequently visited by NPA members.” He affirmed having found that guns were indeed
fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the
scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as
well as the latter’s documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson,
Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum
as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular
and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as
barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take
shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code;
or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.[52]
With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and
Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual
death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of
attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all
of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores,
Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

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Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y

David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim
Leodevince Licup in the amounts of P77,000.00 as actual damages and
P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate
shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused
charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y
Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple
Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249,
in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel
Villanueva in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.[53]
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein
willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order;[54] that the acts performed by
them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without
risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle;
that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict
harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful
performance of official duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis
or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross
inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was insufficient or total
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the
NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been the
product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either
a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty
and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the
subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have
indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since –
as it turned out after the search of the vehicle – they had no firearms with them, and hence,
they had nothing to be scared of.[58] It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been
bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan,
barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the victims and
of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that evening could not have possibly
escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated April
11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well
as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney.
[59] It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to
explain why a large group of armed men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from
neighboring barangays – were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how
petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming
from the direction of Salangsang’s house – such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in
the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to afford a
direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of Naron, the
neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses were
deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the position of the
Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet
holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the
trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of
Naron’s residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past
them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service
firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue,
therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence

pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the
jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that
caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the
bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the
accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Naron’s house; the
deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive
ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners’
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its
conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose,
design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no
conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that
injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night –
petitioners herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the accused
collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the
shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge
against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;[64] and that on the basis of the self-
serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-
up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as
by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise found very consequential the fact that the other
accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was
incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of
the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of
lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits
to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Naron’s residence
from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown
how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally
injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by
proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn
from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The
same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and
his men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the
materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for
60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits;[68] that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his
Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00
for the funeral of his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and
P20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also submitted a
certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.[72]
On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify
(a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of
deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy and
labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly
established that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in
common with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal
object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by
Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the
wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out the
uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the incident could not have been the
product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden
agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish
attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He

laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by
his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene
of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the
scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the
lawful performance thereof – a fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc
when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and
Puno.[75] He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the
responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained the belief
that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed
decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but
erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in the
case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the
barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who
had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-
a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials
and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this
regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate in the presentation
of the evidence by the accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had
fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.[77] Also, they
believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible
evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those presented in a
separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious
and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution.[78]
Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the
prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the
incident or that they were among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they
identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.[79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They
claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether
the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by
the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are
concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an
ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers,
they merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the
conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They
posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal design with the rest
of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the
subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only
after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going to
speed away – as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear
portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would
have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the
victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they were not
intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly
aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their
fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. They
conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the victims
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding
of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had
assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known
that it would be coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that the manner by which
the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the
crimes charged.[83] It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused
had chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target – as
shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded
and the latter died as a supervening consequence.[85] It refutes the invocation of lawful
performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the
accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that
they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes
that the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan
through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they
fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals instead.
[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be
binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David,
Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as
directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of
their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial
proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their own
evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried
and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has
failed to register his objection thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to
rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that
evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the
incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony –
which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,[88]
explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that
occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis
of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was
not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became
apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether
or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them
had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal.[89]
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit[90]
of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint
counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the
joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the
incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that “[their] team was
forced to fire at the said vehicle” when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air
and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to stop;[95] in their earlier affidavit they,
together with Yapyuco, declared that they were “constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic)
the said fleeing vehicle.”[96] Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the
subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires
thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested – substantiating
the implication in his affidavit that it was “the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing
vehicle” [98]– that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could
have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the
suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning
shots,[100] and that it was the “policemen [who] directly fired upon” the jeepney.[101]
Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these accounts do not sit well with the
physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which
Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed from
perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyuco’s claim that
he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had
already moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an
oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots
came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken
post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron’s house sitting on
the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.
[103]
While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who
among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the
examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs
posted within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle.
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that
such finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as
the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for
separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of
the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against
said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter
repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and
the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission
is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.
[105] It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and
Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had
chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We,

therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they
opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a

right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the
accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office,
and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent
or with fault or negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense
charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or
offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful
exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to
the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on
him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them –
who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a
suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify
the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the
information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find
cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to
commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it
is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an
official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even
more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of
authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a
violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was
presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the
presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed
and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether
or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they
do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were
as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must
inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of
performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer
must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest
caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to
be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not
vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more
than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.[109] United States v.
Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or
is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause
himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the
exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the
death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.[111] He is, however, never
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People v.
Ulep[113] teaches that –
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be
taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority
to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers
sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where
an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be
stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance
of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but
within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the
contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and
within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon
the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that
although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be
protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.[114]
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four
members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members,
and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance
in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding
them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means
be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an
office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Other than “suspicion,” there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr.,
his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even
if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law.
On that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home
expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing
justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.[116]
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and
instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but
because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners’ signal
to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from
the party they had just been to,[117] still, we find incomprehensible petitioners’ quick
resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the scene –
the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco – which they could actually have used to pursue their
suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the
use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find,
however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful
firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney
occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined
for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or
simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment
of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a
mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers
of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not have been the
necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a “mistake of fact” is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime.[119] It may be a defense even if the
offense charged requires proof of only general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken
belief of the defendant,[121] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any
other person.[122] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be
honest and reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United
States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-
defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the
accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad
elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving
no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber
had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a
chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized
a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with
homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused
had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in

point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe
the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in
accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for
the extreme measure. x x x [128]
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of an

act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence
or bad faith on the part of the accused.[131] Thus, Ah Chong further explained that –
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can
be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.[132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has
been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the
prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does
not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty
of guilt.[134] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists
of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
the act.[137] In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural
cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of
homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time
or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is
no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence,
the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds
the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is
crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential
element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as
that required of the other elements of said offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is

interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the
occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture
depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as
Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who
harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners’) minds that
which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects.
Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a
relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San
Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA
members. He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades
launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas
supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases
even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a
crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence
purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The question of motive is important
in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who
committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused
the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to
kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the
manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no
other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of
fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is
not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances
where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact
animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a
specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.[144]
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets
were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers
thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired
upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim
and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be
exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires – especially considering that
petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact even the driver
himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be
precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the
impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding
to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to
debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence
put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’
actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together
with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed
no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident
or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men
generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and
not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man
always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is
found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of
themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed
that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden
of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate
intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco’s alternative claim in
G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice.[147]
People v. Guillen[148] and People v. Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People
v. Castillo,[150] we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless
negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent
to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been
accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[152] The
instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they were
really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that
conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had
converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we
nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to let their
suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the
vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to
stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with the
convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepney’s supposed
escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common
purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the
jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of
the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve
their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the
jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that
tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly
caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the
Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to have been in
possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held
collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation
which had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes
of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with
the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.
[154] The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the
minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting
flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and
indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by
petitioners.
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/assets/dtSearch/dtSearch_syste…+3ca3+3ca4+&SearchForm=C%3a%5celibrev2%5csearch%5csearch%5fform Page 20 of 29
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal
whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide.
Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No.
16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have
denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted
homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision
correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence,
which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral
damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly
and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there
being no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614,
the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as
well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, ** Abad, Villarama, Jr., *** and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., (Acting Chairperson).*
* Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
Special Order No. 1241 dated June 14, 2012.
***Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per
Special Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (Chairman), with Associate Justices

Minita V. Chico-Nazario and Roberto M. Lagman, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-
46), pp. 7-80.
[2] Now known as the Philippine National Police.
[3] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
[4] Records, Vol. 5, pp. 1-2.
[5] Records, Vol. 6, pp. 1-2
[6] Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.
[7]Accordingly, the charges against him were dismissed. See April 30, 1991 Order, id. at
108. TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 3-5.
[8]April 30, 1991 Order, records, vol. 1, pp. 107-108; TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 12-14. See
also records, vol. 1, pp 191-197.
[9] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 96-105.
[10] Id. at 307.
[11] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 52-55.
[12] Resolution dated May 10, 1991, records, vol. 1, pp. 198-205.
[13] Id. at 205.
[14] Id. at. 300-308.
[15]See certificate of Death, records, Vol. II, p. 707; see also Manifestation dated
December 11, 1992, id. at 703-704.
[16] Records, Vol. 1, p. 388.
[17]TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 27-30, 32-34, 37-40, 42-50, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991, pp.
20-22.
[18] Id.; Id.; TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26
[19] Exhibits “L,” “L-1” to “L-5.”
[20] TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 6-13, 15-17-19, 22-25, 26-29, 45-46, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991,
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
pp. 38-46; 48-49;
[21]TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 27-30, 32-34, 37-40, 42-50, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991, pp.
20-22;
[22] TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26.
[23] Id. at 31-32, 44-45, 51.
[24] Id. at 37 and 55.
[25] Id. at 16.
[26] Id. at 57-59.
[27] TSN, July 23, 1991, pp. 38-41; TSN, May 3, 1991, pp. 4-10, 18, 27, 29.
[28] Id. at 17-20, 24-26, 41-47; id. at 10-14, 18-23.
[29] TSN, May 3, 1991, pp. 14-15.
[30]TSN, July 24, 1991, pp. 38-40, 47-55; TSN, November 26, 1991, pp. 4-8, 10-14, 19-
20. See Technical Report No. PI-032-88, Exhibit “J.”
[31] TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 17-19. See Memorandum Receipts, Exhibits D, E, F, G, H.
[32]TSN, October 22, 1991, pp. 7, 10-11, 13-20, 42-43, 49-50. Dr. Pedro Solis appears to
have authored a book on legal Medicine in 1964. See Medico-legal Report dated April 6,
1988, Exhibit I.
[33] TSN, October 22, 1991, pp. 21-23, 26-28, 30-34, 37-42, 50-53.
[34] Id. at 44-48.
[35] TSN, October 7, 1991, pp. 12, 14-15.
[36] TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 17-44.
[37] TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 5-12; TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 10.
[38]Memorandum of Cunanan and Puno filed with the Sandiganbayan, rollo (G.R. No.
122776), p. 126.
[39]TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 13-15, 18-21; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 3, 5, 12, 23-
25, 31. See also Joint Counter Affidavit of Cunanan and Puno, dated July 20, 1988, in
which they stated that their “team was forced to fire at the said vehicle” when it did not
heed the supposed warning shots, Exhibit “A.” In their earlier Joint Affidavit dated April 5,
1988, Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno stated that after firing warning shots in the air, the
subject jeepney accelerated its speed which “constrained (them) to fire directly to (sic) the
said fleeing vehicle, Exhibit “O.”
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
[40] TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 22-23; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 6-7, 10-11, 21-23.
[41] Id. at 23-25; Id. at 4.
[42] TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 12, 15-16.
[43] Id. at 6-7
[44] TSN, September 15, 1993, p. 23; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 7-8, 10-11, 20
[45] TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 5.
[46] Id. at 8-9.
[47] Id. at 21-23.
[48] TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 26-29.
[49] TSN, November 22, 1993, pp. 26-36, 40-43, 46-47.
[50] See Order dated April 6, 1994, records, Vol. II, p. 955.
[51]See Manifestation and Motion dated May 6, 1993, id. at 759-761, and Resolution dated
June 1, 1993, id. at 763-764.
[52] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 55.
[53] Id. at 77-79.
[54] Id. at 56-57.
[55] Id. at 64-66.
[56] Id. at 69-70.
[57] Id. at 64-65.
[58] Id. at 61.
[59] Id. at 58.
[60] Id. at 60-61.
[61] Id. at 60-63.
[62] Id. at 73-74.
[63] Id. at 74-75.

[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
[64] Id. at 64-65.
[65] Id. at 69.
[66] Id. at 68-69.
[67] Id. at 71-73.
[68] Exhibit “X.”
[69] TSN, July 5, 1991, pp. 7-9, 27.
[70] Id. at 11-12, 17.
[71] TSN, January 9, 1991, pp. 4-12.
[72] Exhibit “FF.”
[73] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 96.
[74] Id. at 93-95.
[75] Id. at 108.
[76] Id. at 103.
[77] Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 57-65.
[78] Id. at 75-81.
[79] Id. at 82-89.
[80] Rollo (G.R. No. 122776), pp. 101-103.
[81] Id.
[82] Id. at 104-106.
[83] Id. at 223-225.
[84] Id. at 226-227.
[85] Id. at 227-228.
[86] Id. at 228-230.
[87] Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
[88] See note 50 and Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “N” and “O.”
[89] People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578, 592.
[90] Co-executed by deceased Pabalan, dated September 28, 1988, Exhibit “N.”
[91] Dated September 28, 1988, Exhibit “C.”
[92] Dated July 20, 1988, Exhibit “A.”
[93] Dated July 20, 1988, Exhibit “B.”
[94] Dated April 5, 1988, Exhibit “O.”
[95] Exhibits “A-1,” “O,” “B” and “B-1.”
[96] Exhibit “O.”
[97] See notes 38 and 39.
[98] Exhibit “B-1.”
[99] See notes 38 and 39. See also Exhibits “B” and “C.”
[100] Exhibit “C.”
[101] Exhibit “N.”
[102] Id.
[103] See notes 30, 38 and 39. Refer also to the sketch of Yapyuco and Flores depicting the
relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident.
[104] Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.
[105]People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 and 138952, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 66; People
v. Buntag, 471 Phil. 82, 95 (2004). [106] See People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257, 262-263 (1943);
People v. Pajenado, G.R. No. L-26458, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 172, 177; Baxinela v.
People, 520 Phil. 202, 214-215; People v. Belbes, 389 Phil. 500, 508-509 (2000); People v.
Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, September 20, 2000, 340 SCRA 688, 699; Cabanlig v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 324, 333.
[107]People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 655, 665, applying
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
[108] People v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 116200-02. June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 283, 297-298.
[109] People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 262.
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
[110] 10 Phil. 97, 99-100 (1908).
[111] United States v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784, 787 (1922).
[113] Supra note 106.
[114] People v. Ulep, supra note 106, at 700.
[115] 335 Phil. 579 (1997).
[116] Id. at 597. (Emphasis has been supplied.)
[117] See note 17.
[118] 21 Am Jur 2d, $152, p. 232, citing Turner v. State, 210 Ga. App. 303, 436 S.E.2d 229.
[119]Id., citing U.S. v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443 and People v. Nash, 282 III. App. 3d 982,
218 III. Dec. 410, 669 N.E.2d 353.
[120] Id., citing Com. V. Simcock, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 575 N.E.2d 1137
[121] Id., citing Johnson v. State, 734 S.W.2d 199
[122] Id.
[123] Id. at 233, citing U.S. v. Buchannan, 115 F.3d 445; People v. Reed, 53 Cal. App. 4th
389. Generally, ignorance or mistake of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only
if it is not superinduced by fault or negligence of party doing the charged act. (Crawford v.
State, 267 Ga. 543, 480 S.E.2d 573). For a mistake of fact to negate a mental state required
to establish a criminal offense, the mistake must be reasonable, and the act, to be justified,
must be taken under a bona fide mistaken belief (Cheser v. Com., 904 S.W.2d 239).
[124]Id. at 233, citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127. If a mistake arises not from
ignorance of law, but from ignorance of an independently determined legal status or
condition that is one of the operative facts of a crime, such a mistake is one of fact (U.S. v.
Lopez-Lima, 738 F.Supp. 1404).
[125] Id. at 233, citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127; Miller v. State, 815S.W.2d 582.
[126] Id. at 233, citing Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 835, 439 S.E.2d 645.
[127] 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
[128] Id. at 500-501. (Emphasis supplied.)

[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
[131] People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 264; Baxinela v. People, supra note 106, at 215.
[132] United States v. Ah Chong, supra note 127, at 493.
[133]People v. Crispin, G.R. No. 128360, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 167, 179; People v.
Calica, G.R. No. 139178, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 336, 362.
[134]People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59, 64; People v.
Calica, supra, at 347.
[135] People v. Gamer, G.R. No. 115984, February 29, 2000, 326 SCRA 660, 674.
[136]People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386, 400, citing
People v. Fulinara, G.R. No. 88326, August 3, 1995, 247 SCRA 28.
[137] Gay v. State, 60 Southwestern Reporter, 771 (1901)
[138] People v. Delim, supra note 136, at 400.
[139] United States v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333 (1903-1904).
[140]Mondragon v. People, G.R. No. L-17666, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 476, 480-481; See
also Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, Book II, 15th ed (2001), p. 470.
[141] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), pp. 67-68
[142]See Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718, 745 (2005), citing People v. Flores,
389 Phil. 532 (2000).
[143] People v. Ramirez, 104 Phil. 720, 726 (1958).
[144] United States v. Montenegro, 15 Phil. 1, 6 (1910).
[145] Exhibits “U,” “U-0,” “U-1,” “U-2,” “W,” “W-1” and “W-2.”
[146] 97 Northwestern Reporter, 210 (1903). (Emphasis supplied.)
[148] 47 O.G. 3433, 3440
[149] 43 Phil. 232 (1922).
[150] 42 O.G. 1914, 1921.
[151] People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454, 473.
[152] U.S. v. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1901-1903); U.S. v. Santos, 2 Phil. 453, 456 (1903);
[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM
People v. Mandagay and Taquiawan, 46 Phil. 838, 840 (1923); People v. Agbuya, 57 Phil.
238, 242 (1932); People v. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664; People v. Macabuhay, 46 O.G. 5469;
People v. San Luis, 86 Phil. 485, 497 (1950); People v. Dima Binasing, 98 Phil. 902, 908
(1956).
[153]Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 75, citing People v. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097,
January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17 and People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160 and L-22161,
January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 153.
[154] Namely, Eduardo Flores, Raul Panlican, Alejandro De Vera and Restituto Calma.
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[ G.R. Nos.

120744-46, June 25, 2012 ] 9/1/22, 3:40 PM

[ G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012 ]

Criminal Case No. 16612:

Criminal Case No. 16613:

Criminal Case No. 16614:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y

III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence

rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He

detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We,

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a

other government officers or agencies.[108]

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of an

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is

Bersamin, ** Abad, Villarama, Jr., *** and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

* Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012

Special Order No. 1241 dated June 14, 2012.

[1]Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (Chairman), with Associate Justices

[2] Now known as the Philippine National Police.

[3] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

[4] Records, Vol. 5, pp. 1-2.

[5] Records, Vol. 6, pp. 1-2

[6] Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.

[9] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 96-105.

[10] Id. at 307.

[11] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 52-55.

[13] Id. at 205.

[14] Id. at. 300-308.

[16] Records, Vol. 1, p. 388.

[18] Id.; Id.; TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26

[19] Exhibits “L,” “L-1” to “L-5.”

pp. 38-46; 48-49;

[22] TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26.

[23] Id. at 31-32, 44-45, 51.

[24] Id. at 37 and 55.

[25] Id. at 16.

[26] Id. at 57-59.

[28] Id. at 17-20, 24-26, 41-47; id. at 10-14, 18-23.

[29] TSN, May 3, 1991, pp. 14-15.

[34] Id. at 44-48.

[35] TSN, October 7, 1991, pp. 12, 14-15.

[36] TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 17-44.

[41] Id. at 23-25; Id. at 4.

[42] TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 12, 15-16.

[43] Id. at 6-7

[45] TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 5.

[46] Id. at 8-9.

[47] Id. at 21-23.

[48] TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 26-29.

[49] TSN, November 22, 1993, pp. 26-36, 40-43, 46-47.

[52] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 55.

[53] Id. at 77-79.

[54] Id. at 56-57.

Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., * and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.