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1998 Sorensen
1998 Sorensen
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Copyright ? British International Studies Association 1998
The end of the Cold War has prompted a good deal of soul-searching in the
academic discipline of International Relations (IR).* Some results of this process
are already apparent; the dominant version of realism, neorealism, is developing in
new directions in an attempt to address major areas where the theory has been
shown to contain weaknesses (e.g. domestic politics, international cooperation, the
analysis of change).1 Liberal IR-theory is becoming less focused on international
institutions and has devoted more attention to the larger issues of democracy and
democratization, sovereignty, and change in the context of modernization an
globalization.2 Some bodies of established theory are receiving fresh attention,
including the International Society (or English) School,3 and there is a renewed
interest in the field of international political economy.4
Yet all these theoretical traditions (realism, liberalism, International Society,
international political economy) can be seen as enduring perspectives in IR; they
build on a long intellectual tradition concerning problems of relations between
* Many thanks to Kenneth Glarbo, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Michael Nicholson, Steve Smith, and
Alexander Wendt for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1 See, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, 'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Polities', in
M.W. Doyle and G.J. Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, 1997),
pp. 163-202; Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy. Contemporary Realism and
International Security (Cambridge, MA, 1995); John A. Vasquez, 'The Realist Paradigm and
Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on
Waltz's Balancing Proposition', and the responses by Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Christensen, and Jack
Snyder, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman, Randall Schweller and Stephen Walt, American Political
Science Review, 4 (1997), pp. 899-935.
2 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993);
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York/London, 1997); Henry R. Nau, 'Democracy
and the National Interest: An American Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century', paper for SSRC
Conference on U.S. Promotion of Democracy, Washington 1997; Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The
Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990); Robert O. Keohane, 'Hobbes's Dilemma and
Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society', in H-H. Holm and G.
Sorensen (eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder,
1995), pp. 165-87.
3 Robert H. Jackson, 'International Community beyond the Cold War', in GM. Lyons and M.
Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention
(Baltimore/London, 1995), pp. 59-87; Robert H. Jackson, 'The Political Theory of International
Society', in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (University Park, PA,
1995), pp. 110-29; Tim Dunne, 'The Social Construction of International Society', European Journal o
International Relations, 3 (1995).
4 Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order
(London, 1994); Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy
(Cambridge, 1996); Philip G. Cerny, 'Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict
in the Post-Cold War World Order', Millennium, 1 (1993), pp. 27-51.
83
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84 Georg Sorensen
5 See, for example, Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, International Relations: Introduction to a
Discipline (Oxford, forthcoming 1999).
6 E.g., Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism & Beyond
(Cambridge, 1996).
7 Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', in K. Knorr and J. Rosenau
(eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969).
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IR theory after the Cold War 85
Metatheoretical Issues
It should be noted right away that there are many different ways of presenting the
debates between established traditions and post-positivist currents in IR. What
follows is no complete account; no attempt has been made to single out all relevant
issues and questions. But I do claim to address some of the most important items in
the metatheoretical debate. A proper place to begin is in one of the most radical (in
philosophy of science terms) and outspoken parts of the post-positivist camp,
namely the post-modernists. Post-modernism can aptly be defined as 'incredulity
towards metanarratives'8 even if Lyotard emphasizes that this definition involves
'simplifying to the extreme'. Metanarratives are accounts that claim to have
discovered the truth about the social world. In Steve Smith's helpful terminology,
metanarratives are theories based on a foundational epistemology, that is, a position
according to which 'all truth claims (i.e. about some feature of the world) can be
judged true or false'.9 An anti-foundational epistemology, by contrast, argues that
truth claims 'cannot be so judged since there are never neutral grounds for so doing;
instead each theory will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no
neutral position available to determine between rival claims'.
The metanarratives attacked by post-modernists are also most often explanatory
as opposed to constitutive. Explanatory theories 'sees the world as something
external to our theories of it; in contrast a constitutive theory is one that thinks our
theories actually help construct the world'.10
The IR-theory or metanarrative most strongly attacked by post-modernists is
neorealism,11 in part because of its perceived dominance in the discipline, and in
part because of its structuralist parsimony. After all, here is a theory which claims
that only a few elements of information about sovereign states in an anarchical
international system can tell us most of the big and important things we need to
know about international relations. And the theory even claims to reflect the reality
of international politics 'through all the centuries that we can contemplate'.12
Post-modernist critiques of neorealism emphasize the structuralist quality of the
theory. The anarchical structure of the international system confronts individual
actors as a given material reality which they cannot change; adaptation is their only
option.13 The theory is ahistorical and that in turn leads to reification, the move
whereby historically produced structures are presented as unchangeable constraints
given by nature. Individual actors are 'reduced in the last analysis to mere objects
who must participate in reproducing the whole or . . . fall by the wayside of
8 J.-F Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester, 1984), p. xxiv.
9 Steve Smith, 'New Approaches to International Theory', in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The
Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford, 1997), p. 67.
10 Ibid.
11 E.g., Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in R.O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its
Critics (New York, 1986), pp. 255-301; R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as
Political Theory (Cambridge, 1993); R.B.J. Walker, 'International Relations and the Concept of the
Political', in Booth and Smith, International Relations Today, pp. 306-28. There are other positivist
positions than neorealism, of course, and Kenneth Waltz is not the sole standard bearer of neorealism.
But for lack of space, I focus on the critique of Waltz.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and
Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 75.
13 See for example, Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', p. 289, and Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 123.
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86 Georg Sorensen
I believe that this is a core metatheoretical debate in IR after the Cold War. Many
post-positivists of various colours have contributed to this debate, but it is the work
of Steve Smith18 which has been most helpful in clarifying the points of contention
and drawing up the front-lines of the debate. Steve Smith is firmly on the post
positivist side in the debate. His position is premised on the notion of an
insurmountable gulf between positivist and post-positivist methodology. The two
'cannot be combined together because they have mutually exclusive assumptions'.19 I
am going to question this position in two ways. First I argue that even if there are
problems with positivism, the post-positivist position is also in several respects
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IR theory after the Cold War 87
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88 Georg Sorensen
22 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in
R.W. Cox with T.J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (London, 1996), pp. 85-124, quote from p. 88.
23 Ibid., p. 89.
24 Smith, 'Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory', p. 332.
25 The difficult part is, of course, establishing precisely what those common standards shall be, and post
positivists often complain that the other side wants them to 'do more of the moving' on the continuum
between positivism and post-positivism. The quote is from J. Ann Tickner, 'Continuing the
Conversation ...', International Studies Quarterly, 42 (1998), p. 209.
26 Sorensen, Marxismen og den Sociale Orden, pp. 68-73.
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IR theory after the Cold War 89
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90 Georg Sorensen
concern us'.33 which is another way of saying that neorealism holds no monopoly
over truth; this indicates that some post-positivist critiques have pushed neorealism
further into the positivist extreme than is actually warranted.
In sum, IR is no more than other areas of social science compelled to a cruel
choice between extreme versions of positivism or post-positivism. It can proceed on
a metatheoretical middle ground, as argued by several authors.34 I would add that
the major theoretical traditions in IR, including variants of realism, liberalism, and
Marxism as well as most of the theoretical currents grouped by Steve Smith under
the label of post-positivism/reflectivism, are all placed somewhere in the territory
covered by this middle ground.
Yet it is also relevant to emphasize that intersubjective understanding does not
emerge automatically; it requires a measure of goodwill by the parties in the
conversation. The radical post-modernist interpretation of knowledge is not always
conducive to the production of intersubjectivity. That is because knowledge is treated
as a text which can, in principle, be interpreted in any which way by the reader. The
readers can make of the text 'whatever they want of it and no one can say which
interpretation is correct, or even better, for that matter'.35 What is lacking here is
what Habermas calls 'verst?ndigungorientiertes Handeln', that is, behaviour oriented
towards reaching mutual understanding.36 Habermas has specified the elements of
such behaviour and also its preconditions. My premise here is that 'verst?n
digungorientiertes Handeln' is possible, both among IR theorists and among
practical actors in international relations. It should be noted that this premise is being
questioned (and labelled 'idealistic' and 'utopian') by prominent post-modernists.37
The ontological debate concerns the nature of the social world. The extreme
version on the objectivist side is purely materialist or naturalist, i.e. the social world
of international relations is a world shaped by the material structure of the
international system;38 the extreme version on the subjectivist side is idealist, arguing
that the social world is, more than anything else, constituted by our language, ideas,
and concepts?the social world is 'what we make it'.39
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IR theory after the Cold War 91
This is an important debate; but it is significant that the real extremes in the
debate hardly exist in IR (or in social science) today. One would be hard pressed to
find examples of theorists who would argue that the social world is purely
materialist or purely idealist. In other words, the real debate is about the proper
mix, about what matters relatively most. The ontological middle ground is therefore
huge, encompassing almost all theories on either side of the objectivist and the
subjectivist divide. When some constructivists claim that they occupy a 'middle
ground' in this debate40 they are certainly right, but they are by no means alone in
doing so.
In sum, the casting of an ontological gulf between all positivists on the one side
and all post-positivists on the other side is not warranted. Almost all of the
theoretical approaches that we employ in IR think in terms of some combination of
materialism and idealism. The debate about what matters most and how the two
aspects should be precisely combined is a recurrent theme, not only in social science
in general, but also in IR. I am most sceptical of those approaches which move
toward either extreme (e.g. materialist neorealism or idealist post-modernism). And I
find most promise in those who attempt more balanced combinations (e.g. Coxian
Marxism and Wendtian constructivism). The reason for this ought to be clear: the
objectivist extreme leads towards a structuralist reification because of the emphasis
on 'structuralist continuity and repetition'; the opposite extreme leads towards a
freewheeling, voluntaristic subjectivism. The merits of the 'balanced combination'
literatures such as those inspired by Robert Cox and Alexander Wendt should be
emphasized; first, they have a productive way of holding on to the insights produced
by theories leaning towards the positivist extreme, including neorealism; second,
they avoid the relativism which is a danger inherent in extreme post-positivist
theories; and finally, they have a better grip on the analysis of change than theories
at the positivist and at the post-positivist extremes.41
Yet the point here is not to argue in favour of any specific approach. The point is
to argue against the creation of a basic divide between positions and in favour of
thinking about the relative merits of different forms of combination. It is
noteworthy that some of the major debates within the theoretical traditions in IR
(e.g. classical realism versus neorealism; different currents of the International
Society school; different schools within Marxism and within liberalism) concern
precisely this issue of the proper combination.42 I consider this to be the major
metatheoretical issue in current IR; it is around this issue that the most productive
and interesting debates about metatheoretical problems revolve. Constructivists have
40 See, for example, Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Polities',
European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp. 319-64. Adler argues that social
constructivism seizes a middle ground in both epistemological and ontological terms.
41 There are very large literatures connected with these two positions; they cannot be introduced here.
The most recent comprehensive statement by Cox is Approaches to World Order, the influential articles
by Wendt include: 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International
Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-50; 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State',
American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), pp. 384-96, and 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the
social construction of power polities', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. Recent
overviews of the literatures connected with the positions are: Jeffrey T Checkel, 'The Constructivist
Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50 (1998), pp. 324-48; Robert J. O'Brien,
'International Relations and International Political Economy: Apprentice as Teacher?', in John
McMillan and Andrew Linklater (eds.), New Directions in International Relations (London, 1995).
42 As emphasized by Smith, 'The Self-images of a Discipline'.
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92 Georg Sorensen
been helpful in emphasizing this, but they are continuing a very old debate rather
than opening up a new one.
These brief reflections make up no grand solution to all metatheoretical problems,
of course. To the contrary, the middle ground opens a large agenda of new
problems, but even if these are complex and difficult, they are much to be preferred
to the unpleasant extremes of either positivism or post-positivism.
Let me move on to the substance of international relations, the most pertinent issues
after the end of the Cold War. It is clear that the metatheoretical debate in itself tells
us next to nothing about substance, the most important areas of study. But even if
this is the case, the metatheoretical points made above are not absent in what
follows. The substantial issues discussed here are all based on scholarly contribu
tions which try to avoid the extreme versions of positivism and post-positivism; that
is, they occupy that middle ground which was identified earlier as the most attractive
ontological and epistemological position.
There is no straightforward way of identifying the current core substantial issues
in international relations. One approach is to examine what the various theoretical
approaches inside and outside of mainstream have to say about this. Another
approach is to survey a number of relevant journals and make an inventory of the
issues that they take up. I am going to do neither. The starting point adopted here is
that the core issues of world politics are the big questions of war and peace, conflict
and cooperation, wealth and poverty. I readily admit that this lends a certain
traditionalist, even statist, flavour to what I consider the most important issues. The
intention is by no means to exclude other issues based on other identities, be they
gender, class, culture, or civilization. Yet the premise is surely that ours remains a
world of sovereign states; it is clear that this premise can be questioned and there is
no doubt that scholars of both positivist and post-positivist leaning will disagree
with my way of talking about substance. This is merely to emphasize that what
follows is more a personal view of what is substantially important in current IR than
it is an attempt to speak on behalf of the scholarly community.43
My premise indicates that the sovereign state is the single most important
macrostructure determining the lives that people live. Several scholars have recently
argued that in order to analyse security problems for people nowadays we need to
turn away from the state and to understand instead 'the global flux of social
relations within which the international system floats, and to explore the manifold
dimensions of these relations'.44 My claim is that even when our main focus in on
security for people as individuals, sovereign states continue to be 'the single most
important macrostructure'.45 And this is true not only for security. Sovereign states
are the main providers of the basic social values of security, freedom, order, justice,
and welfare.46 A number of weak states in the system do not provide those values for
43 Insofar as such an entity as 'the scholarly community' exists nowadays! For reflections on this, see
Holsti, Along the Road of International Theory . . .'.
44 See Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations (Cambridge, 1994), p. 113.
45 Georg Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security', Security Dialogue, 4 (1996), p. 374.
46 Jackson and Sorensen, International Relations: Introduction to a Discipline, ch. 1.
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IR theory after the Cold War 93
Figure 1. Core issues after the Cold War: Globalization, statehood, and world orders
Uneven globalization
their citizens; they even sometimes put their people in danger including mortal
danger. People that are stateless or people that live in weak or failed states47 are in
serious jeopardy compared to people that live in well-functioning states which
provide for these basic values. Given the importance of the sovereign state, a
measure of statism, i.e. analytical focus on the sovereign state, is thus warranted in
the study of basic problems of international relations. This is true even when our
main concern is the life and well-being of individuals.
The question, then, is what can we say about the big issues of war and peace,
conflict and cooperation, and wealth and poverty after the end of the Cold War?
Figure 1 presents a suitable entry point for discussing this question.
This approach is inspired by (but not identical to) the work of Robert Cox.48 The
idea is that the core issues of war and peace, conflict and cooperation, wealth and
poverty can be suitably approached in their post-Cold War format through the study
of the entities and relationships expressed in Figure 1. It will appear from what
follows that this approach builds on the metatheoretical middle ground identified
above; in particular it stresses the need to analyse material as well as non-material
aspects of social reality.
Uneven globalization
Globalization increasingly defines the context for economic and social development
in the world. It is therefore a core issue in the analysis of wealth and poverty. The
content of globalization can be clarified through two major distinctions. The first is
between globalization as a primarily economic process involving, e.g., production,
distribution, management, and finance,49 and globalization as a broader sociological
process involving all aspects of social activity, including, e.g., culture, reproduction,
communication, ideology, etc.50 The second major distinction is between 'Globaliz
47 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge,
1993); Georg Sorensen, 'Individual Security and National Security'.
48 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'.
49 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the
Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, 1996); Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order:
Social Forces in the Making of History (New York, 1987); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, States
Against Markets. The Limits of Globalisation (London/New York, 1996); Jeremy Howell and Michelle
Wood (1993), The Globalisation of Production and Technology (London/New York, 1993).
50 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London, 1992); Anthony Giddens, The
Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, 1990); Martin Albrow, The Global Age (Cambridge, 1996).
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94 Georg Sorensen
Consequences of globalization
51 Robert Reich, The Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (New York, 1992);
Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (London, 1990); Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-state:
The Rise of Regional Economies (London, 1995); John Stopford and Susan Strange with John S.
Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge, 1991).
52 E.g. several contributions in Boyer and Drache, States Against Markets; Paul Hirst, The Global
Economy?Myths and Realities', International Affairs, 3 (1997), pp. 409-25; Robert H. Jackson,
'Continuity and Change in the States System', in R.H. Jackson and A. James (eds.), States in a
Changing World. A Contemporary Analysis (London, 1993).
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IR theory after the Cold War 95
but also new obstacles. The greatest problem may be that the weak states in the
periphery of the world economy are losing out in the globalization race. Such states
face two kind of problems. On the one hand, access to the world economy is
increasingly difficult, not primarily because of trade barriers but due to lack of
demand. Industrialized countries have a decreasing need for the weak states, be it as
sources of raw materials, as markets, or as cheap labour.53 On the other hand, in
order to reap maximum benefits of any world market integration, domestic political
and economic reform is needed in many countries, and it may not be forthcoming,
not even as a result of fragile democratization.54 Several scholars have demonstrated
the decisive importance of domestic preconditions for successfully facing external
challenges and for seizing opportunities.55 In an increasingly globalized world, such
lessons are acutely relevant.
In sum, what I foresee as a result of uneven globalization is a world tied closer
together in the sense that autarchic development (e.g. North Korea) is less and less
feasible. But it is also a more fragmented and hierarchical world in the sense that a
number of weak states will be unable to reap the potential benefits of uneven
globalization. A complete answer to the question about the effects of globalization
requires an analysis of the reciprocal relationships in Figure 1 as they are played out
in the present historical conjuncture. Let me turn to the next major item, forms of
sovereign statehood.
It is relevant to begin with an outline of the two major analytical positions in the
debate about sovereign statehood. The dominant theoretical position in IR theory,
realism, considers the state an unproblematic given. The state is seen as a sovereign,
territorially based unit run by a government which enjoys a high level of autonomy
in both domestic and foreign affairs.56 On this view, that is really all we need to
know about the state; we do not need to analyse statehood as such, because all states
are basically 'like units', i.e. they have to perform similar functions of government
and they all enjoy sovereignty. The only interesting difference between states is their
power capabilities; some are strong, some are weak.
This 'fixed' view of the state is most often combined with a 'sceptic' view of the
consequences of globalization. Globalization does not challenge the sovereign state
in basic ways. Statehood is not in decline: the institution of sovereignty is more
popular than ever and the new challenges to the state, such as an increasingly
globalized economy, must be seen in the context of the state's increased capacities
53 Kari Levitt, 'Debt, Adjustment and Development: Looking to the 1990s', Economic and Political
Weekly, July 21 (1990). Oil and a few strategic raw materials are exceptions from this trend.
54 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization. Processes and Prospects in a Changing World
(Boulder, 1998).
55 Dieter Senghaas, The European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development Theory (Leamington
Spa/Dover, 1985).
56 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Theory of International Politics' (Reading, MA, 1979); see also Mark V. Zacher,
'The decaying pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and
Governance', in J.N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 58-102.
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96 Georg Sorensen
for response. In terms of domestic extraction of surplus and regulation, the state is
stronger than ever; in terms of the external environment, the long-term trend has
been toward more, not less autonomy.57
Against this mainstream view of the state in IR-theory stands a growing number
of analysts who argue that the state is basically in decline, not least due to the forces
of globalization. The 'declinists'58 first and foremost argue that globalization is
challenging the state in fundamental ways. Economic and ecological interdepen
dence decrease state autonomy. Democratization erodes the domestic autonomy of
state elites. The information revolution has made communication much less bound
by time and place.59 Together with increasing individual skills this challenges the
state from below.60 The argument of the 'declinists' is that all these developments
seriously weaken the sovereign state.
Yet it is clear that neither the 'declinists' nor the 'strong state' adherents can win
this debate for the simple reason that both have a valid point. Sovereign states have
been both strengthened and weakened in complex ways since the end of World War
II. What we need, then, is an approach that can accommodate both 'declinist' and
'strong state' elements. Such an approach focuses on changes in statehood that can
lead to both stronger and weaker states. A suitable way of initiating this analysis is
through the identification of main types of state in the present international system.
In more concrete terms, I would argue that processes of uneven globalization
under the conditions of the post-World War II world order has led to the creation of
three main types (i.e. Weberian ideal types) of state.61 They are: (a) the modern
'Westphalian' state, a consolidated nation-state with its own structural dynamic and
relative autonomy; (b) the post-colonial state, that is, the weak and unconsolidated
state on the periphery, often in an ongoing state of entropy; and (c) the 'post
modern' state, a complex, transnationallly interpenetrated entity immersed in
globalization and multi-level governance. The EU-members are the major examples
of this last-mentioned type of state.
Space does not allow a full elaboration of these main types of state here. Figure 3
provides a summary of the major characteristics of the three types. The point worth
stressing here is that the state typology provides a preliminary answer to the crucial
question about how globalization in the present world order affects the state. This
discussion has hitherto been dominated by the unfruitful dead-end debate of
'decline of state' versus 'continued strength of state'. By focusing on change of
statehood (in the direction of both stronger and weaker states) and combining this
with the notion of different main types of state, this debate can move forward in a
much more fruitful way.
57 Janice Thompson and Stephen D. Krasner, 'Global Transactions and the Consolidation of
Sovereignty', in E-O. Czempiel and J.N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges:
Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA, 1989), pp. 195-221.
58 James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, 1990);
Ohmae, The End of the Nation-state: The Rise of Regional Economies; Susan Strange, 'Wake up,
Krasner! The World has Changed', Review of International Political Economy, 2 (1994), pp. 209-19;
Zacher, 'The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple'.
59 E.g., William H. McNeill, 'Winds of Change', Foreign Affairs, 69 (1990), pp. 162-72.
60 See Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity.
61 Georg Sorensen, An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and
Cooperation', Review of International Studies, 3 (1997), pp. 253-69.
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IR theory after the Cold War 97
62 Robert O. Keohane et al., After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe
1989-91 (Cambridge, MA, 1993); Georg Sorensen, 'Det Liberale Fredsperspektiv i Teori of Praksis',
GRUS, 53 (1997), pp. 7-27.
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98 Georg Sor ens en
especially in North American IR.63 The position taken here is that these issues
should be tied in with the larger subject of the development and change of sovereign
statehood. Democratization is not likely to bring peace to weak states in the Third
World; it will frequently spark more intense conflict. The involvement in inter
national institutions will hardly have far-reaching consequences in countries where
domestic institutions are extremely weak and fragile. At the same time, institutional
development and democratic governance is developing in new ways in the context of
globalized, highly integrated, post-modern states.
In sum, violent conflict between post-modern states is highly unlikely. But there
are large zones of conflict in the Third World where domestic conflict in weak, post
colonial states is prevalent. And in consolidated liberal states, new forms of (non
violent) threat appear to be on the rise, due to the 'risk-society' created by global
ization. Further exploration of these patterns of conflict and threat is an important
element on the post-Cold War IR-agenda.
World order
The third and final leg in the analytical framework in Figure 1 is 'world order'.
Defined as the configuration of forces which define the systemic context for any
concrete ensemble of states,64 I conceive of world order as containing the following
main elements: (a) hegemony; (b) regionalism; and (c) international society values.
Space only allows brief comments on each of these items.
Re. (a): Hegemony concerns the distribution of power. The end of the Cold War
has started a comprehensive debate about the relative distribution of power in the
international system following the decline of the Soviet Union. Neorealists charac
terize the present system as 'bipolarity in an altered state'.65 Bipolarity continues
because militarily Russia can take care of herself and because no other great powers
have emerged. Yet with the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer
held in check by any other country or combination of countries; the system leans
towards unipolarity with the U.S. as the unipolar power. Against neorealism liberals
argue that a qualitative change is under way, towards an international system
characterised by interdependence, democracy, and liberal institutions.66 They argue
that in such a world, power is more diffuse, less tangible, and the non-material 'soft
power' is of increasing importance.67
My starting point on this issue is the Coxian notion of hegemony which contains
material as well as non-material aspects of power. Hegemony is a 'fit between a
configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order
(including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order . . ,'.68
63 As evidenced in leading North American journals, such as International Security, World Politics,
International Organization and American Political Science Review.
64 The definition is a modified version of the one appearing in Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World
Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'.
65 Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities'.
66 An overview of the liberal arguments appears in Sorensen, 'Det Liberale Fredsperspektiv i Teori of
Praksis'.
67 See Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.
68 Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', p. 103.
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IR theory after the Cold War 99
The undisputed U.S. hegemony of the post-World War II era is a thing of the past,
but a new hegemony has not been established. There is international governance in
the form of various regimes and institutions, but there is no apparatus to deal
comprehensively with either global economic crisis (as it threatens, for example, due
to the present downturn in Asian economies) or global security problems (e.g. state
failure in Africa and elsewhere). There is no clear hegemony in the present period.
Cox speculates that we may be entering a 'post-hegemonic' world because the forces
of globalization have led to a transformation of statehood which mitigates against a
new hegemony.69 Yet a more likely prospect appears to be an order based on an
alliance between the three regional clusters led by the EU in Europe, the United
States in America, and Japan/China in East Asia.
Re. (b): Regionalism. There has been a proliferation of regional cooperation in
recent years, from NAFTA and MERCOSUR in America, ASEAN in East Asia,
and the EU in Europe. Several analysts argue that we are well on the way towards a
regionalized world.70 It appears that regional cooperation is in important respects
the answer given by states to the challenges of globalization. Economic globalization
has increasingly restricted the national autonomy of many states. Increased
supranational cooperation is thus partly an attempt to regain some of the regulatory
influence lost in the national political space owing to the very success of the modern
state in organizing transnational economic development during the post-World War
II era.
Yet it is crucially important to emphasize that the type of regional cooperation is
not uniform. There is qualitative variation: only the EU has moved towards forms of
cooperation with clear consequences for the sovereignty of member states. Both the
United States and Japan appear to respond to the challenges to states with more
conventional forms of regional cooperation. Therefore, while regionalism is on the
increase, we are in important respects not moving towards a world of regions.71 Most
forms of regional cooperation are of a rather loose and open kind. It will be an
important issue on the IR-agenda to further analyse regional cooperation in
comparative perspective.
Re. (c): International society values. The end of the Cold War also meant the end
of the Communist challenge to liberalism. There is now an extensive debate about
new possible cultural and ideological challengers to modern, liberal society. It is
becoming clear that the popular notion of a coming 'clash of civilizations' is a
misleading approach.72 A more appropriate point of departure is the English School
notion of an 'international society', that is, the society of sovereign states with
common institutions and common rules and norms. Following Jackson,73 there can
be varying degrees of society between states, from very limited contact and
interaction at one extreme, to comprehensive interaction in a highly institutionalized
setting at the other extreme, sustained by common norms and rules. Against this
background, it can be argued that there is 'more society' in the post-Cold War
69 Robert W. Cox, 'Global Restructuring. Making Sense of the Changing International Political
Economy', in Stubbs and Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 45-60.
70 For an overview, see B. Hettne and A. Inotai, The New Regionalism (Helsinki, 1994).
71 For a similar view, see Miles Kahler, A World of Blocs: Facts and Factoids', World Policy Journal, 1
(1995), pp. 19-28.
72 Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 3 (1993), pp. 22-50.
73 Jackson, 'The Political Theory of International Society'.
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100 Georg Sorensen
international system. There is more agreement about liberal values, including human
rights, and there is more preparedness to act in coalition when the basic values of
international society are violated (e.g. the Gulf War, humanitarian intervention in
failed states). At the same time, processes of globalization can lead to confrontation
between modern and traditional values,74 but even if it is a fragile and stepwise
process, I would argue that the accent is presently on integration and stronger
common values, instead of fragmentation and clashes between different values.
Conclusion
The IR community has reason to be pleased with the metatheoretical and the
substantial debate triggered by the end of the Cold War. The metatheoretical tools
have been sharpened; there is much more clarity about the ontological and the
epistemological bases for the various theoretical approaches. That service has, in the
main, been provided by post-positivists. Even if it is true that the debate
recapitulates many elements from earlier debates, including the debates between
behaviouralists and traditionalists75 and the debates between Marxists and non
Marxists,76 every discipline needs a metatheoretical inventory and house-cleaning
from time to time, because it always produces a number of fresh insights.
As for the substantial issues, there has been a healthy shake-up as well. I have
argued that the core issues of the discipline: peace and war; wealth and poverty,
conflict and cooperation, involve a certain amount of statism, i.e. focus on sovereign
states. But this does not exclude issues based on other identities, including gender,
class or culture. In sum, there is more clarity about what we know and about what
we don't know. And there is more sound humility towards the magnitude of the task
we face, both methodologically and substantially. Combined with a healthy
pluralism in both areas, that is all for the best. There is also a constructive trend
towards opening up the discipline of IR to other areas of human and social science,
including comparative politics, sociology, economics, and the humanities. Both in
substantive and in methodological terms there should be much to gain from living
less isolated. Getting thus far has involved a number of battles and controversies,
some of them more productive than others. This is all business as usual. Social
science cannot and should not attempt to achieve the paradigmatic 'normal science'
of the natural sciences, where there is much more agreement about basic
assumptions concerning metatheoretical premises and scientific habits.77 But we do
have a common ground of intersubjectively transmissible knowledge.
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