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Clausewitz: War,
Peace and Politics
Jordan Lindell
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Nov 26 2009 • 29915 views
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A RE S
used in place of scholarly
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According to Albert Einstein,

“You cannot simultaneously
prevent and prepare for war.”
(Think/Exist 2009) In a
constant state of preparation
for war, Carl von Clausewitz
penned Vom Kriege. Heavily
influenced by Clausewitz’s
experiences in the Napoleonic
wars and the French
Revolution, an era in which
Clausewitz believed ‘… war
itself had been lecturing,’ Vom
Kriege has become one of the
most influential pieces of
literature to date on matters of
war and politics. (Earle 1973:
97) While Clausewitz’s work
has been read widely around
the world and said to have had
profound influence on not
only Nazi Germany but also
current United States’ foreign
policy and military tactics,
Vom Kriege, an unfinished
work, is often times difficult to
interpret and contradictory in
nature. (Bassford 2008)
However, with sometimes-
controversial theories on war,
peace, and politics throughout
Vom Kriege, Clausewitz
provides a thoroughly unique
perspective by which to
interpret the world that is,
arguably, still highly relevant
in the 21st century, over 150
years since the conception of
Vom Kriege. Carl von
Clausewitz: a theorist of war
itself. (Elshtain 1995: 77)

In order to assess the way in

which Clausewitz understands
the relationship between war,
peace, and politics in their
entirety, it is first crucial to
define168
war by Clausewitzian
SH A RE S
standards and to distinguish
between absolute war and
total war, as at least a vague
understanding of each is
certainly necessary in the
interpretation of Vom Kriege.
Next, Clausewitz’s theories on
war and peace must be
evaluated separately from that
of politics. While politics is
unquestionably linked to
matters of both war and peace,
it is imperative that each be
understood individually
before one can fully grasp the
concepts that Clausewitz puts
forth and assess the strengths
and weaknesses in his
arguments. While many critics
have argued against the
validity of Clausewitz’s
theories in the modern world,
after assessment of the
relationship of war, peace, and
politics, it will become clear
that Clausewitz’s lessons are
still highly relevant in the 21st
century.

Defining War: The Absolute

Versus Reality

To Clausewitz, ‘War is nothing

but a duel on an extensive
scale… an act of violence
intended to compel our
opponent to fulfill our will,’
directed by political motives
and morality. (Clausewitz 1940:
Book I, Ch. I) War is neither a
scientific game nor an
international sport; it is an act
of violence, characterized by
destruction. (Clausewitz 1940:
Book IV, Ch. XI) Whereas
Clausewitz submits that war is
a natural part of human life,
he begins to digress from
reality in Book 1 into a state of
fantasy, which considers the
168 of absolute, or ideal,
existence
SH A RE S
warfare. In its ideal form, war
must be evaluated as ‘pure
concept,’ meaning that war
has timeless elements such as
‘violence, political impact, and
the vagaries of the play of
human intelligence, will and
emotions.’ A state of absolute
war would not consider the
political and moral limits that
hold significant in real, or
total, war. (Elshtain 1995: 77)
There are two motives that
lead men to war in the
absolute and total sense,
instinctive hostility and hostile
intention. In terms of absolute
war, Clausewitz discusses
three characteristics that make
it unique. First, the utmost use
of force is necessary. Second,
the aim is to disarm the
enemy. Lastly, absolute war
calls for the utmost exertion of
powers. However, absolute
war only exists in the abstract,
and every requirement
changes in shape when
shifting to reality. For instance,
while Clausewitz argues as to
the impossibility of absolute
war, he lists three
requirements for it to occur in
the real world. War would
become a completely isolated
act in no way motivated by the
previous history of a state or
politics, limited to a single
solution (or to several
concurrent solutions), and
would contain within itself the
perfect solution. The
probabilities and chance that
exist in reality prohibit an
entirely absolute war from
happening because the
political will always enter the
realm of war, even in its
conclusion. (Clausewitz 1940:
Book I, Ch. I)
168
SH A RE S
At the conclusion of World
War I, Clausewitz’s theory of
real war began to gain ground.
Though often confused with
absolute war, and even used
interchangeably, real war is
war as it exists in the real
world. War, in its ideal form,
cannot be waged in a limited
way, though in reality a war
without limits would be
neither possible nor
preferable. Though Clausewitz
set out in search for the
‘absolute,’ and the ‘regulative
idea’ of war in the
international and national
context, he concluded that war
cannot be explained outside of
the political context, and thus
there never can be absolute
war in reality. (Gat 1989: 215)

Theories on War and Peace

As the threat of war was

constant in his time, there is
very little mention of peace in
Carl Von Clausewitz’s Vom
Kriege. Though, much like
Niccoló Machiavelli’s theory
that peace should only be
viewed as ‘breathing time’ to
prepare for the next military
plans, Clausewitz is of the
opinion that long periods of
peace may alter the state’s
ability to defend itself in the
future, and that instances of
peace should be well spent by
exercising the military. In
addition, allies that have
recently been involved in war
should be made during
peacetime to share lessons and
experiences from different
types of warfare. (Clausewitz
1940: Book I, Ch. VIII) Whereas
Michael Doyle, the author of
Ways of War and Peace,
168Clausewitz for
criticizes
SH A RE S
ruminating that war is a
constant and never gives an
explanation as to how to
eliminate war entirely, it
would seem that Clausewitz
never set out to eradicate war
but to theorize on how to be
successful in war. To
Clausewitz, there are no
special tactics for peace. War is
a never-ending cycle, and as
Clausewitz notoriously wrote,
‘To secure peace is to prepare
for war.’ (Doyle 1997: 21-23)

In what Clausewitz refers to as

the theoretical concept of war,
he outlines three objectives for
success. First, the armed forces
of the opponent must be
destroyed. Second, the country
must be occupied. Third, the
will of the enemy must be
broken. (Cimbala 1991: 17) In
theory, peace simply cannot be
achieved until all three
objectives are met, however,
the complete defeat of an
enemy would be a ‘mere
imaginative flight.’ War, ‘… the
hostile feeling and action of
hostile agencies, cannot be
considered at an end as long as
the will of the enemy is not
subdued.’ In addition, the
government and its allies must
be forced to sign a peace
treaty, for otherwise war could
potentially start afresh with
the assistance of the allies.
Though Clausewitz admits that
war could begin again directly
after the peace, he argues that
it only serves to prove that war
does not carry in itself
elements for a final settlement
of peace. War, though not
always constant, is continual.
(Clausewitz 1940: Book I, Ch.
II)
168
SH A RE S
According to Clausewitz, war is
always limited by ‘friction’ –
uncertainty, chance, and
inevitable logistical or
organizational misfortunes.
Also mentioned is the notion of
‘rational calculus,’ that states
intrinsically use violence to
achieve a desired end. The less
controlled the use of violence
is by one side, the lengthier the
war. (Clausewitz 1940: Book I,
Ch. I) Throughout Vom Kriege,
Carl von Clausewitz,
continually refers to a
‘remarkable’ or ‘paradoxical’
trinity which drives real war,
composed of 1) primordial
violence, enmity, and hatred 2)
chance and probability, and 3)
the element of war of
subordination to rational
policy. The trinity serves as a
magnet to balance the three
forces of war – the people, the
military, and the statesmen.
Clausewitz argues that the
passions that kindle war must
be innate in the people, the
courage and talent of the
commander and army plays
into the realm of probability
and chance, but the political
aims are only the business of
the government alone.
Though, without the three
branches working in harmony,
war cannot be successfully
waged. (Clausewitz 1940: Book
I, Ch. I) (Bassford 2008)

Above all, Clausewitz

emphasizes that war exists in
the realm of chance. The most
certain idea about war lies in
the uncertainty of it. Chance
acts in a way that makes all of
the elements of war more
uncertain and can ultimately
alter the course of events.
1681991: 101)
(Cimbala
SH A RE S
‘Everything in war is very
simple, but the simplest thing
is difficult. The difficulties
accumulate and end by
producing a kind of friction
that is inconceivable unless
one has experienced war.’
(Clausewitz 1940: Book I, Ch.
VII)

The Role of Politics and its

Interaction with Peace and
Politics

Considered the theorist of

modern warfare, focused
mainly on military tactics and
the like, Clausewitz’s use of the
political throughout Vom
Kriege as a central issue for
war cannot be ignored.
According to Jean Bethke
Elshtain, a prominent just war
theorist, ‘In the discourse of
Clausewitz, we enter the world
of war as politics, politics as
war that helped to feed the
most bellicist of all centuries,
the nineteenth.’ In its entirety,
prevalent is the dictum that
political ends must be
dominant over military means.
(Elshtain 1995: 77)

To Clausewitz, ‘War is only a

branch of political activity… it
is in no sense autonomous.’
Military events progress and
are restricted on the political
lines that continue through
war and through peace.
(Clausewitz 1940: Book 8, Ch.
6) However, ‘… the influence of
politics on war do not belong
to the nature of war, but, on
the contrary, contradict it.’ The
policies that give rise to war
are the same that
‘circumscribe and moderate it.’
Thus, politics places itself
above 168
war and modifies it to
suit SH
itsA needs.
RE S (Gat 1989: 224)
‘What Clausewitz meant is that
war… is not an autonomous
game produced by fixed
external or internal
constraints; it is instead a
matter of political choice,
reflecting all the variety of
political purposes that make
wars into exterminations.’
(Doyle 1997: 23)

While Clausewitz warns that

politicians must not attempt to
use war as an instrument
through which to achieve
purposes for which it is
unsuited, it is evident that war
is a tool of policy and that state
policy is truly ‘… the womb in
which war develops.’
(Clausewitz 1940: Book II, Ch
III) It has been claimed that
Clausewitz contends for the
superiority and self-sufficiency
of the military, and to some
extent this is true as he
insisted that the general
should be both independent of
political decisions and in a
position to influence them.
(Earle 1973: 105)

As Clausewitz famously wrote,

‘War is nothing more than the
continuation of politics by
other means… For political
aims are the end and war is
the means, and the means can
never be conceived without
the end.’ The greater the
motives for war, the more the
existence of the entire nation
is concerned, and the more
violent the tension will be
which precedes the war. War
then seems to be approaching
its abstract form, and appears
to be purely military and less
political. (Book I, Ch. I)

War 168
is not an act of ‘blind
passion.’
SH A RE SIt is dominated by the
political object, and the value
of that object is what
‘determines the measure of
sacrifices by which it is to be
purchased. When the ‘…
required outlay becomes so
great that political object is no
longer equal in value, the
object must be given up, and
peace will be the result. In
wars where one side cannot
disarm the other side entirely,
the motives towards peace will
rise and fall on each side
depending on the probability
of future success. (Clausewitz
1940: Book I, Ch. II) While war
clearly provides the
foundations for Vom Kriege, it
is evident that politics holds
together the space between
war and politics.

Perceived Strengths and

Weaknesses

In the way that Clausewitz

understands the relationship
between war, peace, and
politics, his work remains the
most comprehensive and, in
some instances, modern
contribution to political,
military, and strategic thought
as it stands. The main strength
in Vom Kriege lies in that
Clausewitz never attempts to
impose a set solution.
Clausewitz’s theory is
descriptive of ‘human-on-
human strategic problems,’
and endeavors to ‘develop
human capital… to help the
reader develop his… own
strategic judgment in order to
deal with the ever-changing
strategic environment.
(Bassford 1994)

The most significant weakness

168
in Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom
Kriege
SH Ais not an issue with the
RE S
subject of the text itself, but
that, because of the premature
death of Clausewitz, much of
the work has been left
unedited and the book was not
finished. While the intent of
the author is always debatable
anyway, the unfinished status
of the book leaves perhaps too
much to the readers’
imagination, and there are
many inconsistencies that
make Vom Kriege difficult to
interpret. Among
interpretations is that of
Liddell Hart, one of
Clausewitz’s leading
opponents. Hart portrayed
Clausewitz as ‘the apostle of
total war,’ criticizing him for
identifying war with images of
the utmost violence. Hart even
went so far as to suggest that
Clausewitz had inadvertently
caused the bloodbath on the
Western Front from 1914-1918,
with the great
misinterpretation of his
theories by his disciples.
(Bassford 1994)

Another weakness in
Clausewitz’s work can be seen
in his case for the
aforementioned three
imperatives of war (the
destruction of the armed
forces, occupying forces, and
the broken spirit of the
enemy). While Clausewitz
himself recognized that these
standards were next to
impossible to meet in reality,
both the possibility and the
impossibility have increased
exponentially with new
technology. First, though
Clausewitz could not have
foreseen the possibility of
nuclear weapons whilst living
168
in the 19th century, with the
SH A RE S
advent of nuclear bombs and
the like, his theory of absolute
war could, in fact become a
reality in the 21st century.
However, in the present day,
an opponent cannot feasibly
disarm a nuclear-armed
superpower, as mutually
assured destruction (MAD)
ensures this. (Bassford 2008)

On the other hand, while war

in itself was no longer a
playable option due to
deterrence during the Cold
War, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the
emergence of more regional
and world powers, the
international arena began to
transform into one ruled by
the political will of the nation-
states. While Clausewitz was
considered obsolete in the
context of the bi-polar Cold
War, the resurgence of world
and regional powers in a
multi-polar world reaffirmed
the lessons of Clausewitz.
Though the modern state is
still classified as a nuclear age,
with nuclear weapons
available for some countries,
the majority of states that
make up the international
system do not have access to
them and still must rely on
Clausewitz’s strategy and
tactics, no to mention less
advanced weapons. The
change back to multi-polarity
shows that Clausewitz is even
more relevant today than his
work was for the better half of
the 20th century, and there is
strength in that Vom Kriege
has, in fact, withstood the test
of time.

While the issue of whether

much168
of Carl von Clausewitz’s
SH A RE S
work is obsolete with the
advent of nuclear weapons is
still highly debatable, and it is
evident that the text of Vom
Kriege is not relevant in the
exact context in which it was
written, the tactics and the
relationship between war,
peace and politics promoted
throughout the literature has
influenced warfare and
politics alike since its
conception. With tactics from
Vom Kriege used widely as
military doctrine and foreign
policy around the world based
on Clausewitzian theories such
as the paradoxical trinity and
the center of gravity, it is
apparent that Clausewitz’s
lessons live on. Because of this
continued application to the
modern world, even over 150
years later, it is difficult to
disagree with Clausewitz and
the concepts of war, peace,
and politics set forth in his
work. Though there are clearly
some contextual issues, given
that he gained influence from
the political atmosphere of the
early 19th century, in the end,
Carl von Clausewitz is the war
theorist to consult when
advice is necessary on war,
peace, and politics. As US
President George Washington
declared, ‘If we desire to
secure peace, one of the most
powerful instruments of our
rising prosperity, it must be
known that we are at all times
ready for war,’ demonstrating
Clausewitz’s sentiments
exactly. (Think/Exist 2009)

Bibliography

Aron, R. Clausewitz:
Philosopher of War. (New York:
168
Taylor and Francis, 1983)
SH A RE S
Bassford, C. 2008. Clausewitz
and His Works [Online].
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/CWZSUMM/CWORKHOL.htm
[Accessed 21 April 2009]

Bassford, C. Clausewitz in
English: The Reception of
Clausewitz in Britain and
America, 1815-1945. (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1994)

Bassford, C. 2009. John Keegan

and the Grand Tradition of
Trashing Clausewitz [Online].
Clausewitz.com. Available at:
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Keegan/KEEGWHOL.htm
[Accessed 21 April 2009]

Bristow, T. February 2007.

Debunking Clausewitz: Why
there is no global War on
Terror [Online]. American
Chronicle. Available at:
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/19998
[Accessed 22 April 2009]

Cimbala, S. Clausewitz and

Escalation: Classical
Perspective on Nuclear
Strategy. (New York:
Routledge, 1991)

Clausewitz, C.V. On War. (New

York: E.P. Dutton and Co., LTD.,
1940)

Doyle, M.W, Ways of War and

Peace. (New York: W.W. Norton
and Co., Inc, 1997)

Earle, E.M., ed. Makers of

Modern Strategy: Military
thought from Machiavelli to
Hitler. (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press,
1973)

Elshtain, J.B. Women and War.

(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995)
168
SH A RE S
Gat, A. The Origins of Military
Thought: From the
Enlightenment to Clausewitz.
(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989)

Howard, M. Clausewitz: A Very

Short Introduction. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002)

Think/Exist. 2009. George

Washington Quotes [Online].
http://en.thinkexist.com/quotes/Albert_Einstein/
[Accessed 21 April 2009]

Think/Exist. 2009. George

Washington Quotes [Online].
http://en.thinkexist.com/quotes/George_Washington/
[Accessed 21 April 2009]

—–

Written by: Jordan Lindell

Written at: University of St
Andrews
Written for: Professor Rengger
Date Written: April 2009

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168
SH A RE S
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