Professional Documents
Culture Documents
02 Whole
02 Whole
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
from
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
by
PUANGTHONG RUNGSWASDISAB
customs post
states appear
Page 151, last para, line 2 close subject
of
these positions
Cambodia's status as a "weak vassal" of Siam and Vietnam has been a matter of
consensus amongst historians. Most previous studies on Thai-Cambodian relations
are based on the framework of tributary relation, emphasising the factor of political
and ideological conflict among the courts of Siam, Cambodia and Vietnam. Based
on such a framework, scholars have tended to conclude that Siam had no real
economic motivation in Cambodia. This thesis aims at reexamining the history of
the Thai-Cambodian relations between 1767-1851, in terms of two economic
factor: trade and manpower. This thesis argues that trade and manpower, which
were the basis of power of traditional states in Southeast Asia, were the economic
reasons for Thai interventions in Cambodia.
As for the Cambodian state, the economic conditions significantly determined the
Since Cambodia's basis of power was destroyed, its rulers lacked effective means
of implementing policy and securing the loyalty of the okya. The weakness of the
Cambodian state revealed in its vulnerability to both local revolts and external
incursions. Such conditions were an obstacle for the Cambodian state in achieving
real independence from the domination of the Thai and the Vietnamese. In fact, by
the mid-nineteenth century, Cambodia ceased to exist as a viable pohtical entity.
m
Acknowledgements
I feel that I have always been very fortunate to have had many good khru.
teachers, and this thesis would not have been possible without help and kindness
from them. I am in debt to Melanie Beresford, my supervisor, for her devoted time,
hospitality Melanie and her partner, Bmce McFarlane, have given me, particul£irly
during my stay with them for eight months at the house in Woonona in 1989-90, is
generously became my co-supervisor just two years ago, his sharp criticisms,
comments and suggestions contributed a great deal to my work. I will never forget
the help and kindness of Ben Kieman, my first supervisor from July 1989 to July
1990.1 am grateful for his guidance with the topic of the thesis and particularly his
There is, however, one thing in common among these three supervisors. They have
been very supportive and patient with my slow progress. They showed me what I
had heard about the farang before I came to Australia was wrong. Not all farang are
cold.
moral support Chaiwat and his wife, Suwanna Satha-Anand, are most invaluable.
support and sense of humour always helped me out of the depression which is a
Many other people both in Thailand and Australia are also part of my thesis. 1
appreciate valuable discussions and comments from Chalong Suntharawanich,
Adisom Muakphimai, Anthony Reid, Phuwadol Songprasert and Gehan
Wijeyewardene. I would like to thank a nimiber of my friends who assisted me in
many ways: the late Sukanya Boontanont, Phetcharat Tang, Suwimon
Rungcharoen, Theeraphot Sirichan, Somsiri Chua, Chumsri Nathawongse and
Thiphawan. Special thanks are due to Patrick Jory, who helped reading the final
draft and correcting my English. Friendship from Patrick and his wife, Chantakara
Chantarachota, made the lives of my husband and 1 in Canberra more worthwhile.
This thesis was possible because of financial support I received from a few
organisations: the University of Wollongong provided a four-year scholarship for
my study; the Mennonite Central Committee (Bangkok) funded my first year
enrolment fees; the Asia-Pacific Development Study Program of Wollongong
University assisted my field research expenses; special thanks go to Professor
Edward Wolfers, Head of the Department of History and Politics, for granting
financial assistance. I am indeed grateful for their generosity.
I also would like to thank the following organisations which gave me chances to
present parts of the thesis as research papers: the Department of History and
Politics at the University of Wollongong; the Thai-Yunnan Project of the
Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the
Australian National University; the Chakrawan Witthaya Group and the Department
of Humanities of Chiangmai University; and the Core University Program
organised by Thammasat University and Kyoto University.
Assistance from staffs of the following archives and libraries have to be thankfully
recorded as well: the National Library and National Archives of Thailand; the
Archives Nationale depot d'outremer, Aix-en-Provence, France; Archives du
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris; the Public Records Office, London; the
Menzies Library of the Australian National University; the National Library of
Australia; the Wollongong University Library; and the Thammasat University
Library.
Niti Pawakapan, my husband, has been very supportive and helpful in many ways.
His company has helped me overcome all difficulties and contributed a great deal
Finally, throughout the period of the thesis writing, there are two unportant persons
whom I always think of I dedicate this work to my mother, who has been ill since
I began to write this thesis, and to the memory of my dearest friend, Sukanya
Boontanont.
VI
CONTENTS
Abstract i-ii
Acknowledgement iii-v
Maps x-xii
Chapter I Introduction 1
Bibliography 222
Glossary 238
vu
List of Tables
1604-35 34
1647-1720 34
Table 6.3 Connections between the five ministers and the five sdat tran 171
viu
The transcripfion in this thesis follows Romanization Guide for Thai Script, of the
Royal Institute, (Bangkok, 1968). This system is also applied to Khmer words.
For the name of the Thai provinces, 1 adhere to The Proclamations of the Prime
Minister Office and the Royal Institute. (Bangkok, 1981) except Ayutthaya. I prefer
"Ayudhya", which has been widely used among historians. In the case of some
personal names, I have to adhere to the owners' transcription.
ix
INTRODUCTION
between 1767 and 1851, in terms of two interrelated economic factors: trade and
manpower. This study covers the beginning of the Thonburi period and the Third
Reign of the Chakri Dynasty. The major questions of this research are: what were
the economic reasons behind Thai interventions in Cambodian affairs and what
its powerfiil neighbours, Siam and Vietnam, which successively achieved control
Cambodia's status as a "weak vassal" of Siam and Vietnam has been a matter of
consensus amongst historians, with the consequent view that its weakness
culminated during the first half of the nineteenth cenmry when intensive foreign
invasions took place. The period of this study thus covers what historians have
regarded as the dark age of Cambodian history when Cambodia was overtaken by
foreign interventions, war, migration, famine, and local revolts.^ Such studies
have attributed the dovmfall of Cambodia in the first half of the nineteenth century
mainly to ideological and political conflicts between the Thai and the Vietnamese
courts.2 In this explanation, because Cambodia held the status of muang song fai
1 David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, second edition (Sydney, Allen&Unwin, 1993), p. 117.
2 I ^ . , chapter 6-7. idem., Cambodia Before the French: Politics of the Tributary Kingdom. (PhD
thesis, University of Michigan, 1973); Klaus Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand tJnder Rama I.
fe, a state with dual overlordship, the conflict was a result of overlapping tributary
relationships which Cambodia was obliged to enter into with Siam and Vietnam.
These two contending states had different ideologies.^ The Thonburi and Bangkok
Chakri kings, who were new to power, made an endeavour to fulfil the ambitious
ideal of the chakravatin. the Buddhist universal monarch or the king of kings, by
exercising their claims over various states around their frontiers. The successful
establishment of their hegemony over the lesser states demonstrated the fund of
merit the king possessed. The accomplishment thus depended on the personal
capability of each mler.'*
The relations between the traditional Southeast Asian polities have been described
as being modelled on the Mandala or Galactic Polity, as it has been formulated by
Stanley Tambiah and Oliver Wolters.^ The concept of Mandala may be useful in
clarifying the anachronistic view of the "nation-state" of historians, and
characterising the power of the pre-colonial state within its kingdom. That is, the
1782-1809. (The University of Arizona Press, 1968), pp. 106-121; Walter F. Vella, Siam Under
Rama 111. 1824-1851. (New York, J.J. Augustin Inc. Publisher, 1957); Thanom Anamwathana,
Phumlang Khuamsamphan thai khmen lae yuan (History of Thai-Cambodian-Vietnamese
Relations), (Bangkok, Sangrungkanphim, 1980); Michael Eiland, Dragon & Elephant: Relations
Between Viet Nam and Siam. 1782-1847. (PhD thesis, George Washington University, 1989); Bun
Srun Theam, Cambodia in the Mid-19th Century: A Quest for Survival. (MA. thesis, The
Australian National University, 1981).
•^ Chandler, A History, p. 96, 115; idem., Cambodia Before the French, p. 4-5.
'^ Other historical studies on the Thai Buddhist kingship are; Lorraine M. Gesick, Kingship and
Political Integration in Traditional Siam 1767-1824. (PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1976); Craig
J. Reynolds, "Religious Historical Writing and the Legitimacy of the First Bangkok Reign," in
D.G. Marr and A. Reid, eds., Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia. (Kuala Lumpur,
Heinemann, 1979), pp. 90-107; Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Prawattisat rattanakosin nai
phraratchaphongsawadan ayudhya (History of Bangkok in the Dynastic Chronicles of Ayudhya),
(Bangkok, Thai Khadi Studies Institute, 1980). Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations:
Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries. (East
Asian Historical Monographs, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter 2.
5 Stanley Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in
Thailand Against A Historical Background. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976);
Oliver Wolters, History. Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. (Singapore,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).
concept of strictly defined boundaries was not applicable for Southeast Asian
states at the time; rather, the stmcture of a Southeast Asian political community
was a variable sphere of influence. The position of the periphery varied in
proportion to their proximity to the centre, while the power of the mler in the
centre over the peripheral regions was similar to the diminishing radius of the
candle light, which became weaker the further one was away from the centre.
However, this political framework seems insufficient to explain how one state
expanded their power over the other. The Galactic polity model interpreted the
bonds between the lesser kings and the king of kings as religio-cultural, and
dependent on the capability of each mler at a given time. It does not take into
account the economic factors which were a basis of one state's power to
encompass another. Besides, the galactic polity suggests that the submission of
one state to a more powerful state was based on consent rather than oppression.
This framework cannot explain how one state could achieve its power in
economic terms. Moreover, it has led to a neglect of the negative impact this had
upon the weak states.
The status of Cambodia as a muang song fai fa or vassal with dual overlords, the
Thai and the Vietnamese mlers, does not conform with Tambiah's notion of the
cosmic power of "king of kings". Cambodia was not overwhelmed by the aura of
the Thai king's power, but was practically responding to more than one extemal
power. In contrast to the Thai, the Vietnamese mlers' ideology was based on the
Confucian model of kingship. The Nguyen emperors were anxious to demonstrate
through the tributary system that they were the legitimate representatives of
Confucian civilisation in Southeast Asia.^
^ The proponent of the Vietnamese idea of the tributary system is Alexander Woodside, Vietnam
and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguven and Ch'ing Civil Government in the First
Half of the Nineteenth Century. (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1971), chapter 5.
In practical terms, David Chandler has stated that the Thai kings required
Cambodia's loyalty, and with it able-bodied men during war time to fight against
their traditional enemy, the Burmese, while the Vietnamese wanted Cambodia's
land.7 Michael Eiland has proposed a slightly different view that the Vietnamese
interference in Cambodia was based on considerations of Vietnam's security,
which was threatened by the Thai expansionist policy of securing Cambodia's
acknowledgment of their superiority.^
^ Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade. 1652-1853. (Cambridge, Harvard East
Asian monographs 76, 1977), chapter 7-9; Jennifer W. Cushman, Fields From the Sea: Chinese
Junk Trade with Siam During the Late Eighteenth and Eariv Nineteenth Centuries. (Ithaca,
Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1993); Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth
Century: Evolution of the Economy and Society. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1984), chapter 3; Nidhi Aeusrivongse, "Watthatham kadumphi kap wannakam ton rattanakosin"
(Bourgeoisie Culture and Literature in the Eariy Bangkok Period), in Pakkai lae bai-rua (A Quill
and A Sail), (Bangkok, Amarin kanphim, 1984), pp. 1-234; Hans-Dieter Evers, "Trade and State
Formation: Siam in the Eariy Bangkok Period," Modem Asian Studies. 21,4(1987), pp. 751 -771.
'0 See the comments in, Victor Lieberman, "Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring
Southeast Asian History, c. 1350-c. 1830," Modem Asian Studies. 27, 3 (1993), pp. 475-572,
particularly p. 478.
After the devastation of Ayudhya in 1767, Siam's politico-economic order was
completely destroyed. Its commercial and agriculmral activities were dismpted.
The central Chao Phraya basin was largely deserted because of Burmese
depopulation. But by the early nineteenth century Siam could stand up again as
the major political and economic power in the region. Its empire expanded further
than ever before. Such a remarkable change has been explained mainly as the
result of the expansion of overseas trade which constituted a major part of state
revenue for rebuilding the country's economy. But how a country whose economy
had been so completely dismpted, particularly during the Taksin and Rama 1
periods, was able to obtain goods for export has not been explained satisfactorily.
The main explanation has been the influx of Chinese labourers who became
involved in the Thai economy as junk crews, merchants, craftsmen, crops
producers and pay labours." Significantly, it is generally recognised that the
Chinese tended to be involved in the production process of agricultural exports,
but the export products of Siam during Taksin and Rama I was mainly composed
of forest products. Indeed, the best known area of supplying forest products for
Siam since the Ayudhya period was the Khorat Plateau and the trans-Mekong
basin. This implies that the Thai mlers could not afford to ignore these potentially
important economic areas. Surprisingly, the remarkable advancement of the
Siamese economy has never been considered in relation to Thai policy towards its
neighbouring states, although along with the attempt to rehabilitate the country's
economy, the Thai monarchs were extensively involved in the suppression of the
neighbouring states along the trans-Mekong basin, Laos and Cambodia. By the
Third Reign, the Thai had successfully moved to establish more effective control
over the Khorat Plateau and the trans-Mekong region. Besides, extensive warfare
' ' Sarasin, op.cit.. chapter 8; Nidhi, Pakkai lae bai-rua. pp. 107-128; Cushman, op.cit.. chapter 5.
between the periods of Taksin and Rama III against their neighbours required
enormous expenditure and took place when the country was facing economic
difficulties. This warfare has been viewed within a fi-amework of political conflict
or as an exercise of the chakravatin idea of the Thai monarchs. If there is any link
between warfare and the Siamese economy, it was interpreted only as a cause of
There had been shortages in revenue during the previous reign (Rama
III). In some years Rama III had even to defer paying, or pay in rice, the
normal salaries of government officials. Rama Ill's government incurred
heavier expenses than that of his predecessor. The king was a devout
Buddhist, and much more money was expended on donations to the
Buddhist order. It is probable that a greater amount of money was
appropriated for war and defence during the Third Reign than during the
previous reign.'2
The reverse has also been argued: that expansive warfare could be undertaken
because the Siamese economy had already achieved prosperity, which was a result
of the growing maritime trade from the Thonburi period onwards, and thus could
provide the king with heavy expenditure for the war. Hong argued with Vella that:
On the contrary, it can be discemed that by the Third Reign the economy
of the country had been nursed back to health by the overseas trade...,
and could sustain a system of tax farms on an unprecedented scale.
There was enough trade for the general economy to be increased well
above the agricultural base, and the expenditure of the sovereign,
governed by expectations befitting the mler of a flourishing kingdom,
rose too. When additional sources of revenue in the form of internal
taxes became available to him, Rama III could afford to challenge
Vietnam's claim over Cambodia by utilizing heavy expenditure, to
support a more elaborate and demanding bureaucracy, and to realize his
penchant for temple building.'^
This thesis tries to fill the gap in the arguments by presenting evidence that
Siamese policy towards its neighbouring countries along the trans-Mekong basin
Further, the interchangeable influences of the Thai and the Vietnamese over the
Cambodian court have been attributed to the capabilities of their respective mlers.
The possibility of either maintaining peace or a disaster in the kingdom of
Cambodia was also very much based on the king's personal capability, rather than
on wider social and economic circumstances. Sometimes the Cambodian monarch
could create a kind of equilibrium between the forces of the two powers. This
could mean peace or even "independence" such as Cambodia experienced under
the reign of King Duang (r. 1847-1860). But sometimes it was not possible, for
example, during the period of King Chan (r. 1806-1835).''^
According to previous studies, factionalism seems to have been part of the nature
of Cambodian political institutions. The shift of allegiance and factionalism
among the court people was a prominent characteristic of Cambodian politics. It
was another key factor determining the country's fortune, as court figures always
invited foreign intervention into their affairs. However, factionalism and domestic
revolts were not at all uncommon in pre-colonial Southeast Asian states. How and
why factionalism became a critical factor for Cambodia is not answered in terms
of the economic basis of the power of Cambodian king and his relations with his
nobility. On the other hand, by overlooking the economic factors which provided
the state's existence, previous studies have used an a priori assumption that the
Cambodian state was a natural, cohesive political, economic, and social entity. By
contrast, I argue in this thesis that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
Cambodia's existence could never be taken for granted. The autonomous existence
of Hatien and the northwestem region (Battambang and Siemreap) provided kinds
' ^ Main references for this section are A. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. 1450-
1680. 2 vols, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988, 1993); idem (ed.). Southeast Asia in the
Early Modem Era: Trade. Power, and Belief. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993); Kenneth
Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia. (Honolulu, University of
Hawaii Press, 1985.); Hall and Whitmore (eds.), op.cit.. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers
(eds.) Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise. (Singapore University Press, 1990). For
the significance of manpower for Southeast Asian statecraft, see, for example, Akin
Rabhibhadhana, The Organisation of Thai Society in the Eariv Bangkok Period. 1782-1873.
(Ithaca, Cornell University. 1969); Kenneth Hall, "An Introductory Essay on Southeast Asian
Statecraft in the Classical Period," in K. Hall and J. Whitmore (eds.), Explorations in Early
Southeast Asian History: The Origins of Southeast Asian Statecraft. (The University of Michigan,
Center For South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 1-24; A. Reid (ed.), Slavery. Bondage.
and Dependency in Southeast A.sia (Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1983).
would succeed in active participadon in maritime commerce which generated
enormous wealth for the rulers. Maritime wealth was used for beautifying the
royal centres and temples, patronising the king's entourage, strengthening political
and military power for subduing their subjects, rebellion, and neighbouring
polities, which in turn constituted a concentration of resources for a mler.
The ambition to absorb manpower, resources, and commerce not only determined
a form of relationship between the mler and the mled, but also was cmcial to
regional inter-state relations. The mler of a competing state would naturally try to
extract natural resources, and manpower, and even annex a commercial base of
the neighbouring polities. This was the case for the Siamese-Cambodia relations
during the period of study.
A primary requisite for a mler was to maintain stability and authority in his or her
domain. Alliances between a king and nobility, particularly the locally-based
elites, were cmcial. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how the traditional
political and economic system operated and developed. The ideas of kingship and
statecraft were significant for the development of traditional polities. In the
mainland Buddhist states such as Cambodia, Siam and Burma, the origins of
ideas of kingship were in Hindu-Buddhist astrological principles, which formed a
metaphor for the power relations between the mler and his subjects. The king
represented divine power by claiming to be a man of merit, a Bodhisattva (a
Buddha-to-be) as well as the Chakravatin (the Buddhist universal monarch). He
could also be perceived as a reincarnated Hindu god, ie., Siva or Vishnu. His
existence was the keystone of the polity, since he brought peace and prosperity to
his people and the world. Such a claim obliged the people to provide royal
service.'^ A monarch possessed absolute power over his subjects and the supreme
right of disposing of or rewarding his followers with titles and ranks. Nobilities
constituted state apparatuses for fulfilling such royal requirements such as tax
collection, levies of corvee labour and troop mobilisation.
But in reality, royal power depended on the ability to form alliances with
ambitious nobles, who attempted to expand their political and economic interests.
Powerfiil officials could jeopardise royal power. Mabbett has stated that "cliques,
factions, personalities, clientele and patronage were essential elements in
Angkorean politics".'^ In Cambodia, the powerful nobles often created revolt and
intrigue in support of pretenders for the throne. In Siam, the nobility could even
provide replacement mlers, as the case of King Taksin and Rama 1.
'^ Nidhi Aeusrivongse, "Devaraja Cult and Khmer Kingship at Angkor," in Hall and Whitmore
(eds.) op.cit.. pp. 125-136; Kobkua. op.cit.. pp. 30-33.
'^ Ian Mabbett, "Kingship in Angkor," JSS, 66, Part 2, (July 1978), pp. 1-58, particulady p. 9.
11
The distribution of power between a monarch and his nobles was a critical means
of strengthening loyalty and alliance, reinforced through a patron-client system.
Apart from a king, people who were actively involved in maritime trade were
members of the royal family, high-ranking officials, and foreigners who were
attached to the royal court, and who provided services as shippers, interpreters,
and trading agents, for reciprocal advantages. The privileges the nobility enjoyed
in trade and their authority over their subjects was the reward for their services for
a king. These substituted for the absence of fixed salaries. Rewarding and
enlisdng a new circle of officials after a succession was the usual means of
creating loyalty and security for a new king.^o
21 Hall, "An Introductory Essay," in Hall and Whitmore (eds.), op.cit.. pp. 11-12.
3 0009 03143396 9
12
Siemreap were subject to the Thai court, which proved more powerful than the
Khmer court throughout the period of smdy.
With respect to inter-state relations, ties between overlord and vassal were not
stable. Some vassals successfully threw off subordinate status and created their
own networks of vassals. A vassal could also withhold submission from a suzerain
who proved impotent, and shift to the rising overiord. On the other hand, some
vassals could hold multiple overlords at the same time for reasons of survival,
preventing any military threat from the powerfiil polities. Cambodia and the Lao
kingdoms in the first half of the nineteenth cenmry sent tribute to both Bangkok
and Hue. The conflict between the Thai and the Vietnamese over Cambodia
Military power was another significant factor in subjugating local elites and
distant principalities. It was an effective means for a competing mler to make his
subordinates aware that it was more worthwhile for them to provide him with
source which permitted the Southeast Asian mlers to expand their military power.
positions was to prevent the indigenous nobility exploiting these positions and
becoming so powerful that they might turn against the king. In the Ayudhyan
court, the important positions in the court of King Narai were occupied by
foreigners. The best known case was the Greek Constantine Phaulkon, who
22 Wyatt, Thailand. A Short History (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 107-109;
Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Kan muang thai samai phra narai (Politics in the Reign of Phra Narai),
13
Alliances between the central authority and the regional chiefs not only facilitated
the flow of resources and manpower, but were also crucial to a link between
overland trade and the port city. As the process of tribute and tax conveyance
always accompanied royal trade in the hinterland, the routes used by central
(Bangkok, Thai Khadi Studies Institute, 1980); pp. 25-34; Dhiravat Na Pombejra, "Crown Trade
and Court Politics in Ayutthaya During the Reign of King Narai," in Kathirithamby-Wells &
Villiers (eds.1. op.cit.. p. 129.
24 Charles Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand. (Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University, 1967), p. 7-9.
25 Boonrod Kaewkanha, Kan kep suai nai samai rattanakosin ton ton. (Suai Collection During the
Eariy Bangkok Period), (MA thesis, Chulalongkom University, 1964); Theerachai Boonmatham,
"Kan kap suai nai hua muang lao fai tawan-ok nai chuang ton samai rattanakosin" (Suai Collection
in the Eastern Lao Provinces During the Eariy Bangkok Period), in Warasan Thammasat. 12, 4
(December 1983), pp. 154-167.
14
My thesis is that after the devastation of the Ayudhyan kingdom by the Burmese
in 1767, Siam was faced with the task of rebuilding the country's economy. It
required effective control of the states along the trans-Mekong basin, which had
greater economic significance for Siam's revival than just annual ceremonial gifts
of gold and silver trees, as historians have viewed the situation previously.2"^
Indeed, it potentially furnished two interrelated factors cmcial for Siamese
overseas trade: one was the provision of local trade routes (inland and coastal)
which allowed Siam to gain access to local supplies of export products and
provided local demand for foreign products; and the other was manpower supply,
providing corvee labour for both agricultural and military activities, and suai. head
tax in kind or in money for state revenue. In other words, the eastward territorial
2^ Evers has perceived Siam in the Thonburi and Early Bangkok Periods as a trade-based state,
and recognised the importance of the integration of the hinterland into the royal power at the port
cities, in his case Ayudhya. But on the other hand he has underestimated the economic significance
of the trans-Mekong basin. See, Evers, "Trade and State Formation," pp. 754, 759.
15
One of the factors that this study wishes to explore is the significance of local
trade network, both the overland route along the trans-Mekong basin and the
coastal route along the Gulf of Siam, for Siamese overseas trade. This will lead to
my argument that the attempt to control local trade networks was a major factor in
stimulating conflict between the Thai and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. The
subjugation of Cambodia was cmcial for the economic security of Siam. But from
the Cambodian viewpoint, the competition between the two contending states
produced substantial impacts on the Cambodian polity and economy. One of the
objectives of Thai interventions during the Taksin Reign and the Third Reign of
the Chakri Dynasty (r. 1824-1851) was to control strategic towns such as Phnom
Penh and Hatien, which were commercial towns in the region and were in the
zone of the Vietnamese influence. When these towns were out of Thai control, the
Thai army devastated them.
One comment by Breazeale and Sanit is worth noting; that is, that the separation
of the events in Cambodia from other parts of the Indochinese peninsula would
limit the understanding of a war which extended across the trans-Mekong area.28
Although the research by Breazeale and Sanit emphasises only the political aspect
of the Thai involvement in the upper Mekong basin, their suggestion is useful
2^ Kennon Breazeale & Sanit Smuckam, A Culture in Search of Survival: The Phuan of Thailand
and Laos. (New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series 31, 1988), p.
18.
16
when talking about the attempts by Siam and Vietnam to take control of the
trading network along the trans-Mekong basin, since the trade routes, especially
the Mekong river, connected several parts of the region together. Besides, the
Mekong river has always been the reference to indicate the position of towns in
early nineteenth century Thai documents.29 The terms "east" (left) and "west"
(right) banks always appear in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Thai
documents. The terms also refers to the positions of towns in Cambodia, since the
Mekong mns through the heartland of Cambodia. In fact, the separate treatment of
the history of Cambodia may indicate the confinement of the nation-state idea in
modem historiography, an idea which did not exist in the region before the middle
of the nineteenth century. Changes in any part of the area in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries could possibly bring tension or changes to the
others. This thesis will show that when Siam encountered crisis either in Laos or
Cambodia, it often reacted by the imposing direct control over one or the other in
Apart from the trade network, I would like to examine the acquisition of Khmer
manpower for Siamese economic development and its effect on Cambodia and
economy. The most prominent feature of the Thai invasions of Cambodia was that
they were always accompanied by the forced migrations of local people to resettle
was the basic element in the formation of the traditional Thai state and social
organisation. Manpower control was vital for the political and economic power of
the Thai mling class, for it contributed to the state head taxes, labour for land
29 In the case of Cambodia, see, for example, TNL, CMH. R.III C.S. 1209/2: Chotmaihet ruang
thap yuan krang ratchakan thi sam (Records Concerning the Expeditions against Vietnam during
the Third Reign), (Bangkok, Cremation volume for General Phraya Singhaseni, 1933), pp. 2-3, 67.
Towns on the western bank include Battambang, Siemreap, Kampot, Pursat, Bati, Kampong Som,
Lovek, Samrong Thong and Kampong Svai; towns on the eastern bank include Phnom Penh, Ba
Phnom, Sombok, Sombor, Chlong, Srei Santhor, Prei Veng, Kampong Siem.
17
cultivation and construction projects, and military forces. The Thai mling class
had to try to increase manpower by conquest, enticement and compulsion of its
neighbour's inhabitants.^o Following the wars with their neighbours, the Thai
always deported villagers from the defeated state to resettle in their domain.
However, it appears that only the contribution of the influx of Chinese labours for
the Thai economy has been fully appreciated. Evacuees from the left bank of the
Mekong river, Laotians and Khmers, have not received full attention. Although
recent researches has explored the significance of the left bank migrants, they
have mainly concentrated on certain aspects of the Thai economy or local history
such as the collection of suai or head tax in the Northeast, and the origin of muang
(towns) in the Northeast.^' They do not link the extensive evacuation of
manpower in the neighbouring states with the specific politico-economic
requirements of Siam between the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods. Besides,
none of them approaches the issue in terms of inter-state competition and
economic perceptions of the Thai mling class towards the trans-Mekong region.
The conflicts between Siam and its surrounding states which resulted in the
appropriation of wealth into Siam have always been explained as only being
oriented towards political security rather than economic interests. Thus, this smdy
argues that Cambodia, as part of the trans-Mekong basin, played a cmcial role as a
major source of manpower supply for Siamese economic development after the
Thonburi period, and it was Thai policy to extract such a precious resources for
the revival of the war-tom economy and subsequent economic growth in the early
Bangkok period. Thai interventions and wars in Cambodia always involved
•*" Akin, op.cit: Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Kan muang thai samai phrachao krung thonburi (Thai
Politics in the Reign of King Taksin), (Bangkok, Sinlapa watthanatham special issue, 1986),
chapters 1 & 3.
^' For example, Boonrod Kaewkanha, op.cit: Theerachai Boonmatham, op.cit: idem., Prawattisat
thongthin huamuang kalasin. pho sn 2336-2450 fLocal History of Kalasin, A.D.I793-1907), (MA
thesis, Chulalongkom University, 1981).
18
manpower issues.
Furthermore, this thesis will shed light on the importance of Thai control over the
northwestem region of Cambodia - Battambang and Siemreap - from the Thonburi
period. Following the loss of the most fertile area in the Mekong Delta to the
Vietnamese in the late seventeenth century, Cambodia again lost the rest of its
fertile land in the Northwest to the Thai in the late eighteenth cenmry. Battambang
and Siemreap were completely removed from the Cambodian court's jurisdiction
and were under Thai authority unfil 1907, when they were ceded to the French
protectorate. The area is generally recognised for its fertile rice-plains. Great Lake
fisheries, and forest products. However, previous smdies - oriented as they were to
politics - seem to have overlooked such an important aspect of the area. It's wealth
has never been fully taken into account in the study of Thai-Cambodian relations.
According to David Chandler, the Thai seemed to have no long-range plan
towards Battambang and Siemreap when they were first brought under Thai
control, but Rama I was obliged to grant the two provinces to Ta-la-ha (the prime
minister) Baen for his years of faithful service for the Bangkok court. Thai
suzerainty over the Battambang region meant only that Baen had to send tributary
gifts to Bangkok from time to time. The Battambang region has been seen only as
a Thai military and political base against Vietnam throughout the Thai occupation.
So it has seemed that the Thai gained no economic interest from the Battambang
region and that the region had little economic importance for Siam.^ 2
Furthermore, to understand the role of the region in Thai-Cambodian relations, 1
think we need to know why the Khmer elites decided to work for the Thai; what
kind of benefits did they obtain by serving the Thai ? Interesting also is the
^2 Chandler, Cambodia Before the French, pp. 78-79; Suphatsri Vorasayan, Panha monthon
burapha rawane Dho.so.2435-2499 (Problem of the Eastern Provincial Unit Between AD 1882-
1906), (MA thesis, Srinakarintharavirot University, 1976), p. 60.
19
question of how different was Thai policy towards the Battambang region to Thai
policy towards the area outside their control or under the Vietnamese domination.
The history of the Battambang region will show how the regional Khmer elites
built up their autonomous polifico-economic sphere outside court power. This
would provide an efficient explanation of the root of factionalism among the
Khmer nobles.
In brief, in this thesis, I argue that control over economic and military resources
were the key objective of Thai expansion into Cambodia. Such resources were
cmcial for rebuilding Siamese economic and political power in the region after the
fall of Ayudhya. Conversely, the loss of effective access to its own resources
contributed to the overwhelming decline of the Cambodian state. I believe that
with an emphasis on economic factors we can better understand the basis on
which Cambodian history has developed since the late eighteenth century. Such a
basis was critical to the future of Cambodia for it impeded Cambodia's existence
as an autonomous entity, but forced it to be continually dependent upon its
powerful neighbours.
Chapter Two will provide the background of the economic development of post-
Angkorean Cambodia and its relations with Siam and Vietnam up until the
eighteenth century. This chapter argues that an "economic centred" rather a "state-
centred" view better explains the development of Southeast Asia, and of Thai-
Cambodian-Vietnamese relations in particular. Chapter Three will discuss the
political and economic conditions affecting Siam after the devastation of the
Ayudhyan kingdom. It provides a basis for understanding why the consolidation
and contest for power over the trans-Mekong basin was indispensable in the
stmggle for the revival of Siam between the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods.
20
Chapter Four demonstrates the significance of the overland trade along the
Mekong River and coastal trade along the Gulf of Siam in the Thai-Vietnamese
conflict over Cambodia. In Chapter Five, I will concentrate on the Thai
acquisition of Khmer population and how it contributed to the development of
Thai economy in the nineteenth century. In Chapter Six, I will examine the
politico-economic significance of Thai control over Battambang and Siemreap
and the role of the area and its elites in Thai-Cambodian relations. Chapter Seven
will conclude by looking at the consequences of Thai control over the Cambodian
polity and economy: how the loss of its economic strength determined its political
configuration.
Sources
^3 John Crawfurd, Joumal of An Embassy to the Court of Siam and Cochin China. (Kuala
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1967).
21
Cambodia as having no government at all.^'* Besides, since the French were much
preoccupied with the attempt to colonise Cambodia, they tended to be very
concerned and perhaps exaggerated the economic interest the Thai obtained from
Cambodia. The Khmer sources like Battambang in the Period of the Vassal,
written by Tauch Chhuong in 1974 also appear to be very nationalistic and lack
accuracy particulariy in dealing with the first half of the nineteenth century. The
retrospective impositions made Tauch Chhuong misinterpret the objective of Thai
mle in the Battambang region. In order to discredit the Thai occupation of
Cambodian land, the history of the Battambang region in his eyes was absolutely
destitute, even though the region was proved to be highly commercial orientation
in the late nineteenth century. However, its usefulness comes in Tauch's
interviews with approximately twenty people who had experienced in Battambang
before the area was ceded to the French Protectorate. For the Thai documents,
particularly those concerning military expeditions in Cambodia, possibly
overclaimed their success in the war against the Vietnamese and their influence
over the Cambodian nobles.
Those Thai archival sources from the National Library comprise invaluable
•^^ The notion was quoted from French archival document by Chandler, A History, p. 104.
•^^ Unfortunately, the Aeroflot airline lost my luggage which contained all documents from
Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres and some from the Public Records Office during
my flight from London to Bangkok.
22
The French documents from the first half of the nineteenth century are not very
fmitfiil when compared with those from the second half of the nineteenth cenmry,
when French penetration in Indochina began. However, they are still useful in
giving a picture of what conditions were like in Cambodia after the period of
extensive Thai-Vietnamese warfare and intervention. The most interesting
materials arose because the colonial officials were usually much concerned about
•'° Those are Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so.l 173 [Records in the Second Reign, Lesser Era
1173 (AD 1811)], (Bangkok, Published on the occasion of the 203th birthday of Rama II, 1971);
Khamhaikan ruang thap yuan nai ratchakan thi sam. (Testimony Concerning the Expedition
against Vietnam during the Third Reign), (Bangkok, Sayambannakit, 1933); Chotmaihet ratchakan
thi sam (Records in the Third Reign), 5 volumes, (Bangkok, Published on the occasion of the
200th birthday of Rama III, 1987); Chotmaihet ruang thap yuan khrang ratchakan thi sam (Records
Concerning Expeditions against Vietnam during the Third Reign), (Bangkok, Cremation volume
for General Phraya Singhaseni, 1933); Thai sathapana kasat khmen (Thailand Established the
Cambodian Kings), (Bangkok, Office of the Prime Minister, 1962); "Chotmaihet raiwan thap
samai krung thonburi" (Records Concerning the Expeditions in the Thonburi Period), in Prachum
Phongsawadan. (Collected Chronicles) Part 66 [hereafter PP 66]. (Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1985);
"Wa dual hetkan muang khmen ton set songkhram thai kap yuan" (Records Concerning Cambodia
After the End of Thai-Vietnamese War), in PP 56. (Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1932); "Chotmaihet
kieokap khmen lae yuan nai ratchakan thi sam" (Record Concerning Cambodia and Vietnam
During the Third Reign), Part One in PP 67. (Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1969), Part two in PP 68.
(Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1969);
Npte PP67 is in separate volumes of 41 and 42. Therefore, hereafter I will cite as PP,
67/41 and PP 67/42.
23
The Thai and Khmer dynastic chronicles, most of which are filled with references
to Cambodian affairs, have also been consulted for this thesis. Of the sources, the
dynastic chronicle of the Thonburi Dynasty (the Phan Chanthanumat version),
which was compiled by the high-ranking official Chaophraya Phiphitphichai by
order of King Rama I, appears to be quite accurate.^^ Its information about the
Thonburi troop attacks on Hatien and Cambodia can be checked against the
published archival records of the same period, Chotmaihet raiwan thap samai
krung thonburi in PP 66. This suggests that the part which deals with Cambodia
was based on the archival records. The First and the Third Reign chronicles were
compiled by Chaophrava Thiphakorawongse (Kham Bunnag), a high-ranking
^^ K.S.L. Kulap, Annam sayamyuth waduai kansongkhram rawang thai lao khmen lae yuan
(Annam-Siam War: War Between the Thai, Laotian, Khmer and Vietnamese), 2 volumes,
(Bangkok, Phrae Phitthaya, 1971).
^^ See a review of Annam sayamyuth by David Chandler in JSS. 61(1) (January 1973), pp. 345-
347.
official at the court of King Chulalongkom (r. 1868-1910), and the Second Reign
chronicle was compiled by Prince Damrongrachanuphap, King Mongkut's son, in
1914.^^0 jyiost of the accounts are, nevertheless, concerned with court politics,
with little economic information. So, their useftilness lies in what they say about
political aspects of Thai interference in Cambodian affairs. The Thai dynastic
chronicles elaborate the royal Thai perspective towards their vassals. Cambodia
was alway clauned by the Thai mlers, who saw themselves as having a legitimate
right to control and manipulate internal Cambodian affairs. On the other hand, as a
vassal state, Cambodia had to pursue an obligation to fulfil the Thai kings'
commands and requirements such as supplying manpower and resources when
demanded. Failing to do so, the Cambodian kings and okya would be condemned
as treasonous by the Thai mlers.
As far as the accuracy of the chronicles between the First and the Third Reigns
goes, the extant archival records reveal that these parts of the chronicles were
generally based on archival records. Both Thiphakorawongse and Prince Damrong
had greater access to court materials than any other writers during their period.
However, there are a few problematic points, which I have discussed specifically
in the body of the thesis, making comparisons with archival records where these
overlapped.'*' Such cross-examination also has been made with the Khmer
'*' The criticism of the period between the fourteenth and late sixteenth century in the Ayudhyan
and Cambodian chronicles is in Michael Vickery's two articles: "The 2/K.125 Fragment, A Lost
Chronicle of Ayutthaya," JSS. 65 (1) (1977), pp. 1-80; "The Composition and Transmission of the
Ayudhya and Cambodian Chronicles," in A. Reid and D. Marr (eds.). Perceptions of the Past, pp.
130-155. Also, Nidhi, Phrawattisat rattanakosin nai phraratchaphongsawadan avudhva (History of
Bangkok in the Dynastic Chronicles of Ayudhya), (Bangkok, Thai Khadi Studies Institute, 1980).
25
chronicles.
In addition to the Thai dynastic chronicles, the surviving two versions of Khmer
chronicles which were translated into Thai will be used for this smdy. The first is
the so-called "Nong Chronicle" composed about 1820 by Okya Vongsa Sarapet
(Nong), a Khmer official at the court of King Chan.42 This version covers the
period between 1414 and 1819. It was presented to the court of King Mongkut in
1855 and first published in Thai in 1868. This version also served as the basis for
the French translation. The second version is a copy of the "Nong Chronicle" and
known as the "Nupparot Chronicle", composed under the supervision of a Khmer
prince, Nupparot, in the 1870s. It covers the period between 1414 and 1866.
Coedes presented it to the Thai National Library in 1916. These two versions are
slightly different from each other, and do not reveal much of the Cambodian
perspecfive towards the Thai and the Vietnamese. Most of the texts contain
information about internal rivalries and turmoil in Cambodia. Nevertheless, when
this information is placed against that concerning the general administrative
organisation of Cambodia, it gives a good idea of who were the powerful okya in
Cambodia, and the root of their conflicts. This issue has been discussed below in
the section on the Cambodian administrative system.
'^^ The Thai translation is "Phongsawadan khamen" (The Cambodian Chronicle - hereafter "Nong
Chronicle") in EEJ., (Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1963).
There are some other interesting aspects that 1 wish to examine such as the
perception of the Khmer villagers towards the Khmer nobility, and those in the
Battambang region towards the Thai authority. Unfortunately, the existing sources
do not completely covered these aspect of Cambodian history. In addition,
although the Vietnamese equally played an important role in Cambodian history
during the period of my study, this thesis mainly concentrates on the Thai side
because of the linguistic and practical limitations to the sources 1 could employ.
Vietnamese interference in the Cambodian economy is a potential area of future
research.'^^ While this thesis focuses on the role of the Battambang region in Thai-
Cambodian relations, I believe that the area close to the Vietnamese domination is
as interesting as the Battambang region, particularly for an understanding of
regional diversity in Cambodia.
^^ For examples, Henri Mouhot, Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China (Siam). Cambodia, and
Laos. (London, John Murray, 1864); Jean Claude Lejoane, Le journal de voyage de G. van
Wuvsthoff et de ses Assistants au Laos (1641-1642). (Metz, Editions du Centre de Documentation
du Cercle de Culture de Recherches Laotiennes, 1987); Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of
the East Indies. (London, The Argonau Press, 1930); John White, A Voyage to Cochin China.
(Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1972); Francis Gamier, D'Exploration en Indo-chine
effectue pendant le annees 1866. 1867 et 1868. (Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1987).
^^ Dr. Li Tana at the University of Wollongong is carrying out interesting research on how the
occupation of formerly Cambodian land in the Mekong Delta was crucial for southern Vietnam's
economic development.
27
CHAPTER II
POST-ANGKOREAN CAMBODIA
PRIOR TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
become a central entrepot in the region between the seventh and eleventh centuries.
From the twelfth century, changes occurred in the Chinese maritime trade policy
under the Sung dynasty (1127-1279), the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) and
the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), and thus produced dramatic effects in the Southeast
Asian economy and state formation. The new policy permitted Chinese private
fleets to come to trade directly with various centres of production in Southeast Asia,
which effectively responded to such opportunities by expanding their production of
pepper, sappanwood, spices and tin. The imports from China consisted of
porcelain, silken materials and yams, musk, gold, silver, iron, beads and vast
quantities of small copper coins. As the Chinese junks visited various ports, they
by-passed Srivijaya's trading lines. The change brought a decline of Srivijaya as a
central entrepot in the archipelago. Instead, many port kingdoms in the region such
as Melaka, Majapahit, North Sumatra, Tenasserim, Ayudhya, Pegu, and a new
Cambodian centre around the present-day Phnom Penh region, emerged. Southeast
Asia at the end of the fourteenth century was no longer dominated by a single
entrepot, but was characterised by the existence of various ports throughout the
region.'
' Oliver W. Wolters. The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History. (London, Lund Humphries, 1970),
pp. 3-4, 38-48; Reid, The Age of Commerce. Vol. 2, pp. 1-12; Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and
European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and about 1630. (The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 23-26.
29
late fourteenth century, the maritime route between the East and the European
markets that passed through Southeast Asia began to flourish.^
There was, however, an abmpt intermption of this trade increase during the reign
of T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-98) when China became isolated and hostile to the outside
worid. T'ai-tsu decided to intermpt the tributary trade that he himself had restored.
Foreign vessels visiting China were rejected. But there remained trade conducted
by Chinese private traders, whom the Chinese court could hardly eluninate from the
sea. A new stimulus for the Southeast Asian trade was introduced by Emperor
Yung-lo (r. 1402-24) because China was confronted with a deficiency of revenue.
Yung-lo decided to undertake the tributary trade again.^
^ Reid, op.cit.. pp. 13-14; Kenneth Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Eariy
Southeast Asia. n98SV pp. 222-23.
Between the late sixteenth and eariy seventeenth centuries, active European
participation offered a boost to Southeast Asian trade. The Dutch, English,
Portuguese, and Indian traders were highly competitive, trying to manipulate
Southeast Asian production. Pepper was carried to the European markets in
abundance. In return, European and Indian traders brought Indian textiles to
Southeast Asian. The extensive involvement of China, Japan, India, and Europe in
Southeast Asian seas made the period 1570-1630 the peak of what Reid calls the
Southeast Asian "age of commerce".^
^ See for examples, Chamvit Kasetsiri, The Rise of Avudhva. A History of Siam in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976); David Wyatt,
Thailand. A Short History. (1984), pp. 63-73; Manich Jumsai, History of Thailand and Cambodia.
(Bangkok, Chalermnit, 1970).
31
trade-based state, just as other Southeast Asian states benefited from the changing
economic conditions.^
Lovek and Udong were more suitable than the old capital at Angkor so that the
Cambodian elites were able to assert control over the Chaturamuk region and
location at the junction of the four river branches, Phnom Penh was an emporium
of goods coming from surrounding Cambodian towns and Laos. The river route
Cambodia and the uplanders, who were situated around the present day borders of
Laos in the seventeenth century, recorded that the Chinese in Sombok and Sombor
brought salt, Chinese earthenware, and iron ware into this remote interior; in
return, they purchased gold, deerskin, wax, rhinoceros homs, ivory, gamboge,
remote area. Trade in the area appeared to give rise to the active commerce of
Sombok, as Wuysthoff found that the Chinese constituted a high proportion of its
population. The area was so important that in the seventeenth century the
^ Michael Vickery, Cambodia After Angkor. The Chronicular Evidence For the Fourteenth to
Sixteenth Centuries. (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1977), pp. 509-20.
^ The uplanders in this area belong to either the Austronesian (Malayopolynesian) or Mon Khmer
speaking groups. The Austronesian groups include Hroy, Rhade, Jarai, Chru, Rai (Seyu, and
Roglai). The Mon Khmer speaking groups comprise of Bahnar, Rengao, Sedang, Halang, Jeh,
Monom, Kayong, Hre, Cua, Takua, Todrah, Cua, Kotua, Stieng, Mnong, Koho, Chrau, Katu,
Kantu, Phuang, Bru, and Pacoh. See Gerald Hickey, Son of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the
Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. (New York, Yale University Pr., 1982), pp. 5-6.
The uplanders were traditionally called by pejorative names, "Moi" by the Vietnamese,
"Pnong" or "Phnong" by the Khmer, meaning savage; and "Kha" by the Thai and the Lao,
meaning "slave". Frank M. Lebar et al., Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia. (New Haven,
Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964), p. 94.
^ Jean Claude Lejosne, Le Joumal de Voyage de G. Van Wuvsthoff et de ses Assistants au Laos
(1641 -1642). (Metz, Editions du Centre de Documentation du Cercle de Culture et de Recherches
Laotiennes, 1987), pp. 101-3, 117.
32
Cambodian kings had to send triennial tribute to the leaders of the upland Jarai,
who were known as the King of Fire and the King of Water, with the wish that
they would continue to protect this trading traffic and forests from the invasion of
the enemies. The governor of Sombok bore the responsibility for conveying this
tribute to the Jarai leaders. The lands of the Jarai kings were chiefly located to the
Cambodia also gained advantages from the increasing Japanese trade in the region.
Li Tana's study of the economic history of the Nguyen Vietnam shows that
between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the amount of Cambodian trade
with Japan was impressively high.'^ It is interesting to see that between 1604 and
1635 the number of Japanese junks visiting Cambodia ranked it fourth out of nine
' ' Wolters, "The Khmer King at Basan 1371-3 and the Restoration of the Cambodian Chronology
During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries", Asia Major. 12, 1 (1966), pp. 44-89.
' ^ Li Tana, "The Inner Region" : A Social and Economic History of Nguyen Vietnam in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. (PhD thesis, the Australian National University, 1992), pp.
62-70.
33
trading centres (see table 2.1). In return, between 1647 and 1720, Cambodia
despatched 109 junks to Japan. The number ranked third after Cochin China and
Siam (see table 2.2). The products the Japanese sought from Cambodia were
deerskins, lacquer, ivory, wax honey, black sugar, buffalo homs, rhinoceros
homs, betel, chaulmoogra seeds, pepper, sharkskins, peacocks' tails and cotton.''^
'5 Emma H. Blair & James A. Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands. 1493-1898. (Ohio,
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903-1909), Vol. 43, p. 180.
'6 Ibid. Vol. 20, p. 50, 99; Vol. 38, pp. 43-44; Vol. 29, pp. 49, 306; Vol. 43, p. 280.
'"^ Ibid.. Vol. 29, p. 49.; Li, op.cit.. p. 82.; George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in the Seventeenth-
Century Thailand. (Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), p.
61.
34
In addition to commercial relations with the Asian states, Cambodia retained active
trade with the West. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish played a cmcial role in
the Cambodian court and trade. The rich and populated areas along the trans-
Antonio that Spain should colonise Cambodia for religious and commercial
reasons.'8 The study of the Dutch in Ayudhya in the seventeenth century by Smith
reveals that when the VOC (the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) could not
gain enough goods from Ayudhya, Cambodia was their alternative supplier of
benzoin, rice, deer hides, rayskins, gold, and gumlac, some of which came from
Laos. For this reason, the VOC decided to open factories in Cambodia in 1620 and
1636.'^ The English began to engage in trade with Cambodia around 1613. By
1651, a factory of the English East India Company was buih up in Cambodia with
the main purpose of selling Indian cloth and purchasing benzoin, wax, silk and the
other Far Eastern wares. Cambodia was a major place for securing enormous
amounts of benzoin, stic lac and ivory coming from Laos annually. The English,
however, had gained little commercial success, since they failed to cope with the
royal trading monopoly system in Cambodia and high competition with the
Chinese.20
The growth of economic activities in Cambodia during this period can be traced to
own political stmcture had existed in Cambodia from that time. In the seventeenth
20 D.K. Bassett, "The Trade of the English East India Company in Cambodia, 1651-1656,"
IRAS, (1962), pp. 35-61.
36
century there were about 2,000 Chinese in Phnom Penh alone. Most of
Cambodia's trade was conducted by the Chinese. The Spanish were apparently
fmstrated by this competition with the Chinese in Cambodia.^' Late in the 16th
century the Portuguese appear to have settled in Cambodia, and the number
Cambodia, the most advanced of these being at Phnom Penh.22 There were also
separate quarters for Japanese, Arabs, Spanish, and traders from the Indonesian
resident in Lovek and Phnom Penh. These traders worked through officials close to
The growth of foreign trade seems to have changed remarkably the kingdom's
socio-economic organisation. During the Angkorean period this had been primarily
based on agriculmre supported by well-developed irrigation systems, and control of
population. From the fourteenth century Cambodia became more dependent upon
trade. A sign of change was the lack of inscriptions and monuments erected since
the late thirteenth century. The organisation of manpower is likely to have been
loose. Settlements and the administration centre shifted southward to an area more
appropriate to foreign trade. The royal capital at Angkor was abandoned and from
the fifteenth century the new Khmer elites showed no intention of moving
backward.2'^
22 Hugh Clifford, Further India : Being the Story of Exploration from the Earliest Times in
Burma. Malaya. Siam. and Indo-China. (London, Alston River, 1905), pp. 97-99.
Cambodia-Ayudhya Rivalry
The fourteenth century saw the rise of Ayudhya, with Cambodia playing an active
role in Southeast Asian maritime trade. Ayudhya was one of the Southeast Asian
states which was enriched by commercial expansion in the region. Trade was a
basis of power which enabled Ayudhya to take over Sukhothai and consolidate
power over the Chao Phraya basin.25 The flurry of intemational maritime trade in
Southeast Asia, however, produced critical effects on the inter-state relations in the
region. Although Ayudhya stood as the important entrepot for trade between
Chinese, Japanese, Southeast Asian, and European trades, there were usually
alternative entrepots in the area for traders such as Melaka, Hoi An, Cambodia,
Patani, Champa, Aceh, Tenasserim, Pahang, and Banten. These trade-based states
were naturally more or less in competition with each other in attracting shippers to
visit their ports.26 Ayudhya thus seems to have harboured the ambition of
particular, which secured control over Ayudhya from 1408, was apparently
ambitious to acquire control over a vast territory containing several trading centres,
and claimed suzerainty over several vassals, both in the South China Sea and the
western side of the Malay Peninsula. Such attempts were designed to impede the
26 Li Tana, op.cit.. p. 63 suggests that the flourishing trade of Hoi An in the first decade of the
seventeenth century possibly brought a decline to the trade of Champa. Also, the rise of Cochin
China in the seventeenth century was at the expense of commerce of Cambodia, Siam, and Luzon.
trade activities of other ports with China, and to control a supply of local products
for Ayudhya's trade.
Melaka, which was a prosperous entrepot in the Malay peninsular in the fifteenth
century, was one of the major objectives of Ayudhya. The Siamese appear to have
eyed Melaka as its trade competitor.28 In 1407, 1419, and 1431, the Melaka mlers
Chinese protection. On the last occasion the Melaka mler protested that the Thai had
prevented Melaka's envoys from going to China.29 Then in 1455, Ayudhya finally
launched an attack on Melaka.^^ Despite the absence of direct control over distant
principalities, the Portuguese sources tell us that Ayudhya claimed suzerainty over
Petchaburi, and Bang Plasoi.^' Nidhi and Akhom reveal that the domination over
several ports along the Malay Peninsula and the Gulf of Siam was very significant
for the emergence of Ayudhya in the intemational trading world. A vast trading
network would certainly make Ayudhya an important centre of the region, where
from various places. The greater variety of goods would certainly attract more
foreign merchants to trade with them. Trade with Ayudhya yielded high profits for
the foreign merchants. It is estimated that profit would range between 50 and 200
percent. This meant Ayudhya became a favoured place for the distribution of
2^ In a recent of article Professor Yoneo Ishii also suggests that Melaka could be seen as an
emerging commercial rival of Ayudhya. See "Some Aspects of Ayuthayan Port-Polity as Seen
from a Ryukyuan Source," South East Asia Research. 2, 1 (March 1994), pp. 53-63.
^' Tome Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires. (Klaus Reprint, Liechtenstein, 1967), pp. 105-
110.
39
Chinese and Southeast Asian products into the world market and re-export of
western merchandise to the Chinese and Southeast Asian markets. The bigger
network meant a larger demand and supply for the products that Ayudhya had
secured. For example, Tenasserim carried on its trade mainly with western Asia,
and also had business connections with Bengal and with the Sumatran ports of
Pasai and Pidir. Although few merchants from the Indian Ocean came to trade with
Ayudhya, and Ayudhya did not trade with Pasai and Pidir, it could acquire their
products from Tenasserim.32 Kedah produced pepper and rice in large quantities.
This pepper was brought by way of Siam to China, with that which they brought
from Pasai and Pedir also. When any ship came to Tenasserim and to the ports of
Siam, it came to Kedah to sell its merchandise also.^^
It is interesting to see that of the products which Ayudhya supplied to Melaka and
China, some were not products of Ayudhya, but gained from its hinterland and
other local ports. Burma's benzoin and lac and Chiangmai's musk were sent down
river to Siam.^'* George Smith indicates that it was the Lao traders who brought
benzoin, gold and gumlac for Ayudhya's exports. In return, they purchased Indian
cloth, red yam and opium. Cambodia was an alternative destination for the Lao
traders when they were troubled by the Thai. The absence of Lao products seemed
to have concerned the Ayudhyan court when King Prasat Thong sent a number of
embassies to Lan Chang to restore trade relations.^^ The continued migration of the
Lao people into the Khorat Plateau in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
resulted in the area becoming more important for the Siamese economy.
^^ Ibid., p. 111.
Meanwhile, Ayudhya began to exert its domination over the Khorat plateau.
Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) was established during the reign of King Narai
(r. 1656-68) with the purpose of making it a centre for the Siamese control of the
are likely to have been influenced by the objective of seeking hegemony over
several polities in the region. Vickery interprets the wars between Ayudhya and
growth of maritime trade turned the new Cambodian centre in the Chamramuk
region into an economic rival of Ayudhya. The attempt to control or suppress the
new Cambodian trading centre occurred after Ayudhya failed to suppress Melaka,
which obtained strong Chinese protection, and thus lost its stams as the dominant
power over the Malay Peninsula to Melaka. By the fifteenth cenmry, Ayudhya
turned its attention more towards the northern and eastern areas, which led to
launched an attack on Cambodia, and placed his son Phra Nakhon In or Indharacha
on the throne at Angkor. About twelve years later the Siamese oriented-
resistance under the leadership of Phraya Yat. Yat is believed to have been a son of
a deposed king of Ayudhya, who was sent to reside in the Phnom Penh region by
his usurper. Though Yat aimed at driving out Ayudhya's intmsion, he did not seek
to administer the Angkor region. Instead, the Phnom Penh region appears to have
•'^ Paitoon Meekusol, Social and Cultural History of northeastern Thailand From 1868-1910: A
Case Study of the Huamuang Khamen Padong (Surin. Sangkha and Khukhan) (PhD thesis.
University of Washington, 1984), p. 38.
been a more favourable place which Yat wanted to build up as bis own politico-
economic base. 3^
38 Vickery, "The 2/k.l25 Fragment, A Lost Chronicle of Ayutthaya," JSS, 65 (1), (1977), pp.
55-56, 79-80.
4' Blair and Robertson, op.cit.. Vol. 9, pp. 76-78, 161-180, 197-203; Vol. 10, p. 226.
42
Despite the fact that the Thai continually attempted to suppress Cambodia, the latter
remained strong enough in the face of its rival until the early eighteenth cenmry.
Cambodia's strength is revealed in its intermittent attacks on Siam; the successful
fight against the Siamese invasions in 1587 and later in the seventeenth century; and
its rapid recovery after the war of 1593-94.'*2 Although Ayudhya's superiority over
Cambodia became apparent since the late sixteenth century, the latter at least could
retain its independence in dealing with the intemational trade. Siamese suzerainty
over Cambodia before the late eighteenth century was not constantly established,
particulariy after the arrival of the Vietnamese in the Mekong Delta.
Until the 1620s, the Cambodian royal family had been able to balance the Thai
influence with the Vietnamese. However, the increasing foreign interference,
particularly since the Vietnamese had begun their advance to the south (NamiTien),
Cambodia's political and economic power began to steadily decline. The result of
the arrival of the Nguyen lords in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia in the 1620s was
that Cambodia gradually lost its land in the Mekong Delta and the Cambodian court
came under two overlords who competed at the expense of Cambodia.
Vietnamese influence at the Khmer court began in 1620 with the marriage of a
Vietnamese princess to the Cambodian king, Chey Chetta II. A few years later, the
Cambodian king granted permission to Vietnamese settlers and traders to move into
the area near present-day Saigon. In 1626, the Nguyen overlords broke completely
fi-om the northern Le dynasty in Hanoi, and began to govern the southern provinces
in their own right. The Nguyen government saw the Mekong Delta area as an
'*2 Vickery, Cambodia After Angkor, pp. 510-11, foomote 53. Also, see "Nong Chronicle," in PP
L p p . 197-209.
43
By 1780 the Nguyen lords had expanded their control over most of the territory
within the present boundaries. This expansion was assisted by a group of Chinese
settlers in Hafien (also known as Cancao; Ponthaimas or Phutthaimas in Thai; and
Peam in Khmer). Hatien's creation dates from around 1700, with the settlement of
a group of Cantonese migrants from southern China, under Mac Cuu's leadership.
Mac Cuu arrived in Cambodia in 1671, and was later appointed as an okya at the
court of King Chai Chetta IV .'^^ Later, he persuaded the king to authorise him with
administrative power and to appoint him govemor of the unsettled region of Hatien.
"^-^ Michael G. Cotter, "Towards A Social History of the Vietnamese Southward Movement,"
JSEAH. IX, I, (March 1968), pp. 15, 18.
^^ William Willmott, "History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia Prior to the French
Protectorate," JSEAH. 7, 1, (January 1966), p.25.
^^ Cotter, op.cit.
^^ Chen, Chingho A., "Mac Thien Tu and Phraya Taksin, A Survey on their Political Stand,
Conflicts, and Background," Proceedings of the Seventh lAHA Conference. (Bangkok, 22-26
August 1977), p. 1537.
44
Mac Cuu and his Cantonese followers moved to build a Chinese-style town named
and gambling in Hatien. Also, its fertile land allowed rice-growing to become
another essential factor in the development of this new settlement. Traders and
Chinese migrants were encouraged to come and settle in Hatien and its seven
surrounding towns. Mac Cuu died in 1735, and was succeeded by his son, Mac
The creation of Hatien was possibly influenced by the fact that Cambodia had lost
the more convenient river outlet down the Mekong to the Vietnamese. Hatien was
thus aimed at being an altemative outlet to the sea for Cambodia. Although Hatien's
commerce was not as vigorous as those of the major ports in Southeast Asia such
as Ayudhya, Melaka, Batavia, Manila and Aceh, western traders and advenmrers
began to recognise Hatien from the time of its early settlement.'*^ Westem travellers
gave the impression that during the eighteenth century, Hatien was a bustling port
on the Siamese Gulf, as Alexander Hamilton, visiting Hatien in 1720, described it:
The next Place in Ponteamass, a Place of pretty good Trade for many
years, having the Conveniency of a pretty deep but narrow River,
which, in the rainy Seasons of the Southwest Monsoons, has
Communication with Bausack, or Cambodia River, which Conveniency
made it draw foreign Commerce from the City of Cambodia hither; for
the City lying near 100 Leagues up the River, and most Part of the Way
a continual Stream miming downward, made the Navigation to the City
so long and troublesome, that few cared to trade to it, for which
Reasons, foreign Commerce chose to come to Ponteamass, and
^^ Emile Gaspardone, "Un Chinois des Mers du Sud, le Fondateur de Ha-Tien," Joumal Asiatique.
240, 3 (1952), pp. 368-85; Vu The Dinh, "Monographie de la Province de Hatien," Revue
Indochinoise. 175 (24 fevrier 1902), p. 17; Nicholas Sellers, The Prince of Ha-Tien (1682-1867).
Etudes Orientales No. 11, (Belgique, Editions Thanh-Long, 1983), pp. 15-17.
^* Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies. Vol. 2, (reprint London, Argonaut
Press, 1930), p. 105; Pierre Poivre, Oeuvres complettes. (Paris, Chez Fuchs, 1797), pp. 137-38.
45
flourished pretty well till the Year 1717, that the Siam Fleet destroyed
it.49
Hatien also traded with the Philippines islands and Batavia. ^^ Its active commerce
was no doubt owed to its geographical position, being simated at the mouth of the
Vinh Te or Giang-Thanh river, the upper reaches of which mn close to the Bassac
River, the southern arm of the Mekong. It permitted traders to come up the river
and to make the short transit overland to the Bassac.^' But the two rivers were
connected during the rainy season, as Hamilton described above. Such a location
gave Hatien the privilege of being able to obtain products from Phnom Penh, which
was an emporium of products from all over Cambodia and the southern Lao
towns.52 Compared to other Cambodian ports, the trades of Kampong Som and
Kampot were not as active as that of Hatien, due to their difficulties in
communication with Phnom Penh. There was no waterway linking them with
Phnom Penh. People had to travel by cart which was longer and more laborious,
and was possible only in the dry season.^^ However, Kampong Som and Kampot
were essential to the traffic which made Hatienflourish,since they possibly played
a role in the demand and supply of goods for Hatien.
From 1708, Hatien became a tributary state of southern Vietnam, although Mac
Cuu continued to pay tribute to the Cambodian court. The Mac family appeared,
52 For records mention inland trade between Laos and Cambodia, see for example, Caspar da Cruz,
"The Treatise of Fr. Caspar da Cruz," in Boxer (ed.), South China in the Sixteenth Century.
(London, The Hakluyt Society, 1953), pp. 76-8; Lejosne, op.cit.. pp. 101-3, 117.
The rise of Hatien certainly could not escape Siamese attention. Hatien stood as the
objective of the Siamese-Vietnamese rivalry in the eighteenth cenmry. Ayudhya
explicitly manifested its concem over this coastal region, and attempted to control
Hatien from the time of its early expansion. To place Hatien under its dominion
would certainly facilitate Ayudhya a concentration of Cambodian and Laotian
goods, which were valuable in the Chinese market. Moreover, the location of
Hatien was essential for the exertion of Thai domination over the Cambodian court.
It was the most convenient route for troops to penetrate from the Gulf of Siam into
the Cambodian capital at Udong. Increasing Vietnamese encroachment in
Cambodian affairs and their control of the Mekong Delta, therefore, invited Thai
anxiety.
Around 1717, King Thaisa sent an army overiand to attack Cambodia, in support
of his own candidate for the Cambodian throne.56 At the same time, Siamese
troops penetrated Hatien. But the expeditions failed, since both Udong and Hatien
received military assistance from the Nguyen lord. However, the city of Hatien was
utteriy destroyed by the war. Alexander Hamilton, the British merchant travelling in
Indochina in 1720, relates to us that Hatien was fiill of mins. The war also affected
commerce and production in the area, as both Phnom Penh and Hatien were unable
to supply products for foreign merchants coming to trade with them. 57
It seems likely that sometime after the Siamese incursion, the Mac family
established tributary relations with the Ayudhyan court in order to avoid any further
attack. It appears that Mac Thien-tu also held a Thai title and rank as Phrava
Rachasetthi, which indicates that he also retained tributary status with the Ayudhyan
court.58 Apart from his title and rank, the available records do not describe any
other contact between Hatien and Ayudhya. Around 1767 it was mmoured that
5^ The date of the Siamese invasion is problematic. The Vietnamese source Liet-truyen indicates
that there were two Siamese invasions of Hatien, but does not give a date for the first one. Sellers,
op.cit.. pp. 19, 167, footnote 18, proposes sometime prior to 1708-11 for the first invasion;
Gaspardone, op.cit.. p. 385 suggests 1688, which seems to be too early. The Cambodian
chronicles record only one invasion during the early eighteenth century, but with a different date;
"Nong Chronicle", p. 222 and Hamilton, op.cit.. p. 105 propose 1717. The Ayudhyan chronicles
also indicates only one attack during the reign of King Thai Sa. But the Phanchanthanumat version
indicates 1711, while the Chakkraphadhiphong version indicates 1719. See
Phraratchaphongsawadan krung sri avudhava chabap phanchanthanumat kap phra
chakkraphadhiphong (The Ayudhyan Dynastic Chronicle, the Phanchanthanumat Version and the
Chakkraphadhiphong Version), (Bangkok, Khlang Witthaya, 1964), pp. 446, 942. Vietnamese
sources indicates 1715. See Gaspardone, op.cit.. p. 384-85.
It seems likely that there was only one invasion, and I incline to the view that it took
place in 1717 as recorded by Hamilton. Since he arrived Hatien in 1720, he certainly obtained the
most reliable information from Hatien's inhabitants who just had experienced the invasion.
Ayudhya was preparing to attack Hatien, but Ayudhya was itself preoccupied by
the war with Burma. Finally, Ayudhya was destroyed by the Burmese in 1767.59
Hatien soon recovered from the 1717 Siamese attack. Mac Cuu began to strengthen
its commercial, military, and administrative organisation. Being free from external
invasion, the Mac family had the chance to invigorate Hatien's trade without
intermption. An attempt to enrich the flow of products from the interior was
undertaken. Roads were built in order to link Hatien with nearby towns. Hatien
successfully shifted its status from a new settlement to a new political entity.^o
The tie between Hatien and the Nguyen lords continued to strengthen. The Siamese
attack on Hatien appeared to push the Mac family in to closer relations with
Vietnam, as it compelled Mac Cuu and his family to seek asylum in Cochin China.
In 1724, Mac Cuu himself travelled to Hue to pay homage to the Nguyen lord.^'
He certainly considered that only the Nguyen lords could provide protection against
Siamese attack, as in 1749 the Nguyen lords gave him a hundred soldiers to station
in Hatien.62
Hatien's relations with the Nguyen lords were, however, a cmcial moment in the
gradual absorption of Cambodian territory in the Mekong Delta into the Vietnamese
domain. The Mac family assisted the Nguyen lords in the acquisition of Cambodian
territory throughout the eighteenth century. In 1754-55, Vietnamese interference in
Cambodian court conflicts compelled King Chai Chetta V to take asylum in Hatien.
the Nguyen lord Vo Vuong (r. 1738-65). Thien-tu again played the same role in
1757, when another Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia took place. This time King
Phra Uthairacha or Nak Ang Ton offered the provinces of Bassac and Tra-vinh in
exchange for the Nguyen lord's recognition of his throne. Thien-tu himself was
rewarded with five provinces from Phra Uthairacha for his good offices. At the
height of his power, the overlord of Hatien mled an area stretching from west of
It should be noted that the Cambodian king did not entirely give up his claim over
Hatien, but the latter appeared to be strong enough to maintain its autonomy, as
Hatien successfully defeated the Cambodian incursion in 1739.^'^ Consequently,
Thien-tu's power over Cambodian affairs was apparently augmented. He went
further by proclaiming himself king of Cambodia under the royal title of Nak
Somdet Phra Sothat. In 1742, he took advantage of his power by sending an
official letter to the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan requesting a restoration of trade
relations between the two countries.^5
A close tie between the Mac family and the Nguyen lords was thus critical for the
Cambodian economy. From the time of its creation on, Hatien began to replace
Phnom Penh and eventually accounted for most of Cambodia's foreign trade.
the tide to the city of Phnom Penh.^^ Therefore, export products from Phnom Penh
^•^ Chen, op.cit.. p. 1554. "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1. pp. 235-37 records only political turmoil
in 1757.
65 1 ^ . , p. 1554.
Conclusion
However, Cambodia from the late eighteenth century onwards experienced extemal
interference. This interference left the country devastated and deeply affected the
formation of a Cambodian polity. As for Hatien, its potential for commerce began
to attract the interest of the Thai and the Vietnamese, both of whom were
determined to take control of Hatien. In the period between the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, Hatien also suffered extensive wars, devastation and
depopulation by the Thai, as will be discussed in following chapters.
CHAPTER III
SIAM'S QUEST FOR SURVIVAL
In a relatively short time after the Ayudhyan kingdom had been completely
destroyed by the Burmese in 1767, the Thai had successfully rebuilt up its military
and economic power so that they were able to stand up as one of the powerful states
in the mainland Southeast Asia again. It is generally recognised that overseas trade
was the most significant factor in Siamese economic development from the time of
King Taksin's reign. Trade was the impetus for the rapid expansion of the
country's manufacturing production and brought prosperity and power for the Thai
mling class. But this notable advancement was not simple as Siam encountered
several difficulties throughout the period of economic achievement. The key to
overcoming the difficulties and the stmggle towards supremacy in the region was
the expansion of Siam's control over the natural resources and sources of
manpower along the trans-Mekong region. This chapter will discuss the economic
conditions which Siam experienced between the period from the reign of King
Taksin (r. 1767-1782) to Rama III (r. 1782-1809). This will provide a basis for
ftirther discussion of why the consolidation and contest of power for the trans-
Mekong region was indispensable in the stmggle for the revival of Siam.
sporadic warfare with Burma and the struggle among local rivals further
exacerbated the problems. It was a time of chaos particularly in the central
Chaophraya basin, where many towns had been depopulated by the Burmese. The
scarcity of manpower made the country's revival more difficult. To rebuild the
kingdom, the kings had to make an effort to revive trade and mobilise people to
resettle in their domain. Several studies demonstrate that the Sino-Siamese trade in
particular was a lifeline for speeding up the kingdom's economy. The involvement
of private commercial ventures in overseas trade which was promoted by the kings
expanded significantly. During the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods, overseas
trade contributed the major proportion of state revenue.2 Revenue from trade
enabled the Siamese government to purchase imported goods essential for the
country's rehabilitation as well as things for warfare against the Burmese and local
rivals, such as weapons, salt-petre, building materials, metal goods, chinaware,
earthenware, textiles and the foodsmffs.^
The expansion of overseas trade, nevertheless, could hardly have been achieved
unless Siam was able to retain its stability and role as the dominant power in the
major trading networks, as well as the ability to mobilise people to serve as
suppliers of products for trade. The other aspect of this was that an increasing
population would provide a greater demand for imported products. The dense
population of the Siamese-dominated area would certainly have stimulated
thonburi lae khrang krung rattanakosin ton ton" (Records of the French Missionaries during the
Periods of King Ekathat, Thonburi, and the Eariy Bangkok), in PP 39. p. 193.
2 Sarasin, Tribute and Profit. (1977), chapter 7; Hong, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century:
Evolution of the Economy and Society. (1984), chapter 3; Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Pakkai lae bai-rua
(The Quill and the Sail), (1984), pp. 1-234.
^ Cushman 's examination of imported Chinese goods in the eariy nineteenth century shows that
they were not only for the Siamese elites, such as luxurious goods as was previous believed, but
also for general consumption at all levels of society. See Cushman, Fields From the Sea. (1993),
p. 74; Also, Sarasin, op.cit.. pp. 144-149.
53
economic activity, and have attracted more traders to come. Thus, the shift of
population could mean a shift of trade as well. Stable conditions would bring a
return to economic activity in the area of the dominant power - connecting interior
trade and the port cities; facilitating the flow of goods in form of suai (head tax);
encouraging local ventures from the interior to the port cities and vice versa; and
attracting foreign merchants to visit its ports. Such conditions required either
amicable relations with or else power consolidation over surrounding polities,
which provided the sharing of benefits from the trading networks. The dominant
power could attract people to come to trade at its port cities by maintaining alliances
with local officials. The expansion of hegemony rendered a higher concentration of
resources from distant principalities. The rebuilding of Siam therefore depended on
the integration of manpower and trade from the distant areas. The period between
1767 and 1851 saw the expansive consolidation of Thai power over the major
trading routes, extensive mobilisation of manpower from the trans-Mekong basin
and subsequent concentration of economic resources.
It should be noted that the Khorat Plateau had become significant to Siam in the
seventeenth century. Prior to that the Khorat Plateau had been virtually recognised
by both the Lao and Siamese kingdoms as a boundary region. After the successive
crises in the left bank of the Mekong, which brought a continuous influx of Lao
people to resettle in the Khorat Plateau, in the seventeenth cenmry, the Thai began
to advance their influence in the area. King Narai (r. 1656-88) established Nakhon
Ratchasima, in the old town called Khorat, as an outpost of Ayudhya. The division
of Lan Chang resulted in Siamese expansion into the Khorat plateau.^ The growing
power of the Siamese over the area seems to have been linked to the expansion of
Ayudhya's overseas trade, since the area was well-known for its forest products,
'^ Charies Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand. (Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program,
Cornell University, 1967), pp. 7-8.
54
which were in high demand in the overseas market. The influx of Lao migrants
acted as gatherers and suppliers of forest products for Ayudhya.
However, the Thai control of the area remained minimal. Tributes and taxes fi-om
the area were conveyed to Ayudhya on an irregular basis. Until the eighteenth
century, however, the Thai monarchs had begun to intensify their control over the
Khorat Plateau and the left bank in order to concentrate the resources for state
revenue and trade. The area was more effectively integrated, both administratively
and economically, into the central power based at Thonburi/Bangkok than ever
before. Between 1767 and 1882, about 150 new muang were created in the Khorat
Plateau, Laos and westem Cambodia. The Thai asserted control over the chao
muang. provincial govemors, who usually were indigenous elites in the localities.
The local elites had duties of levying manpower and suai payment for the capital. In
return, the chao muang were empowered to administrate local affairs and villagers.
In other words, the creation of new muang was a step towards greater centralisation
by Thonburi/Bangkok.
Suai or head tax was a substimte for corvee labour obligations collected in kind or
currency from the phrai (commoners) who were registered as lek suai or able-
bodied men subject to suai payment to the court (for ftirther details of the suai
system, see discussion on the Siamese administrative system in the Battambang
region in Chapter Six). The importance of the suai payment to the Thai economy
was that they provided significant proportion of the commodities for the royal junk
trade from the Ayudhyan period up until the early Bangkok period. The royal
trading junks usually contained forest products for overseas trade since they were
low in weight but highly priced in the Chinese market, while the private trading
ventures usually conveyed export crops such as rice which occupied a larger
volume but yielded a lower profit per unit than the forest goods. Besides, the suai
55
By the Second Reign, Siam confronted a new economic difficulty. The royal
monopoly system began to be challenged. The system was not only a major source
of revenue for the Thai monarchs, but also for the aristocrats, who largely
participated in foreign trade as will be discussed below, and who also shared the
benefits. Siam was increasingly confronted by difficulties with westem merchants
who demanded the liberalisation of trade. The internal administration was required
to adapt in response to the westem demands. In 1825, Rama III armounced the
abolition of the monopoly on various export articles and a commercial treaty with
Adisom Muakphimai, Krom Tha kap rabop sethakit thai: wikhro khrongsang lae kanplianplang
tangtae samai thonburi thung kantham sonthisanya bowring pho.so.2310-2398. (Department of
Port Authority and the Thai Economy: Analysis of the Structure and Changes between the
Thonburi Period and the Establishment of the Bowring Treaty, AD1767-1855) (MA thesis,
Thammasat University, 1988), pp. 122-24; Boonrod Kaewkanha, Kan kep suai nai samai
ratanakosin ton ton (Suai Collection During the Eariy Bangkok Period), (1964), p. 22,
56
the British mission led by Henry Bumey was signed in 1826. The king turned to an
internal source of revenue, the tax farming system, which had been inherited firom
the Ayudhyan period. However, it was applied more extensively during the Third
Reign. An additional thirty-eight items such as pepper, teak, coconut oil, sugar,
tobacco, shrimp paste, iron pans and firewood were taxed. The system was
operated under royal permission given to private individuals, usually Chinese, to
collect taxes on certain products from people in a certain area within a specific
period. In return, the king obtained the amount of money offered by the prospective
tax farmer. Both Hong and Nidhi agree that the successfiil shift to the tax fanning
system as the major source of state revenue was a result of royal promotion of
private commercial ventures to engage in foreign trade after the Thonburi period. In
response to the increasing demand of the world market, the capacity of the
country's production consequently expanded and thus could sustain the extensive
use of the tax farming system by the state.^
Although Hong and Nidhi appreciate the abandonment of the royal trading
monopoly system and the shift of the major source of state revenue as a successful
achievement of the Thai kings in response to the changing economic situation, it is
obvious that towards the end of the Second Reign the Siamese government
confronted several difficulties which required it to seek another revenue resource.
This ftirther demonstrates its ability to adapt to changing situations. Although the
foreign trade of Siam with both China and westem countries was expanding during
the Second Reign, the government suffered a crisis of revenue shortage as its
expenditure was higher than its revenue. In some years Rama II had to reduce to
about half the amount ofbiawat. or grants for members of the royal family and the
^ Hong, op.cit.. pp. 83-85; Nidhi, Pakkai lae bai-rua. pp. 85-100.
57
nobility, even substimting the biawat with products gained from the suai payment.*
The Royal Treasury was at a disadvantage in the royal junk trade with China.^ In
some years, the price of export products for the Chinese marketfluctuated,bringing
a lower profit or disadvantaging Siamese junks.'^ Although this was not the case
for every year, and the trade with China was still the most unportant for Siam, such
instability coupled with the revenue crisis of the government would have influenced
the king to seek another channel of income.
The response was an increased effort to expand trade with the west. Rama II
initially sent royal vessels to trade with the Portuguese in Macau. Soon afterwards,
in 1818, the Portuguese envoy from Macau led by Don Carlos Manoel Silviera
arrived in Bangkok with a mission to set up commercial relations. They received a
licence to trade, and to act as a trading agent for ships of their own countrymen
trading with Siam. They later established a consulate, and a warehouse in Bangkok.
The existence of the Portuguese warehouse thus can be seen as a measure to
guarantee a fixed demand for Siamese products. In the same year, trade with the
United States was also initiated. By the end of the 1820s, Siam steadily evolved its
intercourse with western traders centred at the British Strait Settlements (B.S.S.) in
Singapore, which had arisen as a trading centre in the region since its establishment
in 1819. The value and amount of commercial intercourse between Singapore and
Siam continued to expand. Furthermore, the emergence of the B.S.S. helped extend
Siamese trade with other ports in the Indian Archipelago including Kelantan,
Trengganu, Pahang on the Malay Peninsula, Riau, Melaka, Penang, Batavia,
Semarang, Ceribon, Palembang, and Potianak. Staple exports from Siam included
sugar, pepper, salt, oil, rice, and minor articles such as stic-lac, iron pans, coarse
earthenware, and lard.''
With the development of trade with western countries, pressure on the Siamese
state to adjust its economic stmcture became evident as the royal monopoly system
was challenged. The pressure came from the British in particular. In 1821, the
unofficial British mission led by John Morgan arrived at the court of Rama II,
hoping to create a commercial treaty, but nothing came of the venture. Soon
afterward came another British mission under the charge of John Crawfurd with a
purpose of establishing "free trade" with Siam: that is to set up a fixed tariff
schedule, for the westem traders were confronted with heavy duties on an irregular
basis in contrast to smaller Chinese traders who paid little or none. The mission,
nevertheless, failed again. The failure of the British mission was understandable for
their demands would have meant a loss in direct revenues for the court people and
the royal treasury.'2 Nevertheless, it appears that at least the Siamese government
tried to adjust itself in order to please the westem nations. Officially, twenty kinds
of products were announced as being under the royal monopoly, but, in fact, Rama
II reduced the number of monopolised export products to include only the products
that were carried by the royal trading junks in great quantity. Thus, many goods in
high demand in the outside market, such as tin, dried meat, dried fish, dried
shrimp, cotton, animal skins, and timber for ship constmction could be purchased
by the western traders. Furthermore, although the Crawfurd mission failed to
establish a free trade treaty, Rama II promised to reduce the duty levied on the size
of vessel if at least five British vessels would come to Bangkok aimually.'^
Finally, in 1825, Rama III decided to abandon the royal tradmg monopoly.
By the Third Reign, trade with westem nations was increasingly significant when a
crisis between China and Great Britain broke out into the Opium war in 1839-1842.
The British had been dissatisfied with the tributary tradmg system of China, which
gave privileges to Asian tributary junks, but discriminated against western and
private vessels. Within the tributary system, the Asian tributary junks were granted
exemption from all import-export duties by the Chinese government. It thus made
the capital outlay of western ventures more expensive. Besides, the western
merchants were limited to trade only at Kwangtung, which was a small market, and
often that trade had to be conducted through the trading agents. The Opium War
ended with China's agreement on the Nanking Treaty in 1842, bringing into effect
the abolition of the tributary system and the opening of Chinese markets for westem
nations.''^
The decline in the Sino-Siamese trade began at the outset of the Opium War since
the route to China became too dangerous for trading venmres. Direct access to the
Chinese marketftirtherdecreased the importance of Siam as an entrepot of Chinese
goods for westem vessels. The War consequently caused the number of Siamese
royal junks trading to China to decline.'5 As a result of the decline in Sino-Siamese
trade, it became imperative for Siam to develop its trade with the West in order to
maintain the constant level of state revenue. During the crisis in China, the volume
of Siam's trade with the B.S.S in Singapore notably increased (see Table 3.1).
Perhaps because of the decline in the revenue from the Chmese trade, the Thai court
decided to turn back to its former source of revenue, the royal monopoly system. In
15 Ibid.
60
1841, Rama III violated the commercial treaty with the west by reinstatmg the royal
monopoly system on teak, and on sugar in 1842-43. As sugar was often in high
demand by westem merchants, this resulted in the higher price of sugar in the
market. The profit the government obtainedfi-omsugar exports increasedfi"omthe
previous year to thirty percent. The switch back to the monopoly system by Rama
III reveals the difficulties the Siamese mling class underwent in the changing
conditions in the world market. In an attempt to survive in the competitive trading
world, the king decided to adapt his trading system to the westem style. However,
the monopoly system remained the immediate source of wealth when the king
wanted to prevent the decline of his profitability.'6
Source: D. R. Sar Desai, British Trade and Expansion in Southeast Asia. (New
Delhi, Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1977), p. 80.
and for the decline of trade with China. The increasing volume of trade under
pressure from the western nations demanded the Thai kings make an effort to
expand the volume of export articles, both forest products and staple crops. The
ability to advance domestic production was possible because Siam successfully
increased its population for the country's production process. However, trade
expansion also demanded effective control over the major trading networks in the
region, to facilitate the flow of goods from distant areas to the capital and vice
versa. The tax farming system can be seen as another effective means to facilitate
theflowof local products to the centre. It created economic links between Bangkok
and the remote areas, through tax farmers setting up tax farms on certain items in a
certain district and petitioning the king to allow them to be in charge of tax
collection on the items. The farmers not only collected tax in currency but also in
kind, the products being either sold to different regions or exported. They often had
monopoly rights to purchase the items over which they held tax farms. Some tax
farmers participated in local administration and held responsibility of conveying the
suai payment and purchasing local products for the government.'"^
Siam, Laos and western Cambodia was better organised than it had previously
been. It not only shows the greater efficiency of Bangkok in the acquisition of local
products from distant areas, but was evidence of the successful concentration of
resources derived from extensive consolidation of Siamese power over the trans-
Mekong basin.
It was not only the king who secured revenue for hunself and for the state's use
from the expansion of trade and the concentration of resources from distant regions,
but individual courtiers also obtained substantial profit from them. Hong
demonstrates well the political and economic power of the high-ranking princes and
nobles particularly the ministers of the Krom Mahatthai (Interior - responsible for
the North and the Northeast), the Krom Kalahom (Defence - responsible for the
South) and the Phra Khlang (Treasury - responsible for the east coast). They
maintained absolute power over manpower in the territory under their
responsibilities. As the traditional administrative system of Siam gave them wide-
ranging powers over military, political and economic affairs in their areas, they
were able to gain personal advantage from their performance of several functions,
especially the collection of revenue for the state. They could deduct their
administrative expenses from the revenue collection, without an effective state
organ to check on them.'^ The greater size of the population meant the greater
benefits they were able to gain. This suggests that they too benefited from the influx
of population into the Siamese domain. It appears that after Taksin successfully
besieged Hatien and Cambodia in 1772, he distributed a number of his war captives
to Chao Phrava Yommarat, later Rama I, who joined the expedition.i^
18lhii.,pp. 13-16.
'^ "Chotmaihet raiwan thap samai krung thonburi" (Records Concerning the Expeditions in the
Thonburi Period), in PP 66. p. 145.
63
The creation of the princes of krom rank (literally unit or department) by Rama II
reflected the idea of power and interest distribution the king shared with the
ambitious royal members. The princes' krom were to be granted a body of
manpower to mle over instead of town. It was not only to dignify the princes, but
also to give them wealth. This could be seen as the way the king had to distribute
interest in order to contend with their alliances. The princes of krom rank tried to
enlarge their entourage for their own profit and possessed a large number of phrai
som. which automatically resulted in the decrease of the number of phrai luang of
the king. Thus, sometimes caused tension and conflict between the kings and the
princes.20
The high-ranking Siamese officials and members of the royal families had always
been involved in the overseas trade. They often exploited the channel of tributary
trade by fitting out their junks as part of the tributary mission so that they did not
have to pay duty as private ventures did. The kings even allowed the nobles who
did not have their own junks to make profit by using some tonnages in the royal
junks for their goods. Such methods formed the basis of the remarkable expansion
of the Sino-Siamese trade during the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods. The
rank and power provided them with privileges in securing export products at low
expense. As the three ministers undertook responsibilities for the suai payment and
purchasing local products for the court, they were likely to carry on their own
business at the same time. The rate of official purchasing was generally known to
be lower than that of the private traders. Chaophraya Bodindecha, for example,
while performing his duty in Cambodia in the 1830s, ordered the caravan suai from
the Champassak territory to carry his goods, including five ivory tusks and four
rhinoceros homs, to Bangkok.21 The nobility who were involved in foreign trade
during the early Bangkok period included Rama II, when he occupied the rank of
Krom Luang Isomsunthon. Other courtiers during the Second Reign were the Front
Palace mler, Krom Luang Phithakmontri (the Viceroy during the Second Reign),
Krom Khun Isaranurak (minister of Krom Mahatthai). Krom Mun Sakdipholsep
(minister of Krom Kalahom and later Wang Na. the mler of the Front Palace of
Rama III), Krom Mun Chetsadabodin [minister of Krom Tha (Department of Port
Authority) - later Rama III)], Phrava Suriyawongsetkosa (Dit Burmag) (minister of
Krom Kalahom and Krom Phra Khlang). Phraya Sriphiphat (That Bunnag - official
of the Krom Tha). Phraya Chodoc Ratchasetthi (Head of the Krom Tha) and
Phraya Kosa. Apart from the high-ranking officials and royal members, many
lower-ranking nobles in the Krom Tha had their own junks to trade. Those included
Phra Chodoc Khun Thongsiu, Phra Intr, Phra Sen, Luang Kaew-ayat, Luang
Aphaiphiphit, Phraya Thama, Luang Surathon, Phra Sem, Phra Laoya, Phra
Aphaiphiphit and Krom Luang Chakchetsada. Many of them were Chinese serving
in the Krom Tha.22
Conclusion
As far as the interest of the Siamese mling class was concemed, it is understandable
why the kings were able to convince the nobles to supply manpower for wars
against their neighbours. In fact, those nobles were likely to share in decision
making on war policy for they too could be enriched through the expansion of
Siamese power. The growth of trade and demand for products therefore induced the
increasing penetration of the central power into the distant areas in order to acquire
resources. The encroachment was carried out in various forms, including the
unposition of suai payment and tax farming, forced resettlement, and the creation of
new towns and central administration m the remote areas. It was in this respect that
the trans-Mekong region is so significant for the development of the Siamese
economy between the Thonburi and the early Bangkok periods. But things were not
so easy as the expansion of Vietnam began to threaten profitability and the security
of Siam in the trans-Mekong area. These two contending states made attempts to
control both the inland and the coastal trading networks in order to procure the
commodities which formed an important part of their overseas trade and to expand
their domestic trade networks.
Before I start examining the Thai interventions in Cambodia in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, it is appropriate to first summarise the political
situation between 1767 and 1851 in order to make the significance of the economic
factors clearer.
Intensive competition between the Thai and the Vietnamese in order to exercise tight
political control over Cambodia began in the early Thonburi period. Vietnamese
influence at the Cambodian court had been strong during the period of the Thai-
Burmese war. A year after ascending the throne. King Taksin dispatched a demand
for royal tribute to the Cambodian court of Ang Ton (Phra Narai Racha to use the
Thai title), as a sign that his superiority should be honoured. Ang Ton apparently
refused to recognise Taksin as a legitimate king, indicating that the latter had no
blood tie with the Ayudhyan dynasty, but was a usurper. Moreover, Ang Ton
received two fiigitive Ayudhyan princes, Chao Srisang and Chao Thuy, seeking
military assistance against Taksin's faction. Later, the princes fled to Hatien. Soon
66
By 1777, the Tay Son rebels were able to conquer much of central and south
Vietnam, and the eldest brother subsequently proclaimed himself emperor of
Vietnam. Losing the battle, Mac Thien-m decided to take refuge at the Thonburi
court. But a few years later he was executed by Taksin. This came as a result of the
Tay Son conspiracy to make Taksin falsely accuse Thien-tu of plotting against
23 The dynastic chronicles revised during the Bangkok period indicate that the first expedition
against Cambodia, which was led by Phraya Aphaironarit (later Rama 1), and his brother, Phraya
Anuchitracha (later the Front Palace ruler of Rama I), took place in 1769. But once the expedition
was successful in seizing Siemreap and Battambang, the Siamese troops had to abandon the
battlefield and return to Thonburi hurriedly because of the false news that there was chaos in the
capital, (see, Thiphakorawongse, PKRR I. pp. 19-20). However, according to Nidhi, it is likely
that the 1769 expedition never happened, and that this part of the chronicle was revised in order to
save face for the Bangkok king, who had launched an unsuccessful attack on Nakhon
Srithammarat. See Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Prawattisat rattanakosin nai phraratchaphongsawadan
ayudhya (History of Bangkok in the Dynastic Ayudhyan Chronicles), (Bangkok, Thai Khadi
Studies Institute, 1980), pp. 43-44.
Ang Non was executed by the anfi-Thai nobility who then placed Prince Eng, a
seven-year-old son of Ang Ton, on the throne. Taksin despatched an army led by
the fumre Rama I to counter the anti-Thai Khmer faction. Before the Thai army
could capmre Udong, there was political agitation against Taksin, and the army had
to return immediately to Thonburi. Three years later when Rama I had become mler
(r. 1782-1809), turmoil in Cambodia forced Eng to take refuge at Rama I's court ,
where he had to stay for twelve years. During Eng's refuge in Bangkok, Ta-la-ha
Baen, a Khmer noble who worked for the Thai, took full control of the kingdom
with Rama I's approval.2'7 One of his cmcial services to the Thai was to suppress
the anti-Thai factions in Cambodia. At the same tune as Eng's refuge in Bangkok,
Rama I warmly received Prince Nguyen Anh, who had lost the battle to the Tay
Son. Nguyen Anh was a young nephew of Ton That Xuan and the Nguyen lord of
the south, Dinh Vuong. Rama I amiably supplied Khmer troops several times for
the Vietnamese Prince to fight against the rebellion.28 After Nguyen Anh had
defeated the Tay Son rebellion and proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long (r.l802-
19) of the unified Vietnam, the two continued friendly relations until the end of
In 1794, Rama 1 decided to send Eng back to reside in Udong, and granted him the
Thai title of Somdet Phra Narairama. This was a gesture demonstrating Bangkok's
permission for Eng to be king. At the same time as Eng's coronation, Rama 1
removed Battambang and Siemreap from Eng's jurisdiction in order to grant them
to Baen, who was apparently antagonistic to Eng and his adopted father Ta-la-ha
26 Chen, 'Mac Thien-tu and Phraya Taksin," in Proceedings of the Seventh lAHA Conference.
(1977), Vol. 2, p. 1562.
Pok. Baen became a chao muang. or governor, of the two provinces under Thai
suzerainty. The period of Eng's reign was characterised by strong Thai influence.
However, not long after his return to Cambodia, Eng died in 1796. As Eng's eldest
son. Prince Chan, was just six years old, Rama I appointed Ta-la-ha Pok as Regent
with ftill administrative power.29 Pok could retain a free hand over Cambodian
affairs. Rama I was possibly satisfied with Pok's service as he actively responded
to the former's dispatch by sending Khmer troops to assist the Thai against the
Burmese in 1797, and to assist Nguyen Anh against the Tay Son revolt in 1799, at
Bangkok's orders.^^
The period of strong Thai domination did not last long after peace returned to
Vietnam. The accession of Gia Long in 1802, followed by Prince Chan's ascension
in 1806 (r. 1806-1835) after Pok's death in the same year, marked an early decline
of Thai influence in Cambodia. An unmediate aim of Gia Long was his intention of
restoring Cambodia's tributary relations. In 1805, a Vietnamese embassy carried
Gia Long's letter and gifts to Udong, advising that he now was the Vietnamese
emperor. After Chan's ascension, he quickly demonstrated his goodwill to the court
of Gia Long by sending Khmer officials to inform the latter of his succession. Gia
Long exercised his suzerainty by granting Chan a set of Sino-Vietnamese symbols
of investiture and a letter of permission for Chan to rule over Cambodia. The
Cambodian mission subsequently travelled to Hue for the submission of tribute.3'
The prominent featiue of Cambodia under Chan's reign was its anti-Thai orientation
and strong Vietnamese domination. The explanation for Chan's animosity toward
the Bangkok kings, first given by Prince Damrong, is that it was the result of his
spending his youth under close supervision in the faction-ridden Cambodian court.
Unlike his father, who had lived and been educated in Bangkok for twelve years,
Chan was likely to have been influenced by the anti-Thai nobles. They wanted to
Bangkok in 1802 and 1805. From the Thai point of view, the re-establishment of
the Nguyen court encouraged Chan to act vigorously towards Bangkok since he
could expect support from the other side once he had Chan re-established tributary
His dissidence against the Bangkok king was more apparent after Rama I died in
1809. Chan did not join the royal cremation of Rama 1 in Bangkok but he sent his
full brother. Prince Snguon and his half brothers, Prince Im and Prince Duang. The
action demonstrated contempt for Rama II since the mlers of all tributary states
Uprayorach. the first viceroy, and on Im the Upraracha. the second viceroy,
granting them insignia of rank during their visit in Bangkok. The appointment
signified the legitunate candidacy of the two princes for the Cambodian throne.
Cambodian court into pro-Thai and pro-Vietnamese factions. After the group of
Snguon had retumed to Udong, conflict with Chan suddenly broke out. In 1810,
Phraya Chakri (Baen), and Phraya Kalahom (Muang), both of whom had
Svai, Phraya Decho (Mam), who had a close tie with the Thai, cautiously mobilised
troops in his srok. Both sides were on the alert. Chan also feared a sudden attack
from the other side, instantly requesting Vietoamese protection. A Vietoamese naval
contingent with approximately ten thousand troops soon arrived in Udong, forcing
Main to flee to Bangkok. Meanwhile, Rama II dispatched troops from Nakhon
Ratchasima to defend and fortify Battambang and Siemreap, for he was worried
about the Vietnamese capture of the two provinces.^^ Finally, Chan's three brothers
and a group of Khmer officials secrefly escaped to northwestem Cambodia where,
with support from the Thai forces, a battle against Chan broke out. Snguon
appeared to be so confident of Thai support that he demanded Chan grant him three
srok to the south of Pursat. Snguon's forces advanced to seize Sombor, Kampong
Chanang, and Udong. When news of Snguon's advance reached Chan, the
Vietnamese hastily took Chan and his followers downriver to Saigon. Concemed
with the security of Snguon, whom the Thai expected to be a candidate for the
Cambodian throne, Rama II ordered him and his followers to follow Im and Duang
to Bangkok. Snguon died of illness in Bangkok in 1815. Chan moved from Udong
to reside in Phnom Penh, where the Vietnamese warships could approach more
easily than Udong.34
The attempt to reassert Thai power over the Cambodian court was unsuccessful
throughout Rama IPs period, although Chan still sent the annual tribute to Rama II.
Chan's alliance with Vietnam appeared to be painful and expensive for Cambodia,
since the process of Vietnamisation of Cambodia began and continued into the reign
33 Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so. 1173 (Records in the Second Reign, Lesser Era 1173
(AD 1811), pp. 58-59; "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1. p. 284; Nupporat Chronicle, pp. 198-201.
34 Chotmaihet ratchakan this song cho.so. 1173. pp. 129-33; "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1, pp.
288-92.; Nupporat Chronicle, pp. 202-113.
71
An attempt to restore Bangkok's influence took place again during the reign of
Rama III (r. 1824-1851). The Thai expedition against the Vietoamese began in 1833
when news of the Le van Khoi revolt in southern Vietnam against Emperor Minh
Mang (r. 1819-41) reached Bangkok. The army commander of the Thai force was
Chaophraya Bodindecha, who had led the attack against the Chao Anu revolt
between 1827-1828. Intensive warfare between the tworivalscontinued until 1847.
In the eariy stages of the war, the Thai appeared to lose the battle and retreat. In
1835, the conditions in Cambodia turned favourable for the Thai when Chan died
unexpectedly. Chan left four daughters, but no son, while the Thai still held two
Cambodian princes, Im and Duang, under their custody. Although the Vietnamese
installed Princess Mei as queen, the Thai hoped that the princes would be able to
draw loyalty and support from the okya. Unfortunately, in 1839, while Im
accompanied Bodin to station in Battambang, he and his followers secretly fled to
seek Vietnamese protection with the expectation of becoming king.36 Duang then
was sent from Bangkok to Battambang to replace Im. As a matter of fact, Rama 111
suspected him of seeking Vietnamese support in 1837 and had held him Bangkok,
but apparently he was the only altemative the Thai had left.3'7 During the protracted
14-year war Cambodia was in a state of catastrophe. Finally, military stalemate
35 For further discussion of Vietnamisation in Cambodia, see Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese
Model. (1971), pp. 234-261; Chandler, A History. 123-132; idem., Cambodia Before the French,
chapter 3.
36 "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan nai ratchakan thi sam" (Records Concerning Cambodia
and Vietnam during the Third Reign), in PP 67/42. pp. 146-48.
3^ Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan khrang ratchakan thi sam (Records Concerning the Expeditions
Against Vietnam During the Third Reign), (Bangkok, Cremation volume for General Chaophrya
Singhaseni, 1933), p. 61.
72
compelled the tworivalsto begin negotiations. Duang (r. 1848-1860) then ascended
the throne after a peace settlement with the authorisation of both the Thai and the
Vietnamese under the condition that he was obliged to send annual tribute to
Bangkok and triennial tribute to Hue.
The events summarised here will be used to support the argument of the thesis that
political stmggle was necessary for the major rivals to take control of economic
resources, not that politics was itself the cause of conflict.
73
CHAPTER IV
CONTENTION FOR TRADE
region from Laos to the Mekong Delta, the major source of forest goods for
overseas trade of the surrounding polities. The control of Cambodia and other parts
of the Mekong basin had been cmcial for Siamese economic development since the
Thonburi period. It was because of this that Siam's extensive encroachment into
Cambodia in competition with Vietnam took place. As products from the area were
carried through its vast trading network connecting hinterland with the port towns,
it was imperative for the two rivals to compete with each other in order to
monopolise Cambodia's wealth and take control of the trade network and
idea of how traders from Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Siam formed relations,
and the extent of the economic significance of Cambodia as part of this trading
network by providing some detail about the trading network along the Gulf of Siam
Trading Networks
overland routes along the trans-Mekong basin, which had existed for some time
(for this section, see Map I). In the middle Mekong basin, five passages north of
Cambodia served in times of peace as h-ade routes: the basins of three middle left-
bank rivers (the Ca Dinh, Bang Fai and Bang Hieng), the Phuan state, and the
Thaeng (Dien Bien Phu) plain. People could travel between Vietnam and the left-
bank basin through three passes : the Keo Neua, Mu Gia and Ai Lao, where
74
travellers could continue navigation by way of three tributaries of the Mekong: the
Bang Hieng, Bang Fai and Ca Din. However, the rapids of the first two rivers
could only be navigated by small boats for part of the year, depending on the
rainfall. From there one could reach Northeast Siam. From the left-bank Lao towns
to Siam, traders could cross the Mekong river to Nongkhai, via the Khorat Plateau
to Nakhon Ratchasima, and then down through the heavily forested hills to the
river, landing north-east of Bangkok. The second route was to leave the Mekong
farther up-river at Paklai, the southernmost town of the Luang Phrabang
principality, and to continue the joumey overland through forested hills to the boat
landings above Phichai, from where it took about twelve days travelling down-river
to Bangkok. The Phuan traders brought down some high value export goods, such
as, ivory, gold, cinnamon, gum benjamin, cardamom and rhinoceros hom. In
return, salt was perhaps the most precious imported item for they had no salt-
works. Salt was brought overland by Phuan porters from the coast of Annam and
from various Lao salt-works in Luang Phrabang territory. It was also purchased
from Vietnamese traders who cartied salt on their backs across the cordillera and
sold it on the banks of the Mekong to the south of the Plateau area.'
Imports from Bangkok, including Chinese, European, Indian, and even Siamese
manufactures, reached the Phuan State indirectly by way of the Lao towns.2
George Vinal Smith refers to the Laofraderscoming to trade with Ayudhya. It was
they who supplied the export goods, such as benzoin, gumlac and gold for
Ayudhya, and in return they carried Indian cloth, red yam, and opium back.3
' Breazeale and Sanit, A Culture in Search of Survival: The Phuan of Thailand and Laos. (1988),
pp. 1-5.
2 Gutzlaff, Charles, Joumal of Two Voyages Along the Coast of China in 1831 & 1832. (New
York, Jonh P. Haven, 1833), p. 35.
3 George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand. (1977), pp. 61-62.
75
Traders from Laos and the Khorat Plateau to Bangkok always travelled through the
passes - Chong Chom, Chong Tago, and Chong Samet - in the Dongrek Range via
Prachinburi, instead of crossing the Dong Phrayayen Range in the central Northeast
which was a malaria-infested and deserted area. Chong Samet was the usual route
used by people carrying tribute to Bangkok."*
Apart from Siam, Cambodia was an altemative route by which merchandise from
the middle Mekong basin went down to the sea. The account by Wuysthoff tells of
local trade along the Mekong river between Laos and Cambodia. In this border
region between Laos and Cambodia in the seventeenth century was situated the
commercial town of Sombok, which was also the major place from which
Cambodia could obtain goods from the uplanders.^ Traders usually transported
goods down river by boat or a twenty-six-metre-long bamboo raft, until they
arrived at the impassable Khone falls in southern Laos, where they would abandon
the river route and continue by cart to Cambodia. It took three months to go
upstream to Vientiane.^ This trading traffic continued at least until the late
nineteenth century.^ Laotian and uplanders' goods continued to meet other
Cambodian goods at Phnom Penh before they reached foreign vessels at Hatien or
Saigon-Cholon^ (see Chapter Two for the description of Cambodian trade with the
^ Paitoon Meekusol, Social and Cultural History of Northeastern Thailand from 1868-1910: A
Case Study of the Huamuang Khamen Padong (Surin. Sangkha and Khukhan). (1984), p. 117.
^ Cited in Jean Claude Lejosne, Le Joumal de Voyage de G. Van Wuysthoff et de ses Assistants au
Laos (1641-1642). (Metz, Editions du Centre de Documentation du Cercle de Culture et de
Recherches Laotiennes, 1987), pp. 101-103, 117.
^ Reid, The Age of Commerce. Vol. 11, p. 55; Caspar da Cruz, "The Treatise of Fr. Caspar da
Cruz," in Boxer (ed.), South China in the Sixteenth Century. (London, The Hakluyt Society,
1953), pp. 76-78.
^ Francis Gamier, D'Exploration en Indo-Chine effectue pendant le annees 1866. 1867. 1868.
(Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1873), pp. 222-25.
^ After the establishment of Saigon-Cholon in 1778, they became another destinations for
products of Cambodia. See William Willmott, "History and Sociology of the Chinese in
Cambodia Prior to the French Protectorate," JSEAH. 7,1 (March 1966), p. 27.
76
The Vietnamese were the other key traders in the region. Since the Vietnamese
southward movement had begun, the uplanders in the central upland area around
the present day borders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were significant to the
Nguyen empire as the major suppliers of forest products for Vietnam's foreign
trade. The export goods supplied by the uplanders included eaglewood, cinnamon,
ebony and other precious woods. The significance of the area prompted the Nguyen
mlers to assert their influence over the area. The Nguyen Lord Vo Vuong (r.l738-
65) demanded a submission of tribute from the uplanders of present Suvannakhet
province in Laos, west of the Ai Lao pass, which at the time was under Vientiane's
authority. Probably at the same time Vo Vuong initiated tributary relations with the
Jarai rulers, the King of Fire and the King of Water, so that the two latter would
help them protect the routes and forests.^ The Ai Lao Pass was likely to be the most
important trade route in early Cochin China, connecting Vietnam with Suvannakhet,
and Vientiane. The Nguyen created a tollgate at Khang Yen,fromwhere traders had
to get a certificate and pay tax before they continued to trade upstream. The
uplanders were also subject to pay a kind of head tax to the Nguyen.'^
Northwestem Cambodia was another altemative route for Laotian and uplanders'
goods, some of which were carried further to northeastern and central Siam.
Wuysthoff witnessed that twenty six carts camefromAngkor to purchase cotton in
^ Hickey, Son of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954.
(1982), pp. 159-60; Li Tana, "The Inner Region": A Social and Economic History of Nguyen
Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. (1992), p. 132.
'® Li Tana and Anthony Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam Under the Nguyen: Documents on the
Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong). 1602-1777. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 110-13.
77
Products from westem Cambodia could also reach Chanthaburi and Trad overland
through two border outposts at Dan Pong and Dan Chongkhaep. Chanthaburi and
Trad were a collection centres for forest products coming from Cambodia and
Vietnam for the Chinese market.''^
The connection with the overland routes seems to have activated the trade in the
coastal area. According to John Crawfurd, there was a distinct trading network
along the Siamese Gulf in the early nineteenth cenmry. There existed several ports
such as Bang Plasoi, Bang Pakong, Bang Lamung, Rayong, Chanthaburi, Thung
Yai or Trad, Kampong Som and Kampot of Cambodia, Hafien, Rach Gia, Ca Mau
''* Chumnum ruang chanthaburi (Collected Works of Chanthaburi), (Cremation volume for Wan
Chanthawimon, 1971), p. 165; Pallegoix, Description du Royaume Thai ou Siam. (Reprint,
Hants, Gregg Intemational Publishers, 1969), Vol. 1, pp. 73-74, 79.
78
Based on the above accounts, products from the hinterland had access to several
different ports both in the Thai and the Vietnamese influenced areas. Both the Thai
and the Vietnamese states had access to the procurements from this interconnected
overland and coastal trading network. Peace seems to have been a major factor that
attracted local traders to come to trade. For example, the Lao traders shifted their
destination from Ayudhya to Cambodia because they were troubled by Siamese
' ^ Crawfurd, Joumal of An Embassav from the Govemor General of India to the Courts of Siam
and Cochin-China. (1967), pp. 407-14; Baas Terwiel, Through Travellers' Eyes: An Approach to
Early Nineteenth Centurv Thai History. (Bangkok, Duang Kamol, 1989), chapter 8.
'^ Crawfiird, op.cit.. pp. 413-14; Henry Bumey, The Bumev Papers. Vol. II (Bangkok, The
Vajirayana National Library, 1911), p. 82.
79
officials who tried to conscript them into the army.'^ The French missionaries
recorded that during the Tay Son revolt in Vietnam, the Vietnamese traders in
Tonkin were adversely affected by the turmoil, resulting in shifting their trade to
Laos. 19 Hickey also mentions the dismpfion of trade between the lowland
Vietnamese and the uplanders during the Tay Son revolt.20 However, by the late
eighteenth century the changing politico-economic condifions compelled Siam and
Vietnam to tighten up their control over the trading networks. The two rivals were
determined to monopolise the source of wealth. The ability to control the region's
resources was therefore a stmggle for power, a stmggle which was highly intense
for the last part of the eighteenth and thefirstpart of the nineteenth cenmries.
Early Encroachment
Although Taksin had attained his supremacy by subduing his internal rivals, Siam's
polifical security in relafion to the surrounding states was sfill in danger. The
Burmese remained a serious threat to Siam until the 1820s. Apart from the westem
threat, the Siamese also worried about political security on the eastern side. It
appears that the Burmese had been manoeuvring to expand their power into the
central Chaophraya basin. Meantime, Burma was expanding its domination over
the Lao states. Vientiane and Luang Prabang had been under Burmese suzerainty
since 1764, and had assisted Burma in its wars against Siam in 1765. Later, in
1779, Vientiane called upon Burma for aid against the Thai.2i
'^ "Chotmaihet khnong bathluang farangset" (Records of the French Missionaries), in PP 39. p.
193.
2' Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History. (1984), pp. 134; Kennon Breazeale, The Integration of the
Lao States Into the Thai Kingdom. (PhD thesis. University of Oxford, 1975), p. 7.
80
22 Chen Chingho, "Mac Thien-tu and Phraya Taksin," in Proceedings of the Seventh lAHA
Conference. (1977), pp. 1546-48; Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Kan muang thai samai phrachao krung
thonburi (Thai Politics in the Reign of King Taksin), pp. 90-93.
81
Another act of aggression was carried out by Thien-tu after his son-in-law, Tu
Dung, had been executed by Taksin's army. Thien-m banned all trade junks sailing
from Hatien to Siam. The blockade would more or less exacerbate the famine which
was widespread in Siam after the fall of Ayudhya. It is evident that Siam at the time
relied on rice imported from Hatien and Cambodia.2'* It possibly also affected the
commerce of Chanthaburi and Trad, since their supply and demand of goods were
significantly connected with the adjacent interior and ports. The coastal area had
been remarkably important for Siam since the Thonburi period, as it was the
political and economic base of Taksin, with Chanthaburi being the centre. The
Chinese in Chanthaburi and Trad played a significant role in assisting Taksin to
consolidate power after the fall of Ayudhya. Moreover, when economic activities in
other areas of the kingdom were dismpted, Chanthaburi and Trad were great assets
24 Dhiravat Na Pombejra (trans.), "Ekasan hoUanda ruang chumchon thonburi nai pi kho.so.l767-
1768" (Dutch Documents about the Thonburi Community in 1767-1768), in Ruam bot khwam
prawattisat. 10 (February 1988), pp. 103-13.
82
for Taksin to be able to secure essential goods from overseas, since they continued
to carry on the junk trade with China.25 Therefore, the security of the eastern coast
towns was crucial for Siam's economic revival. But this security also covered the
ability to maintain stable relations with the surrounding area since a substantial part
of the exports of Chanthaburi and Trad was possibly obtained from Cambodia by
overland route from the Battambang region, and from small junks conducted by
local traders along the Gulf. It was natural that the Thai must have mmed to the
prosperity of Cambodia when Siam's agricultural activities and system of revenue
collection were yet to work efficiently. It is also evident that during the time of
famine, Cambodia and Hatien were the major suppliers of rice for Thonburi. Rice,
once an export product during the Ayudhyan period, had to be purchased from
ships coming from Hatien and Cambodia.26 Again, Rama I requested Prince
Nguyen Anh to provide rice for Bangkok when Siam was facing drought.2''
The significance of Chanthaburi greatly increased in the early Bangkok period when
the foreign trade of Siam was expanding. Pallegoix recorded that in 1838 twelve
Chinese junks visited the port of Chanthaburi.2^ It was the most important centre of
pepper plantation in Siam. Pepper was of course in high demand on the Chinese
and European markets.29 Other exports of Chanthaburi included cardamom,
gamboge, eaglewood, animal skins, sugar, ivory, wax, tobacco, and salted fish,
some of which came from Battambang. Chanthaburi also had its own junk to trade
2^ Adisom, Krom Tha kap rabop setthakit thai (Department of Port Authority and the Thai
Economy), (1988), pp. 246, 301, 309.
83
with China. Besides, Chanthaburi became a centre of Siamese ship building.^o Its
importance was reflected in the appointment of the head of the Krom Tha
(Department of Port Authority). They always held family ties or other forms of
close relationship with the kings. After Rama I had ascended the throne, he replaced
the govemor of Chanthaburi who was a supporter of Taksin with his own man.
Rama III himself, when he had been Krom Mun Jetsadabodin, used to administer
the Krom Tha during the reign of Rama II.^i The governors of Chanthaburi were
also nobles experienced in trade, such as Phraya Chodoc Ratchasetthi, the former
Minister of Krom Tha. The active commerce of Chanthaburi can be seen by its
population which consisted of a large number of Chinese and Cochin Chinese.32
The east coast of Siam meant a great deal to trade profitability for the Siamese mling
class. Crawfurd indicates that a considerable number of junks involved in this
trading traffic belonged to the Siamese kings and nobles.33 It was quite common
for the Siamese nobles to have local people who knew the local conditions to
conduct trade for them. For example, in 1821 Luang Phakdiwanit, a Vietnamese
bora in Bangkok, served in the field of trade for the Siamese court, carrying out
trade between Bangkok, Hatien, Chaudoc, and Saigon twice every year.^^ Phraya
Kosathipbodi, the Samuha Kalahom. minister of Defence, also had a Cambodian
who had migrated to Bangkok to conduct trade between Bangkok and Kampong
Som for him.35 Some Siamese nobles conducted both maritime and overland trade;
30 Terwiel, Through Travellers' Eves. (1989), p. 187; Pallegoix, op.cit.. pp. 73-74.
for example, Phrava Chodoc Ratchasetthi, the govemor of Chanthaburi during the
Second Reign, had the Chinese conduct trade for him between Bangkok and
Battambang. Phrava Chodoc also owned the customs post at Chachoengsao for he
served as the tax farmer of sugar and sugar cane.
The great importance of the trans-Mekong region made it indispensable for Siam to
urgently consolidate domination over the area. Taksin first responded to Thien-m's
aggressive policy by encouraging the Teochiu adventurers settled along the east
coast of Siam proper down to southern Vietnam to provoke a revolt against Thien-
tu and seize Hatien. The conspiracy failed.36 Finally, he decided to launch a
campaign against Hatien and Cambodia. Taksin hunself led a naval attack on Hatien
and Udong in 1771, while another expedition went overland through northwestem
Cambodia. Hatien and Cambodia were seized by the Siamese troops. The Thai
installed the Cambodian pretender Ang Non on the throne, meanwhile Thien-tu
was compelled to take refuge in southem Vietnam.37
37 "Chotmaihet raiwan thap samai krung thonburi" (Records Concerning the Expeditions in the
Thonburi Period), in PP 66. pp. 134-164.
Hatien was again under the government of members of the Mac family: Mac Tu
Sanh (1782-90), Mac Cong Binh (r. 1790-1800), Mac Tu Thiem (r.l802-9).39
Although the Thai seizure of Hatien in 1771 did not last long, it is interesting to see
that instead of evacuating and resettling people from Hatien, as the Thai always did
to other areas in order to increase manpower for Siam, Taksin put out an order to
the Siamese troops stationed in Hatien that:
(The Siamese troops) must neither capture nor kill the Chinese and
Vietnamese travelling to trade in Hatien, but should seek to persuade
people to settle and continue working. Those who violate the order will
be punished by death.'^^
The above passage is clear evidence that the attempt to control Hatien was
influenced by the trade interests of Siam. It is noteworthy that Taksin appointed a
fellow Teochiu, Phraya Phiphit as the govemor of Hatien with the rank and title of
Phraya Rachasetthi. Phraya Phiphit was well-versed in commerce in this area since
he formerly served as a high-ranking official of the Krom Tha."^' Chen Chingho
suggests that Phraya Phiphit was probably a leader of the Teochiu in the area and
had undertaken an unsuccessful plot against Hatien in 1769.'*2
Chen's speculation suggests that there was a conflict between the two ethnic
Chinese groups. One was the Teochiu in Chanthaburi and its adjacent area, who
were supporters of Taksin's regime. The other was the Cantonese, who were in the
majority at Hatien. The leaders of the Teochiu in the area had a hostile attitude
**' Ibid., p. 143; Narintharathewi, Krom Luang, Chotmaihet khwam songcham khong krom luang
Narintharathewi (Memoir of Krom Luang Narintharathewi), (Bangkok, Cremation volume for
Princess Wapi Busabakon, 1983), pp. 5, 91.
toward Thien-tu. They had unsuccessfully manoeuvred at least two times to seize
the city of Hafien.'*3 However, I believe that the conflict between the two Chinese
ethnicities was based on compefition for trade rather than on ethnic difference as
emphasised by Chen. Both Taksin and his supporters certainly recognised the
bustling trade and prosperity of Hatien, and thus wished to control it.
In Cambodia, while Taksin led the Thai troops from Hatien to attack Phnom Penh,
another Siamese army went overland to occupy Battambang, Siemreap, and Pursat.
Taksin placed his Cambodian protege Ang Non on the throne, and had the Khmer
okya. Ta-la-ha Baen control Battambang and Pursat.44 With respect to the wealth of
the Battambang region, the Thai knew very well that the Great Lake area was rich in
food product. The records of French missionaries residing in Thonburi indicate that
before Taksin decided to launch a campaign against Hatien and Cambodia in 1771-
prepare rice cultivation for the following army. The area was no doubt the
Battambang region."*^ In addition, the Thai records clearly indicate that the reason
for the Thai occupation of Battambang during the 1771-72 expedition was its
wealth of rice and food products which could well serve their logistical needs."*^
Thus, during the campaign against Laos in 1778, part of the Thonburi army went
overland via Cambodia, from where it continued along the Mekong river to raid
southem Laos. The Siamese army commander demanded that the Cambodian court
of Ang Non mobilise men as well as rice supplies for the Siamese troops. The
Khmers in Kampong Svai and Kampong Thorn were forced to mill rice for the
Siamese army. The intensive imposition of rice levies appeared to provoke unrest
important rice supply for the resettlement area of the forced Lao migrants after the
Chao Anu revolt in the 1830s. Rice from Battambang was purchased by using the
suai money collected from the northeastern Siamese towns and sent to Nakhon
1840s, it appears that Bangkok's concem over the rice supply from Cambodia
Cambodia to Bangkok.'^^
The control of the Battambang region would be of great important for the politico-
economic security of Siam as well. Its location could make it a buffer zone for the
Northeast, the eastern coastal towns, and southem Laos, most of which were
increasingly significant for the Siamese economy in the early nineteenth cenmry.
The Northeast and southern Laos were the major suppliers of forest products in the
forms of suai payment and trade. Therefore, it was necessary to hold the
Battambang region under effective Thai control (see discussion on the role of the
Khmer elites Battambang and Siemreap in serving the Thai in Chapter Six).
Between the periods of Taksin and Rama I, the Thai successfully consolidated their
political power throughout the trans-Mekong region. The major commercial centres
domination. Although Thai influence in Cambodia was challenged when Ang Non
was executed by the anti-Thai nobility in 1779, the Thai soon recovered their power
'^^ TNL, CMH R.III C.S.1192/15 in Chotmaihet ratchakan thi sam. (Collected records of the
Third reign), Vol.5, pp. 92-96.
when political turmoil occurred in 1782 and subsequentiy forced Prince Eng to seek
refuge in Bangkok. Eng stayed there until 1794, when Rama I crowned him king.
Cambodia under the reign of King Eng was strongly dominated by the Thai. In the
middle Mekong basin, the kingdoms of Vientiane and Champassak were attacked
and brought under Siamese suzerainty in 1779, and Luang Prabang followed soon
after. The three Lao kingdoms were then reduced to the staUis of principalities.^^
The Thai seem to have benefited from the political turmoil in Vietnam. Despite the
scarcity of documentation, some factors indicate troubles over the overland route in
Vietnam during the Tay Son revolt. One instance of this can be seen in the
culmination of Tay Son control from North to South Vietnam, including Hatien. In
1774, the Tay Son forces advanced to take control of the port town of Qui Nhon,
and subsequently cut off the transport route between Gia Dinh and Hue. As a
result, Cochinchina faced a serious famine since the food supply from the Mekong
Delta area could not reach there.^' Hickey mentions the dismption of trading
activities between the Vietnamese and highlanders who supplied forest products for
the former's foreign trade.^2 J\^Q French missionaries' records explicitly indicate
that the Vietnamese traders in Tonkin wanted to avoid the route to the turbulent area
of Vietnam. They then had to shift their trade activities to Laos. Unfortunately,
those Vietnamese traders were captured and sent to Bangkok.53 ^ can be discerned
that similar effects occurred to trade between Vietnam and the Mekong basm. Local
traders from Laos and Cambodia were naturally discouraged from going to
Vietnam, but were attracted to carry their products to the Chaophraya basin. Siam
Conditions ceased to favour the Thai after the rise of Emperor Gia Long in 1802.
Thai domination over Cambodia as well as Laos began to be challenged. After three
decades of political unrest in Vietnam, the need for economic recovery must have
been of the greatest urgency, bringing back into effect the local and foreign trades.
The Vietnamese began to make great efforts to re-establish their power, and
consequently the economic interests of the Thai in the area deteriorated.
Although Hatien had been under Vietnamese domination since 1782, there is an
indication that Hatien remained a vassal of Bangkok, as it appears that in 1809, the
govemor of Hatien, together with the Lao prince, the governor of Battambang, and
Ang Chan, were present at Rama I's court in order to attend the ceremony of the
Emerald Buddha Temple.^"* Bangkok continually attempted to reassert its suzerainty
over Hatien. Sellers indicates that after Mac Tu Thiem had died in 1809, Gia Long
appointed his own mandarin Ngiem, instead of a member of the Mac family. The
Thai court soon dispatched a protest to Gia Long on behalf of the Mac members.^^
The protest was in vain as Gia Long insisted on appointing Ngiem. In 1810, he
dispatched a Vietoamese embassy to present tributary gifts to Rama II and to inform
the latter that he had already appointed his own mandarin to govern Hatien, giving
as a reason that the Mac descendent was an incapable mler. Rama II was apparently
unable to refiise such an arrangement, but could only maintain the Siamese symbols
Gia Long tried to nurse Hatien back to health as the civil war had mined its main
city and dismpted its socio-economic activities. In 1810, he allowed Hatien to be
exempted from all kinds of taxes and to be the only duty-free port of Vietnam.^^
Hatien seems to have been involved in the maritime trade again. Although by the
early nineteenth century foreign vessels were attracted by the rise of Saigon-
Cholon, Hatien remained a place for obtaining Cambodian products by Siamese
junks in the I820s.59
^^ Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so. 1173 (Records in the Second Reign, Lessor Era 1173
(AD 1811), (1971), p. 60. Interestingly, the Dynastic Chronicle of the Second Reign composed by
Prince Damrong states that Gia Long's dispatch to Rama II was to request the return of Hatien to
Vietnam. But the document above does not show a sense of request at all. See,
Damrongrachanuphap, PKRR II. pp. 78-79.
58 ibM-, p. 130.
5^ TNL, CMH. R.II C.S. 1183/4: Crawfurd, Joumal of An Embassav. pp. 413-14; Woodside,
Vietnam and the Chinese Model. (1971), p. 258.
91
ventures in the area. In the 1830s the Vietnamese reimposed a custom post in
Hatien. The regulation was directed especially against the Southeast Asian vessels,
together with those of Canton, Shanghai, and Macau, all of which were obliged to
pay the highest duties, while junks from Ch'aochou paid less, and those of Hainan
paid the least.^o Foreign vessels were no longer allowed to sail up to Cambodia,
but they had to trade through the Vietnamese agents.^' French document states that
in 1862, for all exported goods from Phnom Penh ten percent of their value had to
be paid to the Cambodian goverrunent and another ten percent to the Vietoamese
customs post at Chaudoc.'^2 ^g ^ result the Siamese ventores were confronted with
higher costs for Cambodian and Laotian merchandise coming through Hatien.
The Vietnamese appear to have been increasingly concemed over the security of
Hatien and the Mekong Delta. Hatien became more important in terms of being a
strategic military area. In 1818, Gia Long ordered the southem Vietnamese officials
to dig the Vinh Te Canal in order to connect Hatien to Chaudoc and hence to the
westem part of Saigon. As the natoral link between the Vinh Te and Bassac rivers
was possible only in the monsoon season, the Vinh Te project facilitated the much
easier route between the tworiversso that traders did not have to tranship the goods
across the land. Several thousand Cambodians and Vietnamese labourers were
forced to carry out the work.^3 Though it was designed to provide convenient
access for the Vietnamese warships to reach Phnom Penh, it could serve Vietnam's
^^ Sarasin, Tribute and Profit. (1977), p. 203 and footnote 82, p. 332.; Woodside, op.cit.. p. 258,
refers to the Vietnamese annals which indicate that Siamese junks visiting Hatien had to pay tax to
the Vietnamese official, except those whose cargo contained eighty percent or more of rice. But he
did not provide the exact amount of tax.
economic purpose as well: to fortify the Mekong Delta would aid Vietnam's
absolute control over the Cambodian resources and economy.
Meanwhile in the middle Mekong basin, the Vietnamese began to restore tributary
relations with Vientiane. In 1801, Chao Inthavongse, Chao Ann's brother, sent a
tribute mission to Hue to resume a status of vassalage with Vietnam. After
Inthavongse had died in 1804, Anu consistentiy pursued such duties.^^
65 Woodside, op.cit.. pp. 234-261; Chandler, A Historv. 123-132; idem., Cambodia Before the
French, chapter 3.
66 David K. Wyatt "Siam and Laos 1767-1827", JSEAH. 4, 2 (September 1963), pp. 26-27.
93
Therefore, in the eariy nineteenth century the Mekong region became an area of
competition between the Thai and the Vietnamese. It is interesting to see that the
early tension between Bangkok and Hue arose in the border region. Bangkok
apparently took an interest in what was going on in the region after Gia Long had
ascended the throne and began to survey the overland route between the Northeast,
Laos, and Central Vietoam at the same time. The incident took place in 1806, when
Siamese troops under Phraya Chieng Ngoen clashed with Vietnamese forces who
had accused him of evacuating people in the Vietnamese dominated area. The
Vietnamese put Phraya Chieng Ngoen and his followers into custody and reported
the matter to Bangkok. Bangkok provided Hue with an explanation that Phraya
Chieng Ngoen had acted independentiy, since Rama I had only ordered him to
escort to Bangkok two Siamese in northern Laos. Rama I decided to dispatch an
embassy to Hue, in an effort to demonstrate his good will to Gia Long, but in an
astonishing way. Usually, the communication route that both the Siamese and
Vietnamese embassies employed was the maritime route, but this time he sent a
sizeable embassy, comprising three high ranking officials, ninety five commoners,
and sixteen Lao interpreters from Vientiane, overland to Hue via Laos.
Unfortunately, the mission lost two of the high ranking officials and twenty
commoners because of malaria. Hue then sent the survivors back to Bangkok by
sea with a letter advising Bangkok that they should have known that the overland
route was too difficult to send the survivors back, conceivably meaning that they
should have not come by the overland route .6^
The above incident might have had some relation to Hue's treatment of future
diplomatic missions in the following year. In 1807 Hue imposed a limitation on the
size of embassies to and from Vietnam. At first Hue imposed this mle only upon
the Siamese mission, but in 1811 it was applied to the Khmer and other foreigners,
except the Chinese. For the Siamese mission, the limit for travelling by sea was
fifty people, and fourteen for overland route; however, they had to stop at Gia Dinh
before continuing to Hue. Only five people were allowed to transmit a letter to Gia
Dinh where local officials could forward a letter to Hue themselves. A Vietnamese
embassy travelling by sea was allowed to be up to fifty persons; those travelling
overland were not to be over twelve. If they only wanted to transmit a letter, they
would forward it through the Khmer.69 Although the Vietoamese had adopted such
practices from the Chinese "Forbidden City" model, they no doubt wanted to
restrict the mobility of outsiders, probably the Thai in particular, in their domain.
The area from the middle Mekong basin to the Delta was now under Vietoamese
domination. The Phnom Penh region and Hatien in particular were under the
effective control of Vietnam. This sitoation must have reduced the benefits to the
Thai. Although the evidence is limited, it can be deduced that a political settlement
in Vietnam, followed by the reestablishment of tributary relations with Laos,
Cambodia and the uplanders, would have contributed to the growth of trade
relations between Vietnam and the left bank area. The stability on the trade routes
between Vietnam and the left bank area naturally attracted an increasing number of
local traders to come eastward, and brought the Vietnamese to trade in the other
direction. The account of Charles Gutzlaff gives a hint of the effect of this trade on
the Thai. His record tells us that the war between Siam and Vientiane in 1827-28
was caused by a very brisk trade in southem Laos, of which the Siamese govemor
in the Northeast was attempting to gain control.^^ Gutzlaff travelled to Laos in
1830, just two years after the Chao Anu revolt. He was therefore likely to receive
information from the local people in Vientiane who had recently suffered by the
war. His account appears to conform with the Lao document Phun Wiang (a history
of Vientiane), which is concerned with the roots of the Chao Anu revolt in 1827-
28.71
69 Michael Eiland, Dragon & Elephant: Relations Between Viet Nam and Siam. 1782-1847. (PhD
thesis. The George Washington University, 1989), p. 62.
'^ It is likely that Gutzlaff received this view from the local people who had just experienced the
immediate revolt. See Gutzlaff, Joumal of Two Vovages Along the Coast of China in 1831 &
1522, (1833), p. 35.
' ' See, Thawat Punnothok, Phun Wiang: Kansuksa prawattisat lae wannakam isan. (A History of
Vientiane: A Study of History and Literature of the Northeast), (Bangkok, Thai Khadi Studies
Institute, Thammasat University, 1983). A full text of Phun Wiang is published in Pratheep
Chumphol, Phun Wiang (A History of Vientiane), (Bangkok, Samnakphim Adit, 1982).
96
The story of Phun Wiang has proposed a new interpretation of the cause of the
Chao Anu revolt. Phun Wiang attributes the cause of the revolt to the Siamese
Khong (this issue will be discussed ftirther in Chapter Five). With respect to trade,
Phun Wiang states that Bangkok authorised the Siamese authority, the Yokrabat of
Khorat, to pursue conscription in the Northeast and southem Laos. During this
conscription, the Siamese conscription unit based itself at Ban Don Khong (now in
Sithandon), impeding the river route through which local traders usually travelled.
The Thai authorities even captured and conscripted the travelling traders. The
harshness of this measure caused tremendous suffering for the people in the area as
traders no longer dared to come.^^ Although the above accounts do not say
anything about changes in the trade route, there is enough evidence here to assume
to say that the Siamese authorities in the Northeast wanted to control the
Champassak principality because they did not gain substantial benefit from a
lucrative trade in the southern Lao towns. The disadvantage of the Thai was
possibly due to the change in the trade route of local traders, since stability and
the Khorat Plateau. The decline in trade would have resulted in a loss of importance
The most serious threat agamst the Thai came from the Chao Anu revolt. The revolt
was joined by the Vientiane and Champassak principalities, the latter governed by
Ann's son, Chao Yo. The revolt caused tremendous anxiety for the Thai, especially
when the Vientiane troops raided unopposed as far as Saraburi, so close to the
heartland of the kingdom. This was the first time since the establishment of Thai
domination there that the Khorat Plateau had been invaded by a neighbour.
Moreover, the Champassak army led by Chao Yo continued from Sisaket to attack
Battambang.^^ The revolt thus exposed the fact that Thai power was deteriorating in
most of the trans-Mekong basin; the long eastern frontier of Siam was in real
danger from the expansion of Vietnamese domination, although the Vietnamese
were not directly involved in the Chao Anu revolt. The asylum given to Chao Anu
and his son, and Hue's intercession in requesting Rama III to grant Anu a pardon,
certainly caused Bangkok to be suspicious of the Vietnamese. Consequentiy, the
Thai were compelled to reassert themselves in order to restore their control of the
trans-Mekong region. Vientiane was demolished, its population was evacuated to
Siam, and its former territories fell under the direct control of the Thai provincial
administration. In Champassak, the Thai installed a new line of mlers. Both
Vientiane and Champassak together with their subordinate towns were drawn under
direct and firmer control of the Thai adminisfrative system in the Northeast.^"*
Although the Chao Anu war ended in early 1828, a series of expeditions as well as
depopulation campaigns were launched along the whole left bank area from the
Phuan State in northern Laos to Cambodia.^^ Intensive warfare between Siam and
Vietnam in Cambodia broke out in 1833, when the news of the Le Van Khoi revolt
in southem Vietnam against Minh Mang reached Bangkok. Rama III decided that it
was time to latmch a series of expeditions in Cambodia.
"^^ TNL, CMH. R. Ill C.S. 1189/11. in Chotmaihet rathakan thi sam. Vol. 3, p. 15.
^^ For the Thai warfare and depopulation campaigns in the Phuan State, see Breazeale and Sanit,
The Phuan. chapter 3.
98
The strategic objective of the Thai expedition in Cambodia was to destroy the
Vietnamese garrison and to besiege as many Cambodian towns as possible,
particularly in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. The Vietoamese garrisons m Cambodia
on the west bank of the Mekong river included Kampong Svai, Kampong Thorn,
Staung, Pursat, and Kampong Chnang; on the east bank were Phnom Penh,
Sombok, Sombor, Thbong Khmoum, Chaudoc, and Bassac; along the Gulf of
Siam were Kampong Som, Kampot, and Hatien.76 The Thai expedition formed
two land columns and a naval force. From Siam, one column moved overland
toward Battambang; the other went through the Champassak territory in southem
Laos and then to northern Cambodia. The naval force moved to attack the
Vietnamese stations along the Gulf of Siam, and continued to Phnom Penh from
Hatien.'^^ However, as the east bank and the coastal areas were major Vietnamese
strongholds which were difficult for the Thai to besiege. Thai troops were
continually involved in burning down villages, and the fiill-scale deportation of
local population and Vietnamese soldiers. Thai records of the fourteen-year war are
filled with the devastation in Cambodia, and Phnom Penh, Hatien, and probably
Sombok were the worst devastated areas.^^ The most furious fighting was
concentrated in the areas under strong Vietnamese influence, the east bank and
coastal areas.
The Vinh Te canal was also a major military target of the Thai campaigns. The Thai
^6 Chotmaihet ruang thap yuan khrang ratchakan this sam. (Records Concerning the Expeditions
against Viemam during the Third Reign), (1933), p. 9.
^^ For accounts showing devastation and famine in Cambodia, see Ibid., pp. 611-13, 618, 658,
857-58, 967, 990-91; Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan. pp. 7-28, 34; "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen
lae yuan," in PP 67/42. pp. 36, 42-43, 56.
99
made an unsuccessftil endeavour to fill up the canal in order to obstmct the access
of the Vietnamese naval forces, but they were confronted with massive niunbers of
Vietnamese troops protecting the canal.''^
While the Thai tried to demolish the Vietnamese bases, they did not want the
Vietnamese from the Mekong Delta to move into the devastated area. It is evident
that Vietnamese officials took the opportunity to encourage thousands of
Vietnamese to come up to trade and permanently settle in Phnom Penh.^^ Bangkok
sent an order to the local officials to prevent resettlement or trade by the Vietnamese
there and to capture and send to Bangkok any Vietnamese who came to settle or
trade with Cambodia.^' In other words, the Thai considered that if they were not
able to control the area, they should destroy it so that the Vietnamese could not
obtain any benefit from the area either. Evidence for this attitude is clearly
expressed in Bodin's command to the Thai military chiefs in Hatien, Kampot and
Kampong Som, "to evacuate the people, to bum down the houses in every towns,
and to demolish the town, so that only the forest and theriversare left."^^ A similar
orders were sent to the troops of Im and Duang, temporally captoring Phnom Penh.
At the time Bodin found that Khmer unrest was helping the Vietnamese against the
Thai, so he dispatched an order to Im and Duang:
^0 "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. pp, 47, 52, 82, 88-90; K.S.L Kulap,
op.cit.. p. 1083. TNL, CMH. R.III C.S. 1206/7.
^' TNL, CMH. R. Ill C.S. 1204/2/cho/12. The same order was implemented in the left bank Lao
towns. See, Breazeale and Sanit, The Phuan. pp. 20-21.
Khmer rebellions to use it as a base. Then, you must transport the Khmer,
Indian (Cham), Chinese, and others in Phnom Penh to Battambang.^^
Breazeale and Sanit suggest that the purpose of the Thai depopulation campaigns in
Laos was to prevent the area from being used by Vietnamese troops, as the deserted
area was not able to serve logistical services.^'* This was no doubt the case in
Cambodia. But I believe that there was another reason behind the Thai campaigns,
that is, the attempt to control trade and acquire resources (products and manpower)
in the area. The devastated area certainly could not sustain its commercial activities.
Traders would natorally try to avoid routes across the area, and shift their trade to
the more secure routes. In this context, trade between Laos and Phnom Penh must
have been intermpted, and there remained three altemative routes for traders from
Laos to go. First was eastward to Vietnam; the second was westward to the Khorat
Plateau and the Chao Phraya basin; the third was southwestward to the Battambang
region and through to central Siam. As mentioned above, after the Chao Anu revolt
both the Vientiane and Champassak principalities were tied more firmly into the
Thai administrative system in the Northeast, and their economies would have been
increasingly drawn towards the Thai side. Besides, since the Second Reign the area
under the Thai occupation in northwestem Cambodia had been expanded to cover
Mlou Prei and Tonle Ropeou (known in Thai as Manophrai and Tharaboriwat
respectively). French officials reported that there were roads and sala (shelters) built
by the Thai along the way from the two provinces to Champassak.^^ Besides, the
govemors of Pursat and Kampong Svai had already submitted to an alliance with
Bangkok.86 Therefore, the Thai were able to secure the major routes Laos-Siam
and Laos-Cambodia-Siam. The Thai seem to have been so secure in the area
between southem Laos and the northwestem Cambodia that during the Third
Reign, suai from the southem Lao towns - Champassak, Sithandon, Attapeu,
Chieng Taeng (present day Stung Treng), Saenpang, Saravane, Khamthong Yai -
were sent to Bangkok via Battambang and Prachinburi.87 The reader is reminded
that this route was more favourable for travellers than the route across the
dangerous Dong Phrayayen range on the Khorat Plateau, so the security of the
route certainly facilitated trades towards Siam. On the other hand, it is discemible
why the Thai needed to advance their control over northwestem Cambodia.
Although it might not have been possible for the Thai to monopolise every single
trader from Laos and Cambodia to travel westward, the opportunity to influence
and manipulate more effectively the itinerary of local traders by exercising of power
by local officials was one which the Thai certainly took advantage of Moreover, as
local officials often participated in trade, they must have been compelled by
Bangkok's influence. The caravan of suad payment was usually associated with the
royal trade. Bangkok also often ordered officials in charge of suai collection to
purchase extra local goods, usually with the suai money collected in that area, and
send them together with the suai caravan to Bangkok. The purchased local goods
were valuable export items of Siam. As early as 1831, the tax farmer of Sithandon
in southem Laos was responsible for purchase of ivory and bastard cardamom for
Bangkok.88 The tax farmer of Champassak also performed the task of purchasing
87 TNL, CMH. R. Ill C.S. 1201/87: CMH. R. Ill C.S. 1202/42: CMH. R. Ill C.S. 1203/110.
88 Koizumi, "The Commutation of Suai from Northeast Siam in the Middle of the Nineteenth
Century," JSEAS. 23, 2 (September 1992), p. 302.
It is evident that the Thai attempted to prevent local trade between Laos and the
Vietnamese controlled area in Cambodia so that they could secure the maximum
profit in the trans-Mekong basin. Before Chaophrava Bodin left Cambodia, he
decided to impose a trade embargo between the lower Lao towns - Champassak,
Sithandon, and Saenpang - and Cambodia, the reason being, as a Thai document
states, that
Although the official embargo was imposed after the end of the war in 1847, it
probably had been implemented during the 14-year war. The arrests of local traders
travelling between Cambodia and southem Laos during the war by the Siamese
army shows that the Thai indeed kept the area under surveillance.^'
While the Thai were manoeuvring to destroy and obstmct trade in the Vietnamese
bases in Cambodia, they apparentiy made an effort to strengthen commercial links
between Siam and their own base in Cambodia. Given such an objective, what took
place in the Battambang region was entirely different from what happened in the
Vietnamese bases. Thai policy was in fact to strengthen and build up the
Battambang region as their politico-economic base. Although the Thai had
controlled Battambang and Siemreap since the Thonburi period, only in the Third
Reign was a systematic policy towards Battambang put into effect. During the
^' TNL, CMH. R.lll C.S.I 193/17: "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. pp. 43-
45.
103
fourteen-year war we can see the subsequent increasing economic interest of the
Thai in the Battambang region. The evidence indicating such ambition is as follows.
Firstiy, in the eariy stages of the war, Thai troops appear to have lost the battle and
retreated. Conditions in Cambodia, however, became favourable for the Thai when
King Chan died unexpectedly in 1835. Chan left four daughters, but no son, while
the Thai still held two Cambodian princes under their custody, Im and Duang. It is
likely that the okva in the capital preferred a prince to a princess. Although
Cambodia had a bilateral kinship system and no strict mle of succession, men had
dominated the kingship and no woman had been crowned before.^2 Rama III
received a report that the okya now wanted the Thai to beat off the Vietnamese and
send Im and Duang to mle Cambodia.^^ Rama III quickly seized this an auspicious
condition: it was time to strike back at the Vietnamese. He ordered Chaophraya
Bodin to go up to northeastern Siam in order to take a census, and mobilise more
than ten thousand men for a new series of Thai campaigns in the coming dry
season. In 1837 Bodin retomed to Battambang with the first duty of building up
the city of Battambang. He supervised the constmction of new fortifications,
including a fort with a chain stretched across the river in order to obstmct any
Vietoamese naval invasion, ramparts, embankments, and the diversion of a part of
the river into a moat around the town. A new city post and a walled palace for Im
and Duang were also installed.^"^ The purpose of building up Battambang was "that
(Battambang) would be stronger and more prosperous; this would glorify the statos
of Prince Im, who mles Battambang, and it would also be convenient for the
^3 K.S.L. Kulap, op.cit.. p. 787; "Chotmai kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. pp. 86-87.
The city of Siemreap was also strengthened in the following year with new
fortifications and a moat around the town.^^ L^ter, the Thai established a new town
in the North of Battambang. Ban (village) Mongkolborei (or Mongkolburi in Thai)
was raised to a statos of a Muang (town), for "Rama III wanted the news to be
spread to the Vietnamese that this side (Battambang) was well populated."^''
Secondly, I found that there was no forced migration from Battambang and
Siemreap during the protracted war in Cambodia, but only the areas under
Vietnamese influence were depopulated. Instead, Battambang became a temporary
detention camp for evacuees being deported further to Siam.^8 xhe relative stability
in the Battambang region is indicated by the on-going rice cultivation in the area.
The 1834 report from Battambang to Bangkok states that "Battambang, Siemreap,
Svaichit, Mongkolburi, Tanod, Hinrae have already transplanted two thirds of the
rice-fields."^^ But it is obvious that the Thai army did not allow the Khmers living
out of Thai control to settle for cultivation. Although the Battambang region was
inevitably affected by the war and had to purchase rice from northeastern and
central Siam several times, the famine in the Battambang region was less severe that
^^lJM.,p. 119.
^^ Thiphokorawongse, Ruamruang kieokap yuan lae khmen nai samai rattanakosin (Collected
Dynastic Chronicles Concerning Vietnam and Cambodia During the Bangkok Period), (Bangkok,
Cremation volume for Kosit Wetchachiwa, 1964), pp. 160-161.
^8 TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.I 197/3: CMH. R.III C.S.1204/l/cho/l 1: CMH. R.III
C.S.1204/l/cho/12:CMH. R.III C.S.1204/l/cho/17.
^^ "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. p. 21; For records concerning rice
purchased from northeastern and central Siam and levied to Battambang, PP 67/41. pp. 245, 270-
71; E£, Part 67/42, pp. 17-19; TNL. CMH. R.lll C.S.12Q0/68: CMH. R.III C.S.1200/69: CMH.
R.III C.S. 1200/23: CMH. R.III C.S.1201/87: CMH. R.III C.S.I204/1/cho/9
105
in the devastated east bank of Cambodia, where People had to cross dieriverto the
west bank to search for food.'^o
Thirdly, it was obvious that the Thai tried to sustain contentment among
Battambang's people. For instance, in 1827, a hundred able-bodied men, lek, of
Battambang and Siemreap escaped to Kampong Svai and Staung for the reason that
the local officials had forced them to live in areas in which they did not want to.
When Bangkok heard of the news, it dispatched an order to the local officials to
search out and prevail upon those escapees to retom to Battambang and Siemreap,
and instmcted the local authorities to allow people to settle where they wished.'O' It
was also explicitly indicated in Rama Ill's advice to Chaophraya Bodin that
(Bodin) should try to teach Prince Im to govern and nourish the people,
nobles, monks, nuns, and Brahmans in Battambang and its subordinate
towns with mercy. Tell Prince Im to mle with justice in accordance with the
traditions and customs of Battambang. Do not damage the customs of
Battambang and trouble the people.'^^
At this point it is necessary to clarify some points relating to Thai policy towards
Battambang. In 1839, Prince Im, accompanied by 181 okya. half of the okya in
Battambang, secretly fled from Battambang to Vietnam. Im probably expected that
the Vietnamese, who at the time appeared to have gained the advantage in
Cambodia, would have crowned him king. Im evacuated about five to six thousand
people of Battambang down river to Phnom Penh. According to David Chandler,
the result of the event was that "the buffer zone, patientiy built up by the Thai
around Battambang over the preceding forty years, was gone. Bodin reacted
'01 TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.I 189/12. in Chotmaihet ratchakan thi sam. Vol.4, pp.28-33.
strongly, executing Cambodians as they came back into the empty city."'03
Battambang. Besides, not all the refugees accompanied Im to Vietnam, only about
three hundred had undertaken the joumey, while the rest were left in various towns
around Phnom Penh. The Thai officers undertook a search and then forced the rest
that only 236 cardamom payers had fled. Later, in 1840 and 1841, 167 of them
retumed to Battambang. They were placed to resume their duty in thefr former suai
units. 105 Though the Thai court was furious about Im's treason, the aim of building
up the Battambang region as the base for the Thai did not cease. Instead, Prince
Duang, being retained in Bangkok since 1837, since Im had reported that Duang
had a plan to seek Vietnamese protection, was then sent to reside in Battambang.'06
Though the Thai might still be suspicious of Duang, he was now obviously the
only altemative they had. Besides, Rama III proposed to Bodin that the Cambodian
royal capital be moved from Udong to Pursat, which was closer to the Thai base. If
this were possible, Duang could reside in Pursat and Rama III would provide
people to be resettled there,'07 The idea of creating the new royal capital, however,
It is clear that while the Thai were manoeuvring to destroy the Vietnamese
'04 "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. p. 156; Ruamruang kieokap yuan lae
khmen. pp. 163-169.
'05 TNL, CMH. R.lll C.S.1202/43: CMH. R.III C.S.1202/160: CMH. R.lll C.S.1203/51:
"Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP 67/42. pp. 167-68.
'07 Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan. p. 61; "Waduai hetkan muang khmen ton set songkhram thai
kap yuan" (Records Concerning Cambodia After the End of the Thai-Vietnamese War), in PP 56.
p. 7.
107
Further evidence indicating the Thai objective of building up the Battambang region
is related to the prospect of economic benefit derived from the area, namely, the
suai payment and trade. The suai account of Battambang first appears in the 1830s
and payment sent from Battambang to Bangkok shows little evidence of economic
war.' 08 The existing records reveal that Battambang and Siemreap began their
payments to Bangkok in the Third Reign (see table 4.1 and 4.2). Pursat, whose
govemor had been allied with the Thai since the Second Reign, also levied suai to
Bangkok (table 4.3). The accounts show that the region paid suai fairly regularly
throughout the 1830s and T840s, and the size of Battambang's suai units was
relatively constant. Suai payments from Battambang and Pursat were mostly
market. Siemreap, which was less fertile than Battambang, usually sent less
'08 Constance Wilson raises the contradiction between the disturbed conditions in Cambodia
during the protracted 14-year war in Cambodia and the regular suai payment from Battambang. See
Constance Wilson, "The Nai Kong of Battambang, 1824-1868", in Contribution to Asian Studies.
XV, 1980, pp. 66-72.
108
Note One hap or picul is equivalent to 60 kilograms and has 100 catties. Each §uai
payer of Battambang was obliged to pay 4 catties (fihang), equivalent to
2.4 kilograms.
1 The decrease was caused by epidemic.
109
1840 15 5
1842 15 5
1845 15 5
1846 15 5
1847 15 5
1848 15 5
1852 15
1853 15
1854 15
1864 620.00
Note The available records neither reveal the number of suai payers of Siemreap,
nor the amoimt paid per person.
110
1835 22.00 - -
1836 15.00 - -
1840 34.26 - -
1845 70.00 - -
1846 70.00 - -
1847 60.50 - -
1850 50.54 - -
1852 49.70 - -
1853 47.68 - -
1854 49.21 - -
1855 50.54 - -
1856 50.54 - -
1864 - - 8,080.00
Note Each suai payer of Pursat was obliged to pay 14 catfies, equivalent to
8.40 kilograms.
Ill
Suai from Battambang was collected from a specific unit of people called the kong.
People who were obliged to pay suai were known as lek suai. This group of
montagnards known in Khmer as Porr and in Thai as Chong.'09 The lek suai of
Battambang lived in the forest close to the Khao Krawan, Cardamom Mountain, on
the border between Battambang and Pursat. "O However, the unmediate flight of
some suai payers with Prince Im in 1839 suggests that some of them lived near the
town. Battambang held five suai units, each of which had its own chief called Nai
kong suai. and all of them were under the supervision of the Changwang suai.
Both the Nai kong suai and the Changwang suai lived in the town of Battambang,
therefore, the five Nai kong suai needed to have assistants, the Kalabanchi. residing
in the villages in order to keep the records and control of the lek suai. Each unit had
four to five Kalabanchi. When it was cardamom collecting season, which was only
once a year and in July-August or the raining season, the Kalabanchi appointed one
of the villagers to be a Tangkhao. who had the duty of organising a group of lek
suai to travel together to collect cardamom. It took about half a day or more to travel
to the Cardamom Mountain and between twenty-thirty days to finish collecting
cardamom. The Tangkhao received a certain amount of cardamom in retum for their
service.'" They appear to have been Chinese and involved in a trade between
Battambang and Bangkok. They brought cardamom and possibly other Cambodian
forest products as well to sell to the cardamom fax farmer in Bangkok. "^
109 For ethnographic study, see Jean Brengues, "Note sure les Populations de la Region des
Montagnes," Jg^, II (1905), (Kraus Reprint, 1969), pp. 19-47.
' ' 0 TNA, R.5 RL-MT vol. 6. (cho.so. 1234 - AD 1872), pp. 118-120.
' ' ' Document of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, File No. 27. "Major General Det Udom - Prince
Damrongrachanuphap, 25 February, R.S. 123 (AD 1904)," published in Rayabsri Kanjanawongse,
Botbat khong chaomuang phratabong nai samai rattanakosin pho.so.2337-2449 (The Roles of
Battambang's Govemors in Rattanakosin Period (1794-1906), (MA thesis, Sinlapakom University,
1979), Appendix.
Between the 1830s and 1840s, the chiefs of kong suai worked directly under
Chaophrava Bodin until the war in Cambodia ended. Then, the govemor of
Battambang took responsibility for the suai system. No family relations between the
Battambang governors' families and the nai kong suai were to be found. "^ In fact,
the nai kong suai were direcfly appointed by Bangkok. This was probably due to
Bangkok's concem over collecting the complete quota of cardamom. Generally
speaking, Bangkok basically accepted any products available in the locality, but
they nevertheless were mainly important export products. Each suai payer (lek suai)
of Battambang was obliged to pay four catties (chang.) or 2.4 kilograms of
cardamom.
from Pursat was levied to Bangkok by the Changwang suai. The size of the suai
caravan of Battambang was quite large: in 1842, it involved seven elephants, ninety
bulls, thirty carts, and sixty seven people, but sometunes the caravan reached up to
182 people conveying 100.67 piculs (6040.20 kilograms) of cardamom to
Bangkok. The suai caravan travelled overland from Battambang until Krabin, from
where it continued by boats to Bangkok by way of the Bangpakong river. Carts,
cattle, and some people were left under the care of Krabin's officials. "^ The suai
caravan of Battambang often brought back some goods either to sell or consume
among the okya in Battambang. Metal work, metal ware, cloth, and salt appear to
have been the main products that the Khmer Chinese traders brought to
Battambang. "6 The volume of goods brought back to Cambodia must have been
sizeable. In one instance, 600 thang (9,000 kilograms) of salt was purchased by the
suai caravan.'' '^
Cardamom was one of the most unportant forest goods, because of its high price on
the Chinese market. It was monopolised by the Thai court until Rama 111 abandoned
the royal monopoly system in 1826. Among Siamese export goods, the price of
cardamom was rated at the fourth highest per picul (see table 4.4). The constant
number of lek suai. and the regularity of payment in the Battambang region suggest
that neither were the suai payers conscripted into military service, nor did the Thai
force them to resettle in Siam as they did those living in the Vietnamese controlled
area. The records of regular suai payment lead us to infer that the Thai policy of
maintaining peaceful conditions in the Battambang region convinced the suai payers
not to escape the authorities. They seem to have preferred living in the more secure
' '^ TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.1212/128: CMH. R.III C.S.1200/68: CMH. R.III C.S.1206/153.
Battambang to facing risks in the jungle or other devastated areas. Moreover, the
regularity of suai payment explicitly demonstrates the capability of the Thai in
controlling an efficient system of manpower in the region. The high value of
cardamom would convince the Thai to maintain the lek suai at work.'' ^ After the
flight of Im, some of the lek kromakan. those who were subject to local officials,
were transferred to be lek suai in order to substitute for those lost during the
flight."^ The subsfitution indicates Bangkok's strict requirement of a substantial
amount of suai to be levied.
Birds' Nest
1st quality 8,000-3,000 8,000-6,000
2nd quality 6,000-1,500 6,000-2,500
3rd quality 4,000-1,000 4,000-1,000
Agilawood
1st quality 1,000-350
2nd qualtiy 400-250
3rd quality 200-50
Cardamom
1st quality 400-200
2nd qualtiy 200-100
3rd qualtiy 150-20
Gamboge
1st quality 60-50 120-100
2nd quality 55-40
3rd quality 40-30
Banjamin
1st quality 60-50 200-60
2nd quality 45-40 90-50
3rd quality 25-20 40-16
Source Extracted only the seven highest prices of Siam's export products from
Jennifer W. Cushman, Fields From the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade With
Siam During the Late Eighteenth And Eariv Nineteenth Centuries. (Ithaca,
Cornell University, Southeast Asian Program, 1993), Appendix A,
pp. 144-148
116
Table 4.5 gives an idea of the money value of the cardamom suai from Battambang
and Piusat and the revenue expected to be gained by the royal trade from exporting
cardamom suai. The value of the cardamom suai would be better understood when
compared with the value of the annual suai Bangkok gained in the same period from
the Eastern Lao provinces (huamuang lao fai tawan-ok^l and the Forest Khmer
provinces (huamuang khamen padongV including Champassak, Khamthongnoi,
Khamthongyai, Khongchiam, Sithandon, Saravane, Chieng Taeng, Saenpang,
Nongkhai, Mukdahan, Kalasin, Roi Et, Yasothon, Suwannaphum, Det Udom,
Ubon, Khemarat, Khong, Samia, Khon Kaen, Chonlabot, Surin, Sangha,
Khukhan (table 4.6). The comparison between tables 4.5 and 4.6 reveals that
except the year 1845, the value of suai from Battambang and Pursat consfituted
about half of the total amount Bangkok was able to secure from various towns on
the Khorat Plateau.
117
Source Amount of suai payment taken from tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.9
Table 4.6 The money value of suai payment from Northeast Siam
and Laos
1846 26949.01
The Battambang region not only supplied cardamom in the form of suai payment,
but it was also a centre of marketing of cardamom. Suai payment in moneyfromthe
lower Lao towns and northeastern Siam was always sent to Battambang and Pursat
for the purchase of cardamom, which was then sent to Bangkok together with the
annual suai caravan (see table 4.7). The Changwang suai and/or Nai kong suai of
Battambang and Pursat undertook the responsibility of purchasing cardamom from
the chao pa (literally forest dwellers). Some of them appear to have been suai
payers at the same time.'20 Indeed, Bangkok apparently wanted to secure as much
1845 11
10.00 1200.00 2200.00 1000.00
Note Numbers in the brackets are calculated by the author and based on the price
of 120 baht per picul.
* The first amount of money came from the Northeast, and the latter came
from Bangkok.
2 Based on the price sold to Canton in 1844, from TNL, CMH. R. Ill
C.S. 1206/49
121
The Battambang region is likely to have been the major source of cardamom for
Siam since it was rare in Siam, appearing to have been available only in
Chanthaburi, which also sent annual siiai cardamom to Bangkok.'22 But cardamom
of Chanthaburi was reckoned to be of inferior quality when compared with that of
Cambodia.'23 The purchase price was quite constant between 1837 and 1846 at
120 bahts per picul for a superior grade of cardamom. Cardamom from the
Battambang region, both in tax form and purchased by the royal treasury,
contributed a high proportion to the estimated total amount Siam obtained each year.
Henry Bumey indicates that Siam was able to secure about 800 piculs of cardamom
each year, most of which was sold to China, with only 100 piculs being for
domestic consumpfion.'24 in 1846, the contribution of cardamom of Battambang
and Pursat was 168.84 piculs, which is equivalent to one-fifth of the whole
amount Siam could procure (see tables 4.1, 4.3, 4.7). However, the figure does
not include what was purchased by the local traders travelling between the central
Chaophraya basin and the Battambang region. The average annual amount of
cardamom sold to China by Siam was valued at about 140,000 baht.'25
Evidence shows that the Thai nobles were involved in trade in the Battambang
region. Phraya Chodoc Ratchasetthi appointed the Chinese, Chin Phae and Chin
Kia, to conduct trade in Battambang for him. They carried cloth and iron wares to
sell in Battambang, and in retum cardamom was their main purchase.'26 The list of
'22 In 1876, Chanthaburi had three cardamom suai units. See, Chumnum ruang chanthaburi
(Collected Works of Chanthaburi), (1971), p. 169.
'23 Thomas S. Raffles, The Mission to Siam. and Hue the Capital of Cochin China in the Year
1821-2. (London, John Murray, 1826), p. 257.
'25 Cushman, Fields From the Sea. (1993), pp. 144 and 148 note c.
goods in a junk to China which belonged to Phraya Chodoc also contained ten picul
Chinese traders also travelled to purchase products from the cardamom tax farmer
other Cambodian forest goods such as gamboge, stic-lac, varnish, raw hides, homs
and ivory to sell in Bangkok using that money to purchase goods in Bangkok.
Interestingly, the record notes that Khun Thepthipphol also served a high-ranking
activities of the Thai court, he himself probably shared in the benefits of this
venture. As one record shows suai that was sent to Bangkok from Saravane in
lower Laos through Battambang included goods belonging to Bodin (five ivory
tusks, and four rhinoceros boras).'29 As Bodin had been involved in the Chinese
trade with his own junk when he had been Phraya Kasetraksa, responsible for the
royal ricefields, his background suggests the possibility that Bodin had a personal
Concerning the currency for purchasing cardamom, if the money was sent from
Bangkok, it was usually in ngoen tra thai (Thai baht in silver coin).'3' If the suai
ngoen (suai in money/silver) was sent straight from the Northeast and Lao towns.
'28 TNL, CMH. R.lll C.S.1212/128. For the role of Chaophrava Ratchasuphawadi in Cambodia
see, Thiphakorawongse, PICRR III. Vol. 2, p. 2.
apart from Thai baht, it contained various kinds of local silver coins including
ngoen tra lao (Lao silver coin), ngoen namhok. ngoen naenm and ngoen naenrang.
the last two of which originated from Vietnam.'^2 Thai officials usually had to
compute them into Thai baht before they purchased the goods.'33 Bangkok
nevertheless preferred to have Thai baht in circulation to other local silver coins. In
one instance, the suai money from the Northeast and Laos was sent to Bangkok in
local silver coins. The Bangkok authorities melted them into Thai baht, before they
were used ftirther to purchase cardamom in Battambang. The value of local silver
coins was usually decreased by the melting fee (kha sunphoengl'^^ Local officials
in Battambang and Siemreap, however, had no difficulty in accepting both Thai and
other currencies, which seem to have been in common use among the local people.
This suggests that the cross-border trade among Siam, Cambodia, Laos and
Siam would certainly have allowed the growth of the area. Though there is no
information concerning the volume of trade within the Battambang region during
the war, the number of Chinese living in Battambang is an indication of the extent
of the commercial activities in the area since the Chinese were always involved in
the conduct of commerce. A Thai document of the Fifth Reign states that trade in
Asia.'35 In 1838, Battambang alone had 557 Chinese, most of whom were levied
'32 Phadung Khwaenprachan, Luang, "Ruang ngoen khong ratsadon phak isan" (Money Used by
People in the Northeast), in Latthi thamniam tang tang (Beliefs and Traditions), (Bangkok,
Khurusapha, 1961), pp. 50-56.
The systematic administration of suai payment thus expresses the concem of the
Bangkok court with its economic interest in the Battambang region. The high value
of cardamom in the Siamese foreign frade would have been one of the reasons why
the Thai wanted to develop and maintain the relatively peacefiil conditions in the
border region between Siam and Cambodia.
Change in the content of suai payment from Battambang occurred after the war had
ended. After Bodin had left for Bangkok, and the govemor of Battambang, Phraya
Kathathom was responsible for the matter, the suai became less constant (see table
4.9). For many years the suai payment did not reach the requirement set by
Bangkok, and sometimes payment in kind (cardamom) was replaced by payment in
money. The change is interesting. The arrears of suai payment does not necessarily
mean that it was easier in war time for Bangkok to levy the payment, but it was not
possible for villagers to obtain cash because of the decline of commercial activities
during war time. It was more convenient for them to supply suai in kind. The
appearance of money therefore suggests that peace and stability after the end of the
war revived the comical activity of Battambang, and consequently allowed people to
have cash in their hands. Although 1 have argued that the Thai had tried to maintain
stability and economic activities of the Battambang region, it was by no means the
case that the region was able to escape all unpactsofthe war.
Besides, the presence of Chaophraya Bodin in the Battambang region during the
war no doubt made local officials in charge of suai collection aware of Bangkok's
power so that they would carry out their duty efficientiy. It made the continuity of
payment in kind last longer than in the more remote areas such as the Northeast.
The looser control of the Thai after the end of the war began to allow local people,
or more likely the local officials, to take advantage of their products. As the lek suai
could altematively pay four baht per person instead of four catties of cardamom,
local officials probably preferred to sell cardamom to private traders who tended to
offer a better price than the official rate. So if they gamed more income, they could
have sent part of the proceeds as suai money to Bangkok. For example, each lek
suai of Battambang was obliged to pay four baht or otherwise four catties (chang),
and the rate of official purchase was 120 baht per picul (100 catties). Therefore, the
local people would be able to gain at least 4.8 baht for four catties of cardamom.
The revived trade activities in the area were no doubt an important factor, which
stimulated villagers and local officials to make profits from their products.
126
Nevertheless, it is also possible that the decline of Sino-Siamese trade from the
mid-1840s seems to have led Bangkok to pay less attention to in obtaining suai in
kind. Besides, the discovery of a gold mine in 1852 in Battambang seems to have
attracted most of Bangkok's attention. Bangkok sent officials to investigate the
mine and created a gold tax, levied on the villagers searching for gold. This gold
tax was sent to Bangkok.'38 Furthermore, the appearance of suai money is also
interesting in suggesting that the peacefiil conditions after the end of the war
restored the trade activities of Cambodia. The circulation of money in people's
hands indicates the liveliness of commercial activities in Battambang.'3^
'38 TNL, CMH. R.IV C.S. 1214/87: CMH. R.IV C.S. 1215/32.
'39 The stable conditions in the Northeast Siam and Champassak territory since the early 1830s
seems to have made the payment of suai money from these areas occurred much earlier than those
from Battambang. See, Koizumi, op.cit.. p. 285.
127
1849 44.16 -
1851 49.84 -
1852 49.84 -
1854 51.56 -
1864 - 5,796.80
After Bangkok and Hue reached a peace settlement in 1847, it was essential for the
Thai to arrange the administrative system of the Battambang region to provide for
their political and economic interests before the Thai army left Cambodia. However,
Thai influence in the region was not diminished, though the local administrative
authority was transferred back to the govemors of Battambang, Siemreap, and
Pursat after Chaophrava Bodin left for Bangkok. The Thai attempted to minimise
the possibility of the Vietnamese gaining benefit from the resources under their
control, and tried to preserve both the loyalty the people and of the supply of
resources of Battambang to the Thai side.
The Battambang region also had trade relations with Phnom Penh and Cochin
128
China. But since it was under Thai control, trade relations with both Phnom Penh,
and Cochin China inevitably faced intervention from Bangkok. Sources from the
1860s indicate that while there was no customs duty on trade between Battambang
and the Siamese side, exports from Battambang to Phnom Penh and Cochin China
had to pay a duty often percent of the purchase value at Bac Prea (or known in Thai
house in Phnom Penh, and again at the Vietnamese one in Chaudoc. The revenue
transportation between Battambang and Bangkok was longer and more laborious,
the duties made the general expenses of these two traffics almost the same.''^'
These customs houses thus obstmcted the flow of trade between Battambang and
the Indochinese region, while the absence of a customs house between Battambang
and Bangkok made the production and transport costs equivalent to those for
products sold to Cochin China. Thai influence over the Battambang region would
certainly be another effective means to stimulate local traders to come and trade with
Siam.
Conclusion
The economic intervention of the Thai state, on the one hand, encouraged growing
economic relations between Battambang and Siam, and tied up the former's
economic life to the Siamese economic centre. The Thai used every possible means
''^^ AOM, (Indochine) Amiraux 12705: Gouvemement General 26143. "Rapport du Lieutenant
Maitret sur sa mise a Battambang, 1897."; Gamier, D'Exploration en Indo-chine. p. 222; p. F.
Mere, "Une promenade de Saigon a Battambang et aux mines d'Angkor," BSEI. (2e Semestre, 3e
Fascicule, 1888), p. 15(395).
'"*' It took about two weeks by cart between Battambang and Krabin and another three days by
boat from Krabin to Bangkok, while it was only one week by boat from Battambang to Phnom
Penh, and another five days from Phnom Penh to Saigon. See, TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.1203/110:
TNA, R.V M.2.15/1.
129
to force and encourage the influx of people and wealth of Cambodia into their
sphere of dominion. The dominant power thus could attract people to come to trade
in its domain and rendered a higher concentration of resources from distant regions.
In contrast the actions of the Thai brought disaster to the economic basis of the
Cambodian state, for its major commercial area was destroyed, while the
northwestem region was hindered from any potential socio-economic relations with
the Cambodian centre of power. The advance of Thai control over the Battambang
region can be perceived as a substitute for the loss of access to Cambodia by way of
Hatien to the Vietnamese. It was an alternative route for securing Cambodian
products at low expense, although Bangkok still saw theriverroute between Hatien
and the Mekong river as an excellent channel for obtaining Cambodian products.
Soon after the French moved to colonise Vietnam and Cambodia, Bangkok
appealed to French colonial officials to open the Vinh Te canal at Hatien and allow
their junks to sail up to Chaudoc. •'^^ However, it seems that by the mid-nineteenth
century, Hatien was no longer a significant port. The contest between the Thai and
the Vietnamese eventually destroyed the prospective entrepot of Cambodia. War,
devastation and depopulation, particularly in 1833-1847, diminished the potential of
Hatien to develop into a prosperous port city in the Indochinese Peninsula. For the
Cambodian state, the inability to secure resources and make the trade cohere
eventually undermined the state power. Without a basis for acquiring substantial
revenue, it was not possible for the Cambodian government to strengthen its
political and military power sufficiently to protect the kingdom from either extemal
invasions or domestic rivals.
CHAPTER V
MANPOWER ACQUISITION
In Chapter Three I have argued that Siam's successful engagement in the overseas
trade between the Thonburi and the Early Bangkok periods became possible only
when Siam was able to retain its stability and role as the dominant power in the
major trading networks, and to mobilise people to serve as suppliers of products for
the expansion of trade. The dense population of the Siamese dominated area would
stimulate economic activities and attract more traders to come. This chapter will
discuss how manpower scarcity became a critical factor in the development of
Siamese politics and economy after the Thonburi period. I will begin with an
outline of the politico-economic conditions affecting Siam between the Thonburi
and the early Bangkok periods, and thus the consolidation and contest for power in
the trans-Mekong basin was indispensable. Then, 1 will discuss the importance of
Cambodia as a source of manpower resources for the politico-economic
development of Siam and the impact of the subsequent loss of Khmer manpower
due to the successive depopulation campaigns in Cambodia. The demand for
manpower subsequentiy intensified relations between Siam and its neighbouring
states. The unstable conditions demanded that the Thai tighten control over the
frans-Mekong region. The increasing tension finally led to warfare and successive
depopulation campaigns in Cambodia.
Labour Deflciency
After Taksin had proclaimed hunself king, he realised that the system of manpower
control of Siam had been destroyed. In fact, the system had ceased tofimctioneven
before the fall of Ayudhya in 1767. It is evident that since the early eighteenth
century, the continuing loss of the king's sources of manpower, consequently
increased the manpower of the princes and nobles. Basically, there were two
categories of phrai (commoner): the phrai luang (able-bodied men belonged to a
king) and the phrai som (able-bodied men belonged to the princes and nobles).
Since the phrai som were likely to face less burden than the phrai luang. people
preferred to become phrai som rather than phrai luang. They sometimes even bribed
the officials in order to be registered as phrai som. The princes and nobles enjoyed
their increasing power and economic interest. They often caused intense factional
disputes and wars, especially at times of succession. By contrast, it deeply affected
the king's power. The fall of Ayudhya was therefore a result of the inability of the
royal power in Ayudhya to gain cooperation and mobilise troops from the princes
and nobles in order to mount a defence against the Burmese incursions. The war
with the Burmese exacerbated the problems in the manpower system of Siam. A
substantial proportion of the population was evacuated by the Burmese army.
People were dispersed or fled to hide in the jungle, and a large number died of
famine after the end of the war. The accounts of registration of phrai - commoners -
disappeared during the war. Those who were able to maintain effective control of
people were the regional elites, namely the chaomuang or provincial govemors.
Thus, when the kingdom's administration had not yet reestablished effectively, it
132
was difficult for the government to secure cooperation from the regional elites in
order for the latter to levy corvee labour and head tax for the government. The
scarcity of manpower made the revival of agricultural activities, particularly in die
central Chaophraya basin, more difficult. Throughout Taksin's period the coimtry's
capacity to produce rice was hardly able to meet domestic consumption, not to
mention the export ofrice,which had been carried out during the Ayudhyan period.
The lack of a substantial population not only obstmcted the revival of economic life
in the kingdom, but it also weakened the power of the king vis-a-vis the princes and
the nobles. It made Siam vulnerable to incursions from the neighbouring polity, as
the seasonal Burmese attacks remained a threat to the country's security and
demanded more labour for strengthening its defence.'
The Thai mlers seem to have learnt the lesson from the fall of Ayudhya. The first
task of Taksin after his accession was to subdue various political parties throughout
the kingdom. Between the Thonburi and early Bangkok periods, the Thai mlers
tried consistently to increase the number of phrai luang and prevent their loss.
Several measures were taken, such as sending out the central officials to tattoo the
phrai on a vast scale, granting tax exemptions on certain kinds of items such as
market taxes, fishing taxes and land taxes, for the phrai luang. The period of
corvee labour for the phrai luang was reduced from six month in the Ayudhyan
period to four months in the Thonburi period and three months in the Second Reign
of the Bangkok period. A royal decree in 1783 indicates that any phrai som who
wished to institute a proceeding against his patron must be transferred to being
phrai luang.^
' Akin Rabhibhadhana, The Organisation of Thai Society. (1969), pp. 30-39, 56-59; Nidhi
Aeusrivongse, Kan muang thai samai phrachao krung thonburi (Thai Politics in the Reign of King
Taksin), (1986), pp. 5-23, 109-10, 150-61.
people from neighbouring polities. The task of populating the deserted areas was a
primary objective of Taksin's regime. The border regions and its neighbouring
states appeared to have been the wealthy sources of manpower for Siam. After
Taksin had defeated his political rivals in Phitsanulok and Nakhon Ratchasima, his
army evacuated a large number of people from the two provinces to resettle in
of people dying during the war.'* The Thonburi expedition against Vientiane and
Champassak in 1778 carried back about three thousand Laotians to resettle in the
mobilisation remained a major task of the king. Rama 1 tried to encourage the
locally-based officials to carry out the sak lek. conscription by tattooing able-bodied
men. In 1783, one year after Rama I had ascended the throne, Bangkok despatched
an order to various chaomuang to sak lek in their areas, for Bangkok needed to
Following the invasions in Laos and Cambodia an effort was made to expand the
administrative links with the local elites in these border regions in order to ensure
^ "Chotmaihet khong phuak bathluang farangset ton phandin phrachao ekkathat, khrang krung
thonburi lae khrang krung rattanakosin ton ton" (Records of the French Missionaries During the
Periods of King Ekkathat, Thonburi and the Eariy Bangkok), in PP 39. pp. 93-94.
'^ "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1. pp. 143-44; See also, "Chotmaihet raiwan thap samai kmng
thonburi" (Records Conceming the Expeditions in the Thonburi Period), in PP 66. p. 145.
the supply of manpower for the Thai court. The successfiil consolidation of Thai
hegemony over Laos and Cambodia allowed convenient access to corvee labour in
these two tributary states. In 1783, about 10,000 Khmers and 5,000 Laotians were
levied to dig the moat and build a city wall in Bangkok."^ In Cambodia, the Thai had
the govemor of Battambang and Siemreap Ta-la-ha Baen perform services for
them. Bangkok ordered Baen to mobilise troops several times, for example in
assisting Prince Nguyen Anh to combat the Tay Son rebellion.^
The reigns of Taksin and Rama I saw the creation of various muang in the
Northeast and lower Laos such as Attapeu, Chiang Taeng, Chonlabot, Kalasin,
Khonkaen, Saenpang, Phutthaisong, Sapad, Khukhan, Sisaket, Sangkha, Surin
and Ubon.^ Generally speaking, it was the Thai court's policy to encourage the
local officials to create new muang by mobilising as much population as they could
under their command, and then applying for royal permission to set up a new
muang. In doing so, the local officials were promoted to higher administrative titles
and ranks. The higher number of people they controlled meant the more power and
wealth they gained from their subjects. At the same time, royal power was able to
augment its source of manpower.
It is worth noting that the trans-Mekong area, particularly the border region between
Laos and Cambodia, was a traditional source of manpower for the surrounding
states. During the Angkor period, the uplanders were captured to be sold as slaves
in Cambodia.'^ These uplanders were locally known in Thai and Lao as "Kha"
'^ Ian Mabbett, "Some Remarks on the Present State of Knowledge about Slavery in Angkor," in
A. Reid (ed.), Slaverv. Bondage and Dependencv in Southeast Asia. (1983), pp. 44-54.
135
' ' Amarawongwichit, op.cit. pp. 188-222; Also, see the testimony of one of Attapeu's officials in
1886 in "Ruang muang nakhon champassak", (Story of the Champassak Principality) in PP 70.
(Bangkok, Khurusapha, 1969), pp. 177-93.
Forced Conscription
The necessity of obtaining manpower from the time of the Second Reign was
related to a new economic difficulty. I have discussed in Chapter Three how the
shortage of state revenue and westem pressure on the royal trading monopoly
it had lost by giving up the royal monopoly system. Domestic production needed to
Besides, the sak lek was another means of controlling the regular flow of local
products to the centre, since the conscripts became suppliers of suai for the centre.
This reveals the attempt of the central power to extract benefit from individuals in
distant regions with the cooperation of local officials. The higher the number of
people they tattooed, meant the greater network of product supply they controlled.
Manpower shortage remained a critical issue during the Second Reign. The 1810
royal decree of manpower conscription shows that the court found that manpower
control was in administrative disarray. The lists of lek, able-bodied men, were
inaccurate. The number of lek had decreased due to various reasons: death, old-age,
disability, arbitrary changes to new platoons, and mnning away. Besides, some
local officials tried to hide the actual number of lek under their command from
Bangkok so that they could exploit the lek for their own benefit. Therefore, as soon
According to the 1810 decree, the conscription units first began their missions
137
around the vicinity of Bangkok, and then continued to the distant regions where
local officials were obliged to help and cooperate with the kong sak lek.
Interestingly, this was the first time that Bangkok had high-ranking officials from
the capital lead the kong sak lek into the countryside.'3 It suggests that forced
conscription occurred in a more systematic and widespread manner than diuing the
previous period.
Although Siamese conscription was not carried out in Cambodia, one of the major
factors aggravating the antagonism between Bangkok and Udong was Bangkok's
attempt to mobilise the manpower of Cambodia. In 1810, Rama 11 had ordered the
Cambodian court to levy troops to help the Thai campaign against the Burmese, but
King Chan intentionally disregarded the request. The two Khmer okya allied with
the Thai, Chakroei Baen and Kalahom Muang, arbitrarily raised the troops
of rebellion against the royal power. As a result, Chan had Baen and Muang
executed. Chan reported the matter to Bangkok with the excuse that the two okva
Chan's refusal to comply with Bangkok's demand was understandable, since none
decreased the number of guards and revenue suppliers available for the Cambodian
govemment. The lack of manpower was a key factor which hindered the
Cambodian monarch from strengthening his power over local and extemal rivals.
Therefore, the rise of Vietnamese power in the east offered the chance for Chan to
''* Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so.l 173 [Records in the Second Reign, Lesser Era 1173
(AD 1811)1(1971), pp. 54-56.
138
The execution of Baen and Muang showed Rama II Chan's disdain for the Thai
monarch. According to tradition, the vassal mler was not allowed to execute high-
ranking officials himself, but should have sent them for trial in Bangkok.'^
Besides, from the point of view of Bangkok, the suzerain held the right to levy
labour from his vassals. People in the vassal's lands were perceived as his own
subjects, kha khopkhanthasima. In other words, Bangkok considered Laos and
Cambodia its legitimate sources of labour. Such a perception was explicitly
expressed quite often in Bangkok's dispatches to the army chiefs while performing
theu mission in the Phuan state:
The Vietnamese have dominated and appropriated Cambodia and Laos from
Bangkok, since Bangkok was involved in a protracted war against the
Burmese. Since the Vientiane revolt, many Lao families in the east bank fled
to hide in those muang (in the Phuan state). So, the king (Rama 111) wanted
the army to attack and retum the land and people to be subjects of Bangkok
as they used to be.'^
After the Second Reign, Bangkok was concerned about the increasing difficulties it
encountered in Cambodia. It was no longer able to exploit the manpower of
Cambodia as long as Chan was on the throne and the Vietnamese influence
remained there. The adverse conditions in Cambodia were possibly an impetus for
'^ "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan nai ratchakan thi sam" (Records Conceming Cambodia
and Vietnam During the Third Reign), in PP 67/41. pp. 257, 266, 269.
139
Bangkok to advance and intensify its control over the border region in the Northeast
and Laos. It appears that Bangkok's policy of labour mobilisation was actively
enforced by local officials in the Northeast. It was undertaken extensively, and
caused local people tremendous trouble with the result that they turned against
Siamese authority. In 1819, a revolt of the uplanders in the Champassak territory
broke out against the extensive conscription by the Siamese officials. The revolt
was led by a solitary monk named Chao Sa, whom the uplanders believed was phra
sri-ariya. a rebom Bodhisattva who was able to save mankind and liberate them
from suffering. The Phun Wiang indicates that before the Chao Sa revolt took
place, the conscription unit led by the Yokrabat of Khorat was active in the Khorat
Plateau and Champassak territory. The govemor of Khorat (Nakhon Ratchasima)
himself wanted to govern Champassak. He wished to capture as much manpower
as possible in order to gain the favour of the king who had given him the mandate
to send out the conscription unit. The govemor ordered the officials of Khamthong,
Attapeu, Saenpang, Champassak, Ubon, and Srisaket to form the conscription
units and to proceed altogether to ti kha. raiding and conscripting the "Kha".'^
Although the Phun Wiang is the only document to relate this extensive conscription
as a reason behind the revolt, the Phongsawadan huamuang monthon isan appears
to confirm the account of Phun Wiang. It indicates that at the time of the revolt the
conscription team led by the governor of Khorat was carrying out labour
conscription in Khong in Champassak territory, and sent the news of the revolt to
Bangkok.' ^
The Phun Wiang points outtiiatdie harsh measures carried out by Siamese officials
caused chaos among the local people. Those who disobeyed the authorities were
' ^ Thawat Punnothok, Phun Wiang: kansuksa prawattisat lae watthanatham isan (History of
Vientiane: A Study of History and Literature of the Northeast Siam), (1983), pp. 80-83.
executed, and many ran away to hide in the jungle. The conscription units even
captured travelling traders.'^ When the news of the magical power of the monk
Chao Sa began to circulate,tiiepeople fled to join him. They formed a kind of army
to fight the conscription units. After Sa had successfully gathered a force of about
8,000 people, they marched to attack the city of Champassak, which was rapidly
defeated, because its mler, Chao Manoi, soon abandoned the city and fled to Ubon
without attempting to fight. When Bangkok received the news, Siamese troops
from Ubon and Khorat immediately mobilised and recaptured the city. The monk
Chao Sa was finally captured by the Vientiane forces led by Chao Anu and his son
Yo, and was executed in Bangkok. Chao Manoi was also sent to Bangkok, where
he later died.^o
After the defeat of the Chao Sa revolt, Rama II decided to reward Chao Ann's son,
Yo, by appointing him mler of Champassak principality. Prince Damrong pointed
out that Rama III also threw his support behind the decision to appoint Yo. The
decision was based on the fact that Bangkok was concemed about the encroachment
of the Vietnamese in Cambodia and Laos. It was a primary necessity to strengthen
Bangkok's base in Champassak territory, an abundant source of manpower and
forest products. But Chao Manoi's successors had proved to be too weak to endure
even a local revolt. With assistance from Chao Anu at Vientiane, Yo would be able
to strengthen and secure Champassak.^'
By the Third Reign the mobilisation of manpower in the Northeast and Laos was
well underway. One year after Rama Ill's succession, the court issued the royal
'9 Prateep Chumphol, Phun Wianp (A History of Vientiane), (1982), pp. 75-81
conscription decree of 1825.^2 Bangkok failed to leam the lesson of the Chao Sa
revolt, and again used force on the people of the trans-Mekong region. According
to Phun Wiang. the govemor of Khorat volunteered to carry out conscription in the
Northeast and the left bank.23 Again, Phongsawadan huamuang monthon isan
refers to the appearance of Siamese conscription units conducting their duties in the
Northeast at the time of the revolt, and the killing of conscription officials at
Suwannaphum by Champassak's troops.24 In the first stage, the conscription took
place in the Khorat Plateau. Local people there were in distress, and fled across the
Mekong river to seek refuge in Vientiane's territory. The conscription subsequently
proceeded into Champassak territory.
The revolt infuriated Rama III, who had previously favoured and supported Anu
22 TNL, CMH. R.III C.S. 1187/7. in Chotmaihet ratchakan thi sam (Records of the Third Reign),
Vol. 2, (1987), pp. 38-40.
and Yo. When the news reached Bangkok, Rama III immediately dispatched ti-oops
to cmsh the revolt. Before the Thai army reached the princely house of Vientiane,
Anu and his family had fled eastward to seek asylum in Vietnam. The Thai forces
were impeded by the approaching monsoon, and had to wait for nearly a half year
before furthering the expedition. The fightmg broke out again after Anu retumed to
his capital with a Vietnamese escort, who hoped that Rama III would have granted
him a pardon as requested by the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang. Finally in early
1828, Anu was captured and mthlessly executed in Bangkok, while Yo safely
Chaophrava Bodindecha, finally raided and burnt down Vientiane. Its villagers
The Thai mthlessness towards Vientiane reveals the extent of the anxiety which the
revolt caused the Thai, based on their politico-economic security in the trans-
Mekong basin. The Vientiane and Champassak principalities, which had been
from its rival. This was the first time since the establishment of Thai control that the
Khorat Plateau had been invaded by a neighbour. It indeed shocked the Thai when
Chao Ann's army launched an attack enroute to Khorat and Saraburi so close to the
Cambodia since the Second Reign, the revolt exposed the fact that now the long
eastern frontier of Siam was in real danger. The expansion of Vietnamese power
and the antagonistic relationship with both Laos and Cambodia deprived the Thai of
access to the sources of labour and products along the trans-Mekong basin.
govern the area from the south of Luang Phrabang nearly to Vientiane. Nongkhai
143
was to look after the long but sparsely populated stretch of the Mekong until
Nakhon Phanom. The area farther down-river was under the governments of
Mukdahan and Khemmarat. Although the Thai had successfully put down die Chao
Anu revolt in early 1828, a series of depopulation campaigns along die left bank
continued until the 1840s with the purpose of removing as many people as possible
to resettie in the area under effective Thai control on the right bank.26 xhe
successive mass exoduses during this period contributed to the creation of forty
new muang in Northeast Siam. The annual suai payment to Bangkok from the
Northeast and east bank Lao towns, which became more systematically and
regularly paid after 1830, was indeed the consequence of the mass exodus of the
left bank people into the Siamese domain since the Vientiane war.27
In Cambodia, intensive warfare between Siam and Vietnam began in 1833, when
the news of the Le Van Khoi revolt in southern Vietnam against Minh Mang
reached Bangkok. A series of Siamese expeditions and depopulation campaigns in
Cambodia was launched. As 1 have mentioned in Chapter Three, the areas under
strong Vietnamese influence, the east bank and the coastal area, were the major
targets of the Siamese military incursions. Full-scale deportation of the local
population and Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia also took place in these areas.
2^ For discussion on the Thai depopulation campaigns in Laos, see Breazeale and Sanit, A Cuhure
in Search of Survival: The Phuan of Thailand and Laos. (1988), chapter 3.
2^ For extensive studies of the suai system, see Boonrod Kaewkanha, Kan kep suai nai samai
rattanakosin ton ton (Suai Collection During the Early Bangkok Period), (MA thesis,
Chulalongkom University, 1964), chapters 3 and 4; Theerachai Boonmatham, "Kan kep suai nai
huamuan lao fai tawan-ok (Suai Collection in the Eastem Lao Provinces During the Early
Bangkok Period), Warasan Thammasat. 12,4 (December 1983), pp. 158-64; Junko Koizumi, "The
Commutation of Suai from Northeast Siam in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," JSEAS. 23.
2 (September 1992), pp. 278-81.
144
Phnom Penh, Hatien and Sombok were probably the worst devastated areas.28 The
Thai documents are filled with descriptions of famine, burning down villages and
Vietnamese camps, deserted villages, people's flight into the jungle and numbers of
war captives. The extent of the enmity against the dissident King Chan and the
Vietnamese is explicitly expressed in Rama Ill's remark to Chaophrava Bodin:
The Khmer okya and Princes Im and Duang had to carry out the deportation of
Khmer captives for Siam. However, Bangkok was concemed that the Khmer
princes and okya would hide the actual number and make use of the evacuees
themselves. When Bangkok heard that Im and Duang, while stationed in
Battambang had received a large number of Vietnamese captives, an order was
immediately dispatched, demanding that they were not to "hold a single Vietnamese
2* For accounts showing depopulation and devastation in Cambodia, TNL, CMH. R.lll
C.S.I 197/3: CMH. R.III C.S. 1204/1/cho/9: CMH. R.III C.S.1204/l/cho/12: CMH. R.lll
C.S.1204/l/cho/17: K.S.L. Kulap, Annam savamvuth. pp. 611-13, 618, 658, 857-58, 967, 990-
91; Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan. pp. 7-28, 34; "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," in PP
67/42. pp. 36, 42-43, 56.
^^ Chotmaihet mang thap vuan khrang ratchakan thi sam. pp. 21, 26, 34.
145
(for their own use)."^' Whether they were satisfied or not, they were apparently
unable to resist Bangkok's demand.
•^3 Constance Wilson, "The Nai Kong in Thai Administration, 1824-68," Contributions to Asian
Studies. XV, (1980), pp. 52-53.
146
staple crops, the Thai authorities often placed them in Nakhon Chaisi,
Chachoengsao and Ratchaburi. These areas had served as the major sugar growing
regions of Siam since the early nineteenth century.
147
5.2 1,5,7
Cambodia Bangkok 8 -
Note The author selecte;d only records that mention the ne^w resettleme;nt area of
these deportees. In fact, the records showing deportations during the Third
Reign are much more numerous.
Sources
The sugar industry became increasingly important in Siamese foreign trade in the
Second Reign, and by the Third Reign sugar was Siam's highest value export item.
Owing to the low price and relatively good quality of its sugar, Siam attracted a
large number of westem vessels to buy sugar at Bangkok's port.^"* It is estimated
that in 1821 Siam produced approximately 60,000 piculs of sugar and 110,000
piculs in 1844.35 The biggest markets for Siam's sugar were China and Singapore
respectively.
Previous studies have emphasised only the role of the Chinese labourers in the
notable expansion of Siam's sugar industry.^^ Chinese labour was significant to die
sugar industry. The Chinese migrants had first initiated the manufacture of sugar
34 Adisom Muakphimai, Krom Tha kap rahop .setthakit thai (Department of Port Authority and
Thai Economy), (1988), pp. 132-34.
35 l ^ . , p. 132.
36 Sarasin, Tribute and Profit. (1977), p. 214; Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Pakkai lae bairua (The Sail
and the Quill), (1984), pp. 112-15.
149
from sugar cane in Siam in the early 1810s, and the influx of Chinese labour during
the late eighteenth century stimulated the growth of Siam's sugar industry. But
Chinese labour alone appeared not to be enough to fulfil the rapid growth of the
world market's demand for sugar. In some years the amount of sugar cane
produced was not sufficient to supply the sugar factories and led to conflict among
the factory owners in attempting to secure the sugar cane supply. It is likely that the
Chinese tended to be involved in the sugar processing industry, while the forced
migrants served in the cultivation. It is evident that in 1847 in Nakhon Chaisi alone,
about 2,302 rai of sugar plantation belonged to the Chinese, while about 7,322 rai
belonged to the Thai.3'^ The need for labour supply in expanding agricultural
production was reflected in the reduction of the period of annual corvee to three
months in the Second Reign. It was essential to allow a moreflexiblemovement of
labour to make it available for the production process.38 Thus, the forced migration
was designed to further the expanding agriculmral production of Siam. A dispatch
from Chaophraya Chakri to the govemor of Nakhon Chaisi demonstrates the
court's concern over effective labour management in sugar production: "[The
govemor of Nakhon Chaisi] should properly and effectively organise the Chinese,
Laotian and Khmer people to grow more sugar cane than ever before."3^
3"^ Adisom, op.cit.. pp. 282-83. Approximately, 2.5 mi are equivalent to 1 acre.
(Dit), minister of Treasury and acting Kalahom (Defence), and his brother,
Chaophraya Sriphiphat (That), the Changwang (supervisor) of Krom Tha. Dit and
That owned the biggest sugar factory in Siam during the Third and Fourth Reigns.
Other high-ranking officials of Krom Tha who invested in sugar factories were:
Phraya Chodoc Ratchasetthi, the minister of Krom Tha. who had one factory in
Samutsakon; Phrava Sombatwanit and Phrava Ratchamontri who each owned one
factory in Nakhon Chaisi.'^o
As a matter of fact, the areas under the control of Chaophraya Phra Khlang (Dit)
and Chaophraya Sriphiphat (That) were the southem and eastem coasts of Siam.
But they were apparentiy influential over the affairs of Nakhon Chaisi and
Chachoengsao, both of which were under the administrative power of the
Samuhanayok. minister of Krom Mahatthai (Interior). This is shown in a dispatch
of the Krom Tha advising the govemor of Chachoengsao to take care of and assist
the Chinese who wished to establish a sugar factory there. Also, when there were
revolts led by the Chinese in Nakhon Chaisi in 1847 and in Chachoengsao in 1848,
Dit led an army to suppress the revolts.'*' In fact, Dit and That were the most
influential nobles in the court of Rama III, having formed an alliance to support
Rama Ill's succession. The accounts of Luang Udomsombat demonstrates that they
retained a very good friendship with the king. Dit had been a business partner of
Rama III in the junk trade with China when the latter had been Prince
Chetsadabodin. These two brothers played essential roles in the court's
administrative decision making and responsibilities, for they were the most
favoured nobles with whom Rama III liked to discuss the kingdom's affairs. They
seem to have influenced the court's policy on all important issues.'*^ The
background of Dit and That therefore gives a clearer picture of the relationship
between the economic interest of the Siamese mling class and warfare. The pattern
of forced resettlement was designed to meet the growing needs of agricultural
production under the control of the nobles. Besides, the Thai nobles' active
involvement in the country's foreign trade provided them with information on
world market demand. So they were able to decide effectively where were the best
places to resettle the new manpower in response to foreign trading prospects.
44 D.E. Malloch, Siam: Some General Remarks on Its Production. (Calcutta, Baptist Mission
Press, 1852), p. 52.
152
given by Spooner seem to have been underestunated, at least they indicate that fi-om
Spooner's point of view Phnom Penh was less populated than Battambang.45
1830» 11,285
Sources
It is noteworthy that in 1907, the population of Phnom Penh was ranked twelfth
about half of its population was Chinese and Vietnamese (see table 5.3). In fact, a
large number of Chinese and Vietnamese migrated to Cambodia after Cambodia had
become a French Protectorate in 1867 and they tended to resettle in the commercial
cities like Phnom Penh.46 So, the population in Phnom Penh in the first half of the
45 Spooner was a French officer who was sent by the Vice-Amiral Gouvemeur to survey the
agricultural and commercial conditions in the area between Saigon and Battambang.
46 Only Kampot had a higher number of Chinese than Phnom Penh. There were 15,058. But the
number of Vietnamese in Kampot was much smaller, at only 2,173. AOM, (Indochine), A.F.
Carton 111 dossier G 01 (6).
153
nineteenth century must have been much smaller than in 1907. The Thai
depopulation of Cambodia in the 1830s and 1840s seems to have had a lasting
impact on the under-population of Phnom Penh. In contrast to Phnom Penh, the
Thai wanted to maintain the Battambang region for their political and economic
base, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Four. Battambang did not suffer the
destmctive experiences of Phnom Penh. The denser population of Battambang was
a resuh of the Thai manoeuvres to develop and strengthen it. Western explorers in
Cambodia in the nineteenth century never failed to mention the prosperity and active
commerce of Battambang.47
Indian 419
2,000
Cham-Malay _
3,000
Laotian 128
1,000
Siamese -
Uplanders -
Japanese 27
200,000
Total 44,819
4^ For example, Henri Mouhot, Travels in the Central Parts of Indochina (Siam). Cambodia, and
Laos. (1864), pp. 272-75; AOM, (Indochine) Amiraux 12705. "Rapport sur le Cambodge,
Voyage du Saigon a Battambang par Spooner, 30 decembre 1862"; Gouvemement General 26143.
"Rapport du Lieutenant Maitret sur sa mise a Battambang, 1897".
154
Sources
1 AOM, (Indochine) A.F.Carton 111 dossier G 01(6^ "Statistique population du
Cambodge annee 1907".
2 AOM, (Indochine) Residences Superieures du Cambodge 254. "Rapport de
Monsieur Breucq, sur Battambang, 15 fevrier 1907".
3 Chinese and half-caste
Conclusion
regime in particular. However, before 1975 the population of Cambodia had never
been high when compared with that of its neighbours. In 1886, the total population
Vietnam was 10,028,498 souls.48 It is possible to assert that die Thai depopulation
campaigns in the early nineteenth century had remarkably diminished the size of
the power of the Cambodian mlers in all respects, for the basis to form an effective
revenue, since the number of tax payers decreased, local and overseas trade was
dismpted, and the deserted area was not worthwhile for traders to come. The
capacity to build up military power for defending the country against the invasions
of the Thai and the Vietnamese as well as local rivals was duninished. Cambodia's
vulnerability was evident in the Thai and Vietnamese incursions. The Cambodian
royal army never experienced any success in fighting off the invasions.
In contrast to Cambodia, the Thai depopulation campaign did not affect the
basis of power of the Battambang's mlers remain intact. They were therefore able
to continue their effective role in serving the Thai, and were strong enough to show
their independence from the Cambodian mlers in Udong/Phnom Penh, as I will
show in the following chapter.
For Siam, the large scale of the forced resettlement campaigns along the trans-
Mekong basin not only enabled the Thai to populate their kingdom, deserted by the
Burmese war, but also provided Siam with a basis for building up its economy
which had been devastated since 1767. The mass exodus enabled the Thai elite to
develop its production in response to changing world demand and to create a level
of prosperity which enabled the consolidation of state power over a widening
territory in mainland Southeast Asia.
156
CHAPTER VI
BATTAMBANG UNDER THAI RULE
and Siemreap was cmcial for the trade and manpower acquisition of Siam. The
value of products and trade from the Battambang region resulted in tighter control
over the region by Siam, while a policy of strengthening the region to create a
politico-economic base for Siam was undertaken extensively during the Third
Reign. In this chapter, I will examine the Siamese administration in these two
provinces and the roles and interests of the Khmer okya in the Battambang region in
serving the Thai. These questions will reveal the significance of the region in the
Thai-Cambodian relationship. They will also explain why the Khmer okya decided
to work for the extemal power instead of serving the govemment at Udong/Phnom
Penh. The role of the Khmer okya in the Battambang region was very cmcial, as
services, the okya enjoyed relatively autonomous power and enormous economic
of Battambang and Siemreap under Thai mle will show a regional diversity in the
system from other Cambodian regions and were entirely cut off from the
Before we look at the role of the Battambang okva. it is necessary to discuss first
how the traditional administrative system of Cambodia operated, and the basis on
which the king's power was exercised in relation to the okya. This will be the
grounds for further discussion of how the alliance and betrayal of the okva
legitimised and reinforced by the Theravada Buddhist concepts of merit and power,
and the king was a man of merit, a Bodhisattva. who surpassed all other people
(see Chapter One for more discussion on the idea of statecraft). But in reality, the
king's power depended on his relations with the royal family members and
particularly the nobles who were responsible for all important administrative
cases. The role of the Cambodian royal family and nobility was critical for his
power. The king's authority over the appointment of the nobles to titles and power
was then a cmcial means of enlisting and rewarding support and loyalty to the
throne.'
The design of the kingdom's administration was to ftilfil the requirements of kingly
power. The main objective of the Cambodian administrative stmcture was to place
manpower under the effective control of the state, as was also the case elsewhere in
groups, at the apex of which was the king. Everyone in society belonged to a
certain category and was related to each other, either as a patron or a client. Slave
belonged to master; the prai. commoner, was subject to patron; the nobles owed
loyalty and service to the king. In retum for their service, the patron was supposed
to provide protection. Perhaps the most important protection was that which dealt
with legal affairs. A commoner without a patron could not take any legal action
' May Ebihara, "Societal Organisation in 16th and 17th Century Cambodia," JSEAS. XV, 2,
(September 1984), pp. 284-85.
158
treated as an outlaw.^
Cambodia. They were responsible for both domestic and agriculmral work.^ There
were three categories of slaves. First were the uplanders in the eastem region close
to the Lao and Vietnamese borders. They were capmred by private traders, mostly
the Cham and the Vietnamese, in order to be sold to the wealthy and noble families.
This mode of manpower acquisition can be traced back to the Angkorean period.4
assert the central power over individuals in the outlying areas. Apart from the
uplanders, there were two other categories of slaves. One was the debt-slaves, who
had to work for their master to pay off their debt. They also could redeem
themselves from slavery. The other category included war prisoners, criminals,
rebels and their families.^ This group of slaves seems to have been distributed
among members of the royal families.^ As war prisoners usually came from the
invasion of neigbouring polities, by the eighteenth cenmry their number must have
decreased because Cambodia had long since ceased to invade her neighbours.
during the first half of the nineteenth cenmry. But the country during this tune was
^ Ian Mabbett, "Some Remarks on the Present State of Knowledge about Slavery in Angkor," in
A. Reid (ed.). Slavery. Bondage, and Dependencv in Southeast Asia. (Queensland, University of
Queensland Press, 1983), p. 57.
^ Adhemard Leclere, Le Codes Cambodgiens. (Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1898), Vol. 1, Article 53, p.
102 indicates that rice and paddy taxes collected from prisoners of war belonged to the royal
members.
159
With respect to the system of dealing with foreigners, they were exempted from
three months corvee labour. According to the Krom srok. law of the land,
Cambodia established a congregation system in 1693 in order to allow foreign
"^ AOM, (Indochine) A.F.Carton 111 dossier G 01 (2^). "Population de I'lndo-chine de 1886."
° "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan nai ratchakan thi sam" (Records Conceming Cambodia
and Vietnam during the Third Reign), in PP 67/42. pp. 47, 82, 195-97.
^ "Chotmaihet kieokap khmen lae yuan," PP 68. pp. 224-27; TNL, CHM. R.lll C.S.1204
no.l/cho/11.
'0 Thomas S. Raffles, The Mission to Siam. and Hue the Capital of Cochin China in the Years
1821-2. (London, John Murray, 1826), p. 257. Chanthaburi and Trad had a remarkable number of
Vietnamese.
was called chautea. Europeans could be appointed as chautea as well if they spoke
Khmer fluently and were familiar with Khmer custom.'^ Foreigners who were
bom in Cambodia, had fluent Khmer and a knowledge of Khmer law and customs,
were treated as Khmer and could become the chaovay srok. provincial governor.'^
In the sixteenth century, King Borom Reachea II granted two Spaniards, Bias Ruiz
and Diego de Veloso, tides and provinces to govern and princesses for wives.'4 Le
Codes Cambodgiennes does not provide much mformation of how the congregation
Other evidence shows that the Chinese chautea in Kampot also wielded judicial
power over the Chinese community.' ^ Other ethnic chautea possibly held such
power as well. They were responsible for tax collection from their subjects for the
king. A Thai record of 1860 indicates that the Cham-Malay chautea. Tuan Li,
handled tax payment for the court officials. The chautea had influence over their
his conflict with the court authorities. He had successfully convinced thousands
administration. The list of Cambodian okya indicates that there were seventeen
Chinese okya in the capital. Their titles imply that they were mainly involved in the
'^ William Willmott, The Chinese in Cambodia. (Vancouver, University of British Columbia,
1967), p. 68.
treasury and in commercial activities of the kingdom. • ^ Khmer law gave the
Chinese the privilege of occupying important positions such as the head of the
Department of Port Authority. They were granted monopolies such as the tax farm
on gambling. 1^ Apart from such privileges, they appear to have enjoyed the same
The villages where most Cambodians lived can be categorised into three types. The
first were kampong. a Malay word meaning "landing-place", which were situated
along navigable bodies of water. These were more heavily populated and
prosperous than the other two types. People in the kampong were likely to have
much experience with officials, trading, travel, and invasions. The ethnic minorities
tended to live in the kampong. The second category was that of the rice-growing
villages, which were located around the kampong. Most of the population here
were ethnic Khmer. Rice-growing villagers had infrequent contact with those in the
kampong through local trade, the exchange of products, and rice-tax collectors from
the capital. The third category was the prai. or wilderness. Some of the population
here were Mon-Khmer speaking tribal people. They were commonly raided and
captured to serve as slaves. They had some contact with people outside the prai
through the exchange of forest products, which they collected and exchanged, for
Traditionally, the Cambodians paid tax in kind, and the rice tax was probably the
'"7 Bun Srun Theam, Cambodia in the Mid-19th Centurv: A Ouest for Survival. (1981), p. 8.
1^ Willmott, op.cit.. p. 68. Willmott suggestes that the law applied to the Chinese community
placed the Chinese in a category different both from Khmers and from other foreign communities.
But he does not elaborate on how they were different from other foreigners.
oldest and major revenue of the king and the okya. People had to pay ten percent of
their rice production, and this rate was probably applied to other products.^' All
able-bodied men were obliged to pay three months of corvee labour to their
patrons.22 The amount of head tax which was paid in lieu of corvee is unknown,
but it is likely that people paid tax in kind rather than in currency which was scarce
at thetime.Bouinais and Paulus indicate that the okya were entitled to take a quarter
of the head tax of their subjects, with two thirds being sent to the royal treasury .^3
Foreign and local trade was another source of benefit for the Khmer elites. The
head tax in kind comprised valuable commodities for the foreign trade of the king,
and the king also received the ten percent tax on the import and export products of
the kingdom.24 Other Khmer nobles also appear to have participated in foreign and
local trade.25
The size of entourages under the control of the nobles depended on the sak or sakdi
(authority, dignity, and honour) they were granted by the king. The higher the
number they controlled meant the more prestige, wealth, and power they could
2' Leclere, op.cit.. pp. 89-122; Aymonier, Le Cambodge. Vol. 1, p. 75. The ten percent rice tax
remained during period of King Chan (r. 1806-35), and continued at least until the 1860s. See
Nupporat Chronicle, p. 232; AOM, (Indochine), Amiraux 12705. "Rapport sur le Cambodge
Voyage de Sai-gon a Battambang par Spooner, 30 decembre 1862".
22 Aymonier, op.cit. p. 73, states that all able-bodied men paid ninety days of service to the king.
But I am inclined to believe that they paid ninety days of corvee labour to their patrons, which
could mean anyone in the classes of the okya. the royal family and the king.
24 AOM, Amiraux 12705; Francis Gamier, Voyage d' exploration en Indo-chine effectue pendant
les annee 1866. 1867. 1868. (1873), p. 222.
25 For example, TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.1209/7. indicates that the govemor of Kampot had the
Chinese conducted trade for him between Kampot and Kompong Som.
163
derive from their subjects. The sak which allowed the okva to enjoy power and
interest over their subjects, was a substitute for the absence of fixed salary for
officials who provided loyalty and services for the king. According to the Krom
Srok. every able-bodied man aged between sixteen and sixty, had to register
himself as a prai ngia under one of the patrons, and had an obligation of supplying
services - corvee labour or tax - to his patrons.26 J^Q patrons were those in the
official class, royal members and the king. A population census was supposed to be
from the court and the govemor. These men would be called to form armies during
wartime, as Cambodia had no standing army.2'7 It was a duty of the chaovay srok
bear in mind that the traditional system of manpower control was not necessarily
invasions such as Cambodia experienced during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century. The tie between the central govemment and locally-based elites
was not strong, particularly for those in the distant regions. It was difficult for the
royal court to gain accurate information about villagers' lives and simation. The
locally-based okya would naturally attempt to conceal the actual benefit they gained
from the king. Besides, people tried to avoid their obligations by hiding in the
jungle, particularly those who lived beyond the outskirts of villages. Individual
flight appears to have been especially high during periods of protracted turmoil and
wartime, for villagers were afraid of either being conscripted into the army by the
2^ Leclere, op.cit.. p. 103. Aymonier, op.cit.. Vol.1, p. 73, proposes a different age for corvee
labour; that is, between twenty-one and fifty years. This seems unlikely for the period of their
work time was too short.
29 For records of villagers' flight to the jungle in order to avoid conscription during the Thai-
164
Although the system was aimed at extracting resources from the bottom to the top,
where the king resided, the king inevitably had to share the benefits with his
relatives and nobles. Apart from the king, the most important royal family members
who enjoyed enormous privilegesfromtheir status were the immediate members of
the king's family: the Uppavoreat (frequently the heir to the throne), the Upparat
(the second heir), and the Somdet Prea Tieo (the king's mother).30 These three
royal members also received territorial appanages. The Uppavoreat and the Upparat
each obtained authority over five towns, and the Somdet Prea Tieo held three
towns. Most of them seem to have been small towns.^' Territorial appanages
emerged as a cmcial issue in the conflict between King Chan and his half-brother
Prince Snguon, the Uppavoreat. in 1811. Snguon demanded that Chan grant him
three srok north of Udong to be under his control.32 It is likely, however, that the
princely power over their territorial appanages was confined to the rights of tax
collection and corvee labour from the population in the area. They had their own
courts and a number of entourages under their command. The numbers in the
retinues of these three courts amounted to several thousands. When Prince Snguon
Vietnamese war in Cambodia, see, Chotmaihet ruang thap yuan krang ratchakan thi sam (Records
Conceming the Expeditions against Vietnam during the Third Reign), (1933), pp. 67, 78. See a
discussion by David Chandler of how villagers' flight into the forest could be undertood in terms of
perception of moral order in early nineteenth century Cambodia, in "Song at the Edge of the
Forest: Perception of Order in Three Cambodian Texts," in Wyatt and Woodside (eds.), Moral
Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought. (New Haven, Yale
University Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 53-77,
•3^ The position of Uppavoreat was abolished during the reign of King Duang (r. 1848-1860).
Toem Wiphak-photchanakit, "Thamniap khunnang kamphucha" (Directory of the Khmer Nobles),
in Prawattisat isan (History of the Northeast), (Bangkok, Munnithi khrongkan tamra, 1987), pp.
676-679.
32 These three srok were Krakor, Khlong, and Krang. The reason for chosing these three srok was
probably because they were close to the Thai controlled area, the Battambang region, from which
Snguon was expecting military assistance to fight against his brother. See "Nong Chronicle," in
PP 1. p. 288.
165
fled to Siam in 1811, he took along about two hundred officials and two thousand
five hundred prai with him.33 It is interesting to note that intiieThai administt^tive
model there was only one "second king" - the Upparat. but in Cambodia the
position was divided into two - the Uppavoreat and the Upparat. These roles were
an important aspect of traditional Southeast Asian statecraft, for they showtiiatdie
monarch's power was maintained in a divided fashion. Such a practice had been
pursued since the Angkorean period. Mabbett suggests that the complexity of the
administrative system was "to prevent the consolidation of power at any point by
dispersing functions, creating overlapping roles, and fostering cross-cutting
loyalties, rather than to define tasks for the purpose of administrative efficiency."34
^^ The number did not include those of Prince Im and Prince Duang, who also fled to Bangkok at
the same time as Snguon. Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song, cho. so. 1173 [Records in the Second
Reign, Lesser Era 1173 (AD 1811)], (1971), p. 129.
^4 Mabbett," Slavery in Angkor," Reid (ed.). Slavery. Bondage and Dependencv. p. 10.
a group of officials to assist him. Those were the Palat (deputy govemor), the
snong. the kalapeas (registrar), the chaomuang (district chief), the chaoban
(assistant to the chaomuang! the me srok (village head), and the chumtup.^"^
Some chaovav srok were more powertul than others, especially the five chaovay
According to the French sources, these five govemors also held the position of sdat
tran (kings of the field), and their territorial responsibility was called dai (territory)
covering the surrounding towns (see table 6.1). Cambodia in tiie nineteentii cenmry
had fifty-seven provinces, excluding Battambang and Siemreap. They were divided
into six dai (territory), the division of which was simply based on geographical
consideration. These were the dai of Kampong Svai, Pursat, Ba Phnom, Thbaung
Khmum, Treang, and Chaturamuk.^8 But the dai Chaturamuk, which comprised
the area around Phnom Penh, did not have the sdat tran. The absence of the sdat
tran for the dai Chaturamuk was probably because of security reasons since it was
close to the royal court. More importantly, it was the core of economic life of
Cambodia. The central authority, therefore, must have wanted to put it under direct
court control.
37 See Leclere, op.cit.. pp. 117, 231; TNL, CMH. R.IV C.S. 1224/78.
3^ Bouinais and Paulus, op.cit.. pp. 23-28; Aymonier, op.cit.. Vol. 1, p. 71; Leclere,
"Cambodge," Ri, 4 (1905), p. 1381.
167
provinces
dai Kampong Svai 8 Kampong Svai. Staung, Prei Kadi, Baray,
Prei
dai Thbaung Khmum Thbaung Khmum. Sombor, Sombok,
Totung Thngay
The centres of the other five dai were the most populated and rich in natural
resources of each region. The significance of tiie area mled was, therefore, a cmcial
factor in determining the power of each okya. Those who occupied the rich and
heavily populated areas could certainly obtain stronger positions than those in the
poorer regions. Although neither the Cambodian nor tiie Thai chronicles refer to tiie
position of sdat tran. the Krom srok confirms the importance of these five
govemors. They retained the highest sak of ten thousand, while the sak of other
chaovav srok varied from six thousand to nine thousand. The sdat tran carried out
region.39 Moreover, they apparently played an influential and significant role in late
eighteenth and nineteenth century Cambodian politics. For example, around 1779
the govemor of Kampong Svai (the okva Decho Tan), the prime minister (the Ta-la-
ha. Mu) and the governor of Thbaung Khmum (the okya Orachun Long)
successfiilly conspired to overthrow the Thai protege King Ang Ton.40 During the
reign of King Chan (r. 1806-1835), the govemors of Pursat and Kampong Svai
played a critical role in opposing Chan, but allied with the Thai.4'
Next to the chaovay srok were the most influential nobles in the Cambodian
administration, the five ministers at the royal court: the Ta-la-ha. the prime minister;
the Yommarat. minister of justice; the Viang, minister of palace; the Kalahom.
minister of navy and foreign trade; the Chakroei. minister of war. These five okya
held the sak often thousand.42 No royal family members appear to have held these
4' Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho. so. 1173. pp. 58-59.
42 "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1. pp. 267-69. Seventeenth-century Khmer law states that there were
another two okva. the mahatep. and the maha montroei. in the king's advisor. See Leclere, op.cit..
Vol. 1, Article 41, p. 98.
169
five positions. There were another two important positions which were occupied
only by the royal family members - the Somdet Chaopovea and the Somdet Prea
Kaew or Phra Ang Kaew in Thai.43 But they seem to have had no real power, or
The Thai records and Cambodian Chronicles always mention tiie cmcial roles of the
five ministers in Cambodian politics and their alliances with the extemal powers.
They formed an advisory team for the king for such actions as nominating officials
or provincial govemors for the king's approval.44 Although their positions were
supposed to be based in the capital, their power was rooted outside court politics.
They too held territorial administrative power, which was thus a basis of their
tremendous power in terms of manpower control and revenue. Both the Nong and
Nupporat Chronicles refer to the territorial power of the five minister in the periods
of King Eng (r. 1794-96) and King Duang (r. 1848-60) respectively, although their
Cambodian law states that in wartime or emergency, the govemors must carry out
the orders to mobilise forces from the five ministers and the king.46 The king
always ordered them to raise armies for defence or putting down local unrest. This
indicates that they retained a source of manpower. Jaimeau indicates that some taxes
on certain items belonged to the five minister, such as, the tax on fishing which was
conducted in the canals and rivers within their territories. The Yommarat obtained
the right to collect taxes on constmction wood, torches, charcoal and casket; the
43 Leclere, op.cit.. Article 106, p. 115. The role of Somdet Prea Kaew as revealed in "Nong
Chronicle," in PP 1. pp. 246, 281, indicates his close relations with the king as the latter often
had him to carry the royal missions to Bangkok.
Kalahom received taxes on boat constmction, oars, paddles and wood oil. They
had their agents in the provinces to collect taxes for them.47
overlapped and been linked with those of the five sdat tran (see table 6.1 in
comparison with table 6.2). The interconnections between these two groups are
shown in table 6.3 below. They sometunes teamed up into a faction, as in the case
mentioned above when the Ta-la-ha Mu collaborated with the okya Decho Tan,
reign both the Chakroei and the governor of Pursat were ignored Chan's authority
and were pro-Thai.48 They often provoked political unrest in Cambodia. The
Chakroei. the Kalahom. the govemors of Pursat and Kampong Svai all allied with
the Thai. The Chakroei and the Kalahom were eventually put to death by Chan,
while the other two govemors sought asylum in Bangkok. Chan then replaced them
with his own men.49 During the Thai-Vietnamese war in Cambodia, both the Thai
and the Vietnamese were very concemed to procure their cooperation.^o The
transfer Battambang and Siemreap to Thai mle and became the govemor of the two
47 Gustave Janneau, "Le Cambodge d'autrefois," Rl, XVII (1914), pp. 520-22.
48 Leclere, op.cit.. p. 284; Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so.l 173. p. 58.
^0 Ibid., pp. 57-61, 129-130; "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1. pp. 243-304; Chotmaihet ruang than
vuan krang ratchakan thi sam (Records Conceming the Expeditions against Vietnam during the
Third Reign), (1933); Damrongrachanuphap, PKRR 11. Vol. 1, pp. 86-87.
171
Table 6.3 Connections between the five ministers and the five
sdat tran
Five ministers
die Ta-la-ha the Viang the Kalahom the Chakroei the Yommarat
i i
Kampong Svai Thbaung Khmum
i
Ba Phnom
i i
Pursat Treang
the sdat tran
Based on the above account, the traditional administrative system permitted the
okya a relatively autonomous power over manpower, which generated them
172
military, political and economic power. It provoked conflict and competition among
the okya in order to secure power and privilege. The positions of tiie ministers and
govemors of the major five towns were the objective of stmggles among the okva.
The five ministers and five sdat tran were evidentiy often involved in succession
disputes and caused intense conflict with the king. At the end of the stmggle the
victors were usually able to place their men in these important positions. For
supporters to the positions of the Viang, the Kalahom and the Chakroei.51
The social and administrative organisation of Ayudhya also appears to have allowed
for similar factionalism to that of the Cambodian system, although it might have
been to a different degree. 1 have briefly mentioned in Chapter Five that the princes
and nobles often exploited the system by expanding the size of the entourages under
their control. Intense disputes among the princes in the time of succession were not
unusual in the Ayudhyan dynastic history. The loss of manpower consequently led
to the deterioration of kingly power. It seems that the manpower system of the late
Ayudhya period had ceased to function, and that by the time of the Burmese
invasion, the Ayudhyan court was unable to mobilise troops from the princes and
the Thonburi period, several measures were implemented in order to tighten up and
expand the manpower of the kings, and prevent the princes and nobles from
becoming too powerfiil beyond the court's control.^^ One measure the Siamese
control their resources and population. Extensive conscription and evacuation in the
border region and neighbouring states took place on an unprecedented scale. Mass
52 See more detail in Akin Rabhibhadhana, The Organisation of Thai Society. (1969), Chapter 2
& 4.
173
mobilisation occurred along with the process of centralisation in the border regions
by creating new muang in the Northeast, Laos and northwestem Cambodia.
Thonburi and Bangkok asserted their power through the local officials by granting
them titles and ranks.
The interventions of the Thai and the Vietnamese tiierefore intensified the contention
among the Khmer elites and the factional disputes with Cambodian royal power.
Siam and Vietnam became the sources of effective support and protection for the
Khmer elites to ward off each other and often royal power itself In retum for their
support, the Khmer elites facilitated the external powers' intervention and
The attempt to take control over the Battambang region by the Thai began in the
Thonburi dynasty, when Taksin led Thai troops to attack Hatien and Phnom Penh
in 1771-1772. The Thai exerted their control over the Battambang region
Khmer okya served as security guards for the Siamese base in westem Cambodia.
Taksin allowed the Khmer high-ranking okva. Yommarat Baen to control the area
and to work for the Thai.^^ Later, Baen moved to the capital at Udong in order to
53 "Chotmaihet raiwan thap samai krung thonburi" (Records Conceming the Expeditions in the
Thonburi Period) in PP 66. pp. 156-157.
174
compelled King Eng and his adopted father, Ta-la-ha Pok, to take refuge in
Bangkok until 1794. After the suppression of the turmoil, Baen then had the
opportunity to take a higher title, that of Ta-la-ha. and full control over Cambodian
affairs with Bangkok's approval. Until Eng and Pok remmed to reside in Udong in
1794, Baen had to move back to Battambang. His past involvement in the revolt
against Eng's father, Ang Non, resulted in his incompatibility with Eng and Pok.
Rama I then requested the two provinces from King Eng, and placed them under
Baen's authority so that Baen could build up a stronghold for Siam as well as for
himself Thus, the Thai control of Battambang and Siemreap was legitimised in the
reign of Rama 1. Rama I bestowed on Baen the new Thai title of Chaophraya with
the title name of Aphaiphubet, which meant that now the latter became a legitimate
member of the Siamese nobility and a part of the Siamese administration.^4
The selection of a person to administer the region was afiindamentalkey. The Thai
preference for Baen was based on the fact that they knew very well that Baen had
been involved in the fight against the group of Ta-la-ha Mu and King Ang Ton,
who had gained the support of the Vietnamese.^^ Baen had also proved to the Thai
his antagonism towards the Nguyen court, as in 1790, Gia Long had dispatched a
letter to Rama I accusing Baen of building ships in order to att:ack Vietnam.^^ Such
qualities would have confirmed to Bangkok his ability to serve as a watchdog for
Siamese interests in Cambodia. The Thai nevertheless insured themselves against
Baen's disloyalty by holding the latter's son, Ros, in Bangkok to serve as a royal
page at the court of Rama I. The fourth Battambang govemor, Phrava Aphaiphubet
55 "Nong Chronicle" provides a full account of Baen's conflict with the pro-Vietnamese okva and
Pok, in PP 1. pp. 253-299.
(Ched)'s two sons were also royal pages in Bangkok. Besides, in so doing,
Bangkok had an excellent opportunity to exercise its mfluence overfiitureelites, as
Ros became the second govemor, and Ched's two sons served as his father
assistants.5'7 Thus, it could be said that whiletiieThai appropriated the Battambang
region to provide a base for controlling Cambodian politics and resources, the
region initially became a shelter for Khmer dissidents against die Cambodian centi-e
of power allied with the Thai. This role remained a prominent feature of
Battambang throughout the history of Thai-Cambodian relations during the
nineteenth century, as will be discussed below.
Nevertheless, the Battambang govemor did not entirely ignore the existence of the
Cambodian court at Udong, as he allowed one of his daughters, Thep, to be a
concubine of King Chan. Thep bore Chan a daughter. Princess Paen. Also, Baen's
son. Ma, was appointed as a page and later became Phra Ang Kaew at the court of
Chan.58 Baen might have expected that creating a good relations rather than
animosity with Udong would have resulted in the consolidation of his own power.
However, when relations between the courts of Chan and Rama 11 deteriorated,
Baen's relationship with Chan went in the same direction. In 1830, Ma finally
escaped to reside in Battambang where he became governor of Svaichek, a
subordinate town of Battambang.59 Later in 1840, Thep's daughter. Princess Paen,
was executed by the Vietnamese officials who suspected her of a pro-Thai
attitude.60 From that time, none of the subsequent govemors of Battambang were
58 Ibid., p. 140. The position Phra Ang Kaew was a high ranking okya at the royal court, but
appears not to have had real military power. The person who held this position must share kinship
with the king.
related to the Cambodian court. Instead, they increasingly leaned towards the
Siamese side, and their family members married high-ranking Siamese officials.
For instance, two daughters of the Third governor (Ros) married the govemor of
Nakhon Ratchasima and the Siamese high-ranking official, Phrava
Ratchasuphawadi. A wife of the eighth govemor (Yia) was a grand daughter of
Chaophrava Bodin, and three of their children married members of the Siamese
nobility (see the genealogies of Battambang's govemors in Appendix).
Under Thai rule, the governor was required to levy rice when required by
Bangkok. Battambang and Siemreap were an important source of rice supply for
the new resettlement area for forced Lao migrants after the Chao Anu revolt.^i The
region also performed the important task of mobilising Khmer troops as demanded
by Bangkok several times. When Rama 1 decided to throw his support behind
Prince Nguyen Anh against the Tay Son rebellion, Baen was ordered to mobilise
troops to combat Tay Son supporters in Cambodia and southem Vietoam. 62 During
the fourteen-year war in Cambodia, Battambang became the major military and
political base of the Siamese army against Vietnamese domination in Cambodia.
The govemors of Battambang and Siemreap helped facilitate the flow of the annual
suai payment to Bangkok (see details in Chapter Three).
Retaining good relations with their powerful neighbours was perhaps less painful
for the okya in the border regions. The geographical condition of the Battambang
region, adjacent to Siam, was an important factor influencing the decision of the
okya to serve the Thai. As it was the usual route of the Thai army marching into
Cambodia, Battambang was easily attacked. The okva in the border region would
6' TNL, CMH. R.lll C.S.I 192/15 in Chotmaihet ratchakan thi sam (Collected Records of the
Third Reign), Vol. 5, pp. 92-96.
have calculated that, had they refused to ally with the Thai, the Cambodian capital
was certainly unable to protect them from devastation by the invading army.
Conversely, they would have realised that their powerfiil neighbours were potential
supporters for warring against their rivals. Even if they lost the fight, extemal
support would give defiant okya confidence against Cambodian royal power as they
could seek refuge in Siam. As a matter of fact, the same situation also applied to the
okya in the border region close to Vietnam. An example of this is provided by the
alliance of the Mac family of Hatien with Vietnam (see Chapters Two and Three).
Also, the Cham-Malay okya. whose bases were often close to Vietnam tended to
maintain alliances with the Vietnamese rather than the Thai. In 1782, the Cham-
Malay minority, led by the okya Tuan Sed, collaborated with the govemors of
Kampong Svai and Thabaung Khmum, the okya Decho Tan and the okya Orachun
respectively, to overthrow the Ta-la-ha Baen, who worked for the Thai.63 Later
during the reign of Chan, the three closest aids to Chan against the pro-Thai okya
were the Cham-Malay okya. Chan appointed them to the important positions of
Yommarat (minister of justice), deputy govemor and govemor of Kampong Svai.64
While serving the Thai, the Battambang's okya inevitably had to fight against the
Cambodian royal power at Udong/Phnom Penh if the latter gave its allegiance to the
Vietnamese. Moreover, Battambang was often used as a base for dissidents in
countering royal power at the capital. During the reign of Chan, Battambang
provided a base for the Cambodian pretenders and the pro-Thai okva in combating
Chan's army. In 1811, Chan's half brothers, Snguon, Im and Duang, along with a
hundred followers, secretly escaped from Udong and fled to Pursat. With Thai
military support from the Northeast immediately arriving at Battambang and Pursat,
63 Ta-la-ha Baen later moved to be the govemor of Battambang. See "Nong Chronicle," in PP 1.
p. 160.
64 Ibid., p. 297.
178
With the Battambang region as a base, the Thai were able to expand their
domination over the adjacent towns of Battambang and Siemreap. From the Second
Reign of the Chakri Dynasty, the governors of Pursat and Kampong Svai also
pledged their allegiance to Bangkok. The Thai advanced to occupy Mlou Prei and
Tonle Ropeou (known in Thai as Manophrai and Tharaboriwat respectively). Rama
III appointed Luang Phakdichamnong, the official of Khukhan and son in law of
Kampong Svai's govemor, Phraya Decho Main, to govem the two provinces.66
From the 1830s the governor of Pursat, the okya Sangkhalok, undertook the
responsibility of sending armual suai payment in cardamom to Bangkok. The okya
Sangkhalok actively supported the military campaigns of the Thai against Vietnam
during 1833-47.67 j ^ g presence of Thai authority in the Battambang region
diminished royal Cambodian power over the okya in the Northwest but supported
the defiant okya. as shown by the case of the okya Decho Main, govemor of
Kampong Svai. Main was antagonistic to Chan, and fled to seek protection in
Bangkok. When Chan asked Rama I to retom Main to Udong for punishment,
Rama I tomed down his request. Later, Main showed his defiance against Chan by
65 TNL, Chotmaihet ratchakan thi song cho.so. 1173. pp. 66-67; "Nong Chronicle", PP 1. pp.
284, 188-92; Damrongrachanuphab, PKRR II. Vol. 1, pp. 109-10.
retoming to Kampong Svai. He disregarded the traditional mle which required him
immediately to travel to the capital in order to pay homage to the king. He seems to
have gained confidence with the protection of the Thai situated close by his base.
When the conflict between Chan and his half-brothers broke out in 1811, Main
immediately mobilised troops to guard against Udong's army.68
Siamese domination in Pursat and Kampong Svai was sustained until the 1860s,
and it was thus difficult for Cambodian royal power to assert its control there.
Pursat sent suai payment to Bangkok until the French established a protectorate in
Cambodia in 1867. In 1862, there occurred a conflict between King Norodom and
the governor of Pursat, Phraya Sangkhalok. The cause of tension derived from
Norodom's attempt to assert control over Pursat by appointing his own man from
the centre to be Palat of Pursat. The newly arrived officials managed to put a part of
the local manpower under their command, causing dissatisfaction among those who
had enjoyed their privileges without Cambodian court interference for a long time.
The conflict intensified when a revolt led by Ai Pasuthotsarat took place, and
Phraya Sangkhalok refused to carry out Norodom's order to mobilise troops in
order to suppress the revolt. The new Palat then decided to mobilise troops hunself
The increasing tension made Pursat's governor and his assistants appeal to
Bangkok, accusing Norodom of causing trouble for the local people. They
requested Pursat to be transferred to Bangkok's administration. Phraya
Sangkhalok went further, trying to persuade the govemor of Kampong Svai,
Phraya Decho, to follow his path, but the latter decided to stay with Udong. When
the case was considered by Rama IV, Norodom tried to show his loyalty by
suggesting that if the Thai mler wanted Pursat and Kampong Svai, he would be
willing to give the two provinces away. However, Rama IV settled the conflict by
ordering Phrava Sangkhalok and his assistants togetiier with their families to move
to Bangkok. He indicated in a letter to Norodom that he did not want the two
provinces.69 But Rama IV seems to have changed his mind as French influence in
Cambodia became increasingly apparent. The treaty of 1863, which Bangkok
secretly forced Norodom to sign, indicates Bangkok's intention of retaining the two
provinces under Thai confrol:
The treaty was, however, abolished in 1865 immediately after the French colonial
officials discovered it. The Thai nevertheless occupied Tonle Ropeou and Mlou Prei
until 1903, when they were ceded to Cambodia, although King Norodom had
appealed to the French for retom of the two provinces from the Thai since 1867."^'
"7' Toem, op.cit.. p. 638; AOM, (Indochine) Amiraux 10120. "Copie d'une addresse S.M. le Roi
du Cambodge au C. Amiral, Gouvemeur, et Commandant en Chef, 16 septembre 1869"; Amiraux
10288. "Lettre de I'Amiral, Gouvemeur, et Commandant en Chef vi S. Majeste, 2 Janvier 1869.
181
the factionalism among the okva who had split into pro-Thai and pro-Vietoamese
groups. Unlike his father, Eng, who had lived and been educated in Bangkok for
twelve years between 1782 and 1794, Chan had left Bangkok when he was only
six years old. His adulthood was influenced by the pro-Vietnamese faction in
Udong. Chan and his okva wanted the retom of Battambang and Siemreap under
his jurisdiction. Therefore, after Emperor Gia Long came to power, Chan was able
to gain Vietnamese support and act vigorously against Bangkok.'^^ Such an
explanation is partly correct but seems to represent only the Thai court's point of
view. From the beginning of his reign, Chan was doubtiess able to perceive that
most of the important towns and the okya in the Northwest - Battambang,
Siemreap, Pursat and Kampong Svai - were out of his control, but under Thai
power instead. There is no doubt that the Cambodian court wanted tiie retom of the
rich and fertile area of Battambang to its jurisdiction, but there was no sign of any
intention by Bangkok to give up the Battambang region. Certainly, Chan was
dissatisfied with the loss of an area which was fertile and rich in forest products,
and had great potential for furnishing state revenue and trade.^^ As 1 have noted
above, the rice tax was an important revenue of Cambodia and the loss of the major
ricefields to the Thai therefore brought about a decline in Cambodian state revenue.
Besides, it seems to have resulted in the shortage of food supply for Cambodia.
Rice shortage emerged as one of the most prominent troubles of Cambodia
throughout the first half of the nineteenth centory. The Cambodian chronicle shows
that both the Vietnamese and the Thai levied money and rice for the court of
Chan.'^'^ Whenever Cambodia faced famine, the govemment had to purchase rice
^^ Apart from the wealth of forest products in Battambang and Pursat, which has been discussed in
Chapter Four, Kampong Svai was an area of fine woods for construction and ivory. See AOM,
(Indochine), Amiraux 12705. "Rapport sur le Cambodge, Voyage du Saigon a Battambang par
Spooner," 30 decembre 1862.
Chan's desire to retom Battambang and Siemreap to his control was expressed in
the clash between Phnom Penh's troop and those of Battambang in 1815. The fight
took place when a large Phnom Penh force invaded Battambang with the excuse of
wanting to collect fertile soil made of bats' dung. The collection was traditional in
Battambang. However, Phnom Penh's campaign failed absolutely, since the
govemor of Battambang, who was now Ros, formed a defence and quickly
repelled the Phnom Penh troops.'^'' The result no doubt intensified Thai concem
about Battambang's security.
It was not only less painful, but it was also more profitable for the okya in the
border regions to ally with the extemal powers. I propose that the major factor
influencing the submission of the Khmer okya to Siamese authority lay in the
possibility of great advantage the okya expected to gain. Control over the richest
and most fertile area no doubt generated a constant economic benefit for the
govemor and local officials . Besides, their interests would be more secure from
other factions, for Bangkok guaranteed them protection. To understand the power
and interests of the govemor, it is necessary to examine them against the Siamese
Within the Siamese administrative system in the early nineteenth centory, the
provincial administration was under three territorial ministries which undertook
both military and civil-type activities. Those were, the Krom Mahatthai (Interior)
responsible for the North, Northeast, Laos and the Battambang region, and under
the authority of the Samuha Nayok. head of Krom Mahatthai: the Krom Kalahom
(Defence) responsible for the southem region, and under the authority of the
Samuha Phra Kalahom. head of the Krom Kalahom: and the Phra Klang (tiie Royal
Treasury) responsible for the eastem coast region, and under the control of the Phra
Klang (head of the Phra Klang).
The Thai administrative model mainly divided towns into two categories: the
huamuang chan-nai (the Inner townships), and the huamuang chan-nok (the Outer
townships). In theory, the location of the Inner townships was within a short
distance of the capital and these towns held a statos of the fourth class. They were
under the administration of govemors or magistrates (phu rang"). The Outer
townships, which were more distant from the capital, were classified into first,
second, the third classes. The classification was based on their strategic importance
and population. The first class townships were the most important areas in the eyes
of Bangkok. The Outer townships were directly dependent on Bangkok, and under
the supervision of the three territorial ministries. Another category of town in the
Outer townships: the subordinate township, was subject to major townships
nearby.
78 For detail of the Siamese administrative system in general, see Akin, The Organisation of Thai
Society, chapter 4.
184
Battambang and Siemreap were in the category of Outer townships and were under
the authority of the Krom Mahatthai. Siemreap was originally a subordinate town of
Battambang, but in 1834, Chaophraya Bodin, the Samuha Navok and at the same
time the military commander of the Siamese expedition in Cambodia, removed
Siemreap to be under the direct authority of Bangkok and raised it to equal statos
with Battambang. The govemor of Siemreap usually held the Thai rank and title
name of Phraya Nuphaptraiphop. The govemors of Battambang and Siemreap were
granted ranks, titles, and sakdina. by the Thai king as were other nobles in Siam
proper, while the appointment of other high ranking officials of the two provinces
were at the will of the Samuha Navok.
the two provinces. "79 This conclusion represents an anachronistic imposition of the
over territory, onto nineteenth centory history. The relative independence of the
govemors of Battambang and Sienueap was in fact based on the nmeteenth centiuy
centre and the peripheral area. The difficulty of communication and transport
govemors was held by a single family, and thus all subsequent govemors were
family if a govemor had committed any wrongdoing, and/or in conjunction with his
colleagues' attempts to displace him. This is shown by the case of the third
his own deputy in 1827. Rama III ordered Ros to travel to Bangkok where he was
placed in a new position, while his former deputy, Phraya Aphaiphubes (Ched),
took over the governorship.^' However, in practice the position did tend to pass to
descendants. For example, the third Battambang govemor, Ros, was a son of the
first govemor (Baen); Som, the sixth governor was a son of Ched, the fourth
govemor; and Nong, the seventh governor, had his son and grandson become the
79 Suphatsri Vorasayan, Panha monthon burapha rawane pho.so. 2435-2499 (Problems of the
Eastem Provincial Unit Between AD 1882-1906), (MA thesis, Srinakarintharavirot University,
1976), p. 57.
80 Ibid., p. 58; Tauch Chhuong, Battambang in the Period of the Vassal, (typescript, 1974), p.
35.
8' Kathathon-thoranin (Yia), "Phongsawadan muang phratabong," in PP 16. p. 128; TNL, CMH.
R.lll C.S.I 189/12. in Chotmaihet ratchakam thi sam. Vol. 4, pp. 18-33.
186
eighth and the ninth govemors respectively. Their family members often held
important administrative positions in the town (see the genealogies of Battambang's
governors in Appendix).
Apart from the govemors, the important officials in Battambang and Siemreap were
the Palat, deputy governor, and the Phuchuai. the chief assistant to the govemor,
the Phra Wang, or magistrate; the Phra Klang. or treasurer; two Achva Luang, one
of which was responsible for the collection of tax on paddy, and the otiier for the
collection of the head tax; the Changwang were responsible fortiiecollection of tax
on specific items, for instance, the Changwang suai krawan (supervisor of
cardamom tax collection) and Changwang suai thong (supervisor of gold tax
collection ).82 j ^ e Changwang suai krawan seems to have been particularly
important from the point of view of Bangkok, since he was directly responsible for
conveying local wealth to the Thai capital (see discussion of the suai system in
Chapter Four). However, we should keep in mind that the division of labour might
not have been a purely functional one; for example, all officials had to be involved
in military duty in time of war.
Below the officials were the phrai or commoners, who were obliged to perform
services for the state. Generally speaking, only adult males were liable to corvee
labour or head tax payment. There were two major categories of phrai (commoner):
the phrai luang belonging to the king, and the phrai som belonging to the princes
and nobles. They were also referred as lek, able-bodied men. Not all the phrai had
to render corvee labour or pay head tax; they were exempted if they were disabled,
^2 The above positions are scattered in several documents conceming Battambang: Kathathon-
thoranin (Yia), op.cit.. pp. 123-149; TNL, CMH. R.III C.S.1200/69: CMH. RVl C.S.1223/58:
AOM, (Indochine) Gouvemement General 15679. "Renseignements pris dans la province de
Battambang, 1907". For detail discussion of the category of these positions in Constance Wilson,
"Nineteenth-Century Thai Administration: Are Our Models Adequate?," Contributions to Asian
Studies. XV (1980), pp. 29-40.
187
aged, physically or mentally ill and dead. Exemption was also granted for monks,
novices, slaves, local officials on any level, and those who hadtiu-eeor more sons
paying services. There were many sub-categories of lek- Some were involved in tiie
official tasks of a town such as lek thanai. legal officers; lek samian. clerks; and lek
samun, attendants to high-ranking officials. Some were subject to work for local
temples and known as lek wat. Those performing corvee labour or paying head tax
were categorised as lek som or lek phrai som. In Battambang and Siemreap, lek
som subject to local officials were referred to as lek phonlamuang. the civilian
registrants of the township. Lek who paid suai for the Thai kings were referred to
as lek suai or lek suai kong nok. able-bodied men subject to the suai units. So, lek
suai was in category of phrai luang.
In theory, suai was a substitote for the corvee labour that a certain number of able-
bodied men were obliged to render to the royal court. But as Battambang was too
far away from Bangkok, it was more convenient for both sides to accept suai
payment as a substitote. Lek suai of Battambang were organised into a special unit,
the kong suai. Battambang had five kong suai and thus five Nai kong suai. chiefs
of the suai units. Most of them were under the supervision of the Changwang suai.
They held responsibility for collecting head tax in cardamom and for purchasing
and handling cardamom for Bangkok. The suai units of Battambang appeared in the
early 1830s and primarily worked directly under the authority of Chaophraya
Bodindecha, the Thai army commander in Cambodia. Until the end of the war, the
Changwang suai and the Nai kong suai were under the command of the govemor.
Although Siemreap also paid suai to Bangkok, the available records do not have
any reference to the suai units of Siemreap.
The major economic interests of the govemor and his assistants consisted of all
188
kinds of local taxes and fees. There was no exact regulation of how the number of
lek was divided between Bangkok and the officials in the towns. In some
northeastern towns of Siam, the numbers of iek subject to towns were double or at
least higher than those of lek suai.^3 i^ Battambang, lek phonlamuang were the
1830 provides a rough idea of how large the sources of wealth of the Battambang
govemor were. Table 6.4 shows that the number of able-bodied men subject to the
78.93%. Conceming Siemreap, its governor obtained the same kinds of taxes and
fees but to a lesser extent than the Battambang govemor since the population of
Siemreap was much lower than that of Battambang. Around 1847, Siemreap had
govemors to hold complete control over the population in their areas, they were
able to gain benefits from the local residents in the forms of corvee labour and
taxes. They could have their subjects work for them on both the official and their
own business, such as road and wall constmction or cultivation in their own rice
fields. Other high ranking officials of the town also had a certain number of phrai.
^^ Theerachai Boonmatham, "Kan kep suai nai hua muang lao fai tawan-ok nai chuang ton samai
rattanakosin" (Suai Collection in the Eastem Lao Provinces During the Early Bangkok Period),
Warasan Thammasat. 12,4 (December 1983), p. 162.
Officials 10
Total 11,192b
Source NL, CMH. R.III C.S.I 192/4 in Chotmaihet ratchakam thi sam. Vol.5,
pp. 108-9.
Note * The kong nok of Battambang was responsible for sending suai cardamom to
Bangkok, but the document states "lek kong nok fakwai" (let the iek of the
kong nok stand for the time being), the reason for which is unclear.
^ The original document states 11,285. It is likely that one of the above
numbers is misrecorded.
190
Since manpower was a precious resource, the attempt to acquire as many people as
possible to live in one domain became a source of conflict among the nobles of
different towns. In 1853, the govemor of Siemreap appealed to Bangkok alleging
Battambang's govemor, Phraya Aphaiphubet Nong, was taking a number of lek
from Siemreap and collecting tax from Siemreap's subjects.^^ Again in 1861, the
same problem occurred in Mongkolborei (or Mongkolburi in Thai), a subordinate
town of Battambang, with the govemor of Battambang, Phraya Aphaiphubet (Yia),
being accused. The petition from a group of officials of Mongkolborei to Bangkok
indicates that Yia and his assistants extensively levied head tax payment in timber
on lek of Mongkolborei, and caused difficulties for the people. Besides, it appears
that some of Mongkolborei's lek had moved to resettle in Battambang, which meant
that the Battambang govemor had already gained benefit from those lek. But Yia
still demanded the same amount of tax from Mongkolborei to be sent to
Battambang. In fact, the payment of tax demanded should have been reduced in
accordance with the actual number of lek who left Mongkolborei.^^
In the early nineteenth century, the period of annual corvee labour that people in
Battambang and Siemreap had to perform for the govemors was probably three
months, as for those living in Siam proper. Tax in kind or money as a substitution
for corvee labour was an important source of profit of the governors. Taxes on
production constituted the major revenue for the govemors of Battambang and
Siemreap. There were taxes from opium, liquor, paddy, gambling, lotto, cattle,
fishing in the Great Lake, customs duty from import and export goods, and phasi
krawan. which comprised various goods: cardamom (krawan), bastard cardamom
(phon-reo), ivory, suppan wood, beeswax, and animal skins.87 Rice tax or phasi
hang khao was a kind of land tax which demanded ten percent of the quantity of
rice produced. This proportion could be paid either in rice or in money. But it had
to be paid before the rice was sold by its first owner. ^8
Tax collection on some items such as opium, gambling, liquor and lottery were
operated by the Chinese tax farmers appointed by the govemor. ^9 The governors
also earned fees by performing duties such as dispute settlement, land registration
and registration of the able-bodied men. Although they certainly had to put aside
part of the benefit for salaries of their assistants, the govemors nevertheless earned
the largest amount of profit.
Opium tax constituted the highest profit of the Battambang govemor. According to
the Thai law, only the Chinese were allowed to purchase and consume opium. The
fishing tax was another significant source of revenue for the Battambang govemor,
its value being second only to the opium tax (see table 6.5). It was applied to
fishing activities in the Great Lake. Again, fishermen could pay their tax either in
fish or in money. The fishing appeared to cause great expense for the fishermen,
since many of them sailed upfi-omother Cambodian towns and Cochin China. On
their retum, they were subjected to another duty by the Cambodian govemment. In
1868, King Norodom appealed to the French to abandon fishing tax on the
Battambang side for the reason that it caused higher costs for the fishermen.
87 TNA, R.V M.41/59: R.V M.41/5/20: R.V Kh. 14.4/10: R.V Kh. 17.2 Th.2: R.V Ph.20/9.
Those types of taxes were in the category of tax collection decreed by the Second and the Third
Reigns. However, it is possible that by 1892 local taxes in Battambang would have been more
varied than those in the first half of the nineteenth century or later. For example, the import-export
tax in Battambang was introduced at the end of the the Thai-Vietnamese war in 1847.
88 TNA, R.V F.20/19. This rate remained until 1907. AOM, (Indochine) Residence superieure au
Cambodge 254. "Rapport de M. Breucq sur Battambang, 15 fevrier 1907."
89 TNL, CMH. R.IV C.S.121.5/in • CMH. R.IV C.S.1215/72: TNA, R.V M.41/42.
192
merchants and consumers.^o Then, in 1870 a new regulation was introduced in tiie
Additional Article to the Siamese-French Treaty of 15th July 1867, indicating that
fishermen should only pay 1/12 tax to the authorities in the territories where the
fishing activities took place.^i
Total 63,564
Although I am aware that tax revenue in Battambang during the first half of the
nineteenth century was probably lower than in 1892, table 6.5 is usefiil in giving an
idea of the amount of revenue gained by the Battambang govemor. It is noteworthy
that apartfi-omthe suai payment in cardamom, Bangkok did not have any share in
these local tax collections. It was not until direct provincial administration was
^^ AOM, (Indochine) Amiraux 10120. "Lettres du roi Norodom a.s. du Grand Lac, 16 septembre
1869"; Gamier, Voyage d' exploration, p. 240.
^' Ratchasena, Phraya, Pramuan nangsu sanyayai lae anusanva rawang krung savam kap pratet
farangset (Collected Treaties and Sub-Treaties between Siam and France), (Bangkok, Cremation
volume for Phin Aiamsuttha, 1973), pp. 30-33.
193
imposed in Battambang and Siemreap in 1891 that Bangkok began to increase its
share in local tax revenue. Therefore, 1892 was the first year that the Battambang
govemor had to divide part of the local tax income, 8,000 baht, and send it to
Bangkok.
Slavery was another significant source of manpower for the officials. Most slaves
in Battambang were debt-slaves. Interestingly, they comprised Vietnamese,
Chinese and Khmers. There is no information on the number of slaves in
Battambang during the first half of the nineteenth century, but the record in 1904
indicates that Phraya Kathathom (Chum Aphaiwongse) and his assistants each
retained hundreds of slaves.^2
The control of manpower permitted the govemor and his assistants to mm the vast
land of Battambang to their constant benefit, since they had substantial numbers of
people working in the rice fields for them. The average land holding of peasants in
the region around the Great Lake (Battambang and Kampong Svai) was larger than
those in other Cambodian regions. But the big landlords were officials and Chinese
traders.^3 It is also likely that the most fertile rice fields in Battambang were
occupied by the govemor, his assistants and the Chinese. The interviews with local
people living in Battambang in the second half of the nineteenth cenmry by Tauch
Chhuong indicates that few of the commoners had their own rice fields and they
had to rent fields for their own cultivation.^"* Before Battambang and Siemreap
were ceded to the French Protectorate in 1907, the French had to compensate the
govemor Chum, who moved his family to resettie in Prachinburi, for his
^^ Jean Delvert, Le pavsan Cambodgien. (Paris, Mouton & Co, 1961), p. 509.
properties. The French found that alltiiebuildings and major lands intiietown area
belonged to Chum, The buildings were rented to the shop keepers. Chum also
owned an alcohol distillery and arice-mill.Apart from the compensation for his
properties, the French also paid Chum one hundred thousand baht a year imtil the
latter died.^s
As the Battambang govemor was so powerful in the town, he treated the tax
revenue as his family treasury. Phrava Kathathom (Yia), the eighth govemor of
Battambang, gave his children therightto collect tax on certain items. Immediately
after Yia died, conflict broke out among his children over their respective economic
interests. The dispute was taken to Bangkok by Yia's eldest sister, Khlip and her
sons, alleging that their brother Phraya Aphaiphithak, who had succeeded his father
as governor, had deprived them of the tax revenue. The case was settled by
Bangkok's intervention.^^
Conclusion
The interventions of the Thai and the Vietnamese in Cambodian affairs not only
provided the ambitious okya protection but also aggravated the factionalism in
Cambodia.
asserting court control would lead to increasing conflict between the okya and tiie
king. In such a situation, the okva situated in the border and wealthy regions often
sought relations with extemal powers, even though they were aware of the
objectives of extemal powers and what task they had to perform in return for
protection. Under Thai protection, the regional Khmer okva enjoyed tiie occupation
Moreover, from the beginning of its control by the Thai, the region maintained a
with another faction more favoured by the court, sometimes because their
sovereign, the Thai king, was in conflict with the Cambodian court. 1 demonstrated
in Chapter Four that Bangkok attempted to attract products and trade from the
Battambang region to Siam and to impede its trade relations with Phnom Penh and
the political life of the region as discussed in this chapter apparently had no link
with Udong/Phnom Penh. The divide and mle policy employed by the Thai in
Cambodia with the Battambang region as its base, effectively strengthened their
political power and economic interest in Cambodia. On the other hand, it ensured
that Cambodia could never become strong enough to resist Thai encroachment by
independent power of the regional okya developed into a degree that destroyed the
Penh vis-a-vis the powerfiil okya. The loss of control over the economic basis to
196
the powerful neighbours and regional okya significantly brought about the collapse
of Cambodia as a political entity by the mid-nineteenth cenmry, as I will discuss in
the concluding chapter.
197
CHAPTER VII
Following the peace settlement between Bangkok and Hue in 1847, Prince Duang
ascended the Cambodian throne with consent from both Bangkok and Hue, under
the condition that he was obliged to send annual tribute to Bangkok and triennial
tribute to Hue. The Vietnamese handed over the Cambodian royal regalia and sent
back members of the royal family, including Queen Mei, to Udong. All the
Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia, while the Thai political
increasing tensions with the French, the Thai were allowed to enjoy their dominant
position in Cambodia. The long period of turbulence ended. The reign of King
Duang (r. 1848-60) has been appreciated in previous studies as a "renaissance" and
peace and the king enjoyed a relative degree of freedom in dealing with his
bestowing titles on the okya. The restoration of the kingdom involved various
we compare it with the conditions during King Chan's reign, when the Vietnamese
King Duang was more independent in managing its own affairs. Nevertheless, to
2 Chandler, A History of Cambodia. (1993), pp. 134-35; idem. Cambodia Before the French.
(1973), chapter 8; Bun Srun Theam, Cambodia in the Mid-19th Century: A Ouest For Survival.
(1981), chapter 6.
^ For further detail of laws introduced during Duang's reign, see Adhmemard Leclere, Les Codes
Cambodgiens. (1898), Vol. I, pp. 223-34.
198
Cambodia's resources and the economic condition m which Cambodia stood by the
mid-nineteenth century. More importantiy, it would lead to a misunderstanding of
Cambodia's post-war relations with the extemal powers.
This thesis argues that economic factors, trade and manpower, were the basis of the
polity's existence, and the absence of economic power thus meant the collapse of
the polity. In other words, the prevailing economic conditions significantly
determined the political configuration of Cambodia in the mid-nineteenth century.
As I have demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, Cambodia between the late
eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century had experienced
protracted war, extraction of its resources , depopulation and devastation. The
economic basis of the Cambodian polity was greatiy destroyed. It resulted in the
lack of effective means for the mlers to implement policy and control the loyalty of
the okya. The weakness of the Cambodian state prevailed in its vulnerability to the
Thai and Vietnamese incursions.
by the mid-nineteenth century. The command over economic resources allowed the
chaovav srok to play a significant role in determining the fate of nineteenth century
Cambodia. Any attempt by the kings to change that condition led to increasing
conflict among the powerful okya or between the okva and the kings. The
interventions of the Thai and the Vietnamese in Cambodian affairs not only
provided the ambitious okya with protection but also aggravated the factionalism in
Cambodia, which was in a degree that destroyed a balance of political and economic
power of the Cambodian mlers in Udong/Phnom Penh, with the result that
Cambodia ceased to exist as a political entity. The ability to cut off all ties with the
extemal powers and restore its independence was thus impossible, as will be
shown below.
Destitution
In Chapters Four and Five, 1 have demonstrated that after having lost the fertile
Mekong Delta to the Vietnamese in the late seventeenth cenmry, again in the early
nineteenth Cambodia lost the wealthy region of Battambang, which potentially
could have provided manpower, rice supply and forest products for foreign trade.
Battambang and Siemreap were completely removed from Cambodian into Thai
control. Cambodia had lost an enormous number of its people to the Thai
depopulation campaigns. Its local and overseas trade were dismpted for more than a
decade as a result of interventions, wars and massive evacuation. The potentially
unportant port of Hatien became an integrated part of the Vietnamese empire, while
trade in the northwestem region was controlled and diverted to the Thai domain. By
the end of the war, the economic ftmctioning of the kingdom had been almost
entirely dismpted. Thericefields,particularly in the Vietnamese dominated zones,
were all abandoned. The country was faced with a serious famine. Even the well-
200
protected Battambang region had to rely on food supplies from Siam, while people
in the Phnom Penh vicinity were rescuedfi-omhunger by many Vietnamese trading
boats coming up from the Mekong Delta.'^ Therefore, after Duang ascended the
throne, his urgent task was to reconstmct the kingdom's economic base. But the
achievement proved not very great.
According to Leclere, during Duang's reign, two roads which linked the port of
Kampot with Phnom Penh and Udong were built. Such a project was an attempt to
promote Kampot as a new port for Cambodia. It allowed Cambodian goods to gain
access to foreign trade without relying solely upon the Vietnamese controlled
Mekong Delta.^ Unfortunately, Kampot did not appear to be a vigorous port at all.
Its links with the central part of the country, whose supply and demand for goods
were crucial for foreign trade, were entirely impractical during the rainy season.^
But to travel by cart to Kampot in the dry season was not a favourable means for
local traders either, for it was much more laborious than theriverroutefromPhnom
Penh to the Mekong Delta. Thus, as we know from Mouhot's account of 1859, the
volume of foreign trade of Kampot was very limited, if compared with that of
Bangkok. The town comprised only 300 houses at most. Although it was the sole
channel through which the king's revenue from foreign trade came, the king had
only one junk with which to trade with Singapore.^
^ Leclere, Histoire du Cambodge et dans les pays en voie de developpement du Sud-est asiatique.
(Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 438-439; Moura, Le rovaume du Cambodge.
(Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1883), p. 128.
^ Mouhot, Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China (Siam). Cambodia, and Laos. (1864), Vol.
l,p. 180.
201
Besides, the port of Kampot seems to have been partly dominated by Siam.
Bangkok appears to have been very concemed with trade activities and sometimes
exercised its control over Kampot. The record reveals that when there was a revolt
of Pou Kombo in Cambodia in 1860 and the rebellion rapidly moved to seize many
towns. King Mongkut of Siam (r. 1851-1868) worried that tiie revolt would have
disturbed the commerce and safety of foreign merchants in Kampot. He ordered the
Siamese officers to keep Kampot in peace and order. ^ In the Thai and Cambodian
Treaty of 1863, the Thai demanded that the Cambodian court should welcome all
the foreign nations which had amiable relations with Siam, and would provide them
with facilities such as land tenure.^ The control of Kampot might have been anotiier
channel to secure Cambodian products, apart from the inland route between
Battambang and Bangkok. It allowed the Siamese junks to obtain products at a
lower price than at the ports of Cochin China.
Apart from foreign trade, the govemment obtained revenue from a ten percent tax
collected from goods coming down from the Battambang region and Laos to
Phnom Penh, and from goods exported to Vietnam. Although Phnom Penh had
been devastated by the Thai army several times and many of its people had been
evacuated to Siam by the 1850s, it had revived sufficiently to become the biggest
market of Cambodia (not including Battambang).'^ However, as I have revealed in
Chapter Four, the Thai had attempted to shift local products from the Laos and
Battambang regions into their hands instead of allowing them to pass to Vietnam,
via Phnom Penh. The volume of local trade passing through the Cambodian
customs post was probably not very fmitful, and thus must have affected the
Factionalism
The control of manpower and local resources by the local okya. especially the
chaovay srok. was a cmcial factor impeding the king's efforts to revive the
kingdom. Thai records between the 1830s and the 1840s provide a good picture of
how people responded to wartime conditions. They tried to escape the invading
army by scattering and hiding in the jungle. Many of them were led by their local
okya. who would be afraid of either losing their people to the invading army or
being conscripted by the government.'^ Some local okya formed their able-bodied
'2 Leclere, Histoire du Cambodge. (Paris, Earnest Leroux, 1914), pp. 437, 439.
' ^ Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan khrang ratchakan thi sam (Records Conceming the Expeditions
against Vietnam during the Third Reign), (1933), pp. 48, 67, 78, 81-82.; K.S.L. Kulap, Annam
savamvuth. pp. 663-64, 733-74.
203
men into guerilla groups which frequently attacked the unprepared Thai and
Vietnamese armies. It is clear from the sources that most of the able-bodied men
were under the decentralised control of the local okya or chaovay srok.''^ On the
other hand, the power of the latter also caused tremendous trouble for the central
govemment, which had to rely heavily on the supply of men from the chaovay
srok. since Cambodia in the early nineteenth century did not have a standing army.
The king appears to have been unable to obtain a supply of men for the central
army, which in fact seems not to have existed throughout the war because of the
unwillingness of the local okya to cooperate.'^
Both the Thai and the Vietnamese realised that without the collaboration of the
chaovay srok. their domination over Cambodia could hardly be securely
established. The decision to send Prince Duang to reside in Pursat in fact shows the
attempts of the Thai to persuade the okva.'^ As for the Vietnamese by the 1840s,
they had become concemed that the okva were opposing them. They ordered Prince
Im and Queen Mei, both held in custody in southern Vietnam, to write letters to the
okya requesting their support. But the Vietnamese efforts were in vain.''^ It could
be said that the decisive factor which brought political and military advantages to tiie
Thai in Cambodia from 1840 was that the enormous support the Thai gained from
the chaovav srok. The okya's experience of the subversive treatment by the
''^ For the attacks on the Thai troops, see K.S.L. Kulap, op.cit.. pp. 663-64, 669; for the attacks
on the Vietnamese troops, see Chotmaihet ruang thap vuan. pp. 37,44-47, 51-53, 59-63,68-69
'^ The high-ranking Khmer okya. the Somdet Chaophrava. who carried out the order from the
Thai commander to form an army to fight the Vietnamese, complained that he and his assistants
were unable to mobilise men because the Khmer okva took their people into hiding in the jungle.
Chotmaihet ruang thap yuan, p.48.
'6 Thiphakorawongse, PKRR III. Vol. II, p. 46; "Waduai hetkan muang khmen ton set sonkhram
thai kap yuan" (Records Conceming Cambodia After the End of the Thai-Vietnamese War), in PP
56, p. 182.
'"^ K.S.L. Kulap, Annam savamvuth. pp. 950-51, 962-63; Thiphakorawongse, PKRR 111. Vol. 11,
pp. 46-47, 54.
204
Vietnamese during the period of King Chan was a decisive factor which made many
okva throw in their support for the Thai.'^ Many chaovay srok and their assistants
came to pay homage to Duang, who later moved to reside in Udong. They
promised to provide Duang with an army of able-bodied men totalling 32,861.'^
The number of men contributed by the okya was very high. In fact, such an army
might have successfully fought off the foreign invasions if the central government
had been able to command them. Therefore, it was the forces of the local okya
which played the decisive role in both bringing the foreign invaders into the
kingdom and fighting them off
However, the manpower under the control of the chaovay srok was not well-
organised. Thai officials complained of the difficulty in mobilising men and the lack
of discipline of the Khmer soldiers: "They took tums at retuming home to see their
families, but the Khmer officials dared not do anything. Instead, they had to please
their men if they wanted to get any work out of them."20 The lack of disciplme was
due to the poor conditions of Cambodia. The okya did not have enough food to
feed their armies. So the best way to survive was to let the soldiers go home often.
Also, the more coercion they unposed on their men, the higher the possibility they
would have lost them, that they would take refuge in the jungle.
After Duang's accession, he tried to restore and secure the king's power by creating
a new circle of okva around the king. Duang also employed symbolic means to
' ^ Chotmaihet ruang thap yuan provides letters from okya. pledging to fight against the
Vietnamese for the Thai and Duang. Those included the govemors of Bati, Kampong Som, Treang,
Kampot, Chaudoc, Somrong Tong, Ba Phnom, Sombor, Stung Trang, Chhlong, and Kratie. The
okya who remained serving the Vietnamese at the time were the govemors of Sombok, Choeung
Prei, Kampong Siem, Babour, Prei Krabas, and forty-eight okya of Phnom Penh. See .pp. 2-8,
15-16, 21-24, 30-32, 39-42, 48-49; TNL, CMH. R.III C.S. 1202/42.
persuade his okva his fiind of merit by organising royal ceremonies, restoring the
monasteries, palace decoration and linguistic reforms.^' Duang exercised his power
by appointing the chaovav srok of fifty provinces. However, this does not
necessarily mean that Duang's power over the okya was great. His relations with
tiie okva seem to have been smooth as long as he did not impose too many demands
on them. Chandler mdicates that the court seems to have received a smaller surplus
from the people than from the regional elites.22 Therefore, when Duang tried to
increase his demand for resources from the regional okya. a crisis arose. In 1855,
the govemors of Kampong Svai and Stung came into conflict with Duang, because
"they were angry that Duang demanded from them much more than in the past. "23
The two officials fled to seek asylum in Vietnam. The pressure would probably
have been for the supply of manpower to work for the govemment, or for local
products. It is worth noting that the newly appointed officials were possibly the
same group of okya who had pledged to provide Duang with their men to fight
against the Vietnamese in 1840. It means that they had already commanded the
country's politico-economic strength before Duang's accession. They were
accustomed to be independent from the central govemment, and thus unwilling to
share their surplus with the king.
Significantly, Thai influence was felt strongly over a section of the high-ranking
okya of Duang. The key positions in Duang's court were held by those who were
accepted by the Thai court. In 1848, under the supervision of Bodin, Duang
requested Rama Ill's permission to appoint two highest-ranking positions in the
21 Chandler, "Going Through the Motions: Ritual Aspects of the Reign of King Duang of
Cambodia (1848-1860)," in L. Gesick (ed.), Centers. Symbols and Hierarchies: Essays on the
Classical States of Southeast Asia. (New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983),
pp. 106-124.
^^im.-,P- 117.
Cambodian court: the Ta-la-ha. and the Somdet Chaophraya.24 The Ta-ta-la-ha was
granted to a former official of Battambang, Phrava Phichai Ronnarong
Sitthisongkhram. He was a relative of Duang's wife, Norodom's mother, and also
a son-in-law of the eighth govemor of Battambang. The other position was held by
a former govemor of Pursat, who had apparentiy served the Thai military
campaigns in Cambodia. The continual interference of the Thai resulted in tiie
king's powerlessness over his own men. It permitted a section of high-ranking
officials to take advantage of their dual overlordship: to the Cambodian king and to
the Thai king. Later Bangkok sent the Siamese official in Aranyaprathet to be the
governor of Pursat.25 After Duang died in 1860, the govemor of Pursat was
evidentiy in conflict with Norodom on the issue of manpower. In 1862, the former
appealed to King Mongkut that he and his assistants wanted to have Pursat
transferred to Bangkok's suzerainty, instead of that of Udong. The trouble derived
from Norodom's attempt to assert control over Pursat by appointing his own men
from the capital to be Palat (deputy govemor) of Pursat. The newly arrived official
managed to divide a number of manpower to be under his command, thus causing
dissatisfaction on the part of the govemor and his assistants. The conflict intensified
when a revolt led by Ai Pasuthotsarat or Phraya Chetthamontri, the govemor of
Somrong Tong, took place.26 The govemor of Pursat refiised to give cooperation
by providing men for the army. The new Palat then decided to mobilise troops
himself In the end, the govemor of Pursat, his assistants and their families moved
to stay in Battambang.27
The need for manpower and revenue again brought trouble to the govemment in
1859-60. This time it was with the Cham-Malay minority in the vicinity of Phnom
Penh.28 The revolt was led by a group of Cham brothers, one of which was tiie
okjia, named Tuan Li or Somdet Phra Bowon Prathet, who was in charge of the
Cham-Malay minority. The testimonies of the Thai official and a monk from
Cambodia to the Thai court reveal that the conflict began when Phrava Montri
Ratcharit, an official in Udong, was sent to collect tax from the Cham-Malay
minority near Phnom Penh. The action provoked dissatisfaction among the Cham
and their leaders who accused Phrava Montri of being abusive to the villagers.
Phrava Montri was abmptly executed. Fearing punishment from the central
govemment, Tuan Li and his brothers decided to lead the Cham villagers to resettle
in Chaudoc so as to seek Vietnamese protection. About 1,000 Cham villagers fled
with their leaders, and Duang was entirely powerless to do anything against the
revolt. He appeared to fear that the Khmer forces might have clashed with the
Vietnamese if they were sent to take the Cham villagers back to Cambodia. The
Cambodian govemment was only able to ask the Vietnamese to deport the revolt
leaders to Cambodia for punishment. But the Vietnamese never considered the
request. Duang's inability to suppress the revolt brought him another contempt a
few month later. A small group of Tuan Li's followers secretly penetrated as far as
Kampong Luang and Udong and successfully evacuated the rest of the Chams to
Chaudoc.29
The Cham revolt inevitably jeopardised relations between Cambodia and Vietnam.
28 TNL, CMH. R.IV C.S.1222/173: CMH. R.IV C.S.1222/27. But Moura in his Le Rovaume
du Cambodge. Vol. II, p. 133, indicates that the revoh took place in Thbaung Khmum, because its
govemor was oppressive towards the villagers. But from its location, which is much further north
of Phnom Penh, it is unlikely that the revolt took place there, for it would be more difficult to
carry the villagers down river to Chaudoc within so short a time that the Udong forces could not
reach them.
The mmour that Cambodian forces were going to attack the Vietnamese in the
Mekong Delta spread throughout the area and incited the Khmers in tiie Delta to
rise up and kill the Vietnamese there. However, the revolt was soon suppressed by
the Vietnamese army.^o Duang was obviously anxious that the Vietnamese might
come up and attack Cambodia agam. Royal despatches were immediately forwarded
to the okya to mobilise troops in order to set up military camps from Kampong
Luang to Ba Phnom and Treang. Unfortunately, the sustained politico-economic
weakness of Cambodia would not allow such an order to be implemented
efficiently. The king was evidently unable to command the regional okya to levy
men for the army, as shown by Duang's complaint about the conditions in
Cambodia in a letter to King Mongkut:
The vulnerability of the Cambodian state was increasingly revealed by the okya
from time to time. It was particularly discernible in a revolt led by Snong So, a
deputy govemor of Ba Phnom, in 1860. Snong So was a maternal uncle of Prince
Votha, a son of Duang, who was in conflict with his half-brother Norodom, the
successor to the Cambodian throne.
Immediately after Duang had died of illness in 1860, a conflict among his sons
broke out. Norodom and his half-brother Sisowath were educated in Bangkok
where they had been taken as hostages after the peace settlement in Cambodia. They
retumed to Cambodia in 1857 after their father sent a plea to King Mongkuttiiathe
needed the two princes to help witii the administration. ^2 Before tiieir retum, King
Mongkut bestowed upon Norodom, who at the time held the name Rachawadi, the
title Maha Uppavoreat. and upon Sisowath tiie title Phra Kaew Fa. In exchange for
the two princes, Duang sent Votha to live at the Bangkok court, where he became
addicted to opium and had a disgracefiil affair with a woman in the Thai coiut. His
infamy made his father furious. After Duang passed away, Votha found out that his
father had left him no bequest, unlike other members of the family.^3 Votha and his
full-brother Siriwong started to create a disturbance around Udong and Phnom
Penh by recmiting as many followers as possible. Votha's dissidence could not
have been a real threat to Norodom, however, unless he received support from
Snong So, who had begun a revolt in Ba Phnom, where Votha mshed to join him.
The rebellious forces immediately penetrated and besieged Udong. Without
showing any attempt to fight, Norodom and his followers suddenly abandoned the
capital to seek refuge in Battambang, while Sisowath remained behind. The latter
appeared to have no conflict with Votha and was able to command respect from the
okya. The rebel leader showed no hostility towards Sisowath at all, and let him stay
safely at court. However, the situation surrounding Udong became chaotic. The
rebels threatened people with tax demands and also plundered traders and travellers.
Such were the goings on in the absence oftiiegovemment forces. Sisowath and the
okya in the capital could do nothing more than keep their families safe.34 withm a
32 Thiphakorawongse, Ruammang kieokap yuan lae khmen nai samai rattanakosin (Collected
Dynastic Chronicles Conceming Vietnam and Cambodia during the Bangkok Period), (1964), p.
232.
short period, the rebellion successfiilly obtained support from many local officials.
near the Laotian border, and northwest to Kampong Svai, near the Battambang
region border.35 The rebel leader apparently did not want to get involved in a
conflict with the Thai authority, whose forces was certainly the most concemed.
Snong So managed to strengthen his new base in Phnom Penh, where he began to
various positions. He also enlisted support for crowning Votha from many high-
unable to defeat the rebellion and only awaited the arrival of the Thai troops to
rescue them. Ultimately, the Thai troops put down the rebellion, but Snong So
A number of further revolts succeeded this one in Cambodia. In 1862, there was a
revolt led by the govemor of Somrong Tong, Ai Pasuthotsarat, in central Cambodia
(see discussion above). In 1864, two revolts took place: one led by Ai Non in an
area in the northwest, and the other in the area around Treang and Kampot.38
Compared to the eariier period, crises in Cambodia in the nineteenth cenmry seem
to have been perpetual and more widespread. The govemment was hardly able to
put down the rebellion itself unless extemal powers intervened. In the seventeenth
century, on the other hand, Chandler and Vickery indicate that crises were rather
intermittent and the Cambodian govemment showed its capability to beat off the
revolts and sometimes even to defeat the invading Siamese anny.39 This was a sign
The polity was so fragmented that the mlers were unable to reorganise their
The history of Battambang and Siemreap was particulariy important to the issue of
political entity of Cambodia, since the two provinces continued to be under Thai
adminisfration until 1907. A study of the Thai mle in the Battambang region during
the Fourth and the Fifth Reigns of the Chakri dynasty as well as the Vietnamese
role in the eastem part of Cambodia are potential areas for fiimre research to show
advice given to a French official, since the French encountered several difficulties in
Although the above passage shows the Thai elite's point of view, and was
expressed about half a century after the period of this smdy, the conditions in the
Battambang region in the first half of nineteenth century had a significant influence
on the subsequent development of the region. These two provinces had been
39 See, Vickery, Cambodia After Angkor (1977), pp. 509-11; Chandler, A Historv. p. 93.
^^ AOM, Gouvemement General 15679 "M. Collin, Min. de la Republique Fran?aise a Bangkok,
a M. le Gouvemeur General de I'lndo-Chine, 29 mai 1907."
212
The fragmentation of the polity not only weakened the Cambodian mlers vis-a-vis
its domestic rivals, but also prevented post-war Cambodia from gaining a basis to
achieve real independence from its powerfiil neighbours. Their weakness compelled
the Cambodian mlers to inviteftirtherextemal interference in their affairs. It seems
not to have been possible for such a weak polity to manoeuvre for the independence
they wished. In other words, by the mid-nineteenth century, Cambodia was no
longer a viable polity. So it is not surprising then, that when Cambodia wished to
relinquish all ties with Siam and Vietnam, the only course its mler could imagine
was to seek protection from the even more powerful French. This was the way
Cambodia sustained its existence. Being under the colonial mle nevertheless did not
mean, however, that the Cambodian state could achieve an independent entity. It is
by no means clear that French protection was directed towards restoring the
economic base of the Cambodian polity any moretiianthe Thai and the Vietnamese
had done before.
213
APPENDIX
Note > The period of the sixth governor, Som, appears to be confused. The
Battambang Chronicle states that Som became a govemor after Im's flight to seek
the Vietnamese protection in 1839, and died after his two years in office. Bangkok
then appointed Nong to be the governor. But the chronicle states that Nong
governed Battambang for twelve years until 1860. Therefore, Nong's office should
be between 1848-1860 (pp. 143-144). Fiulhermore, in page 148 the composer of
the Chronicle failed to include Som in the genealogies.
214
Baen Ros
1st Govemor 3rd Govemor
Ched Som
4th Govemor 6th Govemor
Baen
sons
Ros Ma Um Dom laJdi
Maw Sachaikhom Kong Ket
daughters
Baen
sons daughters
Ros
sons I daughters
Ros Royal page at Rama I's court; Phra Wisetsunthon, assistant to the
Second Govemor; Phraya Aphaiphubet (in the Second and the Thrid
Reigns)
Phithak Phra Phithaksorakrai, official of Nakhon Ratchasima
Yommarat
217
Ched
sons duaghters
I \——r^—.
Suk Som Kaew Kong
Nong
sons
Yia Thongyu Kham Bua Yos
Yia-Tim
sons daughters
K.S.L. Kulap, Annam savamyuth Vol. ], (Bangkok, Phrae Phitthaya, 1971), p. 149.
219
Chum
sons duaghters
Chum The ninth and the last govemor of Battambang. He moved to resettle
Chaophraya Bodindecha.
Chulalongkom
Note on References
The documents in the National Library include manuscripts of tiie first four reigns
R.III Ratchakan thi sam (the Third Reign of the Chakri dynasty)
The documents I consulted in the Thai National Archieves are those of the Fifth
Reign (King Chulalongkom) of the Chakri Dynasty. The references for this section
contain, for example, R.V M.41/50 denote: the reign, minitry of department, the
Ministry of Interior)
edition, comprised of eighty parts which were divided into fifty volumes.
221
regardless of the beginning and end of each part. But I will give only the number of
part, so it will always be PP (part). Exception is part 67 (1969), which is divided
for volumes 41 and 42. Therefore, I will cite both part and voliune as PP 67/41
and PP 67/42. In most case, title of each part will be given in the same form of an
article in joumal.
4. Thai References
As Thai people are usually referred to their first names rather than surname,
therefore, the first namese will entered in footnotes as well as in the bibliography.
222
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GLOSSARY
Thai
Khmer
Siamese Weights