[ G.R. No.

232455, December 02, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

TEODORO ANSANO Y CALLEJA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal  filed by the accused-

1

appellant Teodoro Ansano y Calleja (Ansano) assailing the

Decision  dated February 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

2

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08223, which affirmed the Decision  dated 3

November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of YYY, ZZZ , 4

Branch 26 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. SC-12326, finding Ansano

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

The Facts

An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor

AAA,  which read:

5

That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of [XXX],

Province of [ZZZ] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, while conveniently armed and

provided with a bolo, with lewd design and with force and

intimidation, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously

have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a minor who at the time was

only fifteen (15) years of age, against her will and consent, the act

of the accused being prejudicial to the psychological development

of the said minor.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Upon arraignment, Ansano entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial

and trial on the merits then ensued.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court

and affirmed by the CA, is as follows:

The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a

resident of XXX. She testified that she filed this case of rape

against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to and

identified in open court. She stated that she did not know him at

first, but when she went to the Municipal Building, she came to

know him because of his niece who is her friend. On April 6, 2005,

at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was going to fetch her

father at Narra, where he was then selling goods at the river. This

was at [GGG]  near the river. Accused Ansano was then carrying a
7
bolo, wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in the farm;

while she was wearing red t-shirt and school uniform skirt. Ansano

poked his bolo at her and told her to go with him to the falls near

the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill

her if she does not go with him, she went along. When they were

nearing the falls, he turned the other way. He held her tightly by

the shoulder, dragged her to a secluded area with bamboo trees

and coconuts and told her to sit down and not to shout, still poking

the bolo at her. He then removed his clothes, undressed her, laid

her down, kissed her neck and placed his penis into her mouth.

She cried very hard and vomited at that time. Thereafter, accused

inserted his penis into her vagina. It was painful. Accused rested

for a while, and then did it again. Thereafter, accused put on his

clothes and directed her to remain lying down until he left the

place. He also told her not to tell anyone about the incident

because he knew her and her parents, he knew what time she

went to church, what time she went to bed and that she was

always with her cousin. He then left and proceeded to the direction

going to Narra. After he left, she put on her clothes and went

home. She proceeded to bed and cried. Her mother asked her why

she was crying and she told her that she was raped. She could

hardly speak because she was still crying. Her father went to the
place of the incident but the person who abused her was no longer

there, so her father reported the incident to the police station.

She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March

19, 2006 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in their

house having a drinking spree with her father. She was able to

recognize him ("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on

his face; he has a moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to

know his name for the first time when she went to the XXX

Municipal Hall, where accused was detained because of the case

filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she

examined clearly, and she was sure that he was the one who

raped her.

Because she was raped, she went to [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital for

a medical examination. At the time of the incident on April 6, 2005,

she was [just] thirteen (13) years old. She presented her Certificate

of Baptism issued by Santo Cristo of Bulacan, Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, showing that she was born on September 14, 1991 and

baptized on September 25, 1991. She does not have a Certificate

of Live Birth, as her birth was not registered because the midwife

who attended to the delivery of her mother went abroad.

Upon cross-examination, she stated that she had been residing in

XXX, since the year 2005, and that she had not known the

accused, even by face, before April 6, 2005. She came to know

him through BBB who was then living in their house, when

accused had a drinking spree with her father on March 19, 2006.

xxxx

The next prosecution witness was Dr. Maria Cheryl Obcemea x x x

[and] [h]er qualification as an expert witness was admitted by the

defense. She testified that according to their records, she

examined the patient AAA on April 7, 2005 at [ZZZ] Provincial

Hospital. She was the one who physically examined AAA and her

findings was reduced into writing in a Medico-Legal Report. Said

findings indicate "Perineum: hymen-multiple fresh laceration 7 and

5 o'clock position; minimal bleeding." 8

On the other hand, the accused relied on denial and alibi to

establish his innocence. The version of the defense was

summarized by the RTC, again as affirmed by the CA, as follows:

The defense presented accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano,

45 years old, single, slipper maker and residing at XXX. He stated

that he does not personally know AAA. On April 6, 2005, at around

5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at Villa Pokan with his friends

Rudy Monfero, Albert Concordia and Nick Esmejarda. They arrived

at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Villa Pokan to go swimming

there and left at around 5:00 o'clock. They went home going their

separate ways: Rudy and Albert to Ilayang Taykin, Nick to

Poblacion and he (Ansano) to XXX. Upon reaching his house, he

immediately went to sleep and woke up the next morning, April 7

at around 6:00 o'clock. On his way home to XXX, he did not meet

AAA, nor did he poke a bolo on her neck and rape her.

The Court noted the manifestation of defense counsel that Ansano

has no scar on his face at the time he testified in court.

When cross-examined, he stated that he does not know AAA and

her father CCC; that he came to know in court that their house is

more or less one kilometer away from his house; that on April 6,

2005, he and his friends Rudy, Albert and Nick left at around 5:00

o'clock in the afternoon; that [Villa Pokan] is more or less one

kilometer away from his house; that upon reaching his house, he

immediately went to sleep and woke up the following day. 9

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision  dated November 16, 2015,
10

the RTC convicted Ansano of the crime charged. The dispositive

portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Teodoro Ansano y

Calleja GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape,

defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Rape Law of

1997. Thus, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION

PERPETUA. In addition thereto, he is ordered to pay AAA the sum

of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty

Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages, and

Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 11

The RTC was convinced by the testimony of AAA identifying

Ansano as the one who sexually abused her. It found such

testimony to be clear, consistent, spontaneous, and unrelenting,

thus establishing that it was Ansano who sexually abused her on

April 6, 2005. The RTC likewise found her testimony to be

corroborated through the testimony of the medico-legal who

conducted a medical examination on AAA. Thus, as between her

credible testimony and Ansano's bare denial, the RTC ruled that

the evidence at hand established Ansano's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, Ansano appealed to the CA. 12

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision  dated February 20, 2017, the CA

13

affirmed Ansano's conviction, and held that the prosecution was

able to sufficiently prove the elements of the crime charged. The

dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated

November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, 4th Judicial

Region, Branch 26, [XXX], [ZZZ], in Criminal Case No. SC-12326

finding accused-appellant TEODORO ANSANO y

CALLEJA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape, is

hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. The Court sentences

accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA the amount of

Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages,

and another Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest

at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this

Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 14

The CA noted that AAA's testimony was clear, consistent, and

spontaneous, and that she positively identified Ansano as the

perpetrator.  Moreover, her claim that she was assaulted was

15

supported by the medico-legal examination, which found multiple

fresh lacerations on her hymen. The CA held that there was

therefore no doubt that AAA was indeed assaulted.

As to the identification of Ansano as the perpetrator of the crime,

the CA explained:

The alleged inconsistency of AAA's testimony with regard to the

time she first saw the accused-appellant face to face only on

March 19, 2006 was properly explained during her re-direct

examination. Again, there is no inconsistency as to having known

accused-appellant's name only on May 15, 2006. That is different

from having to see the accused-appellant again for the first time on

March 19, 2006 after the rape incident that occurred on April 6,

2005.
Accused-appellant's claim of the absence of scar on his face may

be true. However, AAA also identified accused-appellant through

his other physical features such as, "butil-butil sa mukha," "medyo

singkit," and his moustache. In this case, AAA consistently testified

that she was able to see and recognize accused-appellant as her

rapist. 16

Finally, the CA also ruled that Ansano's alibi cannot be given

probative value, as AAA's positive identification, which was clear

and credible, has destroyed Ansano's alibi which, in turn, was

unsupported by evidence. The CA thus affirmed Ansano's

conviction.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the

issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the

accused-appellant.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Ansano on the

ground of reasonable doubt.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its

review of criminal cases elevated to it, still commences its analysis

from the fundamental principle that the accused before it is

presumed innocent."  This presumption continues although the

17

accused had been convicted in the trial court, as long as such

conviction is still pending appeal. As the Court explained

in Polangcos v. People: 18

Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that

every accused is presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven

beyond reasonable doubt. It is "a basic constitutional principle,

fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the

burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged

by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction

must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on

the weakness of the defense."

This presumption in favor of the accused remains until the

judgment of conviction becomes final and executory. Borrowing

the words of the Court in Mangubat, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al,

"[u]ntil a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional

mandate prevails." Hence, even if a judgment of conviction exists,

as long as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still

presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond

reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court outlined

what the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption and

secure a conviction:

First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of

innocence until final conviction; conviction requires no less than

evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty of guilt, not only

with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of

the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits

and cannot draw its strength from the weakness of the

defense.  (Emphasis supplied)

19

Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the

following guidelines in its review of rape cases:

(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the

accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the

person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; 20

(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are

usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the

complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;  and 21

(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own

merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness

of the evidence for the defense. 22

From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the

records of the case, the Court rules that a reasonable doubt exists

as to Ansano's culpability. While the Court does not doubt AAA's

claim that she had been raped, the Court does not, however, have

moral certainty that it was Ansano who committed the dastardly

act.

Verily, a successful prosecution of a criminal action largely

depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of

the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof

that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is

unable to convincingly prove the offender's identity. The

constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is

not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties. 23

The Court has always been mindful that "[t]he greatest care should

be taken in considering the identification of the accused, especially

when this identification is made by a sole witness and the

judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the

identification."  This stems from the recognition that testimonial

24

evidence, unlike other forensic evidence such as fingerprint and

DNA testing which are real or object evidence, are subject to

human errors which may be intentional or unintentional. In People

v. Nuñez  (Nuñez), the Court elucidated:

25

The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of

inordinate reliance on human memory in criminal proceedings,

where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty,

property, and even life, is equally established.

Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In

the first place, human memory is more selective than a video

camera. The sensory environment contains a vast amount of

information, but the memory process perceives and accurately

records only a very small percentage of that information. Second,

because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting

puzzle pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic

and unexpected ways  because of the  passage  of time  or

subsequent events, such as exposure to "postevent" information

like conversations with other witnesses or media reports. Third,

memory can also be altered through the reconstruction process.

Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and

requiring the witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the

witness' memory to change by unconsciously blending the actual

fragments of memory of the event with information provided during

the memory retrieval process.

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably

refers to as "positive identification," is the bedrock of many

pronouncements of guilt. — However, eyewitness identification is

but a product of flawed human memory. In an expansive

examination of 250 cases of wrongful convictions where convicts

were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing, Professor Brandon

Garett (Professor Garett) noted that as much as 190 or 76% of

these wrongful convictions were occasioned by flawed eyewitness

identifications. Another observer has more starkly characterized

eyewitness identifications as "the leading cause of wrongful

convictions."

xxxx
The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness

identification is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of human

memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of

identification operates. It is as much the result of and is

exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as environmental factors,

flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time. 26

In another case, the Court acknowledged that:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First,

witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves

perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness

must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be

able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability

in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for

whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve

information accurately, they are limited by normal human

fallibilities and suggestive influences. 27

Thus, American jurisprudence has followed — and local

jurisprudence later on adopted — a "totality of circumstances test"

in determining the reliability, or at times even the admissibility, of a

witness' out-of-court identification of the accused.

The jurisprudential test of "totality of circumstances"

The totality of circumstances test was first applied by the Court

in People v. Teehankee  (Teehankee), wherein it applied the test

28

as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States

(SCOTUS) in Neil v. Biggers  (Biggers)

29
and Manson v.

Brathwaite  (Brathwaite):
30

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various

ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought

face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug

shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the

suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the

suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since

corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of

in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have

fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with

the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the

admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of

suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances

test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'

opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the

witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any

prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of

time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the

suggestiveness of the identification procedure.  (Emphasis

31

supplied)

Essentially, the problem with eyewitness testimony is that the

human mind is not just limited in terms of perception, but that

human memory is also highly susceptible to suggestion. Hence,

the jurisprudence on the matter, like Biggers and Brathwaite, dealt

with the propriety of police procedures employed to arrive at the

identification of the accused. The rule that was thereafter adopted

was that "convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial

following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on

that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was

so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification."  It was explained that

32

"[s]uggestive confrontations are disapproved because they

increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily

suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the

increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous." 33

In the case of Foster v. California,  the accused was initially put in
34

a line-up of three men, with the accused being almost six feet in

height while the other two men in the line-up were just 5'5" and

5'6." The eyewitness was unable to identify the accused as the

perpetrator, but asked for a one-on-one confrontation with the

accused. Even with this, the eyewitness was still uncertain that it

was indeed the accused who committed the crime. A week or

more later, the same eyewitness was shown another line-up of five

men. Only the accused was present in both the first and second

line-ups. After having been shown the second line-up, the

eyewitness became "sure" that the accused was the perpetrator.

Applying the totality of circumstances test and the standard of

"likelihood of irreparable misidentification," the SCOTUS set aside

the out-of-court identification of the accused for having violated the

latter's right to due process. The SCOTUS explained:

Judged by that standard, this case presents a compelling example

of unfair lineup procedures. In the first lineup arranged by the

police, petitioner stood out from the other two men by the contrast

of his height and by the fact that he was wearing a leather jacket

similar to that worn by the robber. See United States v.

Wade, supra, at 388 U. S. 233. When this did not lead to positive

identification, the police permitted a one-to-one confrontation

between petitioner and the witness. This Court pointed out

in Stovall that

"[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the

purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been

widely condemned."

Even after this, the witness' identification of petitioner was

tentative. So, some days later, another lineup was arranged.

Petitioner was the only person in this lineup who had also

participated in the first lineup. See Wall, supra, at 64. This finally

produced a definite identification.

The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all

but inevitable that David would identify petitioner whether or not he

was, in fact, "the man." In effect, the police repeatedly said to the

witness, "This is the man." See Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S.

404, 407 (dissenting opinion). This procedure so undermined the

reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due

process.  (Emphasis supplied)

35

The SCOTUS clarified, however, that the presence of suggestive

elements in the identification process adopted by the police

officers, on its own, would not automatically result in the

inadmissibility of the out-of-court identification. In Brathwaite, the

SCOTUS emphasized that "reliability is the linchpin in determining

the admissibility of identification testimony"  and that the "factors to

36

be considered x x x include the opportunity of the witness to view

the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of

attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the

level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time

between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is

to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification

itself." 37

This was the context of the totality of circumstances test adopted

by the Court in Teehankee. Years after Teehankee, the Court

would adopt additional guidelines for police officers, and

safeguards for the accused, in the conduct of out-of-court

identification. In People v. Villena,  the Court said that "to avoid

38

charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in

the photograph that would focus attention on a single

person."  Subsequently, in People v. Pineda,  the Court added

39 40

that:
[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is

that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of

the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown

a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no

way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. 41

The Court in Pineda applied the totality of circumstances test, but

also added that the following factors may be considered in

determining the reliability of the out-of-court identification:

A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of

12 danger signals that exist independently of the identification

procedures investigators use. These signals give warning that the

identification may be erroneous even though the method used is

proper. The list is not exhaustive. The facts of a particular case

may contain a warning not in the list. The list is as follows:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;

(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but

made no accusation against him when questioned by the police;

(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness'

original description and the actual description of the accused;

(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness

erroneously identified some other person;

(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify

him;

(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited

opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial

groups;

(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime,

the witness was unaware that a crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the

criminal and his identification of the accused;

(11) several persons committed the crime; and

(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification. 42

From the foregoing jurisprudential tests and guidelines, the Court

finds in this case that the out-of-court identification by AAA failed to

pass the test of reliability to establish the identity of the accused as

the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.

Application of the totality of circumstances test in the present case

To reiterate, the totality of circumstances test requires the Court to

look at the following factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-

court identification: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal

at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that

time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;

(4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5)

the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the

identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification

procedure.   

(a) The first two factors: opportunity to view, and degree of

attention.

Discussions relating to these factors include, for example, the

duration of the commission of the crime, the lighting conditions,

and whether the eyewitness was put on alert that he or she must

remember the identity of the particular person, among others.

In the present case, the Court recognizes that the witness had a

good opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, given

that they spent considerable time together during the commission

of the crime. The witness also said that the crime happened

around 5:00 in the afternoon, thus the lighting conditions were well

enough for her to see the face of her assailant. As well, it could be

said that AAA had a high degree of attention, especially on the

identity of her assailant, during this time as they were the only

people in the crime scene.

Despite these, however, AAA's identification of Ansano as the

assailant fails the rest of the other factors to be considered.   

(b) Accuracy of any prior description.

AAA's description of her attacker was general and related mostly

to, not her assailant's physical features, but what he was wearing

at the time of the crime. In her direct testimony, the only

descriptions that she gave were that: "[h]e is taller than I am; he

was carrying a bolo; he was wearing a long-sleeved shirt; he was

wearing long pants he used in the farm, sir."  These were her only
43

descriptions of her assailant as she was narrating the rape

incident. The description that her assailant had a scar on his face
and that it had "butil-butil" came after, when she saw Ansano on

March 19, 2006.

More importantly, however, the records show that the additional

description did not match Ansano. She testified as follows:

Q Can you please tell to the Honorable Court, how were you able

to come to know the name and identity of the accused?

A I was able to recognized (sic) his face at the time of the incident

on March 19, 2006 at 8 o'clock in the evening. I saw him in our

house having a drinking spree with my father, sir.

Q And while the accused was having a drinking spree with your

father at that night, where were you at that time?

A I was in our house, playing with my cousins, sir.

Q How far were you to the place of your father and the accused

were there (sic) having a drinking spree?

A Our house is near the road and my father and the accused

having a drinking spree beside the road, sir.

Q What happened next after their having a drinking spree?

A I felt nervous, Sir.

Q Why?

A Because I was able to recognized (sic) his face, sir.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to quote in vernacular

"namumukhaan"

COURT Put it on the record.

WITNESS Because "namumukhaan ko po siya"

Q And when you say "namumukhaan", what do you mean by that?

A Because in my mind, I was able to recall his face that he is the

one who abuse[d] me, sir.

Q Now, you said that you were able to recall that the accused was

the one who abuse[d] you because of his face, what are those

identifying [marks] to his face?

A He has a scar in [his] face, sir.

INTERPRETER Witness pointing on her left cheek with her finger.

FISCAL What else, if any?

WITNESS And he has "butil-butil sa mukha", sir.

Q Aside from those, what else, if any?

A He has a moustache, he has an eye which is "medyo singkit",

sir. 44

However, on another hearing date, before the prosecution cross-

examined Ansano, the defense made the following manifestation

which was duly noted by the trial court:

ATTY. ANONUEVO Before the public prosecutor conduct[s] his

cross-examination, I am requesting the witness, the accused, to

please face the Honorable Presiding Judge. I just want to make it

of record that the face of the witness has no scar whatsoever

which will be verified by the Honorable Court.

COURT Verified.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to make it of record that the

Honorable Presiding Judge has confirmed that the accused has no

scar whatsoever on his face. 45

The prosecution made a counter-manifestation that the scar may

have been gone since it had been four years between AAA's
identification and the time the accused took the witness

stand.  However,
46

[t]he Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory

facts and circumstances are capable of two or more

interpretations, one of which being consistent with the innocence

of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt,

then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of

innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus

insufficient to support a conviction. 47

In other words, doubts — no matter how slight, as long as they are

reasonable — created in the identity of the perpetrator of the

crime, should be resolved in favor of the accused.     48

(c)   The length of lime between the crime and the identification

The Court also held in Nuñez that:

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of

the length of time between the crime and the identification made

by the witness. 'It is by now a well-established fact that people are

less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a

long retention interval than after a short one.' Ideally then, a

prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the

incident. 49

In the present case, AAA was raped in April 2005. She supposedly

saw her assailant again in March 2006, and was finally able to

definitively point to Ansano as her assailant in May 2006. There

was thus, more or less, one year between the time the crime was

committed to the time of the identification.

In People v. Rodrigo  (Rodrigo) a time lapse of 5 1/2 months

50

between the commission of the crime and the out-of-court

identification was one of the factors that led the Court to hold that

the identification of the accused was unreliable. The present case,

in comparison, even involves a longer passage of time. While a

longer passage of time per se will not automatically make an

eyewitness recollection unreliable, it certainly impacts its overall

reliability when considered along with the other factors in

the totality of circumstances test.

(d) The last two factors: the level of certainty demonstrated by the

witness at the identification, and the suggestiveness of the

identification procedure.
The Court notes that AAA did not show a high level of certainty in

her initial identification of Ansano.  For instance, in her testimony

ℒαwρhi ৷

quoted above, she used the word "namumukhaan" instead of

"nakilala" when she saw Ansano on March 19, 2006. More glaring,

however, was that she needed a second look for her to be able to

ascertain that Ansano was her assailant — this time, through a

photograph while Ansano was detained for another charge. AAA

testified as follows:

Q Now, Madam Witness, you stated that, that was the time on

March 19, 2006 were able to identify the face of the accused, the

one who raped you that afternoon of April 6, 2005, when for the

first time did you come to know his name?

A When I went to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q Where specifically in Municipal Hall?

A In Municipal Hall of [ZZZ], sir.

Q What office?

A In the office of the police, sir.

Q Were you able to know his name at the Police Station?

A I was then asking if the accused was still at the Municipal Jail

because he was then detained because of the case filed by

[BBB],  sir.
51

Q And the policemen told you the name of the accused?

A Yes and he shown (sic) the picture of the accused, sir.

Q And after that what did you do?

A I examine the picture clearly and I am sure that he is the one

who raped me, sir.  (Emphasis supplied)

52

The foregoing testimony, apart from being an indication of AAA's

level of uncertainty as to her identification of Ansano, is more

importantly an indication that the identification was marred by

improper suggestion.

To recall, the Court has already said in Pineda that:

[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is

that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of

the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown

a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no

way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. 53

This is so because:

[w]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party,

any subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be

based not upon the witness's recollection of the features of the

guilty party, but upon his recollection of the photograph. Thus,

although a witness who is asked to attempt a corporeal

identification of a person whose photograph he previously

identified may say, "That's the man that did it," what he may

actually mean is, "That's the man whose photograph I identified."

xxxx

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to

the conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic

identification of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of

that same person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy

must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first saw a

photograph. 54

Pineda itself involved an acquittal of the accused on the ground

that, among others, the eyewitness was shown only two

photographs of suspected highway robbers while there were a

total of six perpetrators to be identified, thereby effectively

suggesting to the eyewitness that the men in both photos belonged

to the group of the perpetrators. Similarly, in Rodrigo, the

eyewitness was shown only one photo before making the

identification. In finding this out-of-court identification unreliable,

the Court explained:

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious

constitutional law implications in terms of the possible violation of

the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights

to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded

from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions in the

earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the

investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they

themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or

at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo

was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from

coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with

respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators are

the real actors in the identification of the accused; evidence of

identification is effectively created when none really

exists.  (Emphasis supplied)

55
The same thing can be said about AAA's identification of Ansano

in this case.  That she was shown only one photograph, when
ℒαwρhi ৷

considered with the other factual circumstances of this case, only

leads to the logical conclusion that the identification might have

been marred by improper suggestions.

Again, the circumstances of AAA's identification of Ansano were

that almost a year after the rape incident, she supposedly

recognized him as her assailant as he was having a drinking spree

with her father. She, however, only knew of his name two months

after, or on March 19, 2006, when she went to the municipal hall to

inquire if Ansano was still detained for the case filed by her best

friend, BBB, who was also Ansano's niece. Incidentally, BBB was

also present when AAA first "recognized" Ansano in the drinking

spree with her father. She narrated:

Q How did you come to know that he is indeed a resident of [GGG,

XXX, ZZZ]?

A Because of my best friend [BBB] and she is his niece, sir.

Q You mean to say that, through [BBB], you came to know that the

accused is from [GGG, XXX, ZZZ]?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q And you were able to see him face to face through [BBB]?

A No, sir, he had a drinking spree with my father.

Q You were with [BBB] when that incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q That was March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time more or less was that, when you were able to meet

face to face the accused?

A More or less 8 o'clock in the evening, sir.

Q March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were with [BBB]?

A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place, you were (sic) then with [BBB] on that

date?

A In our house, sir.

Q Your house is near the house of [BBB]?

A No, sir. [BBB] once live[d] in our house.

Q You want you (sic) tell the court that, on that day, March 19,

2006 that was the very first time that you came face to face [with]

the accused?

A Yes, sir. 56

It is important to note that the records reflect that the present

charge was once consolidated with a case filed by BBB against

Ansano, but BBB eventually decided to not pursue the case and

this case thus proceeded on its own. While the records do not

reflect the exact nature of the case filed by BBB, it could

reasonably be inferred that it was likewise a rape or sexual assault

charge for it to have been initially consolidated with this case.

To the mind of the Court, there is a reasonable possibility that the

confluence of these circumstances may have, albeit inadvertently,

improperly suggested to the mind of AAA that Ansano was her

assailant. It is true that the latter finding — on the possible effect of

BBB on the identification — did not arise from State action; thus,

this finding would not amount to a violation of Ansano's right to due

process that would render the identification inadmissible. This

does not, however, preclude the courts from taking the said finding

into consideration as evidentiary inquiries do not end on questions

of admissibility. "Admissibility of evidence should not be equated

with weight of evidence."  Hearsay evidence, for instance, cannot

57

be given credence whether objected to or not for it has no

probative value.  Eyewitness testimony, like all other evidence,

58

must not only be admissible — it must be able to convince.

Ultimately, the Court's independent assessment of the reliability of

the out-of-court identification when the totality of circumstances

test is applied resulted in reasonable doubt on the said

identification. All told, the foregoing findings ultimately impressed

upon the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt — to reiterate, not

on the fact that the crime happened, but rather — on the identity of

the accused. Acquittal must perforce follow.

The Court's reminders

The Court laments that neither the RTC nor the CA was able to

discuss the doubt on Ansano's identity as the perpetrator of the

crime even though the issue was glaring in the records of the case.

Both the RTC and the CA focused on whether the crime indeed

happened and examined AAA's testimony only through that lens.

The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear, consistent and spontaneous

testimony of [AAA] unrelentingly established how Ansano sexually

[assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force, threat and

intimidation."  The CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that:

59

"AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator.

The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA

established that accused-appellant committed rape against the

victim,"  adding that Ansano's defense of alibi and denial simply

60

failed to stand in light of AAA's positive identification. 61

The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "[a]

conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and

convincing testimony establishing the identity of the accused as

the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution proving

beyond reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime are

attributable to the accused."  "Proving the identity of the accused

62

as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. Thus,

in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the

crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable

doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the

crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the

commission of the crime can be established, there can be no

conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond

reasonable doubt." 63

Also, while the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak,

they are only so in the face of an effective identification  which, as

64

discussed, was not present in this case.

Lastly, while it was true, as the CA noted, that "no young woman,

especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter testify

about her ordeal in a public trial if she had not been impelled to

seek justice for the wrong done to her,"  this does not mean that
65

the said testimony should be accepted wholesale. It bears

stressing that:

the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not simplistically be

equated to or treated as testimonies from detached parties. Their

testimonies should be handled with the realistic thought that they

come from parties with material and emotional ties to the subject of

the litigation so that they cannot be accepted and held as credible

simply because the defense has not adduced evidence of ill-

motivation. 66

Like all other evidence, they must be independently assessed.

As a final note, the Court ends with the following discussion

in People v. Fernandez: 67

Given the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that

complainant has not been a victim of rape, or that appellant's

defense of alibi and denial can be given full faith and credence.

We only stress that her testimony was unable to pass the exacting

test of moral certainty that the law demands and the rules require

to satisfy the prosecution's burden of overcoming appellant's

presumption of innocence.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt — moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The

defense may be weak, but the prosecution is even weaker. As a

result of this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other

issues raised.
The Court has aptly said: It is better to liberate a guilty man than to

unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the

required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court's support

of ardent crusaders waging all-out war against felons on the loose,

when the People's evidence fails to prove indubitably the

accused's authorship of the crime of which they stand accused, it

is the Court's duty — and the accused's right — to proclaim their

innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. 68

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 20, 2017 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08223 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-

appellant Teodoro Ansano y Calleja is ACQUITTED of the crime

charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED

IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being

lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be

issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of New

Bilibid Prisons for immediate implementation. The said

Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five

(5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan,

JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 See Notice of Appeal dated March 10, 2017; rollo, pp. 111-112.

2
 Rollo, pp. 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-

Sison, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and Henri Jean

Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court) concurring.

3
 CA rollo, pp. 12-15. Penned by Pairing Judge Cynthia R. Marino-

Ricablanca.

4
 The names of the City and the Province are replaced with

fictitious initials pursuant to SC Adm. Cir. No. 83-15 dated July 27,

2015.

5
 The name of the victim is replaced with fictitious initials pursuant

to SC Adm. Cir. No. 83-15 dated July 27, 2015.

6
 CA rollo, p. 11.
7
 The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and

other information which tend to establish or compromise her

identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household

members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and

fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People

v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]) and Amended Administrative

Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.

8
 Id. at 3-5.

9
 Id. at 5-6.

10
 Supra note 3.

11
 CA rollo, pp. 14-15.

12
 Supra note 1.

13
 Supra note 2.

14
 Rollo, p.15.

15
 Id. at 11.

16
 Id. at 14.
17
 Polangcos v. People, G.R. No. 239866, September 11, 2019,

accessed at .

18
 Id.

19
 Id.

20
 People v. Sta. Ana, 353 Phil. 388, 402 (1998).

21
 Id.

22
 Id.

23
 People v. Tumambing, 659 Phil. 544, 547 (2011).

24
 People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 528 (2008).

25
 819 Phil. 406 (2017).

26
 Id. at 415-417.

27
 People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 179 (1995), citing

LAFAVE, AND ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, HORNBOOK

SERIES 353 (1992 Ed.).

28
 Id.

29
 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
30
 432 U.S. 98 (1977)

31
 People v. Teehankee, Jr., supra note 27 at 180.

32
 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).

33
 Neil v. Biggers, supra note 29 at 198.

34
 394 U.S. 440 (1969).

35
 Id. at 442-443.

36
 Manson v. Braithwaite, supra note 30 at 114.

37
 Id.

38
 439 Phil. 509 (2002).

39
 Id. at 524-525.

40
 473 Phil. 517 (2004).

41
 Id. at 540.

42
 Id. at 547-548.

43
 TSN dated April 23, 2007, p. 5.

44
 TSN dated June 25, 2008, pp. 13-15.
45
 TSN dated February 10, 2010, p. 3.

46
 Id.

47
 Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36, 50 (2016).

48
 People v. Vargas, 784 Phil. 144, 156 (2016).

49
 People v. Nuñez, supra note 25 at 428.

50
 Supra note 24.

51
 Supra note 7.

52
 TSN dated June 25, 2008, p. 16.

53
 People v. Pineda, supra note 40.

54
 Id. at 540, citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS

IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 68-69 (1965).

55
 People v. Rodrigo, supra note 24 at 529-530.

56
 TSN dated December 10, 2008, pp. 5-7.

57
 People v. Parungao, 332 Phil. 917, 924 (1996).

58
 Id.
59
 CA rollo, p. 14.

60
 Rollo, p. 11.

61
 Id. at 13.

62
 People v. Pineda, supra note 40 at 537.

63
 People v. Espera, 718 Phil. 680, 694 (2013).

64
 See People v. Pineda, supra note 40 at 548.

65
 Rollo, p. 11.

66
 People v. Rodrigo, supra note 24 at 539.

67
 434 Phil. 435 (2002).

68
 Id. at 455.