1 s2.0 S0959378023000572 Main

Global Environmental Change 81 (2023) 102691
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Governing-by-aspiration? Assessing the nature and implications of

including negative emission technologies (NETs) in country long-term
climate strategies
Heather Jacobs *, Aarti Gupta, Ina Möller
Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University and Research, the Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords: In order to address the pressing challenge of climate change, countries are now submitting long-term climate
Negative emissions technologies strategies to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. These strategies
Carbon dioxide removal include within them potential future use of ‘negative emissions technologies’ (NETs). NETs are interventions that
International climate governance
remove carbon from the atmosphere, ranging from large-scale terrestrial carbon sequestration in forests, wet
Climate change mitigation
Climate change adaptation
lands and soils, to use of carbon capture and storage technologies. We assess here how NETs are discussed in 29
Long-term climate strategies long-term climate strategies, in order to ascertain the risk that including the promise of future NETs may delay
Climate politics the taking of short-term mitigation actions. Our analysis shows that almost all countries plan to rely on NETs,
particularly enhanced use of natural carbon sinks, even as a wide array of challenges and trade-offs in doing so
are highlighted. Many strategies call for improved accounting systems and market incentives in realizing future
NETs. While no strategy explicitly suggests that NETs can be a substitute for short-term mitigation, most estimate
substantial potential for future use of NETs even in the face of acknowledged uncertainties. This, we suggest, may
have the consequence of resulting in what we describe here as ‘a spiral of delay’ characterized by the promise of
future NET options juxtaposed with the simultaneous uncertainty around these future options. Our analysis
highlights that this inter-connected delaying dynamic may be intrinsic to what we term ‘governing-by-aspiration’
within global climate politics, wherein the voicing of lofty future ambition risks replacing current action and
accountability.
1. Introduction these to systematic review (UNFCCC, 2020). This leaves open the pos
sibility that countries may approach NDCs cautiously and conserva
Under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, countries have agreed tively, while outlining visionary and aspirational targets and plans for
to limit global warming to well below 2 ◦ C, and preferably to 1.5 ◦ C, the more distant future. It raises analytical and empirical questions
compared to pre-industrial levels. A key part of the agreement is that about the coherence of a country’s overall climate strategy and the
countries will do this by balancing sources and sinks of anthropogenic feasibility of realizing future aspirational climate goals.
greenhouse gases (UNFCCC 2015). Attention to ‘net-zero’ emission In this article, we critically examine the aspirations contained in
targets is thus at an all-time high, and net-zero commitments have now countries’ long-term climate strategies. Emerging research indicates that
been made by over 130 countries and 694 companies ([ECIU [Energy & the shorter-term NDCs are more closely tied to implementation plans
Climate Intelligence Unit] et al. (2022)). than are long-term strategies (e.g., Fransen et al. 2019). Yet studies of
The Paris Agreement mandates that countries articulate nationally these NDCs also indicate that in the short term, country ambitions
determined contributions (NDCs) with 2030 targets and has developed remain too low for achieving global climate targets (e.g., Moe &
an enhanced transparency framework to review these NDCs every five Røttereng 2018). It is therefore a valuable exercise to specifically
years. Conversely, it invites countries to formulate and communicate examine country aspirations as they project further into the future.
long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT- Central to such aspirations is the inclusion of so-called ‘negative
LEDS, henceforth called ‘long-term strategies’) but does not subject emissions technologies’ (NETs) within long-term strategies. NETs are
* Corresponding author at: Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, the Netherlands.

E-mail address: [email protected] (H. Jacobs).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2023.102691
Received 1 August 2022; Received in revised form 4 May 2023; Accepted 8 May 2023
Available online 22 May 2023
0959-3780/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
H. Jacobs et al. Global Environmental Change 81 (2023) 102691
proposed future approaches that aim to extract and sequester atmo current climate action (Low & Boettcher 2020). Others point to the
spheric carbon dioxide at a scale large enough to remove more carbon problematic consequences of this dynamic, characterizing NETs as an
dioxide than is added (Tanzer & Ramírez, 2019). At scale, many of these ‘unjust and high stakes gamble’ (Anderson and Peters 2016, p.183) that
approaches are still speculative. raises ‘serious ethical concerns, especially in large [temperature] over
There are various types of NETs that differ in stages of development shoot scenarios reliant upon late extreme implementation of NETs’
and readiness for deployment. Nature-based NETs include significantly (Lenzi 2018, p.2). As a way forward, McLaren et el. (2019, p. 3) thus
enhancing biological processes that sequester carbon in terrestrial sys argue in favor of revising shorter-term NDCs to use separate goals and
tems, such as soils, forests, and wetlands, as well as the marine envi timescales for emissions reductions versus negative emissions, to ensure
ronment (blue carbon). ‘Technological’ approaches include using a more ‘explicit evaluation of the practicality of each element’ and
biomass to produce energy while capturing and storing the resulting ‘expose any backtracking on emissions reduction.’
CO2 emissions; using chemical processes to directly capture CO2 from The growing body of literature on NETs also highlights practical
the air and storing it in geologic reservoirs; and enhancing geologic challenges to realizing specific future NETs at the envisioned large
processes that capture CO2 from the atmosphere and permanently scales, and the uncertainties associated with each (Fajardy et al., 2021;
binding it with rocks (NASEM, 2019). Rueda et al., 2021). These studies emphasize that use of future NETs
NETs, and particularly bioenergy with carbon capture and storage should be assessed in relation to societal goals and trade-offs that may
(BECCS), are now included in scenarios published by the Intergovern arise from maximizing one ecosystem service (e.g., carbon sequestra
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that outline how the Paris tion) over others (Low, Baum and Sovacool 2022; Carton et al., 2020;
temperature targets might be reached (IPCC, 2014). The IPCC has Dooley & Kartha, 2018; Fajardy and mac Dowell, 2018). Studies also
concluded that limiting global warming to 1.5 ◦ C with limited or no highlight that separate consideration of individual NETs, rather than
overshoot will require going carbon negative around the middle of this viewing them as part of a broader portfolio of climate options, may lead
century (IPCC, 2018). This would require significant expansion and to unrealistic expectations regarding their future potential (Fajardy
intensification of the global carbon sink, going beyond the conventional et al., 2019; Low & Schäfer, 2020). While initial debates focused on
management of forests, wetlands and soils that are already part of global aggregates in NET use, more recent national-level analyses focus
countries’ mitigation policies. on discrepancies between global projections and national planning (de
Crucially, the extent to which an expansion of the carbon sink is Coninck et al., 2018; Fajardy et al., 2019). In a recent study, Thoni et al.
needed depends on the speed at which carbon emissions can be reduced (2020) call for ‘holistic assessments’ of domestic NETs deployment,
or phased out globally. Critical social scientists are now questioning emphasizing the need to ‘bridge the gap’ between global projections and
whether prospectively hoping to rely on a variety of NETs in long-term context-specific action (see also Buylova et al. 2021).
climate commitments might lead to a delayed sense of urgency in setting In our analysis, we bring together and extend some of these scholarly
or meeting emission reduction targets in the shorter term. As such, insights. Specifically, in analyzing the role of NETs in country long-term
empirical assessment of this eventuality is increasingly important, even strategies submitted to the UNFCCC, we aim to assess how the dynamics
if methodologically challenging (Carton et al. 2023). While the shorter- relating to mitigation deterrence and the multiple feasibility and other
term NDCs are the subject of increasing analysis, in terms of mitigation challenges associated with NETs may interact with and feed off each other,
ambition or inclusion of NETs and the link to potential mitigation under the rubric of what we term ‘governing-by-aspiration’. Aspiration,
deterrence, the long-term strategies require more attention. as Finnemore & Jurkovich (2020) also note, can be used strategically by
In this article, we address this research gap by focusing on how NETs skilled political actors to facilitate agreement and mobilize social action
are being discussed and included within 29 country long-term strategies on complex issues, thereby constituting a key element of social change.
submitted to the UNFCCC, and what this may be able to reveal about the Yet it can also have a ‘dark side’ that can lead to lack of accountability
link to climate action in the present. In section 2, we first develop and and substitution of action.
present our notion of ‘governing-by-aspiration’ as an analytical lens In this study, we explore these dynamics around aspiration by pro
through which to empirically assess the dynamics and implications of posing an analytical lens on ‘governing-by-aspiration’ through which to
including NETs in long-term strategies. Section 3 describes our meth assess whether inclusion of NETs in long term strategies might result in
odology in analyzing the inclusion of NETs in the long-term strategies. what we term here a ‘spiral of delay.’ Such a spiral could be fueled by the
Section 4 presents our findings and analysis regarding the nature and interaction between the prospect of shorter-term mitigation deterrence,
extent of NETs included in these strategies. Section 5 draws on these
findings to discuss whether a potential dynamic of delay inherent to
‘governing-by-aspiration’, as outlined in our analytical lens, is discern
ible in these strategies. We conclude by highlighting the implications for
climate action of governing-by-aspiration, and the risks of prioritizing
lofty future ambitions instead of present-day action and accountability.
We also call here for further analysis of how NETs are discussed in
shorter-term NDCs as well, and to compare this explicitly with their
inclusion in long-term strategies.
2. Governing-by-aspiration: An impetus for change or a spiral of

delay?
NETs and their role in global climate action are now being examined
in a growing and diverse scholarly literature, one strand of which is
concerned with ‘mitigation deterrence’, i.e., the risk that ambitious
mitigation action is slowed in the present by the very possibility of using
NETs in the future (McLaren, 2016; Markusson, McLaren and Tyfield,
2018; McLaren et al., 2019; Grant et al., 2021b). This dynamic has been
analyzed by studying, inter alia, the economic structures and political
discourses of delay that characterize carbon dioxide removal (Carton
2019, Lamb and Minx, 2020) or how future ambition may substitute for Fig. 1. Governing-by-aspiration: A spiral of delay?
2
and the uncertainties, trade-offs and challenges associated with realizing Blue carbon was the next category, relating to carbon capture through
specific future aspirational NETs. In Fig. 1, we posit and illustrate three ocean ecosystems, algae, mangroves, salt marshes, wetlands and sea
steps (A-B-C) of a potential spiral of delay that may be associated with grasses. Carbon capture and use/storage (CCU/S) included all mentions of
‘governing-by-aspiration.’ In step (A), the promise of future NETs may ‘carbon capture and use,’ ‘carbon capture and storage,’ and ‘bioenergy
mean that we may not need to act as quickly or ambitiously in the short with carbon capture and storage’ (BECCS). Finally, we identified men
term on already known but politically contentious and challenging tions of direct air capture (DAC), enhanced oil recovery and enhanced
emission reduction options. This eventuality is linked, however, to weathering.
another emerging dynamic (B), whereby we do not know enough yet As a final step, we examined the text fragments to ascertain which
about these potentially promising NET options. Hence, we first need to NETs were most discussed and how, and to identify challenges, trade-
reduce fundamental uncertainties associated with their potential use offs, and synergies associated with different types of NETs, along with
before we can act on them. This second potential delaying dynamic feeds illustrative examples.
into a third step (C), whereby as the trade-offs and challenges associated
with one specific NET option become clearer, there is a discursive shift to 4. NETs in long-term climate strategies
another type of NET as holding out more promise (what we term here
‘option-shifting’). This keeps the promise of some future aspirational This section presents our empirical findings, organized according to
NET intervention alive, thereby driving a recurring spiral of delay. the envisioned role of NETs in the strategies (4.1), which types of NETs
With this understanding of a potential spiral of delay linked to are included (4.2), and challenges, trade-offs and synergies relating to
‘governing-by-aspiration’ as our analytical lens, we next assess if these future use of specific NETs (4.3).
dynamics are discernible in the country long-term climate strategies that
we examine. 4.1. Role of NETs
3. Methods Most of the long-term strategies (23 of 29) state that NETs will be
essential to meeting long-term global climate goals, including mid-
In analyzing how NETs are being discussed in long-term climate century ‘net-zero’ targets (see Fig. 2). Many base this reasoning on re
strategies, we rely primarily on qualitative methods of data analysis. As sidual emissions, explaining that certain sectors (such as agriculture,
our main data source, we reviewed 29 long-term strategies submitted to industry and transport) are hard to fully decarbonize and that NETs are
the UNFCCC as of March 20211, covering 42 countries (36 developed, 6 needed to bridge the gap.
developing) and roughly 34 percent of global emissions. This cutoff date A few, primarily developing countries, are less explicit about their
allowed us to scrutinize a sufficiently diverse set of strategies submitted position on NETs. In the set of 29 strategies, developing countries discuss
in the first round. inclusion of NETs to a lesser extent than developed countries do. Benin
These 29 long-term strategies constitute our data source (see Annex prioritizes adaptation in its strategy, although it does note the great
A for a list of all strategies). In analyzing these, we undertook the potential of its forests for climate change mitigation. Costa Rica dis
following steps. First, we used search terms to locate text on techniques cusses forest and agriculture policies in detail and an intent to use blue
of carbon removal and storage within these strategies. These included: carbon for mitigation. Ukraine focuses on the large potential of forests
carbon capture, carbon dioxide removal, negative emissions technology and agriculture, while Fiji focuses on blue carbon as sinks, although not
(NET), carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon capture and use (CCU), necessarily using the language of NETs. South Africa acknowledges that
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), Direct Air Carbon ‘before 2050 the core technologies in operation must be fundamentally
Capture and Storage (DACCS), forest and soil carbon sequestration, blue different’ from present ones (South Africa 2020, 3) and that ‘availability
carbon, enhanced oil recovery, enhanced weathering, and biochar. of sustainable bioenergy and biomaterials will be limited by global
Though CCS and CCU do not in themselves generate negative emissions, constraints of forest coverage, biodiversity, and food security’ (South
we included them in this analysis given their key role in enabling BECCS Africa 2020, 4) but does not specifically discuss NETs.
and DACCS. Of the 23 strategies that explicitly mention potential future use of
Second, we used the program ‘Taguette’ to compile and sort pieces of NETs, Fig. 3 notes those with an implicit or explicit position on NETs vis-
text related to NETs in the long-term strategies. The text pieces were first à-vis short-term mitigation, in order to assess whether a mitigation
‘tagged’ according to sectors and technologies (e.g., forests, CCS, blue deterrence dynamic may be discernible.
carbon, etc.), by specific issues raised, and by the ways in which NETs Five countries – Belgium, France, Norway, Switzerland, and the US –
were discussed (e.g., co-benefits, residual emissions, uncertainty, cost assert that NETs cannot be used as a substitute to short-term mitigation.
reductions, institutional frameworks, among others). Additional search Belgium sees CCS and CCU as ‘an avenue to consider in a vision towards
terms were added during the process (including monitoring, accounting, climate neutrality’ (Belgium 2020, 11) but says it should not be seen as
adaptation, transparency, etc.), resulting in an iterative inductive- an opportunity to avoid decarbonization of the economy. France and
deductive process of adding keywords and thereby identifying rele Switzerland highlight that NETs should only aim to capture hard to
vant text (see Annex B for the complete list of keywords). abate emissions or emissions associated with combustion of biomass.
Next, we exported these text pieces as Excel spreadsheets, which Switzerland recommends that targets for emission reductions and
were sorted and examined according to different types of NETs. Agri negative emissions technologies be separated. Interestingly, the US
culture and Forestry were examined as separate categories, though contradicts its own position on continued use of oil and gas by stating
several countries discussed these in tandem. Agricultural techniques that ‘even if developed and deployed successfully, CO2 removal tech
included, at large scale, conservation agriculture, soil revegetation and nologies should not be seen as justification to continue emitting freely –
restoration, agroecology, biochar, bioenergy crop-pasture rotational they represent a suite of strategies that complement rather than substi
strategies, agroforestry and silvopasture systems. Forestry techniques tute for emissions reductions’ (US 2016, 39).
included afforestation, reforestation, reduced deforestation, sustainable In contrast, four countries – Spain, South Korea, the UK and the US –
forest management, peatland preservation and restoration, expanded explicitly also use language implying that use of NETs may allow for the
nature parks, wildland fire management, and urban green spaces. continued use of fossil fuels or may enable a more gradual transition away
from them. Reasons noted are maintenance of current production pro
cesses, enhancement of energy security, time to enable a gradual tran
1
These 29 LTS were submitted by 28 countries and the EU and are accessible sition and reducing pressure on various economic sectors. Table 1 lists
via the UNFCCC website as of 19 March 2021. illustrative examples of this position from the four strategies.
3
Fig. 2. Overview of general stance on NETs to meet global climate goals in country long-term climate strategies.
Fig. 3. Long-term use of NETs vis-à-vis short-term mitigation action.
In short, many countries see the future need for and potential of and Singapore.
NETs, even as a few specifically caution against the risk of delaying short
term mitigation actions, and others highlight that the possibility of NETs 4.2.1. Agricultural sequestration (including soils)
may permit use of fossil fuels for longer. Almost all countries seek to improve agricultural practices to in
crease carbon sequestration on agricultural lands and in soils. The
strategies of the US, France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Spain and the
4.2. Types of NETs
EU contain extensive discussion of these.
Countries see agriculture as meeting multiple goals in the long run,
The specific types of NETs discussed include nature-based ap
including soil carbon sequestration, biofuel production, food production
proaches such as forestry, agriculture, and blue carbon, and techno
and biodiversity conservation. Agroforestry and biochar are ascribed a
logical approaches like BECCS (that ultimately rely on the development
particularly transformative role. Large-scale potential for agroforestry is
of CCU/S).
almost seen as a ‘silver bullet,’ capable of achieving several agricultural,
Fig. 4 provides an overview showing that nature-based approaches
ecological and socio-economic objectives, and as an opportunity to
are the most widely discussed. Agricultural and forestry-related ap
pursue adaptation measures with mitigation co-benefits.
proaches are mentioned in 28 of 29 strategies (with the exception of
Marshall Islands). 24 of 29 strategies also mention (hypothetical) use of
4.2.2. Forestry
CCU/S and 13 mention BECCS. Blue carbon is noted as a potential option
Alongside agriculture, forestry measures are the most widely
in 7 strategies, with a particularly prominent role in the strategies of Fiji
4
Table 1 ‘explore the possibilities of blue carbon as a carbon sink, such as con
Use of NETs may allow for the continued use of fossil fuels: Illustrative quotes. servation and restoration of algae beds using useful aquatic plants found
Country Extract from the strategy nationwide’ and will ‘facilitate the creation of new industries from
marine resources with new materials’ (Japan 2019, 64–65). Singapore
Republic of Korea “To continue to use fossil fuel as a power source, the use of
2020 CCUS technology is critical. Coal and LNG power plants could emphasizes the co-benefits that can be realized in coastal ecosystems,
continue to play an important role in solving renewable such as carbon storage, ecological resilience and the mitigation of floods
energy’s volatility issue and enhancing energy security if their and coastal erosion.
CO2 emissions are captured before they are released into the Blue carbon is also seen as an attractive option by Costa Rica and Fiji,
air…Assuming the level of CCUS technology is fully matured to
an advanced level and its wider application is realized, the
which plan to implement pilot projects in managing and protecting
technology is expected to be applied to CO2 emissions from coal wetlands and mangroves. As Fiji claims, GHG emissions deriving from
as well as natural gas power generation” (pp. 58–59). mangroves are ‘among the highest of all land use practices in the tropics’
Spain 2020 “Considering that both CCUS and hydrogen are alternatives (Fiji 2018, 141). It projects that it could achieve net negative emissions
that can contribute to decarbonization while maintaining
before 2030 or even 2025 ‘if it were to adopt a highly aggressive
current production processes, they can be considered processes
that come into play” (p. 88). mangrove restoration program’ (Fiji 2018, 39).
UK 2017 “Emissions removal pathway: Under this pathway, sustainable The US also plans to tap into the use of blue carbon, indicating that
biomass power stations are used in tandem with CCUS its tidally influenced wetlands are ‘some of the most efficient carbon
technology… There is still a significant clean transition in other sinks in the world’ (US 2016, 80).
sectors but successful innovation in emissions removal allows
more time for some of these changes” (p. 56)
US 2016 “Coal and natural gas power plants can continue to play a 4.2.4. Technological NETs: Carbon capture and use/storage and BECCS
major role in the U.S. electricity system if their associated CO2 Speculative technological approaches linked to negative emissions
emissions are captured and prevented from being released into like Carbon Capture and Use/Storage (CCU/S) and Bioenergy with
the atmosphere. Greater success in delivering negative
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) feature prominently in the long-
emissions through the land sector sink and CO2 removal
technologies eases the burden on GHG emissions reductions in term strategies of industrialized countries but are hardly mentioned by
other sectors” (p. 47). developing countries. Canada, Norway, UK and US already have pilot
projects on these techniques, while Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Switzerland, UK and US include CCU/S technologies in various sce
discussed and are regarded as having tremendous potential, even as narios. South Korea, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the US are investing
there is extensive discussion of the challenges and trade-offs of relying or will invest in research and development (R&D). Of the 24 strategies
on these to realize negative emissions. that mention CCU/S, 13 also single out BECCS.
Most countries note the carbon sequestration capacity of forests and Fig. 5 provides an overview of inclusion of CCU/S and BECCS in the
state their intent to use forestry measures to compensate for future strategies.
emissions gaps. Belgium, Canada, France, Spain, Ukraine, and the US The transformational potential of CCU/S and BECCS is generally
have the most in-depth discussion. However, all countries except related to its assumed permanence and high storage capacity. France
Marshall Islands discuss forests, including other developing countries calls CCU/S an ‘essential option’ for the future, noting that forest storage
such as Costa Rica, Benin, and South Africa. In general, discussions eventually reaches saturation (France 2017, 147). South Korea affirms
around forest measures are filled with promise and aspiration but many that ‘advanced technologies such as CCUS should be fully harnessed to
countries also highlight formidable challenges. ultimately achieve carbon neutrality of the power sector’ (Republic of
Korea 2020, 56). The US notes that, despite the cost, technological CO2
4.2.3. Blue carbon removal technologies offer advantages over land carbon sequestration,
Blue carbon (i.e., carbon sequestration through marine ecosystems) including CO2 storage on geological time scales and fewer limits to
is comparatively new, with enormous potential ascribed to it by, for future scaling due to massive amounts of geologic storage potential. The
example, countries in the Asia-Pacific region. South Korea posits that its EU, among several others, asserts that CCU/S options are necessary,
marine ecosystem has ‘the world’s 5th largest mud flat area’ with ‘great noting that ‘CCS will also be required if CO2 emissions from biomass-
potential in blue carbon’ (Republic of Korea 2020, 101–102). Japan will based energy and industrial plants are to be captured and stored to
Fig. 4. Different types of NETs mentioned in country long-term climate strategies.
5
Fig. 5. Inclusion of Carbon Capture & Use/Storage and BECCS.
create negative emissions. Together with the land use sink, it could recovery are briefly noted.
compensate for remaining greenhouse gas emissions in our economy’
(European Commission 2018, 15).
Less frequently discussed CO2 removal technologies include direct 4.3. Challenges associated with development and future use of NETs
air capture, enhanced weathering, and enhanced oil recovery. Fig. 6
depicts the country strategies that include brief mention of these tech Despite the enormous potential that countries ascribe to future NETs,
nologies. The EU, France, Japan, Switzerland, UK, and the US mention they also identify substantial challenges linked to their future use. At
that DACCS exists only in a nascent state with uncertain implementation least three challenges are widely discussed: the need to prevent captured
and scale-up potential. The US strategy recognizes DACCS as an option carbon from being re-released into the atmosphere (permanence); the
while stating that its required energy intensity is much greater than for need to lower costs and create sufficient incentives for investment and
CCU/S, therefore asserting that DACCS is unlikely to be economically use (costs and incentives); and the need for monitoring systems (ac
competitive before all major CO2 point sources utilize CCU/S. France counting). Furthermore, a key overarching concern is navigating con
mentions it as a potentially viable option while still in early stages of flicting priorities and goals in society between NETs and other potential
R&D. Japan writes that DACCS ‘faces many challenges, including the uses of carbon sinks (tradeoffs), while also securing available synergies
necessity for significant energy input and cost reductions’ (Japan 2019, between NETs and other societal goals, including adaptation priorities
81). Other technologies such as enhanced weathering and enhanced oil (synergies).
The following sections describe these concerns in more detail, as well
Fig. 6. Strategies mentioning other technological NETs.
6
as noting a tendency for option-shifting among NETs. and CO2 transport if sources are distant from storage locations and plans
to initiate an awareness campaign aimed at ‘social acceptance of the CCS
4.3.1. The challenge of permanence at large’ (Japan 2019, 80). Addressing issues of social acceptance across
A key concern relating to the long-term viability of NETs discussed in borders, Switzerland, (which plans on using CCU/S offsets through
the strategies is permanence. Reliance upon forest and land use sinks is projects abroad due to its limited domestic capacity for geological
seen as particularly problematic due to uncertainty over the duration of storage), is keen to ensure that the same standards of social acceptance
long-lasting and large-scale carbon sequestration, especially given the apply abroad as they would domestically.
increase in natural disasters (drought, wildfires, insect infestations) that
can destroy standing forests and ecosystems and negate decades of 4.3.3. Need for monitoring
carbon accumulation instantaneously. A crucial issue highlighted as a key barrier to the realization of NETs
As a result of this concern, the strategies also include suggestions on in many strategies is lack of monitoring infrastructures. Most countries
how best to enhance the carbon sink and build resilience in the long run. attribute a huge potential to land-based sinks, yet lament that there are
Some strategies mention sustainable forest management, switching few methodologies to accurately quantify this potential and few official
species, or changing management to enable more harvesting and wood national-level estimates.
use in construction. Canada notes the need to increase use of cover A large group of countries, both developed and developing, including
crops, biochar application and precision agriculture to avoid distur Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, Marshall Islands,
bance of more fragile soils and to maintain the carbon sink, while South Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, UK, Ukraine and the US, note problems
Korea highlights that a change in tree species would decrease carbon in the measuring, monitoring, reporting and verification of forest and
removal in the short-term but could increase carbon sinks in the future. soil carbon, and the lack of modeling tools to accurately predict the CO2
This point is also relevant to the debate on wood production for con absorption value of the forestry sector. This methodological challenge is
struction, which is seen as more long lasting. seen as greatly impeding the speed at which terrestrial sinks can be
In some cases (like Belgium), countries conclude that CCS/BECCS are enhanced and is seen to hinder the establishment of incentive-based
needed to counter these limitations and to compensate for residual payments for land carbon sequestration.
emissions in the long-run, a phenomenon we characterize as ‘option- The US strategy, for example, calls for carbon accounting frame
shifting’ in our analytical lens. works to calculate net carbon effects from land-based activities in order
to promote consistency and reliability. Overall, accounting frameworks
4.3.2. Costs and lack of incentives for carbon removal monitoring are seen as essential for planning, and
Another set of challenges discussed in the strategies relates to the transition towards using land-based carbon removal is seen as
potentially high costs and lack of incentives as obstacles to realizing the dependent upon these tools. This signals that countries may be starting
potential of NETs. For CCU/S, the most cited barrier is prohibitive cost. down a spiral of delay, rationalizing their deferred action until the
Industrialized countries, including Denmark, Latvia, Portugal, the US appropriate monitoring tools are in place.
and Singapore, state that high costs and a lack of market incentives are a
significant barrier to large-scale deployment of CCU/S and BECCS. 4.3.4. Trade-offs
Developing countries hardly discuss BECCS, and only two mention CCU/ Trade-offs between different societal goals are seen as another key
S in passing. As a remedy, most strategies highlight the need for more challenge for the future use of NETs. Most prominently discussed are
research and development (R&D). The UK as a country with more conflicts in allocating agricultural land and biomass to the cultivation of
experience in this field highlights that the risks inherent in potential energy crops and carbon storage. Because of food security and biodi
large-scale projects and the lack of technological breakthroughs result in versity concerns, some strategies (e.g., Germany and the EU) state that
high prices. agricultural biofuels can only play a limited role in long-term climate
In the forestry and agriculture sectors, the lack of incentives is also change mitigation. Similar concerns are noted by the US around using
seen as a key barrier to realizing the full potential of large-scale carbon forest expansion and its implications for resource use and food
storage. Many strategies mention that private landowners and farmers, production.
as well as governments and corporations, need incentives to prioritize In some cases, this conflict leads to obvious dissonances within long-
large-scale carbon sequestration in these sectors. The US strategy men term strategies. For example, France projects that by 2050, nearly two
tions payments for the use of land carbon sinks and CO2 removal tech thirds of the biomass used for energy will come directly or indirectly
nologies, equivalent to an economy-wide carbon price, claiming that from the agricultural sector. At the same time, it states that:
this can create revenue streams for rural communities. ‘…attention must be paid to the tensions between the biomass user
The need for cooperation – both between the public and private sectors, with priority being given to food in the event of a conflict of use,
sector and across countries – is emphasized as well. The US strategy calls and in the bioeconomy sectors to the uses with the longest lifespans and
for public-private partnerships, and Norway, Japan, Switzerland, and greatest potential for substitution’ (emphasis added) (France 2017,
Canada highlight the necessity of international collaboration, describing 110).
different mechanisms that could be used to realize carbon removal In the forestry sector, a notable tension exists between increasing the
across borders. For technology-based approaches, cooperation between forest sink and increasing timber and bioenergy production. Sweden,
different stakeholders is seen as necessary to bolster investment and Ukraine and Portugal note the imperative to achieve both goals, aiming
R&D and to increase public acceptance of CCU/S. South Korea, Germany to maintain the forest sink while improving forest management to in
and Canada urge joint action between government and businesses to crease harvested wood products. Other countries, including France and
boost investment and reduce costs, while Japan notes the need for Germany, advocate for a case-by-case approach to diagnose the most
public-private cooperation to achieve optimal CO2 transportation, and appropriate use of individual forest stands, accounting for citizens’ ex
the UK seeks to provide international leadership on CCU/S by collabo pectations and finding compatibility between societal and economic
rating with global partners. needs. In Switzerland, the trade-off becomes apparent with respect to
Another potential barrier to greater uptake of NETs that is briefly economic interests in agriculture. The country highlights the difficulty
noted is public acceptance. Only the EU, France, South Korea and Japan of achieving balance between maintaining livestock and enhancing soil
allude to this challenge. The EU stresses the need for an enabling carbon sequestration, also mentioning conflicting priorities between soil
framework for research and innovation to scale up private investments cultivation and the use of herbicides.
while addressing the concerns of the public regarding CCS. Further doubts relate to the problems of saturation and leakage.
Japan emphasizes the need to survey suitable locations for storage Several countries have aging forests approaching saturation, with Spain
7
and Austria predicting that their forests will turn into net sources of 5.1. Short-term action versus future use of NETs
carbon by 2050. Some countries warn of decisions that may lead to
leakage and problem shifting. For example, Norway cautions that: A motivating question for our analysis was whether long-term stra
‘…it is necessary to find a balance between different interests such as tegies reveal preferences for deferring short-term mitigation in favor of
food production, infrastructure, climate change, biodiversity and promising future use of NETs (step A in Fig. 1). Our review reveals that
ecosystem services. It is important to avoid decisions that will shift most strategies acknowledge the urgency of decarbonizing quickly,
problems elsewhere…’ (Norway 2020, 35). while also noting the need to prepare for NETs. Unsurprisingly, there is
The need to consider trade-offs between expanding carbon sinks and no widespread nor overt preference voiced to defer short-term mitiga
other societal goals is a key concern running through the long-term tion action in favor of future NETs. This said, only five country strategies
strategies and acknowledged to be a significant hurdle to future reali explicitly state that NETs cannot be considered a substitute for mitiga
zation of large-scale NETs. tion, with four strategies noting that fossil fuel use could continue a bit
longer in light of the future possibility of NETs. These include the stra
4.3.5. Synergies tegies of the US and South Korea.
In addition to noting various challenges and trade-offs, many stra In both strategies, this claim is accompanied by a high anticipated
tegies also discuss how large-scale carbon storage through forestry and potential attributed to carbon removal techniques. For example, the US
agriculture could have important synergies with adaptation and co- posits that the potential for agricultural carbon storage is even greater
benefits, such as food security, biodiversity, resilience to natural di than predicted if ‘breakthrough innovations’ are harnessed to increase
sasters and improved livelihoods. For example, the US projects that a soil mass and depth of commodity crops (US 2016, 11). It notes that if
large portion of energy crops in 2050 will be perennial grasses that can new crop breeds were taken up across the 400 million acres of US
increase soil carbon storage, improve water quality, reduce emissions cropland, carbon sequestration potential would range from 0.25 to 1.2
from fertilizer, and expand wildlife habitat. It has thus initiated R&D Gt CO2 by mid-century (US 2016, 78). South Korea asserts that its
efforts focusing on energy crop yields and exploring biomass opportu ‘marine ecosystem absorbs carbon 50 times faster than the terrestrial
nities like micro-and macroalgae. ecosystem does’ (Republic of Korea 2020, 101–102), even as Singapore
The strategies of France and Portugal highlight rather the impor claims that carbon stocks in mangrove ecosystems can be ‘three times or
tance of focusing on adaptation as a precondition to preserving carbon more that of terrestrial forests’ (Singapore 2020, 78). These observations
sinks in soils and forests. The use of agroforestry and reducing forest provide some evidence of explicitly combining promising technological
fires, for example, are identified as key to increasing and maintaining futures with a potentially reduced need for drastic emission reductions
domestic carbon sinks. Portugal’s strategy states, for example: in the near term.
‘it is therefore undeniable that the implementation of adaptation Empirically assessing whether mitigation deterrence is occurring is
measures becomes one of the critical factors for the carbon neutrality however notoriously difficult. As noted above, we are unlikely to find
targets, as regards both emissions reduction and sequestration capacity. much direct evidence for countries suggesting a deferral of short-term
Similarly, carbon neutrality is one of the guarantors of adaptability….… emission reductions as a result of NETs (step A of our spiral) in our re
the synergies for mitigation and adaptation that occur in various mea view of long-term strategies. As such, the methodological novelty of our
sures are another sign that integrated action between the two strands in approach here is to focus on and assess how the next two steps, relating to
all components of society is effectively needed’ (República Portuguesa, uncertainties and challenges of NETs (step B) and option-shifting be
2019, 69–70). tween NETs (step C), may de facto trigger mitigation deterrence (step A).
Similarly, the German strategy notes that ‘[a]dapting forests to We turn to our assessment of these next two steps in section 5.2
climate change is particularly important for safeguarding and expanding (uncertainties around NETs as discussed in the strategies) and section
the contribution of forestry to climate change mitigation…” (Germany, 5.3 (option-shifting between NETs).
2016, 68). And even in countries like South Korea, where it is stated that
there is simply ‘no land left’ for afforestation or reforestation (Republic of 5.2. Uncertainties relating to future use of NETs
Korea 2020, 100), there are plans to increase carbon sinks through
expanding green spaces for recreational use, restoring degraded forest Our review of country long term strategies reveals that countries
lands and planting trees on underused lands. raise fundamental questions about the feasibility of large-scale use of
These findings reveal, importantly, a more complex interaction be different kinds of NETs in the future, given a range of uncertainties and
tween mitigation, NETs and also adaptation than is often acknowledged. challenges (step B in Fig. 1). For both nature-based and technological
Short-term mitigation has long been seen as essential to reducing approaches, persisting uncertainties are identified regarding, for
adaptation needs in the future; however, the illustrations from country example, the permanence of carbon removals. Furthermore, the strate
strategies above highlight that the success of carbon removals through gies acknowledge that uncertainties associated with estimating the po
future NETs also requires a suite of adaptation measures necessary to be tential for large scale CCS are large, but uncertainties surrounding
taken in the present and well into the future. implementation and impacts appear to be even larger.
The strategy of France is illustrative of these trends. In this strategy,
5. Governing-by-aspiration: An impetus to act or a spiral of it is argued first that the uncertainties surrounding CCU/S technologies
delay? for storage and acceptability call for proceeding with caution, requiring
both a viable economic model and ‘good long-term risk management’
Drawing on the discussion above, we turn here to assessing whether (France 2017, 147). However, it is then asserted that CCS is also ‘an
the manner in which NETs are discussed and included within country essential option for the future, as it allows for the generation of
long-term climate strategies risks a spiral of delay, as captured in the continuous negative emissions over the very long term ([in contrast to]
three steps (A-B-C) of our analytical lens on governing-by-aspiration. forest storage [which] eventually reaches an optimum level, draining
Below we use two country strategies that appear to exhibit all three carbon sinks in a few decades/centuries).’
steps—those of the US and South Korea—to briefly illustrate how the At the same time, the strategy highlights that land carbon seques
spiral of delay may play out. There are other countries that also display tration potentials are not included in their climate targets, projections or
elements of the spiral, notably steps B (uncertainty) and C (option inventories due to methodological challenges. Enhancing measuring and
shifting), which may in turn contribute to fueling step A (mitigation monitoring capabilities is then suggested to be essential to bridge the
deterrence) in a de facto, emergent way. We weave in illustrative ex gap between future aspirations and the formulation of tangible plans. As
amples from these other countries as well. a rare example of reflection, France notes that the current uncertainty
8
related to soil carbon inventory methodologies ‘should not hinder action Table 3
in anticipation of improvement’ (France 2017, 91). Yet this is the only Uncertainties surrounding the feasibility, safety and public acceptance of NETs
analyzed strategy stating that an encountered challenge should not involving CCS: illustrative quotes.
‘hinder action.’ Strategy On uncertainties surrounding CCS, BECCS and DACCS
Table 2 provides illustrative quotes on the challenges of measuring Norway 2020 “Many pathways also include carbon dioxide removal (CDR), i.e.,
forest and soil carbon, along with a need for accounting systems. removal of CO2 from the atmosphere through afforestation and
As shown in Table 2, accounting systems are seen as a vital bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). This will
precondition to future deployment of large-scale NETs. Yet, building up require considerable areas of land and may have serious adverse
impacts on the environment. It is therefore uncertain to what
large monitoring and accounting infrastructures is time and resource
extent it will be practicable or environmentally sound to make
intensive, even as it prioritizes demonstrating action, rather than the large-scale use of CDR” (p. 9).
taking of action itself, and may even inhibit action if countries do not US 2016 “Given uncertainty around land sector dynamics and the ability to
have the tools to make certain types of progress visible (Konrad et al., economically scale negative emissions technologies, anticipating
2022, see also Dooley and Gupta 2017). Developing monitoring and scenarios in which negative emissions are limited is important…
In the No CO2 Removal Technology scenario, we assume that
accounting systems in order to quantify and verify carbon sequestration engineered CO2 removal technologies like BECCS are
may therefore risk forestalling action further until such systems are in unavailable” (p.32).
place, and may become a distraction from taking the urgent emission US 2016 “No CO2 removal technology has been deployed at scale to date,
reduction actions currently needed. Highlighting the need for these and many important questions remain regarding potential costs,
unintended consequences, and co-benefits. Pilot, demonstration,
systems can then also be akin to what some authors have described as a
and first-of-kind commercial projects are needed to demonstrate
form of ‘symbolic signaling’, where preparing the ground for future viability and to identify challenges…” (p. 39).
ambition may substitute for current implementation (Røttereng 2018, EU 2018 “CCS has not yet reached the commercialisation stage, hampered
Low & Boettcher 2020). by lack of demonstration of the technology and economic
Beyond uncertainties associated with measuring and monitoring viability, regulatory barriers in some Member States and limited
public acceptance… For CCS to deliver on its potential, a
stored carbon, a range of other uncertainties are also discussed in
coordinated and forceful action is necessary to secure the building
country strategies. Canada mentions that uncertainty remains around of demonstrators and commercial facilities within the EU as well
deployment of CCS at scale, while Austria, Denmark, the EU, Germany, as addressing concerns of public opinion in some Member States”
Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Switzerland, and the (p. 15).
Switzerland “The potential for DACCS and BECCS in Switzerland is still
US state that there is potential for large scale CCS/BECCS, but that
2021 unclear… (p. 50) [NETs] should only be used for emissions that
further R&D is needed to either determine the feasibility, quantify the are difficult to avoid owing to limited domestic storage potential,
potential, or increase public acceptance. Table 3 provides illustrative the required transport of removed CO2 over sometimes long
quotes on the uncertainties around feasibility, safety and public accep distances, the current high costs involved, the potential risks, the
tance associated with NETs, specifically those that involve CCS. concerns over acceptance by the public and the uncertainty over
further technological development” (p. 50).
These various acknowledged uncertainties listed in Table 3 signal as
well the risk of a delaying dynamic unfolding. Existing literature on
NETs has discussed some of these aspects as well. Lamb et al. (2020), for the technological breakthroughs that country strategies envision, for
example, describe a delaying dynamic around NETs whereby policy example, in soil/carbon monitoring or in pilot demonstrations that will
statements “promote ineffective solutions and thereby draw attention permit uncertainties around feasibility of certain NETs to be reduced.
away from more substantial and effective measures” (p. 3). They identify In light of the myriad uncertainties identified in country strategies
this as an example of delay relating to what they call ‘technological around specific NETs, we turn next to the presence of what we charac
optimism’ whereby technological progress is envisioned to result in terize as ‘option-shifting’ between different NETs, which may further
future emissions reductions (also see Stoddard et al. (2021). This echoes fuel a spiral of delay.
Table 2
Challenges in measuring and monitoring carbon in land-based NETs: illustrative 5.3. Option-shifting between different types of future NETs
quotes.
As a final step in our analysis of a spiral of delay, we identify in
Strategy On lack of carbon measurement methodologies/data access
stances where our review revealed the phenomenon of ‘option-shifting’
Belgium 2020 “Due to the lack of precise data on current soil carbon stocks, it between different NETs (step C in Fig. 1). This is most evident in stra
is not yet possible to make a quantified estimate of their
potential contribution to our general objective’ (p. 31). ‘As a
tegies that discuss a variety of NETs scenarios. Developed countries
first step, we therefore advocate better monitoring of carbon provide detailed descriptions of the pros and cons of pursuing different
stocks in order to better map the reduction potential…” (p. 32). NET options and seem to use option shifting in the context of adjudi
Costa Rica 2019 A consolidated forest monitoring system is needed to improve cating trade-offs. European strategies in particular show a reluctance to
data on wetlands, peatlands, soils and other high carbon
fully embrace one technique or the other, while at the same time stating
ecosystems, and to make data and projections available in open
format. that not engaging with a given technique will have serious
Fiji 2018 “[a] key constraint in achieving greater accuracy for GHG consequences.
emissions/scenarios was availability and reliability of data” (p. These dynamics align with the prospect of option shifting as a key
216) component of governing-by-aspiration. When discussing uncertainties,
Germany 2016 If carbon measurements are unreliable, they cannot be used to
make projections for national climate targets or to shed light on
challenges and trade-offs, countries tend to shift from one NET option to
progress in achieving these targets. the other: forest-sector NETs may not realize their potential, so BECCS
Marshall Islands “[the] lack of reliable, high quality and accessible data will, may be needed; BECCS requires a great deal of land and this conflicts
2018 unless addressed, be a very significant barrier to RMI achieving with agriculture and food security imperatives, so this may call for
its climate change objectives as set out in its NDC and this 2050
DACCS; DACCS is too expensive, so CCS must first be expanded; but CCS
Strategy” (p. 16).
Spain 2020 “the deposit of organic carbon from soil in agroforestry systems faces cost-efficiency and public acceptance challenges (therefore it
can be increased by 20%-80%…[yet]there is still no robust might be better to support the use of NETs abroad). By shifting between
methodology to reflect these increases in the National NET scenarios, countries remain unclear about what path they may
Greenhouse Gas Inventory, so this deposit has not been taken actually take but also leave open a potential promising future NET
into account” (p.13).
intervention that could be deployed at scale eventually.
9
Table 4 illustrates how countries discuss shifting between different Table 4

options. Option-shifting in long-term strategies: illustrative quotes.
Such option-shifting may become a crucial link in a spiral of delay Summary of the claim Statement in the strategy
vis-à-vis urgently needed short-term emission reductions. Short-term
Austria
mitigation may be impeded by estimates of huge potential of future We intend to use both natural sinks and “…remaining emissions are to be
NETs, which is then accompanied by simultaneous acknowledgements technological solutions. compensated by carbon capture in natural
of fundamental uncertainties surrounding this potential, thus requiring sinks (forests, soil) and by permanent
actions to reduce these uncertainties first, as well as option shifting sequestration in products or technical
storage.” (p. 11)
between different NETs. However, there are major permanence “If land loss continues and the ability of
issues with forests/land and trade-offs the soil to store carbon decreases due to
5.4. Completing the cycle: Illustrating a potential spiral of delay to account for… rising temperatures, maintaining the
current quantity of carbon stored in
Austria’s soil will become increasingly
Having examined above whether the steps A-B-C as outlined in our challenging.” (p. 62)“It will not be
‘governing-by-aspiration’ lens are discernible in the long-term strate possible to maintain a high forest sink
gies, we briefly illustrate here how the US and South Korean strategies capacity over the long term, beyond 2050
exhibit, in our view, all three stages of the spiral. in Austria”
(p. 88)
As illustrated in Table 5, the US and South Korea express the desire to
And even more major issues with CCS “Austria sees substantial hurdles and
continue using fossil fuels, cite different NETs options as a way to buy (including current legality status). uncertainties with these technological
time, then note the large uncertainties and obstacles impeding their use, solutions in terms of domestic storage
and shift to exploring a different NET option, concluding, for example in capacity and ensuring permanent and safe
storage. [T]he storage of CO2 in geological
the case of the US, with an openness to continuing exploring different
structures is prohibited in Austria at least
scenarios. for the time being (until 2023)” (p. 15)
6. Conclusion: Delay as a potential emergent outcome of European Union

governing-by-aspiration Land is scarce and entails adjudicating “The transition of our economy will
trade-offs. always have to be careful how to make
In this article, we have excavated how a diverse array of potential best use of scarce land and other natural
resources and ensure that biomass is only
NETs are being discussed in country long-term climate strategies, what
used in the most efficient and sustainable
key uncertainties or challenges countries associate with their future way.” (p. 14)
realization, and how aspirations to use future NETs may impinge upon In order to relieve pressure on land, we “In order to alleviate the multiple
short term mitigation action. can tap into marine resources. demands on the EU’s land resources,
In so doing, we have examined whether a potential spiral of delay improving the productivity of aquatic and
marine resources will play an eminent role
might be inherent to such aspirational climate governance. Given the
in capturing the full range of opportunities
promise of future NETs use, countries may initially be distracted from of the bioeconomy for tackling climate
urgently needed short-term mitigation, or at least see the two as com change. (pp. 14–15)
plements. Yet, as they explore future use of specific NETs more fully, the CCS is also an option we will consider… “CCS will also be required if CO2 emissions
from biomass-based energy and industrial
uncertainties and limitations of each option come to the fore. In the face
plants are to be captured and stored to
of this uncertainty, countries may shift attention and resources to setting create negative emissions.” (p. 15)
up systems to measure and account for future actions relating to NETs, And yet, CCS presents formidable “CCS has not yet reached the
rather than to the actual taking of emission reduction actions now. It problems. commercialisation stage, hampered by
may also fuel a shift from one NET option to the other. This keeps alive lack of demonstration of the technology
and economic viability, regulatory
the possibility of a future viable NET option, thereby fueling a potential
barriers in some Member States and
delay in current mitigation action.2 limited public acceptance.” (p. 15)
In concluding, we should note here an important caveat: our analysis
of a potential spiral of delay inherent in governing-by-aspiration is based Germany
on document analysis of long-term climate strategies submitted to the Land offers great carbon removal “Land use offers outstanding potential, not
UNFCCC. While we see these strategies as crucial to examine, such a data potential… only because emissions can be reduced but
source and such a document focused method does not allow us to also because it is possible for carbon to be
stored (sink function).” (p. 68)
empirically assess whether a delaying dynamic is actually present in
And yet land measures carry great “…there is a great deal of variability in
practice within countries, in terms of prioritizing longer term commit uncertainty/are subject to this sector, and it is subject to the
ments over short term actions. methodological difficulties. influence of a range of natural and human
Given this, we conclude by identifying three topics for future factors (p. 68) [As such] accounting for
empirical analysis: emissions from land use and forestry is
subject to considerable methodological
First, it is important to consider dynamics of delay, empirically, in difficulties. Therefore, the German
domestic contexts, including whether the growing focus on improved government does not include this sector
monitoring and accounting systems for large-scale carbon sequestration directly in the national climate targets.”
(as future NETs) feeds into an actual spiral of delay vis-à-vis short-term (p. 23, own emphasis)
We are open to using CCS. “If emissions are unavoidable, it may be
climate actions within countries. This would include further research into
necessary to lower them through long-
whether the felt need to set up ever more elaborate accounting and offset term carbon capture and storage (CCS).”
schemes relating to the potential use of NETs in the future diminishes (p. 57)
country efforts to take already well-understood but politically and However, there are uncertainties; we are “Specific measures for implementing
not sure if this will be possible. those solutions must be in place by 2030.
This will require immediate major
research and development work targeted
2
It is important to note that we understand such a potential ‘spiral of delay’ to specific process innovations and to
as more of an emergent de facto outcome of a ‘governing by aspiration’ dynamic
in climate policy, rather than being deliberately planned or intentional. (continued on next page)
10
Table 4 (continued ) Table 5

Summary of the claim Statement in the strategy
Strategies exhibiting all three steps in a spiral of delay: illustrative quotes.
Summary of the claim Statement in the strategy
CCU, which builds on current activities; a
potential role for CCS in this context must US
then be examined if that turns out to be We can continue to use fossil fuels if we can “Coal and natural gas power plants can
necessary and acceptable.” (p. 59) use both land sector and CO2 removal continue to play a major role in the U.S.
techniques. electricity system if their associated CO2
Norway emissions are captured and prevented
We need to use land, but it is a limited “Mitigation measures that require large from being released into the
resource. areas of land may result in conflicts atmosphere.” (p. 47) “Greater success in
between different policy objectives and delivering negative emissions through
require trade-offs between climate policy the land sector sink and CO2 removal
and other interests.” (p. 8) technologies eases the burden on GHG
BECCS requires a considerable amount of “Many pathways also include…BECCS. emissions reductions in other sectors.”
land and may have serious adverse This will require considerable areas of (p. 47)
impacts. land and may have serious adverse We could and might need to use BECCS as “While not currently deployed at scale,
impacts on the environment. It is therefore well. CO2 removal technologies like BECCS
uncertain to what extent it will be have the potential to bolster negative
practicable or environmentally sound to emissions. Developing these
make large-scale use of CDR.” (p. 9) technologies may be necessary in the
But we may nonetheless need to use CO2 “However, this approach may be a long run to constrain global average
removal more than originally planned. necessary part of the solution if cuts in temperature increases to well below
greenhouse gas emissions are not rapid 2 ◦ C.” (p. 34)
enough.” (p. 9) However, there are large uncertainties “However, since the potential for
…And also, land measures are Norway’s “Through the International Climate and associated with all of these. increased land sector carbon
biggest contribution to international Forest Initiative, Norway is seeing to sequestration remains uncertain and the
climate action. reduce emissions from deforestation and economic viability of negative emissions
forest degradation. This is Norway’s technologies remains to be
largest contribution to international demonstrated, we also plan for outcomes
climate action.” (p. 45) in which our ability to achieve negative
emissions is limited.” (p.7)
No single technology will be sufficient (and “The success of the mid-century strategy
economically challenging mitigation and adaptation actions today. we have created 24 modeling scenarios is therefore not contingent upon the
Second, and importantly, our review has also highlighted a more exploring different combinations). successful emergence of BECCS or any
other single technology….” (p. 7)
complex relationship between mitigation, adaptation and reliance on
NETs than might be commonly understood. Country strategies reveal
that there might also be important synergies between the desire to use South Korea
We need CCS to continue our gradual fossil “To continue to use fossil fuel as a power
NETs in the long term and the need to take urgent climate mitigation and fuel phase-out. source, the use of CCUS technology is
adaptation action in the short term. As the discussion of challenges critical” (p. 58).“To this end,
inherent to future use of NETs reveals, the success of nature-based NETs deployment of innovative renewable
is dependent on adaptation measures taken now, in order to enhance energy and fossil fuels with CCUS are the
two essential elements that should be
resilience of existing sinks well into the future. This imperative could
secured.”
even tip the scale in favor of acting on adaptation sooner than later (p. 56)
—especially for developing countries who prioritize adaptation, and However, CCS expansion still faces large “However, expansion of CCUS
who are far less engaged in the NETs discussion thus far (see also obstacles… technology requires: i) technological
Jaschke & Biermann 2022). This intertwining of immediate adaptation advancement and subsequent cost
reduction; ii) large-capacity storage
actions in order to secure more successful potential future use of NETs facilities and their social acceptance; and
merits more scholarly and policy attention. iii) market-based incentives balanced
Finally, our review demonstrates the need for more empirical with regulatory approaches. (pp. 58–59)
research on the structural dynamics of governing-by-aspiration. Specif We would like to increase natural carbon “The Government plans to increase
sinks. carbon sinks through creation of green
ically, we need a better understanding of the interactions between long-
spaces for recreational use, restoring
term aspirational NETs and short-term climate action. Explicitly degraded forestlands and tree planting
comparing countries’ NDCs with their long-term strategies would pro in underused lands” (p. 11)
vide a valuable overview of where we currently stand. Additional But there is no land left for afforestation, “Korea has already succeeded in
research methods like expert elicitation and/or empirical modeling reforestation. expanding forestlands and there is
nearly no land left available for either
could be used to quantify the extent to which this phenomenon is hin
afforestation or reforestation.” (p. 100)
dering climate action or not, and provide insights for possible solutions
(see also Grant et al., 2021a). In a policy context, decision makers could
consider enhancing the link between NDCs and long-term strategies by Declaration of Competing Interest
requiring countries to explicitly reflect on how the actions promised in
the NDCs relate to actions envisioned in the long-term strategies. The The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
mechanism of the global stock-take under the 2015 Paris Agreement interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
could provide an important opportunity to scrutinize the links between the work reported in this paper.
short-term and long-term climate planning and target setting.
These and other dynamics of governing-by-aspiration require Data availability
continued further context-specific empirical research in order to ensure
that the urgent climate actions needed today are forthcoming. Data will be made available on request.
11
Annex A. Long-term strategies reviewed resource/LTS1_Switzerland.pdf.

Government of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Environment. (2017).
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climate neutral economy. https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/publ Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. (2018). Tile Til
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https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2020–02-19_lts_be_fr. Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
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Government of Canada. (2016). Canada’s Mid-Century Long-Term carbon future. Presented to Parliament pursuant to Sections 12 and 14 of
Low-Greenhouse Gas Development Strategy. https://unfccc.int/sites/ the Climate Change Act 2008. Amended March 2018 from the version
default/files/resource/Canada%27 s Mid-Century Long-Term Low- laid before Parliament in October 2017. https://unfccc.int/sites/de
GHG Strategy.pdf. fault/files/resource/clean-growth-strategy-amended-april-2018.pdf.
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Global Environmental Change 81 (2023) 102691

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Environmental Change

Governing-by-aspiration? Assessing the nature and implications of

* Corresponding author at: Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, the Netherlands.

2. Governing-by-aspiration: An impetus for change or a spiral of

Fig. 3. Long-term use of NETs vis-à-vis short-term mitigation action.

Fig. 4. Different types of NETs mentioned in country long-term climate strategies.

Fig. 5. Inclusion of Carbon Capture & Use/Storage and BECCS.

Fig. 6. Strategies mentioning other technological NETs.

Table 4 illustrates how countries discuss shifting between different Table 4

6. Conclusion: Delay as a potential emergent outcome of European Union

Table 4 (continued ) Table 5

Annex A. Long-term strategies reviewed resource/LTS1_Switzerland.pdf.

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