Yurugu - An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior by Dr. Marimba Ani

"f ,,.
Yurugu
An African-centered
Critique
of European Cultural
Thought and Behavior
/
by Marimba Ani
(Dona Richards)
0
Africa World Press, Inc.
P.O. Box ! 892
Trenton, New Jersey 08607
IUPUI
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AfrlcaWorld Press
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Copyrigh{~ Marimba Ani, 1994

Flrsl Printing 1994
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permission of the publiser.
Text Design by Jonathan Gullery

Cover Concept and Design by Aziza Gibson-Hunter
Cover Artwork by Amura Oi'laa
Interior Mask Drawings by Smith-Chinyelu
I .lhrary of Congress Cataloging-ln-Publlcatlon Data
Anl, Marimba
Yurugu : an african-centered critique of European cultural thought
ancl behavior / Marimba Ani.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN0-86543-248-1.- ISBN 0-86543-249-X(pbk.)
I. Europe-Civilization. 2. Ethnocentrism-Europe. I. Title.
Cl3203.RS 1992
940' .01-dc20
91-71027
CIP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Author's Note .............................................................................. xi

Dedication ................................................................................ .xiii
Introduction - John Henrik Clarke ............................................... .xv
Incantation ................................................................................ .xix
Acknowledgements .................................................................... .xxi
Glossary ................................................................................... .xxv
Charts
A. The Process of the European Utamawazo ............................. .xxix
B. European Utamawazo: Mind Control for World Domination
(Chapter I) ........................................................................ xxx
C. Christianity as a Core Mechanism of the European Asili
(Chapter 2) ....................................................................... .xxxi
D. European Aesthetic and European Dominance
(Chapter 3) ....................................................................... .xxxii
E. European Cultural Ego and World Domination
(Chapters 4-5) ................................................................. .xxxiii
F. European Behavior and Ethics in Racial and Cultural
Domination (Chapters 6-8) .............................................. ..xxxiv
G. The Ideology of European World Domination
(Chapters 9-10) ........................................................... ....... xxxv
11. The Tangle of European Cultural Pathology Creates
the System of European World Domination (Conclusion) ........ .xxxvi
Introduction
/Jolelwj(I/ .................................................................................... 1
Th Psis ancl l)roccss ........................................................................ 3
l•:vldrncT ..................................................................................... 9
C'onn:pts and '!'Prins .................................................................... I0
l'1•1i.p•·1·11v,·s<111(1
(Jl)Jt•1·llv•·s ......................................................... i:1
PART I - THOUGHT AND ICONOGRAPHY
Chapter I - Utamawazo: The Cultural
Structuring of Thought
Archaic European Epistemology: Substitution of Object for Symbol ...... 29

Dichotomization and the Notion of Harmony .................................... 32
Heification of the Object: Devaluation of the Senses ........................... 36
Theory of Humanness ................................................................. .44
\ The New Dominant Mode ...............................................................
Lin~ality and Cause: Scientism and "Logic" .......................................
51
56
Supremacy of the Absolute, the Abstract, and the Analytical ............... 69
Dcsacralization of Nature: Despiritualization of the Human .................. 83
Alternative Models .............................................................•.......... 97
The Character of the European Utamawazo .................................... 104
Chapter 2 - Religion and Ideology
A l'oi11t of Departure .................................................................. 109

ThC' l'latonic Influence ............................................................... 111
Till' .lud;iic Heritage ..................................................................... 117
The Monotheistic Ideal: Incipient European Cultural Chauvinism ...... 120
Tlit• Jucleo-Christian Schism ......................................................... 124
'l'hl' Rolllan Cooptation: Two Imperialistic Ideologies ........................ 129
Tl1c Thn:at of Non-Orthodox Christianity ....................................... 137
Augustine and Political Conservatism ............................................. 143
l'm.,t-lytiialion and Imperialism: "Saving" and "Ruling" ..................... 149
("l1ristianily, Colonialism, and Cultural Imperialism: "Heathen,"
··N,11Ive," and "Primitive" ............................................................ 153
('111 lstinnity and European Paganism ............................................. 162
1',1tri11rchy in the Development of European Religion ........................ 171
'l'lw R<'iigion and Rationality Syndrome ................................. :........ 178
'1'11(•Techno-Social Order ............................................................ 183
Tlw l<ccorcl Versus the "Aµology" ................................................ H)J
Co11dusion: Rrligion and Power ................................................... 194
Chapter 3 - Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols
The Meaning of "Aesthetic" ......................................................... 199
The Tyranny of Rationalism ......................................................... 202
An Aesthetic of Control ............................................................... 210
"White," "Good," and "Beautiful" ................................................... 219
The Myth of a Universal Aesthetic ................................................ 222
The Connecting Thread: Aesthetic, Utamawazo, and Utamaroho ......... 226
PARTII - IMAGEAND NATIONALCONSCIOUSNESS

Chapter 4 - Self-Image
Self-Image and Utamaroho ............................................................ 237
"Rational Man" ........................................................................... 239
The European as "Male" ............................................................... 242
"Scientific Man" ........................................................................ 244
The Problem of the "Mad Scientist" ................................................ 245
"Civilized Man" ........................................................................... 246
"The Conqueror": Expansionism in the European Utamaroho ............ 248
"World Savior" ......................................... .,,................................ 251
Race and National Identity ............................................................ 255
Media and Self-Image .................................................................. 265
The European Self-Image in the Literature of White
Nationalism .............................................................................. 271
Chapter 5 - Image of Others

The Complement of the European Self-Image ................................. 279
Why the "Other" Is Black ("Non white") .......................................... 282
Slavery, Its Aftermath, and the Image of Others .............................. 291
Ml·dia and the Image of Others ...................................................... 294
Exig1•ncie:;of the European Utamaroho .......................................... 296
'l'hr i•:uropcan Response to the "Non-European" Utamaroho ............... 301
i111agcand Value-Definitions ......................................................... 306
PARTIll - BEHAVIORAND ETHICS
Chapter 6 - Rhetoric and Behavior
What's in a Lie ........................................................................... 311
I lypocrisy as a Way of Life ............................................................ 312
The Rhetorical Function of the "Christian Ethic" ................•............. 317
The Rhetorical Ethic in Operation ................................................ 324
"Ethical Theory" and the Rhetorical Ethic ....................................... 328
The Ethnological Significance of the Rhetorical Ethic ........................ 331
Chapter 7 - lntracultural Behavior

The Question of Norms ............................................................... 337
"l11dividuality," "Freedom," and "Self" ............................................. 339
The "Protestant Ethic" and European Behavior .............................. 356
The Cultural Role of the Early Church ............................................. 358
Hdormation: the New Role of the Church ....................................... 361
l'rotestantism and the European Ego ............................................. 367
Themes in Interpersonal Interaction: Survival, Competition, Control ... 375
I::pistemology and Behavior ......................................................... 389
I::uropean "Self" and the Problem of Love ....................................... 393
1111racultural Versus lntercultural. .................................................. 399
Chapter 8 - Behavior Towards Others

ll!ii/i as Matrix .......................................................................... .401
·1lw Concept of the "Cultural Other" ............................................ .402
European Versus "Non-European" ............................................... .404
The "Cultural Other" and European "Law" ...................................... .409
l'ulltical Violence: Seek and Destroy ............................................. 416
( 'ultural Violence: Destroying the Will ............................................ .427
Cie11ocidalBehavior: "Wipe Them Out" ......................................... .433
'l'lworles ol Euro-Caucasian Behavior: The Question of Cause ........... .4-17
l-:111op<'ar1 Ideology and the Concept of the Cultural Other .................. 473
l llo11wwc1zoand Imperialism ........................................................ .479
C'o11rl11sron: The Logic of Suprcmary :ind Destruction .................. .482
PARTIV - IDEOLOGY
Chapter 9 - Progress as Ideology

Whose "Progress?" ..................................................................... 489
The Anatomy of "Progress" ........................................................ .490
The Inevitability of "Progress" ..................................................... .495
The Critique of European "Progress" ............................................ .497
Utamawazo, Utamaroho, and "Progress" ....................................... 503
An Ideology of Imperialism ...................................... , .................. 507
Chapter 10 - Universalism: The Syntax of

Cultural Imperialism
The Tradition ........................................................................... 511
The "Myth of Objectivity" and the Uses of Scientism ........................ 515
Claude Henri de Saint-Simon ......................................................... 520
John Stuart Mill ........................................................................ 521
Emile Durkheim ........................................................................ 522
The Political Function of "Objectivity" .......................................... 524
Implications of European Internationalism .................................... 528
The Cal[ for a "World Culture" ...................................................... 535
Concrete Human Behavior Versus Abstract European "Humanism" ... 541
Universalism and the European Asili ............................................. 550
CONCLUSION
Vurugu: The Incomplete Being
What It All Means ........................................................................ 555
The Workings of Yurugu ............................................................... 556
/Jlomaroho in Disequilibrium ......................................................... 560
l'ower as Logos ........................................................................ 563
Imposing the Cultural Self ............................................................ 567
Tl1e Forms or Expression of European Cultural Nationalism ............... 568
J'owards a Vision of the Human Spirit.. ........................................... 569
Noli'" ................................... , .............................................. 571
llll1llnw1111l1y ................. , , , .................................................. GO~

Author's Note
According to the Dagon people of Mali, in West Africa, Amma,
the Creator, ordained that all created beings should be living mani-
festations of the fundamental universal principle of complementarity
or "twinness." This principle manifests itself as the wholeness which
is created when female and male pairs join in all things. Such pairing
establishes equilibrium, cooperation, balance, and harmony. Amma
therefore equipped each being with twin souls - both female and male
- at birth. But in one of these primordial placentas the male soul did
not wait for the full gestation period to be born. This male being was
known as Yurugu (Ogo), who arrogantly wished to compete with
Amma and to create a world better than that which Amma had cre-
ated. With his fragmented placenta he created Earth; but it could
only be imperfect, since he was incomplete, that is, born prematurely,
without his female twin-soul. Realizing that he was flawed and there-
fore deficient, Yurugu returned to Amma, seeking his complemen-
tary female self. But Amma had given his female soul away. Yurugu,
forever incomplete, was doomed to perpetually search for the com-
pleteness that could never be his. The Earth, he had defiled in the act
of self-creation, was now inhabited by single-souled, impure and
incomplete beings like himself. Yurugu's descendants, all eternally
deficient, originated in an incestuous act, since he had procreated
with his own placenta, the representation of his mother.
Dedication
To my mother,
Delphene Douglas Richards
And to my daughter,
Delphene Djifa Atsufi Fumilayo Douglas Richards,
in whom her spirit has been reborn.
In the tradition of Afrikan Ancestral Commemoration,

This book is dedicated to the Egun of the Maafa
Who trusted in us, their descendants, to carry out the Victory
For which they sacrificed so much.
It is for all Afrikan people, therefore,

Who have fought for the simple Truth -
Race First!
And it is especially for those who do not understand

the meaning of that Truth.
For those Afrikans who would be seduced into the

labyrinth of academia,
this book was written to free your minds,
that your spirits might soar,
and you would become Warriors and Fundi,
rather than professors of white power.
It is for and to our Youth

who must believe in the power of their Africanness
So that they will be able to destroy
And to rebuild with African vision.
Introduction by
John Henrik Clarke
In this book, Professor Dona Richards has opened up a
Pandora's box called racism that will not be easily closed by the cre-
ators of racism or its victims. What she is saying will have to be seri-
ously considered if the reader of her words is ever to know peace.
This is a pioneering and ground-breaking work dealing with a
neglected aspect of European culture. Most books about Europeans
deal mainly with what Europeans think of other people. In this book
Professor Richards has analyzed the European influence on the world
based on what they think of themselves and how this thought affects
most of the world.
Without saying it, she has emphasized that for the last 500 years
the world has been controlled by a form of European nationalism.
They have created a concept called the "cultural other" that has influ-
enced their vision of themselves and other people in their contact
with Africans, Asians, and people of the Pacific Islands. They have
declared most things primitive that they could not understand. They
have laughed at the gods of other people. This cruelty was com-
pounded when, through propaganda and the misuse of the Bible,
they taught other people to laugh at their chosen gods and adopt the
god of their conqueror.
I have referred to this as the manifestation of the evil genius of
Europe. They were the last branch of the human family to emerge into
that arena called civilization. In their conquest of the minds of most
of mankind they have been able to convince themselves and others
I hat they were indispensable to civilization, and without them it
would not have existed.
What the European has forgotten and made his victims forget is
I Ital over half of human history was over before most of the people
of Africa and Asia knew that a European was in the world. The emer-
1ic·11c•p of I-:uropeans or white peopfe as the handlers of world power
.t11d tllt>lr ,1hility to rn11vi11n' 1nillio11sof people that this is the way
111I111-{s slln11l<IIll' I~ lilt• gH•,\lt•st single prop.lgnndn 111iraclcin history.
1111lw l!llh ,111dHit Ii c·1·111111y 1101rnilycoJrn1izNI most
l·'.11rup1•ar1!-i
.\/Ii YURUGU
of the world, they colonized information about the world. They devel-
oped monopoly control over concepts and images. The hallmark of
their colonization in this regard was the colonization of the image of
god. After a number of years under European domination, the slaves
and the colonial subjects of the Europeans would not dare to mention
I he word god in a language of their own creation or visualize god
through the lens of their culture.
The political and social sciences and other academic disciplines
used to explain human existence and to prophesy the possibilities of
progress came under European control. The Christian church in
many ways became the handmaiden of European world domination
and to some extent it still ls.
When in 1492 Columbus, representing the Spanish monarchy, dis-

covered the New World, he set in train the long and bitter interna-
tional rivalry over colonial possessions for which, after four and a
half centuries, no solution has yet been found.
Capitalism and Slavery
Eric Williams, University of North Carolina Press, 1944
The above statement indicates the arrogance of the Europeans

in. the expansion beyond their shores on the lands of other people.
Since the re-emergence of Europe in the 14th and 15th century to the
present day, part of what~ refer to as their evil genius is their ability
to drain the diseased pus Mtheir political sores on the lands of other
peoples. With consistency they have attempted to solve their prob-
lrms at other people's expense. The European has a grab bag of ratio-
11alesfor seizing the land and resources of other people in order to
justify their domination.
Prior to the period that I'm referring to, the people of the world
were not referred to by their color. Therefore, the concept of a white
people is a creation; the same is true of black people, of yellow peo-
ple and brown people. The concept of race that now plagues the
whole world is an artificial European invention. Professor Ashley
Montagu has referred to it as man's great myth. While the word race
and the concepts around it are artificial, the effects of its creation are
real. The application of this concept has affected the lives of most of
the people of the world. It was part of the basis of the slnvc I rade ancl
of the coloninl systcn, that follow<•d.111tlwir texthonks, travelogues,
and sonwlit1tl'S i11tlwh i11tl·tp1t•la1lo11of llw Hlbll', tlw l-:11rop1•ai1llns
11,,,1tlwv w1•11•tlw only 1wopli- In llw world wl10 n,•
:;al<lor h1f1•111•cl
·.,11•d .111vtl1l11~111,11d, ., 1v1•, to lw 1 1ll1·d ,, 111111111I 11111p1•,11111
tl1•1,l1uv.. d 1111111• tl11y li111lll'lwy l1,1v"
1·11111111 ,111dI lvtll ,lll111h 111,111
YURUGU xvii
studied people without understanding them and interpreted them

without knowing them.
Professor Richards in her book asks this revealing question:
What is the relationship between the way in which Europeans con-

ceive of the world and the way in which they relate to majority peo-
ples? Put another way: What is the relationship between the
dominant modes of European thought and the dominant modes of
their behavior towards others?
If the people in Africa and Asia and the former European colonies
are to emerge into full independence, statehood and world respon-
sibility, they will have to answer the above question creatively and
in their favor. Then, in a collective sense, they will have to participate
with others in a world that can be free, that can recognize European
influence without accepting European dominance.
Inasmuch as there are not enough soldiers in Europe to hold
down five empires of people that outnumber the population of
Europe, the victims of European aggression need to ask, "How did
they do it?" The European conquest of the mind of most of the peo-
ple of Africa and Asia is their greatest achievement. With the rise of
independence movements and millions of people demanding the right
to rule themselves, the European monopoly of the minds of most of
mankind was over. Imperialism and colonialism will not die easily.
The former colonial subjects of Europe are fighting to regain what
slavery and colonialism took away-mainly their self-confidence and
the image of god as they originally conceived him or her to be.
In order to understand the new information and revelations in
this book, the readers might have to approach it as carefully as the
writer has. This will be an intellectual experience that has its own
reward.
John Henrik Clarke

April, 1992
Incantation
(Taught to me by Armah and Kambon)
Two thousand seasons of restless sleep

Beneath the destroyers' fragmented image
We used their definitions of ourselves
To disconnect our consciousness
Lines drawn in denial of deeply textured souls
Okra/Ka/Se
Life/Force/Energy
Nyama.
They knew even as we slept

That our spirit was more powerful
Than their white death.
In our will-less sleep

We have allowed the Earth to be defiled.
The wake of two thousand seasons
Of Spiritless matter. ..
Destroyers' work.
Confusion in Maafa aftermath

Within our lost knowledge
Enemies have blurred the line
Between us and them.
Are we destroyers ourselves?
No - We are the Springwater

Compelled by Ancestral consciousness
Egun/Nsamanfo
Issuing from Ani's Wl)mb
We divine il victorious destiny
lfa/0<111.
X.Y YURUGU
We are awakening,
Announcing ourselves, self-determining
With Nubian will
Crystal vision
Shaping a new reality
Ancient genius rediscovered
So Dayi - The Clear Word.
Balancing the scales

Restoring spirit to matter
The Whole completed
Made cosmic again.
Rhythm is the key to the Way

Alternating Death with Life
Joining us to each other.
We are the Healers.
The Victory is ours!
We call upon Onyame, Olodumare, and Amma

Invoking the Nommo-power of Blackness
Carried in the genes of Race Memory
Hesse!
Ancestors and Children to be born

Keys to the circles of connectedness
and clarity
Africa redeemed
The universe in harmony
Return and move forward
To the Way
Of a natural order
African World Order
Resplendent reflection of Ma'at.
Ase!
Acknowledgement
Tiko Ba Si Igi Le Hin Ogba Ogba Ma Nwo *
To Whom Praises and Thanks are Due:

I live close to my ancestors, and most particularly to my mother.
1thank them everyday for the blessings that they continually bestow.
My responsibility to them is what this book is about. It helps to ful-
fill the oath that I took, by having been born African, to avenge their
spirits. I acknowledge them here for giving me life, for my connection
to the Universal Life Force (Ntu), for being my collective conscious-
ness, and for the spirituality with which I think.
This work has been mandated by the Maafa, the great suffering
of our people at the hands of Europeans in the Western hemisphere.
It is hopefully a partial solution to what Professor John Henrik Clarke
has identified as "the imprisonment of a people to image." The minds
of African people are still crowded with the image of Europeans as
superior beings. This is a condition which locks our will and freezes
our spirit-force. Professor Clarke has said that we must "instill will
into the African mind to reclaim itself." That is what he has done for
me. In turn I have attempted here to establish a basis for the demys-
tification of the European image, so that our collective conscious will
can once again be activated.
I owe my awakening and growth towards a Pan-African,
Nationalist consciousness to Professor John Henrik Clarke, who
allowed some of us as young people who worked with SNCC to liter-
ally sit at his feet in his Brooklyn apartment in 1965-66and drink of his
wisdom and knowledge concerning the history of the Pan-African
world. This close contact with Professor Clarke tapped my African
center and I developed a passion tor the realization of the Pan-African
vision.
After my experience with SNCC (the Student Nonviolent
Coordtnatlng Co,nmltlt>e) In Mississippi, and some travel in the
MollH:rlnnd, I IH'~n11~rndualt• studies in ;=inthropology. That contra-
"ll l1·1111•
tl111" 11111l1,1v1•
pt np•; It will 1·oll11p1w,"(Ym 1il1.1Pr11v1•rll)
xxii YURUGU
diction led to a dissertation meant to uncover the roots of anti-

Africanism and European imperialistic consciousness in the disci-
pline of anthropology. The research began what has to become a 20
year sojourn through the bowels of European thought, leading to the
conclusions of this work.
Professor Clarke was later to come back into my life as a men-
toring force. When I finished graduate school in 1975he brought me
into the Department of Black and Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter
College. He then advised me to write articles on aspects of my analy-
sis and helped me to get them published.
Perhaps, more than any single person in the African world com-
munity, Professor John Henrik Clarke has stimulated young people of
African descent to search for an African-centered truth. I take this
opportunity to express my love and gratitude, and to acknowledge
the genius of this master teacher; this molder of minds. For a great
teacher is one who can point in his sunset years to hundreds of
younger African people who owe their ideological commitment and
political development to his/her inspiration. Ase!
The specter of continuing the research, indeed of developing
an'African-centered paradigm within which to place Europe for cri-
tique, was awesome. 1 was certainly tempted to let this project go.
And then in 1979,Molefi Kete Asante introduced himself to me, ask-
ing that I write an article for a book that he was doing. My acceptance
of this task resulted in Let The Circle Be Unbroken. But his work
Afrocentricity in 1980,gave me and countless others the affirmation we
needed to move further towards the vision. It was the African-cen-
tered perspective stated boldly in print by an African author. Molefi
articulated what others had implied and what their work had meant.
He stated what we were feeling.
It was this same Molefi Asante who, one day when he was visit-
ing New York, pulled out a dusty manuscript and began to read. I
subsequently mailed more chapters to him. He read all 686 pages,
writing comments in the margins. When he finished he was enthusi-
atic, saying, "Marimba, you must publish this!" It was the first time
that anyone had taken the time to read the entire work, and he made
me·believe in the necessity of its completion.
I n•wrole every c:hapt<'r, did an f'lephant amount nf new r('scarc:h,
1111d dt•vt,lo1wcl a llworC'tir;1I fonnulal1011 whlrh I ttsl•d lo 1tlilkl' senst'
111wlt,il 111,11I f0111ulIt w.ts ,, pal11f11l ,111dt•xl1:111stlt11-111111,11.
TIiis was u
11nw1",', tli,1t l wn11ltl11nt 11,IVI',11r11plf'11·d l1,1d111vll111tl11•1 M11h•l1,111d
cw,,. !'1111•"'"'" < l,111111o1vl11~:
111111, •,111 < l,11I,,.111,t· t.,y, ti 1111111y wl11•11
t Vt I I wu11l,I f•f 111111,"\Vl11II"" Ii lli,11 1,11,ilI'
\'llll l(llhtP ltt f1111t
YURUGU xxiii
Asante Sana to my daughter, Djifa, who has also sacrificed, suf-

fered, worked on, and thought about this book. More than anyone,
she has shared this experience. Her 16years have been the years of
this manuscript. She has lived through it with me. This in itself was
an ordeal for her. She has collated pages, processed words for index-
ing, and listened while I explained and worked out concepts. Her
thoughts and perceptions have been invaluable. She has suffered
long weekends grounded in our apartment while I worked. Closer to
me than anyone else I know, she "shares my space." And l thank her
for hanging in. Her faith and love kept me going. Djifa, Nina kupenda!
My students at Hunter, especially those who participated in our
seminar on Critical Theory during the spring of 1993, have been
exposed to the concepts presented here. Their insights, reactions,
critical comments, and enthusiasm has encouraged me to finish. 1am
indebted to the nurturing relationship which we have shared.
Linda and Jessica started me off with typing "almost" final drafts.
It is to Herriot Tabuteau that I owe so much. He "saved me" when I
did not know how I would be able to get the manuscript typed. A pre-
med student, who could work on the computer (having written and
published his own book at the age of 16), he processed the entire
manuscipt efficiently and with great care. It was a critical juncture for
me. Herriot also gave me critical feedback on the ideas and concepts
that it contained. I thank the Nsamanfo (ancestors) for bringing us
together on this project.
Nichelle Johnson, a young friend, former student, and organizer
of the Daughters of Afrika at Hunter College, worked with me on the
endnotes, bibliography, index, and proofreading. Her spirit was just
what I needed. She is careful, precise, and thorough. Asante Sana,
Nichelle!
I thank Andre Norman for being patient enough to introduce me
to the MacIntosh, as he has done with so many of our people. That
skill made my editing so much easier. I thank him for allowing me to
invade his family's apartment for specific "computer help" that I
needed. His is a nurturing spirit.
Adupwe to the Egun for sending my spiritual brother, Amura
Oflaa who is always able to visually manifest what l see and Amura,
Mf'clasi for your help with the charts of explanation.
We collectively thank the Ancestors for the genius of Al Smith
who brought Afrkan juogement to this work through mask symbol-
ls1n. Al, thank you for your suppor1 ive energy and friendship.
'rlw l01lowl11~1w11plf'lwlpf'rl in various invaluable ways; James
I 1111y1·rs,('11rul1• .loy l.1°1•,l 11•rsl11•t•11Maxw<'II, Cif'yuka Ev<111s,Mark
xxiv YURUGU
Staton, and Spencer Forte.

To Patricia Allen, my editor, I must give more than thanks. I offer
my understanding. I apologize for the volume of this work. It required
months of laborious work. I know that the task was exhausting. Yet
Patricia went through it several times, making extensive, painstak-
ingly thorough editorial comments. She has helped me to strive for
excellence in the presentation and form of this work, but I am respon-
sible for any problems of style which remain.
Had it not been for Kassahun Checole's judgement that this book
was worth publishing, it may never have "seen the light of day."
Asante Sana, Kassahun.
I give thanks to my cousin, Sandra Lawrence, for keeping our
family together while I immersed myself in this project. I also thank
my father, Franklyn Richards, and the other members of my personal
family and lineage, for their support during this endeavor.
Medasi to my sister Gerri Price for our friendship. She supported
me in this project without even knowing about it, for she taught me
about the Victory in confronting the enemy which is ultimately only
fear.
. And finally, I want the African world to know how grateful I am
to my sister and brothers, Aziza (Claudia) Gibson-Hunter, Jawara
Sekou (Keith Hunter) and Kobi Kazembe Kalongi Kambon (Joe
Ba!dwin), for their African-centeredness, for their love for me and for
African people, and for their consistent encouragement and imani
(faith) in this project. They share the vision.
To You All, Asante Sana!
MarirribaAni
(Dona Richards)
Glossary
Asili The logos of a culture, within which its various
aspects cohere. It is the developmental
germ/seed of a culture. It is the cultural
essence, the ideological core, the matrix of a
cultural entity which must be identified in
order to make sense of the collective creations
of its members.
Utamawazo Culturally structured thought. It is the way in

which cognition is determined by a cultural
Asili. It is the way in which the thought of
members of a culture must be patterned if the
Asili is to be fulfilled.
Utamaroho The vital force of a culture, set in motion by

the Asili. It is the thrust or energy source of a
culture; that which gives it its emotional tone
and motivates the collective behavior of its
members. Both the Utamawazo and the
Utamaroho are born out of the Asili and, in
turn, affirm it. They should not be thought of
as distinct from the Asili but as its manifesta-
tions.
Cultural Other A conceptual/existential construct which

allows Europeans to act out their most
extreme aggression and destructiveness, while
simultaneously limiting their collective self-
destruction on a conscious level.
Rhetorical Ethic Culturally structured European hypocrisy.It is

a statement framed in terms of acceptable
111111alIi •lmvlor towards others that is meant
lw rlll'lotl<".11 p111pww:, 011Iy, Its purpo1w is to
cll:1j11111
h1t1•11d11dvie 111111,
ol l:11111111·1111
<·11lt11111I
xxvi YURUGU
and political imperialism. It is meant for

"export" only. It is not intended to have signifi-
cance within the culture. Its essence is its
deceptive effect in the service of European
power.
First World People African descendants throughout the world.
Majority Peoples The members of the indigenous core cultures

of the world regarded collectively, excluding
the European minority.
Nationalism Ideological commitment to the perpetuation,

advancement, and defense of a cultural, politi-
cal, racial entity, and way of life. This use of the
term is neither limited to, nor determined by
the boundaries of a "nation-state" as defined
eurocentrically.
European Nationalism All forms of thought and behavior which pro-

mote European Hegemony/global white sup-
remacy.
White Nationalism An expression of European nationalism which

identifies caucasian racial characteristics with
superiority and African racial characteristics
with inferiority.
Cultural Imperialism The systematic imposition of an alien culture

in the attempt to destroy the will of a politi-
cally dominated people. The mechanism of
cultural imperialism causes cultural insecu-
rity and self doubt within the dominated
group. Separated from their ancestral legacy,
they lose access to their source of political
resistance.
l.id1•11tis111 Tlw ickologkal us<'of "scl1'1Wl'," d1•fi11NIl•:1no•

n•11t1ic·,dly, as a11 ;1dlvlly wllll II s,1111tlrn1s ,ill
tl111uf.(hl,111d lwh,1VIC11, 111,,1
,.,, 11li·1111•
l11•1·n1111·<.
• ,1111•d, tit, 1i11:tll'1>I llllv
'1t,1111l,11tl1111111,1
YURUGU xxvii
Objectification A cognitive modality which designates every-

thing other than the "self" as object. This
process mandates a despiritualized, isolated
ego and facilitates the use of knowledge as
control and power over other.
Desacralization The alienation and objectification of nature. In

this view, nature becomes an adversary. This
approach to reality originates in unnatural-
ness.
Materialization This begins with the separation of spirit and

matter. This separation, in turn, results in the
denial of spirit (despiritualization), the loss of
meaning, and the loss of cosmos (interrela-
tionship).
Despiritualization The denial of spiritual reality. The inability to

experience spirit. Objectification used ideo-
logically results in the desacralization and
despiritualization of the universe.
Reductionism The reduction of phenomena to their most

simplistic manifestations. This occurs when
the mind is not able to apperceive deeper,
more textured levels of meaning. As a cogni-
tive deficiency, it prevents comprehension of
metaphysical truths.
Reification This occurs when theory is used as law rather

than metaphor and when process is replaced
by factual manipulation. Reification is the
hardening of dynamic, vital truth into dead-
ened dogma.
Lineality The intP.rpretation of phenomena as being

made up of unidimensional, separate entities
arranged in sequential order. This conception
is necessarily secular and results in desacral-
lzalio11. It denies circularity and the spiral of
m~a11ic' d1•v1•lop1111·11t. IL prPvcnls t ranscen-
d1•111·1• ol rn dlt y I l1111 • allCI :,;pact', t ll<'rcby
xxviii YURUGU
denying ancestral ontological experience.
Dichotomization A mechanism which accompanies objectifica-

tion. It is the splitting of phenomenon into con-
frontational, conflicting parts. It facilitates the
pursuit of power over other, and is therefore
suited to the European Asili.
Spirit The creative force which unites all phenom-

ena. It is the source of all energy, motion,
cause, and effect. As it becomes more dense,
it manifests as matter. It is the meaningful
level of existence.
Spirituality The apprehension of cosmic interrelationship.

The apperception of meaning in existence, and
the degree to which one is motivated by such
meaning. Spirituality is one's ability to relate
to the metaphysical levels of experience. It
unites thought and feeling and thereby allows
for intuitive understanding. This cognitive
/affective sense is transmitted through collec-
tive ancestral relationship. The absence of
spirituality is an ancestral legacy.
Yurugu A being in Dogon Mythology which is respon-

sible for disorder in the universe. This is a
being conceived in denial of the natural order,
which then acts to initiate and promote
disharmony in the universe. In African Cos-
mology such a being is deficient in spiritual
sensibility, is perpetually in conflict, is limited
cognitively, and is threatening to the well-
being of humanity.
C08M08 - 8PIRIT •
THE PROCESS OF
EUROPEANUTAMAWAZO
Mlnua Equal
THINKING
BEING - SPIRITUAL
BEING =( •KNOWER•
i[ J- =(
MEANING•
REALITY FULNESS •FACT•
C)
Ii.I
II
-~cn1=[ •oeJECT·
FULFILLMENT THROUGH
PROPAGATION,
AND ~,~:mTli~OF
Denial of 8plrttual
Pr1dlallecl on lelf-Allenatlon
l!.g. A .-hod ot oontrol
1111p1le."'- devaluatlon ot
1M Afl1aan .. If and the IOllrN
ot AfrtoM lllnowledge (8plrtt)
fUlltfflH AMo&n .,,_YHIMlt
Ind e,iq,lollatlon,
EUROPEAN UTAMAWAZO:
MIND CONTROL FOR WORLD DOMINATION
tfil•
Pla10's discovery: The UTAMAWAZ.O
EPISTEMOLOGY (The W8:f Europeans ant talgrt
(concept of tru1h) 10 think) defines the uniYerse
CAN BECOME IDEOLOGY for use of European power
(politicized mythology) over other&
OBJECTIFICATION
ESTABLISHMENT BY DENYING SPIRIT
OF & DEGRADING NATURE
ACADEMY (no They build INSTTTUTIONS

ECTIFICATION(no a based on their UTAMAWAZ.O
IZATION (total which teach the "Reat of Us"
the training groood 10 THINK ACCORDING TO
the DOMINANT(10 THEIR RULES
the DOMINA:
o BE rul
WE ARE EDUCATED
IN THEIR •TRUTH•
Africans (and other Majority Peoplea) define ourselvea u

"Inferior objects• of European Domination:
WE ARE TRAINED TO ACCEPT THE SYSTEM OF
GLOBAL WHITE SUPREMACY AS "TRUTH"
,.,nris:,an1ty as a Core Mechanism
of the European Asili
for the Achievement of
EUROPEAN WORLD DOMINATION
?atriarchal European Imperialism

Nature identified with "Sin" and "Evil"
Nature to be controlled, / .-\r.P.,,LAGG Birth of European National
Rationalistic -- denial of Spirit, Consciousness
Fear of Blackness,
Whiteness defined as "good"
Identifies with the (unnatural)
European Self
' ~ean Re;;
<v,$-OY' ~/o--,
-o \
s
CHRISTIANITY
<ti
Intensification of European Expansion of the

"WE"/"they" dichotomy European Cultural Self
'------
Olr1stlan
;_, Order
DSYLET\Z~
of the •Heathen• Monolithic European

Control
EUROPEAN AESTHETIC AND EUROPEAN DOMINANCE
\tOt(\ Nature, Rhythm -- N
,.s•'v,"' 8 ~ 1 l.Jte /::'.
TU -- Un111sr
t:,e~ _,.,/4 ,. o,."e
EUROPEAN CULTURAL EGO AND WORLD DOMINATION
el(& fulflllment Through p
.e
Destruction a
ELF IMAGE'\~ OTHERS

Superior Inferior
Positive Neaatlve
~ififilL ~fr]jilll'
n Cultural Imp
~= [OEOt.OGY OF
OPEAN \ 1/0RLD DOMINATION
\),~MAWAzo uTAMAROJto
Universalism
the ideologlC?9I
lmperlallstlc
Absolutlstlc
Monolith le
TANGLE OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL PATHOLOGY CREATES SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN WORLD DOMINATION
Lacking_
Spirit/Seeks
power
~lofillvo1d
REINFORCE
I
r'IStitutionized Ideology Image Behavior
lntracultural
religion - and Aesthetic Seit-Image of Towards
christianism Behavior
Values Others Others
• :>rossl'itizing • Money= symbol • Artificial • Controlling

nature • Inferior • Nocosmicsett • Non-human
• ! '.'!'.mature of value • Non-spiritual • Superior • Natural • Isolatedegos • Exploitative
• -1.e-arctucal • Materialism • White • Rational • Object • Conflicting • Imperialistic
• · ,',h.;e supremist • Universal • Pristine • White • Irrational • Competitive • Genocidal
• =>~narcflal dominance • Rational • Black • Aggressive
• ·.vr-sointual • Whitesupremacy
• Devaluation
of
spirit
I~ Manifested Through
1·
Mutually Supportive
Utamawazo
.. Cognitive Manifestation oftheASILI AffectiveEnergyof theASILI
"Knowledge' = an actof aggression Consuming
Nocosmicview/separatiing • Expansionist• Unbalanced
Confrontational•
Fanatically rationalistic 'Political"- Needsan Enemy_
Reorders the· Objectifying
• Denialof spirit Expresses
universe through itself and seeks
and is justified by
Asili fulfillment through
Entropic• Pathological
• Unnatural
Introduction
Bolekaja!*
This study of Europe is an intentionally aggressive polemic. It is
an assault upon the European paradigm; a repudiation of its essence.
It is initiated with the intention of contributing to the process of
demystification necessary for those of us who would liberate our-
selves from European intellectual imperialism. Europe's political
domination of Africa and much of the "non-European" world has been
accompanied by a relentless cultural and psychological rape and by
devastating economic exploitation. But what has compelled me to
write this book is the conviction that beneath this deadly onslaught
lies a stultifying intellectual mystification that prevents Europe's polit-
ical victims from thinking in a manner that would lead to authentic
self-determination. Intellectual decolonization is a prerequisite for
the creation of successful political decolonization and cultural recon-
struction strategies. Europe's political imperialistic success can be
accredited not so much to superior military might, as to the weapon
of culture: The former ensures more immediate control but requires
continual physical force for the maintenance of power, while the lat-
Ier succeeds in long-lasting dominance that enlists the cooperation
of its victims (i.e., pacification of the will). The secret Europeans dis-
covered early in their history is that culture carries rules for think-
I 11g,and that if you could impose your culture on your victims you
rnuld limit the creativity of their vision, destroying their ability to act
with will and intent and in their own interest. The truth is that we are
,tll "intellectuals," all potential visionaries.
This book discusses the evolution of that process of imposition,
,,s well as the characteristics of cultural beings who find it necessary
to Impose their will on others. It is not a simple process to explain,
the tools we need in order to dissect it have been taken from
•,lt1<·<'
11•, through colonial miseducation. 1 It is necessary to begin, there-
lurt·, wl!ll 11 painful weaning from the very epistemological assump-
'/111/1'/wjoh, H Yurulm lt•rn1 mcnnlng, "C'omc on down, let's fight!" See

t 'l1h1wl'l111, <h1w111'1wkwa 1111tl
.11•11111• ll11•1·ll11kwuM,1rl11lmlkc,Toward the
/11•111/r111, 11/111// o/ ,\l,11 "" l,1(1•111/1111•,Vnl I, !Inward llr1lv1•rsltyl'n•tiS,
W,111tllh1}{l1111 ll f', 1111-U, p xii
2 YURUGU
tions that strangle us. The weaning takes patience and commitment,
but the liberation of our minds is well worth the struggle.
My chosen field is African-centered cultural science - the
reconstruction of a revolutionary African culture. I teach Pan-African
studies. The experience convinces me more and more, however, that
teaching Pan-African studies well means teaching European studies
simultaneously. To be truly liberated, African people must come to
know the nature of European thought and behavior in order to under-
stand the effect that Europe has had on our ability to think victori-
ously. We must be able to separate our thought from European
thought, so as to visualize a future that is not dominated by Europe.
This is demanded by an African-centered view because we are
Africans, and because the future towards which Europe leads us is
genocidal.
Chinweizu describes himself as an "occidentalist"; Iva Carr-
uthers calls for the study of "Aryanology." 2 These African-centered
scholars have made contributions to the demystification of
European thought and behavior; the African liberation movement is
indebted to them. And there are others (far too many to be men-
tioned here); Ankobia* who are paving the way for an African-cen-
tered social theory. In the spirit of Cheikh Anta Diop and Bobby
Wright there comes Ayi Kwei Armah, Kwame Agyei Akoto, Kobi K. K.
Kambon (Joseph Baldwin), Molefi Kete Asante, Ifi Amadiume,
Frances Cress Welsing, Wade Nobles, Jacob Carruthers, Amos
Wilson, Na'im Akbar, Kariamu Welsh-Asante, Maulana Karenga, Linda
.lames Myers, Aziza Gibson-Hunter, Asa Hilliard, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o,
K.C. Anyanwu, Cedric Robinson, C. Tsehloane Keto, Haki Madhubuti,
Abena Walker, and others; a vanguard that is codifying the language
of African-centered analysis. The standards for bold African affir-
matior,had already been set by Harriet Tubman, Nat Turner, Ida B.
Wells, Anna Julia Cooper, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey,
Carter G. Woodson, George James, John G. Jackson, Chancellor
Williams, Yosef Ben Joachannan, John Henrik Clarke, Malcolm X, and
the names we cannot mention, the names we do not know, the hun-
dreds of political prisoners and prisoners of war, who have spent out
their youth since the early 70's in jail. Most of all, the intellectual tra-
dition of African affirmation cannot be separate<! from the sµiritual
force which exists in every African person, as they sing and make
music and protect their families and raise tl11•lrc-l1lldnn. !\radPinia-
1
n Ehrop<'f\11 n1l:-;t·01w1·ptln11 hn:; 110 pt;,n .. fot 110.:.

Alrlntt1 r1 111t1•n·,l
\11/111/1/11I, ,1 l'wt 111111 tll11tIde 11111111,11110111•

wl111h·ml 11111111111•,
•11'1111111
1ot.1111l,111Ilrn , 1111111•111111I
1111• 11111111tll1111•11t
I
Introduction 3
social theory is the collective creation of every aspect of our history

of struggle and victory. It began when we began; challenged by the
first invaders of the Motherland. It received new life from the Middle
Passage. It was shaped during the crucible of the Maafa. And now
encompasses the visions, thoughts, and creations of every African
soul; every mother and father, every child. These are the names I
would list.
I have attempted a comprehensive critique of the European tra-
dition, but the degree to which the minds of people of African descent
( especially our youth) are freed to envision a victorious African future
will be the judgement of its success. The critique will be called "racist"
by Eurocentrists, but it was not developed for them. And as Aziza
Gibson-Hunter says, "'racism' is the fire ignited by the Europeans; our
response is only the smoke." And though the "liberals" would have it
otherwise, there is no way to extinguish a fire without experiencing the
smoke. Europeans have made the fire; we will put it out.
Thesis and Process

To be of African descent and to study anthropology is to be
st ruck by the pervasive anti-Africanism of the discipline. And if one
1lien approaches the discipline critically, it emerges as a tradition of
l·'.urocentricism, functioning to satisfy the needs of the European
1•!hos. The critique of anthropology led me right into the belly of the
l>l·ast, as I discovered how deeply it was embedded in the bowels of
1I 1t• European cultural/historical matrix. I had no alternative then but
I (1 embark on a critical study of the totality that is European culture;
lo lay bare its ideological underpinnings, its inner workings, the mech-
.11,lsms that facilitate its functioning.
Anthropologists, through their use and abuse of the culture con-
1·11ptltave inhibited this necessarily critical process. They have gen-
e•,.illy ignored the political implications of culture by deemphasizing
lls Ideological function. They have typically focused their attention
011 supposedly "simple" and "isolated" non-European societies.
l l1rn11glithis conventional use of the culture concept these societies
li,IW' heen theoretically and superficially abstracted from the politi-
' ,II 1·1111t~xtsin which they exist. This use allows anthropologists to
11(111111• tile implications of European exploitation, while the condi-
11,111•.ol tolonialism ancl neo-colonialism provide them with their
"11l1j1•1·ts" of stucly.
Anthropology Is not simply a "child of in1pcrlalisrn.":i It is a man-
tt,•,I11tlrn1of I I w J•:11101w,111 t•I I11,s.Tl tis ls why V<.'1
y ft'w anthropologists
• l11dv1111•111'.'wlvf'H, ! ,. , lltet1 owu < 1111111,ll t,,wlcwm11Hls 'l'lwlr polltl
4 YURUGU
cally superior position allows them to study others, but not to be

studied. The few who do study Europe do so in isolated bits and
pieces (Nordic myth, peasant society, folk culture). Even "urban
anthropology" does not approach European culture as a totality. A
Eurocentric social science cannot be used to critically examine the
European cultural tradition. Yet there is no reason the concept of
culture should not be used to study the extraordinary character of
European imperialistic behavior. In fact, the African-centered per-
spective makes it compelling. Fortunately, this perspective has sep-
arated me from the tribe of European anthropologists.
Our present endeavor requires the "de-Europeanization" of the
culture concept. It must be made relevant to the political needs of
those who have been victimized by Europe, 4 and Europe must be
brought into focus as a cultural entity. By emphasizing the ideologi-
cal function of culture, it is possible to make sense of the intimidat-
ing confusion and superficial complexity of the European experience.
Understanding culture as ideology allows us to approach European
culture in such a way as to make it a visible, extremely cohesive and
well-integrated phenomenon, in a sense more "simple" than we might
suppose. Beneath its deceptive heterogeneity lies a monolithic
essence; an essence that accounts for the success of European impe-
rialism. This is not to saythat this endeavor is an easy one. But that
should not dissuade us. Its difficulty makes it all the more imperative,
all the more urgent.
Wade Nobles defines culture as "a process which gives people
a general design for living and patterns for interpreting their reality."
Its "aspects," he says, are ideology, ethos, and world-view; its "fac-
tors" are ontology, cosmology, and axiology; and its "manifestations"
consist of behavior, values, and attitudes. 5 These are the aspects of
European culture that we will bring into focus in this study. Let us see
how culture and ideology "fit" together; how an ideological emphasis
in the interpretation of culture is more consistent with its meaning
and significance. If we look at the phenomenon of culture, we are
impressed by the following characteristics:
l•. It acts to unify and to order experience, so that its members
perceive organization, consistency, and system. In this
respect it provides a "world-view'' that offers up orienting con-
ceptions of reality.
2. It glvcs people group Identification, as It 1)111l<ls 011sh;m-'d his-
torkal 1•xrw1h·n1~c. l'friltlnl,( ,1 st·nse> ol collt•c·tlv,· r11l1111
nl hk11-
' , II y
'\, 11"11-11•"
11, 1111•111h1
1, ''wit.it 111do," llw11•l1y 1•n•,1lh1•!11"vnl1·1"
I
Introduction 5
of prescriptive authority. 6 To its members, culture re-presents

values (which they themselves have created together out of
shared experiences) as a systematic set of ideas and a single
coherent statement.
4. It provides the basis for commitment, priority, and choice,
thereby imparting direction to group development and behav-
ior; indeed, it acts to limit the parameters of change and to
pattern the behavior of its members. In this way culture helps
to initiate and authorize its own creation.
5. It provides for the creation of shared symbols and meanings. It
is, therefore, the primary creative force of collective con-
sciousness, and it is that which makes it possible to construct
a national consciousness.
6. For all the above reasons, it impacts on the definition of group
interest and is potentially political.
Willie Abraham's understanding of the nature of culture is help-
ful in our study, and he perceptively acknowledges its applicability
to the exatnation of European development:
Culture is an instrument for making ... cooperation natural. Its suc-

cess depends on the extent to which it is allowed to be self-authen-
ticating. Though it allows for internal discussion ... the principles
of decision in such discussions are themselves provided by the cul-
ture. By uniting the people in common beliefs and attitudes ... cul-
ture fills with order that portion of life which lies beyond the pale
of state intervention .... It fills it in such a way as at the same time
to integrate its society, on the basis of common reactions, com-
mon actions, common interests, common attitudes, common val-
ues. It creates the basis of the formulation of a common destiny and
t·ooperation in pursuing it. If one looks at the West one finds that
this use of culture is well-developed. It is what is involved, when one
hears it said that this or that belief will destroy a certain way of life,
and that that way of life must be defended no matter what the cost. 7
The ideological thrust of culture is inescapable. It boldly con-

ft 11ntsus. Culture is ideological since it possesses the force and power
111din•ct activity, to mold person1lities, and to pattern behavior. This
11·1nF{nition i111pliesa theory of culture. Raymond Betts puts it this
w,1y: "Ideology is lwre used in a cultural sense, to denote the verbal
11111wgr..1phyhy wlikh a pc-ople represents itself in order to achieve
p111 pnse." 11Leonard Bnrr<'l1 says that ideology is "lhe spir-
1 11111m1111al
l11t1°ll1"'t11al
1111,111111d fo11ud,1tlo11ol group culwsln11."'1 Both rultur~
111dld1•11l11gy 1111• 1·xtn~111Ply pt>llti<',11l1111.1t1m·,
s111rl tlwy illl' ;tl1011t
0
6 YURUGU
the definition of group interest, the determination of group destiny

and common goals. Political behavior is simply behavior that issues
from an awareness of group definition as distinct from other groups.
We think politically when we assess our group interest in relation to
the interests of other groups and determine whether those interests
are compatible with or in opposition to ours. We act politically when
our behavior and strategies reflect those assessments. Cultural iden-
tification and ideological commitment are bases for political con-
sciousness. With this "repoliticized" understanding of culture we are
prepared to begin our study of Europe.
The approach of the study must be, of necessity, holistic and
synthetic. Exhaustive ethnographic description of European culture
is of limited value even if it were feasible. The attempt to achieve
detail would only serve to divert our attention from ascertaining the
fundamental nature of the culture. The successful approach to the
analysis and synthethic understanding of European culture demon-
strates its organicity, discovers the relationships and interdepen-
dencies between its various aspects. As with any culture we look for
consistency and pattern. Idiosyncrasy and anomaly are only useful in
that, through contrast, they help us to recognize what is character-
istic. This is revealed through an ideological focus and a methodol-
ogy by which we search for the interrelationships between the
dominant modalities through which the ideology of the culture
c-xpresses itself. European culture, like culture universally, is an ongo-
ing process in which meaning is created and reaffirmed. The appre-
hension of meaning in the culture and the mechanisms through which
il is reinforced are critical concerns of this study.
This endeavor is facilitated by the identification of "themes,"
which, as Morris Opler called them, are "dynamic affirmations" that
act to determine behavior and to "stimulate activity." The translation
of a theme into behavior or belief becomes its "expression." 10 Again
there is an ideological focus. Suddenly the complexity (vastness) of
European culture becomes approachable. We are in pursuit of the
"explanatory principles" of the culture. 11 Through an axiological focus
(values) the pivotal axes of the culture are clarified, and through an
emphasis on synthetic functions we apprehend unity beneath the
surface diversity (heterogeneity) of Europe. Looking beyond the
superficial for that which has ideological significance, we have sought
the modes of sta11dardizolion a11clthe>mechnnisins or legitin1i7.tltlon.
It is lhcs<' as,pt•cts o! European cullure I hut glvi· ll urdl't, l\ml nnl1'r
ts ll~1•u111•;tlorn•htl ,1tt1ll>t1ft•ol <'11111111•. IIHll't'd, 1111
1
1n1"1P11t·1t11dy
11·v1•,1I-; lit.ii ~lw li11ptc",'llv1 1 l•,111op11,111 nrd1•1. II•, 11v11wl11•l111l111{ 1011
Introduction 7
sistency, and the force of its ideology, give it an incomparable degree

of power. The two-pronged question, "why" and "how," determines
the method and approach of our inquiry. We have approached sig-
nificant cultural creations and behaviors by asking: Why do they
exist? How are they made forceful? These are the questions of ideol-
ogy.
The divisions and subdivisions through which the study is pre-
sented are, to a great extent, superficial. They have been created for
convenience and to aid us in the perception of a reality that we gen-
erally experience as one forceful totality, not in analyzable parts. The
order of presentation is not meant to imply a lineal or hierarchichal
relationship between these "parts," for they overlap in a way that
defies compartmentalization, and their relationship is circular and
reticular.
In all cultures there is the taken-for-granted, assumed, and habit-
ual aspect that though generally less visible than others, and rarely
t'xplicit - exerts the most profound influence on its members. This is
precisely because it functions on such a deep level. According to
Edward T. Hall these "hidden controls" become habitual responses
Ihat are experienced "as though they were innate." 12 Anthropologists
talk about world-view as that aspect of culture that functions to
1t·µlace presented chaos with perceived order by supplying the mem-
hcrs of a culture with definitions of reality with which to make sense
of their surroundings and experiences; it is the meaningful organiza-
t Ion of experience, the "assumed structure of reality." 13 This "deep
slruC'ture" of culture, as Wade Nobles has called it, has a most pow-
1•1.ll.!J influence on the shape of the culture and the thought-patterns
oftt\ members. 14
This is only one of the reasons that this study begins with a dis-
1 ·11ssion of European thought; there is another. European culture is
11,llque in its use of cultural thought in the assertion of political inter-
,.~,t.While the logic of any culture, in the sense of what its members
111•1:iught to accept as "making s~se," may become for them part of
hit ,,ssumed reality, Europeans have used their "cultural logic" in an
,·lf1•<·llvclyaggressive manner: (1) The culture "teaches" its "logic"
111dworld-view to th<' ordinary pdrticipants, who then assimilate it,
1 ;-.11111c-It, ,uHI push it beneath the surface, from where it influences
111111t·ollt•~·tlw lwllavior and responses. (2) Then "special" members
111t I 11 1 11llun· n·!,(nr<11·d as "inli:llt•ctuals," "scholars," "theorists" -
11 It 11·v1• lilt' :wi;11111plln11s111!his wmlcl-vlt•w ttnd tl'pn.·scnt l"lwm ns tlw
I• 111•h 11I,, 1111lv1•P,,tl •,ysll-11111Itli1111~1tt, pn•1;«•11ts
1111t·111,11 slan<lar<h,
11,·,r,1!11111i1llly,
, ,f 1111 ,utd 1111111 lu 1111·w111ld 'l'IH"•I' 1111·11111•.lcl1•n•dIlit•
8 YURUGU
seminal theorists of the culture, when actually their ideas simply

reflect the assumed reality of the mainstream culture. The manner of
their presentation is, however, authoritative. (3) In this way the
European world-view takes on ideological force not only within, but
outside the culture, since it can be imposed as universal, speculative,
and self-conscious. (4) At the same time, its parochial and axiologi-
cal character remains well-hidden and camouflaged beneath a
pseudouniversalism.
This is the most difficult aspect of European culture. But once
understood it is the key to the ideological thread that runs from one
mode, one theme, one characteristic to another. The thought process
is consistent, reflecting the consistency of the ideological thrust that
must be laid bare. It is part of the nucleus of imperialism. Chapter I,
which begins Part 1 of this work, attempts to characterize the epis-
temological and ontological themes of European thought in order to
establish a context in which to place the other dominant modes of
European culture. To approach Europe critically, we must first under-
stand that the language of European value is the language of an
abstract scientism. Our task, in short, is to throw into question pre-
cisely what is assumed to be beyond question in European culture,
namely, its scientific epistemology. By doing this we succeed in bring-
ing European ideology into view so that it can be recognized in other
patterns and creations of the culture. The ideological implications of
the epistemology become a decoding tool for the critical interpreta-
tion of culture.
Chapter 2 reviews institutionalized religion as a system that
sacralizes the ideology, achieves internal social and political order
and imperial authority vis-a-vis other cultures. Chapter 3 discusses
aesthetics as an expression of value. European conceptions of beauty
and European principles of pleasure reveal a further statement of the
ideology and the collective psyche. The theme of universalism rears
its head, since the discussion of "art" is used by Europeans as a tool
of imperialism. This concludes Part I, which leaves us with an under-
standing of the mental, philosophical, and aesthetic habits that act to
support a particular style of behavior.
Part II, (Chaps. 4 & 5) examines the images and concepts of self
and "other," which support the discussion in Part 111: the patterns of
behavior within European culture (Chap. 7) a11d towards others
(Chap. 8). Chapter 6, which begins Part 111, discusiws tlw rl'lationship
lwtw1'<'fl what f~11ropr1111swaul 11:, In h<·llt•vt' llwy ,111•dol11i-;:111(1
whnt
,11l11:1llyll,1pp1•11" II Is v1•1y l111pml,t11I 11111111!11•.t,111d !Iii~ lln•111l1
111tw, 1•11 w111d 11111clt l'tl, ,1, It we 11· 11111<
1 c• 1wuplt 1111111111111•1,
1111tll1'5
Introduction 9
often make costly political errors because of the lack of this rhetori-
cal and hypocritical component in their own culture. They misinter-
pret European language and fail to predict European behavior. They
are always therefore shocked by the intensity of the hostility and
aggressive nature of that behavior.
Part IV closely examines the themes of "progress" (Chap. 9) and
"universalism" (Chap.10) in European ideology. Together they are
the cutting edge that intellectually and culturally disarms the victims
of European domination. The study concludes by offering an inter-
pretation of European culture that relates its extreme rationalism to
its intensely imperialistic behavior towards others. The various
themes, modes, and patterns under discussion converge to form a
single monolithic reality. Imperialism emerges as the overwhelming
persistent theme of this critical statement, which demonstrates how
epistemology, axiology, aesthetic, iconography, and behavior all link
together in such a way as to form an impressively solid and sup-
portive network, girding the quest for European power.
Evidence
Once we have discerned the explanatory principles of European
C'U!ture, we discover many varied sources of information. They
Include the historical record of European behavior, both from the
viewpoint of those with whom Europeans have interacted and from
t l1c viewpoint of Europeans themselves. The emphasis, however, in
t <·rms of information-gathering, is on the various vehicles of European
Sl:'lf-expression, in the belief that it is by looking at the statements,
behavior, and modes of expression of those who have considered
t hcmsclves European that we can begin to get at what "European"
lllcans. It emerges then as a desired "way of being" for a particular
l(r1.n1p of people. Our ethnographic sources are those vehicles of self-
1·xprcssion that reveal how Europeans see themselves and their cul-
t 111c-;i.e., what they would like to be and how they wish to appear to
, ,, I1c,rs.Wc can then understand the logic of the behavior implied by
Il1t•se Ideas, using the record of European behavior towards others.
Western European literature is also a very valuable source of
l11lur111r1tion. I have used European social theory because there is so
11111< 11axiology to be founcl hicldcn in its jargon and in the thought pat-
l1•111-: tl1nt i>merh'("'frnn1 it, a11dI have occasionally used the literature
111wliltP nationHlis111,as it manifests crucial aspects of European ide-
olnJ:Ynncl llw f;:urope;in sPlf frnage <-1ncl Image of others. Often I have
11 1•d ,u1<1t!'l<•rit'd lo lilt• w111d~;and ldr•:11;111tltnsc pllilosophcrs and
tlw111l·,h wlto 1111· 11111•.ltl1·11•d l-:111np1•'•1 •,1·111lnt1l
t llh1k1·rs TIits dis
10 YURUGU
cussion is in part a synthesis and affirmation of previous African-cen-

tered critiques of Europe as well as a recognition of those critical
voices that have been largely ignored by the European tradition.
These critiques also become a source of information.
However, the most important source is my own experience of
the culture. Experiencing the intellectual core through its academies,
feeling the weight of its oppression because of my Africanness, I have
been both semiparticipant and "observer," amassing evidence of the
nature of the European reality through direct confrontation. The
advantage of being African is that it has allowed me to penetrate
European culture from a "non-European" frame of reference.
Concepts and Terms

Ultimately the liberation of our thought from its colonized con-
dition will require the creation of a new language. 15 Those involved
in the development of African-centered theory are steadily moving
towards that goal. At this stage we are prepared to create new con-
cepts to facilitate our approach to the subject matter, which fit the
methodology demanded by our critique. To understand and to
explain the nature of European culture, we need a concept that is
both analytical and synthetic. This concept must enable us to explain
the European experience as a product of European culture and to
explain the culture (thought, behavior, institutions) as a product of
its ideological core. Indeed, any culture must be understood in these
terms.
Robert Armstrong discusses the idea of a "primal consciousness"
as "the code of awareness that instills each person, causing him to
inherit and in turn to help constitute his culture, dictating the terms
under which the world is to be perceived and experienced .... "16 This
consciousness acts as a "generative germ"; it is thus "the causative
factor of culture." This "preconceptual," "preaffective," "prespatial,"
and "pretemporal" factor functions to maintain the integrity and
homogeneity of the culture. Armstrong calls it the "mythoform." 17
Armstrong's approach to what he calls "humanistic anthropology" is
far in advance of Eurocentric social science, and "mythoform" opens
up more liberating possibilities than the traditional European anthro-
pological paradigm. As he presents it, mythoform links the uncon-
scious and the conscious expressions of culture. 111 terms of
consciousness, then, we could say that tlw e11ll11r:ilproct•ss Is from
111y1lwfonn to myllwlo~y to ldt•oloHy B11t w11 linv., IP 1•xtr•11d
A1(1l ,ln1111(!~r111w1•ptl11ll
1 Myth11lnf{l1·11I-. •xl1•111Kptt• 1•111 ~y11ll1t•:-.1:.-.l111-{
,,v11il111h,I I 1111
I wl 11Io 1 11111 , ,t p1•1•,011', wll hl11
·1 l tvl ,c· ti 11•, 1111s, 11111•1111"1'
Introduction 11
the culture, at the same time stating preconscious, hidden experience

in a more outward modality. Mythology creates ikons out of collective
unconscious experience. Ideology is an intensely self-conscious exten-
sion of this process, which began with preconscious "mythoform" (if
we are to accept Armstrong's term). Ideology involves the more inten-
tional use of the sacred ikons of the culture for political purposes,
that is, for the survival, defense, and projection of the culture. Ideology
is mythology politically interpreted.
These facts of the presentation of culture can be understood as
experiential actions (intellectual, emotional, spiritual) in a consistent
process. Each cultural activity leads to or grows out of the other
when all the causal circumstances are present. The process moves
from the preconscious (mythoform) to the conscious (mythology) to
the self-consciousness (ideology). But this is neither a hierarchical
nor a strictly unidirectional process. Ideology is not necessarily the
"highest" stage, except in a political context. (Unfortunately our real-
ity has become dominated by political definition, and we have no
choice but to give more attention to this facet of life.)
The ideological aspect of a culture can have two thrusts: (1) It
is in every culture - giving direction to the lives of its members and
lo their group creations; (2) It gives the culture momentum. But in
some cultures the ideology is also outward, seeking to project the cul-
ture, assuming a competitive and hostile posture towards other cul-
l ures. All cultures do not have an intensely developed ideological
statement in this last sense. The lack of an aggressive ideology seems
lo be related to the lack of the perception of a threatening "outside"
world, the inability to perceive other cultural groups as "the enemy."
111t:uropean culture, the outward ideological thrust, the aggressive
sta11ce, is developed more intensely than in any other culture. As we
l'Xamine the culture, we find that its dominant modes of expression
reveal an almost fanatically political or confrontational conscious-
1,ess in which all cultural phenomena that are "other" or different are
,·011sidered hostile to the group interest. The heightened political
;1warcncss begins in the preconscious mythoform; the bio-cultural
origins.
We need yet another concept, one that combines mythoform,
111ythology,and ideology in one causal atom, so to speak. In the pre-
w11I stucly I have inlroclucecl the concept of asili, a Kiswahili word
tli,11 l::111scd In s<-weral related ways to mean "beginning," "origin,"
"•uHll <'<',""1H1111n·" (In t fH, s<,nsc of Ihe "nat llre" of a person or thing),
11
",wi1•,1r1•, 1u1tl"f1111d11111t•t1l11I
pt lurlpl('. 11 It nrn also he lakt'n lo nwan
11
,1•1•cl"(l,1·, ni l..ilu) 111111"111·1111" or IJ1l1l11ll11M
(l,1·, 1111•s111111•p prl11C'lplt•
12 YURUGU
of development). All of these meanings fit the idea I am attempting to

convey, and I have taken the liberty of using asili as a term and fash-
ioning it into a conceptual tool that the nature of this present study
demands.
Asili as a conceptual tool for cultural analysis refers to the
explanatory principle of a culture. lt is the germinal principle of the
being of a culture, its essence. The idea of a seed, the ubiquitous ana-
logical symbol in African philosophical and cosmological explana-
tions, is ideal for our purposes. The idea is that the asili is like a
template that carries within it the pattern or archtypical model for
cultural development; we might say that it is the DNA of culture. At
the same time it embodies the "logic" of the culture. The logic is an
explanation of how it works, as well as, the principle of its develop-
ment. Our assumption then is that the asili generates systematic
development; it is a statement of the logos. The asili of a culture is for-
mulative, and it is ideological in that it gives direction to develop-
ment. It accounts for consistency and pattern in culture, also its
tenacity. The asili determines cultural development; then the form
that the culture takes acts to maintain the integrity of the asili.'It acts
as a screen, incorporating or rejecting innovations, depending on
their compatibility with its own essential nature. It is as though the
asili were a principle of self-realization. It is a compelling force that
will direct the culture as long as it remains intact: i.e., carried in the
"cultural genes." In order for the culture to change (and this includes
the collective thought and behavior of those within it), the asili itself
would have to be altered. But this would involve a process of destruc-
tion and the birth of a new entity. Cultural asili(s) are not made to be
changed.
Obviously the introduction of this concept implies a theory of
culture. This theoretical framework has certain advantages. First, the
assumption is that every culture has an asili, since it is the germi-
nating seed of cultural formation, and that asili is determined by the
collective, fundamental nature of its members. Second, the asili of a
particular culture can be identified and consequently its inherent
nature delineated. Third, this presents us with a powerful tool of
explanation, since we have a concept that helps to explain the
organicity, structure, and development of any culture: Asili accounts
for its driving force, telling us "what makes it tick."
;\.,;i/i is a syntheslziug concept in that it allows 11slo explain and
to""'"' tllt• wny t11which tlw various t1spc(·t~ of n <'llltt1r(• n•lal(• nnd
lln~ tlwy 10l1e•JC•, 'l'lils < rlth•,~I rt-'l;1tlo11sl1lp
talwr; pl.11·1•
wit 111111
lu• ldt
1
11I 1111111·1ol tlw 111111111•,tlw 11~//r'l\;illw, tli,111lwl11~ lt111llt·d llv

11l1111,lt
Introduction 13
a lineal process, we always come back to the center; the asili is our
reference point; explaining cultural phenomenon within the context
of a specific cultural tradition. Asili has an ideological focus, since it
is concerned with that which compels and demands particular forms
and content of expression. Asili allows us to recognize culture as a
basic organizing mechanism that forges a group of people into an
"interest group," an ideological unit. This is the case even when the
descendants of an original culture and civilization have become dis-
persed in other areas of the world; as long as they are connected
through a common asili, they constitute a diaspora, manifesting the
continued life of the civilization. Asili allows us to distinguish the
peripheral, the anomalous, and the idiosyncratic, and at the same
time asili allows us to interpret patterns of collective thought and
behavior (in terms, of the cultural asi/1). Asili is both a concept and
a cultural reality. H we assume it (the concept), then it helps to
explain a culture in terms of the dominant and fundamental principle
of its development (its reality).
Asili, then, will enable us to understand and explain the behav-
ior, thought, and creations of a people in terms of the origin and logic
of their culture. In this case, it enables us to understand European
thought and behavior as being part of an ideological whole. European
religious philosophy and aesthetics become particularized in the con-
text of the European asili. It remains now for us to determine the con-
tent and nature of this particular asili. Once we have done that,
European culture becomes explicable as an ideological totality. This
does not mean, however, that a definitive asili is conveniently visible
for us initially; rather its nature emerges from the most forceful char-
acteristics of the culture as they are "felt" through confrontation and
observation. It is a question of the perception of emphasis, focus,
and priority. These gel into our conception of asili as the seed, which
is then understood as being the formulative germ. But asili is not an
idea, like Armstrong's mythoform. It is a force, an energy that asserts
itself by giving direction to and placing limits on cultural creativity.
Asili is the primary determinative factor of cultural development and
an essential explanatory principle of cultural theory.
In the present study, I have used two other concepts to com-
plernent the asili concept. I have borrowed other Kiswahili terms to
connote the ideas in question. Utamaduni means "civilization" or "cul-
1ure": wazo mC'ans "tl!OlJ~ht''; and roho is "spirit-life." I have created
t I tl' r·o11t·t'pl 11/wll(t11Jazoto t<J11vey11,cidea of "thought as determined
l1y t·ult urL'." Allfl 111FJv1•11it HHh1<t-cl11/omamlw,IP.:;ll~htly more difficult
to 1•xplnli1, d:• tlw ''•,plilt lllt• ol a 1·11lt11n•,"ali;o lite.•"colleclive 1wr-
14 YURUGU
sonality" of its members.

Utamawazo is very close to what is meant by "world-view," but
it has more of an ideological emphasis than the way we usually use
that term. Gregory Bateson's "eidos" is similar, but again, there are
differences. In his book Naven, Bateson introduces the concepts
"eidos" and "ethos" as tools for investigating what he calls "cultural
structures," a collective term for the coherent logical scheme of the
culture. This is somewhat like our asili. The investigator can deter-
mine the "scheme," he says, by "fitting together the various premises
of the culture." 19 Eidos is "a standardization of the cognitive aspects
of the personality of individuals," and, again, the "cultural expres-
sion of cognitive and intellectual aspects of personality." Ethos refers
to the emotional aspects of cultural behavior; "the system of emo-
tional attitudes which governs what value a community shall set upon
the various satisfactions or dissatisfactions which the contents of
life may offer." 20 Bateson offers an explanation of how this process
works:
The culture into which an individual is born stresses certain of his

potentialities and suppresses others, and it acts selectively, favor-
ing the individuals who are best endowed with the potentialities
preferred in the culture and discriminating against those with alien
tendencies. In this way the culture standardizes the organization of
the emotions of individuals. 21
A really valuable aspect of Bateson's approach is the concept of

"standardization" as "the process by which the individuals in a com-
munity are molded to resemble each other in their behavior." 22
Interestingly enough, he says that the concept of ethos can be "valu-
ably" applied "even to such enormous and confused cultures as those
of Western Europe." 23 If we look at the way in which Bateson explains
the process through which the ethos is standardized from an African-
centered perspective, we can understand that the "discrimination"
against those of us with African "tendencies" is, in a sense, a natural
result of the standardization process that functions in European cul-
ture. The culture "chooses" the personality-styles that "suit" it, just
as our personalities have been influenced by the African asili.
Utamawazo, thought as determined by culture, is Bateson's
eidos in that it focuses on the way in which culture acts to determine
collective cognitive style. It refers to the thought pall •rns of a [Jro11p
nf 1wnplr who an· nilturally t<'latc•cl,In ~o fat ,,:i tlMw thm1gltt p::it-
t 1•111~ ll11vc• I 11•t •ti fipl( ·n nl1wd liy t lit•n tit1111• (/1<1111111/Jfl lw '"wot Id
,11 Ii; 11
Vlt•w" l1111111111
•,llt''llil'!-, 1111··•ltr11!111•111111·ot 111c•f41plty•,k,1l
i1•1•111111pltu11•1
Introduction 15
and presuppositions about the nature of reality, and the way in which
the culture presents its members with definitions and conceptions
with which to order experience. Utamawazo, however, places more
emphasis on conscious mental operations and refers to the way in
which both speculative and nonspeculative thought is structured by
ideology and bio-cultural experience. Utamawazo allows us to
demonstrate the ideological consistency of the premises of the cul-
ture and to identify those premises as they tend to be standardized
expressions of a single cultural entity. Julian Jayne uses the expres-
sion "collective cognitive imperatives," 24 and this is very much what
we mean by utamawazo. It focuses on epistemological definitions in
the belief that as culture acts to fix definitions of truth and truth-
process, the culture constructs a universe of authorization that
rejects and incorporates ideas with reference to a cultural predispo-
sition in intent and style. And, what is more, the asi/i adds dimensions
of purpose and direction, that are forceful. Utamawazo, then, cannot
be understood unless it is placed in the context of asili. Utamawazo
accounts for perspective.
Wade Nobles defines the ethos of a people as "the tone, char-
acter, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mode.
It emerges as a set of guiding principles that define the underlying atti-
tude they have toward themselves and their world." 25 Karenga defines
ethos as "the sum of characteristics and achievements of a people
which define and distinguish it from others and gives it its collective
self-consciousness and collective personality. "26
Utamaroho, like ethos for Nobles, accounts for "attitude," "char-
acter," and "aesthetic" in a collective sense, but it does not include
the "guiding principles" that have a determinative function; that
would be closer to our asili. In terms of Karenga's use of "ethos," uta-
111arohodoes include the idea of "collective personality,'' but it is not
In any way self-conscious. Utamawazo has a self-conscious expres-
sion, even though it originates in the meta-conscious asili, but uta-
maroho remains on an unconscious level of feeling. Utamawazo is
cognitive in expression, while utamaroho is affective. Utamaroho is
many things at once. It is a concept that denotes the way in which the
usi/i acts to forge a collective response among the members of a cul-
ture to life anct to the world as they confront it. But this response, in
1lw sense of utonwrohu, Is 11otthought out or planned. It is more of
,111instincl'iw renrtlon caused by their "spirit.'' Used this way "spirit"
1pf('l'S to I 11~•PSM'llt lnl n,11llrP of i1 lll'illj{. It is I he idea I hat a person,
(111 .,v. It 11-i111tltls r;11,r1 ), ., c11ll1111•,m gr1111p or 11•11plepossess an
l111111,1(1•11.11
(111111pl1y~l1 ,ii) 11li•,l.1111·,, 111111
d(•INlltllH·K tllt'lt lllll((lll'
16 YURUGU
character or "nature." But the physical and nonphysical essence is

here linked as it is in the concept of a "gene" which carries "memory."
We speak of utamaroho as we might speak of "temperament"
and "character" and emotional response. These may sound like the
terms of psychology, but utamaroho is not "individual"; it is collective.
The question of relationship between culture and personality is not
a new one. The fairly recent "psycho-historical" studies assume a
Freudian posture for the most part, using psychoanalytical theory to
analyze cultural developments in the context of historical circum-
stance. 27 The "culture and personality" school of anthropology is
much older, its theorists attempting to discover the ways in which
culture influences the personality of its members. They have usually
emphasized alternatively world-views or "patterns" (Benedict) and/or
''configurations," \'themes" (Opler), and language (Mead) as these
phenomena act to determine the style of the culture in question.
Spengler (1926) talks rather obscurely about the "soul-image" of the
Western European as being "Faustian."
Utamaroho does not categorize the ethos(es) of cultures into
types, as previous ethnological theories may, but, as inseparable
from asili; it focuses on the uniqueness of a particular culture with
respect to its emotional rather than cognitive patterns. While the
character of a culture's utamawazo is expressed most obviously in lit-
erature, philosophy, academic discourse, and pedagogy, utamaroho
becomes more visible in behavior and aesthetic expression whether
visual, aural, or kinesthetic. At the same time utamaroho is the inspi-
rational source from which the utamawazo derives its form, for uta-
mawazo is not simply "thought," but "forms of thought." The asili
defines the utamaroho (spirit) and gives form to the utamawazo. The
asili is in turn energized by the utamaroho Qife-force). Utamawazo
(thought), utamaroho (spirit-life), and asili (seed), influence, rein-
force, and build on each other in a circular process and in a reality
that precludes their rigid distinction as "cause" or "effect." This cir-
cular process and synthesis is culture itself. [t would no,t be possible
for one of these cultural phenomena to contradict another within the
same cultural experience. By their very definition they are support-
ive, compatible, reaffirming, and mutually generative. They are the
interlocking pieces of one ideological system.
Utamaroho is a special part of this process, slm.:eit is the en rgy
source [or all orthe culture's ,ollective forms. Th~ asili ls the seed,
tlw orll,(111,hut on<·c'in c.•xisl('1\f(', tlle 11tor11a,u/Jo1:-.tlw vitality of till'
1·11h1111• Its c·t111tlt1111:d
It w1.111111t1•1•s llf1·.Tilt• <1.~i/1111111111+.
lltt• l'l1lt 1111•
lt•11·lt,1>111
111 l11l11ll II tlot", ,11 tl11011ylt11111111111ol l1-.111111m111111u ,1111I
1
Introduction 17
the life of its utamaroho. The utamaroho of a people is a force made

powerful through its collectiveness. The unique character of the cul-
ture - its accomplishments, limitations, brilliance, institutions, and
posture vis-a-vis other cultures - are spirited by its utamaroho. But
the utamaroho must be continually regenerated by the institutions,
creations, and patterns of thought and behavior in which it is
reflected. The utamaroho (collective personality) of the people will be
warlike, if the asili demands war for its fulfillment, its self-realization.
The utamaroho will be spiritualistic or materialistic, creative or con-
trolled, depending on the nature of the asili of the culture. The uta-
maroho will be an indication of the kinds of activities that are
pleasurable and desirable for the members of the culture. It will deter-
mine what they consider to be beautiful and, to some extent, how
they move and speak. The axiological aspects of culture will be
related to its utamaroho, which significantly accounts for motivation
in a collective sense. The asili is the seed that produces a force. The
force is the utamaroho of a people. It is the collective personalization
of the asili and represents the possibility of its continued existence.
The utamawazo is the thought modality in which the people's men-
tal life must function in order for them to create and to accept a cul-
ture that is consistent with the originating asili.
Utamaroho and utamawazo are extremely forceful phenomena
in the European experience. They are brought together in the asili,
the root principle of the culture. Neither the character of the
European utamaroho nor the nature of its utamawazo are alterable
unless the asili itself changes. Understood this way, the culture is
the unfolding of principles already implied in its originating process.
But the asili concept does not imply its own cause. Chapter 8 reviews
other theories of the origin of European behavior. My theoretical dis-
cussion, however, is limited to a delineation of how the culture works,
not what caused the asili to come into being. These three concepts
allow us to approach and understand European culture as a unique
product of its fundamental aspects. They become intensely political
concepts as European culture is intensely political, and they cohere
in the ideological thrust of the culture. Thus, with their introduction,
we have properly politicized the idea of culture by giving it an ideo-
logical focus.
There are a few more terms, although they do not represent
new concepts, that should be discussed for the sake of clarity, so
that my use•of theni will bt• understood front lhc 011sct.It would seem
ithirnrdly al'llfil-111l
c to n.,k t hi• question, Wllt1lI:-"fa1rope-a11?"Much nf
wll.il p,1ss1·s fur lnln, 111otln11 111t l11•.w111lc•11ilc•s
Ii. i::lmply n1w lnug 1mn
18 YURUGU
egyric of the European experience. In these instances, there never

seems to be a problem identifying what is meant by "European" or
"Western." Norman Cantor reveals his Eurocentric perspective as he
introduces his three-volume work Western Civilization: !ts Genesis
and Destiny, while using the rhetoric of academic "objectivity":
Most of us are products of the Western heritage, and our traditional

ways of thinking about historical events have been shaped by the
forces that molded much of Western culture. In all our modes of
thought, we inevitably show the impress of the Western heritage.
We imbibe our ethics, religions, philosophy, science, art, and liter-
ature from families, schools and a social and intellectual environ-
ment which in turn have been formed by centuries of growth and
development. 28
He feels comfortable talking about "the basic foundations of our

civilization," and goes on to ask the following question:
How and why did the West attain intellectual, economic, and mili-
tary preeminence in the world by 1900?Why does the history of the
West, in spite of many retrogressions and failures, appear to be a
story of progress toward new forms of thought and art toward the
achievement of greater and greater wealth and power? 29
He continues:
Some qualities of European thought and social life are unique. Other
civilizations have merits that the West lacks, but certain ideas
occurred only to Europeans, and certain techniques were discov-
ered and applied only by them.
For Cantor the fundamental problem to be addressed by stu-

dents and teachers of Western civilization is, "Why and how did the
distinctive ideas and institutions of the West develop?" 30 Toynbee
answered that only the West responded to challenges, and that the
West was marked by its creative vitality. According to Cantor, "Thus
far no scholar has offered a full and thoroughly satisfactory explana-
tion of the development of the unique qualities of Western civiliza-
tion." That is precisely the ohjective of the present study, though not
from the same perspective as Ca11lor's. As to wl,nt lw nwans by the
"West," Ca11tnr snys specifically, ''tlli• co11ntries of Wl•stnn E11ropt'
,11HI tlw hr;111elws uf Wi>:.h•111.e•ivill1,1tlut1 £01111<1111No1th ,UHi l.ntlu
,1 " 11/\1111lw ltil'• 1w11l1•It 111•111
/\1111•11, 111.11111hltt vlr•w l'111111w1111',,111·
1111•11111pl1• 11•..,p1111'-llhl1 lor "W1•11t1·1111tvlll111ll1111"
Introduction 19
This is the kind of definition that is assumed as we make our way

though the plethora of undergraduate required courses, texts, tele-
vision, and even movie spectaculars that deal with "Western civi-
lization" Eurocentrically. But when an African-centered critique of
Europe is attempted, suddenly it becomes, if not invisible, an evasive
entity of uncertain definition and demarcation. Once when I made a
comment about the "European world-view" a colleague asked me to
which of the "many" world-views represented in the European tradi-
tion, I was referring. Though he had praised the tradition consis-
tently, now he argued that it was not uniform, nor did it represent a
single reality. But European nationalism, so strong and so pervasive,
is created not by diversity, but by the perception of unity. This is R.H.
Tawny's perception:
The societies composing Europe are in varying degrees the heirs of

the first great age of Western civilization; nor was the partnership
dissolved when that age was wound up. Greek philosophy and lit-
erature, Roman law; the long adventure of Christian missionaries;
the medieval church; feudalism; the Renaissance, the Reformation
and Counter Reformation; the Revolution - all these and much
else have reacted to them. Their religion, their literature and art,
their science, their economic systems are a cosmopolitan creation,
to which all have contributed and all are in debt. Such things, it is
true, do not in themselves create unity, but create the conditions
of it. They cause Europe, amid all its feverish jealousies and terrors,
to be a single civilization, as a contentious family is still a family, and
a bad state remains a state. They make its culture one, its crimes
domestic tragedies, its wars civil wars. 32
This is the cultural entity under examination in the present study.

I have used the term "European" most consistently in this study,
but l consider it to be interchangeable with "Western," "Western
European," and "European American." Oswald Spengler talks about
"Western-European-American," which he considers to be the only
culture in the phase of "fulfillment." 33 What is "European," like other
cultural phenomena, is in part an intuited whole and therefore does
11otlend itself to simplistic "scientifically" rigorous definition. Yet the
tl"'rlll is understood and used by academicians, theorists, and lay peo-
ple alike. The definition of any particular culture is not a lineal
pruce!->s,bul a necessarily dn.:ular one. We begin with the assumption
ul th1• cultural phc110111P11011 of "EuropC'a11ne:;s" that lends itself to
tit '!H"ripl l1111
1111<1 lt111,I 11•c-n11st· Wt' haw nlrendy pC'rreivecl ancl
1·xpli111,1t
1•xp1•rl1•1w1•d (ll'll) It to IH' •;1wli.l11tlw pro, l'~,i. ol dt !t<·rll1l11gwlwl we
1
pc•rc t•lvc·, Wt' l111p1·In KIVI'II 1111°dc•f11rllle111 II ,d1t•,1dyt11li1•1p11llypos

20 YURUGU
sesses. But this does not lead to any kind of lineal or temporal prior-
ity, nor is it "seen" in the same way that a material object is "seen."
What is European will forever be, in part, a product of how it is expe-
rienced. To abstract these reactions from its definition would not
only be impossible, but would leave very little of value or relevance.
What is European is not simply a group of characteristics, and
to attempt to enumerate such characteristics would not only mis-
represent my intention, but would leave this study open to obvious
criticism. Any one or a number of the generalized characteristics that
will be discussed as European can be found to some extent in other
cultures. And a discussion of the etiology of "Europeanness" using
such an approach would be further complicated by the fact that it has
been one of the more significant manifestations of European chau-
vinism to claim cultural creations that can be shown to be of non-
European origin. The contradiction in this attempt is obvious, since
the self-conscious identification of the cultural entity that would be
referred to as "Western" occurred chronologically much later than
many of the institutional developments with which Europeans choose
to identify. As cultural traditions go, the "West" is, after all, quite
young and biologically or racially Europeans are, of course, the "new
boys on the block." Individual characteristics do not identify them
as being "European": rather it is the way in which they are combined,
and the fact that they are reinforced throughout culture, that fuses
them into an ideological force. It is only in the context of European
culture that the identified themes take on ideological significance. It
was this realization that led me to the concept of asili, as the orga-
nizing and meaningful center of culture.
With this understanding and objective in mind, we need not
become involved in the argument as to what cultural institutions are
'European inventions," and "how much" or "how little" a particular
culture has "contributed to the progress of civilization." These are
merely the polemics of European chauvinism, and they become sig-
nificant only as ethnographic data in this study. For part of the defi-
nition of what is European is to be found in those things with which
those who call themselves Western or European have traditionally
chosen to identify, and, similarly, the way in which they view them-
selves in relation to other peoples. What is presented herein is a
unique configuration of characteristics that arc c-ornhhwd in such a
way that the c>mphasls, prlorlti(•s, and manifest •cl twhuvlor.1I 1en-
d1•ndl-!s fon11 i!ll t•xp1•r(!•111•ecl ~111111ral/lllsl
n, knl , e.illl y I hat lrns lra
dlt lo1111llyIH't'II tt•C1•11t•clto ,1s"Wei.11•111 1-:,1111p1·1111,""W,..,tc·n 1," 111, .,~:
we l\ll,11l11•f1•1 In 11,"l.',11111p1•1111"
Introduction 21
A product of modern Europe civilization, studying any problem of

Universal History, is bound to ask himself to what combination of
circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western
Civilization, and in Western Civilization only, cultural phenomena
have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of develop-
ment having Universalsignificance and value. 34 (his itallics]
Max Weber has asked the "right" question for Eurocentric rea-
sons and therefore cannot offer an answer that is useful to us. The key
to the African-centered answer lies in his parenthetical statement -
"as we like to think." That is the only element that is universal about
"Western civilization." Its utamaroho ("we like") and its utamawazo
("to think") combine in a manner dictated by an asili that causes the
culture to consistently project itself in universalistic terms. This ten-
dency is specifically discussed in Chap. 10, but it is a recurring theme
throughout the book.
Is European synonymous with "modern?" Is it, after all, a stage
in universal cultural development? The answer depends on one's per-
spective. The question is, therefore, moot. Part of the difficulty is
with the definition of terms. The significant point from an African-cen-
tered perspective concerns what happens if we say that European cul-
ture merely represents what will be the eventual form of all cultures.
The answer is that there is no possibility for a viable critique of what
Europeans have created, because there is no other ("non-European")
perspective. Other ideologies become impotent, because to identify
"Europeanness" as an inevitable stage in "non-European" develop-
ment is to say that they ("non-Europeans") do not exist - certainly
not as directives, as influences, or as agents of change.
Most of the potentially valuable critiques of European culture -
of which there are a precious few - have suffered from a common
malady. Since they syntactically make European culture into a rep-
resentation of a universal stage in human development, they are left
with no place to look for solutions or creative alternatives. "Western"
problems become the problems of "modern man" in these critiques.
Thereby they are superficially universalized, and Africans must
become "modern" before they can even deal with them. Europeans
nre, in this view, the only ones with the authority to criticize their cul-
ture, and the criticisms they make and the solutions they find are
said to have universal significance. European imperialism, in this way,
Is 1111t sC'cn as the product of the behavioral patterns of a particular
<'l1lturC1lwn11pnor of cNlal11 kind~ nf peoph-', but rather of the "nat-
111111" lt'tHlt•m•h•s of nll pc-oplt•nt n pmtlt1\tl;11JWrlod of r11lt11ralclrvc•l-
• "l~v•,, v , 11111111·I1t•1·1111H''l l·'.11111p,·., 11
op11 u-11 t Tl If' ., q,<111111•11t1·11111Ii111111-,
22 YURUGU
as it becomes more modern," so there is really only one valid culture,

and the only ideological alternative is the "more-than-modern" one.
To be useful, "modernity" has to be redefined, so that, for
instance, we can speak of modern African dress or modern African art
using an African-centered frame of reference. Presently, the concept
of modernity is much too Eurocentric to be either practical or of the-
oretical value in a critique of European culture. We must begin with
the assumption that Europeanness is not inevitable. And since we
wish to describe "a certain mode of cultural being as opposed to "a
certain level of history," 35 European development is a product of
European ideology. Consequently, it represents a particular view and
approach to the world - as partial as any other. And, as any other
ideological construct, it can theoretically, therefore, be rejected, cri-
tiqued, or replaced. This is not to say that the rejection of
Europeanness is an easy task, or that Europe does not give the illu-
sion of being ubiquitous. But the question of the universal validity of
European forms must not be confused with the successful expan-
sionism of European culture. And the resistance to Europe, as it is
now defined, can only be achieved through a commitment to that
resistance. Those who begin with the assumption that they are sim-
ply dealing with the character of "modernity" are doomed from the
start, for they have already accepted the terms of European ideology.
Some problems in terminology arise in referring to other cul-
tures. The term "non-European" is used reluctantly because of its
usual negative connotations, and because it implies a Eurocentric
frame of reference. But in this case it is appropriate since the focus
of the study is Europe exclusively: So that what is "other" is indeed
a negation of what is "European" (i.e., "non-European"). This fact not
withstanding, I have felt more comfortable using other terms, and
they require some explanation. The term "First World" is used to
refer to the descendants of the oldest civilizations known to us: Africa
and its Diaspora. "Primary cultures" is also used in this way.
Europeans in this sense represent a secondary, derived, and younger
people. I have sometimes borrowed Chinweizu's term from the title
of his book, The West and the Rest of Us (1978) and refer to those of
us who are not European as "the rest of us." And I have referred to
these "other" peoples and cultures as "majority," since Europeans
t111dI lw <·ullurP they have created represent a small "minority" when
vlt•W<'d l11th· w111 Id tontcxl.
"Nll11nn,llh111'' ,1,; :i c1ilturnl plH•111111wno11 Is ii Vl'l y sil(11lfk,1nl
tlu•1l'lo11• 111till: •,t11dy N.1llc11111llsn1
,l',p1·1 I 111l.11111pt•,111c•1lll1111•,111!1
1111111,11•11M I· 110Illt11ll, d ltv 1111•1111111·pt111· 11,1111111 ,,1.111•,··
1,11111•1
11
Introduction 23
refers to the commitment on the part of the members of a culture to

its political defense, its survival, and its perpetuation. ln the case of
Europe it also involves a commitment to its supremacy, to its expan-
sion, and to the destruction of other cultures. European nationalism
is therefore dangerous to the rest of the world. But it is very impor-
tant to understand that this does not mean that nationalism is a neg-
ative phenomenon universally. It is indeed "natural" to be centered
in one's culture and to seek to preserve it. That is part of the essence
of culture. But the content of European nationalism becomes prob-
lematical: (1) because it implies imperialistic aggression; and (2)
because it is usually not recognized as the expression of group inter-
est, thereby making it difficult for other groups to defend themselves
against its effects. An important objective of this work, therefore, is
to make European nationalism recognizable as such.
Perspectives and Objectives

This study was not approached objectively. It is not possible to
be objective towards Europe: Certainly the victims of its cultural,
political, and economic imperialism are not objective, if they are sane.
And Europeans cannot be "objective" about their own cultural his-
tory. The question, then, becomes: What could objectivity possibly
mean in terms of human mental attitudes? The implications of the
concept of objectivity are discussed critically in this study and else-
where.36 lt is a concept that acts to mystify Europe's victims: one of
the most effective tools of European ideology.
The claim to an absolute ultimate truth is a psychological neces-
sity for the European mentality. And since we have accepted it, it is
an edict that has constrained most of us who have been trained in
European academies. But African-centeredness breaks that hold by
recognizing the truth as a process in which we immerse ourselves
because of a commitment, not to some universal abstraction, but to
a certain quality of life. From an African-centered perspective, we
understand truth to be inseparable from the search for meaning and
purpose - the unique concern of human consciousness. As African
scholars, it is our responsibility to create systematic theoretical for-
mulations which will reveal the truths that enable us to liberate and
utilize the energies of our people. In this view, the self-determinist, the
rrvolulionary, and the scholar are one, having the same objective,
involvf"cl in tile same truth-process. The claim that we make is not to
1
t1 spurious · objedivl1y,'
1
hot ln ho11Psty. I, therefore, have made no
.1ttP111pt10 c111111111f1;1gt•
l'illwr 111yr •lntio11ship to Europe or my goal
1111uHl1•1t.1klr1H •,t111lv.
1111~.
24 YURUGU
As Wade Nobles says, the types of questions we ask are influ-

enced by the culture to which we belong. 37 Theory is born out of
commitment and intention. Every theorist puts part of herself (or
himself) into the theoretical formulations and conclusions that she
(or he) produces. But that does not make them any less valid. When
dealing with the social sciences, theories gain validity when viewed
in relationship to one's frame of reference, one's center. That center
is culturally meaningful only when it issues from a collective con-
sciousness. The view of Europe presented herein will be convincing
only to the extent that one is freed of European assumptions and
Eurocentric ideological commitments. But that is not because of any
weakness in the arguments or evidence presented. The record speaks
for itself. Ultimately validity is judged in terms of interest. This the-
ory of European culture is valid to the extent that it helps to liberate
us from the stranglehold of European control.
This study represents a view of European thought and behavior
that grows out of protracted personal confrontation with European
culture, out of an awareness politicized by means of African con-
sciousness, and made intellectually positive through a grounding in
African-centeredness. "Afrocentricity" is a way of viewing reality that
analyzes phenomena using the interest of African people as a refer-
ence point, as stated by Asante 38. African-centeredness provides the
theoretical framework within which the dominant modes of European
expression have been set for analysis here-in. This process estab-
lishes a system for critical evaluation. Its standards are severe. Its
questions uncompromising.
The most insidious expression of European nationalism is man-
ifested in the process of codification through which behavior and
thought patterns have been standardized by validating theoretical
formulations provided by European academia. We need only to
decode its workings in order to understand the mechanisms of
supremacy and break its power. The objective of this study is to place
the European experience under scrutiny in order to reveal its nature.
We turn the tables by transforming "subject" into "object," and in the
process we are ourselves transformed into victors rather than vic-
tims. We emerge from the yoke of European conceptual modalities
that have prevented us from the realization of the "collective con-
scin11s will" of our pcople. 39 Our objectives arc, specifically:
I. 111Cll'tll01lstrate the relationship hctweeu l•:uropcan thou~ht,
nf l·'.11rnpi-':l1lhli.tlt11l1011s, E11ropt•nr1,111tlAfrln111lsn1,
th,• 11.111111·
.111d I· 11111111•1111
h11pt•1l.lllsm;
:! 111111111,v1•11111111,11< 11l 1111lvl·1:1;ill.•t111
lt11111l•,111np1•11111
l1nh,,
Introduction 25
value, particularism, European interest and Eurocentricism;

3. to examine and expose expressions of European nationalism;
4. to understand the asili, or fundamental germinating principle
of European cultural development; and thus
5. to provide a tool for the explanation of European thought and
behavior as part of a consistently patterned ideological con-
struct.
This is achieved through an ideological focus that recognizes
Europe as the powerful monolith that it is. The compelling question
this study asks and answers is: What accounts for European power
and Europe's successful domination of the world? The objective of
this book is our liberation from that control, so that we can indeed
reclaim ourselves and what belongs to us, and in the process, trans-
form the universe, thereby reestablishing primary equilibrium. The
intent is to speak with the voice of African nationhood and to be
inspired by the collective vision of our people and our ancestors.
PART ONE
THOUGHT AND
ICONOGRAPHY
/
' ~-d.
..,..
f
Iii .
..
... unconnected consciousness is destructions
keenest tool against the soul.
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter I
Utamawazo:
The Cultural Structuring

of Thought
Archaic European Epistemology:
Substitution of Object for Symbol
The African world-view, and the world-views of other people
who are not of European origin, all appear to have certain themes in
common. The universe to which they relate is sacred in origin, is
organic, and is a true "cosmos." Human beings are part of the cosmos,
and, as such, relate intimately with other cosmic beings. Knowledge
of the universe comes through relationship with it and through per-
ception of spirit in matter. The universe is one; spheres are joined
because of a single unifying force that pervades all being. Meaningful
reality issues from this force. These world-views are "reasonable"
hut not rationalistic: complex yet lived. They tend to be expressed
t Iirough a logic of metaphor and complex symbolism.
Rob the universe of its richness, deny the significance of the
symbolic, simplify phenomena until it becomes mere object, and you
ltave a knowable quantity. Here begins and ends the European epis-
l <'n1ological mode. What happened within embryonic Europe that
was to eventually generate such a radically different world-view?
What part cli<IPlatonic thought play in this process? Whether or not
,IIJ of Western philosophy Is "but a footnote to Plato," certainly his
h1ll111·11cc or1 tl1e Europ<•m1slyl<' or speculative thought and ultimately
11r1 tilt' t1lufltntt!11.;u~tlw Ht'lll't al l>l'l'llllscs and assumptions of the cul-
l 1111• lt,1s l>t•t•11 lot 111111,11
IVI',11111 Any clisc11ssionof Ihe- 111\ture
s11111lt111I.
30 YURUGU
and origin of European epistemology must focus on, if not begin, with
Plato. This is not to say that he was not influenced by the pre-Socratic
African philosophies that preceeded him. 1 But what Plato seems to
have done is to have laid a rigorously constructed foundation for the
repudiation of the symbolic sense-the denial of cosmic, intuitive
knowledge. It is this process that we need to trace, this development
in formative European thought which was eventually to have had
such a devastating effect on the nontechnical aspects of the culture.
It led to the materialization of the universe as conceived by the
European mind-a materialization that complemented and supported
the intense psycho-cultural need for control of the self and others. ...
Contrary to our image of the philosopher as being otherworldly
and remote, even irrelevant (Aristophanes, The Clouds), Plato
appears to have been very much aware of himself as a social and ide-
ological architect. His success was eventually overwhelming. The
power of his ideas is evidenced by the way in which they have con-
tributed to the growth and persistence of a new order. This is pre-
cisely the power of the Euro-Caucasian order: its ability to sustain and
perpetuate itself. Plato's innovations were ultimately incorporated
into the culture because they were demanded by the asili.
The dialogue the Republic is Plato's ideological justification of
the State he wishes to bring into being. What we witness in the dia-
logue can be viewed epistemologically as the creation of the object.
In previous and disparate world-views, we see a knowing subject inti-
mately involved in the surrounding universe. The acquisition of
knowledge involving immersion in this universe until, through sym-
pathetic participation, meaning is revealed, expressed, and under-
stood via complex and multidimensional symbols. But in the "new"
epistemology we exchange symbols for "objects." The creation of the
object requires a transformation of the universe, no longer experi-
enced but rather, "objectified." This transformation is achieved
through a changed relationship of the knower to the known. In the
Republic, Plato performs this feat: a psycho-intellectual maneuver by
which the subject is able to separate her/himself from the known.
This separation is at once the key that opens the way to "knowledge"
as conceived by the European and the key that locks the door to the
possibilities of the apprehension of a spiritual universe.
Two things occur, one effecting the other. First, the psyche
tmdt•rgoes a Lransformatinn: Slowly the "self" Is pt•rn•lvcct clifkrently
fr0111 twrnr,·: ti 1t•ll, I lw unl'-'.<'rst•ln which I hat sl'lf rl'l,11t·sls 1wrn•ived
dlfl1·11•11tly, l,1•1·.111~1· I lit• tlill 11n• ol 1111'rt·l,1ll1111·,l1tp111111.1111.(l'd
TIil' !WII
I, lltl 111111{1'1,1111•11f1h llt IIIH,111'1!1•1111It 1>1•1·111111·
I ''1111'tlll11ld11~1,1d1)t•1 I"
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 31
The Greek word psyche indicates an understanding of an autonomous

self distinct from everything surrounding that self. The primary func-
tion of this self becomes the "knowing" and "thinking" of scientific
activity, which is no longer connected to "intuiting." According to
the Platonic view the highest endeavor is philosophy, and therefore
the most valuable person is the philosopher, the lover/seeker of
"truth," the one who "thinks" best. Other functions and human activ-
ities are devalued. This new self becomes fiercely isolated from its
environment. Why autonomous, distinct, and isolated? Because this
"thinking being," if it is to be capable of scientific cognition, must be,
most of all, independent.
In Eric Havelock's analysis (developed obviously from within
the confines of the European world-view) the dominant mode in pre-
Platonic Greece was the poetic, exemplified by the epic of which
Homer's writing is so representative. The success and appeal of
I lomer's epics depended on the identification of the audience with the
characters and plot. His works were memorized and recited, and they
rested on the strength of oral expression. When successfully drama-
tized they evoked emotional response from an audience that felt itself
to be personally involved with the, subject matter. This, according to
I lavelock, was an "unsophisticated," nontechnological mode that
would prevent the development of a "reflective, critical" psyche. "The
doctrine of the autonomous psyche is the counterpart of the rejec-
tIon of the oral culture." 2 In his view Plato was the visionary, mainly
1c•sponsible for the transition from the Homeric, oral mode to the lit-
11rate,critical mode. The "old" poetic represented the "habit of self-
ld1;:ntification with the oral traditions." It represented emotional
tutcrrelationship. In other words the success of the poetic mode rests
with the ability to forge the world into a phenomenal universe, an
1•xpcrienced reality. Within this context the self is dependent on its
1•xperlences. The crux of the matter for Havelock and Plato is that this
dc•pendence lodges us hopelessly in the concrete, unable to break
lnusc from each instance reaching beyond to an abstract statement.
I l.1wlock says that Plato was arguing for "the invention of an abstract
l,111g11ageof descriptive science to replace a concrete language of oral
lllt'lllOry.":I .
According to lhe new epistemology, in order to be capable of
, 111kt1l thought, we must be independent from that which we wish to
I unw: 1111ll1volvccl, <lelatlH cl, r~motc. Clearly, what this allows for is
, 1111/w/ First, w<·;1ehll'vt• ('011lrol of the self, the S('lf no longer able to
liy It:-.c·n11lc·1tl111f11rl, It ts a self witliolll t'.Onlext
'"' 111i111tp1d,1tc·d
( wltl< I 1 111Ah le 1111kt •:-.II ,1
111:1111111,t :wlf wit I 1rn1 I 111t•;11II111.(, n "11n11~l'lf")
32 YURUGU
This idea of control is facilitated by first separating the human being

into distinct compartments ("principles"). Plato distinguishes the
compartments of "reason" and "appetite" or "emotion." Reason is a
higher principle or function of woman/man, while appetite is "more
base." They are in opposition to one another and help to constitute,
what has become one of the most problematical dichotomies in
European thought and behavior. This opposition results in the split-
ting of the human being. No longer whole, we later become Descartes'
"mind vs. body." The superiority of the intellect over the emotional
self is established as spirit is separated from matter. Even the term
"spirit" takes on a cerebral, intellectualist interpretation in the
Western tradition (Hegel). 4
As we understand it, Plato's "reason" is the denial of spirit.
Reason functions to control the more "base appetites" and "instincts."
The European view of the human begins to take shape here. It is a
view that was to grow more dominant through centuries of European
development and that was to become more and more oppressive in
contemporary Western European society, where there is no alterna-
tive view offered. For Plato, self-mastery, like justice in the State, is
achieved when reason controls:
... in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle;
and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said
to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise; but when owing
to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also
the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse-in
this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled
... look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of
these two conditions realized; for the words "temperance" and "self-
mastery" truly express the rule of the better over the worse ... the
manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally
found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so
called who are the lowest and more numerous class .... Whereas
the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under
the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few
and those the best born and best educated .... These two ... have
a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held
down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.5
Dichotomization and The Notion Of Harmony

The Platonic view sacrilic{'S llw wholf•111•stt nf p<•1S(l11I 1011<1 in
ordcrtos( ..'l llwstai,wo11 wl1kli tlwt•pislt•111«1lol(knl fw111d,1tl1111· ol tlu•
1•:lllopt•,111vh~wwill~ w pl,1y1•cl 111ll ( '11~(11ldv1••IYh" w1·t"I1t•l111~111old1·II
Ill ,il l1•1t:1tHllllt lp111!·!1 I 11cllll1,tlhlll •11ilt1•d,111"'"'"'""" ;, tl1,1t
..
was the realization of the cultural asili. Plato had layed an elaborate
trap. Once the "person" was artificially split into conflicting faculties
or tendencies, it made sense to think in terms of one faculty "winning"
or controlling the other(s). And here begins a pattern that runs with
frighteningly predictable consistency through European thought,
continually gathering momentum for ages to come. The mind is
trained from birth to think in terms of dichotomies or "splits." 6 The
splits become irreconcilable, antagonistic opposites. Holistic con-
ceptions become almost impossible given this mindset. First the
dichotomy is presented, then the process of valuation occurs in
which one term is valued and the other is devalued. One is consid-
ered "good," positive, superior; the other is considered "bad," nega-
tive, inferior. And, unlike the Eastern (Zen) conception of the Yin and
the Yang or the African principle of "twinness" (Carruthers refers to
this as "appositional complementarity"7) these contrasting terms are
not conceived as complementary and necessary parts of a whole.
They are, instead, conflicting and "threatening" to one another.
The process of dichotimization in the European utamawazo is of
great significance, for it is this dichotomized perception of reality on
which the controlling presence (imperialistic behavior) depends. The
11(//maroho,which needs to control, is dependent on the antagonistic
oppositions presented by the cognitive style (utamawazo) of the cul-
tural myth (mythoform). Realities are split, then evaluated, so that
oue part is "better," which mandates its controlling function. This, we
will see, is a pattern throughout Platonic thought. Moreover, it is a
pattern that develops consistently as a continuing characteristic of
I lie European utamawazo grounded in the nature of the originating
11sili.Robert Armstrong says it this way,
0ualities abound, constituting our civilization. Our religion is

premised upon good and evil, and indeed could not exist were it not
for the presence of evil which endows it with meaning and efficacy.
We analyze the unitive work of art into form and content; and we
t·ouslruct a logic based upon right and wrong. Our languages are of
i;uhject and object ... Our science is one of the probable versus the
Improbable, the workable as opposed to the unworkable, matter
111,d a11ti-nrntter ... all revealing more of the nature of the scientist's
tnlnd than of lhe actual nature of the physical universe. 8
I le•i'mttlllll(.!S,
WP :1t·1•1111• world 1111 tlt·lk11tcly 1'011stit11tt•dol hulll t<•rrns in an i111i-

11lt1•:,ysl1·111nl 1·01111,1•111111~
111tl1:1, by lilt· 11'11sil,11
i11HIlloi111dl111-(1·tl11•r
tl111t, l!hl·1 l11•lw1•1•11
ll11·111,'1'11lw ·11111· ,IM' 11, fly
0111•lt•11111111·111'11,
34 YURUGU
definition, of greater value than its opposite ...
In large measure then, the myth of the consciousness of western

Europe is the myth of bi-polar oppositions. 9
Armstrong foreshadows a basic premise of this study as he

relates this polarizing tendency to the structure of the Euro-American
state, its religious ideas, and its international posture.
It is not inevitable that there should inexorably be a division of the

world into friend and foe with the result that the history of foreign
policy in recent years at least is more accurately to be character-
ized in terms of our determination to identify and to perpetuate
enemies than to create)riends. 10
We have already completed the circle, for it is possible to trace

this tendency of conceptualization and behavior from classical
Greece. The theme is confrontation. The mode is control. Page duBois
refers to this as the "polarizing vision" based on "confrontation
between opposites," which she identifies as being adumbrated in the
art and architectural style of the "metopes" of Athens. In duBois'
analysis, Greek thought about "difference" (barbarian/Greek;
female/male) was analogical and became hierarchical as a response
to political crisis following the Peloponnesian War. 11
The thrust of her study (Centaurs and Amazons) is significant in
this discussion for two reasons: (1) because of its recognition of the
ideological significance of the style of Greek speculative thought and
(2) because it affirms our recognition of those cognitive characteris-
tics that distinguish the developing European utamawazo from pre-
viously established traditions.
When is it, in Greek thought, that "appositional" relationships
become "opposites?" When does it become necessary to perceive
pairs as being in polar opposition and exclusive, rather than as com-
plementary and diunital? 12 This may be the point of origin of the
European consciousness. I suspect that the need occurs at a much
earlier point in the archaic "European" experience. Classical Greece
was merely an important phase of standardization. It had inherited a
particular asili, already carrying the cultural genes.
DuBois b<'lieves that the shift from polarity to hi<.'rnrcl1ycorre-
sponded to "the• shift frn111the dt•111ocratk rlty or 1'11· firth ct•ntury to
ii 111·1loc I h I llw foml h 1·t•11t lit'.)' of qi 1t•~I111111111{
I 1U' 1111/I.\ ·nw
., ...,I (<11111'' 1·'
11111.(111•, ol tlw 111111,tl •,pllltl111{l1•11d1·111v 11•,t·II 111 ll11p111tn11I ltt !Ills
, l11ilv, lt11w1 1 v, t, l11•1·.111•w II 1111,vlu· 11••11111•1 "11,1111,il 11111 111,1v1•1.·1,1I 111
perceive the universe in terms of "self" as opposed to "other,''14 and

the ideological significance of that distinction and the implied rela-
tionship between those two beings is the point at issue.
As duBois points out, the "Greek male human" defined himself
very much in terms of opposition to what he was "not"-"barbarian
female animal." This brings us closer to the origin of a nascent
"European" consciousness. She asserts that, "The Greek male strug-
gled against imaginary barbarism, bestiality and effeminization." 15 In
her view the opposition between self and other did not always imply
superior/inferior relationship. But certainly the Greek/male/human
thought it was better to be that (superior, i.e., Greek/male/human).
And this perceived separation gave Plato, then Aristotle, the polar-
izing mechanism with which to work. It was already present in the
(ireek consciousness, a consciousness resting on an utamaroho that
had a predilection for postures of superiority and dominance. Polarity
was necessary for the hierarchy that followed. DuBois refers to the
hierarchical structures as a "new ordering" based on a "new logic,"
one that establishes the "Great Chain of Being" based on "relation-
ships of superiority and subordination.''15 But Platonic conceptions
n·present a formalized ideological statement of hierarchical thought,
IIle terms of which were already present in the Greek mind. We agree
on the significance of these formulations, however. "Hierarchical
tdeas of difference formulated by Plato and Aristotle continue to
t lcfine relations of dominance and submission in Western culture and
l11 philosophical discourse today." 16
This brings us to yet another related and salient feature of the
l·'.uropean utamawazo. It does not generate a genuine conception of
l111rmony.An authentic idea of harmony cannot be explained or
,inderstood in this world-view. "Harmony" is mistakenly projected
,1s rational order, an order based on the mechanism of control. What
l'lalo recognizes as "harmony" is achieved when the "positive" term
nl the dichotomy controls (or destroys) the "negative" term/phe-
1111me11on/entity: when reason controls emotion, both in the person
,11111in the state. On the African and Eastern conceptions, harmony is
.11 llicved through the balance of complementary forces, and it is
lt11l<•t•cl impossible to have a functioning whole without harmonious
11111·1 ractio11 aml the existence of balancing pairs.)
/\ tlH'ory of thC' universe, a theory of the state, and a theory of
l111111a11 natun· un:: ir11pliedln Platonic <>pistcmology.17Justice, or the
1:1111tl,Is oi<'hlt•vt·dwli1•111lw "lwst" cnnl rob tlw "worst." The universe
I I rn tl1•1t •II I In 11111!1,!>lll II 1·rn 1l1111.111I lit· SI,tit•, t lw "lliglwst" co11lrnl llw
l11w.-,t "'l'lic p1•1•,n11h 1·1111•.t.111tlv .11w.11 wlll1l11 11!1111-1•11 Is 1101
,111<1
36 YURUGU
properly human until his reason controls his emotion, i.e., men were
to control women. The political implications of this consistent and
unified theory are not difficult to extrapolate. Plato has already
described what for Europe becomes the "Ideal State," one in which
the human being who has gained control of himself in turn controls
those who haven't (women, of course, were perceived as not having '
the necessary control). It would follow that the universe is then put
in order by the nation of people who are "higher" (controlled by rea-
son). It is also significant that Plato indicates that the "higher" ten-
dencies will always be "less" in number and the "lower" of greater
mass. This rationalizes an ideology of control by the few within the
State and world dominance by a small racial minority. 18 If indeed this
splitting of the person is artificial, inaccurate, and undesirable-if
indeed emotion is an inseparable part of the intellect and of human
consciousness-then this new epistemology ("mental habit") can be
interpreted as a justification of what was to be manifested as
European racism, nationalism, and imperialism. The group that has
the power to enforce its definition of "reason" so that it becomes the
most "reasonable," consequently has a mandate to control those
whose reasoning abilities are judged to be less (and so there is a
need to "measure" intellectual ability: enter I.Q. mythology).
On the level of epistemology we have seen that this splitting of
the human being facilitates the achievement of that supreme mental
state (of being) that in European culture has come to be identified
with the ability to think, at least to think rationally. Unless the intel-
lect is separated from the emotions, it is not possible to talk about
them distinctly, to concentrate on gaining knowledge by controlling
or eliminating the emotional relationship to a given situation, thing,
or person.
Reification Of The Object:

Devaluation Of The Senses
In establishing this new epistemological mode, Plato used his
imagination: He created a reality. Hypothesis became theory. He
demonstrated brilliance, perception, and vision. He must have known
what he wanted the future to look like, taking into consideration the
political and ideological needs of his society. But when theory tt1al
originates in imagination becomes more than a useful epistemological
lool for specific: tasks assorintC'd witli stl<>11lllic l1w<·stiga1lo11,It ni11
olll11sci1lt• till' n•ntlty it Ii-;
lw<·o111('d,111!,(t't<111s,lwt·,u1st• It 1·1111111<11·1·<1
tu 1'1111lly ,111dtll•,1111Itl1t•111f{.tlll111It I•:,1111
11t111111pll11f.( 111ptl11~In pc•,
llH•my nl I 11owli1dl(P Ill 1•,11111• 1•v1•11t1wllv 11•lf11•d
lt·1 t 1'1,1111'•1 111111,111
ideological statement with political implications. His creation was to

become a determinant and support-a foundation and an inspira-
tion-for the dominance, intensification, and valorization of one ten-
dency in European behavior to the detriment of other inclinations.
The need to control and to have power over others ascended to a
position of priority. It became an obsession, always struggling to
negate whatever humanism existed in the culture, because of the asili.
The universe presents itself naturally as cosmos, as "subject" to
which we are linked as "subjects"; ancient African cultures viewed the
world so, and the early Greeks inherited this view. According to
I lavelock, Homer's success rested on the identification of the reader
or listener with the subject matter of his epic. 19 The human being of
these ancient civilizations was a cosmic being (and remains so for
I hat matter in the contemporary African world-view). Plato wanted to
change all that. He was proposing a "revolution" in thought. This
''revolution" was necessary in order to satisfy the European uta-
maroho. Perhaps he should have said, Let us pretend that the uni-
verse is not subject, but object; that we are not a part of it; but
separated from it; and let us do this solely for the purpose of exper-
imentation, in order to see what implications such a conception might
liave. But he didn't say let's pretend. Rather, he said authoritatively
that in order to "know" we must be dealing with "objects." The way
t liat we create "objects" is by totally detaching ourselves from what
II is we wish to know. By eliminating or gaining control of our emo-
tions we can become aware of ourselves as thinking subjects, dis-
1111<.:tfrom the contemplated object. Through this separation, this
11·moteness, this denial of cosmic relationship, we achieve "objecti-
fil';ltion." That is a necessary achievement if we are to be capable of
~l'i<'11tificcognition. To think properly about an object, to gain knowl-
l'Clgc of (mastery over) an object, we must control it. We can only do
I Iils if we are emotionally detached from it. And we gain this emo-
l l1111aldistance from the "object" by first and foremost gaining con-
t rnl over ourselves; that is, by placing our reason (intellect) in control
111our emotions (feelings).
Vt!rnon Dixon discusses a "descendant" epistemological view
, 11iillyrecognizable as Platonic in definition.
111lill· E11ro-Anwricanworld view, there is a separation betwe~n the

t 111•Sl•ll n11dthe nonsctf (phenomenal world). Through this process
111,.;t1pnt at 101,1lit' plH·111 ,11H'nlllworld be('omes an Object, an "it." By
< 11>fc1c·t, I 11wa111lit• 1n1 nllt y nf plwnomcn.\ ronrcivrd as constituting
1111
1 11rnpic•If, I h11tI", 11I
I t lie• pl w11rn11c<1
Iii I llat an· t IH' a11t
It hesls of sub-
1•ct, ''H"· rn •H'lf 1·11>1•1111111.,111·..,:.,Tlw 11l11·11011w11,d wmlct ll••<011ws
38 YURUGU
an entity considered as totally independent of the self rather than

as affected by one's feelings or reflections. Reality becomes that
which is set before the mind to be apprehended, whether it be things
external in space or conceptions formed by the mind itself.20
The key is "control." Clearly, reason is positive, valued, "higher";

emotions are negative, devalued, "more base"-because they have a
tendency to control us. Such control is an indication of powerless-
ness. To understand the self as a cosmic being is to be powerless. It
is politically unwise and undesirable; it is morally reprehensible.
Better people are "more reasonable," less emotional. This is what
Plato implied. This is the essence of his "authoritative utterance."
And what he said was prophetic, nay prescriptive, for those who were
"emotional" (spiritual) indeed were to be rendered powerless.
Here then is the concept of an "object," fiercely isolated from time,

place and circumstance, and translated linguistically into an
abstraction and then put forward as the goal of a prolonged intel-
lectual investigation. 21
The above is Eric Havelock's description of the process of objec-

tification. In his view this separation of the self from the remembered
word introduced a new cognitive mode and allowed the Greeks to
"gain control" over the object and thereby, so we are told, eventually
to "escape from the cave." Or at least their leaders (the philosophers)
escaped and the descendants of the philosopher kings (Europeans).
It is very important that we place this process in proper historical
context. The "European" had not yet "developed," but Plato had
helped to construct a yardstick by which the "true European" would
be measured. The vicious and violent internecine war against the
"barbaric" tendencies in archaic Europe would go on into the
eleventh century (and of course beyond, on a lesser scale, but none
the less vigilant). This was a war to ensure a particular world-view,
which, as we shall see, was complemented by the institutionalized
manifestation of religion identified with European culture.
It is a testament to Plato's success that Havelock speaks for the
contemporary European academician in his unquestioning praise of
Plato's work. Approximately 2500years after his concepts were intro-
duced as "new" to the Greeks and as "racliC'al"Md "revolutlunnry,"
they nrc still part oft hr "takrn-for-grantccl," 11111t1•rlyl11g, prc•supposl
tlon.d fo, 111d:\lln11nf l·'.urop.,;;111 schol;u ly 1ho111,tl11 ;111dof t Iw t'ttl(nf IIV<'
,,.) nt IIH• c 1tlt1111·
,1•,p1 c·h (11(111111111111 0
ii'>,, wl1olc· Wl1ill• l'l,1111lt,1d lo
,11~111 f,u tlw v,lllt111y1111111 ..,,., 01111 pl•,, ll.1\l'ln1 I , ,1111111111.tlt';1lly
extol their virtues and therefore Plato's contribution to European

thought. Havelock is convinced of the correctness and appropriate-
ness of Platonic epistemology just as he is convinced of the superi-
ority of the "Platonic Man" in relation to the "Pre-Platonic" or
"Homeric Man." We will see that Havelock is talking about a supposed
superiority, a mental, even moral superiority. This is assumed just as
the superiority of European civilization is assumed because of the
overwhelming success of European scientific-technological pursuits.
For Havelock, as well as for Plato, the cave or the world of the
senses is presented as a world of illusion. But this implies that Plato's
t I1eory of ideas and objectification allows one to escape to reality. Yet
11cither raises the question of the illusion of "objectivity," the illusion
of control. This illusion has indeed facilitated the "real" growth of the
~cientific-technological order and the ascendance of the European
world, but that should not allow us to mistake it for the only "reality."
In one sense the history of European thought has been based on the
11scof metaphor as literal description. It is as though with Plato, the
l1111ltationsof the written "word" were forgotten; the complexity of the
: v111l)o!icmode was abandoned for the simplicity of unidimensional-
lty, The symbol became the object. And this manipulation paid off. It
I 1.isenhanced the ability to have power over others. 22
Superiority of the Platonic epistemology is aided by dichotomies
t I 1,11hecome grounds for invidious comparisons, further justification
loi control mechanisms. The contrast of "knowledge" and "opinion"
lil'comes another such dichotomy for Plato. Once it is established as
1 •,tntement of value it is used by Europeans to devalue alternative
, pt~temologies, modes of cognition, world-views, therefore cultures,
11111 C'Vcn"religions," as we shall discuss in subsequent chapters.
1lavelock accuses the Homeric poets of only being able to deal
wit 11"opinion." The term "accusation" seems appropriate because it
I, cl1•1·1necl "lowly" and "unfit," even immoral for rational man to func-
11,111111tl1is way. The Homeric poets were, according to Havelock,
\Y1ll li1gprior to the great Platonic Revolution that taught people (only
1111•i11prrior ones) how to think. In the Platonic state of mind one is
v,fl clppt•d to deal with "knowledge." Why? Because the mind in this
lhli· ll;1s separated itself from "the object." Much of Plato's argu-
111, 11111•nterson this object. It is in one sense the nature of the object
ii, ,t d••ttrn1l11es lhe validity and truth of statements made about it.
111111· llrt' "proper" objl'cts of knowledge, and then there are those
tit It ,111• "l111propn" or irtflcll'q11atP.
A 11•l,1l1•ddi< l1otnt11ymt wlilrli Plato's arg11nwnl depends is that
I" l w,•1•11'"p1•11 •·pl 1011' .111d
"10111wlPdl(('."
wl tl'rt' pt·rTt•pt 1011fairs about
40 YURUGU
as well as mere opinion. In the Theatetus Socrates argues that per-

ception is of the body in which exist the senses. The senses are like
"instruments"; the sense organs must necessarily "specialize," as it
were. Socrates says that one.cannot "hear" through the eyes, nor
"see" through the ears, and so on. He makes much of the fact that the
appropriate preposition is "through" and not "with" when we are
dealing with the "body" and with perception. 23 What Socrates gets
Theatetus to agree to is that things that the body perceives are "sep-
arate," and that it is only the "mind" that can relate these things, can
compare them, can say whether they exist or don't exist. According
to Socrates we perceive "through" the senses (body), while we reflect
or know "with" the mind. Theatetus, like Protagorus and other
Sophists, had argued that perception was knowledge. Socrates
"proves" that it is the mind that "unites" our ideas about the objects
we sense. We "think" with our minds.
Again the genius of Plato: Another characteristic dichotomy-
an architectonic one, culminating in the infamous Cogito, ergo sum
of Descartes about twelve centuries later-is born as "mind" is sep-
arated from "body." The "splits" that we have mentioned are worked
out in such a way that they deny and prevent interrelationship. They
do this on a cognitive level, a semantic level, and through the "logic"
on which they are based. The splits then move to the level of culture,
world-view, and belief. They begin to effect experience, because
although they may not be accurate, they limit people's ability to expe-
rience the universe as an integrated whole. It is the essence of "tra-
ditional" medicine that the person be considered as a whole being.
Richard King argues that in the African conception, not merely the
"brain," but the entire body is the human "computer." In that sense,
we also "think" with our sense organs, which perhaps helps to explain
"genius" on the basketball court. 24
Evidently, Plato did not anticipate problems resulting from such
artificial separations as the mind/body dichotomy. His concern was
with providing an edifice of "logic" that could be used at once as an
unquestioned foundation of "truth" and to discredit other views. This
was necessary because the other views were seen as being "com-
petitive," since they could lead to divergent forms of social organi-
zation. Plato was concerned solely with the intellectual habits and
behavior of those who would be participating in the new society. 11<'
does not st•ern to have been co11<.·n11C'cl with the cp1c1li1y of l hf'lr lives.
'l'l1t•rt•llHd In hc- a sla11clnrc! for lhe d1•fi11ltlo11of ltulh. '!'lie.•Sophists
w1•11•,, 1111111·11111111•,
tl111•u1wltlt 1111'11 .. 11t.11111w111•d
;1111111111•111 1111•w,1y
111,1111111111l1l'l11llvHy 1'10111ll,111to 1 •,t.111lhl1 d11l(11111 1'111'
dt1}(J11~1
llt,11
he argued for not only discredited other epistemologies, it estab-

lished a hierarchy in which certain kinds of people (the overwhelm-
ing majority) were inferior. His arguments were ultimately effective.
i;hey succeeded in influencing centuries of subsequent European
development, as other formidable European minds joined his ranks.
As such, his ideas helped to reveal the asili of European culture.
Page duBois' perspective renders a very different view of
Plato's revolutionary alteration of the Greek literary mode from
poetic analogy to the more precise language of discourse, different
from that of Havelock. This change served the purpose of preparing
minds to accept a new state order; a radically altered internal struc-
ture. duBois says,
Once Plato's project of diaeresis, of division and categorization,

was explicitly acknowledged, the focus of discourse shifted away
from reasoning through analogy, from the Greek/barbarian dis-
tinction, to internal divisions, towards hierarchization which ratio-
nalized differences inside the troubled city. Plato denied the utility
of the Greek/barbarian polarity, turned his attention to male/female
difference, but concentrated finally on reasoning based on subor-
dination and dominance. 25
It is as Havelock suggests, a new mode for the development of a

11ew consciousness. But while for Havelock this represented an
unquestioned "good" and the creation of the "critical" mind, for
cJuBois the move to discourse from the poetry and more poetic prose
ol the fifth century was made necessary by the elaborated, detailed
logos, language appropriate for articulating new relationships. She
·:ays of the Platonic view,
Every logos-that is, every argument, every rationalization, every

discourse-should be subject to the same type of subordination
and hierarchy, as well as organic connection, as the body described
at its moment of creation in the Timaeus. 26
lu other words, the structure of Platonic discourse itself forced

I lloi;e who used it to accept a particular concept of social order.
lh llllant! In the very syntax of our speech as we learn the English lan-
l!ll,1j.W,the justification of our "inferiority" is embedded, and, what is
1111m•, we uccept that fact as we "master" the language. (And it is not
111·1 ldcutnl, givc.:11 nat11re of European cultural history, that the
l11<->
w11ttl 111u.~1,·r, wl1lrl1 d,•slgnHtl's t lie 111alc•
gender, n1ea11s "to gain con-
1111I1ivt'I.'') htdt•t•<I lllh, ,u1aly1,lf,of Platollit• tl1nu~ht Is not mc~rcly a11
,11 ,11l1•111k 1•xt•11 i1-,1·
11lwlp•, 1111•itpwwtilt' 11ppll'~slv1•,llld n•pn•s!IIVI'
42 YURUGU
forms within European and Euro-American culture that shackle

Africans, other "non-Europeans," and to a lesser extent, women. Why
is it that speech in European-derived societies is the mark of status
in the culture? And why is it that African people in America and the
Caribbean have maintained such distinct language styles? Here we
have the intuitive resistance to a change in consciousness. The cre-
ation of African-influenced languages in circumstances of oppression
can be understood as a force that insists on the maintenance of an
ancestral world-view.
But this, I think, is what you would affirm, at least, that every dis-
course (Logos) should be constituted like a living being, having its
own body (Soma), so as to be neither headless nor footless, but hav-
ing a middle as well as extremities, which have been written so as
to be appropriate to each other and to the whole. 27
DuBois says that Phaedrus' discourse "moves from head to foot,

from the middle to the extremities and returns finally to the whole.
The form of the argument exemplifies the patterns of subordination
and control which it defends." 28 DuBois perceives the almost fanati-
cal consistency and thoroughness in Plato's attack on the traditional
social reality. Every thrust is part of a directed methodology that
seeks to guarantee the nature of its result.
This is, indeed, the genesis of Western scientific thought; not of
science itself. Plato set the mold, neither for a critical method, nor for
authentic critical thought with which Europeans proudly identify
themselves, but for a method of thinking, discourse, argumentation,
and organization that would guarantee social control by people (men)
like himself. His genius was in understanding that to do this sucess-
fully he had to influence the style of thought, language, and behavior
of all human beings, i.e., their total experience. As we learn to think
"Platonically," we are convinced that that is the only correct way to
think. The mode of the academy is still at the base of social control.
Gregory Vlastos remarks of Plato,
... his views about slavery, state, man and the world, all illustrate
a single hierarchic pattern; and ... the key to the pattern is in his
idea of logos with all the implications of a dualist epistemology. Th<>
slave lacks logos: so does the multilucle in tlw state, lhc body i11 the
1rian, ,ind material 11ec~~ssity
i11tlw 11nlvers<• . C)tdn ls in1pos1•cl
011 1l11·ml;y a lw11Pvol1•11t s11p<-r11,r: uta!ilL't, 1,t1i;11dla11, 111h11I,
d1•111l
111uc I II IP 1,~ .1111I 1111
I lw t 111111111111 It y b ti 11•I111,,w,.>111111 ht
of 1111!11~
.111Iir1111111dl•'• 111,11•11Ii, 1111,•,l,1v1·1y h ,,.1t1u,II 111111•if1·11lt,111111111'r
WIiii 11111>'• 1111111111,1!1111111tlw 111111111111 ll1t• w111 Id ,1111111!111111" 1 •
We are witnessing the uniquely European phenomenon: the

process by which epistemology becomes ideology. Jurgen Habermas
seems to be arguing that this is a universal historical process by
which one world-view supercedes and devalues another. 30
Plato sought to construct a world made up totally of conceptual
reality. In this world there was little room for sense perceptions. They
occupied a very inferior position. He wanted the citizen to become
more and more acculturated to this conceptual reality. Doing so
meant that the citizen's senses were trusted less and less, until
European culture ended up at one end of the spectrum of which Africa
might be at the other. Europeans are not trained to use their senses
nor to be "perceptive" (in so far as that is taken by them to mean "non
intellectual"), whereas Africans relate to the universe using sense
perceptions as highly developed tools-media, if you will-that are
a valued part of the human intellectual apparatus. 31
Sensations, says Socrates, are given at birth. Not only that, but
they are given to-animals as well as men. And they are natural. All of
which functions to devalue the senses and sense perception in the
European world-view. A very strong theme in European moral and
political philosophy is the idea that human beings are superior to
other animals and that they must protect that superiority in order to
be truly "human." Knowledge in the Platonic view is long and slow in
coming. One has to work for it. Is it "natural" to human beings? In a
sense it is only cultural. The senses are afterall only instruments, and
what causes perception to be inferior to knowledge is the nature of
its "object," (the all-important concept of the "object.") The objects
of perception do not have the true reality that the objects of knowl-
edge must possess. 32
The senses, perceptions (what is natural to the human) function
only in the world of appearances and therefore are below the line that
separates "adults" from "children" in Platonic thought. Our senses
can only tell us how things "seem" to be. True knowledge, on the
other hand, relates to the "real world" of "ideas." We are then above
the line and are doing important things. Anyone can do what is nat-
ural and stumble around the cave in darkness. Light and dark are
l wo sides of this value dichotomy, irreconcilable opposing forces.
Since light becomes the metaphPr for truth. The mind, it seems, exists
lwltind the organs through which we perceive. And only the mind is
,·apable or making ju<l1f'tnents. Sensing is easy and immediate.
K111,wled~W co11wsonly 1111011gl1 diffkull rPflection-part of a "long
,IIHI trouhll'I-\Olll<' p101·t'ss of 1•cl11catlrn1.":n
l\11lwhy w.1s It •111li11potl,111l 1,1 1lt·h11w tilt• •;1 IIM't; In tills w.,y'l
44 YURUGU
Why did Plato so persistently and unrelentingly drive home the def-
inition and confines of this epistemological mode? It was an episte-
mology that implied a social, ethical, and even political theory. Plato's
epistemology did indeed eventually become the foundation for a form
of social organization that would facilitate domination of the many by
the few. It helped to create a world-view. The epistemology took on
ideological implications in Plato's presentation and his commitment
to its assumptions. His dialogues were ammunition for the prosely-
tizers who would follow until the assumptions of his epistemology
became the assumptions of a cultural tradition. These epistemologi-
cal assumptions translated into an ideological statement in the civi-
lization that would claim them as tradition.
That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in

the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help
of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becom-
ing and perishing and never really is.34
Friedrich Juenger says "being" is good, valued, and intelligent.

"Becoming" is devalued, inferior, irrational. In Plato's ideology,
"Reason establishes itself as absolute, dominates all other modes of
apprehension, understanding .... It refuses to admit of any concepts
not established by itself .... All non-intellectual concepts are held to
be unreasonable, and are discarded." 35 In this statement, Friedrich
Juenger points to the ideological, absolute and uncompromising
thrust of Platonic conceptions.
Theory of Humanness
A theory of the human being has already been implied in our dis-
cussion of Platonic conceptions. We, as humans, are not whole
beings, but rather made up of parts that are in continual conflict with
one another. We are made up of "reason," "intellect," and our "better
natures," which are constantly seeking to control our desires,
appetites, emotions and to put our "senses" to proper use. The bet-
ter part must control the "baser." According to Eric Havelock, Plato
"discovered" the "psyche" that came to refer to the "isolated, think-
ing self." The self was no longer conceived as a cosmic belug, thal is,
a being that experienced itself as intimately involvc-d with other
beings in Lhe cosmos. A "cosmic self" implies lhnL the reality of setr
is phcno1n<.'nally part of ntlwr rcalitlt·s pn•s<•1111 1d m; a rt·8ult of Sl'll•
tl,•111,t w1s(·low;, ,111<1 :,pll itwil <'t><•)(f!,;l\•n< :11•.( ·o•,mo:,

t• In l111·1111lv1•1
It 111 II , ..1,,,••to IIw 1111!v1n., • 11,,;,, 11111f
11•d. 11 ii, 111 lat"" (1111{;111l1·) whnll'
1l.1v,·lnt I 1-i~uyl11u 111111 "p,c• l'l11t111i11 '' ( ,1111·1o 1111d1·1•1l1111rltl11•·w'tf l11
this way. That makes historical sense, since Greece developed out of
its cultural and intellectual association with early African traditions.
The African and Native American world-views have similar cos-
mic concepts. Their intellectual traditions and thought-systems rest
on the assumption of cosmic interrelationship. These conceptions
form a basis of communal relationships as well as a sympathetic rela-
tionship with the natural environment. How would such a conception
of the human being interfere with the ground rules of Platonic epis-
temology? Why was it essential that he cast doubt on the validity of
such conceptions? A cosmic being must be whole. In such a being rea-
son and emotion cannot be experienced as disparate, unconnected,
and antagonistic. A cosmic self cannot objectify the universe. The more
"intelligent" such a self becomes, the more it understands language
as merely metaphor. This idea is common to the thought-systems
mentioned. The highest, most profound truths cannot be verbalized,
and one reaches for the dimension beyond the profane word where
the meaning of the symbols becomes clear. But for Plato the "cosmic
self" is incapable of knowing; it can only perceive, sense, intuit, and
have "opinions." (The ascendancy of the so-called "left-brain.")
Plato establishes instead the "autonomous, thinking self."
According to Havelock, this "self" or "psyche" is a thing or entity
1·apable of not only scientific cognition, but of moral decision. 36 Plato
not only put forth the idea of the "thinking self"-an idea which must
llnve predated him-but he simultaneously discarded other aspects
of our "human" beingness as invalid or unworthy (unreal) and
dc•clared this superconceptual function-this totally cerebral activ-
11y-as the essence of humanness. Therein lies its uniqueness,
•;trnngeness, and significance all at once. He had preferred a new the-
.,, y of humanness (man/woman). Much later, caught in the throes of
1•vult11'ionarytheory, it became very important in European thought
I 11 t•mphasize those characteristics that were thought to separate
,111ddistinguish "humans" from animals. "Intelligence," of course, was
k,•y; the essence of man/woman. (For Michael Bradley it is the "dis-
c owry of f'ime.")37 Using Platonic conceptions and elaborating them,
l11tt'lli1,{('ncetook on a particular definition.
S<.:lentistshave talked in terms of two parts or "hemispheres" of
1111brain for some time. The left hemisphere is believed to control
, ,., t,dn kinds of thought processes, while the right hemisphere con-
11 oh otlH'I' kinds of thought processes.~ 8 The implications involved
,,, ,. l111p011n11tlo this cliscussio11and w!ll be discussed later.A related
p11t111 lo I w 11iad1· I w,,.Is l I 1,11whlh>nl I c-1111
un•s and all people Involve
111.tli"l11•111lspl11•r1· 1t1Wh",," :H1 to •;p,•,11<, 111"ll(Jtlllitl" fu11~tioninl:(,rul-
46 YURUGU
tures and therefore their members can value one style of cognition
over another. In such cases one will be emphasized and encouraged,
while the other is not. A person will be rewarded for thinking in the
valued mode, and such habits of thought will be reinforced in the
formalized learning and socialization processes. The same person
will be "punished" for thinking in the "devalued" mode, and will "fail
for doing so."
In nineteenth century Europe, in which unilinear evolutionary
theory reigned, European scientists said that the left hemisphere was
"major," because it was associated with "thought" and "reasoning,"
which set humans apart from animals. The right hemisphere was
labelled "minor" and less advanced or less evolved. It had a "lower"
capacity, dealt with "emotion," and had to be directed by the left
hemisphere. Clearly this was a nineteenth century version of the
Platonic conception, which split man/woman into reasonable and
emotional tendencies, superior and inferior faculties, and mandated
the dominance and control of the emotional as normative state of
being. And so "order" and "justice" were achieved. Plato stated the
case for this kind of order in the person and, by extension, in the
State. Nineteenth century evolutionists were giving "scientific" back-
ing to the same kind of imposed "order" among the world's cultures,
with the more "reasonable" (higher and rational) cultures controlling
the more "emotional" (lower and less advanced) ones.
The point that is critical to this analysis of European thought and
behavior is that Platonic theory and epistemology and its subsequent
development, enculturation, and reformulation provided the most
effective ideological underpining for politically and culturally aggres-
sive and imperialistic behavior patterns on the part of European peo-
ple precisely because the argument was stated in intellectual and
academic "scientific" terms. Plato not only helped to establish a the-
ory of the human that would valorize "scientific" cognition to the
exclusion of other cognitive modes, but he established the Academy.
It has since become a characteristic of European culture that asso-
ciation with academia represents association with truth, superior
reasoning capacity, and impartiality or "objectivity"-this also means
a lack of commitment to anything other than the supposed "abstract
truth." What Platonic conceptions allowed for, consequently, was
that the most politically motivated acts (e.g., wnrs of aggression,
r:>rially based slavery) r·oukl he j11stified l11wltnt passed for u-pnlit l-
r,11."sc1t-11ttflc•"
kn11:;: the lc>nw; of n s11ppwwcl "111tlv1·1~fll trntl1," tl11•
1•t1•111.d,11111 'lcln,1 ,,·TIiis wns nut 111•11•1t'li11lly
l1.u1Hl11f.( th1• l'l,1l011lr
tlv1·, 1!111II I:, 1111·11•11•to wllh 11tllb1111w1•ptl1111w.1: p111wl1hl11
111i11•1
•
the confines of European culture, molded by the needs of the

European utamaroho. The as iii-demanding power-made appropri-
ate use of the "universal truth" idea.
The task here is to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive
analysis of European thought and behavior by examining related
aspects of Platonic theory in terms of their ideological significance in
subsequent European development. This analysis ends and begins in
synthesis which is the asili demonstrating the consistency and cohe-
sion, the monolithic character, of the tradition under scrutiny.
Plato's theory of humanness is a crucial aspect of his over-all
theory. He successfully creates an illusion of the isolated self, and so,
in twentieth century European (Euro-American) society, this self is
indeed experienced as the psyche. This conception of the
autonomous thinking self has locked the European into a narrow and
limiting view of the human. It precipated a kind of spiritual retarda-
tion in which painful isolation and alienation either incapacitates par-
ticipants in the culture or makes them extremely efficient
competitors, aggressors, and technocrats (technicians). In the
Theatetus, Socrates uses the term "soul" as synonymous with "mind."
Given the Platonic conception of significant mental faculties, this
means that the soul became identified with cognitive thought, with
"cold" calculation, with a lack of emotion and a denial of feeling and
sensation. What theory of the human being does this imply? And what
kind of utamaroho and behavior develops in a culture that accepts
such a theory? If I am right in suggesting that these Platonic concep-
t ions did indeed become normative and then tremendously powerful
as cognitive models, and if we can accept the relationship between
11ramawazo (cultural cognitive character) and utamaroho (affective
,·haracteristics) as being intimate and co-generative, then clearly a
111oclelbegins to emerge of patterned thought and behavior reinforc-
ing each other as they develop.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates talks about the soul perceiving under
Its uwn "power." He makes the distinction between the body and the
1,oul or mind. Through the organs of the body we perceive "hardness,"
"mid," "red," etc., but with the mind (soul) we "reflect," make judge-
11ll'llls, and "think" about "likeness," "difference"-things that require
knowledge of the "forms" or of "being." The soul reflects with its own
"power," and the objects that it perceives are universal. Universality
1•11H'ti~t's as superiority ai,cl value. In the chapters which follow, the
.,tt I lhutc· of unlwrsality will h(>lrnced along the road of European ide-
11l11}{y .is It dt'Vl'lnpt- and ll,1rcl1•nslnH, tl1c rrnmcwnrk of tlw culture.
Wll,11Is II 111111 till' s111il, t11l11tl,01 p•tyt·III' l1t1s tit.ti tlw lwdy and
48 YURUGU
senses do not? Clearly it is control and with control comes power as

in "the ability to dominate." The desire (need) for control and power
are the most important factors in understanding the European asili.
We will see that the sensation of controlling others and of therefore
having power over them is the most aesthetically, psychologically,
and emotionally satisfying experience that the culture has to offer.
It therefore satisfies the utamaroho. It is the pursuit of these feelings
and this state of being that motivates its members. The sensation of
control and power is achieved in many ways in European culture, but
what is significant here is that in its earliest and formative stages,
Plato laid the basis for its achievement through an epistemology
that rejected the poetic participation, thereby gaining "indepen-
dence" (Havelock) from poetic involvement in order to both "create"
and to apprehend the proper object of knowledge. The "object" was
in this way controlled by the mind that contemplated it. With this
knowledge came power, because the world could begin to be under-
stood as being comprised of many such objects capable of being
manipulated by the knower, the knower who was aware of himself
(women didn't count) as knower and as being in complete control.
The "pre-Platonic" man, in this view, was powerless, lacked self-con-
trol and was indeed manipulated by the myraid of emotions he was
made to feel by the images around him. Such is the picture that we
are given.
We cannot overstate Plato's significance precisely because we
find European theorists and scholars making the same argument,
painting the same picture in the twentieth century. Henri and H.A.
Frankfort are concerned here with the distinction between ancient,
"primitive man," and "mythopoeic" thought on the one hand and
"modern," "scientific" man, and "scientific thought" on the other:
Though (mythopoeic thought) does not know dead matter and

confronts a world animated from end to end it is unable to leave the
scope of the concrete and renders its own concepts as realities
existing per se.[p.14]
... the procedure of the mythopoetic mind in expressing a phe-

nomenon by manifold images corresponding to unconnected
avenues of approach clearly leads away from rather than towArd,
our postulate of causality which seeks to discov<'r identical GH1scs
for identical effects through-out the phenomi>11:1lworld. I p.20]
111ythopo1 1tl1· IIHHt!{ltl 111ay~1w1·1•1•cl

1111l11l1)t
111111 ,1111,11,,1,1118:i H11111ll11,11,,r1 i.v111•111,1i1111111'•1y:,tt·111 t:.
Hp,111.11
tl, 1 1111ult11ti 11111hy nliJ1•1·1iv1•1111•,1111111•1111•111•1,
11111liv 111111111th111,1I
recognition of values. 39
Not only does Plato's epistemology bring control accompanied

by power, but also its attendant theory of (hu)man produces the
European conception of the authentically moral being. For Plato, with
rationality comes the power to make moral decisions, and only this
new "autonomous thinking self" (Havelock) can properly be the seat
of moral decision. This position, however, represents a confusion
between the spiritual and the scientific/rational. Having equated
human potential with an abstracted rational faculty, Plato takes us
out of a humanly defined social context as the ground or determinant
of our being. He then places us back into an artificial social construct
that is now a reflection of his abstract concept of the "good" and of
the "true"; a denial of the lived and experienced reality. But in fact,
our concepts of morality must reflect our ideas as well as our feeling
about proper human interrelationship. The "rational" person is not
necessarily the "moral" person. It may be "rational" (efficient) to think
in terms of selective breeding, cloning, and extermination in order to
produce the "master race." It is neither spiritually nor morally com-
pelling to do so. Plato seemed to be hinting that scientific method
would generate "right" action. But war in the twentieth century is
both rational and irrational at the same time. European horror movies
in which mad scientists do crazy things are expressions of this seem-
ing contradiction. Yet that personality is a "logical" extension of the
Platonic equation of the moral and the rational.
This argument has been expanded, refined, and camouflaged in
the terms of "modern" European "critical" philosophy. Jurgen
Habermas seems to be arguing for a kind of universal language of
"communicative rationality," in which social/cultural beings rely on
their own intellectual examination of issues as the basis for judge-
mcnt, as opposed to relying on their cultural traditions as a source
of validation of choices/actions. 40 This for Habermas would be part
11fthe process of "rationalization" and can lead to authentic moral
behavior or at least a criterion for determining such. His own lan-
guage is that of European philosophic discourse of the 1980s; the
Plalonic model honed to cerebr;i.l perfection. It is "rationality" at its
111ostimpressive calling for a universal rationalism as the basis for
"1 allonal action orientations" 40 and rationalized social order.
I l.tlwr 111<¼S 11scsPia~et's tl,eory of cognitive development in relation
tu the valued prU(;~ss of "dcce11tration," in which a priori cultural def-
l11ttIt HISilrt' <l<•val11e<I
111t ltt• dt•l!•r11l111f\t
ion of "I ruth" and right action.
Wlillt• hi• nllnw•, fm tlw prntih•11111fo "11t11pl,t11'' vli•w m,cl1·,wtio11su:-
50 YURUGU
against "the imperatives of a one-sided rationality limited to the cog-

nitive-instrumental," he insists that "the decentration of world under-
standing and the rationalization of the lifeworld are necessary
conditions for an emancipated society." 41To approach the rational is
to do away with difference. Here lurks the same utamawazo that is
uncomfortable with ambiguity. There is a difference between the
arguments of Plato and those of Habermas (who emphasizes process
as opposed to reified ideal), but the differences are not cultural/ide-
ological. These .two philosophers represent variations-one more
refined, more liberal, more recent than the other-of the same uta-
maroho.
In his theory of (hu)man and of the State Plato succeeds in exor-
cising human and social reality of its problematical and ambiguous
character. He does this by creating his own reality in which the math-
ematical abstraction reigns. "Real" truth, he says, is what we do not
experience. It is unchanging being. Our experience is not real, but
constantly changing, becoming. What this allows him to do is in fact
to create an "unreal" reality in which ambiguity, creative imagina-
tion, and uncertainty of human truth is superficially eliminated. Of
course, there is no such thing as "unreal" reality, so in truth the prob-
lematical still exists. Plato's Republic is a theoretical structure. His the-
ory of the human is unrealistic. It leaves out some essentials of
humanness and so as a model to be imitated has a tendency to cre-
ate Marcuse's "one-dimensional man." Each of us is suited to one task
or mode of participation in the State. The Philosopher-King and
Guardians will be able to determine our proper place and so our des-
tiny, very neat, very simple. The Republic is modelled after the
"good," an abstract unambiguous, unchanging, monolithic reality. In
order for it to work, people within it would have to be convinced of
the theory of the human on which it rests. Stanley Diamond explains
why the artist was seen as a threat to the State;
The artist does not believe in abstract systems; he deals with felt
and ordered emotional ideals and believes order is attained
through the contradictions, the tense unities of everyday experi-
ence. Thus, the artist himself may be unstable, a changeling, and
this is a threat to any establishment. 42
On the other hand, the mal hcmatician would rair m11chbetter i\S
IJlato's view nf th(' id<•al,nan fort 11<' Ideal State·. I IL•1•mpl1asl;,.<:smath
1•111:,lksin tlH' c1n-rlc11l11m for-1111'g11111dln11s. Fo, h1111"m.,t!1l'111,1tks''
llw ,h,tlH' c,f trntll 11111
11,1•1 p111vld1•tlll' ·,ol11llo11t11nll prul>l1•t1P,.
<';111
111•11•,111,1111 ,l p,1111<
111111I 11111,•pl1111111111,111
11,tl1111•I ll11pll1" /\111I II
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought SJ
people were in fact not like this, he would make them so. He would
fashion their minds to think the way they had to think to make his
plan work. He would train them with the "syntactical condition of the
mathematical equation," because "numbers drag us toward
Beingness." 43 In other words there were changes that he had to make
in the cognitive habits (utamawazo) of the participants in the culture
if he was to succeed in the creation of the new order.
The New Dominant Mode

The birth of the archaic "European" utamawazo was accompa-
nied and supported by the introduction of the literate mode as the
dominant and valued mode of expression in the culture. The written
mode preserved communication in an ever-increasingly precise form
in what was to become "Europe." Writing had been used much, much
earlier in other cultures, but as in the Kemetic MDW NTR (ancient
"Egyptian Hieroglyphs"), it involved forms that symbolized much
more than sounds or objects. The MDW NTR contains transforma-
tional symbolism that embodies African conceptions of universal and
cosmic truths. 44 It is an indication of the nature of the European
world-view and of course an example of the intensity of European
cultural nationalism that European scholars so consistently charac-
terize the MDWNTR of Kemet as being merely "concrete." 45 This form
of "reductionism" is an effort to oversimplify ancient African writing,
the earliest form of writing. It is an effort to make the MDW NTR
appear conceptually limited and sometimes contradictory. In truth,
the MDW NTR was too complex for Plato's purposes. He needed a
modality that robbed the symbols of their "symbolic," their esoteric
content. They had to be disengaged from the cosmos.
It is important to understand the process by which the liter-
ate mode became dominant in the culture and to understand exactly
what is meant by the "literate mode" in this context. Although for
n1any centuries to come it was inaccessible to most of the population,
It still had a valued place in nascent, archaic, and feudalistic European
,;oc:icty, and so greatly effected the shape of the culture. We are
dc'scribing a process of development, and because the development
lwcl a "direction'' does not mean that other characteristics were not
ldPnt ifiable. The poetic or, as Henri and H. A. Frankfort call it, the
"111ythopo<'tlc" continued to exist among the vast majority of the pop-
111;111011,1ml it was n•l<•gall•cl to a cleval11ecl position, implying inferi-
orlt y of l111l•llt•1·lI ml rnpnrlt y Thc1t ls why "I he- primitive," defined
I ,11101·1 1 111rl<·,dly, ls ,1lw.1ys H'-s1wl,1t1•dwit Ii :i l,1,·kof w1 lti11g, ;rnrl this
I: 1 ldli•d lll'lil)! ..,,,,· llt1·1,1l1•"
52 YURUGU
In nascent Europe the literate mode had ideological force.

Remember that according to Platonic epistemology we must achieve
objectivity in order to know and that in his terms this is achieved by
causing our reason to dominate our emotions, which in turn gives us
control. We gain control over that which we wish to know, therefore
creating an "object" of knowledge. The mode of preserved commu-
nication (which had characterized most cultures and which would
prevail in Greece centuries after Plato), was the poetic, the oral, and
to some extent the symbolic mode, although Greek culture was not
nearly so well developed in that regard, borrowing from other cul-
tures their sacred and religious concepts. This mode relied on the
identification of the knower with the known, on powers of memo-
rization, and familiarity of the listener/participant with the subject-
matter being used. The symbolic modes of the more ancient and
developed civilizations also required apprehension of abstractions,
but these were not the rationalistic abstractions that would come to
dominate in European thought.
In the analysis of Eurocentric theorists it was this memory, this
emotional identification and "involvement" caused by the poetic,
"oral," and "Homeric" mode that had limited "pre-Platonic" man. This
characterization thrusts us into yet another "split," another
dichotomy of invidious comparison. And with this another aspect of
the supposed "superiority" of the European rears its head. The "pre-
Platonic" man (Havelock's term), whom Homer's epics represented
and whom they addressed, was in trouble according to Havelock. He
is described as being "nonliterate," which of course has much more
ideological force than just saying that he preferred the poetic form.
It surfaces as a weakness and inability to conceptualize, a negative
characteristic. It devalues him as a person. This "nonliterate," "pre-
Platonic" person also picks up a host of other characteristics, which,
in the European world-view, are either valueless or absolutely nega-
tive. Havelock describes the "Homeric man" as being in a "sleeping"
state, as though drugged. His mind is governed by "uncritical accep-
tance," "self surrender," "automatism," "passivity of mental condi-
tion," "lavish employment of emotions," "hypnotic trance,"
"complacency." He uses "dream language" and is the victim of "illu-
sion." He is in the "long sleep of man" and is even ''lazy."~6 Why is
I lave lock so h;\rcl on those whom he places in intellectual opposition
In l'lato't It ls as if this st,1[.(cin Greek history or l•'.\Jropcan clevelop-
lw d1•sllllycd; ccrl!lillly tllorougllly Yl'puclbt1•cl Wt• will see
111<·11t'11H1t-,t
h1 t.i1h-.11q1111 1111•l1r1p11•r~111till!. -;t11dy why ll11•t;1•,1111 1111·c-hwly tilt•
11'1111:,111,IIl.11111p1,111•;11•,1 to dc•"crllw ,111tltl1•1111•,111
11tl\t'1 1 t1ltllrl':;,
cultures that are labelled "primitive." And these are the terms they
use to characterize the abilities of children of African descent and
other groups who are seen as lacking cultural and racial value within
the societies in which Europeans dominate. In fact, European acade-
mies "create" such nonminds. 47 In each of these instances, including
Havelock's critique of the mental habits of humankind "before" Plato,
the statements made have ideological significance. They are sup-
porting a chosen way of life, a set of beliefs. The objective is to estab-
lish the "way of life" as superior to all which either preceeded it or
that is different from it. It is the ideological nature of Platonic episte-
mology that makes this possible: an epistemology dictated by the
European asili, carried in the cultural genes.
For Plato, the poet does not appeal to the proper "principle" in
the person or to the proper part of his or her soul. And so the poet
would not be able to help in the task of lifting us out of the darkness
of the cave and correcting our ignorance towards the "light" of truth.
The poet obstructs the proper functioning of reason and does not
help us to gain control over our emotions.
The imitative poet ... is not by nature made, nor is his art intended,
to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will
prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated ...
his creations have an inferior degree of truth ... and he is ... con-
cerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be
right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he
awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs
the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have author-
ity and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of the man,
as we maintain, the imitative implants an evil constitution, for he
indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater
and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another
small he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from
the truth. 48
Plato's argument with the poets is that they do not foster the
view of the State and of the "good" of which he wants to convince peo-
ple; of which they must be convinced in order for them to play their
p~,rts well. The Republic is perfect because it is absolute. But what if
h111nanrealities are not absolute? Suppose there are ambiguities
c•11rlcn1icto human existence'? Plato solves this problem by simply
"t1l1minali11g''the a111bil.{uous nature of our existential reality, by pre-
I t•11dl11~1 tltitl It isn't tlwr1•. Whn, aft1•r n\11 Is rrc<1ting "illusion" anti
wl 11, l!i I IP11ll11~ wit I1 "tt'illlly'I" Tht• 111
,llosophy 111H lcrlyll If( ll ,e t?,'flt1hfir
,.,,y•; Ill/II lllllll,lll 11.-1t1w, Iii 11110111•,11('lllt'),(111 l1•-..,111,11tlwy 111(' l'IH II
54 YURUGU
suited to specific tasks by nature, and will be happiest doing that for
which they are best suited and that such is best for the order of the
whole. Isn't that convenient? Plato doesn't need the poets "messing"
up this picture-they won't help him sell his myth.
If the poets and the poetic in us is bad and backward, certainly
the other side of the coin is that our better, more rational natures are
brought out by the literate mode, the substitution of object for sym-
bol. When the literate mode dominates, we nurture a new and differ-
ent mindset. That is the important thing. That is the significance of
Plato's work. Contrast Havelock's characterization of this "new" man
with that of the "old." The new man is governed by "self-conscious
critical intelligence," "individual and unique convictions," a "critical
psyche," "inner stability," "inner morality," and "calculated reflec-
tion." He is "self-governing," "emancipated," "reflective," "thought-
ful," "self-organized," "calculative," "rational," "self-generated,"
"awakened," "stimulated," "thinking abstractly," and "autonomous."
In the rhetoric of European ;Value the deck is clearly stacked. This
"new" person is smart/What we see is the epistemological basis of the
conviction that literacy renders progressiveness and that when the
literate mode becomes valued and finally dominant, we have a
"higher" form of culture in terms of European ideology. So that in a
meeting on general education at Hunter College in New York City in
1984, it was assumed that to educate our students we must teach
them about "Western" European civilizations, since that is where
human beings learned to be "critical," indeed to "think."
But the European is certainly not very "critical" if that means
questioning the European world-view as Plato inspired its configura-
tion. The world of literacy, it is believed, is a world of objectivity, a
world of "impartial" truth. Oral media is "subjective." In it personal-
ity is merged with tradition. How do we change this? "The funda-
mental signs enabled a reader to dispense with emotional
identification .... "49 Plato urged a move away from "emotional
involvement," "unquestioned precepts," and "imitation." (Today
Habermas urges us away from predecisive validity claims based on
cultural tradition. 50) Plato supposedly introduced "technical" learn-
ing "on the highest level of consciousness." 51 So while Plato is seek-
ing to produce minds capable of the "highest" form of thougl1t,
"nonlitcrate man'' emerges as being barPly able to "think" at all.
lndt•l 1cl, Wt' nrn11ot be sure that he is f'YCn "conscious." A11d,what ls
tnon•, lltb; Pplstl•tnolugy is sc..;cnto llavl' moral l111ph1·ntl1111s ns wdl.
'l-'111• llh•1.,11' p.utl1 lpall1 of 1111• ld1•,1l •,l11t1• 1-.1110H' 111111,II lwc111J:,1•l11s
,·tlil• •• 111,· ·,ttlll••ct t1rq11, ,1111111111{,1·1 Ille l'.111, 011d 111,1ly•,I•,,wl!JI,, lit••
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 5.5
earlier Greek ethic was not. (Of course, once the "questioning" takes
place in the Socratic dialectic, not too much more "questioning" is
necessary.) Within the logic of European nationalism these ideas were
to be later echoed in nineteenth century evolutionary theory where
Victorian culture was judged as the "highest" form, representing a
more objectively valid moral state, the assumption being that
European values were arrived at "critically" and "rationally" and were
therefore universally valid. This was a legacy from the "enlighten-
ment," so-called.
Plato had set the stage for important ingredients of the European
self-image. He sees himself as a critical being, rational and in absolute
control. His mission is to control and rationalize the world, and this
he achieves through the illusion of objectivity. Plato himself must
have been something like this. Stanley Diamond draws a portrait:
He was it seems, a man of a certain type, incapable of tolerating

ambiguity, intuitive in his conviction of an objective, superhuman
good .... He believed in logic with the cool passion of a mathe-
matician, and he believed, at least abstractly, that the perfectly just
city could be established, through perfectly rational and perfectly
autocratic means. 52
The desacralized written mode allowed the object to be "frozen,"

reified into a single meaning; Kemetic MOW NTR is not of this nature:
The ordinary consideration of the Egyptian symbol reduces it to a

primary, arbitrary, utilitarian and singular meaning, whereas in real-
ity it is a synthesis which requires great erudition for its analysis
and a special culture for the esoteric knowledge that it implies. 53
R. A. Schwaller De Lubicz characterizes the MOWNTR in the fol-

lowing way, distinguishing them from the merely literal mode: "sym-
lwlism," which is a mode of expression, he distinguishes from the
"symbolic," which is the application of a "state of mind," or, again, a
"mentality." "Symbolism is technique; the symbolic is the form of
writing of a vital philosophy ."54 "The symbol is a sign that one must
l1•11rnto read, and the symbolic is a form of writing whose laws one
111ustknow; they have nothing in common with the grammatical con-
•11n 1r1ion of our languages. It is a question here, not of what might be
, ,1ll1•d"hieroglyphic lang~1,1ge,"but of the symho/ic, which is not an
111clli1.ny for in of writ i11g" lk l.11biC'zIs co11c1>rnedwilh describing
'tlw p1l111lplt•s 111,itgov1•111tilt• •,ymlwl ,111<Itile sy111l,olit· i11 the
1•xp11u,p,lr111 nf II vlt;1I pltll111,Ppliv,1101 ., r.1tl1111.dlstitplilloi-11pliy." llt•
1
HYI\ 1l1.11 tlw11• ' 1•,d<,f•, 1111 '111•rn,:/\•11t11,
l111t~fll11J.!1',l1t1t 011ly I llh·10
56 YURUGU
glyphic writing, which uses the symbol to lead us toward the sym-
bolic."55 The significance of these passages is that it affirms my belief
that the MOW NTR of Kemet does not represent a "primitive" form of
secular or profane script and is not therefore "pre-European." Rather,
it represents a quite different view of reality-a mindset that sought
to understand the universe as cosmos, therefore careful not to
attempt the separation of spirit and matter. So that when we speak
of the literate mode as championed by Plato, we mean to stress a
unique definition and use of that mode: one devoid of the "symbolic"
in De Lubicz' sense. This writing lacked something. It was only able
to deal with "one-dimensional realities," and as Diamond says,
It reduced the complexities of experience to the written word ...

with the advent of writing symbols became explicit; they lost acer-
tain richness. Man's word was no longer endless exploration of real-
ity, but a sign that could be used against him ... writing splits
consciousness in two ways-it becomes more authoritative than
talking thus degrading the meaning of speech and eroding oral tra-
dition; and it makes it possible to use words for the political manip-
ulation and control of others. 56
It was not that this literal mode represented or led to higher

truths, but that the claim was made that it did and that it gave the illu-
sion of having done so, making this medium useful. It worked! It
helped to control minds, values, and behavior, just as any media
does, but in a new and for some a "desirable" way. The written lan-
guage was more impressive than speech. Platonic epistemology
achieved this once it was valued. Then speech came to imitate this
writing, which was no longer "magical," sacred, and truly symbolic.
The permanence of the written word gave it ideological strength.
Written dialogues, written laws, and strangely enough, written
prayers-the sacred reduced to profane "scriptures"; all of this
became evidence, for the European, of the superiority of his/her cul-
ture.
Lineality and Cause: Scientism and "Logic"

Consistent with this literate modality as frame of reference,
there is an association between the "critical mtncl" aud the "logical
mind'' in Platonic epistemology, which idcalizNt objectification and
insistc-d on lhC' literate 111n<l~HS vrllLtl-'d tl•l'ilniq1u• t111d further
1•nltn11t•1•dtlw hlt·a 111:11tl1vr1·w;1s ,111lymu· 1•111 r1•1 I llll'111od 111rl',1<·J,.
t'11~t 111ll 1, 11111
I Iht1I w~1•,vl,1"ln~h ."Tl ii•, 1,1,·11ol "111~11'" h 111P<:c•tllt•<Ia~.
llin11~lt II w,•1 P 11~11,u,111111 wn11ldlt,1v1•,'11•1111111,.,
1• th,11 c·111wl111,l11111-, v1•1
..
ifiable truth. Anything else was mere opinion, subject to the whims
of human nature. Logic helped one to maintain one's "objectivity"
(emotional distance). The statement below, from a contemporary
introductory textbook by H. L. Searles, demonstrates the ideology of
Platonic epistemology. According to the author, the study of logic
should enable students to:
... develop a critical attitude toward the assumptions and presup-

positions which form the background of his own and many others'
arguments in such fields as politics, economics, race relations, and
other social sciences, where the facts are not fully verified but con-
tain elements of tradition, preference and evaluation. 57
Habermas wrote in 1987,that we must form a reflective concept

of "world" so that we can have access to the world. 58
Searles statement sounds like those of Havelock comparing "pre-
Platonic" and Platonic "man" or like those of Plato debasing the poets
in relation to the State order. Searles can only make these statements
sound reasonable because Plato had argued so well such a long time
ago, when Europe was not even in its infancy but in the last stage of
a gestation, that perhaps began as a mutated conception in the
Eurasian steppes (Caucasus). Searles statement is an excellent exam-
ple of the longevity and ideological strength of the Platonic influence.
It is a statement of Platonic epistemology, now taken for granted
because it is etched into the European world-view and utamawazo; it
is assumed. Plato, however, had to argue for its supremacy, fighting
the Sophists, the powerful ancient mystery systems, ancient Kemetic
(Egyptian) science, philosophy, religion, and other philosophical and
ideological possibilities. He had to change the mental outlook of the
culture. His task was to shape an utamawazo that would suit the uta-
maroho of those who would come to identify themselves as European.
The psychological habits of the poetic or "mythopoeic" mode had to
be replaced by the illusions of the literate mode. By the time Searles
is writing some twenty-five centuries later, these habits are so
ingrained that Europeans are not even aware that the "logic" that
I hey are taught cannot explain Zen philosophy, African ontology, or
t•Kistential, phenomenal reality. They are not aware of the fact that it
l:-1neither "total" nor "universal." Erlward Hall says it this way:
. . in l1is strivi11i:is fo1 nrclt>r, Western man has created chaos by

d1•11vlngthnt part ol Ills s<'lf that Integrates while enshrining the
p,11111 tl1t1t lt111{(1Wlll t•xpci,11
1111·1• •• W1•s1t•111 111;i1111s~•sonly a small
lr'111•tl1111111Ill•, 1111•11!.11111pnlilllth•s: tl11·11·u11· 111a11y dlrl•·rt>lll atHI
58 YURUGU
legitimate ways of thinking; we in the west value one of these ways

above all others-the one we call "logic," a linear system that has
been with us since Socrates .... Western man sees his system of
logic as synonymous with the truth. For him it is the only road to
reality. 59
While I am arguing for the seminal nature of Plato's work and its
powerful influence in the formulation of the European utamawazo, I
do not want to give the mistaken impression that his work was very
influential at the time of his writing. Only a tiny fraction of the Greek
populace followed, had access to (i.e. was literate and privileged) or
was convinced of this new epistemology. And its accessibility was to
remain restricted for many centuries to come. But what makes it so
important is that those few who did have access and who were con-
vinced were also those who set the intellectual and ideological pat-
terns for the civilization that would follow. It was as Plato wanted it
to be-the few made decisions for the many. The "logical" ones led
those who "could not reason well."
According to Havelock, Plato was looking for the "syntax of true
universal definition." Platonic epistemology allowed one to choose
between the "logically and eternally true" and the "logically and eter-
nally false," whereas the poetic mode did not. 60 Plato identifies the
"logical" with the "eternal," while the poetic is seen as being tempo-
rally limited, all illusion. But now some Europeans are discovering
what other cultures have always known: verbal -linear logic is only
one aspect of our consciousness, one part of our cognitive apparatus.
A.s humans we have other tools that are global and intuitive. But
within European culture these have almost been put out of commis-
sion, made inoperable, deformed by a civilization whose epistemol-
ogy ignored them and considered them almost "inhuman," certainly
·•uncivilized." Deficient in the ability to grasp cosmic reality, organic
interrelationship, Europeans were deprived of the source of a differ-
ent kind of power, which comes from joining. They turned, therefore,
to those forms of intellectual manipulation which seemed to yield
power over others; the nature of the asili.
The dominance of written codification is accompanied by other
conceptual habits that support it and that it supports. Epistemology
meets with ontology as concepts of space ancl time begin to adhere
in theories of humanness, knowledge, ancl truth. l .inealily in EuropeM
thought has all of thcst• impllcatiuns. It Is prt>s1•111in tl1t.• nascent
Europl'11111'onr<'ptlons nf p11rpn:wnnd rm1snllty; In tlH' :wnllarlt.a
tl1111nl th111·tl1,1t 11111'.l' 11pll,1:,lnOil 111
1.to,trlty 111lh1• 1·11111111•;111llll'
111111J1111l1·,1I
111111111 nf 1:•,111n111•.111
r.-ll1-1l1111•,,
plill11•,11plik,1I,,111dlcl1·11lt1!1,
ical thought. These characteristics are all related, but their visibility
as dominant themes emerge at different times in the development of
the culture. They are introduced here briefly, so that we can pick
them up later as recognizable themes contributing to the over-all
configuration of European thought (utamawazo) and behavior.
Dorothy Lee, in Freedom and Culture, tells us that European cul-
ture codifies reality in a lineal manner. She bases her conclusions on
comparisons with specific "non-European" cultures that she finds
have "nonlineal'' codifications of reality. Her work helps to elucidate
the assumption of lineality in the European utamawazo. ln European
culture reality is codified - understood, perceived, organized - in
lineal, sequential relationships. Events are viewed in terms of tem-
porality.61 The line underlies the European aesthetic apprehension of
the given. [ts presence is taken for granted in life, and in all academic
work. Teachers, says Lee, are always drawing them on blackboards.
She goes on to say that "progress" is the "meaningful sequence,"
''where we see a developmental line, the Trobriander sees a point, at
most a swelling in value." Europeans "take pleasure and get satisfac-
tion in moving away from a given point ... the Trobriander finds it in
the repetition of the known, in maintaining the point; that is in what
we call monotony." 62
Lee has hit on the ideological significance of lineality in European
thought. Change or movement away from the point in a lineal direc-
tion toward another imagined point as far as that line can extend (the
future) is "progress" as it is defined in European culture. This con-
ception becomes the basis for willed cultural behavior. "Progress," as
we shall see in Chap. 9, is the idea that initiates change, that gives sup-
posed supremacy to the culture, and that justifies exploitation of oth-
ers. This idea of progress rests on the assumed reality of the line. All
I ltlngs are reduced to sequential relationship on a line: one dimen-
sional and unidirectional. This time line joins the points of "past,"
"present," and "future," where the function of past and present is to
l{lvc value to the future by virtue of inviduous comparison, and then
IIIt' fmure is used as a standard by which to evaluate the value of the
preseut and the past. The future reigns supreme. Any form of cultural
l>t·liavior ls justified in the pursuit of this never attainable future. And
,111y<'1111 ure whose utomawazo d::>esnot allow for the abstract yet
oppt £•ssive fulurc of the progress ideology is thought to be doomed
tu ft1llurc. .Jolin S. Mbiti, writing from a Eurocentric perspective, has
111\l-lto SilY nhout Afrirnn reli!,{lous tho11ght:
11H:i<,1rnl,with II Sasn( prc-

i:• I wo cllt11t
:,., 1011~,,., I 1l1•1t, 0111·1•plnl 111111·
11·111),,111I11/,111111111 (p,11.1), Alrl11111111•1,plt", .1 glo
1 ,111nnt11 11tl'rt11l11
60 YURUGU
rious "hope" to which mankind may be destined .... Here African

religions and philosophy must admit a defeat: they have supplied
no solution .... Do religions become universal only when they have
been weaned from the cradle of looking towards the Zamani (past) .
. . and make a breakthrough towards the future, with all the (mytho-
logical?) promises of "redemption?" ... It is in this area that world
religions may hope to "conquer" African traditional religions and
philosophy, ... by adding this new element to the two dimensional
life and thinking of African peoples. Only a three-dimensional reli-
gion can hope to last in modern Africa which is increasingly dis-
covering and adjusting to a third dimension of time. 63
Sadly, while African himself, Mbiti strives so hard to take on an

alien utamawazo that he loses sense of African metaphysical con-
ceptions. The African conception of time is not merely "profane" or
ordinary, but also sacred. Indeed it is the European lineal conception
that is one dimensional. This is one of Mbiti's most obvious errors.
Past, present, and future are meaningful only as relationships in a lin-
eal sequence, necessarily unidimensional. They do not represent
three dimensions. In the African conception, sacred, cyclical time
gives meaning to ordinary, lineal time. The circle/sphere adds dimen-
sion to the line as it envelops it. The sphere is multidimensional, and
it is curved. Sacred time is not "past" because it is not part of a lin-
eal construct. The ancestors live in the present, and the future lives
in us. Sacred time is eternal and therefore it has the ability to join
past, present, and future in one space of supreme valuation. This is
what Mircea Eliade has called hierophany. 64 Rituals that express
sacred time, connecting it with ordinary experience and punctuating
life, restate and affirm values, beliefs, and symbols, thereby placing
daily existence in a meaningful sacred context. African societies do
not need an abstract European concept of the future to give their
members "hope." 65 The European idea of progress is not a universal
statement of meaning.
What Mbiti is probably getting at, however, has nothing to do
with religion per se, but rather has to do with technology and its
place in the society. Indeed, technological success (European-style)
depends in part on the assimilation of a lineal concept or secular
concept of time, as the most meaningful or ultimate temporal reality,
Friedrich Juenger makes this point. He says that for the European,
time like the "future" becomes a force that c1ornil1atcs human life.
This is certainly not tlu> splrit11r1lly 1•11l1!1,ht1•11lnH 1'<11H't•pt 111.tlMblll
. 111ok1•s ii rn1t to lw. Tlnll', iii E11r11pP1III :wt'l\'ly, ,w1v1•~tile li•cl\11olog
k';d ot<lt t, ,11111,1•1 ..,,11 11,1d 1111•rli,1t1lc 1111111
II 1,, 110111111111;111 'l'lw ,·os111i1·
is the enemy of the technological or so it becomes in the European

experience. Juenger refers to this mechanical time as "dead time,"
and identifies its symbol as the clock. For Newton, time was an
absolute, while to others it is a mental construct that relates our
experiences and ideas. Newtonian time, says Juenger, is linear, unin-
terrupted, inexorable motion. 67 Neither we nor our experiences effect
it.
Time in European culture loses its phenomenal character and is
instead experienced as absolute and oppressive. Once again we have
a concept created by human beings, reified than used against them.
Within the logic of European development this process is necessary,
because mechanical time is a precondition for the triumph or ascen-
dance of European science and technology. They are the supreme val-
ues because they are "progress." Several theorists (Juenger,
Mumford, Joel Kovel, and others) have made the connection between
the establishment of watchmaking in Geneva in 1587 with the ascen-
dancy of Calvinism there in the sixteenth century. Calvin intensified
the importance of the idea of predestination. 68 While preparing peo-
ple for salvation in heaven, Calvinism trained them for assembly-line
production on earth. In Juenger's words:
It ["lifeless time"] can be split and chopped up at will, something

that cannot be done with life time or with the organisms living in it:
seeds, blossoms, plants, animals, men, organic thoughts. This is
why technology works with fragments of time, ... and ... employs
time-study experts-men who watch over the rational exploita-
tion of lifeless time ... all these are methods which subject live
organisms, partaking of vital time, to a mechanical, lifeless time. 69
Because the dominance of lineal conceptions has lead to

Europe's overwhelming technological success does not mean that
there are not other viable conceptions. All objectives are not tech-
nological/scientific. There must be other "times." Lineal time fails
spirituaJly. It pushes us constantly towards anxiety and fear. The
European is always asking him/herself, even while she/he rests:
Where am I going? What will become of me? Lineal time is one dimen-
sional because it has neither depth or breadth, only the illusion of
length. It leads to evolutionary theories. Reality is perceived as the
1·untinuous development of one entity through necessarily temporal
,;t ages. One s1age Is mnn• ''evolutionarily advanced" than the one it
tullows, since thry 11n• a1 r.ingcd or "unfold" iu a temporal sequence.
l'I 11:ronct•pl Is hMwcl 111111ss11mt'flllnrnl tnnnections. The connec-
nt tl111sc·wllo !illM(' ,11•:uro1wa11
t It ms 1•x-lnt111IIH' 111l11<!•1 Lllttmnwazo
62 YURUGU
(cognitive style); they are not universal realities. Evolution cannot be

"seen." What is experienced is "difference." The continuity is the the-
oretical aspect. Evolutionism posits that it is the same entity that
changes and therefore "develops." In spite of its obvious theoretical
short-comings, evolution persists as a European metaphysical
assumption-not just a theory. The assumption is maintained
because it suits the utamaroho leading to power over others, not
because of its accuracy.
Marshall McLuhan says that "all media are active metaphors in
their power to translate experience into new forms. 70 Edmund
Carpenter affirms that the written media encourages linear concep-
tualization; "The spoken word came to imitate writing," and this
"encouraged an analytical mode of thinking with emphasis upon lin-
eality. "71 The written mode as understood in ancient Greece was a
nonpoetic mode that suited a secular view of human events. In the
subsequent development of European culture lineality became dom-
inant until the lack of a cyclical, multidimensional notion of time
became a reflection of the profanation or secularization of the world
as seen by Europeans. The contemporary spiritual malaise that we
witness in Euro-America and in Europe, I would argue, is linked in part
to narrowly based lineal conceptions, as well as to other features of
the European utamawazo and world-view. The assumption of lineal
time is an ontological prerequisite to the European idea of "progress"
and that of unilinear evolution. The valorization of the written mode
encourages and supports these conceptions. It is linear, it accumu-
lates, and it has physical permanence. Therefore, to the European
mind, it gives the impression of "truth": objective and eternal. In
nascent Europe people could begin to talk about the "correct histor-
ical perspective" (Havelock), and in retrospect, Europeans looking
back on their development see this as an advance aided by the syn-
tax of the written word. "Chronology," says Havelock, "depends in
part on the mastery of time as abstraction." The participants in "oral
culture" do not have this sense. Mircea Eliade's view, like that of
Dorothy Lee and Juenger, is very different from Havelock's. Instead
of viewing nonlineal conceptions as symptoms of "backwardness"
and "ignorance," he sees them as being indicative of a theory of
humanity in opposition to, perhaps deeper than, that of the European.
He finds, "in this rejection of profane, continuous time, a certain meta-
physical "valorization" of human existet1c(•."72
The European colKr•pl ion of hist t,1 y was:-< ·1·111,11osH·nsihly 111
iwparat P ii fie1·cc-lyfro111"111ylIi," 'l'o I I w111 I Iii!. w,1)i ,111111111'1111,11
k (i11dl
ol
< 1111011) :-1qwrlorll y ·, wtltt c·11llhlt11 y
.,1·1·1111111 ,1 ; 11pp11••.-d 111''l11:w
curate" orally transmitted mythology. Yet this concept of history

rests on a conception of time that is not validated by phenomenal
reality. "Time" in this view moves ceaselessly towards some point
never reached in the "future." This sense of telos is an important
aspect of European mythology. It gives meaning to European life.
"Purpose" is taking humankind into the "future." Yet this peculiarly
European conception of the "future" creates more serious problems
for the members of the culture than it can possibly resolve. Ironically
it is this "future" approached by the ever present line of time through
which the European seeks fulfillment, but at the same time assures
her/him of never being fulfilled. The "future" in this conception rep-
resents unattainable perfection. It is an abstraction that is unreach-
able and, therefore, is unknowable.
What is unknowable for the European causes anxiety. The
European psyche needs the illusion of a rationally ordered universe
In which everything can be known. Yet European mythoform creates
an unknown and unknowable future whose only relationship to the
past and the present is that it determines them and cannot be deter-
mined by them. This antagonistic situation causes emotional confu-
•,lon, anxiety, and fear for the European. Yet this oppressive future
1·,rnnot be avoided, because the clock moves him/her toward it at an
1111controllablepace, which seems to move faster and faster. All of
I h Is is an effect of the limitations of lineal, secular time. It is neither
plleuomenal nor sacred nor spiritual. Participants in the culture have
only one recourse against the fear: science. (fhe purchasing of "insur-
,11wc" is another attempt to escape the fear, but it does not work.)
',1lt•nce becomes a force conjured up to battle another powerful force.
( 1.lke a battle of "Gods.") Science predicts! It prepares Europeans for
1111'future. It is through science that they seek to relieve their anxiety
I 1yl,(rtiningcontrol over what controls them. It is therefore dictated by
I I w "sili. It works only up to a point. Failing in the end to provide ful-
f1ll11wn1,for, after all, the European conception of science is above all
•u·, nlnr and rests on alienating, literate, rationalistic, linear concepts.
l'lw n1onstcr that the Europeans have created-this abstract and
, 'l'I II p:,;sive future-continues to threaten, to intimidate, to frighten.
I • , 1yl I 1111g is thought to move inexorably towards this future, a move-
"" 111I hat imparts value (progres.;), and yet the perceived destiny is
I\ 111p1 oducing. Thus, lincality is despiritualizing, while simultaneously
111111 tlh11tfn~ a11 css<•ntial 111grndlentto tile structure of the mytho-
1111111II lwlps lo neat<' I lw llluslon of the superiority of European cul-
H11P lw 11· 1111·111l11•rs, 1111d llwn•fon• fits llw os1f/.
All pw po·,1•lw, 111111•'1''t111.il, ;,11:w "Wl1ll1• it 11111ylw a inisli\kC'to
64 YURUGU
view Aristotle as an especially creative or intuitive mind, and history

suggests that he "borrowed" (to use a euphemism) much from the
ancient Kemites ("Egyptians"), 73 Aristotle does exhibit a particular
manifestation of the Platonic influence and therefore needs to be con-
sidered in this examination of the development of the European uta-
mawazo. His formulation both intensified and foreshadowed two
epistemological and ideological tendencies that became crucial
themes and identifying characteristics of the European world-view:
the assumption of cause and scientism (science as ideology). The
Aristotelian typologies, in their emphasis on particular aspects of
Platonism, had tremendous influence on medieval thought and laid
the groundwork for subsequent definition of the rationalistic
endeavor, an endeavor that became the European obsession.
For Aristotle, "metaphysics," or the science of "first causes," is
the "divine" science. It is the "first philosophy," the study of the prin-
ciples of other sciences. It is divine by virtue of the fact that the
nature of divine thought is that it must necessarily have "itself for its
object." 74 Metaphysics, that which is beyond the physical, is indeed
the "place" for the discussion of "cause," since cause is a concept, a
way of making sense of observed and experienced phenomena, that
cannot itself be observed and is not inherent in that phenomena. We
can see "effects." We cannot see their "causes." Cause is a meta-
physical concept. Yet with all of the European emphasis on this con-
cept of cause, they end up by lacking a true "metaphysic," because
of the "success" of a materialistic world-view.
The concept of cause is the basis of a tradition of European sci-
ence that deals exclusively with the physical and in which the meta-
physical is debunked as "mystical" and antiscientific. De Lubicz
argues that there is no "cause" until it produces an "effect" and that
that relationship is by no means certain since any number of condi-
tions may effect the potential "cause," thereby changing its "effect"
from what we would have rationally thought it would be. 75 Yet
European science is predicated solely on the predictability of the
relationship between cause and effect and treats this relationship in
a totally mechanistic way. It is a science that has attempted to mate-
rialize a spiritualistic concept, just as from an African-centered view-
point, it has attempted to materialize a spiritual universe. But the
"discovery" of cause and the formulation of universal laws of cat1sa-
tion are seen from the Eurocentric vlt•wpolnt as rrpr<'se11ll111,(
proi;ire~s. 1lrnri f-'nlllkfurl sct's It as tl111 lra11sfo1111111Ion of the
"tnytl,opm•I<'" to 1111•
"s1'l1111tlfk" 111trnl:
tl1011),(hl 1;1•1I•, t11, ..,t,111II.It 1•o1111t1•••

.
lu11t ,, 111ocl1•111 I 111111
111111l11111,11
tional relations between phenomena, so it views space as a mere

system of relations and functions. Space is postulated by us to be
infinite, continuous, and homogenous - attributes which mere sen-
sual perception does not reveal. But primitive thought cannot
abstract a concept "space.'' 76
And this experience consists in what we would call qualifying asso-

ciations. Primitive thought naturally recognized the relationship of
cause and effect, but it cannot recognize our view of an impersonal,
mechanical, and lawlike functioning of causality ... the category of
causality ... is all important for modern thought as the distinction
between the subjective and the objective ... science ... reduces the
chaos of perceptions to an order in which typical events take place
according to universal laws ... the instrument of this conversion
from chaos to order is the postulate of causality. 76
Cultures prior to European classical Greece most certainly did

order events in terms of universal laws, and impersonal, external
rause is not the only possibility for conceptualizing causality. What
Frankfort portrays as a weakness is certainly only a difference. It is
the European asili that transforms "abstract," "impersonal" concep-
1ions of reality into an advantage, because the asili defines the goal
m; "power over other," and it is in this sense that African and other
r011ceptions appear to be defeated.
Frankfort's statements are characteristic of Eurocentric schol-
,1rship as it attempts to draw the line between European civilization
.111dwhat came before it. (This kind of "before" can of course also be
t'Olltcmporaneous-that is the effectiveness of European evolution-
:uy theory and ideology in combination.) Again we can see the impor-
t 1111re of Plato. From the terms that Frankfort uses he may as well be
chnwlng the line that separates the "cave" from the world of ideas.
But there are other interpretations of the implications of the
,·01wepl of causality. Kwame Nkrumah, in his book Consciencism
( I %4), makes an attempt to synthesize "external causality" with the
Alrlcnn concept of causality, which he characterizes as "internal."
<·,•drlc X. Clark, however, delves deeper into the spiritual implica-
t1011sof these two views. He implies that Nkrumah was attempting the
,.,, rc111l•lydifficult, if not the impossible. For Clark these two views of
c',\1tf:allty rc•prcsc111different axiological modalities and different !ev-
e ho( 1·nus,·ln11s11ess.l~11ropt•1u1 culture glorifies the ego in t·hecontext
111lltdt vi, h 1aIts, n, whl11•Af rk;111l'l1ltun· mini111l7<'Sthe E'gofor\ he sake'
11111 •1t•11:11• 1110111•11t•s:-1,111dg11111p ldc·111lty.E111opc·r1n~1l1C'r<.'fon·('OIi•
1t.111tly,llll'lllpl "In clc-1111)ll ,t1,1tc• lt1dt 1)('1ldt•11t (' hu111 1111'{c,rn·s 11r
1 1
11,1'1111•" 1111d ,111• 1c·l1wt,111I

11
In ,wl11111wlc dHc•llt1• l,1<t llt,11(lltl•y) ,1l011~
66 YURUGU
with everything else in the Universe have been caused," while for
Africans "everything in the Universe is related, is dependent and is
caused," including themselves; they believe that "things happen
because they do. " 77 In Clark's analysis, the European "why," which is
different from the African "why," issues from a consciousness that
remains locked in to the "lower order" of spatial-temporal dimen-
sions. African consciousness, on the other hand, functions more on
the level of spirituality that becomes the meaningful dimension.
(Leonard Barrett makes a similar point with regard to the African
conception of illness. 78 This different emphasis in the conception of
causality is, in Clark's view, "the manifestation of a totally different
state of consciousness" in which the African is able to move beyond
ordinary time and space to a higher level on which events can
become meaningful in terms of cosmic or universal causation. 79
Yet the idea of cause is problematic even within European logic.
Of Aristotle's four kinds of causes, "material," "formal," "efficient," and
"final," the final cause is crucial for our analysis. According to
Aristotle the final cause of an object, thing, or phenomenon is its pur-
pose, the end for which it exists. In his view determining the final
cause of an object or phenomenon is the most important objective of
science. At the same time this tradition rigidly separates science and
belief. Yet the idea of final cause can only be understood to be a
belief! The belief in the idea of "final cause" gives to European thought
its strong teleological character. It leads to an assumption that every-
thing that exists, exists for a purpose, and that purpose is the most
important thing about it. This idea manifests itself in ideologies as
diverse as Judea-Christian thought and Marxian analysis, and per-
haps finds its ultimate expression in the idea of progress, a critical
component of both of these traditions. European science therefore
states what must be taken as an act of faith (the belief in cause) in an
absolutist and deterministic manner. Clearly, the result is dogma and
its purpose is ideological: "scientism."
What should be method only becomes ideology, which rests on
the following myths, according to Carl Spight: (1) that science is fun-
damentally, culturally independent and universal; (2) that the only
reliable and completely objective language is scientific knowledge; (3)
that science is dispassionate, unemotional, and antireligious: (ti) that
logic is the fundamental tool of science; and (S) I hat th«:: sdentific
method leads systematically and pror.:rcssively towa,d the trut!l. 811
The function of science in _Europ<'unru Ihm· htT1111ws 111at11( pst11h-
llsl1ing a11inv11hwr,1bh· sow r,· of .,11tl1111
IIy II1,111 ,1111101
Iw l'I 111lh•11i-i1•d
ti,,.toll' ol 111,t,ll1ll1,lil11~l•:111np1•1111
ln 11'lallo11 lo olll1•r 1•11ltm1",ll 1111•;
givens as "universal" truths, European culture as somehow the most

rational, and the rational model of the universe as the only accurate
view. This has led to what De Lubicz calls "a research without illu-
mination." For him the basis of all scientific knowledge or universal
knowledge is intuition. Intellectual analysis is secondary and will
always be, at best, inconclusive. The African world-view: Spirit is pri-
mary!
The European definition of science is not the only way of defin-
ing what science should be. For Hunter Adams, science is the "search
for unity or wholeness within or without all human experience"
[Adam's italics] 81 and for Wade Nobles, "science is the formal recon-
struction or representation of a people's shared set of systematic
and cumulative ideas, beliefs, and knowledges (i.e., common sense)
stemming from their culture .... "82 The definition of European science
reflects the European consciousness, and the style of thought gen-
erated by that consciousness has become ideological. In this role it
is identified as "scientism." Nobles warns us: "Thus the danger when
one adopts uncritically the science and paradigms of another peo-
ple's reality is that one adopts their consciousness and also limits the
arena of one's own awareness." 83
Aristotle's role in setting the stage for the development of sci-
1•ntismas a European attitude toward truth and value was significant.
For him the world became a hierarchy of beings in which each realm
hllfilled a purpose for the realm "above" it. This was a world-view in
the making, a world described in terms of telic relationship. The cru-
c-ial mechanism was "cause." But causality is not the only way of relat-
ll1g phenomena. The tyranny of mechanical causation in European
thought precludes the perception of cosmic interrelationship, iden-
tification, meaningful coincidence, complementarity, and the "circle."
Aristotle's insistence on the idea of cause was necessary if people
wt>re to accept "purpose" as the essence of the universe. "Purpose"
I:, an essential ingredient of the progress mythology and the techni-
ri\l obsession that would develop subsequently in European culture.
It Is impossible to worship "efficiency" without a prior emphasis on
111\•c-hanicalcausation and materialistic purpose. All of these con-
, 1•plions require a lineal modality. The regenerative and renewing
1 ye-leinterferes with and cannot be tolerated by this view. (De Lubicz
t Hlks about the "closed, self-renewing Osirian cycle" of ancient

8~)
l1,1•111cl.
ln the African worlrl view lt Is the c>ternal cyclf> of life that offers
th,• pm,slhlllly uf lr.i11s1·t·1Hl<•m·1•,
of h11nnu11im1sint1•rrelationship, of
wlml1•1wss, l11tt•Hf11ll<111,
1111d
,111tlw11II<
org,111lc·t1y.
Tlw r-0111'l'))lls splr-
68 YURUGU
itually satisfying. The European, on the other hand, is perceptually

and phenomenally (experientially) limited by his lineal conception of
reality. There is no link between past, present, and future save a
"causal" link. There is no sacred time. History is limited to the secu-
lar. Even the most meaningful religious image in the European tradi-
tion-that of the Christ-is only seen to have value in so far as it can
be placed within an "historic" sequence. It does not have a sacred
validity, but a secular one. The dominance of lineal models perhaps
helps to account for the spiritual malaise of European societies.
Edward Hall believes that the alienation of the European from
nature is related to the dominance of lineality in the European world-
view. "We live fragmented, compartmentalized lives in which con-
tradictions are carefully sealed off from each other. We have been
taught to think linearly rather than comprehensively." 85 "It is not that
linear relationships don't help to order certain aspects of experience,
but they will not alone generate a holistic view." 86 By insisting on the
dominance of one mode the European has lost sight of the whole. But
this was necessary! Just as the mode of objectification had to be ele-
vated to supremacy in order for the "right" people/minds to achieve
control. Lineality was fundamental to the system of "logic" that
Aristotle introduced, which was thereafter equated with truth.
Vernon Dixon quotes from the Metaphysics:
It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not
to belong to the same thing in the same respect; and whatever other
distinctions you might add to meet dialectical objections, let them be
added. This, then is the most certain of all principles .... 87
Dixon characterizes European (Aristotelian) logic as "either/or

logic," which is based on the laws of contradiction, the excluded
middle, and laws of identity. He says that "either/or logic has become
so ingrained in Western thought that it is felt to be natural and self-
evident." He contrasts European logic with what he calls the "diuni-
tal logic" of the African world-view, in which things can be "apart and
united at the same time." According to this logic, something is both
in one category and not in that category at the same time. 88 This cir-
cumstance is unthinkable given the European world-view.
One problem evidenced repeatedly when Europeans look at
"non-European" or what they consider "pre-European" cultures is
their misunderstanding of the rclationsblp beLw0Pn the 011ca11dthe
many, hrtween 1mity and tliwrslty, for 1woplt• ot 111·1 tlimt 1-:11ropl'i'lllS
(1).,-;1• 1·xlst slt1111ll,1111
~'h1·,lv:111cl
111 Iii t III y. '1'111•
t• 1101 •,1·1•11to I w , 111!11111
..
l-:11111p11.111111rn,1 ofl1111 vl1°W'I c 0111·1 plln1111 ,111 1 ;1111pli•K ol lilt'
1111°11•
inability to think "logically." Levy-Bruh! referred to the "pre-logical"

mentality. This is because Europeans needed to be able to say that
there was only "one road to reality," and that road could then be con-
trolled by one culture, one civilization, one type of person-yes, even
one race. And what unfolds in these pages is the way in which that
control, that power, was achieved: the necessity of the monolith! The
asili of European development allows us to understand these "eido-
logical" (Bateson) developments as preparation for the putting in
place of the powerful monolithic state culture that has become
Europe.
Supremacy of the Absolute, the Abstract,

and the Analytical
In the Republic, Glaucon and Adimantis are seeking abstract
"virtue" as opposed to "virtue" always attached to a concrete situa-
t Ion. Havelock again sees this as part of the backwardness of
''l lomeric" as opposed to "Platonic" Greece. In the former modality,
011conly learned of concrete instances of virtues. The Platonic "rev-
llllltion" in thinking was not only to "separate the knower from the
knnwn," but also to introduce a special kind of abstraction that was
I II become identified with European thought. In the Euthyphro, a sim-
11.,r <.:oncern arises. Socrates convinces Euthyphro that he cannot
"11•cognize" piety when he sees it, because he has no "idea" of it.
11111llyphro's actions are therefore, according to Socrates, plagued by
"lnronsistency." It is above all permanence and consistency that are
,tl'ltlcvcd through Platonic abstraction, the "unchanging" form to
wltlch all things subject to change can be referred. But is this not
11wrcly an illusion-at best an operational method? Situations such
,,••t l 11•one with which Euthyphro is confronted will always arise in the
l111111nn condition. There will always be times when one's duty to the
t ;, 11Is ttnd one's duty to one's father conflict. Having an "idea" of piety
wlll uol necessarily help one to make the right decision-if, indeed,
11111• t•Xlsts. Fanatical commitment to such an "idea" tends to result in
11111rnllslk,self-righteous, and antihumane postures. "Piety," after all,
I 1,1•,It I cln with meaning and value and as such is necessarily attached
I11 11It' "l1111nan,"1he existential and the concrete. Plato invents the
'lrl1•,1"wllkh is other than human, and what he claims to achieve by
dciliiH ,11 Is to rid "truth" of the ambiguity that is inherent in the
1111111;111. lls1·II is s11<'11
'1'11,· Ne1J11/Jfir· an "idea" or "1-'orin."It is a state of
p, 111'111011lhl\l :;olw•, IHllllilll prnl>lt'lllS l>y ('lilllllll\ling IIH.'m. In thr
U,•,,1111/11 1111' :i11dltwo11,,li-:tl'11cy
,1111hlr11ilty of tl1t•1•n11<'ll'll' dl~ap1warl-
' II t•111•pl11t 1,y 1111' 111111"liw 1111·,1 ul tlw (,(loci"
70 YURUGU
The fact is that the existence of "piety" and "virtue" as abstrac-

tions, and as intellectual "objects" distinct from the "knowing self"
must be demonstrated. It cannot be assumed. The only convincing
argument is that the illusion of objectification and the use of such
abstractions may, under the proper circumstances, be handy tools
with limited applicability. It is unreasonable to accept them as onto-
logical givens or as being necessary for all kinds of "knowing," as
Plato argues. But then, he must make this argument, because his
intent is not only philosophical but also ideological, i.e., social and
political.
Havelock has only praise for Platonic epistemology. For him it
represents "advance" in human intelligence. The object that the
knower knows must be an abstraction. It must be the quality in iso-
lation, the "thing in itself." The Platonic forms are of this nature (yet
certainly impossible to imagine). According to Havelock:
The abstracted objects of knowledge as known and as stated, are

always identical with themselves-unchanging-and always when
statements are made about them or when they are used in state-
ments, these statements have to be timeless. 89
What is it that the knower "knows?" Only these abstracted iden-

tities. According to Plato they have greater reality than concrete
instances, because they are more "permanent." Yet it would seem to
us that the concrete has greater reality: the material as manifestation
of spirit. Havelock says of Plato, "He tries to focus on the permanence
of the abstract whether as formula or as concept, as opposed to the
fluctuating here today-gone tomorrow character of the concrete sit-
uation." Plato skillfully creates the illusion of "permanence." He draws
the notorious "line" to separate the invisible from the visible, the
"intelligible" from that which can only be sensed or felt; and those
things (ideas) that "are" from that which merely "seems to be." In
Plato's writings, "Ideas" and "Forms" are written with capitals and so
adumbrate the written symbolization of the European "God," while
things in the sensual world, opinions, and poetry are written in the
lower case-just as are the "gods" of people who are not European.
In his obsession with the abstract and the absolute, Plato bas
borrowed from the teaching of the Mystery Schools that preceded
him and from which he lcarnc>d.(There are also F.11roccntricscholars
who s,iy t hilt it was 1111.: ol Iler way arot111d:t llil I t rndlt inns all r 11>11tNl
lo ,111<11•111 l·:J.(ypt11<t11,1llyc,ui1• lnt1•1and w1•11•111'lt1c•1w1·d l1v Pl.1tu.' 101
Ill Ii,,•• 1,,l<1•111111•
ldc•n ot .1 ..11·1c•cl,
c•l1·111.il'>y11il1t1ll1
1 ,Illy ·11,llc•dtrntl1 1
,1pp1n,tc l1111,lc•rnilv tl111111gl1

·,pl11t111tl
1·11l1gllti•111111•11t,
1111d111•ll,1, !H'I'
ularized and distorted it for ideological use. It is interesting that the

mysteries of the universe for Plato become profane, as the esoteric
becomes exoteric, and at the same time deceptively elitist. While it
is an epistemological system that everyone is forced to relate to, only
the very special few are capable of knowing the "Ideas," and so must
teach and rule the rest. Again the creation of power.
This idea of the Platonic abstraction raises an interesting point.
It is important that all of us be able to see relationships between par-
ticular events and phenomenon and that we "understand" or organize
them. We want our children to be able to think "conceptually," i.e.,
lo feel comfortable with concepts that can be used to make sense of
things, to solve problems. We don't want them to be forever limited
lo the familiar circumstance, unable to apply a concept to a "new" sit-
uation or problem. There is also the very simple cultural reality that
111all societies and cultures people must abstract from experience in
order to organize themselves, to build and to create and to develop.
Abstraction has its place. It is not a European cognitive tool (method-
nloizy), but a "human" one. Contrary to European thought, it did not
h<·gin with Plato or the Greeks.
Plato separates the world into two parts-or rather creates two
worlds: the world of "appearance" and the world of "reality." This sep-
11111lionhas continued to characterize European scientific thought.
r,H' Stanley Diamond this is problematical as "concepts become real
, 11t It ies rather than metaphors and as such have power over peo-
pll•." Concepts become reified. This, indeed, appears to have been
l1l,11o's objective. Plato "isolates the abstract from the concrete (and)
llu· l11tellectual from the emotional." 91 However, as Diamond points
11111, the Platonic abstraction is but one kind of abstraction and it is
lids slyle that has become entrenched in European thought:
, l'Vcry linguistic system is a system of abstraction; each sorting

0111of experience and conclusion from it is an abstract endeavor;
•·v,·ry tool is a symbol of abstract thinking; indeed, all cultural con-
v1·1111011,all custom is testimony to the generic human capacity for
111>strnct ing. £3utsuch abstractions are indissolubly wedded to the
, 111H'n·te; they are nourished by the concrete, and they are, I
'11-lh•v,•,ultimately induced nut deduced. They are not, in short,
1,ppc lh<•;,JlyPlatonic abstractions, and they do not have the politi-
' ltP!I p:.ycltologlcal connotations of the latter. 92
IJl11111011tl 1111sp •r ·ciVl'd llw si~nlficance of the Platonic style of

d1• lt.ll'llt111 It l:1 ld1•0l111-{h'all11hl11•11t.It:.. rulr Is In csti\blish cpistc-
1w1l111:1r ill ,111111111
lty ,\lid, nl 1·011Ha•,11tlH•rkhul~: ol n11lliorlly ,·.111llwn
72 YURUGU
be derived from and supported by it. The special nature of this rela-
tionship in European development will unfold in the chapters that fol-
low. Those colonized by Europe (as well as Europeans themselves)
are taught that Platonic abstraction is abstraction and that because
their thought-systems are not based on such abstractions, they are
incapable of thinking "abstractly." This is merely one aspect of
Europe's assault on the rest of the world.
Certainly abstraction is valuable in specific situations, when rea-
soning about certain kinds of things, e.g., concepts of "opposite,"
"sameness," "difference," etc. But we all know that there are very few
instances in which these abstract categories can be applied accu-
rately and without qualification to concrete realities. Plato knew this
and so therefore called reality as we know it "unreal." He says that it
is only our perception that is contradictory, not "Reality" (with a cap-
ital "R"). Perhaps my major argument with the Platonic argument is
the dictum that the mode of abstraction must be applied to our moral
conceptions and our relationships with each other, or as Kant puts
it, our "judgements." The Kantian imperative is, after all, morally and
existentially irrelevant. To be meaningful it must be applied to con-
crete human situations and be qualified and conditioned by those sit-
uations. The use of abstract "universal" formulations in the European
experience has been to control people, to impress them, and to intim-
idate them. These formulations have political significance not moral
or ethical significance. They do not help people to live better. That is
why Eric Havelock is wrong when he implies that the Greeks were
capable of living more morally after Plato's influence. And that is why,
despite the ascendancy of European scientific thought, European cul-
ture is in many ways less moral than the majority of cultures that
have an authentically moral base.
Abstraction is then a tool that all people use to integrate them-
selves into their environment and to organize their thinking and their
knowledge. Clearly the Platonic emphasis that grew to dominate
European thought, behavior, and social organization did not have
this purpose. Alvin Gouldner's interpretation is closer to mine than
that of most European scholars:
Plato's effort to find transcendental universal Ideas which he pos-

tulates to be real is probably related to the very practical problem
confronting the Greek morality of his time: findiug a t:ommon
ground am(lng diverse beliefs and t~stablislling ,, hash, fnr uni(yinH
tllPIII, of ,·1111q,r1slngromp1•1hlf-ldalnt~ n11d v11l111 111'In tltal 11ll111•1•cl
11111l11• ,1•1It 1111••Wt'lt' nl 1•q11,dvaltw 'l'lw

1
ol 11111v1•1-.11I
cit vi 111111111•111 11111v,
t1,•ll11ll111111, tli, II, 111111J11lyl1,1v1•
emerged from the disinterested stirring of an idle curiosity anxious

to think more clearly for its own sake, but also as a response to the
crisis of Greek moral and belief systems. On a sociological level, it
is in effect an effort to identify a hidden ground among warring
views and a rhetoric serving to win consent to a method aimed at
producing concensus. 93
Even in its tentativeness, Gouldner's portrayal of the implica-

tions of Platonic philosophy, and importantly of Plato's motives, is
refreshingly honest in its lack of ordinary European chauvinism. The
implications that Plato's intentions may have been more than "acad-
1:'mic" is strangely sacrilegious in a thoroughly secular society.
Perhaps the Sophists were the most effective critics of the Platonic
Order from those among the "ancestors" of the European. They
apparently presented the greatest threat to his new state, as they
attacked it at its epistemological base. So they come out to be the
worst moral villains, since immorality is equated with relativism.
I .ewis Richards says:
According to the philosophy of the Sophists there does not exist

,iny objective truth, only beliefs. "Man is the measure of all things,"
said Protagoras. There may be many contradictory opinions about
the one and the same thing and all of them equally true. The wise
man is he who can change the opinions of the many through the art
nf persuasion. This explains how they believed that they could
prove "the wrong logic as the right one and the right as the wrong
1111C."~ 4
We would do well to look more closely at the writings of the

Hupllists from an African-centered perspective. It would seem that
I I i.•y were dangerous, because if one believed them, the painstaking
",tl guinents" in the Platonic dialogues might not hold water. Things
111,, 11ol necessarily what they are made to appear. In contemporary
1·11r0Amcrican society the skill that pays off is that which enables one
t 11111nkeaggression look like "defense," oppression look like "free-
rln111," and cultural imperialism look like "enlightenment." The
:,uplilsls, wt>are told, were dangerous because they "undermined the
• 111H't•ptsof religion, family, the slate and moral behavior." (But isn't
1ltl1, wltnt Phito hacl lo clo?) "They taught that religion was an inven-
t 11111ul I lw ph llosophcrs, •hat Gods were the creations of man, and
111111 tlw laws wc•rc p.1ssed l>y the stronH for their own protection.
1111• d;111J,l1•1or ~:wh tl'arllll1w: to ~O('l<•ly Wl\s vast. Tile young people
, ,[11'1 I.lily wc•tt• ,lpl lo lw1·111111•IJ1ll111•111·c•tl "'1!\
,11111111l1wd
11111,Ill l,11t, l'l,1t1111hvl1•w·, w1•11•lo 1'·,,d 111111111111111111111cl
1111111'1
74 YURUGU
ial control, while the Sophists seem to have had a more pluralistic
view, recognizing the validity in cultural diversity and world-view. In
Gouldner's words, this recognition leads them to:
... a critique of the conventional distinctions between Greeks and

barbarians, aristocrats and plebeians, slaves and masters, viewing
these as artifices contrary to nature, and, indeed, viewing the gods
themselves as men's own invention. The diversified customs and
beliefs they encounter lead some Sophists to conclude that when
men disagree about institutions, laws, or customs, it does not nec-
essarily follow that some of them must be right and others wrong;
and that there is not necessarily any one unvarying standard of truth
by which the validity of social beliefs can be judged. Institutions
and laws, from this standpoint, have to be evaluated in terms of the
differing conditions that prevail in different communities. 96
Obviously this would not do at all. This epistemological stand

was incompatible with the Platonic objective. No wonder Plato
spends so much time "refuting" the Sophists in his dialogues. The
Sophist's view did not yield power, did not suit the demands of the
European asili and was therefore rejected as an epistemological
model.
To understand the function of the abstract-absolute modality is
to understand European development and its relationship to alter-
native patterns of development, that is, to other cultures. An effective
critique of European culture must trace its development from one
critical juncture to the next, at which point the need to solidify new
orders has always been met by another dogma, another ideological
statement of European supremacy. This process leads towards ever
more intense despiritualization and greater control.
The culture that Plato has initiated is not a good one for the cre-
ative mind nor for those who are not European. In light of this inter-
pretation, Plato's anger towards the Sophists makes more sense.
They become enemies, almost the symbol of evil because of their
rejection of the rational. To state explicitythat man was the measure
of all things, as Protagoras said, was to undermine the new order. Of
course, the Platonic view implied the same thing, but he limited it to
"rational man," and he defined "reason." Once the new "measure of
man" had been decreed, it couldn't be changed. WE>ll over one tltou-
sancl years later in the same tradition, Saint Simon and others would
echo Plato's edicl. They wo1Jlcl say LImt llw ll('W so<'lc•Iy shrn lid ht•
dt>rlvt•clfrom prlnrlplc•!i ot rntlrn1;1J 1l11111Hhl. w,,,,,, t•ntc·q
/\hi-11'111l1.111
111•:tt,• ol -.,wit ,1 ~111tc•l'l11·',oplll·1h lt,11I 111111
lc11tl1C1 rc•,11l,,1rl1111 0
tll11t
there could be many and contradictory opinions about the same

thing and all of them true! What blasphemy! Worse, sedition!
Arthur 0. Lovejoy uses the phrase "metaphysical pathos" in a
way that seems to bring together Gregory Bateson's "eidos" and
"ethos" into one idea. A sense of the eternal gives aesthetic pleasure
to the European mind, says Lovejoy. 97 The idea of immutability and
pure abstractness are pleasing to the European utamaroho. Lovejoy
says of Platonic thought:
Having arrived at the conception of Idea of Ideas which is a pure

perfection alien to all the categories of ordinary thought and in
need of nothing, external to itself, he forthwith finds in just this
transcendent and absolute Being the necessitating logical ground
of the existence of this world .... And if any reason for the being of
the sensible world was to be found, it must necessarily, for Plato,
be found in the Intellectual World, and in the very nature of the
sole Self-SufficingBeing. The not-so-good, not to say the bad, must
be apprehended as derivative from the Idea of the Good, as
involved in the essence of Perfection. The self-same God who was
the Goal of all desire must also be the Source of the creatures that
desire it.98
The experiencing of the sacred and the eternal, as opposed to

profane and secular time seems to be essential for human spiritual ful-
hllrnent or at least satisfaction. But in majority cultures this experi-
1•11ce is achieved in other ways. The power of ritual drama as a
1 11ltural mechanism capable of restructuring ordinary categories of
ll111eand space is profound, startling, and impressive: a different kind
11!transcendence indeed from the artificial construct that serves as
t lw basis for rational thought. This is not a transcendence in which
wr• pn.rticipate existentially. Ritual drama, on the other hand, acts to
t 1,111sform the psyche to redefine reality for a special moment. It
111•1 omes a phenomenal reality. The European conceptual framework
t r1•,i1s phenomena as objects and so takes away the power of experi-
••1111•dre,11ity. As Norman Brown has said, "Secular rationalism is
, l'Hlly H rellgion." 1111
William James is a Europe:\n philosopher who appears insane
wl11•11 Vll•w1•din terms of Europe;rn philosophy, because of his refusal
lo ,111·1•pt1ls 1011gstanding tradition, his rejection of the European uta-
11111u11111, .l,111wscritiqu<>s what he calls "monistic idealism" or the
upllll11:mplly orlltt• al>solule." lfo says that it is essentially "nonhu-
111,111": "Ill I tll'lll11•ral'(S 1101 s11ffN:;, nor loves nor ilntcs; ti has no
111 ,.,h, dc-~IJ1•11, 111 ,1'-lpli .,tlt111s,1111f.1l111n";111 1-i11·1·1•si-;t•s, fr ll•11ds n,
, 1w11il,••,,vh li1il1"~ 111dt'l1•,ll·1" "/\l1-.11l111t ...111,"Ill' ...,,y..,, dl1 t,111'!-i111,II
76 YURUGU
nothing in this life is real. "The great claim of the philosophy of the
absolute is that the absolute is no hypothesis, but a presupposition
implicated in all thinking, and needing only a little effort of analysis
to be seen as a logical necessity." 100 James' own "pragmatic" con-
ception of truth is as follows:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate

and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. ... The truth of an
idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an
event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-
fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation. [James' italics] 101
Plato would not have had any patience for James' "pragmatism"
and neither has the European tradition. It does not "fit" the ideolog-
ical needs of this minority culture. Does not "suit" the other dominant
modes of the culture. It does not satisfy the power needs of the asili.
The synthetic mode yields cosmic conceptions. The European
world-view has succeeded in leaving the culture with no authentic
cosmology, no true metaphysic. Everything is physical, material, and
separate. The ultimate approach to knowledge is objectification and
analysis. Willie Abraham talks about the European "tendency to rip
things apart." 102 There are some things, he says, that cannot be
"divided" without destroying their integrity. It would seem that the
human would be one of these. The European scientific approach tears
human beings to shreads in order to understand them. The essen-
tialist view assumes man/woman to be irreducible. The analytical
mode splits things up. Remote and absolute abstraction is made
applicable to the here and now through an analytical methodology.
What seems to have occurred very early in European development
was a predilection for one of the cognitive methods that we as human
beings were capable of employing. The absolute, the abstract, and the
analytical suit the European utamaroho, an utamaroho that needs the
sensation of control.
Empirical evidence supports this intepretation. As mentioned
previously, early on in the history of European scientific thought, lan-
guage-related skills, and methods of "knowing" were associated with
a portion of the brain that was labelled "major," while the portio11 that
gC'ncrated other types of responses was c(1llccl"minor," nnd as is indl-
catt•cl hv tlw sc-11iat11i<.' rcli\lionsllip of tht•sf' two ll•rrns, tlw "minor"
· w.1'1 tl11111J!hlto lw "lt·ss dt·-wlo1wd" than 1111' "111,1jt11 '' 'l'ltls w;,s 11,li
11,,11111 '', ·1111, ," htlVPI1 t lw p11•dllt•1·t101,of I lit• E111upt•,111111111d
11111 1111t 1111
11111,11 , voh1ll1111,uy 1111111,+ th,11 ,1l111w1111 1111•, 11111p,11l•11111 111
phenomena on a "progressive" scale. Later, however, in the 196Os

experimentation on the brain, it was discovered that both hemi-
spheres of the brain, the "right" and the "left" were involved in
"higher" cognitive functions and that these two halves were not in
opposition or antagonistic to one another as the European world-
view would predispose one to think, but that their functions were
complementary. Each hemisphere, according to "split-brain" theory,
is fashioned to "different modes of thinking, both highly complex." 103
The term "mode" here is very important. It is the Kuntu of African phi-
losophy: the manner in which a thing is perceived, apprehended,
made intelligible, and expressed. It is the modality and as such it
effects the contours of what we receive, perceive, and experience. It
is "media" and therefore has a complex and intimate relationship to
communication. The Kuntu can do much to determine, limit, portray,
distort, or enrich the phenomenon being presented.
Roger Sperry at the California Institute of Technology has car-
ried out investigations to further the understanding of the "bimodal"
nature of our brains. His work has produced the following informa-
tion: (1) that there is a connecting "cable" of nerve fibers between the
lwo hemispheres of the brain; (2) that when this cable is severed
each hemisphere operates independently; (3) and that each hemi-
sphere perceives its own reality, but that this reality is only partial
or incomplete without that of the other hemisphere. The intact brain
llas a "corpos callosa" (connecting body) that facilitates communi-
cation between the two hemispheres and so unifies the thinking/feel-
ing being. The principles expressed are those of an African cosmology
In which we have the fundamental "twinness" of the universe; the
ro1nplementary functions of opposites that cooperate to form the
proper working of the whole. But our notions of what constitutes
l11lelligence have been molded by the minority Western European
world-view, and so we have difficulty thinking holistically in this
11·gnrd, since the European world is predicated on first separation,
<ll<'11otornization,and then "dominance" of one of the opposites.
The two hemispheres are now known as "left" and "right." The
li•lt hemisphere is thought to function in a verbal, analytical mode,
wllllt• the right hemisphere is nonverbal, global, or "synthetic," spa-
t l,d, complex, and intuitive. Clearly just as the latter was previously
lrn11w11 as the "mi11or'' function, it has consistently and systemati-
' ,illy, c-vcn 011c could say-institulio11ally, been devalued in
I ,111ope-an clvlllzal 1011/rnlturC'. It is rarely even recognized as being a
111"l11l1•llig~•n1·1•.''
, ,11111•1· It Is 11l·illler "kstC'll ro," nor encourage-cl.
hll1·llt~:1•111 srn ll'ty l1,1•; ht•('lJ l<l1•11tltwd
P 1111•;111np1•,u1 with tlw rol{ul-
78 YURUGU
tive mode that is generated and controlled by the left hemisphere of

the brain. Hunter Adams prefers to talk about "cultural styles of know-
ing" rather than splitting the brain in this way. I04
Perhaps the most recent vintage of this Eurocentric view, "sci-
entifically" stated, is to be found in the work of Julian Jaynes. His the-
ory is that human consciousness as "we" know it did not begin to
develop until the Second century before the Christian Era! This means
that the Great Pyramid of Gizeh and the calculations involved in its
creation, the medicine, mathematics, chemistry, and state organiza-
tion of ancient (Kemet) Egypt, not to mention Sumeria, were all
accomplished without "consciousness." "A civilization without con-
sciousness is possible." 105 Jaynes' theory is interesting and ultimately
of the classical Eurocentric genre, while on the surface giving the
impression of being unique and innovative. It is a new variation on an
old theme. For Jaynes, consciousness has the following features: 0)
"spatialization." (2) "Excerption" - we only "see" a part of any partic-
ular thing. It is ironic that he should say this since it is the left-brained
European modality that keeps people from comprehending globally.
(3) "The Analog 'I"' which allows us to imagine ourselves doing things,
i.e., "The Metaphor 'Me."' Of this feature of consciousness, Jaynes
says, "We can both look out from the imagined self... or we can step
back a bit and see ourselves." (4) "Narratization," from which "we are
constantly seeing ourselves as the main figures in the stories of our
lives." (5) "Conciliation," "bring[ing] things together as conscious
objects." 106According to Jaynes, human beings in ancient times could
speak, write, listen, read, learn, make decisions, think, and reason, but
were not "conscious":
... consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository,

or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of construct-
ing an analog space with an analog "I" that can observe that space,
and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity,
excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together
in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated
like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world
and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts.
Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things.[ italics
added.] 107
He takes 1-lavclock's view one step furtl1N, "Th<>rl'Is In 1,t<'1wral

no c•n11sc•lou:-nessill llw Iliad .. .. 'l'ltc b~gln1I1111-t~ 11f,1t·tlo11Jrl' 1111LIn
1·rn1iwlrn1'1pl;111t,,rl'i\SPll'i, ,lll<I uwtlV<'!,:tlwy 1111•1111111' 11<lion:, ,111d
',jll'l'I 111"1 111 }:rnh - rt,,, lltrnlf1· 111'11)', l1,1111111''Hi'"ul(IH WIiy W('II'
these ancient people not yet "conscious?" According to Jaynes, it

was because of the structure of their brains, which had two distinct
"chambers." They used only one part for speaking, thinking, learning,
etc. The other was used for the "voice" of the "gods." In other words,
ancient human beings were told what to do by "voices" in their heads.
"Voices" told them to build pyramids and civilizations. They took
these voices to be the authoritative speech of divine beings, and so
they obeyed. One question that comes to mind is: What couldn't they
do? Well, says Jaynes, they were not capable of "introspection." (One
has only to read the ancient Kemetic texts to know that he is mis-
taken.) And they could not be "self" directed. The voices of the bicam-
eral mind were a form of social control; the last stage in the
development of language, a development that made civilization pos-
sible. In the bicameral stage of "civilization," "the language of men
involved only one hemisphere in order to leave the other free for the
language of gods." 109 It seems that one of the things that led Jaynes
to the development of his theory was his observance of schizo-
phrenics. He tells us that schizophrenic hallucinations are like the
guidances of the gods in antiquity. Stress is the instigation in both
instances. During the eras of the "bicameral mind" the stress thresh-
old of human beings was lower, like that of schizophrenics today. 110
Stress, he says, comes from decision making, and that is what caused
lwllucinations of the gods. Jaynes writes:
... the presence of voices which had to be obeyed were the

absolute prerequisite to the conscious stage of mind in which it is
the self that is responsible and can debate within itself, can order
and direct, and that the creation of such a self is the product of cul-
ture. In a sense, we have become our own gods. Ill
.Jaynes' theory is quite physiological. The difference between

'\•onscious" and "unconsciousness" human beings, or rather "pre-
< onscious" human beings, lies in the structure of their brains. The
two lcmporal lobes of the bicameral brain connected by the tiny
''.uit<>riorcommissure'' across "which came the directions which built
11111,·Jvlllzations and founded the world's religions, where gods spoke
lu 111en and were obeyed because they were human volition," 112
lil'<',unc the "modern" brain with the right and left hemispheres as we
l,1111wIt. Tile left hemisphere, according to .Jaynes, contains the
;,n•ns"; 1111:
·q11•1•1•li :rnppk1111ntary 111otorrortex, Broca's area and
1
k,··:.
W,•1111< ilt't'il, Tilt' laltt•r Is thr ''most l11clhqw11sableto normal
,111•1•1·1!
'"1'11ls c·o11pl1•dwltl1 his (1•t•l1111t
lhnl tl1t• tl}\111hrnl11 is "largely
..,. ,,ry," 11:1l1·cllll111lt111111111111,·
1111111•1·, ll1nl tlw tlHl1I lmil11 I:, u "vt'!>II
80 YURUGU
gial" remain of the "chamber" of the voices of the gods in ancient

times. These "voices" that caused past civilizations to be built were
afterall only "excitations" in what corresponds to Wernicke's area on
the right hemisphere of the contemporary human brain.
But cultural/environmental changes were to cause physiological
changes in the brain. Writing and trade interfered with the "voices."
Writing no longer stressed the auditory, and trade meant interaction
with other groups of people who were hearing "other" voices, which
at the very least was confusing. The gods also failed in the "chaos of
historical upheaval." 114 The result was "consciousness." The result is
also a continued valorization of the left-brain cognitive modality by
the European. Beneath the complexity and ingenuity, even intellectual
creativity of Jayne's theory of consciousness, are quite visible the
earmarks of the European utamawazo as well as its ideological ten-
dencies: Universal, unilinear evolution, "progress," and the intellec-
tual superiority of European culture is assumed. The differences
between earlier civilizations and those that came later are understood
invidiously: "contemporary differences between the hemispheres in
cognitive functions at least echo such differences of function between
man and god as seen in the literature of bicameral man." 115
For Jaynes the process has not ended; it couldn't. "Evolution''
does not stop; after all "progress" is not reached. That is the beauty
of these ideas for the European mind. And so he imagines us to be still
in the throes of "transition" from the grip of the bicameral mind, still
fighting the authority of the gods, or their "voices"-even though now
we can only "read" their voices (except for those of us who are "schiz-
ophrenic.") Jaynes never says what "we" are moving towards. Is it
toward a one-hemisphered brain? The illusion will then become the
reality, and that is truly psychotic. I agree with Jaynes on one point.
We see the same thing, but we see it from different perspectives.
"Science" has become secularized; its view of the human, profane.
And as this happens people (Europeans) search for the loss "autho-
rization" of the gods past. 116
But typically Jaynes has falsely "universalized" a cultural phe-
nomenon. He is describing European science and the European
malaise. In his view "we" are going through a necessary stage in the
march towards "enlightenment," which, if I interpret him correctly,
results when human beings "realize" that there is nothing more than
themselves. that they can look to no greater aul horlzation for t hrir
rlf'Cisions. This lt>ads to Ull' 11llln1al1'a11dlolal d1•~al·raliz:lllr>n nf llw
11-11lvv1u' (Thank gnodtwss only 11:.1111,II111l11111ltv
11•111·cs1·11ts
1-',111opc.•
11I 111••woild, glvc•n Mw 111111111•
1111111• ol 1111'
l•:111up1•,1111c11111•ptlrn1
human!)
But there are other views of the modalities of human con-
sciousness. Erich Neumann offers a Jungian-influenced conceptual-
ization, to some degree reminscent of the right-brain/left-brain
distinction. His distinction is between "matriarchal consciousness"
and "patriarchal consciousness." Matriarchal consciousness is prior,
is linked to the "moon spirit" and "moon time," as it is grounded in
natural and cyclical rhythms; it is intuitive and becomes "impreg-
nated" with ideas, rather than "willing" them. Understanding in this
modality is not divorced from feeling. It involves natural processes
of transformation, so that knowing and comprehending affect the
knowing being. Matriarchal consciousness is also associated with the
still darkness of night that is pregnant with growth.
Patriarchal consciousness relates to "daylight and sun." It is
associated with independently willed thought. Neumann says how-
ever, that it is self-deceptive, "interpreting itself as an absolutely free
system." It is "highly practical," efficient, and quick to react. It fol-
lowed matriarchal consciousness in development, detaching itself
from the unconscious.
We see processes of abstraction, which assist in the free disposal

and application of ideas and ... lead to the manipulation of abstrac-
tions like numbers in mathematics and concepts in logic. In the
psychological sense such abstractions are in the highest degree
without emotional content. 117
In "patriarchal consciousness" the knower is not affected by

what is known; rather the knower controls the idea. While matriarchal
consciousness involves "affect-participation," "the abstract thought
of patriarchal consciousness is cold in comparison, for the objectiv-
ity demanded of it presupposes an aloofness possible only to cold
blood and a cool head." 118
for Neumann, as opposed to Jaynes, both modalities represent
Im ms of consciousness, even though one is linked closely to the
1111c.:ons<:ious. But in an African-centered view this is not negative,
•,IIH·e it allows us to be in tune with a universe in which we partici-
pul<.:as one form of being. Clearly both forms of consciousness are
111•1·cssary.They complement one another. The whole brain has two
li,1lvcs. Perhaps European culture has been molded by a Platonic,
''p.11rlarchnl" consciousness, and seeks to destroy "matriarchal con-
. l'ln11snc-ss"bccm1sc ot the clc>strnctlvc,,ontrnntntionnl nature of the
1:11rop1•,11111/ur111,ro/1<1 '1M,1trlarC'llal c·onsrlo11s1wss" rc•presrnts a loss
1111·111111 vlt•w /\, 11I ns II '111tlt(~!lt·:1 111n•s11rfnc·1•
nl ItI I J w l•:11111p1·111, 1·v1•11
82 YURUGU
European feminists fight against it.

When Plato deified the "patriarchal consciousness," he reified
"form" that inhibited the further "transformation" ("matriarchal con-
sciousness") of the human spirit. As a result European culture does
not allow its members to become complete ("full-term") human
beings (the symbolism of Yurugu). Jaynes may be correct but only
with regard to the European. Maybe they will succeed in the elimi-
nation of one of the hemispheres of their brains, therefore being for-
ever off balance, in a state of perpetual disequilibrium. (Or is that, in
fact, how they came into being?) This is certainly a description of the
culture.
According to Levy-Bruh!, who offered an earlier version of
Eurocentric theory, "logic" began with "civilized" thought, based on
the principle of contradiction. "Primitives" made use of "prelogical,"
"collective representations." The mode of participation contradicts
the European emphasis on recognition of discrete entities. In anthro-
pological theory this cognitive style of thinking has been called "prim-
itive," "native," and sometimes "folk." But aren't we really dealing
with two different world-views, which in turn, generated different
epistemological and ontological conceptions? Indeed, the objective
of this discussion has been to scrutinize the "taken-for-granted"
aspects of European culture or "mind,'' which is afterall a minority
phenomenon, 119 so that they can no longer be assumed to be "uni-
versal": two (or more) world-views rather than two developmental
stages of human thought as Levy-Bruh!, Julian Jaynes, and countless
other European theorists would have them.
The African metaphysic, the Native American and Oceanic
"majority cultures" (it is safe to generalize here), all presuppose a fun-
damental unity of reality based on the organic interrelatedness of
being; all refuse to objectify nature, and insist on the essential spiri-
tuality of a true cosmos. What became known as the "scientific" view
was really the European view that assumed a reality precluding psy-
chical or spiritual influences on physical, material being. This view
also resulted in the elimination of a true "metaphysical" concept and
of an authentic cosmology. David Bidney says that,
Levy-Bruh!... exhibited an ettmocentric prejudice in assuming that

only the positivistic, antimetapllysical position current in his lime
was logic::il as well as scient ilic and l11;1t metaphyskal postulates
were a printi preklgir,11 HSwt!IIas pn•sl'i<•ntlfic·.1i 11
Desacralization of Nature:
Despiritualization of the Human
From the outset, let me say that, in discussing these European
conceptions we will have a problem with gender terminology. First of
all, it is awkward, but nonetheless important to refrain from the use
of "man" to refer to "human" as the European has done in discourse.
Second, the confusion is further complicated by the fact that when
discussing the European, l will be talking about European men for the
most part, because Plato,and those who followed in his wake, ignored
women and did not include them in their self-concepts of "philoso-
pher," "king," or "the European," and that is why they could refer to
themselves collectively as "European Man." In one sense we are talk-
ing about ideas that effected and were adopted by European women,
children, and men. The issue, then, becomes complicated, and the
reader must indulge me as I attempt to deal with these problems gen-
erated by the European world-view.
The way the European is taught to view nature and his/her
proper relationship to it is particularly important, because it is, in
part, the consequences of this conception that are most distinctive
of European culture. European ontology generates a conception of
nature and the human, and of reality.
What is the implicit idea of nature and its significance that
t·merges from Plato's dialogues? Alvin Gouldner says:
In Plato's view ... ends are not resident in nature but in the uni-
versal Ideas or eternal Forms which transcend nature, in which
nature only imperfectly "participates" and apart from which it is
inl1crently disorderly. From his standpoint, therefore, nature can-
1t0t be controlled by the external influence of some regulating end
or <lesign. 121
Elsewhere Gouldner talks about the ideas of those who were to

rPs1 n ,ctu re thesociety:
,·011ceivingof all nature as intrinsically hostile or indifferent to

< 111
111'11<1-having, that is, an abiding disposition toward disorder-the
pl,1111,Ns'propos<'cl changes are felt to be made and maintained only
11g;11ost nntur<', 11otwith its cooperation. From Plato's standpoint,
n11dr<'asrnr, and tlt<•rdore orderliness are not in but above
111l1icl
1111d111:ud
11.111111• il. 1~l
lo 111<.1lll<)r
Not 1111•1•1111•1~,•s 11:, Iht• wn1 Id ol ht •crn11h1H, l IH•St'111:;;..1.1

t' wntld of
I l11w1I 111dc•11)1.111"111'111~" .111d, 1111tc·lrnc·. 111 lw ,llwi1vs 1•1111trnll1•cl,
84 YURUGU
conditioned and moulded in accordance with the absolute and per-

fect ideas that issue from the "World of Being." And the human being,
insofar as he is part of this imperfect nature, which only "imitates" but
cannot "be," must be controlled and moulded as weli. 123 What begins
to emerge is a view of nature and of the human that places them in
opposition to one another, by virtue of the fact that only that part of
the human being which is other than nature (the rational) is superior
to it. This idea of the basically hostile relationship between "human"
and nature, in which the human seeks continually to control nature
is characteristically European. It runs through European culture lin-
eally (in a chronological historical sense) and collaterally or syn-
chronically in that it has both effected the course of European
development and informed the collective behavior and social con-
structs of the culture.
The Christian view of nature again exhibits the influence of
Plato's idea of the disorderly and chaotic, even hostile "nature" that
must be controlled. The "pattern" or "design" (standard) to which
Gouldner refers, is what the Christian uses to measure the morality
of other peoples and to mould them. Katherine George comments on
the Christian view of nature as evidenced in reports of newly "dis-
covered" lands in the sixteenth century:
The dominant attitude in these accounts conceived of civilization-

Graeco-Roman civilization in particular- as an essential discipline
imposed upon the irregularities of nature; as nature -blind nature-
without restraint and guidance, runs to monstrousities, so culture
without civilization runs to disorder and excess. 124
Raw nature, "fallen" nature, which for the Greek was disorder, is for
the Christian even worse: it is sin. 124
Rheinhold Niebuhr attempts to present a more "modern" expla-

nation of Christian concepts, a more philosophically and politically
attractive interpretation in terms of contemporary European
lifestyles than that offered by the Church's scholastic heritage. The
results of an astute mind wrestling to make Christian ideas into both
something distinct from and simultaneously appropriate to the
European utamawazo, and to rescue the Church from thf> more bar-
barous tendencies in European history are most intcreslin~. Niebuhr
ls fighting a losing battle, for to sc•paratc Cl!rist!an Ideology from
l·'.u1npr·nn cultnr,d irnrcrlnlbm would be tu /or ~c nn 1•11tl,1•ly 1ww, ,,JI
~!lwts ti1t1·111t·11t Tl1ls, 111r-11ms1·, lit• t·;1r111111dn sl1111· Ill' h l11ti-111 011
r ,11ltljJ t Iii•w,iy 111wl 111'11
tl1•m1111•,l lit-.pllllm:oplll, ,ti l111t•1111
!'I ,,t 11111•1
,111•
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 8.5
rooted in the origins of the Christian idea. (Unconsciously, perhaps,

it is precisely the European heritage that he wants to claim.)
Though Niebuhr's style and subtlety make his ideas appear to
be unfamiliar at first, it is possible to recognize, if we know how to
look, a characteristically European interpretation of the relationship
between "human" and nature:
Human existence is obviously distinguished from animal life by its

qualified participation in creation. Within limits it breaks the forms
of nature and creates new configuration of vitality. Its transcen-
dence over natural process offers it the opportunity of interfering
with the established forms and unities of vitality as nature knows
them. This is the basis of human history, with its progressive alter-
ation of forms, in distinction from nature which knows no history
but only endless repetition within the limits of each given form ....
Since man is deeply involved in the forms of nature on one hand,
and is free of them on the other; since he must regard determina-
tions of sex, race and (to a lesser degree) geography as forces of
ineluctable fate, but can nevertheless arrange and rearrange the
vitalities and unities of nature within certain limits, the problem of
human creativity is obviously filled with complexities. 125
and finally Niebuhr says,
Nature and spirit both possess resources of vitality and form. The
resources of nature may be more negative. The vitalities of nature
and its forms may be the indispensable presuppositions of human
creativity rather than its active agents; but they cannot be disre-
garded ... the vitalities and unities of nature may play a more neg-
ative part in human destructiveness than those of spirit. The
11atural impulse of sex is, for instance, an inclispensible condition
of all higher forms of family organization as it is the negative force
of destructive sex aberrations. In the same way the natural cohe-
sion of tribe and race is the foundation of higher political creations
ns also the negative determinant of interracial and international
Hlltlr<:hy. 126
In spite of Niebuhr's continual qualifications, the view of the

11•1.ttlonship between "human" and nature that he offers is ideologi-
c 111lytonsistent with and characteristic of European thought. The
11•l11tlunslllp Lo nature i~ one of arrogance and exploitation as
11ppost'd lo nwe, rrspert, and harmony. Put simply, nature is not to
l11•ti Tlw ltt111J1111 011Jytrusts lwr/hls ratiorrnl fnc1ilties that are
1111111111111,II,
11111 ''I 11lt111111 11pl11rt111tlkt with one's nntun.:,
"011t 1 c•11d!-i
wl1lr It 11•p11"1t1
11t-.1111d1•v,1h11•tl nppost·d to tilt'
<'lrl'IPol 1·1•p.-tlllo1111•,
86 YURUGU
valued line of historical progress. To which category does "god"

belong?
The concepts of nature, of reality, of "the human," and of truth
are intricately bound one to the other and inextricably entwined in
the "specialness" or seen another way, the "otherness" of the
European world-view. It is a particular view of nature that allows for
European science, a "science" which is predicated on an epistemol-
ogy that involves the separation of the human from itself in order to
isolate and valorize the seemingly peculiar human ability to ratio-
nalize.Thus as the concept of the human becomes limited, so does the
concept of reality. Theodore Roszak places emphasis on Francis
Bacon and Rene Descartes for this European tendency, while I have
begun with an emphasis on Plato .
. . . domination remains the object; Bacon never deviates from his

conviction that "the command over things natural-over bodies,
medicine, mechanical powers and infinite others of this kind-is the
one proper and ultimate end of true natural philosophy." 127
Roszak's work critiques "objectification," "reductionism," "alien-

ation," and power in European thought in unparalleled fashion:
... what Baconian-Cartesian epistemology did was to bestow high

philosophical status upon that act of alienation by insisting that it
provided our only reliable access to reality. Far more directly than
it encourage callous behavior, this ennobling of the alienated psy-
che has progressively degraded every other form of awareness
human beings possess.
once we elevate such a psychic mode to the highest cultural dignity,

identifying it as the only intellectually productive way of address-
ing the universe ... There will be knowledge, power, dominion with-
out limit. We are licensed to unravel all mysteries and to remake the
world- including human nature itself. 128
Roszak's view of the "psychic mode" that makes European sci-

ence possible is radically different from Eric Havelock's, who praises
Plato for ushering in a new modality. Indeed, it was Plato, and others
who followed, who laid the groundwork on which Bacon and
Descartes could erect their theories. Roszak speaks of 13acon and his
disciples:
· 'l'IH'V 11,td 1111111d l11·1•11k

111.-l{tl"lll 1111111· 1,11111
with 1111'1 uvlH1111111•11I,
1•1.t,11111
.11liPtwc11•11 die lt11t11111v
vn111-.c•II,111dII Ill•• at11111,1tlv1 c ,1IJ11d
objectivity, and you will surely gain power. Then nothing-no sense
of fellowship or personal intimacy or strong belonging-will bar
your access to the delicate mysteries of man and nature. Nothing
will inhibit your ability to manipulate and exploit. This is the same
power we gain over people when we refuse to honor their claim to
respect, to compassion, to love. They become for us mere things on
which we exercise power. Between ourselves and them there is no
commerce of the feelings, no exchange of sentiment or empathy. 129
Roszak has stated almost poetically what became the cutting

edge of the thesis of this study: that European epistemology is sym-
biotically related to European imperialism. The objectification of the
human and the natural allow one to treat both as "things." Peoples
and cultures that refuse to regard themselves and nature as spiritless
are considered "stupid."
Roszak's concept of "reductionism" explains why life must be
taken out of nature in order to facilitate the method:
Reductionism flows from many diverse sources: from an over-

whelming desire to dominate, from the hasty effort to find simple,
comprehensive explanations, from a commendable desire to deflate
the pretentious obscurantism of religious authority; but above all
from a sense of human estrangement from nature which could only
increase inordinately as Western society's commitment to single
vision grew ever more exclusive. In effect, reductionism is what we
experience whenever sacremental consciousness is crowded out by
idolatry, by the effort to turn what is alive to a mere thing. 130
In discussing European cosmology, Arthur Lovejoy isolates cer-

tain ideas or principles that in his view have been seminal to
European philosophy. These ideas find their origins in Plato and can
be traced through their various expressions in the subsequent his-
tory of European thought. He concludes that there have been basi-
cally three ideas so closely associated in European intellectual
history that they together have produced "one of the major concep-
tions in Occidental thought"; expressed in a single term they are rep-
resented by (1) the "Great Chain of Being." 131 Two of the generative
nspects of this idea taken in isolation have been the "Principle of
Plenitude":
... 11ol011lyfor the <'xisl<.:11<.:e of this world, but for every one of its
rliar.Kll'rlstlcs, for t•vpry ki11dof lwh1A whklt it co11tai11s-in strict-
t1f11ili, IJ1d1•(•<i, bran ulthnatr
for t•iwl1 p11rlil'1d111lwt11g •lllt•n• 11111i;t
11•n•;r111, ~di 11 xpJ,11111ln1v1111d "•.11ltwlt'11t"
88 YURUGU
... and (2) the "Principle of Continuity":
... there are no sudden "leaps" in nature; infinitely various as things

are, they form an absolutely smooth sequence,,in which no break
appears, to baffle the craving of our reason for continuity every-
where.132
These culminated in "two great rationalistic ontologies of the

seventeenth century" and in the argument for optimism. According
to Lovejoy, the idea of an "ontological scale" in combination with
Aristotle's zoological and psychological hierarchies produced a third
principle of "unilinear gradation" that was grafted to the two princi-
ples of "plenitude" and "continuity." 133
Lovejoy is concerned with tracing the "historic sources" of these
cosmological and ontological ideas. He says that the principles under-
lying the Chain of Being conception and its related groups of ideas-
"plenitude," "continuity," and "gradation"-owed its genesis to Plato
and Aristotle and its systematization to the Neoplatonists." 134
The scale of being, as implied by the principle of expansiveness

and self-transcendence of "The Good" becomes the essential con-
ception of the Neoplatonic cosmology. 134
Difference of kind automatically implied difference of value,

which generated "diversity of rank in a hierarchy." 134
As we move toward a theoretical model for the explanation of
European cultural imperialism, Lovejoy has given us food for thought.
Clearly one of the outstanding characteristics of the European world-
view is its treatment of "difference," and perhaps what developed
was an utamaroho that related to perceived "difference" intensely,
xenophobically, and aggressively defensive. This relationship could
have been both caused and effected by a world-view that scaled dif-
ference in terms of relative value: an asili that demands power.
Accompanied by the mode of objectification, this encourages an ide-
ology and political behavior that allows Europeans to feel justified in
treating "different" peoples as devalued objects. Since the world-view
has ideological strength, other world-views were (are) political
threats, and so cultural aggrcsslou ls necessary whereby t'lw
European world-view is imposed on "different'' Jwoplf's. This thco-
r<'tical model will lw restated throu!,!houl this sttl(ly, !ls 111;,1!1thrnst
Is tlw l11~lslr1w1•m1 IIH' l11ll111i1k .111dcnusal n·l,t1ln11 IJl]l l111lw1•1·11(11/0
11iwv1/,(I), 1111tol1111v, r•ldo•,, rplstt•11111iogv(11/r11111111111 11) ,111d (,111111
c ,11/t111111rnllw'1.ivlo1 -111I lie• t•:111
O(-H'IIII ,-,qw1!1•1111•
Lovejoy says that Aristotle, in De Anima, suggests a hierarchi-

cal arrangement of all organisms, an idea that had a great influence
on subsequent philosophy as well as natural history. The hierarchy
was based on the "powers of the soul" possessed by an organism:
those of plants were nutritive, those of "man" were rational. Each
organism possessed the powers of those below it on the scale as well
as its own additional and definitive "power." 135 Ultimately this results
in a universe that constitutes a hierarchy with the most "natural" of
beings occupying the lower positions of rank and the most "spiri-
tual"-God and the angels-as the highest and "upper" beings. The
human is unique in that he is both nature, flesh, and spirit and there-
fore among (animate) beings he is the most "rational" and therefore
the "highest." The use of the term "spirit" is somewhat problemati-
cal. Niebuhr, Hegel, and Aristotle use it very differently from my use
of the term. Their use connotes intellect and the rational, as opposed
to nature. In my view spirit is nature and human as well as "superna-
ture." It is the metaphysical. It accounts for human moral sense, com-
mitment, value, and emotion: for human creativity and culture. It
constitutes the substratum out of which the intellect is born and by
which it is properly grounded.
Platonism, Christian theology, and the Chain of Being cosmology
all contain a conception of the human as not being at home in the nat-
ural world. They are not "at peace" with themselves because of the
"dualistic" nature-the coexistence in the person of two conflicting
essences; "the flesh and the spirit." Lovejoy says, of the concept of
the human being's place in nature generated by the "Chain" idea;
... torn by conflicting desires and propensities; as a member of two

orders of being at once, he wavers between both, and is not quite
at home in either. He thus has, afterall, a kind of uniqueness in
nature; but it is an unhappy uniqueness. He is, in a sense in which
no other link in the chain is, a strange hybrid monster; and if this
gives him a certain pathetic sublimity, it also results in incongruities
of feeling, inconsistencies of behavior, and disparities between his
aspirations and his powers which render him ridiculous. 136
And when the "spiritual" entities are removed from the picture-
11•,they usually are once the cosmology is constructed-what is left
I, ;1liltrnrchy with huma11beings at the top looking down over nature
(llll'ir own special ki11gclom). Lovejoy quotes from a textbook of
, hol,,..,tlr philosophy of tlw Mlclclk Ages: "As man is made for the
ti 1 11I<:IHI,na11wly,tl1,1tlit• 111,1y s<.·rv1•him, so is the world made for
1111'•1,1k1· 11f11,,111, ..,,.,v,•lllm.'" 17< >11e1•
ll1;1lII 111,1v "Hnd" i~ postulated
90 YURUGU
to give the impression of spiritual priority and the feeling of intellec-

tual satisfaction that comes to the European mind from an absolute
first principle, "he" is eliminated and, for all practical purposes, the
human being becomes this god. Page duBois says,
it must be remembered that not only barbaroi, foreigners were seen

by Plato to be deprived of reasoning ability. Women and slaves as
well as animals formed part of a "chain" which descended from the
Idea of the good, from god. The hierarchy which Plato fixed among
kinds endured for many centuries and still operates in Western dis-
course about difference ...
The clarification of ideas of superiority and inferiority in terms of

sexual, racial, and species difference is an important step in the
history of Western philosophy and of social relations of dominance
and submission for those who follow in the tradition. t 33
The European conception of nature, the cosmological conse-

quences of this conception, and the place that the human being has
in this cosmology are all significant ingredients of the European
mythoform. Herein are raised several critical ontological issues that
relate to European thought, behavior, and value (ideology).
Europeans assume a very special place for "themselves" in the uni-
verse and at the same time feel "uneasy" in that universe. If there is
anything "natural" in them it is opposed to and in conflict with what
is considered to be the most valuable part of them. This line of
thought (and it must be kept in mind that it is among the deepest,
most conscious-Le., reflective-as well as unconscious assumptions
of European belief, has several cultural implications. First, the
European ascribes to the abstraction "man" priority in the universe,
and throughout the history of European civilization there has been
the tendency to translate this idea concretely into that of the prior-
ity of European "man" in the universe of "men" (humans). As other
"nonrational" creatures exist to serve "man," so other, "less rational"
people exist to serve European "man" (and women, of course, must
serve them, since they are the least rational of the Europeans). This
theme in its more blatant forms is pejoratively referred to in con-
temporary parlance as "racist" thought, and characterized as an aber-
ration of "illogical" minds, in an effort to separate it from the best of
the European tradition. But, to th~ contrary, such tllo11gl1t is "nor-
mal," <;>venu11dNst:i11dablc•;ind q11ltt-"lo1,1ln1I,"If OlH' nrc~'pts the
Hiv1•11s ul 1111'l•:11rop.-a11 ulr1111,11011.,fl,'l'IH• :ui:1111111 111 wrntld j.(P -;0111t•
tl11t11{ltkt• tllh Tilt' l-:11111111•,rn,11m1" I••llh' 11111:II111lhu1,II urpt'.t1plt· II
11
is within him that the natural and the pathological are best controlled.
Other people are closer to beasts in the Chain. The European, there-
fore, serves the rational plan of his god by guiding and controlling
other people. American presidents always talk in terms of the
American mission abroad being that of bringing "freedom" to all peo-
ple. Anti-American revolutionaries are always equated with "bar-
barism," while America is seen as defending "civilization." These
terms and arguments are all based on the same mythoform.
We have seen that the European conception is that of human
beings at war with themselves and with their natural surroundings.
This feeling is both reflective and productive of the "will-to-power"
and the desire to control nature and other people and what is natural
( emotional) in themselves. They have no place in a harmonious rela-
tionship to their environment since their conceptions do not allow
them to experience the peace that such a relationship offers. Niebuhr
says that the "essential homelessness of the human spirit is the
ground of all religion." 139 What happens when that religion is inade-
quate? Unable to achieve peace and security from spirituality, the
European seeks fulfillment in the will-to-power, in "mastery over"
rather than "harmony with." Their effect on the world is one of dis-
rnrdance. Imperial ambitions and the structures they dictate are the
syrnptomatic expression of a lack of spiritual peace. A being who is
11ol at peace with itself, not at home in the universe, is compelled to
disrupt that which surrounds it-to refashion and control that uni-
verse. The European seeks peace in human-made, imposed order,
.u1d, of course, does not find it. And so the imperial pursuit contin-
11csinfinitely, as well as the pursuit of "progress." This as a malaise
ll11ds its origins even before its crystallization in Platonic culture,
wl1idi was perhaps a result of a latent "ice-age" utamaroho. While
Pli1lo11ic conceptions facilitated the institutionalization of the
l,111opean utamaroho and European supremacy in the world, there are
111l11•r "pre" and "non" platonic expressions of this same utamaroho
h I t IIPwarrior mythology and behavior of Northern Europe in its "pre"
( Iirlstlan experience. While the devaluation of nature may have been
lllll'llt•1·tualized by Plato, we find its "religious" expression in early
111 1 1>1<•wthought. (See Chap. 2.)
'l'Jw objectification of nature is what allows for its exploitation
1111 I r ,q 11•• In otl ier cultmes nature is experienced subjectively, as are
111I11•1 1111111,.inbeiIJgs. The European seeks the perfectly rational
111 d1•r 1111 order that hrlS no pl act~ for t·hc natural (as irrational) and
Ih,11 h t Iw 1·11ll10<1h1wnt ot ll1t•l111111a1111ightmurc. In majority cultures
tlw11· 11pp1•,11•, to lw .111lt1lltlllw i,.1rnspof tlw lrnpli
,11HI<;11pl11l1tkntt•1I
92 YURUGU
cations of the exploitation of nature and of the creation of an antag-

onistic relationship between human and nature. The contemporary
ecological discussion is pitifully na"ive when expressed in terms of
"detergents with low phosphates" and the recycling of paper. The real
implications for ecological sanity touch the deepest beliefs of the
European and the philosophical basis of their culture, as Theodore
Roszak points out in Where the Wasteland Ends. The question is
whether it is possible for them to alter their concept of nature and of
their relationship to it. Such a change would, of course, imply corre-
sponding changes in the total conceptual apparatus offered by the
European world-view and would therefore involve many other
aspects of European culture and ideology with which the concept of
nature interrelates. (See Chap. 2.) The asili of the culture would
change. The culture would cease to exist as it is now known. It would
be a different "set" with different members.
Willie Abraham, in The Mind of Africa, suggests that there are
two main views of human nature: They are the "essentialist" view
and the "scientific" view. These two views help to provide the philo-
sophical and ideological bases of two correspondingly different types
of culture. The "essentialist" view is that "there is a constant element
in man which is irreducible, and is the essence of being a man."
African civilization, Abraham believes, is "essentialist in inspira-
tion."140 In the "scientific" view, human nature can be altered; the
human can be resolved into elements; and it is possible to predict and
control human reaction. 'The scientific view depends on analysis,
disintegration and then control of selected variables." 141 In this view
it is possible to analyze human "material" into elements and then
rearrange them according to a desired dominant principle. What are
the implications of these distinctions for the "construction" of cul-
tural models? Abraham characterizes European culture as "rational-
istic" (scientific), and Akan culture (which he says is paradigmatic for
African civilization), as "metaphysical" (essentialist).
"Humanism" in European discourse is usually assumed to rep-
resent the highest and most politically disinterested or "universalis-
tic" approach to the human. In reality "humanism" has generally
implied the typically European deification of the rational and the
ascent of the human being to supremacy in the universe by virtue of
her/his rational faculties. It is the interculturnl implications of this line
of reasoning that become politically significant. /\brnhnrn says:
. thl' l",S('ll<'l' of h11m1111ls111('Olll!bl~ Ill tilt• 11•pl111l'IIIC'llf 111 nod

1111'I 11·,1l111 WltlHll,111 th1• I 11•111111 l'11l11111•,,, flit• •l~I• 11( 1•11ll~{lit
1·111111•111111t•,111t,,t111v.1ti1111
1111111'11·11,.1111 1111•1111•,1 1111tl1•1
lvl11M
rational humanism is a rational one. It was already involved in

Aristotle's account of man as a rational animal and the democratic
political theory which he based on this idea. The idea is that we can-
not think it accidental that we possess reason ... to humans, this is
a defining characteristic. This is what should be meant by calling
reason a capacity, or a faculty, or a disposition, rather than a
sequence of episodic acts.
The cult of rationalism is so deeply imbedded in European onto-

logical and epistemological conceptions that it leads even to a "ratio-
nalistic ethics":
Since the sensibilities were held to be subject to the reason ...

ethics and aesthetics were both accepted as being rationalistic.
The culmination of this was in Kant's rationalistic ethics, which
founded the validity of moral and aesthetic judgments on com-
mands of reason." 142
This, of course, is the working out of the Platonic imperative. It

is the development of a theme. Abraham observes that in European
culture, "art is identified with reality, supernature with nature itself,
(and) ideals with mere truths." The artist may not have been ban-
ished from the State, but in serving the State he/she came to accept
the Platonic conception of the "true." His creation began to reflect the
rational order. On the other hand, in the Akan theory of the human,"
spiritual factors are primary," which contrasts sharply with European
conceptions. For the Akan, says Abraham, the human being is "an
t>ncapsulated spirit, and not an animated body as the Genesis story
has it." 143 This conception of human nature extends beyond the three-
dimensional finite existence of the human being as conceived in
l•:urope, which is one of the reasons European anthropologists have
110 misunderstood the African concept of Ancestor Communion. The
/\frlcan ancestors are not gods, but spiritual extensions of human
l>clngs on earth, representing another stage of human development.
l•,1Ir I lavelock discusses the Platonic model:
Tl lC p<1rablesof the Sun, the Line and the Cave have been offered
11s paradigms which shall illumi11atethe relationship between ideal
lrnnwlcdge on the one hand a11dempirical experience on the other,
,11111shall suggest to us the ascent of man through education from
I lw IH<•of I he senses towards the reasoned intelligcnce. 144
TIii~ 11111ologk,1I111< 1
1npl11,r ls ~o p11w1·dtd lhal II llas slnmgly
IH'I( l'l)IIOll or llh OWll pl;I('(• Ill llw 11111
l1illllt'll( t•<I lilt• 1-:11mp1•,111's
94 YURUGU
verse. It has enabled him to speak of "high" and "low" cultures. In the
former, people are closer to the "light" of civilization, while those in
the latter wallow in the "darkness" of ignorance, aware only of what
they "feel." Havelock describes the view of humanness offered in the
Republic (compare it with Abraham's earlier description of the Akan
conception of the human being):
Here the conception of that autonomy is now elevated to a plane

where the soul attains its full self-realisation in the power to think
and to know. This is its supreme faculty; in the last resort its only
one. Man is a "thinking reed." 144
According to Havelock, this new definition of the human psyche

that Plato sought to encourage signified not "man's ghost or wraith,
or a man's breath or his life blood, a thing of sense and self con-
sciousness," but "the ghost that thinks," that is capable of "moral
decision" and of "scientific cognition" ... something unique in the
whole realm of nature. 145 It is not, after all, that the European con-
siders human beings to be unique and special that is surprising, for
each category of beings in the universe is unique and special; it is the
importance that he attaches to this uniqueness that is so character-
istically different. The epistemological mode that Havelock has
described, that which became characteristic of European culture,
presupposes a rationalistic concept of the human, whose proper
function is not to feel, but to overcome feeling with "thought."
Thought is only properly so called when isolated from feeling and
when based on "objectification"; that is, separation of the "self" from
the contemplated "object." Human nature is above all and most prop-
erly rational. This rational faculty gives humans power and indepen-
dence. In the Laws, Plato says of "man":
Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfish-
ness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and
will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and the better; and
so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him
and the whole city. 146
And Plato's definition of human "freedom" would be realized when

man is totally "rational"; that is, when "reason" rules "passion."
The height of arrogance is approach<'rl in the rationalistic con
ception of being ,mrl or the 1111111:rn.
The EuropPan rnncciws or lils god
111his 11w11 1111,11-<l'
,111111101 ll1P rt·Vl'nw. I.OVt.'IOY<:,tyh'
M11111 th.- ,•11•,1111111111

will< Ii 1:11tll11lly11••1111111
1 , ,u1 01111•1
I 111 111111
self. Man is God represented by God. God is man representing God

in self-consciousness. Man is God wholly manifested.
Europeans assume that their god created the universe accord-

ing to the logic of scientific rationalism, their own invention. "The
history we are to review is thus among other things, a part of the his-
tory of Western man's long effort to make the world he lives in appear
to his intellect a rational one." 147 The Christian formulation of the
l·'.uropean tradition is also, as we have pointed out, consistent with
this conception of the human being. Lovejoy says,
The recognition of the fact that man is a creature not in harmony

with himself was not, of course, due primarily to the influence of the
notion of the Chain of Being. Other elements of Platonism, and in
Christianity the radical Pauline opposition of "flesh" and "Spirit,"
had made this dualistic theory of human nature one of the ruling
conceptions in western thought. 148
Again what we see is a consistent conception of human nature

, 1•l11forcedin the various modalities of the culture, making possible
I I1l!most successful technico/scientific collasus in our experience.
l•tlt>drich Juenger says, "An advanced state of technology is accom-
11,111icd by mechanical theories of the nature of man." 149 It would seem
t h11t In subordinating existential humanity to the machine, the
I• Ht opean would end up with a low estimation of human worth. And
ul 1•ourse, paradoxically, there is in a real and tragic sense, a corre-
,p1111clingdevalorization of the human. But the European with politi-
• 111nst11teness and ideological consistency deals with this problem by
luw1•ring his estimation of other people, thereby rationalizing his
.11mressive and demeaning behavior towards them. At the same time
tit,· pnrt of him that might have been sensitive, and emotional, was
,d o drmcaned. Ontologically, the European sees himself as perfect
ll111111l-(h the perfection of the machine; he becomes the perfect
11111 11111 ~.The efficiently operating machine becomes an extension of
lit, 111(0, Its power to ''make" and "produce" is his power. Since all
I 1111wl1•1 lgc was linked to the object, eventually this would effect onto-
Ii ,,,1,,ti ch•nnillons as well: only the object existed. Plato's epistemol-
••1:y1,, also a11ontology. The "True" is that which exists-"Being."
t V•·• yt I ilng else Is "becoming" or later "non-being." Ironically this led
I, 11111 111"l<lcclllst" philosophy to a materialist view of reality, since the
1111lyllllJ1g I l1al l'Xl:;lc.•d wns I Ila! which could be objectified. Spirit
11nt1>1
, 111ild IH>I lw 1111,dP h1to 11illt•1·1,1·1111ld 1
1·011lrnlh'd so as lo ht·
I 11,1w11ft w11~11nl v11l111·dTlw11·foic· It did 111111·xl~1<>hj<•1·tlfkatlo11
96 YURUGU
led to materialization where matter, studied "scientifically" was all

that was left. Even human psychology and relationships would be
governed by mechanical and physiological causation (Freud).
Objectification leads to inorganic relationships.
The rationalistic conception of the human leads inevitably to the
machine and to the technological order. A materialistic conception
of the human is what rationalism becomes in the existential "acting-
out" of culture, for rationalism denies human spirituality. It is only
matter in isolation that ultimately has significance for the European
mind; it is only matter that can be made to appear perfectly rational.
So everything must be materialized. The European view of the human
is rationalistic/materialistic, and the European concept of being
involves the perfectly ordered universe-with meaning and value
being derived only from this rationalistic material base. Scientific
rationalism leads to technological rationalism; organization for effi-
ciency.
Lovejoy's concluding comments present one of the most theo-
retically devastating critiques of the main currents of European philo-
sophical thought. Of the "rationalist ontology" of Europe, he says:
In so far as the world was conceived in this fashion, it seemed a

coherent, luminous, intellectually secure and dependable world, in
which the mind of man could go about its business of seeking an
understanding of things in full confidence, and empirical science,
since it was acquainted in advance with the fundamental princi-
ples with which the facts must, in the end, accord, and was pro-
vided with a sort of diagram of the general pattern of the universe,
could know in outline what to expect, and even anticipate particu-
lar disclosures of actual observation. 150
His estimation of the Chain of Being idea and its implications:
the history of the idea of the Chain of Being-in so far as that idea
presupposed such a complete rational intelligibility of the world-
is the history of a failure .... The experiment, taken as a whole, con-
stitutes one of the most grandiose enterprises of the human
intellect. .. as the consequences of this most persistent and most com-
prehensive of hypotheses became more and more explieit, rhe more
apparent became its difficulties; and when they are fully drawn out,
they show tile hypothesis of the absolute rationality of the cosmos to
be unbelievable. . . . [ it'allcs add cell It rnnflicl :;, 111 t lir first place,
wll ll rnw lmm(•osc fact, lwsiclus nutny parl k, ,ta, f,wt s, h11111• n,11t1l'11l
ns w1• 1•x1w,lt•111'1'II I• 1(•111pornl.A
ordc•1 lh1• fn1·1 t hal 1•xli-;t(.•11c1•
w11ll!I nt 111111• lil~t111yli,111·ihnw,1
;1t1<Id1,111Ht' tills, 111l1·r1!-it,11111
is a world which can neither be deduced from nor reconciled with

the postulate that existence is the expression and consequence of
a system of "eternal" and "necessary" truths inherent in the very
logic of being. Since such a system could manifest itself only in a sta-
tic and constant world, and since empirical reality is not static and
constant, the "image" (as Plato called it] does not correspond with
the supposed "model" and cannot be explained by it. 151
Lovejoy sees that rationalism admits of "rational" contradic-

t ions, and that in the attempt to exclude all "arbitrariness," it
becomes "irrational." He says that the world of "concrete existence"
Is a "contingent" world and as such is the negation of "pure logic."
"Will," he says, "is prior to intellect." 152 But if such is the case, why
would Plato, Aristotle, and so many of their descendants spend so
111uchtime trying to prove the opposite, indeed, living as though the
opposite were true?
Clearly, European forms of thought have worked, and they have
worked well. The theorists had ideological commitments to a social
111dcr that would facilitate the rule of certain kinds of people. The uta-
1111twazo described in this chapter became a tool. The tool was so suc-
1 ,•i;sful in one kind of enterprise that its shortcomings in other areas
c 111ild easily be overlooked. Just as its definition of the human was one
t 11.,tencouraged the manipulation of human beings, but ignored "the
l111111an" at the same time. "The utility of a belief and its validity are
lu1kpcndent variables" 153 The ethnological study of European I
I l11111~ht demonstrates the power of its conceptions in the service of

t [11•t•xpansionistic, confrontational, domineering utamaroho, not their
l11111lor universal validity.
J\lt rnative Models

Hut this is, after all, merely a description of the European uta-
111,1111<1;;0, and Europe represents a fraction of the world's ideological
111d c11ltural creations. There are other possibilities. Vernon Dixon
, 111111,\sts the European-American and African "axiological world-
t, w•:" 111 the manner in Figure I (overleaf): 154
l'li1• African universe is personalized, not objectified. Time is
l1•1t<'(•d,
11••1 There is no infinitP abstract and oppressive future; it
11111w•,organically from the past and present. Value is placed on
•I,, l1111,"r't1t Iwr thi.ln "dolng." 155 The universe is understood through
1111, 11111111•11,ll i11lernC'tlu11,which produces powerful symbols and
11111111• ,, wltli'lt l11 lt11ll ('Ou1111uninil(· truths. "11iunllal IO!Jic"indicates
11111 l11/\ltk1111 tll1>111-{lil n 1!1111~ <',rn h(• hntl1 A ,lt'ltl uot A i'lt till' sa11w
111111•l'IH11111I1 lll1<011 dtH"l 1H1t ,ty •,o 1•xplll'llly, wlu,t ht•, ,,lb ''dlunl
98 YURUGU
Figure I: Euro-American World-view

Human Non-Human
Phenomenal World
Self Other men

Affect \ I Nature
Subject Invisible beings
Ego \ "Gap" r Concepts Object
Self-consciousness
I \ "It"
Africanized World-view
Human ----- Person (''Thou")
Human beings Concepts

Nature
Invisible beings
Self
Subject Affect
Ego
Phenomenal world
Self-consciousness
Other men
tal logic" can be understood as the recognition and affirmation of the

ambiguity and multidimensionality of phenomenal reality. What is
contradictory in Euro-American Aristotelian logic is not contradictory
in African thought. The European utamawazo cannot deal with para-
dox. ·
This is not the place to discuss in cleptll the world-views of
majority civilizations. It is appropriate, howrvcr, to 111akt'some ol>vi
ous observations about what African, Anlt'rlndlan, a11cl (kc;.111ic-
11i.l)11rlly lltuttl-(l11 syslt>lltS 11:IVl' In co111111rn1to 1111·1•xclw,lu11 of
l·.11111p1•,111tll111tl{hl, All ol tll, vl,:w!'-.111111fl11111•d1111·•1pl1lt1t,ll 11111,1l1111•,
111,11I, tlwy l1,1v1•.,pldltl.il 11,1•t''t 1111I tl11•11•liy11•!1•1
I t,llln11.ilh111 ,11111
objectification as valued epistemological modes. Obviously, they do

ltave rationalistic and pragmatic aspects but these do not dominate.
These views generate an authentic cosmology, the interrelatedness
of all being. They reject Aristotelian logic as the primary path to ulti-
111atetruth, while recognizing the symbolic and not the literal mode
;1s appropriate for the expression of meaning. Most clearly these peo-
1,les share a vision of a harmonious order achieved through balance,
,\s they seek to understand and maintain that order. We who have
l><'cneducated in European societies have grown up assuming that it
Is only with the triumph over such world-views that "true knowledge"
1,egins. Yet, what should strike us as students of culture is the fact
I It.it of all the world's civilizations the European utamawazo world-
vi('W is the strangest (the minority view); it is most conspicuous in
lls materialism and rationalism. Max Weber called this "universal-
lf>lll." By what logic does anomaly become the norm? Obviously with
I 111•introduction of ideology and value-judgement. Weber mistook
11v(•rwhelmingly successful cultural aggression for "universalism."
l'l11' European world-view is far superior to the others mentioned in
11,,1hilityto generate material accumulation, technological efficiency,
t111d imperial might. That does not make it universal.
Fortunately, these are not the goals of all of humankind, nor the
, I, 111111 ion of all cultural asilis and other views of reality have led many
I 11 1 unstruct different models, to envision the possibility of new and
, 1111,•r1•11t functional definitions. We have already seen that African-
' 1•1, I 1·rcd theory is moving towards new definitions of sciences.
156
In TIie Sacred Science, De Lubicz offers an interpretation of
11111ll•11t African philosophy. He calls it "Pharoanic Theology." It is a
,,11rPd science" because it is concerned with "revealed" knowledg~
,11,I wit Ii the "beginnings of things." It is founded on an irrational
11111 I, ,u1d therefore not a rational science. It rests on the assumption
111 H ", 011m1onenergetic origin to all bodies," an ultimate spiritual
, 1111, ,, ''which alone is able to animate matter," "an undefined cosmic
11• 1 " Dt' l.ubicz recognizes two irreconcilable mentalities based
r ,,, 1111 ,1•paration of two concepts; one that "points to a kinetic energy
l111111.1111•11t in matter," and the other that "calls upon an undefined
I II 11111l'lll'l'UY-"
\\'I ti I hi 1·m1 d rt>a::;oning, our science secs in the universe nothing but
, , h,i,,•d drn1it, an al,(!{l<>mcrate and a decomposition of the self
11111 111,ttll'r S11l'11 a vww ls cNlt1i11ly less reaso11able than admis-
I1111 ul 1111111<\l'(l11t•1\ •,011n·1• of !'IH'fl.tY wtill'11 beco111esmatter,
11ilt111(l'l1 lh•• l,1lt1•1°,11l11lln11IH1-;1•11,1 p1111•ly lllt'lapltysiral probl(•m.
JOO YURUGU
From there it is but a very small step to seeing a divine principle in

the harmony of the world. 156
The interpretations of both De Lubicz and Jaynes are antitheti-

cal: One understands the ancient Kemites to have had a heightened
consciousness; the other says that they had no consciousness. That
is because of the difference in perspectives. In De Lubicz's view, the
materialist mentality splits from the spiritualist beginning with
Xenophanes in the Eleatic school of philosophy, ca. 530 before the
Common Era. With the split comes the beginning of the separation
between science and religious thought and ritual. These are
dichotomized in European thought so that "rationalistic religion" in
Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. approaches the absurd, as great minds wres-
tled with the search for "scientific" and materialist proofs of the exis-
tence of the most spiritual of beings. Even now Christian thought
suffers from a doctrine that overlooks the contradiction inherent in
a "faith" based on secular historicity. European science ascended on
the demise of spiritual religion.
In the early schools of what was to be considered "Greek
Philosophy," the teachings of "Pharoanic Science" are evident, and
what continued to be developed as "science" was heavily influenced
by what had preceded in Kemet (ancient Egypt). What began to
change, however, was the approach and attitude of objectification.
The new forms had a different utamaroho (spirit life). The definition
of the utamawazo became critical. The Greeks, unable to grasp the
spiritual principle at the base of the "sacred science," simplistically
"anthropomorphized" the cosmic truths. Their religious response
resulted in the reduction of African philosophy, as expressed through
the symbols of the Neters, through the attribution of "physical char-
acter(s) to metaphysical principles." 157 According to De Lubicz, those
who rejected this adulterated version of ancient mysteries sought
truth through an extreme rationalism. Two tendencies developed in
archaic Europe: One group claimed a body of religious ritual whose
base they could not understand; the other group took the pragmatic
scientific aspects and developed them into a science without mean-
ing. This is the chronic European split between faith and reason,
which was to intensify throughout the centuries of European devel-
opment. Rational doctrine led to the denial of the divine, the sacred.
Yet rationality alone could never reflect cosmic truth and irnnfcally
c-0111,1not ~ive spiritual nM ulllrnr~te lntt•llt·ctutal ~a11~ra<"tlo11.Tl1ls
had l,1•1·111111!11<1:;tnnd
111K1•11wlnt1dht sllll 111Hll'l
•;tood 011tsldt1 of tlw
l1rnllll1111.A:, ill' IA,hlt/ Ul'f(lll",, 1111111• 111111,1
l•,11ropc•1111 ,1lw,1ys Ill' 111yi;
11, y l11v11lvl'cl, '',111 In ,1tlo11alltv nl tli1• 11111-(111
with It 111,llu", 1,1111111,II
philosophical construction impossible." 157 It is almost as though peo-

ple outside of the European tradition (the majority) make up a col-
lectivity who recognize and are comfortable with the tiny bit of
"mystery" at the beginning and at the end. This view originates with
human beginnings in Africa. Ayi Kwei Armah writes in Two Thousand
Seasons: "We have not found that lying trick to our taste, the trick of
1naking up sure knowledge of things possible to think of, things pos-
sible to wonder about but impossible to know in any such ultimate
way."158
There are several theorists whose work touches on the striking
difference between the European world-view and that of the major-
ity; several who do not presume this to be an indication of the supe-
1 lority of "Western civilization," that is, who do not approach the
1 oinparison eurocentrically. Often such theorists will contrast
l•'.:1sternphilosophies with those of Europe. Fritjof Capra, in The Tao
ul Physics, attempts to reconcile Western science and Eastern mysti-
1 Ism. In the process he characterizes these two views of reality, just
,1•, l>ixon has done with the African and Euro-American views. In
( ·,,pra's discussion, the Eastern view comes out on top: the Eastern
( ,111clearly Greek) view is organic. All things are perceived as being
1111•rrelated and different manifestations of the same ultimate reality.
l'IH·basic unity of the universe is the key to understanding phenom-
1•11,1,and one's aim becomes that of "transcending the notion of the
h11lalcd self, and to identify oneself with the ultimate reality." Spirit
o111tl matter are joined. Causal forces are intrinsic properties of mat-
t 1•1, 1!,'i One is struck again and again with the familiar sound of this
, li,1racterization. It is almost identical to our description of the
t\h knn world-view. How many of us have been compelled to ask, why
11,, , E11ropean world-view is the only one that differs so drastically
I, 111111hose of majority cultures. The European solves this problem by
l11v1•1 it Ing the concept of "modernity," based on progress.
Tltc following is Capra's characterization of "Western philoso-
1•ltv,"111contrast to the "unifying" philosophy of the Milesians the
111, fl•ttl lncllan and Chinese civilizations:
lfo• :,pli1of this unity bega11with the Eleatic school, which assumed
1 I llvhH' I'rlntiplc standing above all gods and men. This principle
wo1·,ltt :,I ldC'11\ifif'd with l lie unity of the universe, but was later seen
,,~ 1111l11l1•1llfle11t a nil p<.:rsonnlGod who stands above 1he world and
i1111•1 l•: II, 'l'llus IH'!{HII a l1<md of thought whkh led, 1il1imalcly,to
1111· ,,,•p,11,tll1111 nl -.pit It ,111cl
111all1•r1111d10 11tl11,1lli.1nwhh.:h became
11111 ill t,•t l•,lll' ol w,,r.11,111pltll11Nopl1y,11•11
102 YURUGU
Capra, like De Lubicz, places the origins of this tendency in the

Eleatic school. The tendency becomes a dominant theme and much
later hardens in the philosophy of Rene Descartes, who further
divides reality into "mind" and "matter." The results were the greater
fragmentation of the universe in which we perceive "a multitude of
separate objects and events." The mind having been separated from
the body is given the task of controlling it. The human being is split
into a "conscious will" that opposes our "involuntary instincts." The
European experiences a mechanized universe constructed to deal
with a world made up of mutually hostile parts. 161 This results as we
have seen, in their being alienated from nature, while "physics'' prior
to the eleatic school did not include a word for "matter" "since they
saw all forms of existence as manifestations of the 'physics,' endowed
with life and spirituality." Capra says that the "roots of physics, as of
all Western science, are to be found in the first period of Greek phi-
losophy in the sixth century B.C., in a culture where science, philos-
ophy and religion were not separated." 162 He is almost right. But his
error becomes glaring when viewed from an African-centered per-
spective. Capra must know that Thales et al. did not grow from "noth-
ing." As George James, and others have pointed out these "early"
Greeks learned their "science" philosophy and religion from the civ-
ilization of the "sacred science." In those times everyone travelled to
Egypt (Kemet) and studied there. Capra's omission of Africa in his
comparison of philosophies is blatant.
Vine Deloria, in God is Red, contrasts the Native American world-
view, which is "religious," with Western philosophy as expressed in
Christianity. In the world-view of the Native Americans, all living
things share a creator and creative process and, therefore, relate to
one another. 163 Their spiritual quest is to determine the proper rela-
tionship that people have with other living things. The universe man-
ifests life energies, "the whole life-flow of creation." The person is
dependent on everything in the universe for his/her existence. Rather
than the determination to subdue nature (European world-view), "the
awareness of the meaning of life comes from observing how the var-
ious living things appear to mesh and to provide a whole tapestry."w:i
We have seen that Europeans have problems with difference (Page du
Bois). The Western "fragmented view is further extended to sociely,
which is split into different nations, races, religions, a11d political
~roups." This results In ,onflicts that are ,111essPntlal caus1• of pre-
svnl "snc-lnl, L'Colo~i<'aland c·11ll unit nls1•s" 11" (('ap1 ,l). This 11s
oppos"d l11tlt1 N,1llv1•A111Nk,111,lp\>tllilt l1 tl,at .,,w•,
1 th,11 "111dlllt·r
,·1111 1, 1111•11•
h 11t,·~tl<'ll~!th 1JItlw ('1,•;lll1111.11ul11,.,1llil· ·,ll<'llj-1111l'l 11
tleliberate desire of the Creator." 164 Both these and a host of other
writers have talked about the European's "alienation from nature" as
opposed to the idea of the "identity and Unity of life" in which sym-
bolism expresses reality. 165
This cursory glance at different thought-systems is necessary,
not only to demonstrate the possibility and existence of alternative
world-views, but also to bring attention to the chauvinism in
l·'.uropean interpretations of these world-views. We have seen repeat-
c•cllythat European epistemological and ontological definitions are
placed, by European theorists, in the context of "advanced" intellec-
111al and cognitive development, as compared with what they call
'".11,cient,""primitive," or "prescientific" thought. What this interpre-
t ,\t ion does is to preclude the viability of alternative definitions of real-
11,v, in so far as these same theorists represent a successfully
,,i.mn·ssive culture that has the means to impose its interpretations
1111 ntliers. Let me bring home the point emphatically that this impo-
. Ul1111 was made by equating "European" with "modern" or "scientific"
1111Iall other cultures with "pre-European" or "primitive." According
1,,I h·nri and H.A. Frankfort:
I IH' ancients, like the modern savages, saw man always as part of
11<"it>ly,
and society as imbedded in nature and dependent upon
, 11:anic forces. For them nature and man did not stand in opposi-
11,1nand did not, therefore, have to be apprehended by different
IIHHl~·s of cognition ... natural phenomenon were regularly con-
' 1•1v,,()in terms of human experience and [that] human experience
w11<, conceived in terms of cosmic events ... the fundamental dif-
1,,,1•11,·,,between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as
els the surrounding world is this: for modern, scientific man
1,•1-1111
1lw I ti ll'nomenal world is primarily an "It"; for ancient-and also for
111111111 lv<>-man it is a "Thou." 166
'l'I 11• Frnnkforts have camouflaged their cultural nationalism in

1111IVt•1•11illslk tenns. (No wonder there is no "modern god" for the
I 11111p1·,111.) hi this study, we have made European culture the focus,
1111I1111rt>lu,c> interpretations such as these become ethnographic
I ,t , lo llf' c•xplaincd in tE>rmsof the European asili. They enable us
1,, 111d1, ,ta11d tit(• nature of the European utamawazo and utamaroho.
1111q11P•,ll1111111,con"•sthat of why there is a need for Europeans to
11\\ tl11•111·,c·IVt's111ri s11pl'rlor t·vol11tionary position vi.Hi-visother cul-
1111,I , lw•, We will ,·1111tl11111· to rHld!C'SS tllls q1ll'slion n11cl ntl10rs in
111 t 11,11111•1 • th.ii l11l111w
104 YURUGU
The Character of the European Utamawazo

We should not leave this discussion with the impression that
Platonic thought ushered in vast and immediate changes in the nature
of European culture. To begin with there was, in a sense, no "Europe"
in his time. But in another sense, what we have identified as the
European asili, the seed of the culture, had already been planted.
The planting of this seed had to have taken place in the early days of
Inda-European tribal development, where there was already a very
definite utamaroho, or even earlier with the first homosapiens to
inhabit the Eurasian Steppes and the Caucasus region for a long
enough period to have become "non-African."
This means that Plato's work was all the more important in the
definitional process of the utamawazo, because it had been prefigured
in the germ of the culture, necessary if the asili was to be realized. It
means as well, that as the culture, through its members, fought to
assume a particular definition, it was developing according to a code
already in existence, somewhat in the sense that we think of a par-
ticular combination of genes as determining a particular human form.
The seed struggles to develop. The germ insists on fulfilling its for-
mulative role. European history is a history of bloody internecine
wars and battles fought to maintain a particular character and to
eliminate opposing influences: "heretics," "infidels," "barbarians." It
is a history of aggressive behavior towards other cultures. All differ-
ence threatens the realization of the as iii. It is like a child's struggle
to be born. The battle is fought because the asili exists, and Platonic
thought is so significant (determinative) because it suited the asili.
His epistemological theory helped in the formulation of an utamawazo
that complemented the asili.
With Plato, epistemology became ideological. What is more, con-
trary to what some have claimed, Platonic conceptions did not make
knowledge accessible to the masses through its desacralization. 167
What he did was to ensure that, at least until the "Gutenberg Galaxy,"
the few would have no threat from the many, because the many did
not have access to the intellectual life of the State. This was due to
the ascendancy of the literate mode coupled with the lack of printing
and mass-production technology, as well as the fact that only the
privileged few were trained to be "literate" in this sense. Plato's µIan
was foolproof; because even when the European masses gainNI
access centuries later, the mechanisms of control were so t lgllt ly
structured that t·hc ass11rnptions llwy had to nsslntllnt, lt 1 111dt•r Io l)p
1
considered "c,d11e;it1•~l"KllaJHl'll.'l'cl lllill I H'Ywo11ld tl11t1lttilt' w11y1111
ltnd pl,111111•1I.
II w.i:, ,1, tli11t1Kl1ltl11li,ttHI11111'1H•d
1 ut
tl11ntt1!l11•1•11tlt1lt"1
cultural existence, as the European cognitive style (utamawazo)

became an extension of Platonism. Not only all European intellectu-
als but all intellectuals would be trained in the academy (Plato's
legacy), a testament to the success of European cultural imperialism.
The Academy has preserved a cultural tradition, a race of people, and
a dominant society. No matter the internecine controversies and so-
called political revolutions that might occur, the Academy ensures
that the ideological infrastructure will remain intact.
The emergent theme is power. What begins to develop from this
initial discussion is a portrait of the European utamawazo as respond-
ing to an asili that is power-seeking. A particular definition of power
presents itself in the search for European predilection, temperament,
and need. Power is here defined, not as the "power to do," which
results from the giving and receiving of energy from forces in the uni-
verse and through interaction with these forces as they manifest
themselves in the various modalities of natural being; it is instead
defined as "power over" and is predicated on or rather originates in
separation. This is the fanatical European objective. "Power to do"
1-eeks balance and harmony. "Power over" functions only through
I Ile modality of control. It precludes cosmic, communal, or sympa-
1hetic relationship. It is essentially political and materialistic.
The asili-seed of the culture prefigures, then dictates, the devel-
opment of structures, institutions, "arrangements," 168 that facilitate
I he achievement of power-over-other. The forms that are created
wllhln the European cultural experience can then be understood as
1uechanisms of control in the pursuit of power. That is what they all
I ,ave in common. That is the key to their cultural explanation. The ide-
ological base of the culture is the will-to-power.
The utamawazo or culturally structured thought reorders the
1111iverse into relationships that "prepare" it for the illusion of control.
Sr•µaration must come first. The asili forces its own self-realization
111rough the cognitive structure of the utarnawazo in the following
ma1111er:
Dichotomization. All realities are split into two parts. This begins
wit II the separation of self from "other," and is followed by the sepa-
1 ut 1011 of the self into various dichotomies (reason/emotion,
111l11rl/body,lnlellect/nature). The process continues until the uni-
v1·1:w Is eomposed of disparate entities.
n,,,,11.~itional, Confro11tational, Antagonistic Relationships. The self
")mows lt:wlf" I H--'C'lllt:•w ii ls placQcl in opposition to "other," which
h11lud •:, tlH' IHlllll,tl /\lld :1llttcllvc !)Ml of tlw st'lf. This "self-aware~
111 • "I•, lltt• 01l1-tl11111 l•:11111pt'illl 1·011!-H'h111:,1w:,t1,''()1111 1 1" thnl whirh
106 YURUGU
is perceived to be different from the self-is threatening, therefore

establishing an antagonistic relationship between all entities that are
"different." This presents a principle of confrontational relationships
in all realities. Indeed, cognition itself is made possible through con-
frontation.
Hierarchical Segmentation. The original splitting and separating
mental process assigns qualitatively different (unequal) value to the
opposing realities of the dichotomies and a stratification of value to
all realities within a given set or category. This process of valuation
and devaluation is accompanied by that of segmentation and com-
partmentalization of independently derived entities. The effect is to
eliminate the possibility of organic or sympathetic relationship,
thereby establishing grounds for the dominance of the "superior"
form or phenomenon over that which is perceived to be inferior: the
power-relationship. Abstracted from the larger whole, these oppos-
ing realities can never be perceived as either complementary or inter-
dependent.
Analytical, Nonsynthetic Thought. The tendency to split and seg-
ment makes the European comfortable with the analytical modality
in which realities are torn apart in order to be "known." This is an
essential process within all cognitive systems on one level of under-
standing. But since organic interrelationship discourages the hierar-
chical thought patterns necessary for confrontation, control, and
power, it becomes impossible, within the parameters of the European
utamawazo, to comprehend the whole, especially a-sa cosmic reality.
Culturally this tendency inhibits the movement to a higher, more syn-
thesizing level of understanding. It is on the level of synthesis that
opposition would be resolved, and given the fundamental premises
of this cognitive system, there would no longer be any basis for knowl-
edge: power-over-other.
Objectification. With these characteristics of the utamawazo an
autonomous self has been created. This autonomous self is gradually
identified with "pure thought." The conceptualization of "pure thought"
is made possible by a cognitive emphasis on absolutism and abstracti-
fication. The self as emotionless mind creates the proper "objects" of
knowledge through the act of controlling that which is inferior to it in
a phenomenal sense. In this sense, everything that is "other" than the
thinking self is objectified and is therefore capable of being controllNI
by that self; as long as the knowing self is careful to remain nffcctlvcly
detached. Therefore, through I ht>,node of objectilkntlun, kuuwlt·df~t·
l11•cnme5a 111<•(·hanls111 tlwl fiH'ilitr1tes pnwt•1 ov1•1ntll••r
Absolutist-Abstractification. This also mandates the universaliza-

tion as well as the reification of truths. This universalization is not to
be confused with the inductive search for authentic principles of a
cosmic reality; that is discouraged by the limited analytical and seg-
menting mentality. It is instead, a universalism dictated by the need
to use epistemology as a power tool and as a mechanism of control.
Rationalism and Scientism. Extreme rationalism is not reason-
ableness; quite the opposite. It is the attempt to explain all of reality
as though it had been created by the European mind for the purposes
of control. It is the belief that everything can be known through objec-
tification and that the resulting presentation of reality is an accurate
picture of the world. If all of reality can be explained in this way, then
we as thinking beings have control over everything. Intense ratio-
nalism is the ultimate experience of control for the European mind.
Ideologically, it justifies the control of the European self over others.
Scientism is the merger of religion and rationality. Here the
European god becomes the great scientist and the rationalist pursuit
ls the criterion of moral behavior. The need to experience control cre-
at cs a scientistic utamawazo in which predictability and rationality
ltclp to defend the knowing self against any possible threat from the
11nknown.Intuitive knowledge is devalued and mistrusted since it is
only possible through cosmic self-awareness; it does not guarantee
1·11ntrol,it does not help to create the illusion of power-over-other.
'l'hc intuitve modality is not uncomfortable with mystery.
Authoritative literate Mode. The written symbol becomes author-
ltat Ive utterance, enabling the European mind to further obje"ctify
t1·11lityas it universalizes European control. Reductionist symbols set
111,, nonsymbolic lineal modality help to further alienate the knowing
wlf from its authentically affective environment. More control, more
p11wcr. Conceptual lineality further secularizes the axiological
,1•1pl'cts of the culture thereby linking it as well to the process of
11IIJ1•ctlficat ion.
I >esacralization. This is a necessary by-product of all of the char-
,11 lt•t lstics of the European utamawazo, as nature is alienated and
11hJ1•c1ifiect anct approached with a quantifying mentality, that views
llw 1mlvc.>rseas material reality only, to be acted upon by superior
"111l11cl."
'l'lle drnrnctcristics outlined all issue from and result in the illu-
ln11 ul II dl•splrll 11alizNIuniverse. European power is the negation of
pit It, lust 1,s F.uropc•:111,ontrol is threatened by the recognition of
pfrll 1\11of tlws,• <'hnnwtl'risti<'s wt·wn 1111derstoo<lideologically,
111,t h, 111 11•1111:. 11,\IIIIP 11! tlw E11rnp1•;111 "stfi, yield the· possi-
of 1111•
108 YURUGU
bility of power and create the illusion of control. The pursuit of power
is the nature of the European asili. The utamawazo is one manifesta-
tion of the asili. It is created to assist in the realization of the asili.
What remains to be demonstrated is the way in which these charac-
teristics encourage the development of a technical order and impe-
rialistic behavior towards other cultures. We must explain how the
utamawazo couples with the utamaroho (energy force) to support
the ideological thrust (asill) of the culture: the quest for dominance.
The asili makes each aspect of the utamawazo political in its use
(application), every action motivated by the utamaroho, both defen-
sive and aggressive: the assumption of a confrontational reality.
We have identified the asili-logos and source of the culture; it is
a seed that once planted dictates the logic of cultural development.
In the chapters to come we will use this concept to explicate the rela-
tionship between the dominant modes of the culture, following the
path along which the logos of the asili leads.
I am the way, the truth, and the light. No one comes
to my Father but through me.
- John 14:6
There was a third white destroyer: a missionary who wanted

to replace all knowledge of our way with fables even our chil-
dren laughed at then. We told the white missionary we had
such fables too, but kept them for the entertainment of those
yet growing up - fables of gods and devils and a supreme being
above everything. We told him we knew soft minds needed
such illusions, but that when any mind grew among us to adult-
hood it grew beyond these fables and came to understand that
there is indeed a great force in the world, a force spiritual and
able to shape the physical universe, but that that force is not
something cut off, not something separate from ourselves. It is
an energy in us, strongest in our working, breathing, thinking
together as one people; weakest when we are scattered, con-
fused, broken into individual, unconnected fragments.
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 2
Religion and Ideology

A Point of Departure
Religion is integrally related to the development of ideology in
t lse West. For that reason and because of the unique nature of
European culture, it is critical to make clear what I mean by "reli-
gion." This is important because what is identified formally in the
European experience as religion often has very little to do with what
h understood generally as "the religious" in a phenomenological
,,,.l\S<'. 1 This discussion focuses on the European experience of reli-
~lnu ns a forrnniized institution existing in relation to the other insti-
l 11llo11s of E11ropN111culture, as opposed lo "religion" as the
1 · ptt:s:;1011 of lwlic.•f!. about tlw s111wr11al11rul world and as the basis
1111 Ptlllc·al lwl111vlw, 111 a~., dPtt•111d11a11I of v11l1w
It I•,c I ttlt 11111~ w,•11lo dhli11~11hh he IWf't•11"11•llulnu" ;rnd "•,pl1I
110 YURUGU
tuality." Spirituality rests on the conception of a sacred cosmos that

transcends physical reality in terms of significance and meaning. At
the same time spirituality enables us to apprehend the sacred in our
natural, ordinary surroundings: They become elements of a symbolic
language. Religion refers to the formalization of ritual, dogma, and
belief, leading to a systematic statement of syntactically suprara-
tional tenets that may or may not issue from a spiritual conception
of the universe. Most often it functions to sacralize a nationalistic
ideology.
If one looks for a sense of the supernatural, the sacred, or extra-
ordinary in European culture, undoubtedly the only area of experi-
ence that approaches the "religious" in this sense is that of "science."
It is only what is considered to be science and scientific method that
is regarded with the awe and humility that in other cultures repre-
sents the "religious attitude." Scientism, as such, is not the focus of
this immediate discussion, but rather the institutionalized set of ideas
and practices that Europeans refer to as "religion." Scientism will
enter the discussion only as it functions normatively to provide the
models or paradigms of European theology.
The other sense of "religion," i.e., beliefs concerning the nature
of the human and the universe, have been discussed in Chap. 1 as
metaphysical conceptions. The authentically normative European
ethic is treated in a later section of this work. Such beliefs are ncit eas-
ily recognizable if one makes the mistake of looking for them only in
what is labeled "religion" in an avowedly secular society. The two
uses of the term will overlap occasionally, as has already become
apparent in the previous chapter, and will do so more in the follow-
ing discussion as we observe the way in which the themes of
European epistemological and ontological premises find expression
in the formalized religious statement of European culture.
To say that a culture is "secularly" based in European social the-
ory is primarily to associate it with what in the terms of European ide-
ology is the phenomenon of modernity. But an ethnological
understanding of European culture using the concept of asili leads to
a conclusion that is more far reaching than that understanding of
"secular" would imply. We are not simply discussing the separation
of Church and State. The relationship of European religi-on to ot l1'er
aspects of the culture is symptomatic of a persistenl clespirilualiza-
tion and desacralization of experience and can be shown to be a char•
a,teristic· of "Wf'stn,wss" since lli; nrchaic ~tages. Till' Et1ni1wn11
rrrrm,"'o".:u, 11r11nl(rrolto,a11dEumpP;111ld,,0l0Hy d1•l<'l'l11h1t•
till' 11.it11n•
nl 1111•ft1111i.dl11•<1rt'llglt,us •,111t1·11l.l'ttl1111111'Wnl 1.illll't tlt,111 tlw
Religion and Ideology 1JI
reverse. That is what it means for a culture to have a "nonreligious"

base. It means that the formal religious statement merely reflects fun-
damental metaphysical concepts and ideology. It is not their source.
It is not identical with them as is the case in traditional and classical
African and Islamic cultures. This secularization of European culture
begins with the institutionalization of European religion. It begins
with the Church.
This discussion begins, therefore, with the Platonic influences
on the development of European institutionalized religion, its Judaic
origins, and its solidification in the ideology and organization of the
early Christian Church. Later we will discuss the ideological signifi-
cance of European paganism. Throughout this treatment, however,
our focus is on European institutionalized religion as a manifestation
of the European utamaroho, utamawazo and ideological commitment.
The concept of asili particularizes this "religious" statement, and
exposes its legitimization of European behavior.
The Platonic Influence

For the most part, whatever dramatic imagery and spiritual pro-
lundity are traditionally associated with what is called "Christianity,"
originate in chronologically "older" cultures,2 cultures that existed as
est·ablished traditions centuries before the crystallization of archaic
l·:urope or the establishment of Christianity. We are discussing here
what Europeans isolated as valued characteristics of a proper reli-
l(lous statement. I will take the liberty of using the term Christianity
I 1) refer specifically to its European manifestations; that is, to the
"European" uses and responses to the religious ideas presented by
Pnrlier cultural-ideological traditions. For, having changed the
1•111phasesand offering different interpretations, Europeans can
Indeed be credited with the creation of a formulation that uniquely
11•spo11dedto the needs of their cultural selves. In this sense, which
l'tllphasizes the ideological uses of religion (the asili approach),
F,11ropeanChristianity was a "new" phenomenon.
Tl1e dialogues the Euthyphro, the Apology, and the Republic are
,di lo some extent concerned with the problem of the moral justifi-
1·,111011 of Rn individual's choice of action (Euthyphro, Apology) and of
t lw St nk (Republic). In the F:uthyphro, Socrates succeeds in convinc-
h1JtEutl1yphro of the logical inconsistency of his appeal to "that which
I Ill' gods love" ns the crltcrlon or definition of "the pious act."
t\,•cmrllng to ~orrntf's, E11thyphro':; problem is tlwt his gods are
111,111y, 11111m•<ll1 l,1l>h llllll, lll<t' 1tH11,(:illlhll'. So111t•th11esthey do nol
1
,
1
,,,,.,. , • wl I Ii rn111.11101I 11'1., •• to wl 1,11"pli·ll"ic ·s I I w111:• A, 11I :-11111

c· 1I 11•y,1rt•
ll2 YURUGU
"many," what pleases one may not please another. Socrates demon-
strates to Euthyphro that in looking for a proper "first principle" it is
necessary to go beyond the gods to something prior to them as a ref-
erence point. "The gods love what they love because it is holy," and
not the reverse. This priority is, of course, a logical one.
In the Apology, Socrates accounts for his actions by saying that
they were divinely inspired: He was made to act as he does; he was
compelled to "ask questions," an activity that apparently is threat-
ening to the authority of the State. Socrates becomes the nemesis of
the State as he demonstrates to the young Athenians that the politi-
cians are the least wise of its participants. The point that we are con-
cerned with is the way in which Socrates defends his actions. By
identifying his behavior as having been made "necessary" by the
order of the gods, he is, in fact, saying that he cannot help being
Socrates, that he cannot help being as he is. Socrates is being charged
with "impiety," and it is therefore necessary that he brings the gods
to his defense; but more than that, he does so because of the nature
of that which he is defending. 3 Socrates is, after all, defending an entire
"way of life"; not merely one specific or concrete action which, in
Platonic terms, is Euthyphro's mistake. To do this he must appeal to
something that is outside of, greater than, independent of, that life;
something to which it can be referred. The moral principle of justifi-
cation for "all actions" cannot be in terms of anything "human," for
that would be inconsistent, ambiguous, and imperfect, as Euthyphro
was made to see. Socrates' appeal can only be made to the divine; that
which is beyond space and time, that which "created" him.
Now the duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon
me by god; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in
every way in which the will of the divine power was never intimated
to anyone. [Plato, Apology, 33]
God orders me to fulfillthe philosopher's mission of searching into

myself and other men. [Plato, Apology, 28]
It is not that Socrates has suddenly become a priest. It sounds as

though he is describing "the religious" in experience; the creation of
meaning through transcendence beyond the ordinary, beyond the
profane. But, if this were the case, clearly it would not represent a
"new" human activity, nor a new conception of relii:tlo1t. Euthyphrn
has bc1·n in the habit of dotn1-1 prl!ciS\·ly that In th~ l'lntnnk view, the•
11;1lort· uf t I 11~"f.j(1d" or 11prl11dnl1•" I lint Snnnlt':, :11•1·ks
Is 0111•,<11·1,slun
111lilt- 1111111,111II I•. i101 "l(tl',111•1 lll,,n" 11111"n11t•,ld1•"tile• 111dl11,11y
Religion and Ideology 113
Rather it is a logical necessity of human reason, that is, reason as

Plato defines it. Socrates is talking about an absolute, unchanging ref-
erence point: the grounding of reason.
Both Euthyphro and Socrates appeal to the gods for the justifi-
cation of their actions that are being challenged. But Socrates makes
it clear that the logic of Euthyphro's argument is defective. Euthyphro
does not make effective polemical use of the authority of the gods,
while Socrates, in his own defense, uses the divine to construct a log-
ically rigorous argument for the moral validity of his actions. This
brings us directly to a critical component of European religion. It is
the "syntax of the mathematical proposition," in Havelock's words,
that becomes the model for the moral precept and idea. In this way
the European "monotheistic ideal" comes into being, and its religious
statement becomes rationalistic. The arguments of the Euthyphro and
the Apology make the assumption that there is but one system of
logic, one mode, and this comes to appear "logical" within the epis-
temological confines of European culture. Plato identifies the "good"
with the "true," and for him this means that the morally true has as
its methodological model the mathematically true. That is why it is
important that the Guardians be trained first in "the art of number":
The knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal,

and not of aught perishing and transient ... then geometry will
draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy,
and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.
And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?
Yes.
And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?
Yes, in a very remarkable manner.
Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, hav-
lni,: a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war
must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his
troops, and 1he philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the
llcn.of <'l1nngeand lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be
w1 arlll11n~llc:lan.'1
'l'lu• l<1•1111/Jllr·
l'I 1111"ldi·ul" slrllt· lw<·1111st·it Is ht•st a11cl lllC'rdon·
wh,1111-.t.11••-,1i,,11ldlw, 1>111 Ith ,1l:10"ldt•ill" In till' -:1•11,;,,tl1at II d11l's
114 YURUGU
not and cannot concretely exist. The ideal state is itself a "Form" to
be participated in, approximated, imitated, but never consonant with
the becoming, that is, the experienced. The Republic is not in any way
limited by the particular circumstances of human experience. Just as
in the European conception, the philosophic and ethical "progres-
siveness" of the Christ image lies in its presentation of a model of
moral perfection, to be imitated but never reached. So the Republic
represents the perfect order towards which the European state must
continually "advance." As "idea," as "normative model," it is not sim-
ply modeled after the "good," it is the embodiment of the "good." The
problems in the Euthyphro, the Apology, and the Crito are created by
the discrepancy in the world of becoming between the "moral" and
the "natural." This problem is eliminated in the Republic; the State
becomes totally moral because it is totally rational. Virtue is identi-
fied with "objectification"; spirit is reduced to matter and the ability
to manipulate it.
This mode of thought that has worked so well to produce the
kind of technical and social order that Europeans desire has also cre-
ated a moral and spiritual disaster. The formal religious statement
has taken on the form of the rational state and has left Europeans no
access to the necessarily spiritual reservoirs of human morality. This
tendency has intensified over the centuries; until now, when the West
is faced with tremendous self-doubt.
But the point to be made here is that the epistemological model
in which the Platonic abstraction was born (the normative
"absolute") underlies theAexpression of the "monotheistic ideal," the
"rational religion" syndrome, and written codification as values in
the formalized Judeo-Christian religious statement.
Stanley Diamond succ1nctly states the reason for the "monothe-
istic ideal" as well as the reason for its failure as a religious vehicle
in one sentence. "Absolutely pure monotheism exists in the realm of
mathematics, not religion!" Precisely! And that is why it became the
European ideal, since ("logically") pure monotheism can be under-
stood as an attempt to express the Platonic abstraction as the nec-
essary justification of all moral propositions. When European
theologians took up from where Plato left off, they should have real-
ized that they would be forever plagued with the dllemma uf recon-
ciling what should have remained two distinct philosophic-al-
episternological modes; Plato had mistakenly iclc•11titicctllwm as 011e.
l)i,1mn11dsnys lh.i: lltis tc•111IPncytoward Ill<• inl1•~i;11lonof JIIPIJ
11111111d t•11111l1rnutl Ilk ;ind till' d1·Vl'lup11w11Iof tlw "c·xnltc•cl,111clpnsi
llv•• 1•llll1·,1lld!',1°' 1l11rlliu; '.'p101(n 1,•.:• In 1111•1•:1110111•,111111l11d
01111l1a·1
Religion and Ideology Jl5
become one of the shibboleths of European culture. But this is a slip-

pery point, if one is unfamiliar with the mode of ancient philosophy.
For the Kemites (ancient "Egyptians"), other Africans, and many con-
temporary "non-European" peoples, there is an authentic integration
of science, philosophy, and religion. The difference between these
two kinds of "integration" is that one reduces spiritual reality to mat-
ter, while the other understands spiritual reality as the fundamental
integrative principle of all being. The European view results in the
desacralization of the universe and, by extension, the despiritualiza-
tion of morality.
Monotheism for the European becomes a characteristic of supe-
rior philosophical belief. It is not important here that other cultures
exhibit religious concepts that philosophically imply the spiritual pri-
ority of a single creative principle and that the idea of monotheism,
of course, came to the West from other experiments with it. Even in
European culture, where it is discussed so much, the "high god" con-
cept is not experienced as an "unknown featureless quantity" that
never changes: Several gods are called by one name, and they are per-
sonalized. But what is significant in this discussion is that absolute
and "pure" monotheism is expressed as an ideal or value in Western
European cultural chauvinistic expression, and that it serves as a
basis for the devaluation of other cultures. In addition the expression
of this ideal is, in part, a legacy of the Platonic abstraction.
Havelock's observation on the developmental relationship
between the written media or "literate" mode and "objectification" as
n dominant or preferred epistemological mode can be used to under-
stand the uniqueness of the European, Judea-Christian religious tra-
dition. Religion, to be superior and worthy of the "civilized," had to
he "knowledge" and have the nature of the eternal truth of logic. Its
written codification helped to give it this character and so became to
l·~11ropean'sevidence of "true religion." (A student in my African civ-
1111.ation course vehemently protested that Christian belief was supe-
rior because it was "documented.") Where else but in the European
111inclwould it seem so compelling that the "self" be separated from
t I1e ''religious object" in order to achieve a proper religious state-
111c•11t.It could instead be argued from a different perspective that it
h the very point at which the "individual" self and the experience of
Ihv "other" defy distinction that a sense of the religious is born. But
lot E11ro1wans,even this t·xpcriPnce has to be understood rationally,
wliiPl1 1lll1111,11t•lynihs tl1t•111
of tlw ability to recognize it. George
',t,·1111•1-.,1y:;,
JJ6 YURUGU
The classic and the Christian sense of the word strive to order real-
ity within the governance of language. Literature, philosophy, law,
the arts of history, are endeavors to enclose within the bounds of
rational discourse the sum of human experience, its recorded past,
its present condition and future expectations. The code of Justinian,
the Summa [theologica] of Aquinas, the world chronicles and com-
pendia of medieval literature, the Divina Commedia, are attempts
at total containment. They bear solemn witness to the belief that all
truth and realness-with the exception of a small, queer margin at
the very top-can be housed inside the walls of language. 5
The European formalized religious statement was made to fit

the conceptual mode that had become aesthetically pleasing to the
European mind because of the Platonic influence, the diligence of
Aristotle, and the nature of the Utamawazo. Arthur Lovejoy has this
to say regarding Plato's relationship to the subsequent religious for-
mulations:
The interpreters of Plato in both ancient and modern times have

endlessly disputed over the question whether this conception of
the absolute Good was for him identical with the conception of
God. Stated thus simply, the question is meaningless, since the
word "God" is in the last degree ambiguous. But if it be taken as
standing for what the Schoolmen called ens perfectissimum, the
summit of the hierarchy of being, the ultimate and only completely
satisfying object of contemplation and adoration, there can be lit-
tle doubt that the Idea of the Good was the God of Plato; and there
can be none that it became the God of Aristotle, and one of the ele-
ments or "aspects" of the God of most philosophic theologies of the
Middle Ages, and of nearly all the modern Platonizing poets and
philosophers. 6
Plato's influence wc:fsmost heavily felt in the early formulative

work of Augustine, and Aristotle's influence was directly manifested
in Aquinas and the Scholastics in their conceptions of the "self-mov-
ing Mover" and of "Final Cause," but most importantly in their labo-
rious attempts to "prove" the existence of their god. These efforts
become pathetic when it is und~rstood that the need for "proof" itself
is symptomatic of the human failing of the culture. Aristotle, in this
way, becomes himself the "prime mover" of the "religion and rat lo-
nality syndrome" that continues to plague European theology.
The Judaic Heritage

In Judaism we find the first conscious formalized and institu-
tionalized statement of certain critical characteristics of European
culture, tendencies, and values that intensified as the culture became
an ever increasingly identifiable ethno--historical entity. This does not
include the Qabbala, which is non-European in both a spiritual and a
racial-cultural sense. In fact, a caveat to this discussion would be to
raise the question of to what extent our knowledge of Judaism is
determined by the tradition of the Khazars, who were converted Jews,
and their descendants the Askenazim and contemporary European
Jews. (See Arthur Koestler, The Thirteenth Tribe, 1976.)
Judaism is much more than a "religion" as that term came to be
used in the European experience. It is a political and cultural ideol-
ogy. It has within it the germ of a model for social organization
designed for the energetic development of technological efficiency.
It is the prelude to a cultural configuration that emphasizes that
aspect of the human experience. The characteristics that can be iden-
tified within this tradition combine to give the culture of the early
Hebrews the particular socio-technological direction that later
became a definitive component of the Western European tradition.
The Judaic tradition is associated with a cultural tool that is
"'cnerally termed "codification" in relation to the social norms, sanc-
tioned behavior, and religion of the Hebrew people. The term "codi-
fication," however, properly refers to the systematic arrangement
and preservation of certain aspects of culture. All cultures possess
111cthodsand media (songs, mythology, art, poetry, ritual) that act to
standardize in this way; therefore, all peoples "codify" what they con-
slcln to be the valuable and necessary facts of their tradition. 7
It is specifically the use of the medium of the written word in this
n·spect that, in European parlance, is connoted by the term "codifi-
' .:1lion"and that, in the minds of Europeans, is so reverently associ-
.il1•d with their cultural heritage. Through the use of the written word
, 11lture becomes recorded, and this recording becomes an impres-
1velycumulative activity, giving the impression that the culture itself
h 111nrecumulative and therefore within the logic of this same value
y-.tcm, evolutionarily superior to cultures that codify their tradi-
through other media.
t 11111:;
Wrlling, of course>, first developed neither in the context of
l111l.tls111nor any other part of the European cultural tradition. So that
lt h not niNrly t hl'' pr<'$t'llt't', knowlNlgc, or "possibility" of this
111111111111 tlt;1t ls c·rlllt 111111
ldt>11llfyh1gtlw peculiarity of the European
1111tltH111.il11111, Mutl' ~:11htly,It Is tl11•WilYht whl<'h 1111~lo11l lip,11rt>sin
118 YURUGU
the culture in question that is important here. In the European tradi-

tion writing takes on the features of a dominant value within the belief
system of the group. It is not merely a tool among tools. The medium
of the written word is so valued that it can itself impart value, much
as religion does to the entire fabric of traditional cultures. Without the
written media, how could the European "God" and all the pronouns
referring to "Hirn" be capitalized?-a primary European expression of
reverence. The same is true of Plato's "Forms." The act of writing and
its importance become ideological in function. They become a frame
of reference that acts to determine and, in many respects, limit the
mode of perception of those caught up in this structure of values. We
have already pointed to some of the implications of "lineality" in the
European utamawazo as it relates to the written media. (See Chap. 1
of this work.)
The point to be made here is the way in which this valued activ-
ity related to other Western tendencies of the European asili, already
prefaced in early Judaic culture. When written expression becomes
a dominant value, words become binding through writing, and values
are perceived laws. Laws preserved through written codification are
more impressive to the European mind than mere "values." This cir-
cular process hel,ps to maintain order in lieu of those mechanisms
that would be binding in other cultures. Written laws became the
mark of European religion. The literate mode helped to impart the
illusion of historicity and therefore of "universal truth."
Written codification is necessary for the development and
growth of a certain kind of ideology and a qualitatively distinct style
of organization; not necessarily more complex, but in many ways
more oppressive to the human spirit as it forces human activity to be
increasingly technologically oriented. The Kemites (Egyptians) pos-
sessed a system that allowed them to keep written records thou-
sands of years before the Hebrews. They also had a larger and more
technologically accomplished culture. And for these reasons, Kernet
might at first appear to be the ethnological precursor to the crystal-
lization of European culture.
But Kemetic civilization is sacredly based, and its religion more
cosmic, mythic, and symbolic in intent. The mathematical, astrolog-
ical, astronomical, and philosophical knowledge of the Kemites, even
the material colossus that was Kemet, were products of a total con-
ception of the u11iverse as spirit. It' is for this rraso11 t Ital Ken tt>I st ill
remai11s a puzzle to the E11ro1w.111111incl Tlw Mrk,u1 ,1pprPhv11sli111 of
lltt' 111tivt•1
s1• ;is rosn1h' lli\l"lil!lllY simply 1<·p11",1·11t-.., phtlo•,oplllt
:q>p1t1,11ll 11,.~1d1•flt's tl11•t•:11111p1,t11w1.i1ldv11•v. Wl1,,1It 11li•v,1111111•11•
Religion and Ideology ll9
is the difference between the uses of written codification and its

value-place in Kemetic and Hebraic culture, respectively. What was
written in the Book of the Coming Forth by Day ("The Book of the
Dead'') was to be buried with the dead and was intended for their ben-
efit and use. But the philosophical essence of spiritual knowledge
(which included science as well as theology) was represented by the
Priest "schools" or Mystery Systems, and could only be transmitted
orally-reserved for a small circle of initiates.
Written expression of these teachings was prohibited for two
reasons: They were "secret," and they were "sacred." Writing, on the
other hand, imparts two things to its content: (1) it publicizes,
reveals, and spreads its content in a way that other (pre-electronic)
media cannot (one never commits to writing that which one truly
wishes to remain private); it "makes public'' its content in this way.
(2) The written media "profanes." Initiates into this system of spiri-
tual wisdom pledged themselves to secrecy. This was interpreted to
mean the prohibition of writing down what they had learned. It was
only when individual Greek, Persian, and Ionian students (Socrates
and Plato no doubt among them) gained access to Egyptian schools,
and political control of Egyptian civilization, that acts of sacrilege
were performed, acts that in the nascent European ideological frame-
work of ancient Greece were compelling. As early as this in the
European experience, the culturally exploitative use of the written
media seems to have been recognized and utilized. And the European
interpretation of these priestly Kemetic teachings became much of
"Greek Philosophy" through the many strokes of many, many pens,
as George James explains (1954). In this view we could almost say that
classical European culture began with an act of profanation and pla-
giarism.
How profoundly different was the Hebrew conception of mean-
ing from the Kemetic and other "non-European" conceptions. It was ·
a conception that promoted the arduous activity of recording in writ-
ing the religious laws of its people and thereby gave birth to the idea
of the "scriptures." Within the European context "culture" and "law"
arc rcified and, therefore through writing, are deified; religion has
~rcatcr force, is "truer," because it is codified in writing. Starting with
other presuµpositions, however, it would seem that it is only as laws
become allcnatccl from the human spirit that conformity to them
1t•q11ires that they he pul on paper.
120 YURUGU
The Monotheistic Ideal;

Incipient European Cultural Chauvinism
Our concern here is with "monotheism" as a culturally
expressed value. In these terms the counterpart of the "good/bad"
dichotomy of European value becomes that of "monotheism/poly-
theism." For Europeans the one-god idea, like written codification,
represents a socio-technological "advance" along the evolutionary
spectrum. Judaism proclaims this ideal. It is recognized as a Jewish
concept-in spite of Akhnaten-for in Judaism, it becomes hardened
ideology. The statement of this ideal expresses the European uta-
maroho dramatically. What follows is Hugh Schonfield's characteri-
zation of this "ideal":
Messianism was a product of the Jewish spirit. It was inspired by

the Hebrew reading of the riddle of the creation and the destiny of
mankind. Though some of its features did not originate with the
Hebrews, they absorbed them and brought them into relationship
with a great vision of the ultimate Brotherhood of Man under the
rule of the One God and Father of all men. The vision was not sim-
ply a cherished ideal; it was associated with a plan for its realisa-
tion. According to this plan God had chosen and set apart one
nation among the nations of the world, neither numerous nor pow-
erful, to be the recipient of his laws, and by observing them to offer
a universal example. The Theocracy of Israel would be the persua-
sive illustration of a World Theocracy; it would be "a kingdom of
priests and a holy nation" witnessing to all nations. Manifestly,
according to this view, the redemption of humanity waited upon the
attainment by Israel of a state of perfect obedience to the will of
God. By so much as Israel failed to meet the Divine requirements,
by so much was the peace and well-being of mankind retarded. 8
This characterization of Hebrew theology is an accurate state-

ment of the European self-image: one type of person-one culture-
whose task it is to "save" all people. This vision of a larger world in
relation to a special culture (one's own) contains the germ of "uni-
versalism," the critical ingredient of European cultural imperialism.
Early in Judaism the indication of this theme appears, a theme that
we shall follow in this study as it develops both historically and syn-
chronically through the various aspects of European culture. The
Judaic statement also laid th~ groundwork for the secularlzatlon of
history. By interpreting history as the unfold In!,{of divine' lnw, profa1w
lineal lime (hlstoridty) rntllc•1 than llan111(s;1('H•d 111,w1111dsp,1t·v)
I HJ<',IIIIP I lw su111•lfcrnl11g
lon·c~
'l'I ll'l ,. h ,111In 1p111
I ,IIII 1·011111·1
t lni I l>c1 I wc•1•11
t I II' c•,cp1<"lMfrnI nf I I 11•
"monotheistic" ideal and that of Plato's ontology as expressed in sev-

eral of his dialogues. The humanness and inconsistency of the gods
is illogical (Euthyphro) and, therefore, immoral. Value must be
abstract, universal, unchanging. The Republic is perfect because it is
modeled after such an abstraction. It is really not the content of the
"ideal" so much as its "form" that is significant. The "logical" and
ontological "authority" that issues from the "good" or from "God"
must be monolithic. It is a more suitable structure, the ideally orga-
nized state for the growth and nurture of technology and for a par-
ticular kind of ideology. The concept of monotheism provides an
ontological justification for the State as an efficient mechanism of
assured control. While wars have always been (and will always be,
although the rhetoric may become more subtle) for all people "reli-
gious" wars, and while religious statements have always been state-
ments of cultural nationalistic ideology, the religious statement of
the Hebrews corresponded to a qualitatively different nationalistic
conception. Their religion put forth the proposition that all religions
that did not espouse the one-god ideal were evolutionarily inferior.
The adherents of this religious statement, in effect, declared war on
(that is, opposed themselves to) all peoples who did not profess this
idea. It is important here to reiterate a distinction that must be kept
In mind between Jewish religion and others at this historical juncture.
All religions are by necessity culturally nationalistic in that they
profess in some way the specialness if not the moral superiority of
Ihose who are "born into" them and, in fact (most importantly),
Involve an explanation of the sacred origins of the group. But there
Is a crucial difference between the way in which the European image
111its culture represents its members as advanced on an evolution-
11ry spectrum. This ideological thesis demands a vision of themselves
lit Invidious comparison with others and therefore in relation to a
l.,r~cr order. One idea-the sacralization of the group-does not rule
11111the validity of a plurality of other groups. The other-evolution-
·" y superiority-is a supremacist concept and allows only for a mono-
ll1I1lc reality.
For the Jews, those who did not profess the one-god ideal-
t host' wbo "worshipped images"-were in fact irreligious. It was impi-
1111s,111cllrnmoral to worship many gods. Moreover, it was stupid; it
wos IHH:kward.And, therefore, the violent hostility towards all other
11U~lo11sw:1s not only justified; it was morally compelling. And here
we· ll11d ·tl,l! first r1>1wnk srntcnwnt of what can be callec;I the
1
dh l1titwny ol 1•:urop('illl ('h;u1vl11!~111. th<' <•volutic,n of which we can

11111•1•lll•,tt11
lt·ally ,1ud ldi•nln!{l<-,dly.
122 YURUGU
According to the logic of European ideology as manifested in its

early stage of Judaic culture, the cultural statement ofgood/bad, of
we/they, becomes Jew/Gentile. To be Jewish was to be not only spe-
cial and "chosen" but also "religious" and therefore culturally supe-
rior in an evolutionary sense. A Gentile is non-Jewish: a heathen and
pagan, is idolatrous and actually irreligious (has no religion), is igno-
rant, is culturally inferior in an evolutionary sense. With certain crit-
ical amplification, this was later to become the logic that supported
European cultural imperialism; and it has been alarmingly consis-
tent, left intact for over two thousand years, an unchanging tradition
in a culture that propagandizes itself as the embodiment of "change"
and self-criticism.
The Jewish/Gentile dichotomy is the early form of expression on
the continuum of the civilized/primitive dichotomy of European cul-
tural chauvinism. Within the framework of this chauvinistic expres-
sion the concept of authoritative "scriptures" and the written
codification of tradition, the monotheistic ideal and the Jewish/
Gentile dichotomy all combine in unique configuration to reinforce
each other in the logic of a belief system that can be identified as the
earliest institutionalized manifestation of the European utamaroho-
seeking to fulfill the asili of the culture.
Written codification and its promulgation encourages the linear
mode of conception that in turn establishes a "logical" system that
produces the thesis of evolution and advance. This thesis, in turn,
introduces the deification of the written word; and so the circle con-
tinues. Monotheism, which had philosophical (not spiritual) appeal
to the European mind and which served best the purposes of social
control in a European context, was placed at the valued end of the
"evolutionary" spectrum. It is again significant that Europeans have
never left that aspect of social organization open-ended as a superfi-
cial understanding of progress ideology would imply but retain the
monolithic image of their'very first model.
The monotheistic ideal (and the thesis of its "evolutionary"
superiority) then leads to and at the same time is recreated by the
dichotomy of European nationalistic ideology. "We" become(s) the
group that is "advanced," practices monotheism, deifies writing;
"they" become the rest of the world, the group that is bac)cward, idol-
atrous, irreligious, possesses no impressive body of written religious
laws, and of course believes in ''many gods.'' No punish111e11lis too
severe for this group, ac.cl"we'' must go lo great lt!11!,(I
hs ln cns111·1•
tlifll
"we" arc 1101 rontn111lnatcdl>y''tllt•lr" backwar<h1e::s.TIit•.l11d,11t-
sl,11t•
111t•11Iof lbl'l P"slllnn w.is ,, v!•1lt'11llydPl1•11•·lv1•
rni.•. 11111111 Ill<• ll11t•nl
from without was, at that point, very real.
If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter,
or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul,
entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other gods, which
thou hast known, thou, nor thy fathers;
Namely, of the gods of the people which are round and about you
nigh unto thee or far off from thee ...
Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor harken unto him; neither
shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou
conceal him:
But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to
put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath
sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God, which brought
I hee out of Egypt, from the house of bondage.
- Deuteronomy: 13:6-13:10 (See also 13:12, 13, 15, 16.)
When the Lord thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou
goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations before thee, the
I lit lites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites,
.111(1the Persites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations
v,n'ater and mightier than thou;
And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee; thou
:,ltalt smite them and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make not
1 11vcnant with them, nor show mercy unto them:
Ni•lthcr shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter shalt
1u1I give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto they
•IOI),
V1•sl1t1lldestroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut
dnwn their groves, and burn their graven images with fire.
I rn I I tuu a, I an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God
11,1111 d10s<'t1 thee to be a special people unto himself, above all peo-
pl•• 1lw1""' upvn the face of the earth.
- !1e11teronomy7: l, 7:6
124 YURUGU
In the Christian context this statement becomes stronger and

more powerfully aggressive (yet at the same time more subtle, less
explicit) as opposed to the adamently defensive nature of the Jewish
statement, which seeks to protect itself against contamination. All of
the necessary ingredients were already present, including the
European self-image as "world-savior." Put into the context of
European ideology this can be seen as an ideal vehicle for the cultural-
imperialistic projection of the European objective, which, in fact, it
became later. That is an African-centered interpretation of what in
Eurocentric rhetoric is stated as "a vision of the ultimate Brotherhood
of Man under the rule of One God and Father of all men." 8 The impli-
cation of this "vision" is, indeed, a European theocracy.
The Judeo-Christian Schism

The "Christian" formulation becomes the next identifiable stage
in the development of the European utamaroho as expressed by insti-
tutionalized religion. Christianity owed much to the early Judaic tra-
dition; so much, in fact, that the questions become: What exactly was
the difference in this "new" religion? In what way was it new? Why did
the followers of Jesus consider themselves distinct from, even antag-
onistic toward, other Jews and vice-versa?
According to European tradition the critical theological differ-
ences between the Jews and Jesus are fixed on his claim to be the
"Son of God" and, correlatively, the refusal of the Jews to recognize
him as the "Son" of their "God." But the ideological issue is lodged in
the implications of Jesus' teachings for Jewish nationalism, and the
cultural imperialistic implications of Paul's elaboration and inter-
pretation of them. From this perspective the schism and resulting
antagonism makes political sense. I do not impose consciously polit-
ical motives on any of these teachings. I mean rather to point to the
political implications of the ideas when put into the context of embry-
onic European nationalist and cultural behavior patterns. In other
words, the point is that some religious statements can be used to
support certain political objectives while others cannot.
For the Jews, while their god was projected as the one "true" god
for humankind, the emphasis and essential feature of Judaism was nol
the possibility of world-wide application, but rather the specialness
of the Jewish people. According to them it is only the Jews who hml
been "chosen" to fulfill God's prophecy:
For thou an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God
hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all peo-
ple that are upon the face of the earth.
Deuteronomy: 7:6
Hut they were to fulfillthis prophecy by presenting a normative exam-

ple to other peoples, not through conquest.
The cultural-political implications of Paul's strategy or inter-
I 1retation of Jesus' teachings were quite different. In Paul's view, con-
vnted Gentiles would be assured the same privileges as those
1·11joyedby the Jewish believers, and they would also inherit the
n·ward and promises made to Israel. 9 The Christian organization also
,Hided an increased stratification to the Jewish model through a hier-
.u chy created out of the need for "correct interpretation." This was
11ot a primarily religious function for the Jews since their doctrine
1•111phasizedthe "letter" of the written law.
The critical difference is to be found in Paul's attention to the
1 il'lltiles, a move that was both the cause and the effect of rejection by
t IIt' .lewish nationalists. The many Jews who became the first
'('l1ristians" were not, of course, .Jewish nationalists. It is in this con-
l••~t and at this point that a distinction began to exist between pri-
111,trliy self-deterministic Jewish nationalism and the more imperialistic
I,111 opean cultural chauvinism. This is a distinction that has remained
1 1111sistentto contemporary times, for while the Jewish interest may
11•1•k power, it is not expansionistic in the sense of seeking converts.
The Judaic formulation was the ideal vehicle for the expressly
ll1111l<>cl objective of Jewish cultural solidarity, the solidarity necessary
J, ,, t Itc efficient socio-political organization and consolidation of the
,•lie,rt s of its members. It was the perfect statement of nationalistic
,•,pH~ssion to the Jewish people as it encouraged their identification
wit 11the group through an assumed historical (transcending the ter-
1 llur lt1I)experience and destiny, and functioned as a defensive mech-
111h111 necessary for their self-determination-a need that was
l11t1•11slficd by their extreme "minority" circumstance.
/\f; the F.uropean utamaroho began to emerge in the wider con-
t I I , 1l'i1tt•cl by an ever-expanding self-image, itself defined in terms
• ti •"Vl't Iunensing power, the needs of European nationalistic/chau-
1 ll1h1lc t'Xpressio11 requir ·cl much more than .Judaism provided.
h1d,1l-.111 <ltdt11clec•dpromote and encourage severnt of the rather crit-
ti ,I v,d1w1-1 vll•w1•d as 111:c•flssnryfor tl1e plit1llcd European asifi h11t
111 hrly 11.s11,tll1111,tllstlrHtril1•1111·11I Wlli gro<H.ly lt1i1cl<'<1lli1l<·
for llw
p1111dl11g l•:11,opl'lltl:,.,If 1111,IHI'Wlill<•11ww1 .i ,l1tt1·1111•11t
of pnlltknl
126 YURUGU
self-determination and defensive social cohesion, it was not a state-

ment of world imperialistic objectives. The Judaic vision was elitist-
isolationist; the expanded European vision sought the control and
cultural exploitation of other groups. Terrence Penelhum says, "When
Christianity appeared on the scene, it came not merely as one more
religion but rather as an implacable rival to all others. It claimed total
allegiance from all men .... 10 Oswald Spengler makes this difference
in political implication clear:
Even in the first days the question arose which decided the whole
Destiny of the new revelation. Jesus and his friends were Jews by
birth, but they did not belong to the land of Judea. Here in
Jerusalem men looked for the Messiah of their old sacred books, a
Messiah who was to appear for the "Jewish people," in the old tribal
sense, and only for them. But all the rest of the Aramaean world
waited upon the Saviour of the World, the Redeemer and Son of
Man, the figure of all apocalyptic literature, whether written out in
Jewish, Persian, Chaldean, or Mandean terms. In the one view the
death and resurrection of Jesus were merely local events; in the
other they betokened a world-change .... In the Judaic view there
was essentially no need for recruiting-quite the reverse, as it was
a contradiction to the Messiah-idea. The words "tribe" and "mis-
sion" are reciprocally exclusive. The members of the Chosen
People, and in particular the priesthood, had merely to convince
themselves that their longing was now fulfilled. But to the Magian
nation, based on consensus or community of feeling, what the
Resurrection conveyed was a full and definitive truth, and consen-
sus in the matter of this truth gave the principle of the true nation,
which must necessarily expand till it had taken in all older and con-
ceptually incomplete principles. [Spengler's itallics.] 11
It is the European utamawazo (cultural thought structure) that makes

the Christian statement.appear to be conceptually more complete.
The significance of Spengler's observation is that while the over-
whelming body of the Christian formulation, as taught by Jesus and
interpretively elaborated by Paul, was consistent with and not con•
tradictory to Jewish belief, two critical and related features wen:
added. These additional features molded the Jewish idea into an ick-
ological statement that supported and justified not only a nasce11I
European definition of value, but also a new brand of imperialism, a11
imperialism that suited the European utw11oroho. Orw of t hos<· ft•a,
tures was the rhetorically nniversalistic ancl 1w111•xrlt1:;lvl'dplinltlrnt
IH• iwv11d": llw otlwr wus tlw
uf tlw group (or "ohjt>ct") !hill ''('11111<1
11•l,1t,•d ft•at1111•ol tlw 111,111d.1tc~
lo p1wa•lytl1,1•, {'11!1:,tlrn,tlty, tlwi1,
became the ideal formulation for the unlimited expansion of a culture

with a supremacist ideology, and at the same time it provided the ide-
ological tool for the control of the resultant empire through its rhetor-
ical "universalistic" component.
Why did the Jews refuse to accept Jesus as the Messiah they had
long awaited? Possibly because they refused to enlarge the cultural-
national group with which they identified, and, in part, because they
refused to become absorbed in (though always intimately ethno-his-
torically related to) the larger ideological entity that was forming and
that was to culminate in Western European culture. One refusal was
dictated by the other, and the separation and antagonism between
the two groups (Christians and Jews) can be seen as one of political
lclentification and strategy worked out in religious terminology. The
q11estion then, as now, is one of allegiance. In so far as the Jewish peo-
ple refuse to identify with the nationalistic expression and destiny of
t I ,e larger and dominant group whose territory they share, they con-
•1titute a "thorn in the side" of that group and have been, therefore,
111lstrusted and, what is worse, terrorized. In spite of this victimiza-
tion, and because of the similarity of value orientation and compati-
htllt.y of utamaroho and utamawazo between the Jewish people and
t I 1c larger Western European group, Jews are not referred to as
"pagan" or "primitive" and are not considered to be "evolutionarily
I I tlt•rior" as other victims of Western European oppression have been.
l'lwy are indeed totally "Western" in this sense. Even Rheinhold
Nlt•huhr recognizes the fact that Christianity was inconsistent with
lt•wlsh nationalism, but he fails to observe the new nationalistic state-
1111•111 of Christian ideology, or rather he mistakes its cultural imperi-
dl11tlcexpression for a morally superior "universalism."
TIie freedom of God over the instruments of his will ... is asserted
iwcorcling to insights of prophetic universalism, as against the
lower level of nationalistic Messianism. It is significant, however,
I Ital Christianity does not finally purge itself of the nationalistic
1111rtlt:ularismuntil St. Paul asserts the right to preach the gospel to
lilt• Gentiles, rejects the validity of Jewish law for Christians, and
•.ttl>slitlltcs the church for the nation as the "Israel of God." 12
t\11 Interesting treatment of the difference between the Jewish

111d('l1ristla11 slalements is found in Schonfield's The Passover Plot.
,1 ll1111lldcl Is rxpr ssly concerned with documenting the evidence
fin 111'. lh.it .lt•irns, 1wrhups convlnred that he was in fact
,•1111t1•ul11111
111,Mt•11l,1h1 dt•votl•d hb ~llw I lift>to 11m111gl11g his "<"rutifixion" and
,11li•1•q1it<11t"11••,11n1•1'tlo11,''
•,u iis lo 11u:11.111l1•t.•
tltt• fltlrdlnic.·nl of llw
128 YURUGU
Jewish prophecy (which itself is from earlier non-Western traditions).

Schonfield's avowed stance is one of "objective scholarship." He
wants to "shed light" on a subject too long clouded by "religious
bias." In his introductory statements he says that his objective is "to
be of helpful service" and that of the "patient seeking after truth." 13
But, in fact, Schonfield's perspective is one of both Jewish national-
ism (though he probably does not identify himself religiously as a
Jew) and Western cultural chauvinism. His argument is that the
Christian conception of Jesus as the Son of "God" de-Westernized the
Hebrew formulation and was therefore a retrogression from the intel-
lectual "advance" that Judaism had made from the "superstitions" of
the "pagans."
Christianity was still much too close to the paganism over which it
had scored a technical victory to be happy with a faith in God as
pure spirit. There had never been in the Church a complete con-
version from heathenism. We might be living in the second half of
the twentieth century, but the Gentile need remained for a human
embodiment of deity. God had still to be grasped through a physi-
cal kinship with man and his earthly concerns, and there yet lin-
gered the sense of the efficacy of the substitutionary and
propitiatory sacrifice of a victim.'3
We hear an echo of Spengler's analysis but interestingly enough

with the reverse position. For Spengler, the Christian idea is "con-
ceptually" more complete, while for Schonfield it is less "pure." Both
are using Platonic rules consistent with the European utamawazo.
They are ideologically committed to the same values. The civilized is
represented by the technologically more efficient, the conceptually
more abstract, the perceptively less subjective. In this critique of the
Christian conception by Schonfield, an "apology" for the Jewish rejec-
tion of Jesus as the Messiah is a perfect and concise statement of the
European religious ideal, and the correlative of the mode of European
religion. Of the Christian image of Jesus he says,
Such a man could have his god-like moments, but could never be
consistently a reflection of the Divine except for those whose no lion
of deity would permit the gods to share our human frailties ...
Far too many Christians do not know God in any other way I han
through Jesus and their faith in God is ilnpcrllPcl or rl1•stroyl'd.Till'
N1·wn•~tanw11tls 11111c>nliH·ly 10 lw hl,1111t•cl 'l'lw m.ijor tmdt
for 111114
11,·-.wltll 1hos1•who lt,1v,• p,11ul1•11·d111l111•li,(11111.uu
1· ,111d :-.11p1•1,t1
ol I Ii.• lll'llpl,• 111Hlvl1111t I 11•111
111111 ,1 ( :rnI 1 11•,111•dl11II II' 1111,11,(1·
111111,111
Yet Jesus and his nation, differently taught, could love and wor-
ship God without recourse to incarnation. 14
Ironically, it is precisely the "mystical" ingredient of the Jesus

legend that gives Christianity its religious appeal, as well as other
aspects that are taken from prior cultural traditions. There is no sense
in which Schonfield's statements above can be called "objective,"
even if it is agreed for the moment that "objectivity" is a valid concept.
I lis use of the term "pagan" corresponds to that of not only Christian
.~ndJewish theologians but to "nonreligious" and so-called objective
f-:11ropeansocial scientists.
There are few terms common in both ordinary and scientific
11sagethat so blatantly reveal the utamaroho (collective personality)
,111CIself-image of Europeans as does "pagan." It is perhaps the epit-
rnne of European arrogance and self-delusion that Europeans can
with seriousness describe First World peoples as being "irreligious."
Schonfield points out, disparagingly, that the Church has absorbed
nrnny so-called pagan customs and beliefs. 15 He does not, however,
11ale the political significance of this fact: that much of Christian
111ythologycomes from older cultural and religious traditions, which
1111:. aided the Christians in their "conversion" of Africans and other
111111European peoples. This factor served the objectives of Western
I 111 opean cultural imperialism well, for while people of other cultures
w1•rc in part being "converted" to their own conceptions, they were at
11It' st1me time being absorbed into an organization that controlled
11t1•111for the benefit of Europeans.
I lie Roman Cooptation: Two Imperialistic Ideologies

Al the close of the Principate the pagan world presented a great
1·011fusionof religious beliefs and doctrines. But the various pagan
1·11ltswere tolerant of one another, for the followers of one god
w1•1 c-ready to acknowledge the divinity of the gods worshipped by
lhulr neighbors. On the contrary, the adherents of Judaism and
( 'hrlstianity refused to recognize the pagan gods and hence stood
Ill h rcconciliable opposition to the whole pagan world. 16
Politically, the Roman ideology was the perfect counterpart to

1111•"t 1•llglous" formulation, as Arthur Boak's History of Rome char-
,, l1•1l11•:,;It. Just as the Christian projection was that of a benevo-
1, 111·1 llt:tl soughi' to shar~ enlightenment in the form of the word
wf1l1 1hrn1l' 11nforl'1111ntrrnongh to havP so far Pscaped it, so the
1(11111111111i1tlc111,1lbillr w,1sth,11of a pcoplc• 111possession of "civ-
l11111~c•
111 111011"pt<')Mtt•tl In IH"llow Its hl1°;tillt~., 1111 "h,11h,11lr111~.''
130 YURUGU
Christianity offers salvation to all, providing they "come into the fold,"
accepting Jesus as the "Son of God," therefore gaining eternal life; the
Romans offered citizenship to all, providing, as Aristides says, they
possessed "talent," "courage," and "leadership" potential. "Cultural"
boundaries did not matter. Both were offers of "civilization" and a
supposedly evolutionary superior way of life. These formulations
posited a perpetual opposition between those who did not share the
ideologies expressed and those who did. Both statements, impor-
tantly, contained justifications and directives for the "conversion"
and "recruitment" of those outside the cultural group with which
they were identified. Perhaps the single most important ingredient
shared by these "brother" ideologies (actually two arms of the same
ideological weapon) is their vision of the world as the "turf" of a sin-
gle culture. Any and everyone presently under the ideological and
political control of the Christians and Romans was fair game. Never
before had ideologies so explicitly stated this worldwide objective.
This indeed was the "technical victory" to which Schonfield and
Spengler allude. And this unique self-image that projects itself as the
proper model for all, we can identify as European. This self-image
and its projection are part of a centuries-old process through which
Europeans miraculously become the universal paradigm for all
humanity.
While it is clear that both the Christian and the Roman formu-
lations could serve as ideological statements of a world imperialistic
endeavor, it is also clear that the two could not coexist as competing
ideologies. But this did not constitute an irreconcilable opposition.
Their synthesis made much political sense. It was represented in the
cooptation of the Church by and for the purposes of the State, or one
can just as easily reverse this statement. The solution was, indeed,
culturally, as well as historically, compelling. The two ideologies, put
to the service of one cultural group and espousing compatible values
and objectives, worked hand in hand, to command the same alle-
giances, to conquer the same world.
Constantine's conversion is often characterized by European
historians as a "turning point" in European history. Norman Baynes
says that Constantine's conversion is hard to explain based on wl1.1I
came before him and that he "diverted the stream of human !iii.
tory." 17 Ethnologically, it ·was not a "turnlng poiut," hut thc:-con-
cretization of a tendency-a push in a direction alr<>aclyiclentifwhl1•
in the continuum of Western European dcvdopmcnt. Consta11tl11'!I
"co11v •rsion" was do111n11dt•d hy llw l•',urop!':111<l.~tll,I Ii,•<'tllt11rnl 'H't•d
It w11sa 11,•11",.,,1rv•itt·p l11r1l11·f!tpwlll ,1111I1111lldlfi1,1tl11111111,!11
1 Uw11,i11
l~mpire. The religious formulations that had existed previously in the

state were not compatible with the socio-political objectives that
guided the Roman leadership-they were not compatible with the
Western ideal. These prior religious formulations did not share the
imperialist vision.
According to Constantine's own account (if we are to use
r:usebius as an authority), his conversion was intimately bound up
with his immediate military objectives. In A.D. 312 Constantine was
one of four competitors left in a bloody struggle for the rule of the
Roman Empire. In that year he invaded Italy from Gaul and "gained
,·untrol over the whole West by his victory over Maxentius at the
gates of Rome." 18
Eusebius says that Constantine had searched in vain for a god
,·npable of assuring the success of his military endeavors. He decided
lo try his father's god: the Christian god. He prayed to this god, ask-
Ing for a sign, and one appeared to him,
he saw with his own eyes the trophy of a cross of light in the
heavens, above the sun, and bearing the inscription,
"Conquer by This ... "
111his sleep the Christ of God appeared to him with the same sign
which he had seen in the heavens, and commanded him to make a
likeness of that sign which he had seen in the heavens, and to use
II as a safeguard in all engagements with his enemies .... The
,•mperor constantly made use of this sign of salvation as a safe-
g11ardagainst every adverse and hostile power, and commanded
I hat others similar to it should be carried at the head of all his
11rmies.19
This, then, in a very real sense was the first "crusade." In 313
I 'nttslantine and Licinius agreed, in the Edict of Milan, to the official
11•1 ugnition of the Christian religion by the state. The agreement with
1 11'l111uswas for "joint rule," but,
Wllllt• Constantine granted ever greater privileges and advantages

Io 111eChristians, Ucinius gradually reversed his policy of toleration
,11111Initialed repressive measures. It became obvious that
20
1 '1111stantineaimed to be sole emperor.
'l'lmi1t11y HnrnC'•~ vit>W qf tl1cs<' samC' iss11cs in llis book,

t , 1mf<111fl111' liww/Ji11.,,ls t I 1:,t.
1111,I
lo 1·n111l11d1·111,,1lw w,1i,, 011v,•11,•d

It ,•1•111'111111111,11 to ('litl•11 l,11illy
132 YURUGU
before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. But the moment of psycho-
logical conviction may have followed, rather than preceded, his
own avowal: It perhaps occurred during the battle, at the moment
victory became certain. In the ultimate reckoning, however, the
precise details of Constantine's conversion matter little. After 28
October 312 the emperor consistently thought of himself as God's
servant, entrusted with a divine mission to convert the Roman
Empire to Christianity. 21
This same servant of "god" probably later had Licinius, who was
his brother-in-law, killed along with Licinius' nine-year-old son.
Evidently this did not conflict with Constantine's "Christianity."
Barnes says that by 324, Constantine was taking every oppor-
tunity to "stress the truth of Christianity" because of his "religious
sympathies," and he concludes that "an emperor with these convic-
tions could not be expected to tolerate pagan practices which all
Christians found morally offensive." 22 Barnes continues, "He estab-
lished Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire ....
Christians received preference in official appointment. ... Constantine
forbade the erection of cult statues, the consultation of pagan oracles,
divination of any sort, and sacrifice to the gods under any circum-
stances."22 Not only was Constantine concerned with the spread of
Christianity throughout the Empire, but he was equally concerned
with ideological unity among the Christians. If institutionalized
Christianity was to be of political benefit, its lead~rs must speak with
one voice. Theological disputes were of little import in Constantine's
view when the unity of the Church was at stake. His role was there-
fore one of mediation, and he mandated that the bishops settle their
differences, calling the first ecumenical council of the Christian
Church, the Council of Nicaea, in 325.
Arthur E. R. Boak gives his interpretation of Constantine's
actions and convictions:
It is clear that on the eve of the final encounter with Maxentius, he

placed both himself and his army under the protection of the
Christian's God, and that he was convinced that his victory then
and his later success in winning the whole Empire were clue to the
power and favor of this divinity. From 312 A.D., he looked upo11
himself as designated by God to rule the Roman World. And it1
return for this divine recognition, he felt the obligation to promote
the cause of Christianity in all possible wnys. Tllis n1(!a11Illint
Christianity rnusl rccPiVP offidnl reco~1iitlo11 .,s st nil' rl'll!,liou: 11ql
c11ilytilal, II 11111st
hc•c-c1111c•
llw C111l,v
1fillt• 11111-(1011,lrn ( J11l11tla111,
1•111lld 11•10"11l11• 110 01111'1 ~-11l1!'lt11I 0111' '1'l111·1( c11l'1l,1111h11•
•1,1w lt1
Christianity the religion which could and should provide a spiritual

bond among his subjects as well as a moral basis for political loy-
alty to himself as the elect of God. 23
It is compelling to add, "and a 'moral' basis for world imperialism."

Boak continues.
Having decided to make Christianity the one state religion, he also

felt obligated to take the initiative in ensuring the unity of the
Christian community itself .... Constantine made full use of his auto-
cratic power to develop a totalitarian regime for which the foun-
dations had been laid by earlier emperors. 24
These accounts and descriptions of Constantine's "conversion"

inadvertently (in spite of the intentions of their authors) point to the
political expediency and suitability of the marriage of the Roman and
orthodox Christian ideologies for the imperialistic ambitions of the
Western nation of the fourth century. Constantine's association with
I he new god-the "European god"-gave him additional support
,1fforded by religious sanction of his political and military power, and
1lw religion he chose had the advantage of itself incorporating a
vision of complete worldwide power and control. Eusebius says,
'"Thus then the God of all, the Supreme Governor of the whole uni-
VI•, se, by his own will appointed Constantine, the descendent of so
, 1•1wwned a parent, to be prince and sovereign: so that, while others
I 1;1vebeen raised to this distinction by the election of their fellowmen,
Ills is the only one to whose elevation no mortal may boast of having
1 ontributed." 25 This process, having been put in motion by
< 011st·antine, was further solidified by Theodosius, in the Theodosian
< od<>.
111the fifth century, the Senate was thoroughly Christian. As early

ns :380A.O. Theodosius had ordered all his subjects to accept the
C'llristian creed formulated at the Council of Nicaea in 325. In 391
lw ordered the destruction of the image and temple of Sarapis in
t\11-xandria,a step which sounded the death knell of paganism in the
,·aSINn part of the Empire. The following year he unconditionally
lorhacle pagan worship under penalties for treason and sacrilege.
l'lwoctosius II continued the vigorous persecution of the pagans.
Adlu•renc..:cto pagan beliefs was dec:lured criminal, and in the
Tl w11closi:rnCoric laws a!,!ni11s1
pagans nre included among the laws
11•1(Ul11tl11gcivic 111(~."lti
1·n1rnt.u1ll11«' lrnd laid 1111'Jt1t1111Hlwwklur 1111'p111cl,1111al1011

Ill
134 YURUGU
Christianity as the religion of an orthodox Roman State. It was his bril-

liance to recognize the compatibility, rather than antagonism,
between the political objectives of the Roman State and the Christian
ideology. Many European historians, in fact, begin the Medieval
period of European culture with Constantine's innovation.
Lest the identity of these ideologies remain too abstract or
ambiguously stated let us offer here some very concrete ethno-
graphic data, i.e., Constantine's own statements of his objectives and
interpretation of his "new Christian" mission. Constantine says of
those who did not worship his supreme god with fitting veneration,
I will destroy and disperse [them] .... What can be done by me

more consonant with my fixed resolve and with the duty of an
emperor than, having dissipated errors and cut off all unfounded
opinions, to cause all men to present the omnipotent God, true reli-
gion, unfeigned concord, and the worship which is his due. 27
This is taken from a letter written by Constantine to a group of

bishops at the Council of Aries regarding the official policy to be
adopted toward "pagans" and Donatists. The Donatists were a
Christian sect who opposed the alignment of the Church with the
Imperial Government. This position is analogous to the attempt to set
a sailboat on an "upwind" course. For the die had been cast:
"Europeanness" was already set in motion-gaining momentum
rapidly, its successful development (the fulfillment of the asilt)
· demanded the monolithic model and ideological justification that
this alignment offered. Constantine says,
God sought my service and judged that service fitted to achieve His
purpose. Starting from Britain God had scattered the evil powers
that mankind might be recalled to true religion instructed through
my agency, and that the blessed faith might spread under his guid•
ing hand. And from the West, believing that this gift had been
entrusted to myself, I have come to the East which was in sorer
need of my aid. 28
Licinius, in the East, who did not claim the Christian god, stood
temporarily in the way of Constantine's unified control. Licinius' per
secution of the Christians becomes understandable as u pollt lcul
necessity in his efforts to prevent Constantine's take over. Ry tlw
same token, the rea!lzatio11 of Constantine's arnbl1lo11swen• faclll
tated hy his mission In sprendln~ the rnitl1•
•
I knew that, if in accordance with my prayers I could establish a

common agreement amongst all servants of God, then the need of
the state would as the fruit of that agreement undergo a change in
a consonance with the pious desires of alI.29
Norman Bayne's interpretation of Constantine's objectives is

stated as two separate aims: to overthrow Licinius and thereby "heal
the body of the Roman world," and to "unite his subjects in one com-
1non religious belief." 30 He even remarks on the "close connection
llctween the fortunes of the state and the unity of the Church," in the
mind of Constantine. 31 Yet, this historian of early European develop-
ment never explicitly interprets Constantine's motives as having been
llllperialistic. That is because this interpretation of European devel-
opment does not serve the interests of European nationalism. It is
quite clear, even from his own words, that the Christian cause gave
! 'onstantine a powerful tool with which to unify Rome under his con-
t 101 and to conquer those not yet within this Empire. For this reason
( 'onstantine is adamantly opposed to disunity among the avowed
l'liristians: "Open to me by your unity the road to the East." 29 The
•P1·11rringtheme in his directives to his bishops is unity; for unity
was the political necessity of the day. The world could not be made
,, 1-'.uropean hegemony until European culture was itself solidified.
l 011stantine says,
For truly it would be a terrible thing-a very terrible thing-that

110wwhen wars are ended and none dares to offer further resistance
w1•should begin to attack each other and thus give excuse for plea-
!Hlrc and for laughter to the pagan world. 32
One of the internecine disputes within the Church during

I 1111stantine'sreign had to do with who, in fact, was a Christian; par-
tlr 11lnrlywith regard to those who wished to convert. When Arius
111111ouncedthat he had "surrendered" to the Christian god,
lliHnnsius did not want to accept him. Constantine wrote to
J\l l11111usius: "Now you know my will: to all those who desire to enter
I Ill' Church do you provide free entry." This had to be official policy
11I lw doak of Christianity was to do its job for Western European
1111pP1lalisw. !Ls counterpart was the offer of Roman citizenship, to
-.JilcIi 1-'vnyone was to aspire, to the "elite" of other cultures. Both
", 11·1ndus!Vl' IP that no one was to be excluded from European
!1111111111011.()f l{oinno rll lzrnship, Aristides, writing approximately two
l1t•lor1•tlw 111111·
, , 11t111l1•t, of c,,nstunthw (<'ii. A.D. 144 or 156) says:
136 YURUGU
Dividing into two groups all those in your empire-with this sword
I have indicated the entire civilized world-you have everywhere
appointed to your citizenship, or even to kinship with you, the bet-
ter part of the world's talent, courage, and leadership, while the rest
you recognize as a league under your hegemony .... Neither seas
nor intervening continent are bars to citizenship, nor are Asia and
Europe divided in their treatment here. In your empire all paths are
open to all. No one worthy of rule or trust remains an alien, but a
civil community of the World has been established as a Free
Republic under one, as into a common civic center, in order to
receive each man his due. 33
The previous quotations, taken from Constantine's own corre-

spondence and statements, are included for the purpose of provid-
ing concrete examples of the potentially isomorphic relationship of
the Christian and Roman world-imperialistic ideologies and the actual
realization of their oneness of purpose through Constantine's policy.
The source for these quotations is a lecture given by Baynes in 1930.
His objective is to show that Constantine's primary concern was in
bringing Christianity to the pagan world. This Baynes argues in oppo-
sition to the divergent interpretation that Edward Schwartz presents
in The Emperor Constantine and the Christian Church. The following is
Bayne's interpretation of Schwartz's analysis:
He [Schwartz] has found the Open Sesame to the Understanding of

the reign in Constantine's resolution to exploit in his own interest
the organization which gave to the Christian Church its corporate
strength: through alliance with the Church Constantine sought to
attain victory and the sole mastery of the Roman World. 34
The interpretation of Theodor Brieger (1800) is also a forceful

statement of what Baynes terms the "view of purely political motiva-
tion." Schwartz is the "modern representative of this standpoint."
But Baynes is adamant:
I believe that his conception of the character and aims alike of

Constantine and Athanasius is essentially inhuman. This prodigious
simplification does scant justice to the complexity of human per-
sonality. The view that Constantine adopted in religious diplomacy
as his principle of action the Roman maxim "divide el impera" I find
impossible to believe. 35
Prom an African-cenlered 1wr:.pL·1·1lv1•. 11111111, ntl111, 11,111<1, I flwl

Sd1watlz's vit•w of to b1• tl1t• 111w,t "l11u111111"111li1t1·1p1<·t.11l1111~ 11h
, ll,IVH1·•,'1•Kpl,111.1llc111Iii•,11w11.11l111l•,•,l1111,
1 111 Wille 11l,tll;, lo 0ll1'•1111ll1u1il
historical continuity. His reluctance, in this instance, to do what he has

supposedly been well trained to do as an historian, forces him to fix on
the absolutely irrelevant and moot issue of whether or not Constantine
was a "true convert!" It then becomes hard for him to explain
Constantine, and so he resorts to the "great personality" theory:
If the reconstruction of the past "difficulties" are, at times, caused

by the interposition in the stream of history of outstanding per-
sonalities which resist rationalization and remain unexpected and
embarrassing ... [Constantine was] an erratic block which has
diverted the stream of human history. 36
Again, it is understandable, in ethnological terms, that inter-

pretations of Constantine's religious policies as being politically moti-
vated are unpopular within the tradition of European social theory.
The interpretation of which Schwartz's view is representative
(though virtually unrecognized) is consistent with the reality of
human self-interest within the parochial context of a given culture and
ideological setting. By the same token, such an interpretation is dia-
metrically opposed to the "disinterested," "beneficient," and "altru-
istic" stance of European "universalism" that has been projected as
a part of the propaganda of European cultural imperialism since the
archaic states of that culture. Baynes' interpretation of Constantine,
lllerefore, provides us with an ethnographic example of European
nationalism.
The Threat of Non-Orthodox Christianity

One of the concerns of this chapter is the relationship between
, ,•ligion and national consciousness, i.e., behavior. Nowhere is this
1(!!ationship better exemplified then in European cultural history. In
110culture is the supportive relationship of formalized religion more
!-.Uccessfully developed and elaborated. One of the correlates of this
view of the relationship between religion and nationalism is that in
1udcr to understand the dynamics of a particular religious statement,
111w 1nust first be aware of the ideological commitment of the people
wl,o identify with it, their utamaroho and their relationship to other
1 1dtures. This is, of course, a radical departure from the usual
,1pproach to th<' study of religion and in direct conflict with Christian
I llc•oloi-1!,1ns.
Tho:;c who would argue the "revolutionary" political
l111plic:itlor1sof Cllrls.t'lanlty (sec Liberation Theology literature) also
lu1ply, 1,1llwr UIH'OllVlllrh,gly, lllHl the :.woo year Imperialistic quest
111Wl'Mt•m l•:111 11ialnlai11P<l
ripe•, tlw11 l·'.11roAnll'ril'n, wiH, s1ttT<•ssf111ly
111\f>tf•• 111
.111·ll1ll1t1i pnal, Tlt11Its sh11-
111,d·1p11It• llll 111nH'1111111,rnl•:tlt
138 YURUGU
ply implausible and it does not make sense. It is not contradiction but
consistency that has made for Western European imperial success.
Elaine Pagels, in her interpretation of the significance of the
developments of early Christianity, supports my view in that she
points to the social and political implications of apostolic
Christianism, as opposed to those of the Gnostic tradition that the
orthodox church condemned, and over which it triumphed (although
we must not confuse political triumph with spiritual triumph).
Perhaps it would be more fitting to begin with a discussion of the
African or Kemetic (ancient Egyptian) origins of Christian mythology
and symbolism, though Pagels does not refer to these at all. But since
we cannot take the time here for such a discussion, the reader is
referred to the works of Gerald Massey (1973), John G. Jackson
(1985), Yosef Ben Jochaman (1973), and others. Suffice it to say that
the mythology and symbolism surrounding Usir, also known as Asar,
and Osiris by the Greeks, introduced the concept of a resurrected sav-
ior 3000 years before the advent of Christianity. A study of this tra-
dition also explains why the date of December 25 is used for the
birthdate of Jesus, the symbolism of the stable as a place for his birth,
the three "wisemen," and so forth. 37
Clearly, however, there had to have been something "special,"
something "different" about the formulation of what is now accepted
as biblical Christianity, or it would not have been so well suited to the
archaic European utamaroho as expressed in the Roman State. In
Pagel's book, The Gnostic Gospels, one of the things that we already
know is reaffirmed: Gnosticism was unacceptable to, and considered
heresy by, those who were in the process of establishing the ortho-
dox Christian Church. These gospels were "written out" of the reli-
gion. Pagels offers us a plausible explanation, one that fits with my
understanding of the Western European cultural reality. Gnosticism
was not different enough from the Kemetic and other ancient origins.
Its utamaroho was too close to these. It was neither politically ori-
ented nor materialistic enough. Resurrection was understood sym-
bolically and spiritually-much deeper than unending "physical"
existence. Pagels tells us that the Gnostics believed that resurrec-
tion was to be experienced spiritually, that one experienced Christ on
a spiritual level. "This may occur in dreams, in ecstatic trance, 111
visions, or in moments of spiritual illurnination.": 18 l{cbirth for tlw
ancients was after all a result of illumination and inte11se self-knowl
edge-a heightened splrllua\ level of cl(•velop111 •11LBut contrnry to
tills, orthodoxy that oppost-ct ll1v C,11oslk VIPW, w;1s lud1•1•dll11'!•i1l
(!id, lhnt 11,1<; ('1111.tI (II,(• hndlly hrn1'1
1•1ic•cl hy It, ,II f,ltil11u HS 'l'i JI 11lllta11
Religion and Ideology 13.9
the grave so every believer should anticipate the resurrection of the

flesh." 39 Interestingly enough, this is precisely the criticism that
Schonfield has of Christianity, when comparing it with Judaism. 40 But
in this case the "materialization" of the god-concept serves not to
bring it closer to the human, but facilitates its use as the justification
for authority. Tertuillian insists that the resurrection of Christ is unde-
niably physical, material in a very real earthly sense. "Tertuillian
declares that anyone who denies the resurrection of the the flesh is
a heretic, not a Christian." 38 The Gnostic emphasis on personal, spir-
itual growth and development, along with its deemphasis of prose-
lytization made it ill-suited for the imperial quest.
Pagels raises the compelling question: "Why did orthodox tra-
dition adopt the literal view of resurrection?" 38 And I would add: Why
were they so threatened by the Gnostic teachings and those of the
ancient Kemites? Pagels opens the way to the answers. She tells us
Lhat upon his resurrection in the New Testament, Jesus "proves" to
his disciples that he is "not a ghost," and "Thomas declares that he
will not believe that Jesus had actually risen from the grave unless he
personally can see and touch him." 38 But, she continues, other
accounts in the New Testament could lead one to the conclusion that
some people had experienced visions of Jesus' return. "Paul
describes the resurrection as 'a mystery,' the transformation from
physical to spiritual existence." 41 The related questions restated: Why
did orthodox Christianity insist on the literal, physical interpretation
HS opposed to a more metaphysical transcendental one, and why did
I hey label other interpretations as heretical? 41 The answer, accord-
l11gto Pagels, is that
the doctrine of bodily resurrection also serves an essentially polit-

ical function .... [Pagel's italics]
It legitimizes the authority of certain men who claim to exercise

leadership over the churches as the successors of the apostle Peter .
. Frorn the second century, the doctrine [of bodily resurrection] has
served to validate the apostolic succession of bishops, the basis of
papal authority to this day. 41
What Pagels argues is that the idea or claim of the resurrection

ol J<·s11sprovided a source of authority for his earthly successor:
I 1t'll'r. It.was trwial that ~ome such claim be possible given the fact
I Ital IIH' l,·adc•r or 1tllsolt1tt.·aul hority within tlw movement was gone,
,111cll11111rlfc•dsnf p<•npl1•w1·n• 1·lc1ln1h1g to ln1Prprct hi:; t<•achlngs In
i1•; 111,111ydlll.-11•111w11ys 111ord,•1 In, 111•!1•1lo tw llw t·:-t,1h
,,tl111t1•,t
140 YURUGU
lished "rock" or foundation of a structured, institutionalized organi-

zation, all other groups had to be discredited. What better way than
through his actual contact with a physically resurrected Jesus, who
had explicitly given him authority to begin the institutionalization of
his (Jesus') teachings. 42 (See Matthew 16: 13-19.) Given this political
necessity for a doctrine of physical resurrection, the Gnostic teach-
ings of a more metaphysical and symbolic concept of resurrection
were most threatening to the establishment of the church. Not only
did the apostles get authority in this way, but they were the only
ones who could confer it on those who succeeded them. Christians
in the second century used Luke's account to set the groundwork for
establishing specific, restricted chains of command for all future gen-
erations of Christians, concludes Pagels. 43 So that present popes must
rely on their connection to Peter, who had originally witnessed the
physical resurrection of Jesus, for their authority.
But the Gnostics were indeed heretical, because they did not
seem to be concerned with establishing an institution that would
exercise total control. They insisted that the resurrection "was not a
unique event in the past: instead, it symbolized how Christ's presence
could be experienced in the present. What mattered was not literal
seeing, but spiritual vision." 43 And in this way they continued the tra-
dition of the mystery religions that predated orthodox Christianity,
which Constantine, Justinian, Theodosius, and others were so bent
on destroying. The emphasis in the Kemetic (ancient Egyptian) and
derivative religious forms was on initiation into a process of spiritual
development and enlightment. The emphasis within orthodox
Christianity was (and is) on the acceptance of a dogma that could be
the basis of socio-political structure and control.
These insights of Pagels coincide with my analysis of the func-
tion of institutionalized religion in European development. The sec-
ular, historical emphasis within Christian doctrine, and this includes
the various "non-orthodox" forms that evolved as a result of the
"Reformation," is a direct result of the need to claim superiority to
other religions, which, in turn imparts cultural and therefore politi-
cal superiority or control. No Christian will accept an authentically
"spiritual'' or metaphysical interpretation of Christian teachings.
Herein lies the telling contradiction of Christian theology. To be H
"Christian" is to insist on a "historical Christ" (in a rigidly Sf'Ct1l1:1r
sense): yet this adjective shoulcl contradict Lile noun it p11rports to
clc•scrihe.Tile reason for this st range d1nracteristk of Christ innlty, i\S
II w;1•,II1lt•1pn•l!•d111I lw d(•Vl'lopnH·nt of ,,rel 1ui<'l·:urnp1•i111
dvllh~.11
lrn1
It.,.to do wltlt 1111•r,f(l111w11/,r1 tll;1I w,,~t1ls11lw, 111111!1~
:1l,n1d,11<ll1.1•1·l,
as well as the ideological needs of the new order. The spurious

dichotomy between history and mythology would become the hand-
maiden of the civilized/primitive dichotomy, so essential to Western
European cultural nationalism and imperialism. According to
European nationalism, other traditions and earlier ones were expres-
sions of mythological beliefs only: Christianity was an expression of
historical fact. To this day the most threatening appositional phrase
that an avowed Christian can be presented with is "Christian
Mythology." To accept its validity is to shake the ground of her/his
belief.
The Gnostics, like the Africans and many contemporary non-
Christians were concerned with the attainment of spiritual intuition,
which would reveal the nature of cosmic reality. According to Pagels,
they talked about, "the possibility of encountering the risen Christ in
the present." 44 But imagine what that would do to the establishment
of the apostolic Church as an institution if people could continue to
"witness the resurrection!" The Gnostics claimed to have kept the
<'Soteric aspect of Jesus' teachings, which were necessarily secret
and could be revealed only to initiates. 45 This is, of course, how all
the ancient African spiritual systems were organized, which still rep-
resents the basic structure of spiritual learning and development
among Africans who adhere to their own "non-European" concep-
tions. It would seem reasonable to assume that Jesus himself was an
Initiate of a derived, albeit adulterated "mystery system" as his teach-
ings can be interpreted as being consistent with these earlier tradi-
1Ions, and it was out of these traditions that Christianity evolved.
Both Pagels and I put emphasis on the institutionalization of
( 'ltristianity. She says that, "the controversy over resurrection, then,
proved critical in shaping the Christian movement into an institu-
1lonal religion. 46 I share this emphasis because of the critical role of
I lils institution within the matrix of European imperialism, especially
l11certain stages of European development. Gnosticism could not
l1·ad lo the subsequent developments-the Roman cooptation,
Constantine's "conversion''-that were necessary for the expansion
ol Imperial techno-political control. For, according to Pagels, the
I ,1111slicsargued that "only one's own experience offers the ultimate
, 111 ,•rlo11of truth ... .'' She tells us that "they celebrated every form
.,, l')"t'nl ivc invention as evidence that a person has become spiritu-
ally allw. On this theory, th(: structure of authority cau never be fixed
111111 u11lnslltullonal f.r,1mcwork: it musl rcmaiu spontaneous, charis-
111,111<, ,ul<I opt•n." 1" nut that Is 1101how 1·111plresarc built. It docs not
1111II llH• l•:11111p(l.11,m1/1, .111d11111
l•:11rop.-,111
l11qwrlnl qut.•sl has lh•(•n
142 YURUGU
more successful than any other, because it has always been based on
the claim of superior culture. In the budding stages of the quest, as
the European utamaroho took shape, a tightly structured, institu-
tionalized and secularly codified religion was the key to this claim .
. . . in terms of the social order ... the orthodox teaching on resur-

rection had a different effect: it legitimized a hierarchy of persons
through whose authority all others must approach God. Gnostic
teaching ... was politically subversive of this order: it claimed to
offer to every initiate direct access to God of which the priests and
bishops themselves might be ignorant. 47
Certainly there is no universal or absolute moral imperative that

dictates that it is culturally superior to recognize the existence of
only one god. Therefore, in the ethnological analysis of European cul-
ture, we must look for tendencies within it that would make avowed
monotheism desirable. We look to European ideology-more specif-
ically to Rome at the time of its Christianization. A political/ideolog-
ical interpretation of the significance of the monotheistic ideal, again,
makes sense. Pagel's analysis fits: "As the doctrine of Christ's bodily
resurrection establishes the initial framework for clerical authority,
so the doctrine of the 'one God' confirms, for Orthodox Christians, the
emerging institution of the 'one bishop' as monarch ('sole ruler') of
the Church." 48 She argues that another aspect of the threat to ortho-
doxy posed by Gnosticism was their lack of recognition of the Church
hierarchy. Valentin us says that the Gnostics "join together as equals,
enjoying mutual love, spontaneously helping one another" as
opposed to the ordinary Christians, who "wanted to command one
another, outrivalling one another in their empty ambition," inflated
with "lust for power," "each one imagining that he is superior to the
others." While the "lust for power" is the nature of the European asili,
Pagels tells us that the Gnostics refused to rank themselves "into
superior and inferior orders within a hierarchy, and that they fol-
lowed the principle of strict equality." 49 On the other hand, she says,
Tertuillian, advocate of the orthodoxy, considered certain distinc-
tions essential to Church order: namely, those between "newcomers
and experienced Christians; between women and men: between a
professional clergy and people occupied with secular employme11t;
between readers, deacons, priests, and bishops-and above, hetwL•e11
the clergy and the laity "so
Tlw C,11ostics emphasl:t.NI spirilul\l :ittnl1111wn1;ind snld llwy
rc•l,tlt•cltn a (:o,1rq1t I)[ i,iutl tl,ul w11:-tbPyuncl lh11l11lllw 11wn• lt11ui,(<'nl
flllll lo wll11111 thP 11nl111,11 v < ·111hU,111'1rl'l,,t(•d 'l't11•y111l1,•d1J1h 11•:ii.1:,
god the "demiurge" and said that this "creator" made false claims to
power. In Pagel's explanation of Gnostic thought, achieving gnosis
involved "coming to recognize the true source of divine power-
namely, 'the depth' of all being." But the god of Clement, Irenaeus,
and Tertullian claimed, "I am God, and there is no other .... I am a jeal-
ous God." And to them the concept of a transcendent force reachable
through initiation was "heresy" that "encourage( d) insubordination to
clerical authority." To Irenaeus the meetings of the Gnostics were
"unauthorized." The concept of authority is key. If spiritual growth had
been the focus for Irenaeus and others, the Gnostics would not have
been threatening. The Church represented a structure of authority,
and that structure had to be monolithic. Therefore, in Pagel's words:
"If God is One, then there can only be one true church, and only one
representative of the God in the community-the Bishop." 51 This "One
God" became the basis for the power of "One Emperor" of the "One
Civilization" as well. Belief in him gave the emperor authority to con-
quer all nonbelievers in his name. In a sense Gnosticism was anachro-
nistic, while orthodox Christianity was "right on time." Religious
formulations that were more spiritual and transcendent, less political
and secular in intent, were simply not expedient.
Augustine and Political Conservatism

The strength of the Christian ideological formulation in its func-
t Ion as a tool of European cultural imperialism is twofold: (1) It sub-
1ly justifies two kinds of political activity; that is, it appeals to two
different layers of the world's population. (2) It unifies the conquerors
wl li\e simultaneously pacifying the conquered. This, in part, is
, <·fleeted in the strikingly different tones or "moods" of the Old and
Nl!wTestaments in terms of their political possibilities for the Roman
l·'.111pire. The Old Testament is extremely militaristic and aggressive.
II Is often an unveiled directive: the blatant command that a homo-
w•neous and limited cultural group resist all alien influences through
11l • prohibition of intermarriage and other social intercourse with
n11lural groups adhering to different ideologies. The task of the New
'1'1•stamcnt, on the other hand, is much more complicated. What was
l,llN interpreted as the directive for aggression is there stated as the
d, ..;lre to spread enlightenment. What developed into the mandate to
1111111:,( I hose "who are not like us under our domain" is there molded
111111 Ille-rhetoric of "soul-saving," and at the same time, it sells pas-
lv1 11c<'t'plr11H'<' tn thost! "srnils.'' The Christia11 statement, as an
,, :1,,hlli;h1•d,1s1w1·Itlf l-'.1111,p1•111l, Is, nltc•r nil, n nntionnllst!c l<k'-
111l111·1•,
11l11~y (1°11ltiut Ith tlw 1•?<1H1•r.st1111
of !111•ldc•ology 111,1 pa111(11Jarnil
144 YURUGU
ture just as any religious statement is), and its function in this regard
is to serve the interests of that culture. The docility and lack of aggres-
sion of the conquered peoples serves this interest, and so the
Christian directive is dual in nature; while it provides a justification
for a world-order in the service of a European god, its teachings
encourage others to be nonpolitical and discourages their cultural
nationalism (identification with their national gods and belief sys-
tems).
There is a curious characterization of Jesus as a "revolutionary"
in the literature of Liberation Theology and Black Theology.
Unfortunately, persecution and unpopularity do not necessarily make
ideas revolutionary. The Jewish ideology in its stubborn nationalism
could in this sense be considered more revolutionary in the face of
Roman policy than that of Jesus and his followers. It would be very
difficult to imagine, if we did not consistently put our data into the
context of the European asili, how any historian or social theorist
could identify the so-called "Christian virtues"; i.e., the "Christian
ethic" or mode of behavior as being in any way new or innovative at
the time of Jesus. The mandate to regard and treat one another as
brothers and sisters (i.e., as members of a "family" kin group) had
existed probably since the beginnings of human civilization in Africa.
The African ideological statement, of this mode of behavior as an eth-
ical imperative is much more philosophically profound than the
Christian-European statement of it and, of course, so much more con-
sistent and authentic. It originates in a spiritualistic world-view. 52
What was "new" about the teachings that purported to have
resulted from the activities of Jesus was that they proclaimed that
one was to treat members of other cultural groups in this way, and,
more importantly, one was to treat one's enemies in this (the same)
way-"enemies" being those who were hostile to one's cultural group
or one's "family." This directive is, of course, debilitating and cas-
trating to political cultural nationalism and counter to the demands
of self-determination. This feature, along with that of the direction uf
attention towards "another world" in which justice is sought, may cer-
tainly combine to form a new statement, but it can hardly be called
a politically revolutionary one.
Otto Spengler concerns himself with this political duality uf
Christian doctrine in the Decline of the West. He accuses those i11I lit•
West who would seek to apply the "brotherhood" n11d "lovl'"
cspousccl by Jesus to the "unfortuuate" ~111d "opprtsst(I" h1 the S()<"I
rty of his day of havlni,! 111 fort 1nlsi11l1'rp11•H•df1•srn;'IP11rl1l11gs:
poses to Jesus is blasphemy. His occasional utterances of a social

kind, so far as they are authentic and not merely attributed sayings,
tend merely to edification .... Religion is, first and last, metaphysic,
otherworldliness, awareness in a world of which the evidence of the
senses merely lights the foreground. It is life in and with the super-
sensible. 53
Spengler is arguing that the ostensible teachings of Jesus are

irrelevant to European life; i.e., that they were not meant to be used
in a way that would act against the self-interest of the ruling Western
European elite. He gives examples of passages that in his opinion
point to the apolitical (asocial) intent of the Christian teachings. It is
the misinterpretaion of these teachings, so as to give them political
relevance to the plight of the poor, the oppressed, and the racially
despised, that Spengler objects to so vehemently:
"My kingdom is not of this world," and only he who can look into
the depths that this flash illumines can comprehend the voices that
come out of them. It is the Late, city periods that, no longer capa-
ble of seeing into the depths, have turned, the remnants of reli-
giousness upon the external world and replaced religion by
humanities, and metaphysics by moralization and social ethics.
ln Jesus we have the direct opposite. "Give unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's" means: "Fit yourselves to the powers of the fact-
world, be patient, suffer, and ask it not whether they are 'just."'
What alone matters is the salvation of the soul, "consider the lilies"
means: "Give no heed to riches and poverty, for both fetter the soul
lo cares of this world." "Man cannot serve both God and
Mammon"-by Mammon is meant the whole of actuality. It is shal-
low, and it is cowardly, to argue away the grand significance of this
demand. Between working for the increase of one's own riches, and
working for the social ease of everyone, he would have felt no dif-
lerence whatever. 53
ll is indeed Spengler's interpretation that is consistent with that

, 11the Roman State, from Constantine onward, and it is this same
'potential'' within the Christian ideology that has allowed it to be a
, owilslt'Ol part of European culture, from that time to the present. But
"ipc•11~lcris ncecllcssly critical. The Christian doctrine has only aided
1lw lln1wrlnllsllc !ell-al, nt,t hindcrecl its realization. Anyone who has
,,v,.,, wllli lll11slo11:-11f allrulsn1, approached the battlefielcl armed
wlll1 ('lllllitl,111 tlll'tmh did su tnlnlly unpr1·pi\red to <In any-
111,•111lv
llll11g11111
lt11tl1t•1·tl1t• ollj.-1 tlvc•i- 111F,11111111'u11
t·xp,111•,1011.
1111'
1·0111p,,11till1ty111"1111•{'1111!.ll,111 way" wttlt 1111'nlljcwtlvt·•1 of
146 YURUGU
the Roman State is argued for by St. Augustine in The City of God. This
was one of the many "apologies" written in defense of Christianity
against its non-Christian critics, as well as the Donatists. Through
Augustine the political compatibility of Roman and Christian ideology
and, therefore, the "counter-revolutionary" role of the followers of
Jesus and Paul are clearly demonstrated. Augustine says that all
earthly authority is "approved'' by and "issues" from God. He quotes
from the scriptures:
Hear therefore, 0 ye Kings, and understand, for power is given you

of the Lord and "Sovereignty from the Highest."
Wisdom of Solomon vi, 3
For there is no power, but God; the powers that be ordained of

God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordi-
nance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves
judgement."
Romans xiii, 1-2
Norman Baynes paraphrases the method of Augustine's argu-

ment,
Because rulers are chosen by divine Providence, the servants of

Christ are bidden to tolerate even the worst and most vicious of
states, and that they can do by realising that on earth they are but
pilgrims, and that their home is not here but in heaven. 54
We must remember that Augustine's purpose is to convince the

Church that the Roman State is its proper earthly vehicle, and, by the
same token, to assure the politicians that Christianity was not meant
to interfere with the State but, in fact, to complement it. In Baynes'
words, "St. Paul had urged obedience to the state upon the ground
that the state rewards the good and punishes the evil." 55 In
Augustine's view, "God" had helped the Romans, for even though
they were vain seekers of earthly glory, according to the relative stan-
dard of the earthly state, they were good people. And in rewarding
them, "God" had in view a further purpose-that the Romans might
on their own level be an example and an inspiration to the Christians.
These things being so, we do not attribute tlte power of giving king-
dom and empires to any save the true Goel,who gives !ht' lu,pphwss
in tlw kingdom of heaven to the plo11sal0111',1)11!l,{lvrs kl111-(ly pow,·r
In llll' plott:, and 1111•
rn11 ,1tll1 1)11111
1 as II ltlllY plf'IIM' 111111,
l111plo11~.
w110"' 1<11111I pl1•11~m,• ii, 11lw;\y•;J11:;l
The same is true in respect of men as well as nations. He who gave

power to Marius gave it also to Caius Caesar; He who gave it to
Augustus gave it also to Nero; He also who gave it to the most benig-
nant emperors, the Vespasians, father and son, gave it also to the
cruel Domitian; and, finally, to avoid the necessity of going over
them all, He who gave it to the Christian Constantine gave it also to
the apostate Julian, whose gifted mind was deceived by a sacrile-
gious and detestable curiosity, stimulated by the love of power. 56
Augustine writes this to Marcellinus:
Let those who say that the doctrine of Christ is incompatible with
the State's wellbeing give us an army such as the doctrine of Christ
requires soldiers to be, let them give us subjects, such as husbands
and wives, such parents and children, such masters and servants,
such Kings, such judges, in fine even such tax-payers and tax-gath-
erers, as the Christian religion has taught that men should be and
then let them dare to say that it is adverse to the State's well-being!
Nay rather let them no longer hesitate to confess that this doctrine,
if it were obeyed, would be the salvation of the State. 57
It would be difficult to state the compatibility of these two ide-

' 1logies more clearly than Augustine has. Niebuhr attempts to absolve
/\11gustine of the implications of these writings. But even he cannot
1>retend to ignore the imperialistic nature of the Church-State alliance
l11the Middle Ages which Augustine justified, inspired and helped
I 1rl11gto realization.
IAugustine identified] the City of God with the historic church, an

fdentification which was later to be stripped of all its Augustinian
r(•servations to become the instrument of the spiritual pride of a
~111iversalchurch in its conflict with the political pride of an empire.
This identification had the merit of introducing a religio-political
l11stitution into the world which actually placed a check upon the
,wlonorny of nations; but at the price of developing in that institu-
t hm dangerous similarities to the old Roman Empire, and of estab-
lblil11g the pope as a kind of spiritualized Caesar.'' 58
111Augustine's view it is paganism and the "immoralities of the

1"'8•111 i_.!nds';I hat society must battle. On these grounds as well he jus-
1111,;s t llt· s11pprr.ssion by the state of non-Christian religious prac-
1Ii ..,;, WHII lllf' Chur('ll rc~idcs the authority to decide what the "true
l.11111" 1-:, wliicll fl{ t lw d11ty of tlw Statr to protect anti clcfcntl. At tlte
,11111· It b1•linov1•s('htl•;tl:111slo ollt•y law:- and pay tax<.·.~
111111• as l011~
11 f11lll1h ttnl vl11lal1•d ("H1•11cl1•1 1111l11('iws,11
1111'11 • ") /\tl)-{11sflllt'':-:
148 YURUGU
Platonic influence is evidenced in his conception of the Church, rem-

iniscent of Plato's conception of the Republic. The Church represents
those who are on their way to the celestial city. According to Baynes,
"it is the organ and representative in the world of the eternal city of
God." 59 And rigid class hierarchy, human exploitation, even slavery
become for Augustine embodiments of "justice" in the "world of
becoming" through the concept of sin. 60
The similarity between the developmental roles of Augustine
and Constantine are striking but not ethnologically surprising. To
Augustine was left the task of "selling" the idea of the Christian-Roman
merger, which Constantine had initiated. Constantine had convinced
the non-Christian Romans. Augustine had now to convince the "non-
political" Christians. He concerned himself with the unification and
solidification of the Christian organization and, therefore, devoted
much of his attention to the "clarification" of Church doctrine-espe-
cially in terms of its political implications and its suppression of dis-
sidents.
Augustine's battle was with the Donatists and other "heretics"
within, and with the Manicheanists (who were basically non-
European culturally), for these voices represented the political threat
of disunity. His task was that of forging a more dogmatic formulation
of Christian teachings; it would be taken up again later by Aquinas.
His philosophical influence was that of Plato via the neo-Platonists.
His inherited ontological "monism" dictated a theory of being that
would admit of only one principle-as opposed to the Manicheanites,
who said that there were two ultimate principles: good and evil.
Augustine's contribution to the orthodoxy and unity of the Church
was consonant with his mission to assure its triumph as a political-
ideological force, and he is probably most responsible for its early
monolithic nature. Of African birth, he contributed to the develop-
ment of the European empire, the Church, and European imperialism
"Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." [John:
3-16]
The gentile (pagan) of Jewish nationalism became the heathen
(pagan) in its broader archaic Western European form under
Christian doctrine. Many of the same criteria for this distinction are
found in the new expression. The hypothesis of theological evolu
tion is present in the Jewish formulation, based on the implied goal
(i.e., superiority) of belief in and commitment to a god as au abst ril<'I
principle or "pun• spirit," and the <1cc11mulationof n•llgious pr1·rvpts
don11111 111tt•d111 wrlltt•n ft,rni. 111tl1l' ('ltrbll.i111•xp11·~slo11 Wt• lwgl11lo
1;1•1• ,Ill ,1ddltlc111.d1•111pll,1'il~: flu• ('!IIH't'(II or "n•vt•l,tllull" "l<t•VtHl1•d'
1
religion" begins to be closely associated with the idea of monotheism

and its "progressive" nature. The illusion of the "objective truth" of
Christian teachings is heightened. The Jews had no problem; they had
been born the "chosen people." Christians had to create a criterion
for admittance into the brotherhood, with its rhetorical inclusive-
ness and its pragmatic exclusivity.
Proselytization and Imperialism: "Saving" and "Ruling"

This concept of revelation is of interest both culturally (politi-
cally) and philosophically (metaphysically). Traditionally, anthro-
pologists have regarded revealed religion as a characteristic of the
state of "civilization." For Tylor, the related characteristic of belief in
retribution was a mark that helped to separate the "civilized" from the
"primitive." One should have to deserve the good ("after") life. This
concept has strange ethnological implications. It cannot be inter-
preted simply as the Christian view of the "religious" or "extraordi-
nary" experience (Eliade's hierogamy). The traditions of other
cultures are filled with, often centered around, the transcendent as a
category of human experience. Traditionally, one is born into a reli-
gion just as one is born into a culture. One's religion is considered a
birthright. Culture is indeed the natural context for religious belief.
Christian ideology radically altered this concept and by so doing
fashioned a religious statement that was potentially elitist, "intellec-
tual" as opposed to "spiritual-emotional," 61and at the same time uni-
wrsal-imperialistic. One is not born a Christian, one must be baptized
by the proper authorities. In some sects Jesus must be first accepted
'The Christ" in the hope that the Christian god will reveal himself
Io the properly pious. This idea is related to the imperialistic nature
of Christianity. It is justifiable (and, in fact, an act of piety) for mis-
sionaries to proselytize the Christian religion, because, in their view,
1I10sewhom they seek to convert have no religion, properly so-called.
It ls only because of the political implications and related con-
·,1·quences that it seems so "immoral" to Tylor that there is no pun-
lsl 1mcnt-reward system associated with the after-life cosmology of
111,tny non-European religions. Unless Christianity is able to offer the
IIIPssings of "heaven," rather than the tortures of "hell"; unless
< 11rlst!;ms arc able to convince people from other cultures that these
111•the: alternative fates 0!')en to them, and that they (the Christians)
11,tw\'lll' kc•y,then f'.uropeans lose one o( the most persuasive tools
11t1•yIHIVl' wtll1 wlllc-11 lo C't11il111Iol11er reopll'S. In the words of
l{lwl11ltold Nll·lll1111,
150 YURUGU
... only in a religion of revelation, whose God reveals Himself to

man from beyond himself and from beyond the contrast of vitality
and form, can man discover the root of sin to be within himself. 62
And Mbiti, in his discussion of African religions, says that,
Traditional religions have no missionaries to propagate them, and

one individual does not preach his religion to another .... Traditional
religions are not universal; they are tribal or national. .. the propa-
gation of a religion would involve propagating the entire life of the
people. 63
And Jomo Kenyatta says,
In Gikuyu religion there is no provision for official priesthood, nor

is there any religious preaching. Converting campaigns are, of
course, a thing unknown. This is due to the fact that the religion is
interwoven with traditions and social customs of the people. Thus
all members of the community are automatically considered to
have acquired, during their childhood teachings, all that it is nec-
essary to know about religion and custom. The duty of imparting
this knowledge to the children is entrusted to the parents, who are
looked upon as the official ministers of both religious ethics and
social customs. 64
All religions promote cultural nationalistic expression, and

Christianity is only universal in that European cultural nationalism is
characterized by universal or international imperialistic ambition.
This theme will recur again and again throughout our study. And its
recognition is crucial to an understanding of the uniqueness of the
European mind and political effectiveness of European cultural impe-
rialistic ideology in the quest for world power. It is a theme that is
masked and subtly expressed in the presentation of European cul-
ture. The international character of the European political ambition or
objective has been continually and tragically (for its "objects") con-
fused with the spurious universalism of European cultural and ideo-
logical identification. In many respects, of course, this is precisely the
desired effect of such formulations that become part of the arm.i-
ments of European imperialism. The proselytization of Christianity
has perhaps the greatest culturally immobilizing and dcmoralizi11g
effect on its "objects."
Since Its inception, the Cl1urch has partldpnll•cl 111a11d s11p
pmt,·cl Ille E11101H•,111l11qwrlalisl t·111t-rprl:w E11101wn11c·1ill11rr•ts 11p
cllll1•11•11Ilrc111111111<
0
1 rttlltll ''i l11 thl•, 11",pl't t, •,lt11c• 1ltc· 11·l,111u1111lilp
between religion and nationalism is most certainly a universal cul-

tural fact. No cultural group goes off to war without invoking the
names of its national gods, and the reasons for declaring war are usu-
ally reformulated on a conscious level in religious terms or most cer-
tainly in terms that are consistent with the religiously stated ideology.
The nature of this relationship in the European context is only "spe-
cial" because European imperialism and European nationalism are so
unique and intense. The uniqueness and intensity issue from the asili
of the culture and the utamaroho through which it is expressed. But
let us briefly trace the nature of the relationship between Christianity
and the European imperialist venture.
We have looked at examples taken from the Old Testament
which serve as evidence of the way that the religious laws and pre-
cepts of the Jews supported and encouraged their militantly nation-
alistic ideology. This ideology was stated in terms that were to
become pivotal in the rhetoric of European cultural imperialism; e.g.,
the quest for the "universal good of mankind"-a good that, having
been realized or at least recognized by Europeans (Jewish, Christian,
"civilized," "religious" people), made it incumbent upon them to
spread it among and thus "enlighten" (conquer, enslave, control)
Ihose less fortunate and "slower" than they ("gentiles," "primitives,"
"pagans," "heathens"). We have seen how the Christian formulation
·laborated and altered the Jewish conception, enlarging it to suit the
expanded European utamaroho and imperial world ambitions of the
1-'.uropean.The Roman State had already conceived of the world-impe-
l ialistic objective politically, but Roman religion lagged behind-not
vrt sophisticated enough to support a world order. We have also
sN;:n in what manner the Christian formulation was coopted and used
In the Roman pursuit.
My objective is not to argue that the Christian doctrine was con-
sciously formulated for the purposes of European imperialism nor
tliat Constantine was not in fact "a true convert" and came to believe
In I he Christian god. Speculation on that level is pointless and irrele-
v1111lfor the purposes of this discussion. The obvious and significant
1•1il1·ural fact is that the Christian and Roman ideologies expressed the
:,~111<' values and political objertives, supported the same activities,
,111cl t-nco11rageclthe same behavior of Europeans toward people of
111 Ii •1 cultures. Tl,e J11daic,Christian, and Roman conceptions consti-
11111 • s 'parnt c hut <·ttllu1aily related dcvelopni<::ntal stages in European
11,1Llt II' t xpresstm1. Tlwy toalt'.S<' 'O In I lw E11ropea1t nillural asiii.
111111ls1 1
1'11c•y1111·1-lwd d1•f111ttlo11
tu j-!IVI'1·1-1tly :,1•tr-lm,11.(t'
lo tltt• 1,:,1111p1•u11 anti
11(11111111'1Jh11,,Ill lll/111/t//1)//11 lh,11 d1·111,1111li-d
l111p1·1l11lbtl1
l>t•h,1vlor
152 YURUGU
The role the Church has played has sometimes been that of the
aggressor in a military and political imperialist pursuit. Most often
and most successfully, though, it has been the protagonist in the
drama of European cultural imperialism. The Church has taken a lead-
ing role in cultural aggression, because, of all the facets of European
expansion, it has easiest access to non-European peoples and great-
est potential for their ideological destruction. Only rarely, and never
very effectively nor aggressively, has the Christian Church attempted
to act against what it considered to be the excesses of European
nationalism and even in these instances, by virtue of its conversion-
ism, the Church still occupies a central position in the European offen-
sive, for as has already been pointed out, European imperialist
tendencies may be easily grafted onto Christian ideology.
It remains here to cite only a very few of the instances of the
Church's support of the European imperialist venture. During the
greater part of the Medieval period, Church and State were barely dis-
tinguishable, or more properly speaking, the Church was more pow-
erful than the State, and the term "Christendom" reflected the
intimacy of this relationship. The following statement is a character-
ization of the "Christian holy wars" from a Eurocentric perspective,
one of the more obvious varieties of European nationalism.
During the tenth century, when the Kings of Wessex were winning
back the midlands and Northumbria from the heathen Danes, other
heroic Kings were saving Christendom from its heathen enemies in
the German lands. The Saxon King, Henry the Fowler, drove back
the Danes in the north and the fierce Hungarian archers in the east.
His grandson, Otto the Great, destroyed a great Hungarian army in
955. These men shared with the men of Wessex the honor of sav-
ing Christian Europe. And the defeated heathen were converted to
the Christian faith.65
Generally, the First Crusade is set in the eleventh century, but

the above is obviously a description of an earlier successful
"Christian" imperialist campaign. The Crusades were, of course, the
primary instrument of Western European expansion during the
European Medieval period and at the same time remain an example
of the most militaristic and aggressive expressions of the European
conquering utamaroho. The Church not only condoned these actions
in terms such as those in the statement above hut was itself th· Int
IIHlor of these campaigns. Tlw followln~ <l(snlptl1111 fron1 WIiiiam
1
McNl'lll 111,1k1~~ t·lt 1\l' llw stilt k t'l'HIIIy ol ti tt• I111ii11.111·

1
,111dii wxt rlru lilt•
11•l,1lln11,lilp lwtw1•1•11('1111,tl,111 ld1·11lt11:1,y
1 ,1rnl 1-:11111pP1111
t•X(Mthloll
ism. The religious, military-political, and commercial institutions of

the West meshed easily into a united imperialistic endeavor.
The most spectacular early step in the expansion of Europe was the
conquest of the eastern Mediterranean coast as a result of the First
Crusade (1096-1099). The Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban
II. ..
The motives which impelled the Crusaders to embark on their ven-

ture were mixed. Religious enthusiasm, stirred up by the pope and
by numerous preachers, played a decisive part. The aim of the
Crusade was to free the Holy Land from Moslem rule, and Crusaders
were promised absolution from their sins as a consequence of their
service to a religious cause. Other motives, of course, were added
to religious ones: the spirit of adventure, the hope of carving out
new estates and principalities, the diplomacy of the Byzantine
emperors who needed military help against the Turks, and, to some
(small) extent, the commercial ambitions of a few Italian towns all
contributed to the First Crusade. Yet, when due allowance is made
for these subsidiary motives, it still seems safe to regard the First
Crusade as a striking example of the power of the Church and of
Christian ideals to inspire military and political action. 66
During this period the Church was the spearhead of European

c•xpansion, and historically we can view the Crusades as one of the
111ostimportant military ventures in the expansion of Europe. The
lnt<,rnal politics of the Church was itself to become quite "worldly,"
, 1Pating the ironic and embarrassing situation of the "profanation" of
1,:,,ropean institutionalized religion. It is only reasonable to conclude
Illil I the effects of these cultural tendencies were far-reaching and
I 11111they have made themselves felt long afterward in the moral
1h•cay of the contemporary West. The period of intrapolitical maneu-
v, 1l11gsand power plays-extreme and sometimes violent competi-
1lc111 for the papacy-was perhaps the height of "religious profanity"
within European culture, but its legacy remains.
hrlsllanity, colonialism and cultural imperialism:

"tleathen," ''.Native," and ''Primitive."
'1'11~next period of the involvcmenl of organized religion in
otll'ai1 1•xpanslo11I:. I hat of colonization. The justification for the
I 111
I h11n·li'•; l11volv1•11w11t wns ntways 1·ouclwd In trrms of c11nvcrsio11.
M,111yl~11w1w,,11hlst1111.,,,., ltl1•11lllyu,11v1·rslo11f•;I:w111l111cntwith
1111v c .ill "1111111,11111,11
111111'1111111: wltl1 Ii, Iii 111111,
l,11ils111," I-;ld1·11t1Jwd:i-.
154 YURUGU
the universally altruistic motivation of behavior. Although this may

sound contradictory, if understood as a manifestation of European
nationalism, such interpretations of "conversionism" become, at
least, ethnologically understandable in terms of the cultural asi/i.
They represent the hypocritical semantics demanded by the com-
mitment to a view of the culture as superior.
In The Image of Africa, Phillip Curtin quotes from proceedings in
the British Parliament concerning the question of "aborigines" in
1935-7.The responsibility of the committee dealing with this question
was to investigate government policy:
Native inhabitants or Countries where British Settlements are

made, and to the neighboring Tribes, in order to secure to them the
due observation of Justice, and the protection of Rights; to pro-
mote the spread of Civilization among them; and to lead them to the
peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian religion. 67
This is an example of what Curtin characterizes as the "humanitarian"

concerns of the missionaries for the British Niger Expedition of the
1840s. He identifies "conversionist sentiment" with "Christian human-
itarianism":
[Between 1830 and 1870] The dominant British attitude toward

Africa became more conversionist than ever. The Niger Expedition
itself was a large-scale public effort to convert barbarians to
Western ways. The middle decades of the century represent,
indeed, the height of conversionist sentiment. 68
The missionary interest group argued that "only a previous

indoctrination with Christianity and the ways of 'Western Civilization'
could prepare them [the Africans] for the impact of European
Settlement. Furthermore, in their view, Christianity and civilizatio11
were inseparable." 69 "After 1870," says Curtin, "the idea of conversion
declined. Humanitarian motives found new manifestations." 68 These
examples from Curtin are helpful because they afford us the oppor-
tunity of making clear the relationship between what Europeans have
termed "humanitarianism" (supposedly characterized by "altruism"
and identification with a "universal good") and what I recognize as
imperialistic behavior, the epitome, and most visihle expression, c ;r
European self-interest.
The tendency to ignore the political implication of this lci11dot
l111manltarlanlst11 (so-called) is dlsplayNJ <'OllSl!ill'lllly In Wc•sl1•111
sorlitl I llPory. 111Nore rt,,, /l,sr1,n 1 11/ ,,,, ft/11,1111A111,•nu1'l'llw,1111,
Cn111wll .11~111•stlt,11IIH•"t(l,•11ol 1111'"11nlty ul 111111ild11d"
IH l11lt1•1t-11I
111
Christianity and that it has acted against "racism," which he sees as

distinct from and somehow bad as compared with the good inten-
tions of "conversionism."
Slavery, it has sometimes been argued, was first considered in the

colonies as an interim institution designed to convert both Negroes
and Indians to Christianity ... It is interesting, however, that among
the colonies of the seventeenth centuries it is the heathenism of the
Negroes and Indians, rather than their race, which is emphasized
as a basis for their enslavement. 70
The fine distinction between the connotations of "heathen" and "nig-

ger" may well be interesting to Gossett, but from an African-centered
perspective they become one and the same-both denote "objects"
of European imperialism. Of the two, the concept of "heathen" is per-
haps potentially more debilitating as it is more rapidly adopted by the
oppressed herself and incorporated into her own self-image.
There are some few accounts, exceptional and difficult to find,
which do not get trapped between Christian ideology and European
Imperialism. Let us take time to quote from a few of these, which
together give a much more accurate picture of the historical rela-
1ionship between the Christian Church and some of the more base
manifestations of European nationalism.
Katherine George entertains a discussion of what she calls "eth-
11ocentricism" as manifested in descriptions by Europeans of Africans
written between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. To be more
prPcise she is offering evidence of "Eurocentrism"; more accurately
we might caII it "Western European nationalism," which translates
l11l.oa "culturalism" and, of course, "white racism.'' Her research
affords us an excellent example of the supportive relationship of
<'hristian ideology to the invidious comparisons fundamental to
l·'.11ropeancultural nationalism. The image of European peoples that
< 'liristianity presents has provided ideological support for the
1-:tJropean'sview of himself in relation to those who are not within his
« 11lturalgroup. This image is also essential to the Christian argument;
It was upon this supposition of the moral and therefore "evolution-
,11 y'' inferiority of aII other people that the proselytizing mission was
ltHlltclc.'cl,a mission that provided moral justification for the expan-
•,to11J-st mission of Western European imperialism. The author of the
Ii,llowini,i· statc-nwnt was cnclPavoring to justify the Portugese slave
lt,ICI(•'
156 YURUGU
And so their lot was now quite contrary of what it had been; since
before they had lived in perdition of soul and body; of their souls,
in that they were pagans, without the clearness and the light of
holy faith; and of their bodies, in that they lived like beasts, with-
out any custom of reasonable beings-for they had no knowledge
of bread or wine, and they were without the covering of clothes, or
the lodgement of houses; and worse than all, through the great
ignorance that was in them, in that they had no understanding of
good, but only knew how to live in a bestial sloth. 71
Of the above statement, Katherine George says:
... Christianity did not eliminate older hierarchies based on race,

nationality, class or occupational status, but it rather collaborated
with such hierarchies and more frequently than not strengthened
instead of weakening them-though it did introduce the compli-
cating idea of a possible restatement of human relations in the soci-
ety of another world. The availability of salvation to all properly
indoctrinated souls alike, despite bodily inequalities-we find this
gift of Christianity in the previously cited passage. But does it lessen
the writer's prejudice? To the contrary. It enables him instead to
commend actions (the kidnapping of helpless people) as morally
virtuous, actions which to classical observers would have seemed
merely expedient. 71
To Serve The Devil is a two-volume work that documents

American behavior and attitude-toward primary peoples. Here, an
advocate of Hawaiian colonization writes on the mutually beneficial
relationship between the American commercial interests and those
of the missionaries in Hawaii:
Christianity civilizes in the broadest sense. Commerce, industry,

science and literature all accompany her majestic march to uni-
versal dominion. Thus, while it denies the suffiency of commerce
alone to transform the savage, it encourages a legitimate commerce
and even courts its alliance as one of the most important instru-
mentalities. 72
In contradiction to Gossett's analysis, the authors of To Sero,·

The Devil, Paul Jacobs et al., comment,
... the destruction of the Indians was written Into the first rhnplt:1
of tile successful white colonization i11AuH'rlc-,1.Tll'=!plln' l<ll•ttlt1 nl
C'llristianity Wl'rt· easily mnld<·rli1110a r,1<:l:;tl(lc•nlogyLl111t 11111IC'IH'd
1111•1•co11111utc ,111d '>1id:II r11•111b of 1·xp11111l111Hl{<·lll<•r-;11
The fact is that almost from its inception the continuous venture
of European expansion ensued not only with the blessings of the
Church but, where necessary, by its decree. In the early fifteenth cen-
tury Pope Edward IV issued a papal bull "granting to the Crown of
Portugal all the countries which the Portuguese should discover from
Cape Non to India," to accommodate the "discoveries" of Prince
Henry the Navigator, on the African Coast. After Columbus' "discov-
ery," according to William Howitt, "His sponsoring Monarchs,
Ferdinand and Isabella, lost no time in applying for a similar grant.
Alexander VI, a Spaniard, was equally generous with his predecessor,
and accordingly divided the world between the Spaniards and
Portuguese." 74 The Pope as earthly representation of Jesus Christ
was supposed to have a right of dominion over the entire earth.
Alexander VI, an infamous pontiff, was determined to stay in
1:erdinand's good graces in order to ensure his own protection and
,1ccumulation of wealth. Anxious, therefore, to gratify Ferdinand and
Isabella, he granted "full rights" to them to all the countries inhabited
l>y"infidels" that they had discovered or would discover.
As the Pope's dominion was held to be worldwide, he had
,1uthority over vast regions he had never even heard of. To prevent
I liis grant to Spain from interfering with lands already "given" to
l'ortugal by a previous bull (issued by Pope Edward IV), he pro-
l'laimed that an invisible line existed from pole to pole, one hundred
lt·agues west of the Azores, separating the two territories. Everything
Io the east of the line of demarcation he bestowed upon the
I1c,rtuguese; all to the west of it went to the Spaniards. His motivation
was supposedly his enthusiasm for the propagation of the Christian
l,11th. In this way the Church divided up the world between two
1:11 ropean powers.
The apologists for the Church cite the public emancipation of
Ill"> slaves by Pope Gregory "the Great" as evidence of the Church's
nlhclal position against slavery. This interpretation is very much out
ul t11newith the historical/political reality. Chapman Cohen, in a work
p11blished in 1931, says:
Nol only were there thousands of unfreed slaves in the possession

of ci.:clcsiastics even a thousand years after Gregory had published
1I ils "death warra1it'' to servitude, but Gregory in person possessed
,11le,,st hundreds, a11<1 pcrt 1 aps thousands of slaves whom he did not
Ir t't'. AWiln, ns Poµc, lw w<1st rusl cc· for ti 1cpossession of thousands
111mc·, d1nlt1-I:; ol tlw l{omn11Church; yt•t h( 1 l11itiaH'd110 general
p11p;d lllflVl'llll'lll (111llw lllwr,1111111 ch s1•tls On I he•cunt rary,
ol ( '11111
c·c 1'11•111.i,tit al l,1w•111Jt1'11,111lly11p11e1~f'd,;111 h ;1 pnlh•v 1'•
158 YURUGU
The English slave trade, like that of other European nations, was
launched with the blessings of the Church. It is ironic but not con-
tradictory that the first English slaver was named "Jesus" and that the
first two rules Captain John Hawkins imposed on his crew were, to
serve God daily, and to love one another. "The piety of the expedi-
tion," says Cohen bitingly, "was beyond reproach." 76
There is no doubt that the Christian community gave its bless-
ings to the slaving venture, participated in it and contributed to its
success by embracing it within Western "morality." W. E. B. DuBois
brings home this point when he says, in reference to West Africa,
"Protestants of England, the Huguenots of France, and the Calvinists
of Holland started mortal struggle for Guinea. "77
Another valuable work, exceptional in European scholarship, is
E. D. Morel's The Black Man's Burden, written in 1920. Here he com-
ments on and offers a first-hand account of a slave raid by Europeans.
The African was a heathen, and as such fair game for the prowess
of the noble Christian Knights who opposed their steel breast-
plates, tempered swords and cross-bows, to his bare chest and
primitive spear. Here is a typical account of one of these predatory
forays:
Then might you see mothers forsaking their children and husbands
their wives, each striving to escape as best he could. Some drowned
themselves in the water, others thought to escape by hiding under
their huts; others stowed their children among the sea-weed, where
our men found them afterwards, hoping they would escape notice .
. . . And at last our Lord God, who giveth a reward for every good
deed, willed that for the toil they had undergone in His service they
should that day obtain victory over their enemies, as well as a guer-
don and a payment for all their labour and expense; for they took
captive of those Moors, what with men, women and children, 165,
besides those that perished and were killed. And when the battle
was over, all praised God for the great mercy He had shown them,
in that He had willed to give them such victory, and with so little
damage to themselves. They were all very joyful, praising loudly the
Lord God for that He deigned to give such help to such a handful of
His Christian people. [According to Morel, this comes from
Portuguese chronicles.]
Thus did Europe first bring the "glad Lidings" to the African. ll did
not take long to ascertain t ilat thE>spiritual ,011snlatlon drrlvc-d
fro111conv0rt ii 1g the J\fric;1n1n C'hrli;lln11ity had Its 111
llll,1111111
('111111
lt•rp,111.1x
The contemporary European imperialistic endeavor, contrary to

ils projected image, is understood by its perpetrators precisely in the
same terms as the Crusades and the subsequent period of colonizing
ventures. The following is the text of a prayer for the American Special
1:orces in South East Asia:
Almighty God, who art the Author of liberty and the Champion of
the oppressed, hear our prayer-
We, the men of Special Forces, acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee in the preservation of human freedom-
Go with us as we seek to defend the defenseless
and to free the enslaved-
May we ever remember that our nation, whose motto is
"In God We Trust,"
\'Xpects that we shall acquit ourselves with honor,
that we may never
bring shame upon our faith, our families, or our
f1,lJowmen-
( irant us wisdom from Thy mind, courage from
Thine heart, strength from Thine arm, and protection by thine hand
It is for Thee that we do battle, and to Thee

belongs the victor's crown.
1-'orThine is the Kingdom, and the power and
111eglory, forever, Amen. 79
From its inception Christian ideology has traditionally condoned

111111 c >ften mandated violent aggression and brutality on the part of the
1:, 11c ,pcan. The members of the Special Forces are simply taking direc-
111111 from the Bible.
Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have,
,111<1
spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suck-
ll11g,ox and sheep, camel and ass ...
A11dwhen the Lord thy God hath delivered it [the City] into thine
h1111tl:,, thou shat) s1nite every male thereof with the edge of the
w.ord. nut the women ancl !'he little ones, and the cattle, and all that
l , l11t ht· city, even all the $poll thereof, thou shalt take unto thyself;
t111cl tllc,11::halt t•at till' spoil of l hil,c enC'mics which the Lord thy
1:11d11,1111glw111111•1• .•. of tlw <'ltlt•s of these rwople which the Lord
11,y <lci<Idoth ~IV!' llwc· 101 111 l!llll'rll;1,ic-,·, 1ltn11slwlt •rnv" alivt•
11,111,111~ 111,11l111•,1ll1t•tl1
NII
160 YURUGU
The European's invocation of his god to aid him in his imperial-

istic pursuits is consistent with his self-image and his image of those
who are not like him. His "religion" itself is an expression of these
dialectical images.
Of the historical relationship between Christianity and the
enslavement of people of color by Europeans, Cohen says:
(But) we have another slave system to deal with. This took its rise
in Christian times. It was created by Christians, it was continued by
Christians, it was in some respects more barbarous than anything
the world had yet seen, and its worst features were to be witnessed
in countries that were most ostentatious in their parade of
Christianity. It is this that provides the final and unanswerable
indictment of the Christian Church. 81
Cohen, in contrast to Curtin, Gossett, Kovel (White Racism: A

Psychohistory), and others, has correctly assessed the meaning of the
Christian ideal of "the brotherhood of man":
Its brotherhood of man never meant, even in theory, more than a

brotherhood of believers, and in practice it did not always mean
that. It recognized duties and obligations between members of the
same church or sect, but outside these boundaries it applied a dif-
ferent code of ethics. What kind of brotherhood did Christians
bestow on Jews and heretics for hundreds of years? Christians in
their heyday of power would have looked with amazement on any-
one who claimed consideration for either. What kind of brotherly
attention did the inhabitants of ancient Mexico and Peru receive
from the Christian conquerors? How fared the Redskins of North
America, the Maoris of New Zealand, or inhabitants of Africa at the
hands of their Christian brothers? In practice nearly always, and in
theory often, Christians have shown that their doctrine of broth-
erhood meant little more than the mere brotherhood of a gang.
Within the gang rules must be observed. Outside the gang they
might be broken with impunity. 82
The costly political error of non-Europen converts has been to think

that they would ever be included in the European "Christian broth-
erhood" in the same way they were part of their own cultures.
Chinweizu admonishes us to "recall that European rule w;is
entrenched in Africa by means of a Western Christian cul1ure, a west
ern political power structure, and a colonial economy."~:\ The "holy
allia11cc" lt!ft a defeated Africa In its wake·,
Because white missionaries of Christ working in Buganda clamored

that their losing efforts to recruit black souls for the heaven of their
white god needed to be protected by white troops, and because the
British masters of Egypt were demanding that all of the Nile valley
should be placed under British rule, the Imperial British East Africa
Company (!BEA)was in 1890 granted authority by England to trade
in and administer the territory of the headwaters of the Nile. The
invading captains of the !BEA,in their quest for trading monopolies,
attacked the sovereignties of the African Kingdoms of the upper
Nile.84
As we have noted earlier, and Chinweizu agrees, the wide-scale

destruction of African sovereignty necessitated the simultaneous
destruction of an African consciousness. Here European Christianity
had a unique advantage.
To buttress and crown their creation, the founders of the colonial

nrder embarked on a cultural reorganization of Africa. If the African
auxiliaries of empire were to be docile and loyal servants, their alle-
giance to Africa had to be undermined. Total admiration for Europe
had to be instilled into them. Besides the technical skills they would
need to carry out their practical duties to the employers, they were
lo be taught Christian values of a servile-making sort. Unquestioning
obedience to white men was presented as a cardinal virtue. The
retooling of their minds and values was entrusted to the schools.
Whether run by missionaries hunting for black converts for their
white heavens, or run by colonial bureaucrats, these imperialist
schools not only taught reading, writing and arithmetic to their
Inmates, they also stuffed the heads of their victims with church
devotional hymns, filled their psyches with submissive Christian
itltitudes, and undermined their attachment to the culture of their
,u1ccstors. These schools inculcated in their wards a Christian the-
olof.{yand cosmology, and a western individualist ethos that weak-
1•1wd their African identity, destroyed their commitment to an
African communalist ethos, and erased their sense of patriotic
n•sponsibility to Africa.85
The Christians had no compunctions about destroying indige-

11111is rc•ligious movements not to their liking. They had done it before
111l".11t<>pl'. Their creed was, after all, one of violent proselytization
wtIt'll called for. Chiuwci.Zll rites examples in Africa such as the burn-
lllH oll\will chapels In Gabu11,where tlii:i sy11crctistic religious move-
111,·111 w,1s :.<·t 11 ns n pm,slhll' n11rturlnf.1ground for African nationalism.
0
l I ill Iw1·l1111•011111w11I:, 111al"t·s1wd;1lly ,11I lit• 1)1·!-(l1111l11g

of 1IH! cnlo11lal
1 •1,1, 1111•1 h111Tli W<1',,lll ,1r11111{, oln11l,IIdc·••IIll< 11011of Afrk,111111~a11l
162 YURUGU
zations and movements.'' 86

These passages reflect the direct and very political relationship
between the European Church and European imperialism. It is a rela-
tionship between "brothers." Ironically it is the subtle aspects of this
relationship that have proven to be much more devastating in the
long run to indigenous forms wherever the expansionist West has
sought to exercise its control.
The phenomenon of cultural imperialism, if it is to be distin-
guished from its strictly militaristic, political, and economic compo-
nents, is that which strikes the "death blow" at a people's ability to
resist aggression. There has never been, in the history of the human
race, more expert dealers of that blow than Europeans. They alone
have realized the full strategic potential of destroying the ideological
life of a cultural entity. Christian ideology is an ideally fashioned
weapon for the destruction of the self-image and value-system of
African and other non-European peoples. With its delusionary
rhetoric of "love" and "peace," its debilitating image of the non-white
(non-European, "backward," "heathen"), and its false "universality,"
it has succeeded where guns never could in tearing people from the
cultural base necessary for the formulation of an effective self-deter-
ministic ideology. A Christian with a gun in the armed forces is one
thing-he might end up with a spear in his back; but a missionary
with a Bible and a well-meaning smile who speaks of "eternal love" is
wholly different. It takes a great deal of political sophistication to rec-
ognize him as a potential menace.
Disease played a major role in killing off the Hawaiians, especially

venereal diseases. Measles and cholera swept through the popula-
tion and alcoholism weakened the islanders so badly that they often
succumbed to thE;common cold. But more important was the psy-
chological sickness that struck the islanders as their culture and
religion disappeared. "Nkanaka okuu wale aku no I kau uhane."
("The people dismissed freely their souls and died.") 87
Christianity and European Paganism:

So as not to ignore a relevant stage of European rlev<'lop1111•11t,
we ask: What is the relationship betwee11 Europ<>:111 Chrlslla11lty and
European "paganism" (a terni thr1t i1npllt•s 1111•F,11ru1·1·11t1k111111
Christian perspcctlv<·)? In tlw utl1·111pt to 11111li·1·,t,1111i 1111·11\llt id
E11111p1•,·11 t•ullrn,.ll d1•v1•1t,p1111•111, ot I 11101H',H1
tl1h 1111p1•rt 11 l!Jll11111l
tradition cannot be overlooked. I have focused on the institutional-

ization of religion in the form of the Christian Church because of the
way in which it expresses the underlying ideology or mythoform of
the culture. But for a moment let us take a brief look at non-Christian
Europe.
"Violence and battle were always at hand in the lives of men of
the heathen period in northwestern Europe. "88 This statement by
I l.R. Ellis Davidson allows us to glance at the warrior gods of Northern
Europe: Wodan (Odin), Tiwas (Mars), Mercury, Tyr, and Indra of
Aryan India. There are others, but the pattern is clear. War, the war-
t ior, and violence were worshipped among these Inda-European
:111tecedents of the present day Europeans. Odin-a warrior himself-
!1cld to be the divine ancestor of the Swedes and most of the Anglo-
Saxon kings, rewarded those who served him and who died in battle
with weapons, immunity against wounds, and a place in glorious
Valhalla, the famous "warrior heaven." The beliefs of these "ancient
Northmen" and women were a testimony to the glorification of war.
I lavidson quotes from Saxo Grammaticus, who in turn quotes a
1,1)\'C:'chof the warrior Biarki,
War springs from the nobly born; famous pedigrees are the makers
of war. For the perilous deeds which chiefs attempt are not to be
done by the ventures of common men .... No dim and lowly race,
no low-born dead, no base souls are Pluto's prey, but he weaves the
dooms of the mighty, and fills Phlegthon with noble shapes." 89
The style of battle was very individualistic, emphasizing single

1ornhat. Confidence in one's war god gave psychological advantage
11!(111to "possession." 90 In Davidson's words,
Throughout the heathen period in northern Europe there was clear

11Pt>c.l of a god of war. The story of the Germanic peoples and the
Vlki11gsis one in which local battles, feuds, invasions, and wars of
11 11t1llonalscale are the order of the day. The heroic literature is
I 1,t'it>d on an unsettled society, accustomed to violence and short-
llP!iS of life .... Clearly men reared in such a world were bound to
I 11t 11 In 1he god whom they served to protect them in the hour of
11111\IL' •... !ll
'l'ltl' violence int his early European religion did not only express
II 1•11111
lt•r111sof w<tr am! lhe killings of enemies but also through the
••11j11 l111<·1II
ol hlonrly ri\11,d 'Hltrifirc to l11e W,HTior god as well.
164 YURUGU
In the earlier days of Germanic heathenism the terrible wholesale

slaughter of captured forces and criminals implies a belief in a god
of battles who demanded that blood should flow in his honour.
Blood had to be constantly provided for the mighty deity, or else
he would be compelled by his nature to seize on the lives of wor-
shippers.91
Among the Heruli, worshippers of Odin (Wodin) practiced a rit-

ual in which human beings were first stabbed and then burned. 92
Such practices were common among the warlike Inda-European
tribes.
In spite of variations of detail in the many myths of these tribes,
Georges Dumezil finds a consistency in what he calls the underlying
"ideological datum" that explains the various myths. This is a crucial
point, for it affirms and justifies the methodology and theoretical
premise of this study. Dumezil's recognition of a common ideological
base shared by Inda-European peoples also argues for a vital rela-
tionship of continuity between the consciousness of contemporary
Europeans and their forbears of the classical and prehistoric periods.
The "ideological datum" of which Dumezil speaks, in his book The
Destiny of The Wan-ior, is related to Armstrong's concept of "mytho-
form." Is there a relationship between the mythoform of "pagan" and
Christian Europe?
Dumezil points to the parallels in Roman and Aryan-Indian reli-
gions: between Indra and Tullus; Varuna and Mitra; Romulus and
Numa. Of the beliefs, he says,
What the Indian and Roman thinkers have maintained in clearest

form are: (1) the idea of a necessary victory, a victory in a single
combat in which, inspired by the grand master of the warrior func-
tion (either king or god) and for his sake, "a third hero triumphs
over a triple adversary"-with stain implicit in the exploit, and with
a purification of the "third" and of the society which he represents,
so that he finds himself to be the specialist, the agent, and the
instrument of this purification, a sort of scapegoat after having been
a champion; (2) the idea of a victory brought off not by combat but
by a surprise which follows upon a betrayal, betrayal and surprise
succeeding one another under the pretext and within the contex1
of a solemn agreement of friendship, with the result that the sur-
prise act of revenge includes a clisquieling note.!13
Suppose we use this schema to Interpret tli<' rrurlf,xlnn of .l<~s11!:
;;111dJ11<11's' h1'lrayal of '1i1117 Dunll.'711sp<•aks ol 1111• "<•11llc•1·llv<
1
1111•111
111y" ul tlw l11(111 t::lll't1pl',111,111d of 1lw IIH>• d 1111!1poll II( ,II drn trilH' lh,11
"111e11,tl('flll?>l'lt•tll'(•.'" 11
1111•11
( 011,111111t·d
But how then can we account for the supposed hiatus between
Christian Europe and its pagan origins? Only to Christians does the
appearance of "god" in human form explain this evolution. In what
terms do Europeans usually express the difference/relationship?
They do so always in terms of the dichotomy of European national-
ism/chauvinism. Yes, even with regard to their own predecessors/
ancestors. Davidson says: "Northern heathenism, that is, the pre-
Christian beliefs of the Germanic peoples and the Scandinavians,
came to an end in the eleventh century." In the nineth and tenth cen-
turies we know that the Vikings were a great power, but, in Davidson's
words, they were "a menace to Christian civilization." 95
Christianity is associated with "civilization"; non-Christian reli-
gion is called "heathen" or "pagan," but very rarely, even in scholarly
writing, are these latter terms defined. "Pagan" is, in some cases, sim-
ply used to mean "non-Christian," but looking to the dictionary, the
ideological uses of these terms become explicit. The term "heathen"
has the following uses:
1. an irreligious or unenlightened person; 2. an unconverted indi-

vidual of a people that do not acknowledge the God of the Bible; one
who is neither a Jew, Christian, nor Muslim; pagan; 3. (Formerly)
any person neither Christian nor Jewish, esp. a member of the
Islamic faith or a polytheistic religion.96
For the word "pagan" we find:
1. one of a people or community professing a polytheistic religion

as the ancient Romans, Greeks, etc.; 2. a person who is not a
Christian, Jew or Muslim; 3. an irreligious or hedonistic person. 97
'l'lle Latin pagus means village or rural district, and so "pagan" has the
, lcrogatory sense of "peasant" or a person of the countryside. As we,
In contemporary parlance, might say "bumpkin" or "hick," indicating
1111Pwho lacks the "sophistication" of the cities.
"Christian," "heathen," and "pagan," therefore, do not merely
, ,•present religious differentiation. They indicate ideological differ-
1•11<·es,differences in world-view They are culturalist terms defined
It 0111 a Eurocentric or Arab nationalist perspective. European
t 'I 11ll-l inns consider kws to be religious, even though they may dis-
·'U'111• hi! tNly with them asIo the nature of historical truth. (fhere is
cot1c<'rni11gMuslims, who are not considered "hea-
, u1111• ;1111IJiv.tlt·11ct'
1111·11·,,'' IHII wllo 011<'<'wc•11· Tiley pose a cultural embarrassment
lt11·1•II w:1•:M11"il111 tlt;1l 11st 11t·<l''E11ropean civilization
sc·l111l,11~;lllp 11 1
166 YURUGU
from the "dark ages.") Why are the Europeans so hard on their so-
called "pagans" and "polytheistic" forbears?
What, in the European context, represents the proper form of a
religious statement is intimately involved with their concept of "civ-
ilization" or, as Europeans see it, the "civilizing" process. These ideas
cannot be understood without reference to the two basic concepts
of European ideology: evolution and progress.
One of the reasons that the terms "heathen" and "pagan" hold
such reproach and are so derogatory from a Eurocentric perspective
is that initially it was the European "past" to which they referred.
Nothing requires defeat so much as the past in the logic of the
European mythoform. It is the non-European in the contemporary
world who becomes associated with the past in the European mind.
(fhe anthropologists studied the "past," which meant non-Euro-
Caucasians.) But we must remember that Europeans still practiced
what in Christian parlance were "pagan" religions until the eleventh
century. This means that these "backward" peoples were actually
both within and outside the culture simultaneously. "Heretics" were
culturally acceptable (though dangerous). "Pagans" were not. In this
critical period of transition there could be no equivocation concern-
ing the correct path toward progress; the shape of the new national
culture.
This "paganism" did not die easily. Christians have always been
willing to fight bloody battles and wars to "convert" others to their
way of thinking, even their own people. Perhaps the threat of those
who dared to persist in the religions into which they had been born
issued from the fear that Christianity might not triumph as the ideo-
logical champion of the "new" European. Imagine the anxiety that
this caused for those who were convinced of the necessity of
"progress!"
An African-centered perspective forces us to look more closely
at this history, this cultural development. We must make sense of it.
Using the concept of asili, seemingly complex "paranoid" behavior on
the part of the European becomes crystal clear and makes "sense,"
unfolding from the logic of European development. Why should "
people who were non-Christians and who were slaughterin~
Christians become Christians themselves anct begin to slaughter theh
brothers and sisters in order to make them so? What is lhf' ronn0<·
tion between this new religion and the ethos of the religion~ p, acll<.:Pd
by early and "backward'' E11ropca11s?
1'11<'C'Ol\C't'l)I or(/.'1/i tt'll!i II~ to look 1111l'Oll',l:.tc•111•v, lltt· 1•1111·11-l•
lc-11,·v101 whkl1 w,· •w,111'11 lfc•swltlt11111111•,q1l,111,1t111v ,111d 11,•111•r;11IJ1H
principle of European development. Europeans have always been

involved in an unrelenting quest for power, political hegemony,
expansion, and technical control. As this drive to conquer developed
more intensely, the parameters of the conquering self and of the ter-
ritory (world) to be conquered expanded. Constantine had inge-
niously perceived the effectiveness of institutionalized Christianity as
a supportive mechanism for the cohesion of the Empire. Later,
Christianity would be fashioned as the appropriate vehicle for a much
more expanded concept of imperialism, one which required a more
refined concept of progress, and more importantly, a more cohesive,
and at the same time, expanded identification of the conquering culture:
Rurope.
Davidson says, "Since they themselves [the 'heathens'] had no
desire to make converts, they were at a serious disadvantage, and it
was only a matter of time before the new religion replaced the old." 98
Whether knowingly or not, she is pointing to a political and ideologi-
ml disadvantage. Conversely she hits on the political and ideological
advantage enjoyed by Christians. "Pagans" do not seek converts.
These "pagan" Europeans may have been "barbarian heathens," con-
quering others and even expanding their territories, but they had not
11s<'dtheir religions to do so. The posture of their religions had not
lwen imperialistic. It was not outer-directed. They had not under-
·,tood the political uses of religion. (Africans and most other non-
F.11 ropeans still do not. Arabs are the only non-Europeans to have
11s<:cl religion in this way.) Proselytization is inherently imperialistic;
pC'rfcctly suited to supporting an expansionistic utamaroho. Now we
, ,Ill begin to understand in what sense "paganism" was "backward"
from a Eurocentric perspective.
There are other dynamics to this phenomenon; other pieces to
t lw puzzle of why Christianity and not paganism. Pagan lndo-European
c·11'tttrcwas violent, aggressive, xenophobic, and individualistic. Its
, dll,(ion called for the sacrifice of human blood, as did many religions.
h till' auswer then that Christianity was more suited to the European
11t11marohobecause the Europeans became more peaceful, loving, and
, 11111munalistic?That answer is illogical, for Europe has never been
1'11.11,trterizedby those values. To the contrary, European Christian
I II I 1,,vlnr Is equally.xenophobic-in spite of its rhetorical xenophilia-
1111cl t•1111>rac1•swar a11clviolence in tlw name of the Christian god. In
1.,1,•1 pt11locls ii l't1wlnps tlw ln<lividualistic ethic of capitalist-materi-
dl•.111A11d,wli;H b 11H1rt.:, it tlt•mmldC'<Illunwn sacrifice!
1\11Illtt•tt· /.','t 1·1l11h1ly,1 tlttl1•1t•1H'1•
lwlwt•1•11E11rop1•1111( 'lirfsU;111lty
1,u1 l 1,1p,111l-,111
111dI 11111p1 'I'll, 11tn111111ul,1111f
l',11:1111
l11d11E111111w,111
nil
168 YURUGU
ture is the same. The formal structures through which it is expressed

are different in much the same way as European peasant culture and
archaic European culture are different from the cosmopolitan cul-
ture of the European "multinational." It is a question of "sophistica-
tion," but not to indicate valued behavior in any universally valid
sense. "Sophistication" refers to the hypocrisy that began to develop
within the bowels of European culture. It was a matter of pragmatism
and efficiency. Christianity was a more refined tool for the selling of
European imperialism.
There are certain traits that have made for the success of
European civilization in its quest for supreme dominance and control
of others. It is a culture based on an ideology of superficial change.
This allows its hegemony to expand while being maintained. If what
can be called "modal changes" do not occur at strategic historical
points, the objective of total domination will fail. The Platonic epis-
temological mode (utamawazo) put archaic European culture on the
right track, as it were, towards successful imperialistic expansion by
establishing the intellectual confines of that ideology. The aggressive
utamaroho was already in place. It had to be harnessed for efficient
performance. Herein lies the genius of Europe!
What classical Greece had achieved on the intellectual level,
classical Rome must achieve politically. "Paganism" didn't fit. It was
as simple as that. As the imperialistic goals of these fledgeling
Europeans expanded, the various modalities of the cultural structure
grew out of sync with one another. If they had not been reshaped,
readjusted so as to form a cohesive unit, Europe would have failed-
just another culture living peacefully in a culturally pluralistic uni-
verse. Unfortunately for the rest of us, it didn't. At least not at this
juncture. (Medieval Europe represents a long period of dormancy; a
loss of momentum, perhaps even intellectual ambivalence as far as
the ideology of progress and change are concerned. But subsequently
the culture regrouped itself and catapulted once again on to the road
towards world domination through technological advance.) The
Protestant revolution and the rise of capitalism represent the neces-
sary creative responses at other such junctures in European history.
The cooptation of Christianity was such a response in A.D. 312.
Constantine was the shrewd strategist in question. Anti it worked.
Violence, aggression, and xenophobia could 1w longer he
expressed in the form of European paganism if thes<' 11as,c11t
r-.urnp0n11swere to rurl h1·r clPvPlop t lwir c·111pln-. wn:-,
'l'hr 11/11111,11n/t<1
cow,lslt·11I. It still <11•1111111dPcl
eo11trnl,:tl-(l,!l(",Hlo11,n11d l111111,111
s,11·,·llk1•.
11\ll I111'11/,/1111
w11s 1·11:1111.(l11~: vl•.11111uf wil,tl WH:, JH1·,•1lhl1•/\IHI ht
11111
turn, what was necessary. A more expanded vision required a more

sophisticated technique. This had been the immutable law of European
development.
The European institutionalization of Christianity was something
akin to a technological advance. It added the element of proselytiza-
tion that more suited the objective of imperialistic expansionism
within which those objectives could be hidden or camouflaged.
Xenophobic, aggressive, and violent tendencies were molded into a
more subtle statement that packaged them in a universalistic, peace-
ful, and moralistic rhetoric. In other words, "barbarian" Inda-European
pagan religion became more "modern" in Christian formulation, more
suited to the new demands of European "progress," progress clearly
referring to ever greater efficiency of the mechanism for total control.
r.uropean civilization can be understood as nothing more than the
rnost efficient mechanism for that end.
As always, the utamaroho remains the same. That is the consis-
tent, unchanging factor. The ideology is informed by the utamaroho,
lmt must develop as the vision grows. For the utamaroho, is expan-
.sionistic; always seeking a larger space in which to be housed, a large
''turf" to control. This brings us to a second aspect of the European
political genius. As the vision grows, so must the national conscious-
11ess.This is critical, for the nature of the utamaroho requires an
1•xpanded definition of the self. We are talking about the growth of
political consciousness. This is why cultural and political behavior
ran only superficially be separated. They are united in ideology.
Political behavior on a national level requires the definition of the
Interest of the nation vis-ii-vis other nations. The definition of the
lt1terest requires a national consciousness. Culture creates that con-
~dousness through its ideological function.
In early European or Inda-European history we witness violent
1t Ihes or hordes whose lives were ordered by war. True, they tended
I II move at various points, on the more peacefully oriented, less
11~!.(ressivepeoples, generally of the south. After this southern inva-
1,lrm,when their utamaroho was implanted into the Mediterranean,
wllat then? They continued to move against each other! Rome was
••wnt ually overtaken by these Germanic peoples. The culture went
1111 n1~!,{hperiods of uncertain development, instability, and insecurity.
<'lt•Mly,If 1h~ Europca11 hegemony was to be achieved this penchant
1111 vlolc•n\ h 'havlor must be turner! towards "others." Christianity
111l1wd 10 d ,fine who the "othrrs" wer<' l11 a way that fitted the
E111op1·1111 n Hnmnn, ;i Hrlton, a Frank, a11cl
prng1t•~s ldt•cilo~y M1\kl11~1
o 1111111111l11 wrntld ,u,I 111•t'ilW,
,1 "l•'.111op1•:u1" II W,lS lh<· onkt of
1111I
170 YURUGU
the day in terms of the logic of European development. First, ortho-

dox Christianity provided the perfect structure within which the (sub-
limated) statement of aggression, even human sacrifice, and
imperialistic ideology could be meshed; and lastly, it provided the
perfect structure for the forging of a European consciousness that
could carry out this vision of a European-dominated world.
Christianity achieved the unification of the new European self.
It acted as a unifying element as it housed and solidified the nascent
European utamaroho, one inherited from a northern, "heathen" past.
It helped to redefine European nationalism as universal imperialism.
(This is why the Jewish statement was insufficient.) European civi-
lization has been so successful in part because of its ability to outer-
direct hostility, another example of political genius. When this ability
is hindered, the survival of the culture is threatened. The destructive
tendencies within are so intense and so endemic to the culture that
they must continually be redirected. The cooptation of Christianity
represented such a redirection of aggressive energy.
Now the difference and relationship between European pagan-
ism and European Christianism can be placed in its proper context.
Pagan religions were aggressive but not expansionist. They did not
have this vision, and they were too separatist to be successfully impe-
rialistic. Christianism took the concept of human blood sacrifice and
raised it to the pinnacle of religiousity by sacralizing it in the symbol
of Jesus; this acted as a sanction against the killing of other
Christians. They then legitimized its actual practice by superficially
(ideologically) dehumanizing non-Christian non-Europeans and then
sacrificing them to their god.
But this change would not take place overnight and, as we have
seen, well into the eleventh century, the more "sophisticated"
Europeans, who had incorporated the vision of European hegemony
and now identified as Europeans, would fight and kill their more
"backward" brothers. First, Celts, Goths, Druids, Teutons, Angles,
Saxons, etc., then finally and fiercely, the Vikings, who would wage
constant battle to protect their national identities, as they defined
them, unwilling to accept this new "European" consciousness, a con•
sciousness that Saint-Simon would still be seeking to solidify in th('
early part of the nineteenth century. The identity of this long period
of internecine wars can be unclers1ood then, nol as llw b,1ttlc of the
c11lightc•1iecl and the "civilizf'd" .igalnst the 1111c11llghte1wd hnrhnriH11s,
Ii, it M, ,1 :-.l.1f!1• In t I II' st ri 11~gl1·to Inst II uh' ,\IHI ro, 11mli,h,I l' a 111·w 111q>t•
11,11111d1•t,
Patriarchy in the Development of European Religion

Inda-European pagan culture did however contribute charac-
teristics to European Judea-Christian ideology. Although it is possi-
ble to identify practices of male dominance in most societies of the
world, patriarchy, as an institutionalized value, as an intrinsic char-
acteristic of utamaroho can be associated with Inda-European origins
of Western civilization. One of the aspects of cultural development
that demonstrates this most clearly is religion.
In the ancient religious traditions of Africa and other parts of the
world, we find again and again the predominance of the mother god-
dess; the valorization of the female principle, the earth symbol. These
traditions were well-developed before it was possible to speak of a
"Western" or "Western European" peoples. The older, more
"Southern" civilizations can be generalized into one cultural or ideo-
logical model in contrast to the younger and more aggressive
Northern groups comprising what has been called the "Tumuli" civ-
ilization, associated culturally with the Inda-European and racially as
the Aryans. It is this latter group with which we are concerned as they
represent the cultural/racial forbears-the ancestors-of what we
now call "Europe." These people came from "the regions North of the
Black Sea, between the Carpathians, and the Caucasians," according
to Mircea Eliade. 99
A brief statement of Cheikh Anta Diop's "Two Cradle" theory of
111eorigins of Civilization, will help to initiate our consideration of the
l lleme of patriarchy in European religion. Diop's concern in his book
l'lt<'Cultural Unity of Black Africa is with "the Domains of Patriarchy
1111dMatriarchy in Classical Antiquity." For him these types of social
mcler correspond to two contrasting "cradles" of civilization. These
I wo cradles are areas of origin for two different kinds of civilization
t 11,tlreflect two different world-views and corresponding lifestyles.
'l'I w differences between these two places of origin seem to originate
l11t•cology, according to Diop's explanation.
The environment of the Northern Cradle was harsh, cold, and
, 1 t,,tlvcly infertile, lacking in opportunities for agriculture. Adaptation
I II t I tis environment produced a series of cultural/social characteris-
t Ii •,, a111ung them aggressiveness, individualism, the predominance of
,11..11t111tlw diet, and monogamy. There were other characteristics,
I ,111I l1t•y will be discussed more thoroughly, along with a deeper
, l11ho1at Jon of Diop's theory In subsequent chapters. It is interesting
1111ic11«•, t1owcvf'r, thnt Diop!~ ar~ul11g ag.iinst Eurocentric interpre-
1
('rn1e·ernh1g t·hc origins of

l,1tl1111·i 1.1IU,1<ho(Pll, M11q.(;u1, r111d l•:111.wts
'11111lllt•l 1 l1{l11":11,dpolv!!VIIV
172 YURUGU
Our focus here is on religion, and, according to Diop, the

nomadic and transcient nature of the lifestyle of the ancient Inda-
European had some interesting effects:
In this existence which was reduced to a series of perpetual migra-

tions, the economic role of the woman was reduced to a strict min-
imum; she was only a burden that the man dragged behind him.
Outside her function of child-bearing, her role in nomadic society
is nil. It is from these considerations that a new explanation may be
sought to account for the lot of the woman in Inda-European soci-
ety_too
This devaluation of the female role was incorporated into their

religious practices. Among the nomads, who had no permanent res-
idence, cremation took presidence over burial, and fire, which gave
much needed warmth in a land with little direct or close sunlight, was
"worshipped." Fire rituals can still be witnessed in some European
communities. (See James Frazier's, The Golden Bough, New York:
Mentor, 1964.) By contrast, according to Diop's theory, in the
"Southern Cradle" the earth takes prominence as agricultural activ-
ity and fertility abound. The population is more peaceful, secure, and
sedentary. Women play a critical part in the economy and in subsis-
tence. The female principle is the foundation of the cosmological con-
ceptions.
Mircea Eliade, in his work A History of Religious Ideas, Vol. I,
identifies these warlike Aryans as the "Proto Inda-Europeans" and
the "Inda-Europeans." These are the people of Diop's "Northern cra-
dle." Eliade identifies them as the initiators of a destructive period of
invasions into the Southern regions between 2300 and 1200 years
before the Christian Era. This is part of what he calls the process of
"Inda-Europeanization," which had an effect on the religious ideas
and practices of the areas into which these people expanded. Eliade
is concerned with delineating and understanding these effects.
In terms of an African-centered analysis, the process Eliade iden-
tified is part of the historically continuous process of European impe-
rialistic expansion. This "Inda-Europeanization" of which Eliacl<'
speaks is the earliest expression of the European utamaroho. Eli,Hlc
says,
This characteristic process-migration, conqut•st of IH'W l<::rrilo-

rlPs, •:111
)IJJlssiu11of inhahll,ml s, follnw<>cl
by I I1111,1s1->ln
11iat1011 did
1
I 11111111111•
111111•111 y nf 111,r 1·1 ,, St wh ,1111•,ca111pll'111
nlnl't 1•1·111111·1•111111
ll1111111',th ,111cl1·1dl11rnlt·Xp,111slc111 Ii, ollwrwli.1• 10tl11111w11 101
If we accept Eliade's statement as accurate, it would seem that as

social scientists and historians, we should be curious as to the rea-
son for the peculiar intensity of this phenomenon. What accounts for
this atypical behavior and for its "success?"
According to Eliade, the Tumuli (Kurgan) culture developed
between the fifth and third millenia and expanded westward about
4000 B.C.E. They then proceeded to "make their way into Central
Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, Transcaucasia, Anatolia, and Northern
Iran (ca. 3500-3000 B.C.); in the third millenium they reached north-
ern Europe, the Aegean Zone (Greece and the Coasts of Anatolia), and
the Mediterranean." These, he says were the Proto lndo-Europeans.
This developing Inda-European culture was influenced by the more
developed civilizations of Africa (the "Near East" is a misnomer) and
the East. 102 They practiced agriculture, but "preferred to develop a
pastoral economy." Eliade's explanation, contrary to Diop's, would
imply that there was something other than ecological necessity that
determined this predilection for the nomadic lifestyle, but he doesn't
say what that factor might be. "Pastoral nomadism, the patriarchal
structure of the family, a proclivity for raids, and a military organi-
1.ation designed for conquest are characteristic features of Indo-
102
Furopean societies."
Eliade is interested in determining the relationship between a
lifestyle of pastoral nomadism, war, and conquest, on the one hand,
1111d the "emergence of specific religious values," on the other. He
lllakes an attempt to reconstruct themes of a common Indo-European
, •ligion. He suggests the idea of celestial sacredness, light and height
or elevation; the idea of creativity in its immediate meaning, the idea
of sovereignty, the sky-god as supreme father, and that fire kindled
liy lightning is celestial in origin. "The cult of fire is a characteristic
••l1•111ent of the Indo-European religions." Whereas, "Mother Earth as
11 , cligious concept is recent among this group." 'The Aryans had no
, JI!PS and knew nothing of writing .... Iron began to be used only
1050B.C." 103
il11111t
Rosemary Ruether goes even further in her analysis and identi-
11111,patriarchal tendencies in European religion with monotheism:
II I•, possible that the social origins of male monotheism lie in

hcrcling societies. These cultures lacked the female gar-
111111111cll<-
d1•11l11g role and tended to irnage God as the Sky-Father. Nomadic
11•lll{ln11swcrt•1·l1arartcritl d by exclusivism and an aggressive, hos-
1
111•• tom,hip tot 11('ngrlr1ilt11r.ilpr•ople of the land and their reli-

111 1111
~hnt. 111,,
174 YURUGU
While her analysis echoes those of Diop and Eliade in many

ways, in neither of the other two theories do we see this connection
between what for us are critical and characteristic aspects of
European Christianity: patriarchy and monotheism. Clearly, monoth&
ism is related to the monarch and monolith, to forms of power. Who
is the monarch? Certainly the European answer would be that the
monarch must be male.
In Ruether's view:
Male monotheism becomes the vehicle of a psychocultural revolu-

tion of the male ruling class in its relationship to surrounding real-
ity. Whereas ancient myth had seen the Gods and Goddesses as
within the matrix of one physical-spiritual reality, male monotheism
begins to split reality into a dualism of transcendent spirit (mind,
ego) and inferior and dependent physical nature. 105
Ruether points to one of the characteristics of the European uta-

mawazo (which we discussed in Chap. 1): the tendency to "split" real-
ity into valued and devalued categories, which are dictated by an
utamaroho that must relate to phenomena as either the superior self
or inferior other, so as to justify conquest and control.
The male is seen essentially as the image of the male transcendent

ego or God, woman is seen as the image of the lower, material
nature .... Gender becomes a primary symbol for the dualism of
transcendence and immanence, spirit, matter. ,os
Elaine Pagels also picks up the theme of the patriarchal nature

of European Orthodox Christianity, but she correctly includes
Judaism and Islam in her description. These three religious tradi-
tions are conspicious in their lack of positive female symbolism,
whereas most of the world's religions "abound in female symbol-
ism."106But what about the early Christian tradition? According to
Pagels, the Gnostics combined the female and male principles in their
image of the divine. Valentin us "suggests that the divine can be ima~-
ined as a dyad; consisting, in part, of the Ineffable, the Depth, the
Primal Farther; and, in the other, of Grace, Silence, the womb and
Mother of All."107
In the African view, we would speak of the lrnrmo11ious interac•
lion of the complementary IJivin<' Feminine ancl M.1sc-uli11c. This lei ~:,
of cornpl<'11w11tnrlty, so not iC"NtlllynhsPnl 111t lw l·'.urupenn world
vlt•w, w,,~i,(111ptt>:.Pnl to so11u• clt•g1ec· l11flit• c;,111•,llt(Ahlt·a11111H11
ly nu ht la 11,pre• p11lfllt-11I)( 1tl1(1•pt11111nl cit tty Puw·h lc•II•
C'IIC••ti, 1•,11
1 • ( ,11,,,t II •• Hnltl l I 111!1111•I IIVIIH' ww, ' 111,1111
1-1, I h,,t 1111111 11111lc·11tl111t11•
the great male-female power;" others said that the divine had no gen-
der; and a third group held that it was either, depending on which
attribute you wished to emphasize. 108 Some Gnostics, she says,
described their god as Mother, Father, and Son. This would resemble
the African conception of Wsir (Osiris), Ast Osis), and Heru (Horus).
Feminine powers, for the Gnostics, were associated with thought,
intelligence, and foresight. 109 Pagels refers to material from the
"secret" gospels, revelations, and mystical teachings that, she says,
are replete with feminine and sexual metaphor, and the valorization
of female aspects of creation and godliness.
But the process of censorship by the self-acclaimed represen-
tatives of Jesus on earth then took place, and
Every one of the secret texts which gnostic groups revered was
omitted from the canonical collection, and branded as heretical by
those who called themselves orthodox Christians. By the time the
process of sorting the various writings ended-probably as late as
the year 200-virtually all the feminine imagery for God had disap-
peared from the orthodox Christian tradition. 110
The acceptance and sacralization of the feminine went hand in

lrnnd with greater involvement of women in the gnostic movement
when compared with the orthodox church and more prominent posi-
t Ions of women in the organization. The orthodox leaders were out-
1,1ged. Pagels quotes Tertullian: "These heretical women-how
t111daciousthey are! They have no modesty; they are bold enough to
l1·nch, to engage in argument, to enact exorcisms, to undertake cures,
,11111,it may be, even to baptize!" Irenaeus chastises Marcus, a Gnostic,
wl10 "invited women to act as priests in celebrating the eucharist
with him." (Marcus) "hands cups to women to offer up the eucharist
pr:,yc•r, and to pronounce the words of consecration." Tertullian
>11H·aks for the orthodox view, "It is not permitted for a woman to
,p1•,tk in the church, nor is it permitted for her to teach, nor to bap-
1111·, nor lo offer [the eucharist], nor to claim for herself a share in any
11/irwfunction-not
11111.•,, to mention any priestly office." 111
Pagels says that "from the year 200 we have no evidence for
w111ut•11 laking prophetic priestly and episcopal roles among orthodox
• 111111lws." 112Fro1n Judaism and .Jewish values the Church inherited
11111,II of its prlt rlnrchai character, and though Paul recognized women
1 d1·11i·1111:, illld ft,llow ww kl•rs, ht>"argues from his own-tradition-
tli\ .f1•whll -1·01wt<ptlon.of II monislic, 111asn11i11c Gc,dfor a divinely
111d,ll111 d ltlf'1,111·ltyof ·,rn l,ll i,11lmtcll11ntlo11·
.ls C:nd llns autllnrityovPr
t 1111-,1, 111•d1•i l,111",, < 111111!
(i1•111•s1i. ·> :\, ~.11 111,111l1o1-. ,lllllintlly 11vl'1
176 YURUGU
women." 112In I Corinthians 11:7-9, "a man ... is the image and glory
of God; but woman is the glory of man. For man was not made from
woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman,
but woman for man."
Pagels contrasts the position of women in Egypt, Greece, and
Rome, where women enjoyed many rights with men or were in the
process of being given more rights, with "women of the Jewish com-
munities [who] were excluded from actively participating in public
worship, education, in social and political life outside of the fam-
ily."113 (Actually, the position of women in Kernel was far superior
to that of women in either Greece or Rome. So much so that travellers
from these areas were appalled. See B. Lesko, The Remarkable Women
of Ancient Egypt, 1987.) But the scriptures were to say:
Let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness. I permit no

woman to teach or to have authority over men; she is to keep silent.
I Timothy 2:11-12
The Apostolic Church decided that no woman was to become a

priest, and the orthodox view of women was as having come into
being for man's fulfillment. This puts Christians in a bind. Clearly this
concept of fulfillment is not spiritual, therefore women are created
solely for the purpose of their sexuality; the same sexuality that is
damned. It is women who are inherently evil and all of humanity who
are caught in a hopeless contradiction. Why were women "created"
in the first place? Pagels says,
By the late Second Century, the orthodox community came to

accept the domination of men over women as the divinely ordained
order, not only for social and family life, but also for the Christian
Churches. 114
This period of formulation was of tremendous historical significance,

and was impressively successful from the perspective of consistency
and adherence to dogma. The history of the Church is proof that
monolith makes for ideological control. In 1977, Pope Paul VI, Bishop
of Rome, declared that a woman could not be a priest "because our
Lord was a 1n,u1.''115
Wli:it WC'are observing tl1rougho11l lhls st11dy Is tlw prort·ss of
"fall OJ H'f\J\IZUI 1011," ii ('0111 flllli\ll('t' or wll11tEll,l<lt' ll,l'l (',lllt•<I"[11<10
11,1unp1•1111l111tlo11." 'l'lw uil11d'lt•l, lite• 11tw1111111111, tlw 11t11111mulw, tl11•
lwl111Vl111,1I
t1•111l1•111·lt•-.
lh.1l llth 1111•1.d,111111111I
•1lrn II p1111'1t",'IC'd
w,1•,
continually creating and refining modes through which to express

themselves. We are not surprised to see the connections between
early Inda-European religion, social organization, and conquest,
namely, seminal classical Greek thought, as expressed in Plato's writ-
ings, and the Orthodox church of the second century. They are all
part of one ideological tradition; each influencing and helping to
determine the next historical cultural form; a link in the chain that
would become "Western civilization." More specifically, the devalu-
ation of women is adumbrated in classical Greek thought, where it is
explicitly elaborated in philosophic discourse by Plato and Aristotle.
They paved the way, along with Jewish social values, for a patriarchal
church. What may have happened in Greek society especially is that
men attempted to incorporate the female principle within them-
selves, thereby relegating the woman to a merely physically different
being who had little of value to contribute to the construction and
maintenance of the State. In this way, men, who were the valued form
of being, were not forced to look outside of themselves for wholeness,
or so they led themselves to believe. In her book Centaurs and
Amazons, Page duBois discusses this process of devaluation through
an examination of the Timaeus:
The philosopher maintains his closeness to the divine, moving

upward in the scale of beings, while men who fail in the effort of phi-
losophy are punished by becoming women in their second lives. No
woman can be a philosopher. She must wait until after death, when
her soul might be reincarnated in the body of a man. 116
And again, of the Timaeus,
The male sex is assimilated to the divine part of the soul; men, like
that divine soul, must be protected from the miasma, the pollution
represented by women. That worse part of the soul, likened to
women, is superior to the worse of the body, which is like an ani-
mal. She says, "women were associated with the body, which was
inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the
lteacl, the philosopher, the male." 117
t\11rlfrom the Republic, she quotes:" ... all those creatures generated
,rn 111c11 who proved themselves cowardly (deilol) and spent their
IIVl's !11wrnng cluing w0r0 transformed, at their second incarnation,
l11l11w1111wn." 118TllL· fatl1ers nf the Church were merely continuing
tli.1I r •Occ-lNIil particular view of
,111d f11rllH•tl'l,1hot:tllttH 11·tr.1cl1llo11
H ,dl1y, ,1 vh•w tli,11 l1ncl 11l1'1•11dy i,llll:H'Pd 111lt11l0l•:1nnpc1111t·11lture
111111lu. Hh ,11<l11·1•litllo11..:h1
178 YURUGU
The Religion and Rationality Syndrome

One of the consequences of the specious universalization of the
Christian statement was that it-together with its adoption of the
Platonic mode-launched the European into a fruitlessly unreason-
able and senseless enterprise. In the words of E. L. Allen, "Socrates'
greatest achievement to many is his insistence on the use of reason
to decide moral questions." 119 Yet, while this may very well be one the
most significant legacies of Platonic thought, it may also be the most
misguiding, given the Platonic understanding of the nature of "rea-
son." It is here that we can clearly recognize the definitive func-
tion/role of the European utamawazo. It shapes the consciousness
and limits the possibilities of conceptual experience. The European
identification of religion with rationality is a demonstration of this ten-
dency, ultimately originating in the need to control. The European
interpretation of this "use of reason" was bound to the attempt to
remove the religious experience from its natural cultural base, and
thereby was confronted with the task of "finding" (which in this case
means "creating") the proper religious statement. Given the pre-
dominant perceptual mode of European thought, Europeans were
destined to search within the confines of the abstract and the ratio-
nalistic.
Even Rheinhold Niehbuhr recognizes the dilemma posed by the
attempt to approach and justify the religious by way of the rational-
istic. And he is forced to attest to the Church's perennial suscepti-
bility to this mistake:
... obviously a view which depends upon an ultra-rational presup-

position is immediately endangered when rationally explicated; for
reason which seeks to bring all things into terms of rational coher-
ence is tempted to make one known thing the principle of explana-
tion and to derive all other things from it. Its most natural
inclination is to make itself that ultimate principle, and thus in effect
to declare itself God. Christian psychology and philosophy have
never completely freed themselves from this fault, which explains
why naturalists plausibly though erroneously regard Christian faith
as the very fountain source of idealism. 120
What Niebuhr does not want to admit is that Christian philosophy is

plagued by this particular conception, because that concep1 io11 Is
itself charactl'rislic of t'l1ewhol<• or European phil<1~ophy.
TIH· 1·:11ropt•a11s had 1r.q1pcd 1h1·111:-.t•lvt•~ lly il:t!illllllllj.! (ll,1( rt'll
~l1111•, It 11th1•011~Mt•dol lll)lllllll,( 111011•tit,111lilt• plttlo•,opl11i',d '•Y'•
II 111, nl 1l1111nw111·1111111111
,1wl tlw11•f1111•
11•ltt:lrn1, ,11 llvlty 1111llw111
seemed properly to be contained in their own "philosophical inves-

tigations." They had already established the criterion of "true" reli-
gion to fit into this framework when they declared that monotheism
and revelation were more consistent, universal, and therefore "ratio-
nal" religious conceptions than were polytheistic ones. But the reli-
gious statements that they themselves made became increasingly
unsatisfying; for obvious reasons, these conceptions did nothing to
fulfill them spiritually. Some examples from the ongoing European
theological discussion will help to clarify the point.
Terence Penelhum has devoted an entire work to the subject of
Religion and Rationality. The pursuit to "rationalize" religion in this
way is a proper one in his opinion. His book is something of an his-
torical survey of the many attempts of Europeans to "prove" that
their god exists. The work offers excellent ethnographic material as
it demonstrates in broad historical spectrum the peculiar flavor of
European thought and the uniqueness of European theology.
Natural Theology represented the elaboration and refinement of
a fusion of principles that had taken place when Plato identified the
"true" with the "good." (In Kemetic [ancient Egyptian] thought, for
instance, philosophy, theology and science were never separate.
Their integration becomes only problematical because of the reifica-
lion of the "Platonic Abstraction," which tends to reduce thought to
a limited rationalism.) What does the attempted "fusion" do when
rationalistically defined? The following passage is taken from the
work of Aquinas:
Now, since we have proved that God is the source of being to some
things, we must further show that everything besides Himself is
from Him.
for whatever belongs to a thing otherwise than as such, belongs to

it through some cause, as white to a man: because that which has
no cause is something first and immediate, wherefore it must needs
belong to the thing essentially and as such. Now it is impossible for
illlY one thing to belong to two and to both of them as such. For that
wltich is said of a thing as such, does not go beyond that thing: for
111slancc to have three angles equal to two right angles does not go
· lwyoncl a triangle. Accordingly if something belongs to two things,
11will not belong to bolh as such: wherefore it is impossible for any
011P lltlng lo be prNlical~cl of two so as to be said of neither by rea-
s1111 orfl ra11sc, 1>111 it is m·rcssary that either the one be the cause
1111t It' ol ltt•r, for ill!1Iam·<•fin• i!l the cause of heal in a mixed body,
.11111 ye-I Pal'i1 I:, rulll•d /10/; or l'lst• souw tllircl thing musl be the
, ,111'11' ol 1111Ii, 1111•
lmtlt, 11111111,t,11111• l'i\llM' ol n111rll<•s1~iviri~llf.!hl
180 YURUGU
Now being is said of everything that is. Wherefore it is impossible

that there be two things neither of which has a cause of its being
through a cause, or else the one must be the cause of being to the
other. Hence everything that, in any ways whatever, is, must needs
be from that to which nothing is a cause of being. Now we have
proved above [He refers to Bk 1,Ch. xiii where he says "there must
needs be a first mover separate and altogether, immovable, and
this is God," p. 31] that God is this being to which nothing is a cause
of being. Therefore from Him is everything that, in any way what-
ever, is. If however it be said that being is not a unequivocal predi-
cate, the above conclusion follows none the less. For it is not said
of many equivocally, but analogically; and thus it is necessary to be
brought back to one thing. 121
Only within the context of the European utamawazo and uta-

maroho would such a statement be recognizable as having anything
remotely resembling religion or spirituality as its subject matter. The
need to "prove" the existence of the spiritually true is a European
need. The inability to distinguish between the "logic" of the mathe-
matical syllogism (proposition) and "reasonableness" or "truth"; and
the inability to recognize the limitation of pure logical analysis points
to a European conceptual weakness. One is tempted to view Aquinas'
statement as the product of a strange dementia, but if it is, it is a
dementia determined by the European asili, the ideological, cultural
seed. It is characteristic of the European utamawazo, as discussed in
Chap. 1, and becomes intelligible, if not totally "understandable," as
one comes to know the European utamaroho. For when rationalism
becomes sanctified, then, of course, formal theology must become
rational, to be deemed suitable for superior minds. And, after all, that
is what European culture is all about.
Here is another curious specimen of similar genre taken from
Leibniz' writing in the Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on
Reason:
It follows from the supreme perfection of God that producing the u11i-
verse He chose the best possible plan, containing the greatest order;
the best arranged situation, place, and time; the greatest effect pro-
duced by the simplest means; the most power, the most k11owlecl~W,
the most happiness and goodness in created things of which the uni-
verse admitted. For as all possible things have a claim to cxiste11<.:<'
in I he undersla11di11g of Goel In proportic111to their 1wrf1•clio11s,I lw
ri•s11lt of all I IH'sr clnlms must lw th<' most 1wrf1•rt act 11,tlworld
wl ill'! 1 ls I 111ssllilt
1
• ( )t I wrwls1· II wtHtl<I 1101 Ill' pos~:lhlt· lo t'1Cpl,tll1wily
1lil111J,'1 l111pp1·1wd ,1stlwy It 1v1· ,,11111·1 tll,111nlll1 1 1wli1t• 11'
Again, the lack of sophistication or depth of spiritual insight is

striking here-areas so impressively developed in African, and other
First World-descendant philosophical systems. There is much in
Leibniz that bears the stamp of Plato, while Aquinas is obviously
much more in the debt of Aristotle and his "self-moving mover." But
like Aquinas and Leibniz, Plato and Aristotle represent only slightly
different manifestations of the same ethnological traditions and ten-
dencies: All fit the asili and so were embraced.
In the introduction to his work Primitive Religion, Robert Lowie
says that Leibniz' conceptions "belong to a different compartment"
from that of "religion" and that, "In Leibniz religious flavor is singu-
larly absent because his abstract propositions leave the religious con-
sciousness cold." 123 His term "compartment" is well chosen for it
implies at least a conceptual differentiation between the nature of
spiritual and scientific activities. This is a differentiation necessitated
hy the European definition of science and the accompanying materi-
,1lization of the universe. The problem is how one develops spiritual
conceptions that can be applicable to a world that one has already
dfectively (or affectively) materialized. The solution is unavoidable:
Reduce spirit to matter; the essence to its manifestation.
Most European theological and philosophical discussions make
llw same "compartment" or, to use Gilbert Ryle's term, "category
111i~take."For the European mind, operating outside of the rational-
istic: sphere means a loss of control. It necessitates the recognition
1 if a power greater than itself, and such a possibility is contradictory
to the European utamaroho. And so Europeans are faced with a
dllpmma, for religion has by definition to do with the awareness of the
,11pernatural; i.e., a power that transcends the mortal self. Yet it is
l111rnanent within the immortal being/spirit. It is a dilemma never
, ·,caped in European theology, and Europeans end up with an image
111the all-powerful or supreme being as "the most rational mind"-
wl itch is of course their image of themselves. Having inherited reli-
Hl1111sinsights from older traditions, they were bound to misinterpret
tlu•m.
IL Is the appearance of rationality that was added-a character-
I t II' t lial only they needed. This characteristic exhibited in the state-
111i•11t s from Leibniz were long before adumbrated in Platonic
ll11111glll-~yrnptnms lhat became more and more acute as the
l.t 1111pca11 I rndition grew older and rnore hardened. The "coldness" of
\q1d1m•1nlltl l.<•ill11lz rt'll<•cl tit~: coldness of a culture unequipped to
111uvldt• Its 1111·111lwrs wll°II l'll hrr sph it 11nlperc{'pt iveness or a related
111111111 n1lt11te lies in its fanatical
ll.1•11• '1'111·":H11•111(tl1"nf l-'.111t1p1•,111
182 YURUGU
commitment to the technical-scientific. Its weakness lies in the ill-

fated attempt to derive meaningful value from a mythology of the
"eternal truths of a universal logic," the absoluteness of the rational
mode.
Much of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience
bears on the problem of "religion and rationality" in that he is con-
cerned with the way in which the religious experience is presented
to human beings. Instead of making the mistake of assuming that it
must properly occur within the confines of rationalism, James per-
ceptively observes the relationship of the emotional to religious con-
viction. In the passage below, he is discussing the convincingness of
certain "feelings of reality":
They are as convincing to those who have them as direct sensible

experiences can be, and they are, as a rule, much more convincing
than results established by mere logic ever are ... you cannot help
regarding them as genuine perceptions of truth, as revelations of a
kind of reality which no adverse argument, however unanswerable
by you in words, can expel from your belief. The opinion opposed
to mysticism in philosophy is sometimes spoken of as rationalism.
Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for
themselves articulate grounds. Such grounds, for rationalism, must
consist of ... (1) definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite
inferences logically drawn. Vague impressions of something inde-
finable have no place in the rationalistic system.
And further:
If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your
nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your
whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs,
your divinations, have prepared the promises, of which your con-
sciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you
absolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chop-
ping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. This
inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as man-
ifest when rationalism argues for religion as when against it. 124
For this reason all of Schonfield's labors of documentation

"proving" what he calls the "Passover Plot," and his attempted logl
cal rigor, should not be able to convince a Christian that Christ was
not t·he "Son of God" (or "Son of Man"), sine<> faith bdongs lo t!H·
splic>r1• of 111ytlirnl11tir lh,111lo tl1L'rat0gory pf slwulm· lllstmy, will, t,
h 111c,1.-ly lc•n1prn al 1"r, Tlw 111,1111·1
lwc·o111c•s f111tlw, c•rn11pllc-,111•d,liow
ever, in the European context, because the Christian claim is pre-

cisely that of possessing "historical truth."
James makes the distinction between what he calls "existential
judgment" and "propositions of value" or "spiritual judgement." [n his
association of value with the spiritual, James is atypical; and so is his
recognition of the fact that these two areas of judgment "proceed
from the diverse intellectual preoccupations." 126 He is rejecting the
European utamawazo-battling the logic of the European asili. And
so he himself is rejected by the cultural traditions (and not included
in the required reading of Philosophy 101, 102, or 103).
In terms of the European utamawazo religions became associ-
ated with belief (nonvalue), while philosophy was associated with
knowledge (value). Therefore the task of the theologian was to give
European religion the shape of European philosophy, so as to
enhance its value. First, the European utamawazo artificially sepa-
rated spirit from matter (known), then it devalued spirit (unknown)
and attempted to redefine it in terms of material reality. The ancient
Africans had done the reverse; for them all meaningful reality was
rooted in the spiritual.
The rationalistic approach to religion is the counterpart of the
European conviction that values are "discovered" intellectually
rather than created via cultural activity. This ideological tendency
has its historical and epistemological origins in Platonic thought and
finds its development and interpretation in Aristotle and the
Scholastics. This "syndrome" perhaps points more dramatically to
1he spiritual failure of European religious formulations than any other
single aspect.
The Techno-Social Order

Though Judea-Christian thought is always heralded as being
tremendously influential in the development of the European tradi-
t ton, it is not as often made clear in what ways this influence made
Itself felt. It is certainly obvious that the avowed belief in "universal
brotherhood" and "peace" were not incorporated into European ide-
oloizy; that this espoused Christian morality has not had a formula-
I Ive Influence on the European ethic is quite clear. To an extent it is
a!{:tlna question of the compatibility of ideological perspective and
1·1ilturaltc11dencics. Christianity was, in the early stages of European
dt•wlop111c11t, conducive to tl1e growth of technology. A religious
slilll'llll'lll t hitt was not .cn111pnt Ible with Europ<"andf'velopment in
till" 11•~pr·1•t wn11ld 11<11 l1,1Vl' 1>1•t·11s11<t·t,sshtl In th<' European context.
/\', wllll lttll1tl-;111,l'ltrli,ti.1111tyl111wlit1111•d lo !-.itppl1rt 11Hdpru
184 YURUGU
mote the recording of tradition in written form as a valued activity.

Doctrine was made authoritative by putting oral tradition into writ-
ten form. Writing in this way acted as a sanction in the developing cul-
ture, and at the same time facilitated state organization.
The growth of Christianity in the early history of European cul-
ture was also associated with the cities in the same way that the
European chauvinistic expression associated European culture with
"city-life. "127
The European ideological frame of reference seemed to house
comfortably both the institutionalization of the Christian formulation
and the growth of European technological society. It is a question of
not only compatibility but, in the European context, one of neces-
sity. There are most definitely religious formulations that are not con-
ducive to the growth of technology as it occurred in the West.
The growth of cities, the use of writing as a preferred mode, and
the general emphasis on technology as a social goal all go hand in
hand with an assumption of and belief in the "idea of progress" in
which the continued intensification of these social facts constitute
absolute value. The Judeo-Christian formulation is based on precisely
the same concept. Within this tradition "religion" is seen almost as a
technological advance, and, therefore, is aided by and aids the growth
of the technical order. Christianity, then, is in this sense, as well as
others, quite "worldly" or "secular." It is the advantage of the "world
religions," according to traditional European social theory, that they
enable man to "discover" future time and, therefore, to achieve a
higher stage of cultural development. These analyses do not raise
the question of the conceptually limiting effects of a strictly one
dimensional concept of time in combination with a progress ideology;
a combination that implies the creation of a hypothetical future.
European religion must deal with what is a European problem, the
deeply ingrained assumption of an unknown and limitless future.
This conception of time and of an oppressive future functions
culturally to direct the activities of a people toward the creation of
an ever-increasing rationalized technical order. In so far as ChristiM
ideology is predicated on lineal and not cyclical or repetitive con-
ceptions, it supported this kind of development and was, therefore,
an important aspect of early European developn1ent. for while lhe
accelerated growth of the technical collossus may have been many
centuries away, the ideologic.il germs were .iiready inrubnll11g, lay
ing t11cgroundwork (or ;1 1norf' 111atureWt~slt>r11l1.n11cm
It I~ ('llllll)t
1
lllng ltt•rt• lo dlv1•1w· hrll'lly, f(I 1111•11111111
tlH· H('t'lll
h1~!lv.i1111111.ilull', Ii,,.,
1·11~<· 111hl.1111,wl11tl1 :lt'Vt•1i1I11lllw ·1111111•
ld1•n
logical features as Judaism and Christianity. Islam provides a model

for social organization that promotes some of the characteristics
associated with European culture: patriarchy, the monotheistic ideal,
an emphasis on the accumulation of literature and institutionalized
learning as opposed to traditional education. While Europe was going
through the embarrassment of her "blind age," the Islamic culture
was preserving and developing the tradition of scholarship that
Europe had associated with her own history. Why, then, isn't Islam
considered a "Western" religion? Or is it? It is never considered to be
such in the textbooks in which Europeans define themselves.
Europeans did not, of course, choose to follow Muhammad.
But, again, using the index of cultural chauvinism and ethnic
identity, the case of Islam and its relationship to the Judeo-Christian
experience becomes quite clear. The Islamic religion politically sup-
ported a statement of Arab nationalism and conquest, while the
Jewish and Christian religions are statements of Jewish and Western
r::uropean nationalism, respectively. Just as the Jewish religious state-
1nent was not meant for non-Jews, so the Christian religious statement
was never meant to be and cannot tolerate an interpretation that
t•11courages the self-determination or military solidification, defense,
nr aggression of any "non-Western," "non-European" peoples. The
nitical distinction between Islam and Christianity is racial-cultural,
11ottheological-ideological. The vicious, prolonged, and bloody cru-
•,acles constituted a series of racial-cultural ("ethnic") wars, "color
wars." It is grossly inaccurate and misleading for them to be referred
lo as "religious wars" without reference to ethnicity, race, or cultural
ld1•11tification,as is usually done.
One of the most important connections between Christianity and
lt•l·hnology since the colonial period is that missionary Christianism
11,,vc-.s the way for capitalism and the European-centered market econ-
11111y.This form of Christianization in areas such as Africa was an ide-
olngkal preparation for acquiescence to the mechanisms of
, I1loitalion represented by colonialism. The colonies were needed for
1111• t•<·onomic growth and development of Europe, which meant that
1111Indigenous population had to be convinced that they had been
l111111 lo serve their European masters and, further, would benefit from
111 It 'iNVltude. What better way to make this argument than by sell-
111~llt1•111nn the superiority of Christianity, which could save them
h11111 1111•falt• of heiug lrrc'igious, sinful, backward, and black? Once
, 1111vll111·<1 nf this, llw <'«1lo11lzccl bc-ginto assimilate attitudes that help
1,, p11p,11,. ll1t•111111 fit Into l·:11rnpt•1u1 style technological organization,
lit ,•,111•,1•1111"11'11ttttud,.., .111• l111pll1·fl
111F.11r11pt•,111
Christianity.
186 YURUGU
One mark of the new mindset is the concept of time. For the
African ordinary time is punctuated by sacred time, and time is val-
ued according to what the community experiences. Therefore, we
can speak qualitatively of different "times," because they are experi-
enced differently. Christianization repudiates this concept as it
demeans African culture and substitutes a secularized concept of
uniform lineal time, suiting the more mechanized order, which the
European colonizers and neocolonialists need to establish.
In his book Breast of the Earth, Kofi Awoonor has an excellent dis-
cussion of Christianity's role in this regard and tells us that "The
school was the most important instrument of missionary work in
Africa." 128 It was the key to the process that would strip Africans of
their culture so that they could become part of the technical order;
albeit at the lowest level. The school always took African children
away from their elders and caused them to be ashamed of the very
things that could have been a source of political strength and resis-
tance to colonial rule.
The new technology of exploitation required that the African
become an imitation of the European. 129 It required a total transfor-
mation that embodied new standards of success and social status. 130
Christianity, of course, meant "civilization." To be civilized was to
become as much like the European as possible. Awoonor tells us that,
"The converts were also encouraged to acquire European material
culture .... The superiority of the European way of life was rigorously
inculcated." 129 This included living in the townships that the mis-
sionaries established, in opposition to the very villages in which the
African extended kin lived.
The missionary school discouraged the use of African languages.
"Christian conversion meant cultural change," a change essential to
the donning of the cultural clothing of European technology. "Christ
was a white man; the saints were white; and the missionaries were
white .... Continuously the African was told he was cursed in his
adherence to the ways of his fathers, and because he was black-
skinned, the implications were not lost to him .... The fundamental
erosion of the African's confidence in himself began with the first
Christian convert. "131
One of the most important ways that mi~sionary education pn.>
pared Africans for capitalism and the European techno-social nrck,
was by destroying the integrity of li11eageorganization th al fornwcl
the basi~ of l'hr traditional cornm1111al strurturc. f'hrlstl.i.11ily sln•:::H•ct
n1lt11r1•,"w.
lndlvld11,1I ~alv;1llnn :111dtl1! ".lt1clt•oVllristl,111 111t1l1•rlul
1
It, 1111dIf d11111111w·1

Aworn1111 pl11,1o.;c•i. 1d :d: <'Ollll1lllll11l •1111'11
1111111a ,11
polygyny, the traditional educational system, and especially, eco-

nomic communalism; i.e., the communal ownership and distribution
of resources. Individualism was an implicit value of missionary
Christianism as it revealed itself among those colonized by the
Europeans.
The "civilized African" behaved and dressed and spoke like a
European. He had been educated in European schools that began
with the mission school and was therefore trained to uphold
European values and to perpetuate European control: The purpose
of any educational system is to perpetuate the society that it creates.
The "non-evolue" or "uncivilized" African was an "unsaved," "unedu-
cated" primitive and non-Christian and therefore "a usable chattel for
mines and farms-" so thought the Europeans and their "civilized"
Africans. 132 Missionary Christianism stripped colonized, "non-
Europeans" of everything. In this psychologically insecure state they
could then be immersed in the ideology of the technical order. And
so many Africans themselves will speak of the "blessings" of
Christianity, because they are sold on the "ideology of progress" to
which its European adherents subscribe.
It is not only in terms of the specific technological tendencies
manifested in the Christian lifestyle that the essence of this relation-
ship lies (e.g., deification of writing, literacy, the growth of cities,
etc.). The compatibility of the Christian doctrine and the develop-
ment of technology in the West is found at a deeper and more criti-
cal level. Christian ideology is teleological, providing a conceptual
model peculiar to the European utamawazo; both are based on and
I 1eculiar to a particular image of the human. The Christian-European
interpretation of the human is of a being who derives meaning from
his ability to move toward a universal goal-both "progressive" and
"rational." It is this and not the "not-of-this-world," "do-unto-others"
Idea that operates as the motivating factor in Christian ideology;
"other-worldliness" goes against the grain of technological "advance."
The ideal, of course, is an abstraction; it implies unending movement
lts<>lf.It is in some crucial way associated with the creation of power
l ltnt is in turn associated with efficiency. Both power and efficiency
,\1" identified with the control of nature and people and the belief that
It Is the natural and proper destiny of humans to negate nature and/or
t 111•''primary" condition.
Rlieinhold Nieb11hr proudly declares, "The idea of progress is
1111•1~.lblc only upon tl1c ground of a Christian culture." 133 Niebuhr
l1i11•1Hls llt•n· to pol11t I'<• n "posillve,'' and culturally desirable,
,1ll1lh11t1•.of 111111ld1·11l11~!Y,
llt· I•, 1101(IH(.•slim1l!t!;t
the universal valid-
188 YURUGU
ity of the concept. Niebuhr never really repudiates the idea in terms
of its ideological thrust; he merely nibbles a bit at the edges.
As noted in Chap. 1, Lynn White has pointed to specific periods
in European development, and has presented an impressive case for
the supportive relationship between European technology and
European religion. "Modern science," which White identifies with
European culture, is predicated on certain assumptions about the
nature of the human and our relationship to the environment.
Christian ideology supports these assumptions. In White's view, "Our
[European] technological and our scientific movements got their
start, acquired their character, and achieved world dominance in the
Middle Ages. "134The unique style in which these activities have been
carried out in the West required particular ontological conceptions,
conceptions that, White says are "religious" in origin. In his view, the
ideas about nature, our relationship to it, and our destiny, which
crystallized in Medieval Christian theology, were the dominant con-
tributor to the ideological ascendancy of science and technology in
the West, an ascendency that accounts for the present Western
European "ecological crisis," since the technical order is essentially
exploitative of the natural order.
But we can look to an even earlier period for the origins of the
development. Judea-Christian thought in the company of Platonic
epistemology initiated the desacralization of nature that would allow
for a dehumanized techno-social order and the materialist, mecha-
nized conception of the universe on which European scienc.e
depends. This desacralized cosmos was an early conception within
the Hebrew tradition. Mircea Eliade says,
Cosmic religiousity continued the most elementary dialectic of the

sacred, especially the belief that the divine is incarnated, or mani-
fests itself, in cosmic objects and rhythms. Such a belief was
denounced by the adherents of Yahweh as the worst possible idol-
atry, and this ever since the Israelites' entrance into Palestine ....
The prophets finally succeeded in emptying nature of any divine
presence. 135
This amounted to an attack on nature as an integral part of 011,

human existence; an attitude that went hand in hand with the Hebn:w
submergence of the power of women. The Divine rcminlne is assod
ated with the fecundity of the earth ancl the centrality <11till' cyC'IIC'al
ordN ancl I he workings of nat Un' in our llvt·s. Tt11·f1•1utuhw, In ol IH 1
lrnclfll1111:;, of llw (or1·(1 of 11nt11rl',whirl, Is >{1'1wr:1tlw nl
wns sy111IH11l1·
Ill.- If tlw dlvhw I•: lcl1•11tllH•cl
1111 ol 1111•Emllt 111111
wltl11lw f<•1·1111dlly
with nature, then, as Rosemary Ruether points out, the tendency in

Judea-Christian thought to desacralize nature would go hand in hand
with the need to devalue the feminine and, therefore, to masculinize
the conception of a god. 136 Ruether points out that in Genesis I, God
commands Adam to "Fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion
over it." 137
This masculinization in the Hebrew conception of "god" is linked
to the need to believe that being can be mechanically, technically
"created.'' And while this early Hebrew society may be distant in time
from the technical colossus that we now experience, the view of real-
ity on which this colossus was constructed was being put in place in
Ihe early Judaic statement. Two divergent world-views emerged: (1)
the more ancient, in which nature was associated with meaningful
experience; and (2) the Platonic, Judea-Christian world-view, in which
111eaningfulbeing was a human-controlled, "denatured" reality.
In his book The Sacred and the Profane, Mircea Eliade gives us a
phenomenological view of the sacred and of the religious that directly
,·ontradicts this Judea-Christian desacralization of nature. "For reli-
gious man, nature is never only "natural"; it is always fraught with a
1digious value." The gods "manifest(ed) the different modalities of
1I H' sacred in the very structure of the world and cosmic phenom-
1 •11a." 1:3sHe says that to the religious person, the universe presents
II~:rlf as a divine creation, as cosmos. "The cosmic rhythms manifest
11rder, harmony, permanence, fecundity." Nature always expresses
•,oincthing that transcends it. It is "supernature," not nature. 139 We
"I ,c·come aware of the sacred because it shows itself as something
wl101ly different from the profane ... the manifestation of a reality that
d111•snot belong to our world." But this reality can be felt within
ulllccts that are part of the profane world. 140 Eliade then says some-
I lllng very revealing about culture:
'l'ltc modern Occidental experiences a certain uneasiness before

1w111ymanifestations of the sacred. He finds it difficult to accept the
11\C'Ithat, for many human beings, the sacred can be manifested in
•.tone::; or trees, for example. 140
Tl 1c sacred African tree, the ::;acred ancestral sculpture-(what

l1 w 1, C'hristlans, and Muslims call "idols") are not merely Kintu
(11hj1•ets),they are "hierophanies." 141 Is the Christian cross an idol?
W,,.,..l,•sus lll1 Idol'? Perhaps the true idols are the clollar bills in Euro-
011C'-hunclrcd-storybuild-
\1111•1lrn11'H 1rlc-ly-ll It•rnlly "corn: reliied ,. 111
t II w,'1'111•:
.ls ltlH' ldol,1!1y: wn,i.ldp qi th, ohjcrt.
1-:11,11l1•
s;Iys, "tlw wholly clt"llln,ill11•<1 cwwI11~ hit tl'<'1•11t.dlsrnv
190 YURUGU
ery in the history of the human spirit. .. desacralization pervades the

entire experience of the nonreligious man of modern societies and ...
in consequence, he finds it increasingly difficult to rediscover the exis-
tential dimensions of religious man in archaic societies." 142 If we sub-
stitute "European" for "modern" and "non-European" for "archaic," we
have a formulation that leads towards a meaningful critique of
European culture.
Lynn White traces the development of the ontological concep-
tions inherent in European religion, on which depends the European
commitment to create an artificial, technically controlled environ-
ment. The Judeo-Christian world-view introduced an all-powerful
"God" who created "man;" but, says White, it is "man" who "named
all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over them."
God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item
in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's pur-
poses. And, although man's body is made of clay, he is not simply
part of nature: he is made in God's image .... Christianity is the
most anthropomorphic religion the world has seen .... Man shares
in great measure, God's transcendence of nature. Christianity ... not
only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that
it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends ....
By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to
exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural
objects .... The spirits in natural objects, which formerly had pro-
tected nature from man, evaporated. Man's effective monopoly on
spirit in this world was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the
exploitation of nature crumbled. 143
By the thirteenth century natural theology in the Latin West was

"becoming the effort to understand God's mind by discovering how
his creation operates." 143 In this way, "modern Western science was
cast in the matrix of Christian theology. The dynamism of religious
devotion, shaped by the Judea-Christian dogma of creation, gave ll
impetus." 144 Because European ecological conceptions are implicil 111
the development of the technical order, "Christian" attitudes can h1·
seen to have been its prerequisites. White says,
We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use il for

our slightest whim .... To a Christian a tree can be 110 more than n
physical fact. The whole con(;ept of the Sacred Grow is alien to
Christianity and to tht 1 <'thos of the West. 1-'or1warly two 1nlll1•11la
<'llt'l:.llan misslorvuks t,av1• I H'l'tl 1'hnppli11J.
d11w11 Sa<·n•clgi ovt•<:,
wl1ld1 M1· ldt,l,11111111, •1p1tlt lt1 n,il11H•. 111
1)1•r1111•wtlwy 11s:-:1111w
I have said earlier that religion is the sacralization of ideology.

The technical order is the rationalization of nature. It was a process
hinted at long ago in European commitment. This commitment
required moral sanction, and what was formally recognized as reli-
~ion in the West, in turn, had to be compatible with this commitment,
or it would have taken another form. In other words, the religious for-
mulation cannot change without commitment changing, and vice-
versa. As White says, "the presenl: increasing disruption of the global
environment is the product of a dynamic technology and science ...
their growth cannot be understood historically apart from distinctive
llttitudes toward nature which are deeply grounded in Christian
clogma."145 European science and technology are, then, ideologically
t lependent on this Christian arrogance toward nature.
Our daily habits of action are dominated by an implicit faith in per-

petual progress ... rooted in and indefensible apart from Judea-
Christian teleology .... We can continue today to live, as we have
lived for about 1700 years, very largely in a context of Christian
ltXioms.146
Christian ideology has played a supportive cultural role in the

1u1lqueness of Western European techno-social development at cer-
l,1111formulative periods in this cultural/historical process.
I he Record Versus the "Apology"

The cultural/historical record of the European experience clar-
111, ,..,I he interdependent relationship between the institutionalization
, ,J t•:uropean Christianity and the European imperialistic endeavor, as
w, 11as the compatibility of Christian ideology with European cultural
11lllonalism.
The efforts of Reinhold Niebuhr to salvage Christianity and
, I, ,111sr it of this historical record are perhaps the most impressive
t•I ,111yChristian apologist, but in our view his failure is nonetheless
, vltl1•11t. His discussion is helpful to us, as it is in his attempts to extri-
' 111,• 1I w essence of Christianity from the history and character of the
I 111•>1H•an imperial order that he touches on some of the most signif-
lt ,111l,;sucs raised in our discussion.
( >nt•of these issues is that of the so-called universality of the
1 I 1111.-IL.For Nlvbuhr, the historical evils of the West issue from "col-
l,, tlv,• 1•1,1otls111," "culturnl p11rti<-ul;1rism,"or "nationalism"; while the
"11111v,•1 ('ll11n•l1 Is ;1 l1>11dc11cytoward tile good that can
,1111-,tn"of 111,·
,v, 11'1 lw,11 1111':it'"•·vii~" I lnw1·vt>r,lw ti, loH 1•<1lo 11d1111l lhal "tlw
1 111111'11,
H•, w1 ll ,1•, 1111
1 ,,1.1111 , 11111l11wo1111•
1111•
vc·lili-lc•of c·11llc•1:t
Ive· 111-(u
192 YURUGU
tism." 147 Imperialists and slavers that they were, Popes Paul III, Paul
IV, Pius V, Gregory, et al., in Niebuhr's view, were only embarrassing
exceptions to the pattern. Certainly from an African-centered per-
spective, we cannot view them as such, for, as Cohen and others have
pointed out, there were far too many of them, and if the "real"
Christians had no part in the creation of the European empire and are
not responsible for the inequities perpetuated by it, then one is forced
to ask, where are they, and where have they been? If in fact they exist
at all, surely they have not been part of the European "experience."
And if the only "real" Christians are outside of Europe, then are they
Christians? In other words, the question is raised as to whether the
non-European values and ideas claimed by Christians like Niebuhr,
who would exonerate Christianity from its militaristic and culturally
aggressive aspects, can be identified with the European tradition at
all!
"Christianity" is a configuration of values, attitudes and behav-
iors that are inseparable from the history of Europe. 148 Unhappily for
non-European people, "real" European Christians do exist and have
existed in large enough numbers to have successfully imposed their
own brand of European cultural nationalism wherever they have ven-
tured, inevitably backed with the armed might of the West.
Niebuhr employs what is perhaps the most ideologically affec-
tive tool and manifestation of European cultural imperialism in his use
of the concept of "universalism." The subtle, but critical, issue raised
by his claims is a philosophical-ideological one. It lies partially in the
implicit value dichotomy he makes between nationalism and univer-
salism. Nationalism in his view is "bad" and represents negative par-
ticularism in which the self (ego) is the source of motivaJ;ion,
sentiment, and behavior; while universalism is its positive opposite
and represents the ability to identify with the universal good of all
people, i.e., takes an abstraction called "humanity" as its inspirational
source.
First, I challenge this formulation on the grounds that it, itself,
is not a "universal" statement, though its value for the European li<'S
in the fact it has all the earmarks of such. It is a moot question as t(i
whether any such "universalism" is desirable even if it were possibk.
Nationalistic, i.e., (self) group identification, is positive because ii Is
humanly feasible and originates in the concrete circumstance of nil
tural definition. Hope for humankind Iles i11tltc possibilities for rash
tuning nationalistic idPologl<>sllrnt arC' not dcfinltiun,\lly prccll1·11t1•d
011tlw cl1•111nwt1011 of otlw, cult11rnl w·rn1ps. 1':111op1•,111 11,1\l011,lll•,111
('lirl•Hllrnl:1111,111• tlu•1P(t111•
,11111,1l,nv1•.di 11<1 ''111•w1tlv1•" thh, vlc•w
f111111
point. Second, even if the ability to identify with others is accepted

as a normative goal, it is neither Christian thought nor European ide-
ology that makes such identification possible. The European concept
of self is an isolating one, and the Christian concept of spiritual
enlightenment is individualistic, as opposed to being group or com-
munity oriented. Christianity is a European "nationalistic" (i.e., cul-
tural imperialistic) statement in opposition to the "non-European"
nationalists it wishes to conquer.
In other words, from the African-centered perspective, it is not
nationalism (cultural particularism) that is negative, but the content
that a particular nationalist ideology is given that makes it a threat
to the survival of others. In this regard, it is clearly European nation-
alism, of which Christianity is an example, that has been most
destructive of the peaceful coexistence of divergent cultural group-
1ngs. The projection of so-called "universalism" as an assumed goal
of human behavior is not desirable or culturally meaningful, but it
nllows Europeans to thereby project European particularism as some-
thing other than it is. The claim to "universality," whether made by a
C'hristian apologist, a social theorist, or a military leader, is merely a
1,at:kaging device. The "struggle of the Christian religion against the
pride and self-will of nations" 147 that Niebuhr wants to see does not
c•xlst, but by giving voice to this supposed "struggle" the impression
1-.conveyed of the moral superiority of Christianity based on the
h11plied invidious comparison between a nonexistent, abstract "uni-
wrsalism," "the embodiment of the good," and cultural nationalism,
"lhf' expression of evil." The real question becomes, Why has the
E11ropean made so much of this claim of universalism? (See Chap. 10
c111ltis work.)
Niebuhr criticizes the universalism of the "classical" philoso-
plH'rs of ancient Greece as being merely "the extension of their par-
t k11lar viewpoint," like that of "a modern communist" who "is a
1111lwrsalistin his hope that communism may become the basis of a
w111 Ill dvilization." 149 But Christian "universalism" has precisely the
111111' t:oncrete implications in its existential acting out, and is of the
111H' vintage. The difference that is so important to Niebuhr is only
I 11 I I,, •wmantical/philosophical expression, and merely facilitates the
,, t1•111;lon of a particular viewpoint-namely, that of Christianity.
II ls facilitated in that it can more thoroughly extend itself over
r1wlclt•t 1111d mor<.:!dlv~rst-' arena of cultures. Europeans simply dis-
t 11vl'11•dlilt• polltlcid vnlue of not verbally identifying "god and
111111111" Is 1101 lo s..iy that this ldcnllfknllon ceased to exist. Most
1 111111
111li,•1 <'ull 111·1•:;l111Vt' l1,\d 110 pollt f<';\J11111hll1,,ns t lint rc·quln•d s11ch
194 YURUGU
rhetoric, and when they have, they were certainly not as successful
or as "well-equipped" to carry them out. They therefore speak of "a
god" in necessary relationship to "their nation" or culture. Niebuhr
makes much of this terminological difference in Chap. 8, Vol. I, of The
Nature and Destiny of Man. But to delete the article "a" from its usual
position before "god" and to write it always with a capital "G" merely
gives a quasireligious statement, like that of European Christianism,
greater imperialistic potential. In one case a religious statement is
openly identified with the cultural entity that is its source, and in the
other, it is formulated to be put at the service of a cultural entity in
its world imperialistic pursuits.
Niebuhr cannot avoid the imperialistic uses of Christianity, but
his perspective obliges him to explain European imperialism as ulti-
mately inconsistent with Christian teachings: "prophetic religion, " he
says, "had its very inception in a conflict with national self-deifica-
tion."150 However, it appears that the European Christian definition
("universalistic," absolutist, and monistic) is reinforced by the inter-
national ambitions of the European nation, the cultural supremism of
the European ideology, and the expansionism of the European uta-
maroho. Far from "struggling" against "collective pride," I have argued
that Christianity was ideally fashioned to express European "collec-
tive pride" (nationalism). This explanation, among other ethnologi-
cally satisfying characteristics, has the advantage of being consistent
with the history of the Christian Church, while Niebuhr and other
Christian apologists are hopelessly involved in the impossible task of
explaining away millions of "unreal" Christians and centuries of char-
acteristically "un-Chrisitianlike" behavior of the Christian world.
Conclusion: Religion and Power

The strength of institutionalized religion in the European expe
rience is also its weakness. Morality in a secular society proports to
be intellectual. In European culture its models are rational. It is despir-
itualized. Early in the developing European tradition, the advantagf.•
of a religious statement that rhetorically sanctioned its political objer
tives was discovered. But the result, as well as the cause, was a spit
itual deficit in the culture. The Christian emphasis on a heavenly
afterlife does not alleviate European anxiety concerning death, prl
marily because it is a remote abstraction rather than a lived belief and
does not address itself to the spiritual Isolation uf lndividuals-whlrl1
Is I he· rcul basis of ti 1vir a11xivty. This anxl ~ty Is the:' pric , p,11<1
for I h1
(tl11· 11flflmt10<1 o), awl th,·
rog111llv1•slrurt111c• ol l·'.11ropPn11 1.:1111111·,-
• 111I 111:.
('III l•,t 11111111,1 \'ly 01 I 1'111111pll.1111
1 n11lt'XIIs 1111•1 ly, d1•1w111tl11grn 1
one's view point, symbolic of the illusion of "progress," a constant

striving for that which cannot be achieved. Perhaps this image of a
resurrected savior, born in African metaphor, but intensified and rei-
fied in European mythology, unconsciously represents, as well, the
"humanity" that was indeed sacrificed for European success.
But no other civilization has been as successfully imperialistic.
No other has used its institutionalized religion as pragmatically in the
support of its imperialistic objectives. The spiritual deficit does not
appear to count for much, if one is impressed by world dominance.
The asili demands power and is itself powerful. The modality and
dogma of European religion have been mandated by the asili, which
they, in turn, reinforce.
In African religion and in many other primary religious formu-
1,ltions, it is the spiritual-emotional needs of the people within the cul-
lure that are served. At the same time the values of the culture are
..mctioned, and the mechanisms for its continuance are sacralized.
l.ipiritual/philosophical conceptions such as ancestor communion,
which help to explain the universe as a spiritual whole in which all
Ilk• and being are periodically regenerated, give the African an emo-
ltonal security and confidence that the European lacks. But such con-
1i•pt ions did not prepare the African, nor her Native American or
t ><·<,anic counterparts to deal politically with the aggression of the
1,.11ropean.These conceptions have not been used successfully in the
ddw1se of culture. Non-European religions were not fashioned for
w1,rll.lwide acceptance nor for international propaganda. There is no
,11pcrficial, merely rhetorical, component of these religions.
1-.thnologically, both European and "non-European" religions serve
I lit• teleological needs of the cultures in question as defined by their
1111•1111,ers. The radical difference between them issues from the dif-
l1•1 ,·nccs in these two sets of ideology: One is based on the pursuit of
wot Id dominance; the others seek to use the forces of the universe
ti, 1•11surea harmonious existence. The two types of ideology involve
two different conceptions of power. Europeans are culturally nur-
1111 ,,, I with a keen political sense that is simultaneously defensive and
•~~t t•ssive. The utamaroho comes with an awareness of "others." It
I I ltt-l'l'fore intensely political.
Wlint begins to emerge in these first two chapters is a pattern
11,wl1h•lt, nt rrltlcal points in the development of European culture,
wl 1,111 II s Hsre11<lancyapp,•ars to have been threatened because of
confuslt,n, or c1 malfunctioning of the ''machine," mas-
1111illv.ill•11c•l·,
t, 1l1tl 11dJ1t~ll11c>nli.lw<I b1•t•11
llllHh.• lhi'I hrou!-(hl 1ww clarity of pur-
1111N1•, H ·11•11111·,olld,1111111
1111't1C•1~l1•x, 11•trtPvl11!,lfoc11s so tl1at tlw
196 YURUGU
machine would once again be efficient. These adjustments were

sometimes in the form of what I have called "modal changes," some-
times creations of political genius, fanatically devoted to the objec-
tive of total control.
We have, to some degree, traced the intimate relationship
between religion and utamaroho in European development from its
Indo-European pagan origins, through its initial nationalistic state-
ment in Judaism, its Roman cooptation by Constantine, and the bat-
tle against the apolitical interpretations of the Gnostics, the Donatists,
and others. At another critical point Augustine sells the idea of the
merger of Church and State, and Europe is well on its way to the cre-
ation of a national consciousness with a religious statement sup-
portive of its imperialistic ambitions. At each juncture a monolithic
doctrine was required, and it was created. The threat of dissension
and disunity were dealt with. Threats would continue, but the mech-
anisms were in place with which to destroy them or keep them in
check: The three "great" inquisitions (initiated by Pope Gregory IX,
1231; Pope Sixtus IV, 1478; Pope Paul III, 1542) merely represented
some of the more infamous and blatantly sadistic methods of such
control.
The objective of this study is to identify and understand the asili
of European development. A history of Europe would disclose other
junctures, set backs, and personalities who were instrumental in the
creation of the empire. The fall of Rome is a setback because the
focus is deflected as the "Europeans" become disunified, perceiving
themselves as Germanic and Asian "tribes." Clovis the Frank (481)
becomes a Christian and unifies the Franks. Charles Martel reunites
the Merovingian Kingdom, establishing the Carolingian line. In the
600s, Charlemagne increases the size of the Frankish Kingdom, again
spreads Christianity, and together with the Pope in the year 800
declares himself the Emperor of the New Holy Roman Empire.
The process continued through the Norman Conquest (1066)
and beyond. During this early period, throughout the Middle Ages,
Christianity was used to forge and solidify a European conscious-
ness. Later, in the Renaissance and into the modern period, both the
physical and social sciences would be used in the same way, I h •
Church no longer occupying a central position in this process. 1'11('
establishment of a scientific ideology and the varlous disciplines ol
the F.uropcan Academy through whic-h to promote• It, tr1k~s ow1
Inst it lll iOtli\lizecl rrllgion, so l'SSPlltillllo I IH' COll6l l'll('tlOll of ti I(•
l lH--rtc!.
l11qw1l,1Iordt•r 1111<1 tilt.•n~ntton of a 1•:111111w1111 c·rn11,rl11w11wi.s In 1111•
1·,uly ..1111-w-.ul F.11111pt'illl tlt'Vt'lt1p1111•111,wlll lH•t'lllllt' ,lh11w1t nll~olt·lt'.
taking a back seatto Science: the new religion.

We have seen that religion, as associated with European cul-
ture, is shaped by utamawazo and asili, which shape the culture itself.
That, of course, is what we would expect. The concept of asili tells us
that it is possible to identify the seed/germ of the culture, which is at
once its explanatory and generating principle. Once we understand
lhat germinating core, all aspects of the culture fall into place.
Institutionalized religion in the European experience poses con-
frontational dichotomies for the purposes of proselytization and dom-
inance. It is absolutist, offering an abstraction as the proper object of
religious devotion. It struggles to present a rationalistic proof of the
existence of its deity. The literal mode becomes religiously authori-
t ntive. Lineal conception, which valorizes secular, historical time,
becomes a validating mechanism for religious superiority. In the
1irocess of the unfolding of this religious tradition it desacralizes
11ature,denies the vision of a cosmos to its adherents, thereby alien-
,1ling nature and paving the way for the technical order.
The focus in this chapter has been on the institution of religion
,11;it related to early European cultural and political imperialism. The
111,rmative intracultural ethic is not to be found in this earlier
<'hristian statement. It is not until its reformulation in Protestantism
tl1a1 European institutionalized religion becomes to some extent a
VNbal reflection of the European way of life. In Protestantism it
l11•cornesa functioning directive of internal behavior; that is, within
\lu• culture. This issue will surface in Chap. 7.
In the chapters that follow we turn our attention to the mecha-
11ls111s of value-definition and look at the images provided by the cul-
1,u,II mythoform that act to support the pattern of behavior towards
111111-t-:uropean peoples. I attempt to paint the portrait of an utamaroho
I '1,1thas already begun to emerge from the previous discussion of reli-
1<11111 and ideology in early European development and from the
llw111t•s of the European utamawazo.
... That our left eye should be set to see against its
twin, not with it-surely that is part of the white
destroyers' two thousand seasons of triumph
against us? That the sight of the eye should be
unconnected, cut off from the mind's embracing
consciousness; that the ear's hearing should be
blocked off from the larger knowledge of the mind,
that the nose's smelling and the tongue's tasting
should be pushed apart from the mind's whole con-
sciousness-what is that but death's whiteness in
delirious triumph?. .. the walls of whiteness built to
separate sense from sense . ..
- Ayi KweiArmah
Chapter 3
Aesthetic:
The Power of Symbols
I he Meaning of "Aesthetic"
There are two uses of the term "aesthetic" that will have rele-
v,111ccIn this discussion corresponding to its usages in European cul-
l 11,1•. First, we want to identify the European conception of beauty, in
I lie•sense of the forms, images, and experiences that evoke positive
, 111ntlo11al responses from those who have been enculturated in the
11.ulltlon. This sense of the European aesthetic is closely related to
v,il11t·;t lint is, its themes are "expressions" of European value. This is
1lw ;1estlwlic that reaches to every layer of the culture. The values
,111el l111<1g<·sinvolved Mc nc,t limited to the ordinary person, although
I 11.-y,11(' n1on• co11srlrn1sly <'Xpressecl in the media that addresses
to tlw popular art forn,s. But thls
II 11•lftn llw "11011l11ll'llt•c·t11al",111cl
l11111ld 1lw 1•;~111·,
nol 1·01tf11:-:c• lwc·.iww (p1•rll.1ps 1111<·rn1sclouslyor n1
I,• t·,I 1,w1v1•1
h11lly)tlih ,II'' ll11•th ,1flc•1·1•,
tlw "1t11c•lli·1·t11nl"
,t!, wt•II.
200 YURUGU
Because of the peculiar nature of European culture, we have to

include another meaning of the term "aesthetic." In characteristic
European fashion there is not only the experience of the beautiful, but
there is the "objectification" of that experience as well. In keeping
with the asili of the culture, it follows that there must be a "science"
based on this objectification. So that our discussion must touch on
aesthetics or Western European philosophical thought about the
nature of the beautiful and its apprehension, insofar as it is relevant
to our overall objective.
These two senses of "the European aesthetic" interest us at var-
ious points. Consistent with the dynamics of European culture, this
"scientific" or "philosophical" aesthetic seeks to influence and con-
trol the emotional experience of what Europeans consider beautiful;
while, on the other hand, the philosophic aesthetics takes its shape,
its form, and its style from those habits of mental organization that
are "emotionally" appealing to the European mind: the utamawazo.
The mode of "rationalism" itself forms an important part of the
European aesthetic. It is not possible to understand this utamawazo,
nor the construct of the culture, unless it is realized that its stan-
dards of thought, behavior, and social institutions are all touched by
this predilection for rationalistic forms. Max Weber discusses "ratio-
nality" in Western art forms:
The rational use of the Gothic vault as a means of distributing pres-

sure and of roofing spaces of all forms, and above all as the con-
structive principle of great monumental buildings and the
foundation of a style extending to sculpture and painting, such as
that created by our Middle Ages, does not occur elsewhere. The
technical basis of our architecture came from the Orient. But the
Orient lacked that solution of the problem of the dome and that
type of classic rationalization of all art-in painting by the rational
utilization of lines and spatial p'erspective-which the Renaissance
created for us." 1
A discussion of the experience of the beautiful in the context of

European culture illuminates this point well. On a conscious level
11
the attempt is made to separate this experience and raise it "abov '
its effectively emotional aspect. That presents special problems fl~
even the European philosopher is forced to recognize that the pcrso11
must react initially to what she considers to be beautiful wlth 11•1
s<·11scs aml willi lier ft!<'llngs; i.e., thnt \•flt• nppr,~lwnds br;111ly Inf
11ally ne.i:it·I \HiH loi 1. Therc:'lnn• ph 110:-1,pltN~ I11I I 1c i::urop, •a11 I n,d 111011
lo1111tltliq11wlw:, ht 1111'1111•.llltlllnf l111!•1l1•('l11i1ll1l11f1; 111:1t Is, 111,lltlttl(
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 201
"conscious," in a technical sense, even the emotional aspect of the

perception, apprehension-the experience of "beauty."
Again, as with the attempt to merge rationalism and religion,
the results are very strange. One consequence has been "aesthetics"
or the "science" of the aesthetically valid: a rationalistic discussion
of the rules by which the experience of the beautiful takes place, of
what properly constitutes "beauty" in a "logical" sense. Of course, this
discussion purports to have universal significance. European philoso-
phers never claim to describe their own aesthetic experiences (and
In truth one doubts that they could possibly be), but they do claim
to prescribe the proper rules for determining "the beautiful" and to
describe the nature of "true" aesthetic experience. They are setting
the "standards" for judgement and criticism. But none of these dis-
russions is satisfying to anyone other than European philosophers.
One questions their motives and the reason the subject occupies the
ultention and energy that it does. The answer is that this specula-
t Ive/philosophic activity functions in its own way to reinforce and val-
idale the cultural asili and to strengthen the national consciousness;
Ihe•collective self-image as superior to others, a universal standard
lnr humanity.
A reading of Kant's "analytic of the beautiful," in the Critique of
Jrutgmnent, gives one the impression that the things he is trying so des-
111·rcttelyto define, to verbalize, to "enclose within the word," as Steiner
,1ys (cited in Chap. 1), do not lend themselves to the forms of thought
111•c·inploys, and moreover, that aesthetic experience itself is in no way
, ritlllr!cted to this discussion and certainly not aided by it.
l'lw beautiful is that which pleases universally without (requiring)

11 1·011cept.If we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its
I, .111scendental determinations ... [We say that] the purpose is the
1111jl/ctof a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause
, if t ltc object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality
, d H concept in respect of its object is its purposiveness (form
1111,llls) ... the tone of mind which is self-maintaining and of specu-
l,11Ive 11niversal validity is subordinated to the way of thinking
wllkt1 c·an be maintained only by painful resolve, but is of objective
1111iv1·1s<llvalidity. 2
l'ht.·sc arc only a few statements from a lengthy and incredibly

111I 111:.t•t rctllls •, 1J111they are exemplary of the work. One wonders
II Iii. wntk lt•wlf l'l n,•1•Psflnryfo1 Kant lo comE>to conclusions that
,pp, j\f lt1I 1111lvf'ly ol>v1011s.
202 YURUGU
There can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine, by

means of concepts, what is beautiful. For every judgement from
this source is aesthetical; i.e. the feeling of the subject, and not a
concept of the object, is its determining ground. To seek for a prin-
ciple of taste which shall furnish, by means of definite concepts, a
universal criterion of the beautiful, is fruitless trouble, because
what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. 3
Then why this effort? Why does what Europe considers to be

one of its greatest minds concern himself with an "analytic of the
beautiful?" There appears to be no ultimate purpose other than that
this exercise itself gives to a segment of society a strange kind of
pleasure. The analytical and the "rational" are so valued that they
become a part of the emotional experience of pleasure among a select
group of people. There is no doubt that the undergraduate who is
required to read the Critique of Judgement gets no pleasure from the
experience and in fact may regard it as punishment; but the power of
the sanctions in the culture should not be underestimated, for if the
student pursues philosophy until the end of her college career and
into graduate school, she will no doubt begin to consider the Critique
a "work of art" and be convinced therefore of the pleasure it should
convey, at least to "understand" it (if not to read it).
The Tyranny of Rationalism

This attempt on the part of Europeans to reflect on the nature
of beauty spills over into their experienced culture, and a further
consequence is the intellectualization of the artistic experience. In
European culture "art" becomes the domain of the intellectual elite,
because it is they (in the tradition of Plato's Symposium and
Aristotle's Poetics) who determine the criteria of its perfection; it ls
they who say what its attributes should and should not be. The ordi-
nary participant in the culture does not have access to, nor is he con-
sidered capable of enjoying, "true" art. What he does enjoy is not
considered to be "art"; nor is it "beautiful." Again we return to
Platonic definitions and find the precedent for a rationalistic aes-
thetic. For "beauty," as well as the "good," is identified with the "true."
All are apprehended by the same method. The position relegated lo
the emotional experience is a low one. It is ''reason" that triumphs.
/\s the result Europeans are taught to aµproach the aesl llettc-
exp<'rl<'tH'C'through analysis. Th~y objc:cli(y 1lw •xpl'ri<:1H'l':lltl'y teat
II np;irt: llll'y w,b:ill,w It, ltH'C'Si;/\11tlv,1111d lt'i\l'li .11,d 1111•l1111uli1lh.11
st.111cl llw l'Xp1·1 l1•111·1·
111till·, w,ry ttwy 1·111111•lo u11d<•1 1111111•-•111lwlh'I
,q1p11•1 l,111•II Y1•t fut 11111•dpt•ttp!t· II I:, 1111•
·u•11•,1\11llyl11lllll'dl,1l1•/UHi
not the intellectually mediated that gives pleasure, that evokes emo-
tional response. The intensification of this tendency leads to the
actual replacement of the authentic emotional sensitivity with an arti-
ficial intellectual aesthetic; and people lose the ability to respond
emotionally and to create that to which others can, indeed, respond.
This is a consequence of the cultural value and utamawazo that splits
human faculties into the "rational" and "emotional," and then dic-
tates that the emotional be controlled, "weeded" out, ignored if pos-
sible-its existence being recognized only because the European
begrudgingly acknowledges that the "human" is afterall part "ani-
mal."
But very different philosophical premises inform the art forms
of other cultures and the ideas about the aesthetics they generate.
The awakening of the human spirit in emotional communion with the
sacred, however that may be defined, is its primary goal. There are
S<'veral authors worth mentioning whose comparisons help to eluci-
( late some of the characteristic features of the European aesthetic
Pxperience.
Willie Abraham says of the Akan art form:
... they expressed their philosophico-religious ideas through art,

through the timeless, immemorial, silent, and elemental power so
('haracteristic of African traditional art. Indeed this is the main rea-
son why it was not lifelike in a representational sense. Forms had
to be distorted. In art there was a moral-philosophical preoccupa-
1ion which led it to portray forces of the world, and to portray a
force it was essential that it should not be treated like something
assimilated, and consequently like something overcome, as the ren-
dering of it in life-like figures would have been. 4
In the African view of the human, the emotional-spiritual and

1lw 1::itional-material are inextricably bound together, and if anything,
ti t•,a human being's spirituality that defines her as human, provid-
th<:>
1111-( <.:ontext within which she is able to create art as well as tech-
1111lliHY· Such a view leads to a very different emphasis in artistic
, pt t•ssion. The emotional identification with, and participation in,
t lw ,11 t rorm by the person and the community are primary values that
l11Ip to d<>termine Its shape. In this way the form itself becomes less
111,111"objc•rt." In Europeau culture the tendency and emphasis are
111111Ii t lit• oppnslle. Whllt• artist's may still attempt· to evoke certain
I ,11l,111•tl 1rspn11:ws from tlwir audlen('CS, these responses
1·1110111111,d
1111wt•ll< ally lt,\Vt' v1;1y lll1l1• ''rult11111I"o, "moral" sil-{nlficance, and
1111 1 111111•1 xp1•1l1•111·1•
lrn111 1111·1·n•11llrn1 11i 1111·11f1wt1/'111110Its (>11·
204 YURUGU
sentation is much more "individualized." The artist creates out of his

own particular response to his environment, and his work is appre-
ciated by separate and distinct "individuals," who reach into their dis-
tinct experiences for whatever identification they can find.
As Abraham says, this is the mark of a "secular art." What the
culture as a whole does for the individuals involved is to suggest that
they "objectify" their experience, isolate the "object," and approach
it analytically. That is really the only preparation they are given by
their cultural experience. And so the circle of people who participate
in this exchange for pleasure (who derive pleasure from it) is very
small. The aesthetic sense of the rest is aroused by that which is not
"art," and they have no "taste," or so their culture says. Abraham's
distinction between "secular" and sacred or "moral art" is very sig-
nificant, and the European has always approached the art of other cul-
tures as though it were meant to be as "amoral" as his own. Abraham
says,
When critics like Gombrich say that the African artists were inca-
pable of realistic presentation, they quite miss the point of African
art. If they seek life-likerepresentation, they should turn to secular
art, the art which was produced for decorative purposes or the
purposes of records, rather than moral art, the art whose inspira-
tion is the intuition of a world force. 4
Awoonor says that African art expresses the relationship

between humans and the Creator. It expresses our will and wishes to
the Creat0r; is "an assertation of (our) own temporality as a living
being, and more importantly, an articulate statement of that spiritu-
ality through a cyclic order within (our) cosmos." 5 Art (carvings) at
shrines are instruments that affirm the divine link between us and our
Creator. 6
In earlier European development artistic expression is also inti-
mately bound to religious understanding. This interrelationship
reaches its height in the medieval period, though theorists debate as
to the degree of secular humanism and religiousity in Renaissance art.
In earlier periods there is even a strong communal aspect to musical
creations. But with the advent of scientism, that is, the triumph of Sl'I•
entific-rationalism, initiated by Bacon and others, the assault on tl1l1
remaining vestiges of the sacred and the rc>r1111111nnl l)egins. What Is
<-'111phaslzedIn tlils discussion an· 111,,tt•ncknclcs 111tlw F.11ro1w,111.
,Wt-illwlk 1•,<1wrl1•111·t• ll1tll bc!,(!111 to l'llll'l!W wllli Ahrliud 111111
c·xp,rndt•d ll11tH1HllllllltlH• R1•1111l1:!l1111c11,111:1C'lil111{ l)y tilt'
do111l11,1111•1•
(ll11Vhwl', 111l11glvli11-(•,
l•~11ll1(ltf1•111w•11I, ,l111111l ll11• wp11111tlrn111·11111111111
0
ascendence of science over its spiritual grounding did not have the
cultural backing to resist the ideological momentum of the European
asili.) European art, already heavily rationalistic, was to become sec-
ular, individualized, and elitist.
The more intellectual, individualized, and individual art became
in the West, the more technical it became. The artist regarded his
work as an object to be made technically perfect. That is, his ideas of
perfection were much more influenced by the concept of technical
and mechanical perfection than in other cultures, and this is primar-
ily the way in which the European artist is presently shaped by his
culture; these are the models with which he is presented and he per-
ceives them "rationalistically."
Sorokin says that as European art searches for diversity and
ever-increasing variety, it loses "all harmony, unity and balance,"
which become "submerged in an ocean of incoherency and chaos."
These trends, he continues, lead to an emphasis on the technical
means of production rather than the art itself. These tools become
increasingly complicated ends in themselves. 7
In his view, European art becomes increasingly "a commodity
manufactured for the market" tending toward the vulgar. We should
point out that the interesting contradiction in European culture is
that its art may be commercially inspired ("the artist must live, after
all"), geared to consumption, inspired by the desire for recognition,
and at the same time remain an elitist form; that is, essentially sepa-
rated from the people, because the art, like the culture, creates (con-
trols) the people, rather than the reverse. According to Sorokin, in the
artist's tendency to disregard religious and moral values, the art itself
comes to be more and more divorced from truly cultural values

and turns into an empty art known euphemistically as "art for art's
sake," at once amoral, nonreligious, and nonsocial, and often anti-
mora/, antireligious, and antisocial. 8
This "amorality" is directly connected to the "nonsocial" char-

acter of European art. It is symptomatic of the character of the cul-
t 11reand can be traced from Platonic misconception, as evidenced in
I lavelo<.:k'swork in praise of Platonic epistemology. In Havelock's
view it was a "discovery" and an "advance" when the Greeks were
"nblc" to conceive of the ll'ldividual psyche as the seat of rationally
cll'lt•rnilned moral Judl:(t'lfl<.>nts.But there can be no such thing as a
111urnlltylodgc.•clprh11arllyhv 111l11lllc11ed In the "individual." "Reason,"
II lrb 111lw dlstli1~ult;l1t•dltrn11 ,,11111111111 and f<>ellni,:,is sorely insuffi-
111•111111 dlcl111\•·•11111111111"
111111,d111•11,vtu1 '1'1111 sulttr'(• of l11111rnn
morn!-
206 YURUGU
ity must necessarily be in the interaction of human beings. It must be

communal, which, more than "social," implies a joining of persons.
This basic fact of human existence is of primary importance in other
cultures and informs their modes of organization. The lack of authen-
tic community, i.e., the substitution of the social for the communal,
accounts for much of the atrophied development of the West. Art
that is noncommunal cannot be moral, and a rationally, individually
conceived "ethic'' is humanly, even personally, inadequate.
Daiseti Suzuki makes some observations on the comparison of
European and Buddhist symbolism that help to further delineate the
nature of the European aesthetic. He presents a haiku by an eigh-
teenth century Japanese poet, Basho, and discusses its poetic and
philosophical significance. The haiku form contrasts dramatically
with European verbal art forms, because of its extreme simplicity
and directness of intent.
Oh! Old Pond!

A frog leaps in,
The water's sound!
Of this haiku Suzuki says the following,
Basho was no other than the frog when he heard the sound of the
water caused by its leaping. The leaping, the sound, the frog, and
the pond and Basho were all in one and one in all. There was an
absolute totality; that is, an absolute identity, or to use Buddhist ter-
minology a perfect state of emptiness (i.e. Sunyata) or suchness
(i.e. Tathata). 9
This sense of identity is most difficult for those nurtured in

European culture to comprehend, because the culture dictates the
necessity for experience to be continually mediated through con-
cepts, through "the word," and it must be analytically absorbed. And
so, it is difficult to imagine how Kant's "Analytic" or Aristotle's Poetics
could relate to the haiku, for just as the mode of haiku reflects the
principles of Buddhist philosophy, the understanding and approach
of these philosophers reflects the nature of the European utamawazo.
lt follows, then, that the European idea of "symbol" is not adequnll:
to explain Budd hi ;t symbolism. Suzuki continues,
•. do wr- c-all "I h!' old pond" 01 tlit>water's sou11d or I hv lt•;ipli1g frni,:
:t wn1hol lo1 11lth11.1t1• plill11sopl1y 1111•11·
rl'/1llly't l11B111ldlil11t l:1'110111
IH•lll11dtlu• old p1111d,lw1 ,1ww It l111·01qpll'lt· 111ll·wll ,111ddrn•·
1111,{
1111Ip11hl1 In ,111vtltl11).( lt•h·lf l'llt' old
lwlll11tl 01 l11•yo1ul01 1111l<1ld1•
pond (or the water or the frog) itself is reality ....
Buddhist symbolism would ... declare that everything is symbolic,

it carries meaning with it, it has values of its own, it exists by its own
right pointing to no reality other than itself. 10
But lineal, causal, purposive thought presupposes a relation

between "objects," and a reality that is "other than" and "outside of,"
them. Since this is characteristic of European ontology, it effects
European art. Wade Nobles characterizes the African "symbolic
method" as involving a "transformation-synchronistic-analogic
modality," while the contemporary European cultural understanding
of "symbol" is as a "representational-sequential-analytical" mode. 11
Suzuki describes the feeling of exaltation that comes from iden-
tification with the pond and simultaneously with the universe itself.
But in the European experience, exaltation is achieved from feelings
of "control over" a passive object-and separation from it. For this rea-
son, there is no precedent in the European tradition for identification
with other people; that is, the culture does not support such identi-
(kation. Suzuki points out that like haiku, which fixes on the imme-
diate rather than the mediated experience,
Zen Buddhism avoids generalization and abstraction .... To

Buddhists, being is meaning. Being and meaning are one and not
separate; the separation or bifurcation comes from intellection,
and intellection distorts the suchness of things. 12
The habit of analysis does not make room for this kind of appre-
lle11sion, and the predominance of the analytic mode in the European
c·xpcrience has all but eliminated the sensitivity to immediately per-
1t•lvable beauty and its definition. It is the European conviction that
,111 experience of art must be difficult; that profundity is only com-
p, chended through intellectual struggle.
Willie Abraham says,
1'11r-amount of get up, preparation and education which the mod-

11111Europea11mind requires to resuscitate its sense of rapport with
1lu• beautiful aud the sublime, the arid technicalities of his sophis-
11t·,1tln11 is artificial sensitivity. It is only when sensitivity is natural
11,,11It is im111ccliate, cffor t less, picturesque, non-nostalgic, and intu-
it IV<'. The snplllslki\!Pcl sensitivity must tear apart what it co11-
l1•111pl,1t1•s II,._ 1111,llylklllq11isitivc, 1·r1rvi111,(-k11if<'
sensitivity,".!
208 YURUGU
This analytical mental habit results in a culturally problematical

aesthetic. The creation of a reflective, scientific aesthetic-superficial
and nonauthentic from the point of view of the human/emotional-
establishes a quasiseparation between an elitist art form and a "pop-
ular" one. But also a division is made-of which the members of the
culture themselves are not aware-between a consciously imitated
or normative aesthetic, operating most successfully among the intel-
lectualist minority, and a most often unconscious aesthetic common
to Europeans in general. The latter is, in my view, the more properly
speaking "European aesthetic" in the sense that it embodies the
European standards of beauty and the feelings, styles, modes in
which the members of the culture participate pleasurably.
The dichotomy between these two senses is culturally unpro-
ductive and stultifying, and brings us to another effect of this symp-
tomatic distinction; the factors that work to promote a lack of
creativity and sterility in European art. These are cultural factors
that the creative European artist must overcome. Art divorced from
spirituality is culturally debilitating. Secular art is not natural, but
artificial, and the European artist is under immense pressure to per-
form an all but impossible task: She must create an object of beauty
for a passive audience whose aesthetic sense must be aroused, yet
an audience with whom she has shared nothing but the unaesthetic
experience of European culture-a culture that has excelled in its
ability to separate her from the very people to whom she must pre-
sent her work. She shares nothing that would serve as an experien-
tial base through which she and her audience can communicate
emotion. Armstrong says, "The individual consciousness must define
itself in the only way it can, which is to say in opposition to all oth-
ers. "14This is the result of an epistemology (utamawazo) that isolates
the knowing self as a definition of "superior" evolved human con-
sciousness. What the artist and the other members of the culture do
share, however, is commitment to the affirmation of the superiority
of their culture vis-a-visother cultures. On an unconscious level the
European artist validates these feelings, satisfies these needs.
On a conscious level European audiences must constantly spec
ulate about the artists' source of inspiration and guess at her int Jn
tion; her "message." "What Is she trying to say?" is the question hcnt <I
at a New York art galle,y. The artist is conceived of as a person wltu,
out of his own u11lquennd l11divld11nl t•xpNl('lH'P ,IIHI tlgony, joy anti
II• 1·xprt•ss hlm:wlf 1111110,·nla11<1 c11l111rnl~1rn11gN•,,
i;11ffi,rl111~. o;1•1·ks 11
11,110 w1111clc·1 111,11111 tilt' W1••,!, ,lfl ,q1p1·,11•1 111 lillV«' 1111plill P l1111(1',II
•11·1•111 I u I H' 1 ,u I l11cl 1111.,,, .111.1clj11111I Ive•111I lvll v 11•, t 111111µ,lt
It cl,11"1 11111
affect the vast majority of Europeans. It does however: Subliminally,

it effects the European national consciousness. There is a sense in
which "art" could cease to exist, and the average European would
only become aware of its demise if it were chronicled in the newspa-
pers. There is another sense in which European art serves as the
scaffolding of the nationalistic psyche. Aziza Gibson Hunter calls it
"the invisible clothing of the West." 15 This elite art and popular art
have different, but related, purposes.
But art has a radically different significance in non-European
cultures, where it is most often intimately bound with the sacralized
pattern and existence of the total lifeways of the group. Because of
this critical difference, the confrontation between the European and
non-European art is a phenomenon of culture shock. The European
is either blinded by his cultural chauvinism to the parochial nature
of his own aesthetic sense, and so cannot appreciate the profundity
of non-European forms; or, the European artist, his creativity stran-
gled by a dying culture, is forced to draw inspiration outside of that
culture from these same non-European forms. Robert Goldwater says,
As artists who felt their own native traditions weakened and

increasingly meaningless who were convinced that the necessary
renewal could not come about by continuing, but only beginning
again-by a rebirth; as artists who wished to cast off Western devo-
tion to appearances and to devote themselves to realities; as artists
who wanted to strip away the surface in order to reveal the essen-
tials, they turned to the primitive. The primitive could set them an
example, could show them how to start anew. Because it was itself
nn art of power and conviction it would aid them to create their own
meaningful art. 16
Goldwater, of course, is careful to say that he is not using the

tc•rrn "primitive" in a pejorative sense, and that in this use it connotes
-.0111ethingthat the European artists considered to be positive. The
ti-, m il:imost often essentially valuative, however, because it usually
• 011110tesa kind of temporal "incongruity," from a Eurocentric per-
•,p<•<·tive.What Goldwater does not say is that the European artists,
l11q11csscd with African and othe1 non-European forms, used them as
, 1ww source of energy for the validation of their own cultural chau-
vlnl,;111.Like the Greeks, they stole, and then used what they stole to
, 1111vl11n'others of llwlr supcriorit'y.
210 YURUGU
An Aesthetic of Control
Perhaps there is no better form of artistic expression than that
of music to demonstrate the peculiar dynamics of the European aes-
thetic. The European mind responded to music in precisely the same
way as it responded to every kind of phenomenon with which it was
presented. Music was analyzed, dissected, "studied" and translated
into the language of mathematics. It was written down, and then it
could be "read" as one would read a mathematical equation. And true
to the pattern of European development, the intellectuals who cre-
ated this new music were successful in introducing it into the culture
as a whole because the culture itself was predisposed to value such
an approach. With writing comes control, and with control, for
Europeans, comes power. This is the nature of the utamaroho. This
obviously is far more aesthetically pleasing to them than the cre-
ativity and spontaneity that results from the interaction between
human emotion and the medium of music. In the West, an artist of
African descent who has somehow miraculously inherited the genius
of her culture, via her "ancestral memory," and plays without ever
having studied the tools of the European, is an embarrassment. It is
like European science being confronted by the astronomical knowl-
edge of the Dogon people. It exists, but it shouldn't!
Centuries of tradition of the mathematization and rationalization
of music have caused the European to forget its origin and how it is
produced naturally-as opposed to synthetically (the mere imitation
and description of music). Europeans created neither the first music
nor the first musical instruments; they found them and made them
objects of study. Because there was only one way in which they could
understand this music with which they were confronted, they ana-
lyzed it, looking for "laws" of harmony, and melodic relationships, yet
unable to hear/ feel/ comprehend the cosmic manifestation of sound.
(Even in the Middle Ages, music was the study of harmonics and pro-
portion and, as such, was related to mathematics; (in an academit-
technical, not a cosmic-metaphysical sense); Augustine's De Musico
was the standard textbook.) The Europeans then created a facsclm~
ile and style in which they excelled; i.e., a style that expressed all tlw
power and control of the European aesthetic and value. They en·•
ated the symphony-a technical and organizational masterpicc:l', LI11•
epitome of spcciali7.ation in performance.
Tllrir inventiveness, LhC'ir u11lq11enrss, thl'l1 11tc1111mof111
"cl,\s.:,I<
l'\Prt",S('d ll1wlf prin ,nrlly wit lll11 1111•1r nl" clluwnsloi ,: 11II' ol I w1
lt1 l~111opp,111rttlll r1• ,Ht' p1l111i11llyl11111ow1•d
1 xp1t•i.·.l111rn nl 11111:,h•
o1cl,tpl,1ll11w1,,111rl111111.11101thl'lw
!~11111·., ,11 1 o1 I lw .y111
u111pl11l1111t•11l
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 21l
phony should not have caused Europeans to forget the origins of

musical expression nor the plethora of differing styles more creative
and spontaneous, which had demonstrated a greater elemental
genius than the symphonic form, with its emphasis on structure. With
this in mind the existence of the African musician who plays "by ear"
is only a "wonder" in that it is perhaps one of the suprarational "facts"
of human existence.
Again, it is the technical aspect of the craft that is emphasized
in the European tradition, and as the technical order intensifies, its
musical instruments become more and more mechanical, electronic,
synthetic, and unnatural. Those who play them become better and
better technicians, but their compositions would be just as mechan-
ical, synthetic, and uninspiring as the instruments on which they
were played if it were not for the utilization of the musical creativity
and awareness of the African experience. In America innovation in
music, dance, and language is influenced by African culture through
the contribution of the Africans who live there. This influence is in
turn exported to the larger European community. European culture
can prepare an individual for the technical mastery of European musi-
cal instruments and machines, and is able to train a small minority
to perform the music it has created-commonly referred to as "clas-
sical," "long-hair," or "good" music, commonly referred to among
Africans in America as "dead" music. But European culture must rely
on the creativity inspired by the African musical and expressive
genius for the music and dance that most of its members enjoy. This
circumstance is directly related to the nature and ideology of the cul-
ture and to the radical differences between the two utamarohos.
In Ortiz Walton's comparison of the African and Western aes-
1hetics in music, he points to some of the trends in Western cultural
history that account for the predominant mode of European music.
I le says that written music cannot be considered improvisation. We
see that in the European's attempt to plan and predict, he has lost the
opportunity to develop the art of improvisation and spontaneity on
which a vibrant and creative musical expression depends. European
111usic,says Walton, "became highly rationalized with the Greeks." Qt
wlll be remembered that Plato associates music with a despiritualized
111nll1e111r\lics; both should be an important aspect of the education
uf I Ile Guardians, because they help to encourage and develop the
"proper mental habits.") Later the Church further "rationalized"
11111Hlr ill its Hlt<'lllPt to ronfrol its content. lie says that a system of
In ll1t•Wt•sl wlll1 Hw Ct<"l'k idt•i-1of ethoi. "which has
1111l.1lfc111_lwr(u11
ll<•t•1111dcl<
1
d onto 111tlH· follnwllt~ <'1'111111'11·1,,
rn:;tln~ w<•tilN11 1n11sf<·
212 YURUGU
into a rigid, unalterable, fixed phenomenon." 17 Walton adds that the

makers of European instruments reflected the European predilection
for rationalization in
... a new technology of tempered instruments .... Valveless horns

resembling their African prototypes, and keyless woodwind instru-
ments, were replaced by the highly rationalized and mechanical
keys and valves. It is difficult to comprehend these developments
in the West except as a passion for the rational. ...
The order of the auditory world had now been transformed into a
visual, mechanical, and predictive phenomenon. Now all a player
had to do was look at the music and put the finger a certain place
and out would come the sound that had been conceived long before
in somebody's head. 18
Max Weber talks about "rationality" in the development of

Western, European music:
rational harmonious music, both counterpoint and harmony, for-

mation of the tone material on the basis of three triads with the har-
monic third; our chromatics and enharmonics, not interpreted in
terms of space, but, since the Renaissance, of harmony; our orches-
tra, with its string quartet as a nucleus, and the organization of
ensembles of wind instruments; our bass accompaniment; our sys-
tem of notation, which has made possible the composition and pro-
duction of modern musical works, and thus their very survival, as
a means to all these, our fundamental instruments, the organ, piano,
violin, etc.; all those things are known only in the Occident,
although programme music, tone poetry, alteration of tones and
chromatics, have existed in various musical traditions as a means
of expression. 19
Though Weber uses this principle of rationality to make clai1r1

to the "superiority" and "universality" of Western forms, he, accord-
ing to Walton, indicates, as well, his own ambivalence towards th<:
ultimate effect of the obsessive rationalism of Western culture:
Weber concluded that only in Western music is the drive towartl

rationalism a predominant concern. And his findings rcsullccl iu
whal became, for him, a central (Juc·stion: Why docs cflicien<'y of
1tl\·«I1sIn reh\tlon to ends (Wc:hcr's definition of rnllonnllsm) resull
111,1 spirit of ''<IISl1 1irh1~111111<•nt
wllll ltre" -;1slalt• of IH•l111<
wlwn• lift·
(111 d1 1 ,1llt) It;,,; IHI llil'HIIIIIH 'lO
While in the West the tendency was for this "written," controlled
music to become elitist and for a passive audience to be "confronted"
with a performance, in Africa the cultural priorities and values
demanded a communal musical form in which there was no real sep-
aration between "performer" and "audience": a participatory experi-
ence for everyone involved. Walton says,
Contrasted with the music-for-the-elite philosophy prevalent in the

West, African music retained its functional and collective charac-
teristics. The element of improvisation was developed rather than
abandoned, and it found its way into Black music in this country.
Similarly, the unifying element of audience participation was also
retained. 21
There were most certainly forms of European music designed for

communal participation (sometimes hundreds of singing voices walk-
ing through the European countryside), at earlier stages in European
development. But the asili was such that this form would soon be
eclipsed by those that suited an utamaroho craving power and an
11tamawazo constructing mechanisms of control. Communal and par-
ticipatory music/art forms would be discouraged until they all but dis-
appeared, since they did not reflect the ideological matrix/thrust of
lhe culture. They were not "European" enough.
The emphasis on communal participation in African music gave
, isc to antiphony or the "call-response," "question-answer" form that
l1as carried over into the musical creations of Africans in the
Americas, as Walton points out. Whereas control, technical preci-
•,lon, and theoretical complexities are valued in European classical
11111sic, rhythm and tonal variation are primary concerns in African
111usic,and the symphony therefore has limited aesthetic potential to
1lw African ear.* What few have understood, however, is that the
Alt lean predilection for rhythm in its various complexities is not hap-
p.-11stance, but is intimately bound to African melanated bio-chem-
1 t1y ;ind to the cosmic nature of the African world-view. 22
It Is only through contrast with other art forms that the pecu-
lt.11lty and uniqueness of the European aesthetic is made clear. This
,111m1·slionof contrast is compelling in an ethnology of the culture,
l11 III(•attempt to counteract successful European nationalism that
p111Jt•c1s European ideology in the form of universals, as opposed to
I 1110111•,111choice a11dparticularism. The development of a "science"
the W(:~tonly l1t'lps l'o co11fusethe issue, and in the
111,1111,tlH•lln; 111
l1v J11•wpll l llq11do, lit M,1111\//h r/r, / 111•11111111·,Vol. I, 1•il

1lil•t 1111li1ll111111111!•
, •I p11k11,N,•wY111I, 1'l11111111,.1
,11w,•ll1 ,\pr,ll11l•'.dlllo11, l!170,l' I~
214 YURUGU
main it has been the particularly European brand of cultural nation-

alism that allowed European critics to "evaluate" African and other
forms of non-European art. Joseph Okpaku offers us a prime example
of the inevitable Eurocentricism that results from this presumptive
posture. He quotes from Jones-Quartey, who is commenting on an
event in which an African audience found a Western tragedy amus-
ing. Jones-Quartey says that Africans have a "misconception of mean-
ing," and
that drama of any genre is pure entertainment (to Africans) and

nothing else. But, secondly, and at a deeper level still, it is also pos-
sible that Africans are unwilling to isolate, or incapable of isolating,
the one element of death or disaster from their trivial concept of
existence as consisting of the dead, the living, and the unborn and
treating this element separately or differently. 23
Indeed, the "misconceptions" of self-appointed European critics

of non-European aesthetic conceptions are, unfortunately, not usually
so obvious as the above example. The writer's characterization of the
African conception of death as "trivial" would be simply amusing if
such judgements were not so successfully supported by the appara-
tus of European imperialism.
In his article "Afro-American Ritual Drama," Carlton Molette
makes some perceptive observations on the European aesthetic by
way of comparison. Molette points out that mimesis or imitation and
mimicry are aesthetically pleasing to the African, while the European
observer will often complain of what he calls "monotony." Plato's
attitude toward "mimesis" is that it is an aspect of that natural human
weakness that must be expelled from the official media of the State.
For the European the "maintenance of reality" is crucial, while in
African ritualism the form "is of much greater importance." As witl1
the musical experience, the European audience is passive, while t lw
African objective is total participation of the group. All of these fac:
tors, says Molette, are operative in the African-American church ser
vice, which he identifies as "ritual drama." "The tradition .... aims at
creating ... an illusion of reality of time, place and character otltc,
than the actual one." 2~ African ritual drama creates the "eternal
moment" that transcends ordinary time, joining the <.:ategorics oft l1n1
and place (hantu) into a single boundless, experience of spiritual tP111
1111111!011.the ultimate' nw<111ln~fulr•pulity. 25
1\11(1tlw l:1<·kof :rnhj1•rtlv1• ld1·11llh<1111011tlaht rl1;11,ll'l.-rl1t·~ tilt•
o, wltlc·lt 11,,vt-ln<k 11ppl,111cl•,1,111 lw • c•1·11 ,1•,1)1•lt1H
1·~1110111•,11111tu1111111111
~1v0,l11111llc111,tl, .. 11ll'lllc C 111111•1, ,q1p11•c t.,1lrn1,,1•1ll p11·v1•11I•
1 ,llllt 111111
or limits the emotional involvement of the audience. The following

comment of Molette reinforces our observations concerning the ratio-
nalistic conception of the human inherited from Plato and Christian
theology:
The Afro-American aesthetic does not operate on the characteris-

tically Euro-American assumption that all human behavior is either
rationally motivated, resulting in elevated behavior, or emotionally
motivated, resulting in base behavior. The Afro-American aesthetic
places a very high value upon emotionally motivated behavior; or
another term that might be used to describe it, I think more accu-
rately, would be spiritually motivated behavior. 24
Molette is accurate in his use of the term "spiritual" here,

because it is this understanding of spirituality that is lacking and/or
ignored in the European aesthetic and mythoform, especially in the
last two hundred years. This is due not only to the rationalistic con-
ception of the human psyche or "soul" but also to the confused
European conception of "art-for-art's sake"-an idea predicated on
1he assumption that there is value in separating the function of art
from the life-blood of the group. Molette counters this with an outline
of the purposes of Afro-American ritual drama. "One of these pur-
poses is to celebrate the affirmation of a sense of community, a feel-
Ing of togetherness ... based upon the assumption that we who are
1/olhered here to participate in this event are and belong together."
{Molette's italics.) This he says is frequently emphasized through
physical contact, like holding hands. Euro-American forms, on the
ot lier hand, emphasize the individual, his uniqueness and different-
11c-ss.The individual, then, is constantly aware of himself as "indi-
vidualized" (Diamond's term) and cannot easily perceive the group
( which, therefore, often becomes "non-existent" for him). He per-
' dvcs himself as an "observer," distinct from that which he observes.
1\111"a purpose of Black ritual drama is to create a total spiritual
l11vnlvcmcnt" in the event. "Another purpose of Black ritual drama is
1,1 serve some functional, useful purpose ... a funeral ritual is sup-
I II l'i(•<I lo have a certain specific useful future effect upon the soul of
l I 11• 1 lcceascd brother or sister." 2 n
This brings us again to the critical question of the cultural sig-
111111 ,111n•of European art. European art forms have an avowed pur-
l, ..,.,. l'helr goal Is lo reprcs~•nt a "universal," "abstract,'' and "eternal
I, 111 I," (E11ro1H•un1111th).They nrr- no1 designed to create an immedi-
"' • 11ll11r.11I l'lft•1·1:.u,;I I I ,1•yat,. 11111s1 tll'fiallt<•ly 1101inspired hy a con-
' I pllntl or 1111('111' ••• Ill I IIIIIIIIIJIIIII h•1•ll11gnf 1111'1111111p For, we• nrt:
216 YURUGU
told, the European artist creates "art for art's sake." She is able to
break out of the socio-cultural limitations and definitions of the cre-
ative experience and therefore produces art that has no other pur-
pose than that of expressing the artist's own individual ego. This, we
are told, is "progress," just as Havelock regards the Greek conception
of "knowledge" as a "discovery" leading to intellectual "advance."
But this formulation is both intellectually and emotionally unim-
pressive. It is meaningless, incomprehensible, and confusing. Is it any
wonder that elite art produced under the guidance of such a philos-
ophy fails to reach the major portion of the culture, often has no cul-
tural significance other than material power and tends toward
spiritual demise? The "fine arts" in the West tend to become merely
intellectual exercises. "Art for art's sake" is peculiarly European and
should be rejected as a critical standard in other cultures. Yet this
very peculiar misconception has been one of the main tools used by
Europeans in their criticism of non-European art. Sometimes sur-
rounded by the terminology of a contradictory and superficially
restrictive "universalism," it becomes difficult to realize the severity
of European distortion and self-deception. In regard to "the idea of
art," Rene Wassin·g, in the book African Art says: "Fundamentally it is
a European idea developed in the mental climate of European phi-
losophy and applied to the expression of European culture." 27
Universalism, so called by the European, is actually very par-
ticular, and these statements serve as evidence of the nature of the
peculiar European utamaroho. Evidently, it never occurs to Wassing
that he is talking about the European "idea of art" or that that idea
used in the context of African art might be extremely misleading, to
say the least. What are the indications that an idea of art exists in a
culture? Its verbal documentation; its systematization; its translation
into European philosophical terminology; its "objectification" or the
attempt to isolate it from other aspects of culture, in the Europea11
habit, as with what is regarded by them as "religion?" This is a man-
ifestation of the same ethos, displayed by Placide Tempels, who
wishes to "teach" the Africans their own concept of being. It woulcl
be so much more helpful if "objective," "open-minded" would-be t11l
turalists like Wassing would put more effort into an cxpllcatio11 ot
their own conceptions. (A few years ago I had occasion to att011d 11
Haitian Art exhibit, at which the guest speaker (a European "ex1wrt"
mi Haitian Art] infonnetl us that h<' was delighted to see this dlspl11y,
lwca, Is1·whl'll IH· Hr~,~;artcd going to I lnll I, "llwrc w11sIIn !.1,ell 111ll1i•
,l'I Atl", th.it lit• h,1clIn f;wt hrrn1glit 1111'ldP,t lo 1111•
1111111,111 ll,11ll,III', l
<ll Alric ,111~,111<1ll11•lr.111, W,1:,1,lllg s;1y-;·
It must ... be remembered that the artist did not consciously set out
to create a work of art. They considered a piece a success if it ful-
filled the task set, a task which was primarily functional. Whatever
function a piece might have-economic, magical or religious-the
aesthetic principle never became an end in itself, in the manner of
"art for art's sake." Aesthetic appreciation and criticism of the mate-
rial culture of Africa is a western invention founded on a discovery
made not long before, the development of which runs parallel with
the developing concept of art in western history. 27
It is in statements about other cultures that Europeans reveal

themselves most and the limitations of their own forms of thought.
Wassing's statement says a bit about African culture, while it inad-
vertently reveals much about the difficulties inherent in the European
concept of art. Artistic creation tends to become identified with tech-
nical awareness. There is no doubt that the traditional African artist
has set out to carve the most powerful ancestral stool or ceremonial
mask that will best capture the nature of the spirit it is to express. His
goal is both aesthetic and functional, and because the experience of
beauty is intimately bound up with the manipulation of force or com-
1nunication with the sacred, or gift-exchange, it is not less valid.
l11deed, this is a more existentially real and spiritual understanding
of "beauty." If he were not writing for a European audience, Wassing
would have to be prepared to defend a conception of beauty that is
divorced from life; that is what is problematical. But he, in charac-
teristic European fashion, has confused the abstraction with the expe-
rknce. And it is easy for him first to be misled and then to mislead;
lwcause, in European logic, first Europeans invent a concept, method,
or" ·reed," then treat it as a "discovery" about the nature of the uni-
v •rse-something everyone should know and utilize. The idea of "art
for art's sake" is not only a European aberration with little relevance
outside of the European context, but it is of limited value within the
, 11lture itself and may indeed be symptomatic of a lack of creativity,
•,plrituality, and vitality in much of European art.
Traditionally, the European discussion is not of "the European
,,.,sthctic" but of "Aesthetics," and the discussants claim to be delin-
I11gthe necessary rules and dynamics of a universal "science" of
••11t
IIH• IH•nutiful. While Kant can say, on the one hand, that it is fruitless
111•,1•1k a "universal criterion of the beautiful," he can, at the same
1
dt>vnl~ seemin~ly bounrlless intellectual energy to a "pure judge-

I 11,11-.
1111•11l" h' of I hP l1Vin1t
111,d'';111;1lyt lful." Hut such phllosophical and ana-
l vii•,11 <11~.c-t1:.•,lo11H1111• 11lw11ys1•011ce11wd with the consciously,
l1il1•ll1•1·ttu1ll,-;tlr g1.:11L·rnlly
",11•t.tlu·llt·" 111 tlw l-'.1ll't1pn,111. '1'111: llll<'Otl
218 YURUGU
scious or less conscious, nonintellectual aesthetic definitions and

the images that appeal emotionally to the Europeans rarely surface
in their academically oriented discussions of "Aesthetics."
To get at these aspects of the contemporary European aesthetic
one must look at what comes out of Hollywood, Madison Avenue,
children's picture books, magazines, imagery in ordinary language
usage, and "fairy tales"-media that abound with cultural symbols
(religious paintings, novels, comic books, and the like), the symbols
of "popular art" and of educational materials, and what is left of a
European religious cosmology. If we take the "European aesthetic" to
include that which is pleasing to Europeans, then we would have to
include certain "feelings" with regard to other people, as well as cer-
tain forms of thought.
The European receives pleasure from a feeling of control over
other people; this feeling is extended to the most "ordinary" partici-
pant in the culture through her identification with the European hege-
mony. Power is aesthetically experienced in the ability to manipulate
others, and this desire has been culturally sustained and generated
perhaps since the "Inda-European" experience. It is so deeply a part
of the European aesthetic that even those who consider themselves
to be free of the excesses and distortions of European chauvinism,
critics of American foreign policy for instance, are not prepared to
face the consequences of a dramatic depreciation in European power.
The Western aesthetic is, in this sense, tied to the European uta-
maroho (need for supremacy) and European ethic. And the
European's image of himself as the "adventurer-discoverer" who con-
tinually seeks new lands, peoples, and resources to conquer-all of
this is emotionally pleasing to him. Similarly, as both William James
and Arthur Lovejoy have pointed out, rationalism, the mode of
abstraction, and the "idea of progress" and "evolutionism" are all
aesthetically and emotionally satisfying to the European mind. They
seem to fit. They are harmonious with the Western conceptions of the
universe and are dictated by the asili of the culture.
European art is oppositional, developed through what
Armstrong calls "a dialectic of polarities." In his view, European art,
therefore, can be understood as a series of competitions based 011
contrasts. "There are those arts which compete for gravity, thos<•
that compete with emptiness, and those that compete with silence." 211
rlere again is the asifi of the l:Ulturc revealing itself; the seccl/g<-r,n
t hnt while unfolding dktatr.s t Ii' sty!<-of earl! n1odnllty. 1-:nrhrn11
lllh11tll\l-( tu 1•11:nm· of u 1111111,e
the ovl'r all (1rg,111l1,1ll<m dl<'lalr•d hy
,l •,lltHlt••wl or ohjt·c-llV<':-1,W0tl(l11g lo s.111srvlllv l11s11\l,d)lt•/lfllll/lllO{ttJ
Through separation the self is isolated, opposed to "other," and

placed into a competitive relationship. The one who controls most
wins. It pays to be aggressive.
"White," "Good," and "Beautiful"

The "whiteness" of the European aesthetic may be consciously
ignored by the European intellectual, but nevertheless it permeates
the culture and reaches her as well. Jesus, the symbol of perfection
for the European Christian, is reinterpreted as white and often with
blond hair, and similarly every symbol of purity is white, all inno-
cence is blond youth hence the expression "fair-haired boy." Even the
Ideal (but unattainable) sex object is blond. In simplistic depictions,
villains are dark haired, mustached, unshaven, and wear black. And,
of course, the other physical attributes associated with the Caucasian
rnce are part of the European aesthetic. These images are all visible
on any Saturday morning cartoon feast offered by American televi-
sion. In The Passing of the Great Race, Madison Grant supports this
nbservation:
... in Celtic legend as in the Graeco-Roman and medieval romances,

prince and princess are always fair, a fact rather indicating that the
mass of the people were brunet [sic] at the time when the legends
were taking shape. In fact, "fair" is a synonym for beauty.
The Gods of Olympus were almost all described as blond, and it

would be difficult to imagine a Greek artist painting a brunet [sic]
Venus. In Church pictures all angels are blond, while the denizens
l)f the lower regions revel in deep brunetness. "Non Angli sect
angeli," remarked Pope Gregory when he first saw Saxon children
Pxposed for sale in the Roman slave-mart.
111depicting the crucifixion no artist hesitates to make the two

tllit!vcs brunet [sic] in contrast to the blond Savior. This is some-
lhlug more than a convention, as such quasi-authentic traditions as
W\' l1ave of our Lord strongly suggest Nordic, possibly Greek, phys-
kttl ;ind moral attributes. 29
l\ul Grant's view only emphasizes the fact that mythical reality
11'•" ,11uclimore important than secular history, since Jesus would
l111v1·to have been a niula11t to be blond and blue-eyed, given his
(ll,1n of origin.
Tl 1<'l-'.11rn1wan 11wcli;i dcmonst ral<•s th Is aspl'cl of the European
•••KIIH•tk.Wt•ll,11111 It 18 111ll11•ll11•1al11n•of ,ivnwed wlill<·natio11alis111
tit ti 1111',11••.1l11•ttilit hl.1L111lly1·xp1,·v 1•d Wlll1l11lilt• 1:<•og111pht,·11l
220 YURUGU
confines of "new Europe" it has been the person of African descent

who has done most to expose this aspect of the European aesthetic,
as she came to recognize it as a tool that had kept her psychologically
and ideologically locked into the role of pawn for the European uta-
maroho; if white was "right" and good, then she must be wrong and
very, very bad.
Addison Gayle, Jr. traces the genesis of the idea of white as
"good" and of black as its opposite in European literature. These are
the value symbols of European culture. With Plato, says Gayle, comes
the imagery of the dark cave of ignorance as opposed to the "light" of
knowledge. The lower (bad) as opposed to the upper (good) regions.
Christian symbolism intensified this imagery, and in it, whiteness as
value becomes expressly stated. Chaucer, Petrarch, and other writers
of the Middle Ages "established their dichotomies as a result of the
influence of Neo-Platonism and Christianity." 30 Gayle writes about the
white (beautiful, good)/black (ugly, bad) dichotomy of the English
"morality plays." White, in the syntax of the European aesthetic, also
represents the universal, while black is parochial. And of course
European Christianity tells us that white represents purity, while
blackness is sin. The "dark ages" are Europe's "unproductive" years.
"Dark period" refers to the melancholia of Gothic novels, Gayle tells
us, and in the eighteenth century English novel the symbolism became
directly translated into racial and cultural terminology. Gayle writes:
Robinson Crusoe was published at a historically significant time. In

the year 1719, the English had all but completed their colonization
of Africa. The slave trade in America was on its way to becoming a
booming industry; in Africa, Black people were enslaved mentally
as well as physically by such strange bedfellows as criminals, busi-
nessmen, and Christians. In the social and political spheres, a ratio-
nale was needed and help came from the artist-in this case, thf~
novelist-in the form of Robinson Crusoe. In the novel, Defoe brings
together both Christian and Platonic symbolism, sharpening the
dichotomy between light and dark on the one hand, while on the
other establishing a criterion for the inferiority of Black people as
opposed to the superiority of white.
One needed only compare Crusoe with Friday to validate both of

these statements. Crusoe is majestic, wise, whit•e and a colonialist;
Friclay ls savage, ignorant, IJlack and a colonial. Therefore, Cni~o<•
the colonialist has a double task. O,, tlw one l1i111d l1v tnll!l\ trn,,~
rmm tlw tslancl (Afric'a-unp1nd11rlivc>, .llan1•11,<11·11<1) 1111D ,1 111111•
i-:1,gt.,wt (p1ospN011,,, lllt• ~lvl111-1, fp1till'), 1111dIll' 11111•11 1Pt 11•11t1•
1
111 ltt.w Ill 1,1,,!IWII 1111,11{1',1111111 ltlt11 ,l•j ( lwll' In l1t•l11n

l11l111,(l111,( 1111
Englishman as possible. At the end of the novel, Crusoe has accom-

plished both undertakings; the island is a replica of "mother
England"; and Friday has been transformed into a white man, now
capable of immigrating to the lands of the gods. 31
It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree to which the aes-

thetic Gayle describes here permeates the culture. A continual pres-
sure exerts itself upon the psyche of a "nonwhite" person living within
the ubiquitous confines of the West to "remold," "refashion," "paint,"
''refine" herself in conformity with this European aesthetical image of
what a human being should be. The pressures begin at birth and out-
live the person, often breaking her spirit long before her physical
demise. This aspect of the European aesthetic is a deadly weapon at
the service of the need to dominate and destroy. So deep is the wound
it inflicts that in Senegal, West Africa, women, some of the most beau-
tiful in the world, burn and disfigure their rich, smooth, meianic,
ebony skin with lye in the attempt to make it white. Since the Maafa, 32
it is only very recently, particularly within the African community in
North America, that an alternative and more culturally valid aesthetic
has been presented to "non-Western," "nonwhite" peoples to emulate
nnd to value.
Gayle refers to the work of Hinton Helper, a European-American
<'hauvinist writing in 1867, who contributed explicitly to the estab-
lisllment and support of the "white aesthetic" in America. In Gayle's
(l()inion, Helper's work was influential in presenting "the cultural and
•,o,ial symbols of inferiority under which Blacks have labored."
I Iclper intended, as he states frankly in his preface, "to write the

ncgro out of America." In the headings of the two major chapters
nf the book, the whole symbolic apparatus of the white aesthetic
handed down from Plato to America is graphically revealed: the
ll~ading of one chapter reads: "White: A Thing of Life, Health, and
Beauty."
l l11clcrthe first heading, Helper argues that the color black "has
,1lways been associated with the sinister things such as mourning,
lilt' devil, the darkness of night." Under the second, "White has
.llways been associated with the light of day, divine transfiguration,
llw l>rncficicnt moon and stars ... the fair complexion of romantic
l,1dll•~. the ('OStu111csnf Ro1nans and angels, and the white of the
ling so bc-.111litully<·ombi11edwith blue and red without
l\1111•1·!t·a11
l'Vn ,1 I011('l1of th,• l>l;1<'k lwt'll for lhe flag of pirates.":i:i
tlrnt l111s
l,wl Ku\lnl 1t1111,, l1 11p 111111 Wl•:STb /\ WI IITI•'.CIVIi ,IZ/\

WIiy, "'1'111•:
222 YURUGU
TION; no other civilization has made that claim. White emblemizes

purity, but purity implies a purification, a removing of impurities ... it
is upon this symbol of whiteness that the psychohistory of our racism
rests." 34
These comments present a view of the usually "unconscious" or
"nonreflective" sense of the European aesthetic; that which in some
senses would be referred to as the affective European idea of beauty.
The theme of "whiteness" as a value in European cultural history will
occur repeatedly as we discuss further aspects of the European uta-
maroho.
We have suggested that, in addition to the quality of whiteness
and the mental habits of rationalism, the experience and ideas of
"power," "control," and manipulation are aesthetically pleasing to
the Europeans in a way that does not affect the utamaroho of others.
These are apparently the uncontrollable aspects of the European cul-
tural aesthetic. The desire to relate to other people in this way is
insatiable for Europeans. They can never have enough power; they
can never control enough objects. The pleasure derived from power
and control determines their behavior to an inordinate degree, and
it is expressed in their fantasies via the movie industry and various
other media.
Giovanni Gentile observes precisely this element of the
European aesthetic, but, as is usually the case with Europeans, he
conveniently universalizes the particular through the concept of
"modernity." Yet the spurious universalistic ideas that Gentile pre-
sents need not be emulated by other cultures.
The most striking difference between ancient and modern times [is
that] the reality that now begins to attract men's minds, and to
arouse their main interest, is no longer the reality which they find
in the world but that which they create within it. Man begins to feel
a power capable of confronting and opposing nature; his indepen-
dence and creative energy are asserted though not yet proved.
Man's power and virtue are seen as capable of winning over fortune
and all those events on which he has no control and which constl
tute his nature. This human energy is most evident and most slrik
ing in art and literature, in which man fancies an inner world of Ills
own where he can enclose himself ancl reign as absolute rnaslcr_:,i,
The Myth of a Universal Aesthetic

Tht• Flllop1·r111 phllosophlr,11 sl a1f'lll!'t
rt nf ;wsll 1c1lrs ,wls to slip
po1t 1':11111p1•,1111111tu1,II
l11qwrl,llli,111:111d1·0111111Iof ollH•, 1·11111111•• l11
., 1,111 1,11yc•t d,1111(1•11111',ly -.11111
It• 111,111111·1 A 1111111,11
y 1 1lll-1lw1 (1111111
aesthetic value of art, according to European philosophy, is its "uni-

versalism." Asante warns African poets and writers, "Universal is
another of those words that has been used to hold the enemy in our
brains." The "Afrocentric base" is classified as "narrow" or parochial,
while the "Eurocentric base is considered universal." 36
This concept of "universalism" is an ideological statement of
such wide and devastating political-cultural ramifications that it war-
rants continual discussion in the process of delineating the critical
expressions of European cultural imperialism. It is a theme found in
every aspect of European nationalism. It is cultural commitment dis-
guised.
We have seen how both the claim to universality and the pro-
jection of universality as a value to be emulated by other cultures
J1avefunctioned historically to facilitate the proselytization and impo-
si lion of Christianity. Universalism has also been projected as a cri-
lt•t'ion of worth in art to effectively force non-European artists to
t 1•jcct their own well-springs of cultural creativity. Gayle uses the
w,,rcl "strangulation," and it is a good one. Joseph Okpaku offers an
1•xample of the more obvious brand of European nationalism in aes-
l l1t'tic criticism form Jones-Quartey, but at this stage in the game that
ld11dof Eurocentricism no longer presents a "clear and present dan-
1wr" to the African artist. What does continue to threaten her expres-
•dt 111 of the uniqueness of her culture, however, are the ideas of the
"1•11lightened"philosophers who, in their struggle to move beyond the
111-1l1<·r aspects of their own culture, posit the virtues of a "universal
111111,anity" towards which every artist should direct her efforts-the
111•~ntionof culture. Though this conception may tend to strangle
'\Ir 1nm and "non-European" artists, they find it almost impossible to
ll HIit· against, because it is emotionally and symbolically connected
I•1 t l 10 Christian "brotherhood of man"-the "we are all one" rhetoric.
hi t Ia• moralistic climate of the European rhetorical ethic, the rejec-
111111 11fthis proposition is made to appear evil, and yet the proposi-
'" 1111s Itself a most unnatural and therefore immoral one; it is quite
111111,11'' to hate one's enemies. Much the same thing is accomplished
\'II ti t lw European proposition of the universal normative in the aes-
1111•1 Ii 1·xpNience. Universality as a normative goal becomes difficult
11111•j1·1•tIntellectually, giveu the presuppositions of European
l li1111uht Tl1HI Is why 1he road towards intellectual decolonization
11111111
1
, wllh H pn•carlous ohslarle palli a11descape from the maze of
I III np,•1111 n1yl11oforn1. ·
A, 1:,1otlt• :,11y:1Ill,11pw•t II·:IIill l'llW11I
s Mi' "uf t III' 11111
urf", .. of uni
•c,, ,h," .111rl111,llhy , 1111lv1•1r;,d •;t:1t1•11u•111
It<·11111111s"mw a•; lo whlcll
224 YURUGU
such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do." 37

This problem of the European normative statement of "universality"
in art may stem partially from an attempt to achieve transcendence.
But this is a serious misapprehension, for transcendence and uni-
versality are not in the same categories. The transcendent is a very
special kind of human experience, while universality is only a seman-
tical "fact" in the syntax of European thought. Gentile presents us
with an excellent example of this sort of European philosophical
statement. Seemingly apolitical and acultural, it lays the theoretical
groundwork for a damaging conception of the purposes of art. Of
these "diverse minds," he says,
Each of them has his life and his world, his ideals and his passions,
but all feel at bottom of their souls one common need which they
cannot satisfy unless they strip off these particular passions and
ideas and lay bare that human soul which is one and the same in
all of them and which perceives and creates beauty. The true
human soul is one, and it is capable of preserving its unity through
different nations, races, and ages, however indelibly every work of
art may bear the imprint of its age and birthplace, that is, the ideas
and passions which contributed to shape the life of its creator. It is
true that, behind all apparent human differences, there lives in each
man that one free soul, by virtue of which all men have, deeply
within themselves, a common humanity. 38
The European intellectual is so well conditioned and has so suc-

cessfully conditioned others that what Gentile says here has the
sound of "goodness itself." The question is, what does it mean? Whal
effect does it have on the artist and her art? Gentile might be, as so
many European philosophers have been, unaware of the intercultural
(i.e., political) implications of his statement, but that does not make
it any the less harmful; to the contrary, it becomes more effective and
more delibitating, because the reader and artist make the mistake of
being influenced by what they suppose Gentile's intention to be. They
are misled by his apparent "false-consciousness." Politically, of
course, and for our purposes, his "intention" is irrelevant.
Robert Armstrong criticizes traditional anthropology in t h,1t
anthropologists bring "structures" and tools in the attempt to und<•,
stand alien cultures that do not "fit" them. ThC'se tool:-, tl1c•rcfort·,
cn1111otexplain the cultures under scr11ti11y.But tlwy do. l1owcw1,
"fil" th,, a11tl1ropologlsl's mind 01w such tool, lit-'snys, Is llll' ldt•il 11I
,11111lv1•1s,dc·ont"t•pt ol "tlw ht•,111llflll"Wlwu 1lilH "1111IYl'l"sal"c·,1111111I
Ill' 1111111d
l11 1111 11lij1•tI•, ul •,l11dy, ,111lli1upt1lc1l(l11I; 1011111111111·II
absence to a lack of understanding, vagueness, or sorcery on the part

of the informants. 39 But Armstrong needs to look more closely at the
purpose of the anthropologist's "study" to understand better the
function of the "universal." Anthropology itself is an expansion of the
European utamaroho and satisfies the need to perceive oneself as
being superior. The universal, then, allows the European to judge
other cultures: all repetitions of a familiar theme.
Again, it is only very recently that, from a critical perspective of
European culture, some African and other non-European artists and
critiques have begun to question the validity of this concept of uni-
versality. One must not get lost in the emotional quality of particular
semantics. What matters is the use of a conception: what it does;
how it helps; what comprises its concrete implications. From an
l\frican-centered perspective, we ask, Is it good for African people? 40
C>ris it merely an abstraction used to endorse a particular value or
viewpoint? The problem is always that the nature of the "universal"
lllUst be defined and delineated, and it is always the European who is
d<·:.ignated to this task. Joseph Okpaku hits the mark when he says,
There is no universal aesthetic, and if there were it would be most

11ndesirable. The greatest value of art lies in the very fact that there
are at least as many different and sometimes conflicting forms as
f I1cre are different cultures. This is the basis of the wealth and rich-
11t'SSof art. For full enjoyment of art, it is not necessary that all art
l,c reduced to a single form (the Western form) in order to make it
r-asily comprehensible and acceptable to the Western audience and
to all those who have acquired its taste (by "proper education"),
IHtl rather that the would-be connoisseur make an effort to learn to
;1pprcciate different art forrns. 41
.lohari Amini pierces through to the political essence of the

I 11111pcanconcept of "universal art." Unfortunately, we rarely find
n, t lhls who have the critical ability to view European values in terms
1 d 1:111 opean objectives as opposed to the "scientific" and "objective"
I 111tI 11-1l l!ey are presented to be. Because of the prominence of this
tl1c•11w In European cultural imperialism, and its pernicious effect on
, ,1l 1«'1 1l\ ·oples, Amiui 's perceptive and succinct analysis is invaluable.
111, •.t,,t<.•mentbelow follows a passage in which she has been dis-
' 1h•ll11gthe way in which E11ropean cultural definitions act to cultur-
1\llv 1'111111ol "1ton-l-'.11ropeans'':
1•11111 c•lc1!11•1
1•i1,1111!e111llon
111 tile l11l<11;wtlo11
lwrc•, WP cnn lakr the
11•1111·1"111rlvc•r•;,1l
1111" ,11111i•proln:it llt1•t,1l1i11•," wlil1'11ari• 11st>d ai-
' pll, It dl'l111ill1111h
l1y tlH' l·'.11111pi•1111
ll11•1,11v , .. ,1.,1tl1•,l111111111
,111d ·"''
226 YURUGU
labels to imply an opposition in purpose and intent, and a distinc-

tion in the level of creative ability, and aesthetic value. The use of
these labels, definitions, however, is definitely expedient for anyone
who has the power to define the existence of and maintain domi-
nance over large masses of people ....
. . ."universalism" is a highly functional definition used by

Europeans who attempt to impose their cultural values on others.
The concept of "universalism" is invalid: there is no art, of any peo-
ple, which emanates from a basis common to all cultures. Even
European art, which makes claims to "universality," cannot address
itself with any degree of relevance to peoples of other cultural back-
grounds. But in the claim of "universality," racism is projected;
since European art is "universal," all humans can relate to it; and
by the same token, if Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, or any other
indigenous non-European peoples are unable to relate to it, then
they are "culturally deprived" (of European cultural values), the
further implication being that they are, in addition, less than
human. 42
Addison Gayle, in turn, demonstrates the way in which the

theme of universalism in the statement of the European philosophi-
cal aesthetic acts to (culturally) debilitate the African and African•
American, as they struggle to become what Europeans say they
should be: mythological "universal" people. Referring to Robinson
Crusoe, Gayle says:
From such mystical artifacts has the literature and criticism of the
Western world sprung; based upon such narrow prejudices as
those of Defoe, the art of Black people throughout the world has
been described as parochial and inferior. Friday was parochial an<I
inferior until, having denounced his own culture, he assimilated
another. Once this was done, symbolically, Friday underwent a
change. To deal with him after the conversion was to deal with him
in terms of a character who had been civilized and therefore had
moved beyond racial parochialism. 43
Universalism is a European myth used to oppress non-F.uropi•.111

artists. If there is something in an artistic creation that appeals IH"•
thetically to people in cultures other than that which procluc<•d I I II'
artist, all well and good. But that is not a criterlou of its value•, 11111
sho11lclii lw a concern of lilt> arlii-l. It Is no11Pssentlal and pet ipl "'""
Tilt• polltic;,l usl's of 1111lv1·nwllst11'1IH•lmf1• ,111• 1•xpo:;1•dhy Aidt ,111
c•11•d ,111,1ly•,I<:
<'t ·111
The Connecting Thread: Aesthetic, Utamawazo, and

Utamaroho
By using the concept of asili to explore the European aesthetic,
we arrive at a distinction between "elite" and "popular" art. Though
somewhat different in function, these two layers of art in the
European experience issue from the same mythoform, the same ide-
ological base. The elite art functions mainly to support the uta-
mawazo as it is and in turn acts to standardize and reinforce the
cognitive modality that, in terms of European ideology, is understood
as being superior. The elite art addresses the intellectual conscious-
ness of European experience. It helps to establish, along with the
Academy, science and all European speculative endeavors, the stan-
dards by which the "true" is judged: For as Keats has told us, for the
European, "truth is beauty and beauty truth." The genesis of this
aspect of the European aesthetic is the tale of the reinterpretation of
an ancient "pre-Western" conception of truth. It is a story that demon-
~trates the essence of utamaroho, and the way in which utamawazo
dictates cultural response. A divergent utamaroho demands a radi-
l'ally different interpretation and elaboration of the original idea.
To understand the European utamawazo, as always we return to
l'lato. Both he and Pythagoras (who seems to have influenced Plato
i.:rcatly) traveled widely and studied in various "mystery schools,"
most notably those in Kemet (ancient "Egypt"), which were held in
ltlghest esteem. The teachings in these schools were considered eso-
11·1 lc and were not to be written down or taught to the uninitiated.
I'yl hagoras, after having been initiated into the mathematical knowl-
P<lgeof the African priests/scholars, returned to Samos somewhere
IH•lween 540 and 530 B.C.E., and taught the new philosophy he had
li•nr11ed.The ideas were so alien and threatening to the integrity of
1IH•culture that he was forced to leave; a familiar pattern, as similar
1,,lt•s befell Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Pythagoras then went to
M,1~,1Graecia and established a secret fraternity or "mystery school"
111ltis own. It involved three degrees of enlightenment, as do most
111ystcryr·raditions, where mathematical knowledge represented the
hlJ{IIC'stlevel of understanding. For Pythagoras, "number" embodied
1lw fundamental nature of the universe. Plato was initiated into the
l'y1l1ilgorcan brotherhood and its secret doctrine concerning math-
' 111.illc,d k11owlcclgc.The Cmtoniate League, the political aspect of the
I'vt I 111wll'l'i-\ll Hrol Ittrl111oc!,Inf!ucncccl Pl<1to'sidea of the "ideal state"
111h·d I~ 1111c•lltt•of pllllo•iilpl11•rs 11
111 llw. 1111111• 111wl1·111 11111r1•pt1!111•,, tr11111 which Pl11tn a11d
tli1• 11111v,t,;c• w,,,,., , o•,1110•:,H lt,11111rn1l1111slv
l'vt11.iw,1,1•, ti,1tl !1•111111'!1,
228 YURUGU
ordered whole. Since all phenomena were connected by a universal

life-force, which made a unity of being, the "truth" of the macrocosm
was reflected in the reality of the microcosm. This is still the cosmic
vision of African peoples. 45 But when the Platonic mentality con-
fronted the African esoteric, spiritualistic conception, it was rendered
intellectualist, cerebral, exoteric, and ideological. The harmoniously
ordered whole was understood to be reflected in the proportions of
the perfect human body and in the perfect work of art. 46 Plato arrived
at a concept of absolute beauty; the archetypical "idea" of "beauty."
Among the ancients the construction of a dodecahedron repre-
sented the "divine proportion" of the Golden Section. But the science
of the cosmos, which later came to be known as alchemy, used math-
ematics, not only in a concretely physical way (in the construction of
pyramids, obelisks, and so forth), but more significantly as a
metaphorical expression and symbolic language that allowed the
knowing person to participate in eternal truths.
For Plato and those whom he influenced, mathematical, geo-
metrical proportions became the standard of "beauty." The order
had been reversed. Spirit was no longer primary, creating symmetry
and proportion in the natural sphere, but symmetry and proportion
were now used to impose a standard of beauty on the natural and on
human conceptions. For Plato the geometrical form became a mea-
sure of perfection; indeed beauty was identified with perfection a11cl
so with truth. Matila Ghyka traces from their Platonic origins Western
conceptions of art and methods of composition. "Number is knowl-
edge itself," this quoted from Plato (in the Timaeus). Ghyka says that
this maxim was "to become the main tool of western artistic com po
sition, that is, the concept of proportion." 47The proportional mca11
or "harmonizing link between two magnitudes based on the principll 1
of analogy influenced Gothic and Renaissance architecture." Ghyk,,
quotes Vituvius, a Platonist: "Symmetry resides in the correlation l>y
measurement between the various elements of the plan, and betwt·c•1,
each of those elements and the whole." 48
Plato is credited with initiating the search for "absolute beauty,"
free of earthly contamination. This conception is discussed in 1111
Symposium, where the more ethereal aspects of his concept are d1·Vl'l
oped: This is beauty "uncreated'' and "imperishable," "true bealllY, ·
"divine beauty," "pure and clear and unalloyed," "not c:loggeclwltlt llu-
pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of h11111,,1,
llfP. "~9
'!'111· otlw1 .-s,wcl or tit(• I OIH'Ul)I Is as ii lll«'HSllr,dilt·, plty•,f<,rl
11•,tlll y, 111 tl1(•l 1/,tl!•/111.\~011.111•~ "oy,,
I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or

pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but,
... understand me to mean straight lines and curves, the plane or
solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and
rulers and measures of angles; for these I affirm to be not only rel-
atively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and
absolutely beautiful. ... "50
Augustine demonstrates the Platonic influence: "Reason, turning to

the domain of sight, that is, to the earth and sky, noticed that in the
world it is beauty that pleases the sight; in beauty, figures; in figures
measures; in measures, numbers. 51 Precisely! Europeans approach
the beautiful (which is after all an experience) with their reason. And
"reason" has been given a rationalistic definition, which implies con-
trol: mechanical relationship rather than organic interaction. This
Issues from the nature of the asili of the culture.
Ghyka traces this peculiarly developed European conception of
beauty through European music and architecture, so that "eurythmy"
or the principle of "symphonic composition" along with the "con-
scious use of proportion" can be identified as the "dominant charac-
l 1·ristic of western art." 52 We see it in European dance, where, as
Kariamu Asante tells us, ballet is valued because of its classical
1111lure,relying heavily on "symmetrical, proportional, and profile-
11riented form" .53 European ballet is control in the sense of the restric-
1Inn and precise extension of muscles, according to an exact
r,rcconceived and prescribed form. But the African dancer gains mas-
ll•ry paradoxically by developing the ability to allow his/her body to
,·xpress the perceived/felt universal life force within: that which we
lrnow as rhythm.
The European aesthetic set in the ideological context of
F.11ropC'an culture oppresses, distorts, and strangles the African spirit.
l'lll' European aesthetic wedded to a materialist conception of perfect
111,11 heniatical proportion, defines the African as excessive. Her spirit
I "loo much"; she is too emotional, too dark; her nose is too broad.
1\11d as the African attempts to conform to the restrictions of
I 11111pca11 ballet she is constantly reminded that the buttocks are too
1111111tlt>cl,too shapely, too pronounced! Can there be a clearer, more
1 1111vilwi11g example of the iclcological uses of the European aesthetic?
I 111 dl•,·adc•s lilt le-African girls have been taught to hate their natural
, I ws .is t lwy st 11CIINI ;1da11n· form created lo Pxpress the European
11t,111111111flo 111111111nl1111tllrf11t•1111slyrllsrrt•tlit tlw t1cstlictic viability of
111111111fv 01111
1
1 111111111·..,11111nl 1111w, l111111,111 trn111s!Str.1igl11t•nyour
11111 'ii> I li,11' II 1·,111 h1• p11~li·d11p ll1t11., 111111 {1•v1•11 II ii ho 11011011).(
230 YURUGU
enough). "Tuck your behind under, so that the profile of your body
is as straight as possible!" Ballet is "universal"; other forms are "eth-
nic" and therefore "culturally based." So continues the myth of the
European aesthetic. The Greek conception of beauty still effects
whites (European Caucasians) and tyrannizes blacks (Africans), who
judge their physical appearance in relation to how closely they
approximate the blond Adonis and Venus. African culture itself (and
this is certainly true of other non-European cultures) offends the
European aesthetic. It is too human.
An aesthetic that strives after a model of perfection; that per-
fection represented by proper proportion to be determined by pre-
cision of measurement and mathematical relationship of line and
space-such is the inherited classical European aesthetic. As an
expression of the European utamawazo this aesthetic became ratio-
nalistic, and controlling, representing a striving toward perfection,
associated with whiteness the lack of color (which is seen as exces-
sive), and it experiences pleasure in power (utamaroho), not "power
to," which is energy; but "power over," which is destruction. So that
even as the European aesthetic relates to other aesthetics, it incor-
porates and reinterprets, and then discards them. But the cultures
that created these ideas can never be totally discarded because they
are a much-needed source of creativity.
The nascent European mentality-a literal, superficial, control-
ling mentality-mistook metaphor for reality, reducing spiritual com-
plexity to technical mathematical formula. And this was the birth of
the "elite" art-art that could be used ideologically to support a per-
fect state order, which would in turn oppress the nonelite and colo-
nize the "cultural other." Elite art in contemporary Europe reinforces
European ontological and epistemological conceptions, which as wt?
have seen, take on ideological significance in the development of the
culture and its stance vis-a-visother cultures. In this way the elite aes-
thetic conception supports European nationalism and European cul
tural imperialism.
This brings us to the forms of popular art. An obvious interpr<•
tation of the function of art on this level would be to give pleasure to
the European (European-American) masses. Such a view misses I lie
mark. That is only a part of the reality, because lt cloesn't employ I I It'
concept of asili. An African-centered perspective allows us to li'111h•1
stand the icleoloi:{ical and pol ii ical uses of this Ml. In Chap. 2 wt• :-.,1w
lltat Eur11rwm1C'liristla111typlay1•d nn cssl'nlllll rnlt' 1111111•
ch•vdop,
1111'111of •l 1-:llroJH'illl 11atl1111.d l'Ol1Sl'IC111Sllt'S!, r,tllll lht• lod
l{m11;111 111•1
1111,111gh .. A1w~ "'111•1111111•
111. M1t1i11 11,1111111,,1<1 11v,•, 111111t1! 11w
Renaissance, and then capitalism and industrialization joined in form-

ing an edifice of European identity. In contemporary Euro-America
popular art directs itself to the subconscious life of the ordinary par-
ticipants in an effort to reinforce their identification and loyalty as
"Americans," "Europeans," "Caucasians." Popular art affirms the
forms of the national consciousness. This function of popular art has
become heightened and more overt recently because of the perceived
crisis in American nationalism (patriotism) and the attendant psy-
chical insecurity believed to be brought about by the reality of
Japanese "success."
While elite art presents and reaffirms utamawazo (the cultural
cognitive style), popular art services utamaroho (the affective life-
force of the culture). Of course, European utamawazo and utamaroho
are intimately connected in a symbiotic relationship, feeding on each
other. It would be wrong to think of them as disparate phenomena.
The generalized cognitive modality (utamawazo) takes a particular
form because of the nature of the cultural personality; the shared
rharacteristic spirit of the people (utamaroho). Utamaroho and aes-
t Iietic spring from the same bedrock of cultural reality. Both have to
do with "feelings"-that which would be psychological on the per-
sonal level. Utamaroho is the source of cultural aesthetic, in the sense
nf ;i kind of "pleasure principle."
The peculiar nature of European culture is that its "success" is
tot ally dependent on the maintenance of its unique utamaroho. The
11/omaroho-power-seeking, expansionistic, spiritually deficient,
111 (•cling control-is
1
the driving force beneath the mechanisms and
lwllavior patterns that contribute to the definition of the culture. This
11tr111Jt1roho is the energy-source that keeps the culture going. Popular
111l is used to present the ikons that tap the energy of the utamaroho.
It Is In this sense that art in the culture is not peripheral, but is an
1 ••i.t•ntialpart of its sustaining ideological matrix, touching the lives
111Its members on a deep level.
An image is an ikon when it becomes a forceful presentation of
t III' 11.illonal/cultural idea. It is a sensory presence defined by the col-
l, , IIVt' vision and self-image. An ikon is a powerful image that causes
11111• In f(:cl and internalize a culture. (The most effective mechanism
II111I pt'rforms t 11isfunction in African culture is ritual drama.) The

,, l/dPst~11 is used to present the ikon to the individual psyche. The
II 1111 11.,stlw specir1I nl>ility to forge individual psyches into a collec-
ll\ ,. p:iy,•lit• ht thl'l wuv a !1Hlional c:nn~ciousness is created, affirrnc<i,
Tld•l h ,Ill Oll going l)l(H"t·ss. 1~111It is a prot'(;'SS
ul wt,1, 11 tlw 111d1t1111v!>••~tictp,u1t 111l~11Jop,•;111/E1uop1•;i11-/\1111•rh1111
232 YURUGU
culture is unaware. Often the ikons are camouflaged; in this way they
are better able to effect the individual psyche on a subliminal level.
Presently, it is possible to witness many obvious presentations, such
as eagles, flags, the national colors on cars, Jeans, school uniforms,
boxes of cereal, and toys. And of course there are pronounced ikons
such as the cross (crucifix). These are ikons that promote a Euro-
American national consciousness; there are other, more subtle ones,
that relate to the broader European consciousness. Advertising
media uses these ikons, such as blond-haired women with straight
aquiline noses. There are also verbal ikons that abound in European
and European-American popular culture, so that we continually hear
the juxtaposition of terms like "civilized" and "terrorist," or terms
like "future," "tomorrow," "newest" to indicate value. These are what
Aziza Gibson-Hunter refers to as "literal-ikons." 54 We are usually
unaware of the ways that popular art welds the collective psyche
into a national consciousness of identity.
One of the most prevalent expressions/uses of popular art as it
collectivizes the individual European psyche is in design. If studied
from an African-centered perspective, we see that design is a power-
ful and ubiquitous influence in our lives. The cars we drive; the fur-
niture on which we sit, sleep, or eat; the appliances that we use; even
the colors and fabrics with which we decorate our homes-all employ
the European aesthetic of line, dimension, and space. Oftentimes,
objects themselves become ikons. The television is a Euro-American
ikon. Popular art acts aesthetically; that is, it conditions the cultural
psyche to respond with pleasure to the ikons that represent the
national identity. Aesthetic is above all, in this sense, an emotional
mechanism.
This aesthetic is used ideologically. Ingeniously, it gives differ-
ent signals to different segments of the population. Ikons like the
American flag, for instance, or even a Greek statue, engender feelings
of pride in a person of European descent, as he identifies with what
he understands to be a superior cultural tradition. It is easy (cultural)
for him to feel this because of his ancestral memory and the various
mechanisms, institutions, textbooks, theories, games, movies, videos,
teachers, and forms ad infinitum that surround him, all reinforcing tlw
idea of his cultural superiority, all makiug use of the ikons.
But the very same ikon reaches the individual psyche ol ·n p1·1
son of African descent, creating and rC'inforcing fl'rllngs of l11ft•riorII v,
depeuclcnc-y, ur1dllu111illalion. /\t; I lit' person of J\lrka11 rlL'S<'t·nt lult•r
11,111:,.,,, tlw l1111t~ll'
of IIIP llm11l1110 lier l11dlvldu11I(111% 11-(sl'll, :,lw ,u·t 11
:illy "clt"li11•s" 111•1111 latfo11'-lilp ol 1h•111•111l111wv ~1•t•ld11g lo 1 011•.111111·
(buy) as many products as possible that incorporate the ikon. The

internalization of the ikon-image causes her to want to be controlled
by what she perceives to be the superior culture. And so she adorns
herself and her home (personal space) with European ikons, giving
them total access to her consciousness.
The person of non-European background becomes a victim of
the European ikon that acts on her as a powerful weapon of control.
The reason for this is that European ikons only act to collectivize or
unite the European psyche: The psyche that is linked to the European
ancestral memory. But for the non-European it has the opposite
effect. It takes what it finds of an African or other non-European col-
lective conscious and splits it up; individualizes it, so that it can be
placed at the service of the European nationalist cause. The solution
is not as difficult as we might think. To break the control of the
European ikon we have simply to respond with our collective con-
scious will.55 An African consciousness either automatically rejects
European ikons as displeasing or acts as a filter screening for that
which reinforces African being. Through this process, they are
robbed of their ideological power and are no longer ikons. This abil-
ity is promoted through the use and creation of African ikons that tap
the energy of the African ancestral memory. But in Euro-America the
popular aesthetic is supported by the elite aesthetic (art) that makes
11011-Europeanikons appear to represent ignorance, imperfection,
lmckwardness; all that which lacks value.
The reason the city is the valued rriode of social organization in
1•:uropean ideology is not only because of its supposed efficiency for
t II<' technical order. In the European urbanized setting, the mecha-
11lz1'<land visual media have the greatest access to the human
111l11d/soul. The city is media! The myth of sophistication is that in the
,·tty one becomes a "free-thinker," liberated from the control of small-
It 1w11 morality. In point of fact there is no corner of the city that allows
1h ll1e privacy of our own thoughts. By shaping human experience the
, It y-sy:;lem shapes people. That is its value. The plethora of media ( of
wl dch the educational system is a part) creates our environment and
1l11•rt-'lorc,in a very real sense, creates us. 56 The ikons of the "state
, 11dc•r,'' the "national order," of a European-dominated "world order";
llw lkun!-lof European tradition, of Caucasian, Inda-European racial
1111•11111, y nml pride; the ikons of European expansionism and imperi-
,111•,111t ltt•sp lko11s nre cvnsta11tly Invading the subconscious and
, 1111·11 1111,sof I l1ost>wl 10 llw l111lw 1nctropolc. Our visual and auditory
11111111•>1 a11•11111th111011-.1y nu·dlatf'<I tlirou~l1 tlw ;1<•outri.'mcnts of "city
Ill, "'l'lt., dty 1,, 111t•dl,1l1llt•d; It h 111,1d1· dl11 Wl111t
ol 1111
1 h<'lt<•1wny to
234 YURUGU
control sentiments, commitments that become behavior patterns and

goals, than by effecting consciousness and affective responses? The
Euro-American city creates and mediates images. That is its purpose
and perhaps the most important purpose of the popular art form.
Cfhis art form also functions as a safety valve to express fears and
ambivalence about the national/cultural self. This point will be dis-
cussed further in the following chapter.) Graffiti represents the pro-
duction of images not controlled by the state order. It is therefore
"despicable," a "defacement of property." But the advertisements
that steal our sight, that crowd our vision, that fill the air which trans-
mits sound are not considered ''defacements," because they con-
tribute to the control of the image; to the creation of the ikon.
By using the concept of asili we see that the European aesthetic
is part of the consistent development of the cultural seed/germ. The
utamaroho is political in nature. It is defensive/aggressive, always
intent on separating self from other; the other that is perceived hos-
tily. The uses of art and the character of the aesthetic, therefore, take
on an intensely ideological and political definition. Both the elite and
popular art forms are essential in the creation and reinforcement of
the Euro-Caucasian self-image and, dialectically, of the European
image of the "cultural-other." Consideration of the cultural function
of the European aesthetic leads us first to a discussion of these two
images (Part 11)and then to a discussion of their relationship to
European culturally patterned behavior (Part III).
PART Two
IMAGE AND
NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
Here indeed was the white man in action ... the
godlike, the white man descended among the black
people to do magical wonders. The white man was
a god, among mere men, a beloved father, god
among infant-men.
-Ayi Kwei Armah, The Healers, p. 201
Chapter 4
Self-Image
The bard of a modern Imperialism has sung of the White Man's bur-
den.
The notes strike the granite surface of racial pride and fling back
echoes which reverberate through the corridors of history, exul-
tant, stirring the blood with memories of heroic adventure, deeds
of desperate daring, ploughing of unknown seas, vistas of mysteri-
ous continents, perils affronted and overcome, obstacles tri-
umphantly surmounted.
Hut mingled with these anthems to national elation another sound

Is borne to us, the white peoples of the earth, along the trackless
l>yways of the past, in melancholy cadence. We should prefer to
dose our ears to its haunting refrain, stifle its appeal in the clash-
t11gmelodies of rapturous self-esteem. We cannot. And, today, we
rend ourselves, we who have torn and rent the weaker
I1•,tr ;111<1
lolk 111our imperial stride, it gathers volume and insistence. 1
The European's view of himself reveals the nature of the

uta,n,,mtw and Is.diale('tically related to his view of others.
l'.11111111•,\11
II h lw1·:n1M· nf ·till' 11atm1•of this 11tc1111"mlw tl1at one of the most
we 111,111·
l11dk1·s 111llw 1•:11111p1•,111sPll lt1111g1•
I~ tlwlr lmagt· nf others.
1111•;
dh1•11•,•,looI•.1 1111p1
lsc•tl of Iwn ov1•1l.1ppl111{ ,11111111l1
•t, l'latPd s1•1
238 YURUGU
tions: the first (Chap. 4) emphasizes European descriptions and feel-

ings about self ("positive"); the second (Chap. 5) emphasizes the
complementary descriptions and images of others ("negative") that
serve to reinforce the former, i.e., through the dialectics of value
dichotomy. From the general behavior, literature, and other cultural
expressions of Europeans, there emerges a consistent autobio-
graphical statement of how they envision themselves and what they
"want to be" in relation to others. By isolating the components of this
self-image, we have found that the European "cultural ego" is com-
posed of elements traceable to the early and formulative stages of
European culture; traits that matured and developed simultaneously
with the culture itself. The isolatable features are interrelated and
each functions to support the other, combining to form a cohesive
"ego," which uses the conflict/tension, resulting from an inherent
deficiency as a continuous source of energy. What emerges in this dis-
cussion is the culturally visible self-image that functions meaning-
fully to support European normative, sanctioned behavior.
The term "cultural ego" is used by Joel Kovel; it is a useful con-
cept for this study. Kovel says,
The ego we are discussing is not that of an individual...but rather

the egos of a mass of personalities as they present themselves in a
historical situation. Let us call it a Cultural Ego....2
The sense of self and the sense of identity are reflections of the
synthetic work of the ego. All the elements presented to the indi-
vidual by his drives, his past development and the needs of the
environment in which he finds himself, must be fused together into
a coherent self-image and sense of identity. 3
Europeans responded with enthusiasm to the initial Platonic

directive by adopting the self-image of "rational man." What is it I hat
the abstraction "man" ought properly to be in the European view'?
And how do they view themselves? The culture is "successful"
because it convinces them that these two answers are synonymous.
The two are identified with one another, and the universalistic
abstraction collapses into the particular, concrete European s<·ll
image. European philosophic discourse deals with t lie specific, the•
images, stanclarcls, desires, and goals o{ tlw Europeans. ffol It
en,ploys a universalistk S(~mantic-s.It is Pssc11tl:il that w1· h·11111 tu
n•cug11l:t.l'1·.xpn:sslo11~ (Jf F.111
orw1111 valu~ ,111rls1•1l1111,,g<•wilt •11t Iwv
,1pp1•.1r 111llit• l,111~11,,w•01 tlll' Jo:111np1•,111
lt11dltl1111,1t•1111i;s111l1 ,l'I
"1111111,""111,11l1
1 l11d," "ll11111.111lty'' 1111111ot1· "Eurnp1 .u1" ,1111I1111111111•11p
Self-Image 239
self-images in the mind of the European. (For "the rest of us," these
terms, defined Eurocentrically, present images of what we think we
should be but cannot become, no matter how hard we strive. And that
can be attributed to the success of European cultural imperialism.)
"Rational Man"
The implications of "rationality" for the European mind are cru-
cial. The essential characteristics associated with this concept, within
the European world-view, are control and consequently power-the
theme that reverberates endlessly in the ethnological unfolding of the
culture, echoed in every statement of value. The "rational man," in
European terms, is above all the person who is in control of his pas-
sions. He makes decisions-choices based on reason-the proper
and invulnerable guide. Being in control of himself puts him in a bet-
ter position to manipulate and control others-those who are irra-
tional or at least less rational. He has power over others by virtue of
his rationalism. Through the institutionalization and abstraction of
this "rational" decision-making process-of which science is consti-
tuted-he believes that he can even control his destiny. He plans, pre-
dicts, and creates his future; activities usually associated with a
"god."
When Plato described "justice" as the triumph of "reason" over
"passion" in human beings, he was laying out a blue print for what he
wanted the "men" of the Republic to become-even in terms of breed-
ing. When the philosophers of the Enlightenment called for the plan-
ning of society according to the "laws of reason," they were
announcing their own entrance onto the stage of "history" as its
ttndisputed vanguard. They were the "rational men" who had been
mandated to determine these laws. They and their progeny would
fashion a social order as only rational men could.
The contemporary "critical" version of this position, which
1111fortunatelymany disenchanted African scholars look to for direc-
t Inn instead of developing their own African-centered analyses, is
t Ital of .Jurgen Habermas. In the 1980s Habermas calls for a "ratio-
11.1lizcdlifeworld"~ that will lead to rationality in the "conduct of life."
Willie he professes to be avoiding the universalization of an "occi-
dental understanding of the world," 5 he claims to have achieved a uni-
wrsally ;:ipplicablc definition of rational behavior, which includes
l1,\Vl11g "goud rt·asom;" fo1 actions; more specifically, reasons that
,111• l 01{11lllv<•ly"c'rn rc•ct" or ":-.lt<'<'t>ssful,"
nnd 111orallyand practically
11
"11•ll;11ll1• ,IIHI "lrH,11(1111111'11 'l'lwrc• I~ nl,vfou,;ly 1u1 t•sc:1pi11gjudge-
voltll', .111dwot Id vl1·w, 1111wli,1I 11111111'
1111•111, ul 11·l1•11•1wt•ls lo lw 11s1•d
• I
240 YURUGU
in the definition of these terms? Habermas, like Plato, talks about an

"objective universe." He has succeeded in updating (contemporiz-
ing) the European utamaroho that expresses itself in the desire to be
"rational man," as he himself, strives to posit a "world-historical
process of rationalization of world-views. "6
Habermas' quest is to clean up the European act by separating
the mythological from the rational in the European world-view, but
in so doing his thinking is structured comfortably by the European
utamawazo that understands "truth" and "rightness" as universals,
rationally superior to cultural values that are "local" and "specific." 7
Habermas' ideal is the "rational man" par excellence, who, as such,
will be able to claim moral superiority. The circle completes itself; the
modality is unchanged.
The European image of the "non-European," the African, or their
own antithesis reinforces these observations. Recognizable in it are
all those things that they repudiate-that which they do not want to
be. In their view, people of other cultures are basically irrational.
Therefore, these people do not choose; they do not make decisions.
They have no control over their destinies. This is what Europeans
want the case to be, and consequently they proceed to act in such a
way as to bring that condition into being. Just as they struggle to
become what they want to be, and in struggling, succeed, they must
be the ones "who control" (i.e., they represent rational man).
Europeans devote their cultural lifetime to becoming what to others
is not necessarily desirable. Accordingly, the benefits of "rationality"
must be shared-that is "progress." It is "irrationality" that must be
stamped out-subdued; that too is "progress." Rationalization (effi-
cient order) becomes rationality ( control of the emotional). This com-
bination is an essential ingredient of the European self-image
-although such rationality might very possibly be considered the
height (or depth) of the unreasonable in other cultures.
The self-image that we are reconstructing is all part of the
mythology with which Europeans equip themselves. By the term
"mythology" I do not mean to comment on the truth or falsity of these•
images; such terms have no relevance to "mythology" as I use it. I am
referring to a composite of beliefs, t}1every language of which is rut
tu rally determined. It is the setting forth in symbolic matrix an cxpn•s
sion of the culturally operable definition of the ''true." It makes little•
sense lo discuss whether Europeans are "rational"; what mnttPrs h
wllal 11wyt·on<'('iV<'"rationnl" to m~an, that 1'11<•y id1·ntlfy l111•1wwlVP"-
wlll1 thh <'<1tll't•ptirn1,,111d111111 till:, lclc-11tlfi1·,11lc111
),!llldc•:,tl1t'l1 lH•li,1v
1111It 111,1vwc·II lw lll,1t lllli, "1at11111,1llty' tu whit l1 l.11111pc•a11s 11<,pltt
Self-Image 241
and view themselves as possessing is not recognizable as a norma-

tive goal for other people.
This view of rationality is part of a related series of characteris-
tics or attributes with which Europeans associate themselves. In their
collective self-image they are the "critical man." Havelock writes in
praise of the emergence in Greek culture of what he calls a "self-con-
scious critical intelligence." This is contrasted with the inadequacy
of the poetic media of pre-Platonic Greece, which was predicated on
"uncritical acceptance," "self-identification, and self-surrender." He
describes the Homeric Greek as having been under a "hypnotic spell."
Havelock is, in effect, offering the Europeans' view of themselves
("critical") and their view of non-Europeans ("noncritical"). And, as
with the idea of rational man, critical implies "control over." For the
European mind, it implies an agent who acts on things, people, infor-
mation; while the noncritical being is passive, in a trance, to be manip-
1dated by events, objects, emotions, and by critical man. For Havelock
t Ile "surrender" of noncritical man is "accomplished through the lav-

ish employment of emotions." 8 Again, a relationship of power is
l111pliedand underlies the European's conception of himself as "crit-
lt·.il, rational man."
The idea of "critical man" is in turn related to the concept of
''objectivity," as we have seen in Chap. 1. This is one of the most sig-
11il1cantcomponents of the European mythoform. Europeans are "crit-
kal" and "reflective" because they believe that they can separate
ll11•111selves from their emotions and from the "objects" they seek to
"lwow." Havelock says,
TIius the autonomous subject who no longer recalls and feels, but
lwows, can now be confronted with a thousand abstracted laws,
principles, topics, and formulas which become the objects of his
l\uowledge.9
A11clbecause Europeans are able to separate themselves from the

11hl1•c•t, it is assumed that they can be objective. This association of
, alt lq1w with the European notion of objectivity has had very unfor-
1111111!1· ronsequences, for in actuality, a critical perspective towards
, 111, ••t•l of assumptions can only be informed by the commitment to
lw,, .it least when these assumptions are epistemological. There
111111
l 1111 !111cl1 thing as true human objectivity, just as it is not possible
I, 11 1 l)t'l'SOll lo S\"'paratc one "part" of herself from another.
H,11,wr{l1dh1g 1t1 1-:uropt:nnmythology, they are indeed in pos-
' ,11l1111 ot .111ollJ1•(·tlvlly 111,llpl,1<<'S llwn1, as It were, way ahead of
0
tlu 11111I\ 1•·111 whllP otl1t·1•,Urn111d111 111,, s1•,111f1•1110111111

. ' '
(l.t•., n1lt11ral
YURUGU
commitment) that colors and clouds their vision, Europeans are able
to rise above this attachment (identification). With rationality and
objectivity comes "universality." Europeans are closest to being "uni-
versal" because, by being rational, they are best able to choose and
design the proper social and intellectual forms for all people. They are
what it is hoped others will become, however remote that possibil-
ity may be. By being objective their vision and interpretation can be
international in scope and have universal significance, as opposed to
being parochial and culturally bound. The myth continues.
All of these normative themes affect the European intellectual
aesthetic, just as they affect European behavior. These are the char-
acteristics, the attributes for which a participant in the culture
strives, and, at the same time, they combine to form an important part
of the ontological construct that governs the utamawazo. Criticism
and analysis are considered important parts of the European aes-
thetic experience. In this view, other cultures barely possess "art," in
part because they cannot "critically" assess it.
The European as "Male"

The feminist critique of European society has its roots in the
bowels of the European tradition. 10 The patriarchal nature of early
Indo-European religion (see Chap. 2) indicates more than a desire of
men to dominate women. It also results from the association of "male-
ness" with superiority and "femaleness'' with inferiority. Perhaps the
earliest European definition of "self" and "other" was as male and
female. In reaction to a more than 4000-year-old tradition of male con-
trol European feminists organize for an end to female oppression.
Some see the base of their movement in the equality of men and
women, which they translate as "sameness." From an African-cen-
tered perspective this position is incorrect. Others have developed
a "feminist ideology," much of which uses the tenets of an African
world-view as its foundation within the category of what Ruether calls
"reform feminism," 11 although they do not identify it as such. Tlw
question looms: Why was it the male in the Inda-European experience
who sought separation and dominanceI rather than the female'?Or did
the female share the same ambitions but simply losl out becaust• of
disparity in physical strength? Susan Brownmiller sc-enis to lw sayi11~1
that male domination is related to anatoniical rhnractcrislics ll 111t
,lllowt·cl lbr h11mnnmale to 1'1\f)l' tllP l1umnu ft·111;tlc.1:i Ent~Plsoffers n
links 11,,,It·d11111111,11H
1n,1tt'l'lallst ,111alyslst 11,11 ,, tot I w rn lglu u( pt Ivat 1•
111op1•1tv lfo·.,1· 1•spl111111ll1111s
,111· 11nl111111111·1qw1 ll11.'!'Ile•1·nJ1r1•pl 111
""'' d1·11111111I, Ill.it w1 l11 • pt·c
1l111v1• ,111111111111 Ill•
Self-Image 243
In our analysis male domination has a specific history in

European culture and is linked to the other cultural forms in a
uniquely "European" manner. This phenomenon should not be under-
stood as a universal, because while it may have similar appearances
in different cultures, the degree of intensity varies as does the rela-
tionship to the asili of the culture. Perhaps the answer to the ques-
tion that looms is that separation and dominance are themselves part
of a "male" or "patriarchal" approach to reality, and that this
approach became associated for the European with maleness of gen-
der. Indeed, I have argued that separation, opposition, and domi-
nance are characteristic of the European utamawazo and mythoform.
This imparts what Eric Neumann would call a "patriarchal con-
sciousness" to the culture. This consciousness is directed toward
control, distance, and analysis or splitting, and it tends to be threat-
ened by the matriarchal nature of consciousness. Neumann says, "A
fundamental development has been to expand the domain of patri-
archal consciousness and to draw to it everything that could possi-
bly be added. 13 The patriarchal nature of European culture in this
deep sense as part of its asili explains many aspects of its develop-
ment; for instance, why the tradition embraced Freudian theory, but
relegated Jungian thought to its lunatic fringes.
In other cultures where we find patterns of female oppression,
I hese patterns do not have the same ideological positioning in the cul-
tu re as they do in the European tradition and therefore are not as
strong. They co-exist in tension with matriarchal philosophies, often
111atrilinealdescent systems, traditions of female leadership, and
strong patterns of cooperation and associations among females. 14
The literature and ideology of European feminism reaches towards
111Psecultures for intellectual inspiration and the creation of a new
lt'minine self, or it attempts to compete with the patriarchal nature
of the f.uropean tradition by denying the female and seeking to dom-
inate the male.
But the analytical mode is not limited to the male gender, and
clo not necessarily lack spirituality. It is the culture that tends to
111l'll
, 11•atelhc dominance of the patriarchal consciousness in both gen-
d1•1s, I.<'., In all who parlicipatc therein. What is to be learned from
\II l<'an a11dother non-European philosophies is the principle of appo-
r0111pknicnlarity. 15lt Is not a question of which gender dom-
1111111111
nor of wlwtlwr 1•vt•ryo11c
111,111'-; can hC'comc "male" (that is, take the
d111ul11n11I pm1l11iu1), 1,1lltv1 ii Is ll q111.-stlnnof whctlH•r our view of
, xi ,11•1111·di, l,tf Ps 1111111•1·1·ss,11y c110p1•rallo11 ol "!1•111,1l1•" 11
.111<1 lllflll 0 "
111t lw wlinlt·
pt 1111 l_plt", l<HI Ill' ,111 1 t"I: 1tlll 1•1111111111.11111·
244 YURUGU
Plato was very clear on this question, but he was simply devel-
oping the lndo-European asili in its intellectual, ideological form. Not
only were males superior, but they were superior in ways that
demanded their control of women. They were more rational, critical,
and intelligent, more capable of grasping higher truths. Only men
could be philosophers. In fact, women were not even qualified to be
their Iovers. 16 But if we accept for the moment a Jungian analysis, the
characteristics for which the Europeans breed were indeed "male":
coldness, control, oppositional thought. Even females who succeed
in these terms are incomplete, as the culture is in a continual state of
disequilibrium because of "lopsided" development, 17 since its asili is
not based on the principle of complementary or wholeness, but
rather on dominance and destruction.
The European has no choice other than being "male" in terms
of positive self-image. It is not accidental that the term for a male per-
son "man," becomes the term in European languages for all human
beings. This issues from the initial European self/other distinction,
where male is "self" and "female" is other. Michael Bradley says,
"Caucasoid sexes have never really got used to each other, never
really completely trusted each other." 18 This, he says, is because of
the extreme sexual dimorphism necessitated by Neanderthal devel-
opment as an adaptation to the glacial environment. Caucasoids, he
argues, descend from Neanderthals. Bradley assumes that males are
more territorially assertive, and as the category of time was
approached "territorially" by Neanderthals, men feared women as
the bearers of children who would subsequently supplant them. 18
We will return to Bradley's analysis in a later chapter. What is already
apparent, however, is that it has many holes, but it does point to the
recognition that male/female relationships and differences are prob-
lematical for Europeans, and that this is somehow related to the
extreme aggressiveness of the culture.
"Scientific Man"
The European is "scientific man." To them this implies the
essence of universality, objectivity, and the ability to be critical and
rational. "Scientific man" does not connote lo the European mind,
simply the person who is engaged in scientific acllvity. To tliP1_111lw
tC'rm indicates a state of mind a11d of bcil1g: a way of lookinH at the
world. /\s srlc-n,c takc•s OHa m:tglcal quality ht E11rnpt·a11 c11lt11re,so
1lw 11s1•ol Its 111C•tl111clnlnl-(y (';111lr11p;u·1 vnlt1v 111lhP f11dlvld111d
ls "l1.-" wl11,,,pptn,wlw" ti 1· 1111lvP1•11•
~i1lt·11llltc 111,111 wlll1 ., p.1111!111,11
,1111111111
'l'lw tllltll(l1•11l•,,11•1111•h,1vc-lil1l1livwlllllillll'wrnldl•,1011
Self-Image 245
sumed. Science for the European is synonymous with "knowledge,"

and this "knowledge" is the representation of power. Scientific knowl-
edge is the ability to control, manipulate, and predict the movements
of people and other "objects." Indeed, Europeans view themselves as
this "scientific man" who manipulates the world around "him."
The Problem of the "Mad Scientist"

According to the European self-image, "scientific man" is in a
desirable position, for he is above all logical-remote and detached.
But this is not quite the same thing as being "a scientist." A scientist,
in terms of the European image, is one who envelops himself in sci-
ence. He is totally immersed in the laboratory and wears special
"glasses" that allow him to see nothing but his work-the "objects"
on which he experiments. This image has a special place in the
European cultural ego. Such "scientists" are relegated to a very small
portion of the collective personality, but on an unconscious level this
personality is identified with a characteristic tendency of the entire
culture. It is a part of the self that Europeans perceive themselves to
he; yet they neither want to become nor to identify with it.
In this sense, it is not part of the European self-image as a "pos-
itive" self-concept. It is the only aspect of their culture towards which
they express ambivalence and possible fear. A major vehicle for the
expression of this fear is the "horror" movie. The recurrent theme of
the "mad scientist" in the European nightmare fantasy is an expres-
~1011 of the fear and recognition that somehow it is the European asili
that produces such madness in every "European." The madness of
this c;haracterization is not the emotional confusion of an overly sen-
-.1, Ive human being who refuses to accommodate to the inhumanity
o( rontemporary life (quite the opposite), nor is it of a weakened and
clt•pressed individual. It is nothing caused by ordinary human frailty.
II Is a culturally induced madness caused by the very absence of
l1u111anity.
In the typical plot one finds the same person. He (always male)
Is committed only to his experiments and will not stop them, no mat-
t c·r what danger they imply to the community. What excites him are
1111•Implications of his being able m control and manipulate some part
111 w,tLlr<' that has previously been untouched, perhaps something
1.. 1rn•d. Tl1is Ile insists is "sdcncc" and "progress." As he is typically
clt·plctecl, tl1is rwrn <.:a1111ot love. hns no friends, becomes deaf to the
;11lmonltlnns of thosr 11rn1111cl him I le losf's the nbility cvt"'n to unclcr-
llllt<I wh,t1 lltt•y ,lit' !1,JYlllH I It• I!, II t,11111t1t·hi 1111·
lllll<'!:IS('llSC or tit('
(clc•pll'lt1d (11 1!120,l'l;t~. :1ud l!HI 1111111,),
tc 1111 'l'\11'1I•, llt l•1,111,lt1•11•,tc·li1
246 YURUGU
Dr. Jekyll and all the others not sufficiently infamous to be known by
name, but always there. The Deadly Mantis (1957); Dr. Cyclops (1940);
The Island of Dr. Moreau (1977); The Thing (1951); Alien (1979, the
more modern vintage)-the theme does not "go out of style" but con-
tinues to provide material for the European/ American science fiction
"thriller."
An intensive ethnological study of such films alone would no
doubt provide valuable insights into the nature of the European psy-
che. But unfortunately all "mad scientists" are not as bizarre as these
films depict them. There are those who have had deep cultural/philo-
sophical commitments. There is a certain "madness" even in the
fanaticism and unidirection of men like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
and Aquinas. All of the most ideologically influential people in
European development had this fanatical dedication either to total
systematization or to visions of what the world should be and a deter-
mination to make it that way-monolithic and consistently European.
This appears to be the only aspect of the European self-image that
may be perceived as negative-undesirable. They want to be rational,
critical, objective, universal, and scientific; but they are not certain
that they want to be "the scientist." They sense somehow that in this
cold rationalism they will lose control. The nightmare of the self they
envision, therefore, is that they have completely lost their humanity
and have become monstrous (for it is the mad scientist who is the
"monster" in these monster movies). The reality of the nightmare is
that the nature of European culture is such that this monster can and
does gain the power to endanger the lives of those not only in his cul-
ture but throughout the world.
"Civilized Man"
The terms "modern" and "civilized" are also those with which
Europeans describe themselves. They represent the epitome of value
on the scale of "progress"; their own interpretation and description
of value and the abstraction to which the human endeavor is most
properly committed. If this is kept in mind, it becomes easier to rel'.•
ognize instances in which Europeans-are describing themselves, ew, 1
as they struggle, and usually succeed, to make it appear that 1·hcy111,.
doing otherwise. This is the most common manifestation of r::uropt•a11
cultural nationalism/imperialism.
Most <.:0.rtainlyhistorian I larry F.lm<>rBam('S would clalin 1ltnl 111•
is l>el111,t wl11<h follows
"ob)t•cllvt•" 111lhP str111·1111.•nl
Self-Image 247
From the intellectual standpoint, then, a man is a modern if he

thinks in a logical fashion and acquires his information through the
inductive methods of observation and experimentation. Insofar as
he believes in supernatural causation, thinks illogically, and does
not rely upon scientifically ascertained facts, his thinking is of a
primitive cast, whether he be a graduate of a leading American uni-
versity in the second third of the twentieth century or an illiterate
bushman. 19
In terms of a European scientific rhetoric, the last phrase is

proof of the universal validity and objectivity of his statement. To
Barnes it is the indication that he is not displaying Eurocentricism. As
long as his remarks apply "universally," they are "scientific" and
"rational," not "emotional" or "political." The fact is, of course, that
the phrase in question does nothing to change the nationalistic
impact of the statement. The positive image in his mind is undoubt-
edly that of the graduate of a leading university who is striving with
all his might to think in a "logical fashion," while representing the
a11tithesis of the "illiterate bushman." Barnes continues,
So powerful is the mystical or religious aspect of the preliterate

mind that in many respects civilization advances only in the degree
to which man frees himself from the spell of the supernatural, puts
away his animism, taboos, fetishes, totems-as a growing child puts
away its toys-and relies upon his intellect and observations to
irHerpret the varying manifestations of nature and the activities of
his own psyche. 20
Here one should read, "Only as we weed out African (non-

1•:11ropean)religion and philosophy do we succeed in spreading our
1·1ilture, for we Europeans rely on our intelligence, rather than mys-
t li'ism, and are, therefore, adult, mature, and in control of our des-
ll11y."
William Schockley says that black people are genetically less
h1l1•lligcnt than whites; how different is that from the implications of
ll11rnes' statement? Schockley loses effectiveness, is even shouted
, le,wn by college stuclcnts and not allowed to speak, because he uses
1111• IL•rms of "race." Barnes' work, on the other hand, is considered
,, ilid, 1c•spt>c\;\l,lc material for teaching a course on the History of
W,·stt•r11 Clvlllznl'lon, a ln,sic required course for most undergradu-
.1t1·•·lit l•:11ropenu<lEt110-Amerka. In using "11nivcrsalistic" and "objec-
t1v1•'' tl't 111s tht• lt•rn1s 11I dlsll,tt:rc•,;t Bat 11cs succeeds in
p1m,c•lyll1l11~! IIH· l-.11tupP1u1w111)d,vl1•w wlwn· Sd1ol'ldL•y falh.
l 11•11t11r1: II t-. 14,11111
11, who I•. 11u1t1• nl .1 11.1llt111,dhl.1111111 t•x11111l11,1tlno
218 YURUGU
orthe dynamics and nature of European culture, it is imperative that

we compare the function of the term "civilized" with the idea of
"whiteness." They function in the same way: But one clouds European
commitment, while the other avows it. Those who are critical would
be much less upset by the theories of Schockley, Jensen, and others
if they simply viewed them as statements of the European self-image
and valued characteristics expressed in the terms of the European
utamawazo. In other words, these Europeans must be understood to
be talking about themselves and their culture; and therefore provid-
ing valuable material if one is concerned with examining European
mental and emotional life.
These characteristics to which Europeans aspire and to which
they attach themselves all have to do with their desire for power and
the way in which they interpret power. Power comes from control-
the ability to "objectify," manipulate, and predict. And these intel-
lectual manifestations of power have their counterpart in the
European self-portrait, in the image of their behavior in the interna-
tional political arena. MacDougall quotes Lord MacCaulay as boast-
ing that the history of England "is emphatically the history of
progress." The English people "have become the greatest and most
highly civilized people that ever the world saw. "21 This was reiterated
by a multitude of European nationalists throughout the nineteenth
century.
"The Conqueror": Expansionism

in the European Utamaroho
In a speech urging President McKinley to keep the Philippines,
AIIJert J. Beveridge said of United States control,
It means opportunity for all the glorious young manhood of the

republic-the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhoocl
the world has ever seen. It means that the resources and the com-
merce of these immensely rich dominions will be increased as much
as American energy is greater than Spanish sloth; for Americans
henceforth will monopolize those re~ources and that <:ommercc.2 l
The exercise of this power, which Europeans attribute to llw111

selves and which they rnntinuously seek, is manifested 111tile ahll
ity-no, thE> mandate-to conquer everything t lwy fh1cl. Tlwli
t!SSnlSIIWlll of llwmsclvl!S lnclud<'S tlwlr birthright lo C'lllltjll('I, tlOI
011ly111,llwHl1 wlildl lllt•y l1appt·11 lo cpnw In t·1111latt, hilt lh;tl wlilc Ii
llwv s1•1·k lll'W l,IIHI•,,11/llllJI', 111•t1pl1·'1'111·,
,I! tlvlty or "c 1111q1wrl111(
h •111111 tl11111•dhy 1111•E11111p1·o111 1'1,11p111vhl1... ,1 ll111d ol
11/1111111111/111
Self-Image 249
moral justification for it. This characteristic can be traced from the
early Inda-European heritage of the culture. The conquering uta-
maroho houses the intrinsic aggressive tendencies. The culture itself
redirects these tendencies as "progressive energy." Destructiveness
becomes reconstruction of the world in the conquering self-image.
This characteristic helps to determine the Europeans' behavior
towards other peoples. The quoted passage from Beveridge (written
in the 1890s) expresses the same conviction and self-concept as the
speeches of Ronald Reagan in 1988, those of Richard Nixon in 1974,
those of Bush in 1990, those of the Catholic popes during the
Crusades, and those of the Roman orators in the Archaic "West." The
history of Western Europe abounds with such examples. The con-
sistency and power of this utamaroho is formidable, having been sym-
bolically expressed at least 2500 years ago in the Persian (Iranian)
myth of Yima, reputedly the first leader of the Aryan people, who
was personally appointed by Ahura Mazda, the god of "light" and
"goodness," to "rule the world." 23
The following are excerpts from a speech delivered in Rome in
I he second century. It is praise offered by Aristides, a professional
orator, for Rome, "the eternal city." It is evidence of the Roman uta-
11wroho: of how they saw themselves, and of those characteristics of
which they were most proud. Mikhail Rostovtzeff has said that this
speech is one of the most important sources of information on the
political ideas and mentality of the age of Antonines .
. . . if one looks at the whole empire and reflects how small a frac-
1ion rules the whole world, he may be amazed at the city, but when
Ile has beheld the city herself and the boundaries of the city, he can
110longer be amazed that the entire civilized world is ruled by one
so great. (Section 9)
Your possession is equal to what the sun can pass, and the sun
passes over your land. Neither the Chelidonean nor the Cyanean
pro111ontorieslimit your empire, nor does the distance from which
., l1orseman can reach the sea in one day, nor do you reign within
hxccl boundaries, nor does another dictate to what point your coo-
l I ol reaches; but the sea like a g?rdle lies extended, at once in the
11ildcllrof the civilize(I world and of your hegemony. (Section 10)
t Iii• present (•inpirr has been extcnclecl lo boundaries of no mean

cll,-.11111,·t·,
10 such, ltt fact that one <·,111nolcvc11 mrasure the area
within 1lw111. 011 tlli' 1·1111lr,11y,for 1HI<' wlln IWHiJ1sa journry west-
w.11 d fi 0111t I w pol11twl 11•ri•,It I l1,1l1w1loci I ht• 11111plt
c•of I lw 1'1•rsin11
l11111!cl It· 1111111,th1 11·nlI•, l,n 1111111•tlt,111th1• 1 111trc•tyol 111:,
1
do111,ti11
1
1.50 YURUGU
and there are no sections which you have omitted, neither city nor
tribe nor harbor nor district, except possibly some that you con-
demned as worthless. The Red Sea and the Cataracts of the Nile and
Lake Maeotis, which formerly were said to lie on the boundaries of
the earth, are like the courtyard walls to the house which is this city
of yours. On the other hand, you have explored the Ocean. Some
flowed around the earth; they thought that poets had invented the
name and had introduced it into literature for the sake of enter-
tainment. But you have explored it so thoroughly that not even the
island therein has escaped you. (Sections 23, 24)24
What is it that causes Aristides and his Roman audience to feel

self-pride? That only a small fraction of the world's men rule the rest;
that this fraction is the "best," the "most talented," the "smartest";
alld that the rest are their "subjects"-whom they rule with perfec-
tion. Their empire stretches as far as they can conceive; empire con-
notes "all in my power." What is associated with them is the entire
"civilized" world; i.e., "everything of value in the world." What is left
is only of value in that it can be used by them. These are the dreams,
atnbitions, and images that comprise the European utamaroho. The
same today as they were when Aristides made this speech.
This self-image as the conqueror of all imagined is manifested in
the desire to spread themselves over all they see (the Sun never set
on the British Empire); in this way what they control becomes an
(:Xtension of themselves. The European self-image becomes trans-
lated into fanatical expansionism-insatiable and limitless. They con-
tinually seek new lands, people, objects to conquer and in so doing
to expand their cultural ego symbolically-until everything relates to
t llc-irimage ( either mirrors it or is its reverse). It is not accidental that
the European speaks of "conquering space." This expansionist uta•
maroho has been consistently a part of the cultural ego and self-image
from Roman times to contemporary American life, compelling them
to consume the universe.
In Joel Kovel's words,
The West became intoxicated with the idea of distant space, whicll
was represented in the dream of a New World (and today, a new uni-
1
wrsc) to be collquered.
llcrc was the 11utlcar synthesis of 111anand his worlcl tllal <'011ltl
l>t'C-0111(' cXl(•1\((1•d Int<) inli11ity.
Tl w l11111w11:.1•lmHl•,(·.1p1•, ,,t, 11 1r ltln1,11•11( d ,,1111

II,· 1:1lv,111w,11 dl'11w!l114
h ,Ill, lo II, 11•1·11dlt1H'111111011•,, lht•II lw, llllH'' v111l1111l1
i\1111•1 1111t1l1•111
Self-Image 251
It became represented inwardly as the idea of spaciousness, an

expansiveness of personal style; an accompanying inner sense of
blankness that was to fuse with the whiteness of the settler's skin
into the conception of a self both pure and unbounded, a self that
has the right, the necessity and the manifest destiny to dominate
the continent and the darker peoples upon it. A self grew in this
symbolic soil that could abstractly split apart its universe as read-
ily as it cleaved the unstructured land. 25
"World Savior"
Only the West developed theistic, providential religion ... the
belief that God works actively in history to perfect the world ...
Westerners were forced to take social change and history seriously,
and they found it natural to envisage themselves as agents of
Providence striving to perfect temporal society. 26
Consistent with the self-image as "world conqueror" is the

European self-proclaimed mandate to save the world. This image is
found rather explicitly in European religious formulations and, there-
fore, in the earlier stages of European development. Though Judaism
did not seek to include the world in its nationalistic statemen( it did
rontain a statement of the obligation to humankind of providing the
proper example that would therefore be the world's salvation. Thus
1,egins the imperative of the European utamaroho-the "voice" that
Lelisthe European that he is somehow "special," that he has superior
qualities and knowledge that oblige him to shoulder the burden of guid-
ing those less fortunate than he (the rest of the world). The Christian
statement is the epitome of this image, and, indeed, presented a "world
:,;avior"to the world. This aspect of the European utamaroho implies the
l1lea of European superiority; it does not imply altruism, as it has been
111lsunderstood to do. Europeans are themselves the "Christ," who
would save the world and whose qualities are superior enough to
1·11ablethem to stand as a model for all of us to emulate.
The expression of this aspect of the European utamaroho in the
Imm of Christian ideology made it more acceptable and subtle-more
l'!ft•ct ivc among those who were to be "saved." The implications of
•,11periority, and of the self-image of world savior, are as much a part
ol 11ilssio11aryactivity as it is of tlw utamaroho expressed in Kipling's
, tHH't•pt of "the while man's burden." Phillip Curtin says, "The con-
v1•r~lrn1lstSl'lll i111cntof the 111icl-cent11ry [nineteenth] and trusteeship
11l the •11(.1wt.·n•two w,1ysot 11sst•ssl111,1 the proper goals for non-west-
1•111 ...."~7 Tl 11•,It 1·11~,11wc<,II ,cl p11·~11111pt
pt •01~11 Ion In 1IIC' Europe-an scU-
l111,1w•111 tt·l.1tlo11 In tl,1• 11''11 uf tlw wrnlcl .trt' 1•vldt•lll't•d itt tile
2.52 YURUGU
expansionist expeditions they have undertaken. Whether in the early

or contemporary stages of their developing empire, Europeans, at
hest, have related with paternalism to the rest of the world. Curtin
says,
In that great age of imperialism racism became dominant in

European thought. Few believed that any "lower race" could actu-
ally reach the heights of Western achievement. Their salvation
would be achieved in some other way; but meanwhile they were
entitled, in their inferiority, to the paternal protection of a Western
power. The idea of trusteeship gradually replaced that of conver-
sion.28
Joel Kave! offers his own psycho-cultural interpretation of this

"savior" image and its implications for the European's political rela-
tionship to others. Kave! says,
When the Marine officer described the American obliteration of a

city in Vietnam by explaining that, "We had to destroy the City in
order to save it," was he not expressing in the succinct form given
by such an extreme situation, the pure, nuclear fantasy underlying
Western history-to save and destroy, include and extrude? 29
The point he makes is that Western "saving" has meant a "mak-

ing over," possession, and destruction, until what the world needs
most is to be saved from the insatiable appetite and egotism of the
European.
The European utamaroho allows people to experience an intense
ideology of cultural and racial supremacy as "beneficence" and "altru-
ism." This, in essence, is the message to be gleaned from an exami-
nation of the European self-image. Europeans do not merely commit
atrocities against other peoples and then rationalize them in nation-
alistic expression; they seem to believe that they have the right and
the obligation to "think" and "act"-to make moral decisions-for
other peoples and therefore to commit such atrocities. As we haw
seen in Chap. 1, the European utamawazo allows them to "believe"
this. The European utamaroho is a unique ethnological phcnomeno11
and accounts for the intensity of European/Euro-American cult ur,tl
behavior.
Yehoshua Ariel! :;ays,
Tit!:, Prolt":tant 1H1llrn1:1l1~111,11lopt1•d

pl'< t1lli1r111<
0
lal 11t1•111·r,•s1"111•
l11:111111,11l1111
of tlu• 11µ111
1111011q1w1,1
,1111I1111·111..,11v 111111,urlll'-.t
11.. .,
t111v wl11•11,v1 1 1111.wlu•d t,y J\1111•1
i1,111·,,,11t 1•pl1•rl tn ,1 1 ,,, t.1111
Self-Image 253
degree the idea of the superiority of the Anglo-American "race" as

a progressive force which would impose liberty on all mankind.
The New England concept of the nature of the American mission
blended universalism and nationalism in an ideology which
accounted for its own achievements by a theory of race and yet
believed that its patterns of life could be imposed on others. The
Anglo-American race had the duty of transmitting the pattern of
life it had developed to the whole world in order to promote pure
Christianity. The expansion of the American nation was the means
by which Providence furthered the cause of religion and the spread
of pure faith. 30
Arieli, quoting from Horace Bushnell in Christian Nurture, offers these

examples:
"Any people that is physiologically advanced ... is sure to live

down and finally live out its inferior (sic). Nothing can save the infe-
rior race but a ready and pliant assimilation .... What if it should
be God's plan to people the world with better and finer material.
Certain it is ... (his plan) that there is a tremendous overbearing
surge of power in the Christian nations, which ... will inevitably
submerge and bury ... (the less capable) forever."
"The Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American, of all modern races, possess

Lilestrongest national character and the one best fitted for univer-
sal domination, and that, too, not a dominion of despotism but one
which makes its subjects free citizens ... In them ... the impulse
towards freedom and the sense of law and order are inseparably
1111ited,both rest on a moral basis." 30
This is precisely the same sentiment, mood, and conviction that

/\r Islides expressed in behalf of the Romans. The Roman self-image
,,s "world conqueror" and "savior" issues from an ego that does not
, 011fincitself to the limitations of a culture, a nation, or even a conti-
11.-nl,hut from an ego that views its boundaries as ultrauniversal.
l'lils Is the counterpart of the intellectual self-image of the European
,.., "universal man." He is "universal" in his freedom from emotional
1lt;it•l111wntand objectivity, by virtue of his scientific approach and
11•,1• 11f"logic"; he, therefore, has the right to spread himself univer-
11,llv111order to "enlighten" the worlct.
t\rl:,t icl<•ssays,
yoll who 11n'"gr,•1111,(1

'l'(I l(11111t•, !'HIly'' cllsl ri1>1110<1
your I'll izensliip.
II W41•, 11111111••1ll1'·'' yn11 -;lood nfl 111ulr1•l11'1111I a sli,11·1•In il lo
lo 1-<1v11
111111•1•,tlt,d y1111111,11111
111v '.'' 1111• yrn11cltl11•11•il1q11111111i1,•c1 nf wo11
254 YURUGU
der. On the contrary, you sought its expansion to be the label, not
of membership in a city, but of some common nationality, and this
not just one among all, but one balancing all the rest. For the cate-
gories into which you now divide the world are not Hellenes and
Barbarians, and it is not absurd, the distinction which you made,
because you show them a citizenry more numerous, so to speak,
than the entire Hellenistic race. The division which you substituted
is one into Romans and non-Romans. 31
And so, indeed, the world became divided into "European" and "non-
European," the valued and the nonvalued, the worthy and the unwor-
thy.
Europeans, above all, see themselves as the "grand organizers,"
the forgers of order from chaos. They do not recognize the order that
they find in nature and in other cultures, and so they impose their
own wherever they go. (He is not "religious" man in the phenomeno-
logical sense that Eliade uses this term, and therefore for him the
world does not present itself as "cosmos"-only chaos that he must
reshape into a manmade, desacralized, wholly rational "order." 32
Land and people (and even space) are not conquered until they are
so ordered; Christianity is, above all, an "ordering" of the individual.
And it is the military in European culture that represents the epitome
of this kind of order. Aristides says again,
In respect to military science, furthermore, you have made all men

look like children .... Like a spinning of thread which is continu-
ously drawn from many filaments into fewer and fewer strands, the
many individuals of your forces are always drawn together into
fewer and fewer formations; and so they reach their complete inte-
gration throughout those who are at each point placed in com-
mand, one over others, each others over others still, and so on.
Does this not rise above Man's power of organization? 33
Below Philip Curtin describes the British Niger Expedition. II

exemplifies the mood, presumption, and utamaroho we are descrll>
ing, the peculiar European self-image:
The government expedition sailed in April 1841 in a mood of high

hope. Every care was taken. The steamers were cs1wcially rn11
st ructed and placed under the command of cx1,c-ricnccd naval nfh
c·c-rs. They were also to sign anti-slave I rad(• I n·al lt•s wit Ii I lw
African a11l11orltil•s,111clcst;1l>lisl1 0111•or n111n•trutli111-tpo'lt:-., plw, ,,
p1111 ll,,sPd froi11 till' Ahic•;111s,11 tilt' j1111t11111•
11
"111odl'If,11111 on l.11111
of 1111'Nlµi•, ,1111Ill1•1111I''J'l11•~•.11v1·1111w•11I
•.iq1plli•d tlw ·1l1lp1, '1'111•
,111111~11,t, ty•.11ppli1d 1111•,, fl 1111111
.\lit, ,1111·1v111, t,dl 'Ill, 1·1t111d1
Self-Image 255
Missionary Society sent representation, organized as a private firm,

took responsibility for the model farm.34
The assumption underlying this endeavor is that the European

has the right and the duty to sail into alien lands; no lands are in fact
"alien" to them. The Niger Expedition was nothing more than an inva-
sion (fortunately for the Africans, in this instance anyway, it failed).
But to those who participated in it, it was a "mission of mercy." For
Europeans there are no lands that belong to others. All land and
space (air and water) belong to them. And as they bring "order," they
!iring "peace." Aristides says again of Rome's accomplishments:
... before your empire there had been confusion everywhere and
things were taking a random course, but when you assumed the
presidency, confusion and strife ceased, and universal order
entered as a brilliant light over the private and public affairs of
man, laws appeared and altars of gods received man's confidence
... now a clear and universal freedom from all fear has been granted
lwth to the world and to those who live in it.35
And so the European becomes the world's peace-maker. It

IH•c·omestheir mission to bring "peace" and "freedom" to all by the
l111positionof their order. Pax Romanus is the "Roman world order,"
l11slas the American objective of peace means as much United States
rnntrol as possible. In a speech delivered on April 4, 1973,Nixon said,
"1111ly America has the power to build peace." The utamaroho that
l1ispircd this statement is precisely the same as that to which
/\rlsticles responds in his paean to Rome in the second century. These
llll'n represent the same cultural tradition and are both nationalistic
pt oponents of that tradition.
H,,re and National Identity

The creation of a national consciousness has been a crucial com-
pom•nt of European success, because of the preeminence of political
il1•l111ltlonin the nature of the European utamaroho. Consciousness
1111·s11pposcs identity. The question of national identity is essential. No
11n,11p of people have realized this more than European historians.
What 1-'lalonic thought, Christianity, and science have done for
tlw 111ill1c11lln11 or Eurorw Is r·omplcmentecl by what Europe's histori-
,11'" I 1,1v<·ro11trlh11t,t·dtn t lw 111yt hnlogy of 111<' rac-ial and national orl-
1•111•, nl r,:mnp•'illl 1wopl1•s. ll11p.llM:wnn11~!nlllwgil1s Ills l>ook !?aria/
~frtlt II/ J,,,u/1,lt1/M(II V hy 1yl11).l,
0
.. "Mvt Its 111Ill 1~(111 (•11:ihl,·fH'npll' to
1111111w111111
11111111•\l1e•111:,l'IV1", ',fl,ll'f' '' 'l'lll•, I•, 11111•Im 11111·11 ,·1ilt1111·:,,
'"ifi YURUCU
1>111 an oversimplification in the case of the European experience, as

M,wDougall's book demonstrates. Myths of origin for Europeans have
lt1111·lioned most significantly to justify and to inspire imperialistic
l11'11aviortoward non-European peoples.
The European national self-image had to fit and support the
l·'.11roµeanutamaroho and ideology. Its construction was part of a long
:-.lowprocess, seemingly disparate at times, as each European nation-
,lllly immersed itself within the limited parameters of its own nar-
111wlydefined boundaries. But even this competitive process fed into
t I 11• building of a larger European national consciousness and the self-
l111ageon which it depended. European cultural history, understood
f, om the perspective of the asili concept, reveals the centrality of
111yt hand myth-making to political success (in this case imperialism).
Whal surfaces as central in the European experience in this regard is
1lw myth of national/racial origin. And even in competing myths of the
( ;1•rma11,French, English, Italian, and Spanish, we can identify certain
,·ornmon themes that eventually jelled into and emerged as a mono-
Ill hk anct powerful "preferred" European self-image.
111his book The Aryan Myth, Leon Poliakov focuses on what he
1 utts In one passage, "Germanomania." 36 In this way he describes
wl 1,1l ls perhaps the most common myth of national origin among
1•'111opcans: "Aryan" descent. At first even the obsession with Germa11
111!~~Inswas rnlored by an attachment to biblical mythology, and all
I 111opt>,111 nations claimed that their people descended from Japheth.
l•:w11Mart in Luther as late as the early sixteenth century said that the
I it 1111,m people descended from Ashkenaz, who was the first born of
< ,n111t•r,who was the first born of Japheth and Noe, who came directly
ftor11 AdarnY Such claims were common throughout European his
111,v.
Martin Luther, celebrated for his inspiration of religious ref or·
11J.1llo11, was above all a German nationalist rebelling against the co11
tr ol of I.at in Christendom. He compared the Pope to the anti-Christ
Hild gave voice to national feelings of the German people, who it'll
••xploltc<i by Rome. Poliakov points out that the Protestant
lkforn,ation can also be understood, in part, as a German reaction to
1IH· Italian Papacy.: 18 If Orthodox Christianity, having served its pur
(Hist• in tile creation of the myth of European superiority, was 110w
pt•,n•lvnl as i11tt•rfcri11gwitl1 thl' r<'ali7ation of the (j<'r11m1111atlo11,il
s1•1f,t ht ·11It ltact Io st<•p asid(•, ( 'c11turl<'s later Adolf I lltlt•r w01tld f111
low lrt l)rc• s1111w tr11cllllo11,;is '11'r111nn~,•lf•llllill,(t' n111flk1t·d wlt11 llt1·
pr,11111,II 111i1ll1•1 nf E11111p1•,11111111ly 111l•:11m1w.t11 cl1·vd11p11w11I II w,11,
•,l1lp, !lfl': 1•:,•,,111
I 11.11llrl' 1w11plP,, ..,p,, l,dly lhn-.1· 111lt•,11lt·1
, .. ,. 1 1111;11
Self-Image 257
image of themselves that would enable them to galvanize their ener-

gies in the fulfillment of an envisioned destiny. Papal control con-
flicted with German self-image.
In Spain, Russia, and England as well, the desire to be associated
with a German heritage was compelling. This association became a
conviction that helped to inspire Europeans to seek power over oth-
ers. Poliakov says that early in European history Gothic descent was
understood to be superior. "The Christian princes of medieval Spain,
inspired by the conviction that they were Goths, made every effort
to behave like the offspring of a conquering race." 39 The European uta-
maroho demanded identification with the conquering mode. "The old
tendency in Spain was to over-value Germanic blood and to give pref-
erence to descent from Magog over the indigenous posterity of
Tubai. 40 The earlier claims to descent from biblical characters were
later replaced by racial and nationalistic ideologies. "During the
Renaissance the influence of antiquity began to rival that of the
sacred scriptures." 41
In the following passage from the prologue to the Salic Law, writ-
ten in the eighth century, the French drew a self-portrait, calling them-
selves "Franks" because of the prestige in which German origins were
held: "illustrious race, founded by God Himself, strong in arms, stead-
fast in alliance, wise in counsel, of singular beauty and fairness, noble
and sound in body, daring, swift and awesome, converted to the
Catholic faith .... "42 From the onset "fairness" or "whiteness" was part
of the European self-image. This perhaps is part of the reason for the
obsession with Germanic origins.
The European utamaroho very early on demanded the creation
of a nationalist myth of superiority. The myth would inspire the peo-
ple to what they perceived to be "greatness." The early Roman self-
1mage had suffered in comparison with what they considered to be a
s11perior Greek cultural heritage, and in the second century before the
( 'llristian Era, they sought to connect themselves with this heritage
I 1y claiming descent from the Trojans though Aenaeas, the mythical
!1iunclcr of Troy.~1 Centuries later the English would attempt to do the
•.11111c thing. The French wanted to be "Franks," because they were
1•1111vluced, as were other Europeans, of the superiority of ancient
"( ic·nnanic virtues." Montesquieu wrote that the German ancestors of
t ltc· 1-'r<'nthenjoyed a tradition of liberty and independence, an ingre-
dl!'11tof tlH· 1-'.uropc!anselr-irnage that was to becon1e hardened into
Ill\· ldl'ol,,~:k:11 s11h:..t111c·111rt· of tit<' c•ivilization. Tile· German "forc-
11f1111· l•'1l'1wll Wl't1• lto11ntahlr•, cn111agc•n11s,and pro11cl: "they
l11111~1·d tlwl,-11.'11111•, 111111tlwy dtuw1H·d tlwh I ow,11ds."H Pollalmv
258 YURUGU
says that Montesquieu argued that English Parliamentary institutions

were of this ancient Germanic origin and that the French should emu-
late their example. 45
It would seem that the European mentality, since its inception
in the Inda-European hordes of the North, caused them to fear
strangers and therefore to react to their fear with aggressiveness. 46
A warlike disposition was necessary, or else one could not enjoy "lib-
erty." This is the theme that surfaces again and again in the self-image
of the European who identified with a defensiveness and distrust of
others that translated into aggressive destruction/consumption of
all that was "other": the "love of liberty" and the mandate to "lead"
others in "freedom."
An African-centered interpretation of European cultural history,
using the analytical tool of the asili concept, demonstrates the cen-
trality of racialist thought, of racial myth in European ideology. The
concept of racial superiority is inextricably entwined in the matrix of
the European mythoform. Racialist thought has even been systemic
to European development. It complements capitalistic, exploitative,
aggressive behavior; but is not caused by this behavior. Racism is
endemic to European chauvinism, a consistent factor of European
history. It is based on the nature of the utamaroho, i.e., threatened by
difference, essentially materialistic and aggressive. It is the European
utamaroho that creates the system of capitalism, which in turn com-
plements the national consciousness, an ingredient of which white
nationalism consists. We see this pattern again and again in the his-
torical/ethnological record.
The development of England as a national entity exemplifies the
special role of racial thought in the creation of a national identity in
the European experience. The history of England is the history of the
European self-image, forcing itself into the consciousness of human
ity. It also demonstrates the indispensable role of the historian in ti tt:
process and answers the question of why it was so important to first
create the European myth of a secular "objective" and "scientific"
history. Cultural myth had to be understood as historical "fact." (Tl1I:.
is the problem that underlies most biblical interpretation.)
In eleventh- and twelfth-century England, the political prohl<.·111
w,\S that of bringing Britons, Anglo-Saxons, and Normans togc•\ht•t
into a si11glena1ion; that is, of getting these groups to i<l<'ntily 11s,uic•
11ntionality. In 1116, (;eoffrey or Mon1noulh compktC'd his llisH11y ol
!lit• g,1111ps 111q11vstlnn. His "history" c"r(':\11•d tl1v t\rH111rl:in l1•1,(1•11tl
111.,1I 1111111'1'!1•d llll'nl 1111 to 'l'n1J,u1 mytil lllll{ll M,1,•l)1111wlll,In tlih
1
, v," ",1·., ,I WIii k ol 1·11·.11fv1· l,11.11-(I
r 1•p.,11ti, 'ulY'• I 11,il ( i1•11l111·y'"ltl•,1111
Self-Image 259
nation was a superb achievement." 47 It provided the mythological

framework and justification for a nation based on a royal monarchy
in which the king had absolute authority. This authority was sup-
ported by a mythology that praised the legendary achievements of
past kings, but as the power of the royalty began to give way to the
demands of the newly developing commercial interests, a new eco-
nomic structure, and the parliamentary form that accompanied these
changes, the legend of King Arthur was no longer politically usefu!. 48
Trojan origins gave way in inspirational power to Germanic origins.
The English self-image was evolving. MacDougall says,
Anglo-Saxonism, born in the sixteenth century in response to a

need to demonstrate an historical continuity for the national
church and nourished in the seventeenth century in debates over
racial supremacy, finally triumphed and became the dominant myth
that fixed the national imagination. 48
Basically Anglo-Saxonism held that the English people

descended from German Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, and while this
myth of racial origin may not have become dominant until the six-
t centh century, it was prefigured much earlier in the work of Bede,
"the father of English history," writing in 731. that the English had
been elected by God to establish political hegemony. 49 This supposed
superiority came more and more to be associated with alleged
German origins. This myth, according to MacDougall, alternately
tderred to as "Anglo-Saxonism," "Teutonism," or "Gothicism," had
four postulates:
1. Germanic peoples are of unmixed origins, having a universal civ-

ilizing mission and are superior to all others.
2. Tl1e English are of Germanic origin; Their history beginning with

I he landing of Hengist and Horsa at Ebbsfield, Kent in 449.
3. English political and religious institutions are the freest in the

world. This is a legacy of German ancestors.
•I.The English represent the genius of German heritage to a greater

!11'grecthan any of Ihe other descendants and therefore carry a
·,Jll'<'ialn·sponslbllity of l1.:.1dershipin the world_:;o
'l'ltls (;('1111,u1li' was to he t'Xlolll-d hy <"Ol1t1tll'sshisto

111•11111,w
lltt-rnl I, ,1111Ipolll Ii 11Ilt•,uIPt>,nf ,dtnost 1•vl'1y F.11n1pP:\ll11<1t
1l,111°1, Ion
,dlty 11:11!(11•,ltt:H 1,11n11d 11i1ll1111iil111yll1lwl{tlll lu lw ll11lwd1111111• ,111d
260 YURUGU
more with that of Germany, which saw itself as having been maligned
and neglected in order to facilitate domination by a Latin Church
hierarchy. This reasoning must have had tremendous appeal for the
English, who, under the leadership of Henry VIII, sought religious
independence from Rome. English nationalism created an English
church, and it is interesting that while Henry rejected Latin author-
ity, he did not reject Christianity itself, because of its deep associa-
tion with the definition of "civilization."
Martin Luther said for the Germans what Anglicanism was say-
ing for the English, "I thank God that I am able to hear and find my God
in the German Language, whom [sic] neither I nor you would ever find
in Latin or Greek or Hebrew." 51 The Germanic consciousness of
England was further encouraged by the fact that London became a
place of refuge for German Protestants fleeing persecution. "Out of
the Renaissance and the Reformation a myth developed of an origi-
nal Germanic people with roots reaching back to Adam, possessing
a language and culture richer than and independent from any
other." 52
William Camden (1551-1663) was, according to MacDougall, the
first Englishman to treat the history of the Anglo-Saxons in a serious
and detailed manner. He said that he was motivated by "a common
love for our country and the glory of the English name," and that he
was intent on emphasizing the Germanic origins of "English Saxons. "s:i
According to Camden, England owed its language and greatness to
the historical victories of the Germans. These Germans were the tri-
umphant Franks and Burgundians in France: the Heruli, West Goths,
Vandals, and Lombards in Italy; the Suevians and Vandals in Spain;
a11d the English-Saxons in England. The Greatness of the Saxons was
expressed by Camden as: "This warlike, victorious, stiff, stout, and
vigorous nation." 53 This is further evidence of the function of social
science, in this case history, in the service of the national myth and
illlperial ambition. It is also evidence of the self-image of the European
as warlord.
In order to convincingly argue for Germanic origins of tht>
Euglish people and their culture, Norman influence had to be n1inl-
mized. MacDougall describes Richard Verstegen's Restitution of
Uecayed Intelligence (160S) as a "Panegyric to Germanic dcsc<·nt nl
the English" and says that it was "the first comprchcnsiv{~ pres<•11t:1
lion in English of a tllc•ory of national origin bas<'d 011ii lwlld Iii 1111•
racial ~llpcrinrity of tllr Gl!ri11a1111' 1
1wnpl<.>."!i•
Tllc· ahlllly ol ri 11,1111111ot1111,1111111,dltv
to 111dlilll11• ltst•lf fo1 tPsl•,
tr111l1' ,1f{al11~l11pp11",•,lo11, o, 11111n1p1 11111
,1)H(ll't1•,l011, ,·11111101
11xlt.t h1
Self-Image 261
a vacuum. It is of necessity linked to a peoples' definition of them-

selves, and such self-definition must locate itself in time and space.
The rootedness that results is a product of the national myth.
Successful political action is linked to positive self-image. A concerted
military campaign is strengthened to the degree that the people in
question identify as a single entity with a common source and a com-
mon destiny. Belief in special origins will inspire special behavior.
Europe has understood this better than others and long before other
cultural groups felt the need to act politically. For the most part the
African and other non-European political sense has suffered under
humanistic priorities. As people of African descent and others assert
their definitions of self in an effort to create a national conscious-
ness, European academia belittles these efforts as juvenile and unnec-
essary. Can it be that they do this (1) because their own myths of
national origin have long ago been constructed and have served their
purposes well and (2) because they are well aware of the motiva-
1ional power of such myths?
The English, in reality a people with very little to be proud of,
whose own history began as a result of colonization by others, self-
ronsciously turned a heritage of mediocrity into one that inspired
Imperial success the likes of which had never been seen. They then
denied the process to others and pretended that it had never
occurred among them, extolling the virtues of "objectivity" and sci-
r·11tifichistoricism! But scrutiny of English history paints a very dif-
ferent picture.
As the English rising commercial class fought to establish a par-
lin111entthat would take power from one group and place it into the
li;111clsof another, they argued that such an institution owed its gen-
l'Sis lo Saxon Germany. English law was said to have originated there
,1!-Iwell. The argument was for the limitation of the power of the
<·rown. People like John Toland (1701) and Catherine Macaulay
( l 7l>:3)argued in favor of a tradition of "freedom" that demanded that
t lwy l)e freed from the yolk of royal power.
Herein lies an aspect of the European self-image that has been
c 1111slstcntlyexpressed in European nationalism, so that we have no
cllllin1lly In identifying it in contemporary Euro-America. The Aryan
1'",,m•;krll: Arya, "nol>le") Saxons were a "freedom-loving" people. This
I. pc•ilrnps the most significant aspect uf the national/racial myth.
'i11ppwj('dly, (it>rma11 1wopk loved their freedom and had never
,1llow1•dtl1t•111s1•lw·~ to IH•('011q1u1 1t'cl.The English, of all ctcsccndants
I w11pl1•s,I 1.id t I H• 11•sprn1slh1llty 111
, d the < \1,, ~11,111k <·arrylng on t I w lwr
II••~!I'
of "t1t·1•do111 '' 1111d11II'olll1~;11l1111ol 'il1r11
h111It wit II otl11•r'l t Ill m1gl1
262 YURUGU
their rule. This theme was to be echoed again and again throughout
the history of European and Euro-American chauvinism. Ancient
Germany was held to have been inhabited by a people who loved lib-
erty, and the English sought to associate their political and social
institutions with the "freedom" of these forebears. In a speech deliv-
ered in 1832, Baron Henry Bulwer said, "It was in the free forests of
Germany that the light of our purer religion first arose." 55 In his
famous work The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward
Gibbon held that the "puny" Romans had been rescued by the "fierce
giants of the North, their German invaders." 56 The implication is that
these "fierce giants" brought freedom, no matter how violent the
deliverance of the Romans. Even Kant placed the highest value on this
notion of "freedom" and said that in order to be moral one had to be
"free." 57
According to MacDougall, Sharon Turner (History of the Anglo-
Saxon, 1805) wrote that although the Germanic tribes were barbarian,
they had a "love of individual independence and a high sense of polit-
ical liberty" and that these characteristics were "the source of our
[England's] greatest improvements in legislature, society, knowledge
and general comfort." 58 Turner characterized the "nomadic mind" as
being especially well suited to the creation of free social institutions.
It is fascinating how historians are able to take what they usually
judge as a culturally debilitating factor-nomad ism-and turn it into
a strength in order to serve the national myth.
"The nomadic mind is a mind of great energy and sagacity, in the
pursuits and necessities peculiar to that state, and has devised many
principles of laws, governments, customs, and institutions, which
h<1vebeen superior to others that the earlier civilized have estab-
lished. "58 Turner adds that among Germanic tribes the Saxons wer<"
"superior to others in energy, strength, and warlike fortitude," and
that the Anglican Church found its rudimentary beginnings in
Saxony. 59
The French had also used a myth of national origin to suppo, l
the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie against the royal power of th<•
Crown: a struggle that the protagonists viewed in terms of "freedom"
against ''tyranny." Diderot, an encyclopedist, conncctccl this 11eeclfor
"freedom" with the Frankish legacy:
Three kinds of 11ol>ll's(~xisteclat the begi1111il1!,!ot llw ino11;1rc·liy·

I hose clcscc11ded lrrnu Ille c:.:wli·,h rhlvalry wl>n tollowPd lilt• pro
f1•sslo11of rirms; ollwrs wl1u tl1·rlVC'd 1111111 Ill!' l{11111,1111w1t,tlt1l1at1111°
,111dwho 1·011il ,1t11 •ti 11I(' (''(I'll h1• 11t,111 II', wit 111111.,d111111l1,I
I .ti loi I nt
111 ,If< c l'lvll ~i11v1•1111111·11I •'. o111fl1111•tl1l11I w1•11lilt' 1•1,1111<,
rn 111111111
Self-Image 263
all dedicated to the practice of arms, who were exempt from all
personal servitudes and taxes. For this they were called Franks, as
opposed to the rest of the population which consisted almost
entirely of serfs. This franchise was understood as the hallmark of
nobility itself so that Frank, Freeman or Nobleman were normally
synonymous expressions. 60
The self-image, which Euro-America has inherited from its

European ancestors, of the conqueror who "frees," is accompanied
by a value that becomes part of European ideology. This "freedom"
is defined in terms of individualism and the license to "achieve" no
matter what the cost to others. This peculiarly capitalist "morality"
is the hand-maiden of American imperialism. But European-
Americans are following a long-established tradition in this pattern of
cultural/political behavior. Charles Kingsley writing in the mid-nine-
t eenth century said that the English were Teutons with a universal
mission: "The welfare of the Teutonic race is the welfare of the
world." 61 And, of course, they had been chosen by "God." The
American president Woodrow Wilson would make the world "safe"
lor "democracy." Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan created police-
men. The concept of being self-appointed leaders of the world, which
ubligates people of European descent to "free" others, is part of the
logic of a self-image linked in mythology to the ancient hordes of the
(icrman forests, reinterpreted as a "freedom-loving" race. It is out of
I !tis cultural tradition that the concepts of "freedom," "liberty," and
"free enterprise," "the pursuit" of "whatever"-associated with the
Western world and Western value-were born.
Verstegen, writing in 1605, had said that these ancient Germans
wt·rc great because: (1) no other people had inhabited Germany; (2)
t lwy had not mixed with any other racial group; and (3) they had
11L·vcrbeen subdued by any other group. 54 While James Ronde, writ-
l11gin 1865, said that "the ignorant and selfish may be and are justly
, 11111pelled for their own advantage to obey a rule which rescues them
Ir t 1111Iheir natural weakness ... and those who cannot prescribe a law
111ll1cmselves, if they desire to be free must be content to accept
ilt1 (•cl1011 from others." 62 These two sets of ideas, coupled together,
111 rnluced the self-image that matched the power utamaroho, the ide-
11l111(Y,,rexpansionism, and the utamawazo of control.
Bill 1lien• was lo be yel another ingredient to the overwhelm-
111~/ly Hlll'l'l'ssftil sclf-pnrtrnit. The idt>olo&,,y of "progress" was the coup
,t,, wnrr· ol Ilw <'rnirp1rrlng c1llt11mlvgo. "Thr nineteenth ccnl11ry was
1,11}{l,1111l',._1•,•11t 111y" So :,,1y!1M1H Doug.ill. Wll,1t 1n;id1·s11c:hsutcrss
prn,•,11>1,, Ir, W,11' ,I I 11111hl_11.1llnu 11( 1·1dl111,tl l,H l(IP,, .,11td,•olniiknlly
264 YURUGU
consistent. Nothing was better suited to this ideology than the vision
of European progress. Its optimism, arrogance, and freedom from the
fetters of common human morality, which ordinarily prevents other
peoples from wanton theft, rape, and wholesale murder. The nine-
teenth century was "England's century," because there was nothing
that the English would not do-there were no holds barred for the
English nation-no place they would not go in the service of greed
and in fulfillment of this insatiable utamaroho. The ideology of
progress justified every possible act that could be committed in this
service. Progress was a path that had to be followed by "civilizing"
human beings, and the English were the leaders whose destiny it was
to take everyone towards this abstract goal. A powerful self-imaget 63
In MacDougall 's view;
As a directive force moving Western society to an ever higher form

of civilization, the notion of progress was accepted as axiomatic by
most major thinkers. Conceived by men of the Enlightenment as a
secular substitute for the ancient belief in divine providential rule,
it dominated European thought by the end of the French
Revolution. In association with neo-nationalism and industrialism,
it provided the dynamism which led to western world hegemony. 64
He says that Kant supported this self-image with a theory of his-

tory as being the unfolding of meaning and truth and as serving the
purposes of morality. This theory leads to the interpretation of his-
tory as justifying all actions of its European "lords": industrialists,
capitalists, imperialists alike. This was the "age of progress."
MacDougall points out that "Hegel led the way in identifying the
process of universal history with Germanic political thought and cul-
t·ure. He asserted that the final stage of history was reached with the
development of Christian Europe and specifically with the manifes-
tation in his own time of the Germanic spirit." 65 "The German spirit
is the spirit of the new world." (Hegel quoted in MacDougall, p. 90.)
MacDougall reminds us that no other profession served till'
cause of the progress ideology and Anglo-Saxonism more than that
of the historian. But that is because it is the historian who hears I I w
responsibility for the construction of the myth of national origin rn1
which a national identity and successful image rests. Within th<•
European cultural trarlition it is in the progrt~ss Ideology that "lllt-
tory" takes on mcani11g. The idt'ology of progress Is rlbti11t·tiwly
l·'.urop1·«11,b ·c;111s1·11Is hm,c·d 1111llw l•:111'op1•.in llffllfl<tlt)ltu, H<'lll't,11
h1H;111l'ltvcttwly ,1g~rt·•1.,IVI'sl'II h1lit~WU-il'I' ( ·11,1p '))
lJt1rl1 1lyl11!(,ill 11f1lw,.1 tl11•1w•v.nl S,1,111il•,111,"l11·Pd1t111,"1111d
Self-Image 265
"progress" is the concept of "race," as defined in the context of white

nationalism. MacDougall quotes from Charles Wentworth Dilke (b.
1866): "The gradual extinction of the inferior races is not only a law
of nature, but a blessing to mankind." 66 The Aryans were seen to be
the parents of Western European culture. The great mission had
been assigned to three superior Aryan groups: the Greeks, Romans,
and Teutons. Each in its turn were "to be rulers and teachers of the
world." This was according to Edward Freeman in his History of the
Norman Conquest (1876). 67 Victorian England had descended in an
unbroken line form Teutonic Germany, so went the myth of racial
and national origin. "Elitist racial theories stressing Nordic superi-
ority received further confirmation from the new sciences of eth-
nology and anthropology." Beginning in the eighteenth century
Linnaeus, Comte de Bufton, and Blumenbach classified human beings
on the basis of biological differences. 68 Phrenology involved the mea-
suring of skulls, which was supposed to be an indication of intellec-
tual ability.
It was inevitable that the myth of national origin, the question
of national identity, and the positive self-image of European peoples
should be ultimately expressed in white nationalist terms. As Europe
bl'came more unified in terms of a cohesive national consciousness,
ll It! categories of racial distinction would of course become broader
with competition between European nationalities giving way to a
•:tatement of racial identification that tended to unite them-the myth
pf Aryan descent always reigning supreme. As the British Empire
spread to exploit more melanated people who could in no way claim
( ;l•rmanic heritage, the lines of ''race" became more clearly attached
1u l he broad cultural/historical lines that separated Europe from the
1 i•sl of the world. The European self-image has always been based on
tltl' implicit perception of cultural/racial difference. The utamaroho
t IIrives on this difference. Because of the nature of this utamaroho, the
dlaJt,ctical complement of the positive European self-image is a neg-
~1lvt! image of others.
Media and Self-Image

Kovcl says that mass meJia and advertising "hold the main
11111·1• nl Lhe cultural superego," 1;9 and most certainly the themes iso-
11111,tl nhc,ve are blatantly expressed in the European, Euro-American
11wdliL Tltt• 1,1ovic'Industry has had an obvious nationalist propa-
l{,11ttlhl lr ,•lial'H<'IN; ii huw1 Ion that II I ms p~rfornt('cl expertly. There
I 1101I1111!,!c-w11p,11. 1ltl1· 111•111,vol I w, 1·11It 1111'. I 11 I !'tlllS nf ('ff L'rt. Tl I<' li1w
1,, IW('l'll 1111•11101,•1 !I'd 1111;1,i,·1111!1Ilic• tntly tl)ll't,1llv1· •,t•II1111,11:,w b
266 YURUGU
very thin, if it is to be drawn at all, and there is no doubt that Euro-

American-made films reveal the European utamaroho. Movies that
depict the "virtuous" pioneer family defending itself against the
"vicious" and irrationally "hostile" Native Americans function to jus-
tify the actions of the European-Americans and their behavior
towards the indigenous population. But it is also the case that these
pioneers must, in fact, have thought of themselves as the virtuous,
adventurous souls they are depicted to be. Surely they believed it
their "manifest destiny" to "brave the wilds of untamed lands" and
that by building their homesteads, and thereby bringing family life
and "civilization" to the "wilds," they were being the most moral of
beings. It is equally certain that they could not understand the intran-
sigent hostility of the "lndians"-after all, were they not making great
sacrifices to bring their inherited talent for "civilization" to these
ingrates?! This image had to be assimilated into the Western
European self-image. It had been adumbrated in the earliest mani-
festations of Westernness. The movies that project this are consistent
with the European self-image as "they who create order from chg.OS,"
and "they who conquer the unconquerable."
The British films that are the counterpart of the British imper-
ial ethos portray the East Indian and African nationalists as "irre-
sponsible elements" who seek to bring suffering, violence, and
disorder to their people-for their own personal gain or, at best, for
misdirected political reasons. The British officer and his forces, on
the other hand, represent the interest of the natives and bring ratio-
nality, peace, and, above all, stability with their rule. Again, this is, of
course, European nationalistic propaganda, but it is also consistent
with the operative European self-image as "world peace-maker,"
"world organizer," and "world superior." The white man's burden
concept is not merely propaganda, it is an internalized self-portrait
that functions normatively. This helps us to understand tht'
European-American reaction to the airing of the The Africans seri<'s
un Public Television (November 1986). Major films, documentaric:-:,
and other media productions that do not serve to propagandize t11e
preferred self-image of the European are resented and see11 ;1s
"biased."
The location of European films is often an indication of t lit-11
aspect of the European sclr-imagc th<' film is projecting. Wh(•l1 t l1t•
story lakes place on foreign soil, the film he(·omes nn op port 11111\y lni
the expression of the Europi•an self i111ageIn relalio11 to llw i11L,1g1• ul
olltt•J's. Tltt· lauds 11f 11IIH'Ipt•oplt"i olft•11prnvldt• <''<lllll' •;1•1ll11g•i
,11ul
ll,u k1\HH1111I•,1111 lltt• "l11v1• ,11f,1lr<;" ,11111 pnllllc;il ,111d 1·1·01101111!
Self-Image 267
intrigues of the European protagonists. ("Their love set the Dark

Continent aflame!") The reason that this setting is so common in
European (American) films is that it has become a meaningful aspect
of the European utamaroho. The world exists as a playground-a
backdrop-for sport and play, for the adventures of the European.
(The movie Out of Africa is a contemporary example.) Peoples of
other cultures are actually experienced as "props," supportive to the
main (important) action of the script. These exotic settings are excel-
lent for such purposes; a sexually stimulating "native" dancer at a
strategic moment in a love affair-the romantic atmosphere of an
"unspoiled" (not yet "civilized") terrain-help to excite the "sophis-
ticated" and sated imagination of the European audience. Sometimes
a "native" girl helps to comprise part of the "unspoiled" resource to
be enjoyed; at others, the European gets involved with the native sur-
roundings to the extent that he becomes a temporary "god" or "chief."
All of this points to the very real belief and assumption of Europeans
that the lands of other people provide an environment in which they
c1reto act out their fantasies.
In advertising, this use of and relationship to other cultures is a
<101ninant theme. Not only the terrain but the indigenous peoples
t liemselves are no more than "ornaments" used to enhance the
,1ppeal of the European who is being depicted. There is no more accu-
1ute expression of the European utamaroho than a fashion ad with an
"t·xotic" setting or an airline commercial in which the world is rep-
n·scntecl as one vast resort area to which Europeans can escape from
t Ii(' "seriousness" of their "important" work. Pan American Airlines
.attests to all the places it has "opened up" to the West: "We can take
yrn 1 anywhere in this world we've opened." Delta Airlines talks about
"( )ur Caribbean'' and the various other places that "belong" to them.
't'lic·s<' phrases express the European's conviction and assumption
t li:1l lie owns the world, or at least that it is potentially his. The task
I w,·nmes simply a matter of transforming it-bit by bit-into their
1,1111 I of world, into what is familiar and comfortable for them. The air-
11iws, liotels, travel agencies, businesses make sure that this hap-
p1•11s.They want to be able to assure the European-American and
I , 11OPl'HII I hat th<'y are working to make yet another area, part of the
"W1•stc·111 world" (and therefore vf the "civilized" world).
< )t course\ the implications of this process are that these areas
Ill'{ t)lllf' n1ort' aml mon' 11ncornfortable for the Indigenous popula-
t 1011!,1lt.11l11ltahll· 1lwm as t 111•orlginnl inhabitants become less and
1,..,.• w1·h 1111ll'dhy 1lw l11vnd,•rn.<l11ly111vt•ry r1111tt0ll1·d
rol<'s i\rt' tlwy
w1 h 111111•1I,h w,11l1·1•,,l>1•lll111p·1
1 ,11HIllw lllw wltl1'11lwlps to 11'111
268 YURUGU
force the European self-image. lt is characteristic of the European

utamaroho that the plague of European-American "adventure-
tourists" are most attracted to places that have been least contami-
nated by themselves. But the groundwork must have been laid by the
"advance men" to assure them that the European stamp has been
put there; that they are indeed protected against "non-European dis-
order" and hostility. The European/European-American desire his-
torically (as potent now as at any time in western history) is to "save"
and destroy (Kovel); to "discover" and take over; to "open up" and
move in.
William Golding's book, and the film based on it, Lord of the Flies
is an excellent source for the study of expression of the European uta-
maroho in European literature. It contains quite explicit statements
of the European self-image in relation to the European image of oth-
ers. The polar dichotomies of the book mirror those of Western
European nationalism: order (1aw) versus chaos; the ubiquitous good
versus evil; "the chief" and Piggy (who represent civilization) versus
Jack and "the hunters" (who represent the primitive). An underlying
current throughout the plot is the battle of "knowledge" against the
abyss of "superstition."
The story revolves around a group of very young English boys
(probably from six to twelve years old), who are marooned on an unin-
habited island without adults during a crisis caused by nuclear warfare.
The most intelligent and well-mannered boys (the "good guys"), led by
Ralph, "the chief," devise a plan for decision-making and the mainte-
nance of order and assurance of survival. Opposing them are "the
hunters." These are the "primitives," the bad guys, the not very intel-
lige11tones. They are led by Jack, who is divisive, "regressive," and
c testructive. He threatens the "civilized" order of the group by going off
by himself and inducing others to join his "tribe." The bad guys are
utterly irresponsible; they play with fire, they grunt more often than
they talk, and they partake in "ritual" (not the ordered, culturally con,
slructive ritual that we know of in African societies), in which they rllll
around wildly, killing the good guys and shouting, "Kill the beast." Tl ll'
"beast" is a mythical being in which the "hunters" believe; a belief tlwy
foster and use as a justification for killing the good guys. In 111efih11ll11•
hunters are made to look like the I::uropean image of non-Europ~1111s
They give the impression of having darker skins, they p,1l11tthl'ir f,H't•s,
111'Y snt>am rmd yell a11cl111:-\ke 11ois<'Slike a11in1t1l!-i
mHI s11ppww<llyllkt•
"prlmltlw" 1wopl<•s. Piggy (wllo I:; C'l111bhy)Is lltl' l>r,11t1yl11t!'ll"<'ln,tl
wl1rn11.l,u k d1·spb1", !10111tl11·oulwt, ;111tl,11n1H•p11ll1I111!-IHY •..1y•, lu
to hi' ,1 p,1ck nf •..1v,11!1'krn •w11·1llllt·lllw 1{11lpl1''"
l,11I<,''l\11· y11111:111111-(
Self-Image 269
And therein lies the theme of the story, which is that of the continual
regression of the boys in the absence of adult (European) supervision.
The hunters kill Piggy, but before they can get to Ralph the boys are
rescued by adults. In European terms, the boys have culturally moved
"backward" thousands of years in one and a half hours of film time. This
is an expression of one of the European's greatest fears. Perhaps the
worst fate that could befall Europeans is that they lose their "civiliza-
tion" (superiority) and become reduced to what they view the "non-
Europeans" to be. The dichotomies that are presented are not those
that accurately indicate the distinctiveness of European-derived cul-
ture or even the difference between traditional cultures and secular
societies. The images presented are almost the reverse of these dis-
tinctions. African and other primary societies are characterized as
being "disordered," "uncontrolled," and "immoral"; European society
supposedly symbolized the movement away from this into order,
morality, and responsibility-where the individual can feel safe!
The 1954 Hollywood film The Naked Jungle is a prototype of the
media's interpretation of "the saga of Western man," in which he is
depicted as "conquering new lands" and "taming the wilds." Whether
the setting is Africa, India, the Pacific Islands, or South America, the
story is ethnologically the same.
Charleton Heston is a "strong," "rugged," "fearless" Euro-
American plantation owner in South America. He is also very, very
proud. He tells his newly arrived girl friend, "I came here when I was
nineteen and started with just twenty acres. I built all of this with my
own hands, I hewed it out. There was nothing when I came here." But
he warns her, lest she make the mistake of thinking that everything
ls like the paradise he has built. "Civilization is only as far as my land
goes, after that you are in the jungle, where no man has a name. In the
j1rngle man is reduced to an animal and the only law is survival."
At one point they meet a native "friend." The hero explains to the
woman that his friend "is more civilized than the others [because] he
!ins Mayan blood." At another point they view a "cruel" indigenous rit-
ual in which a man is being killed for taking another man's wife. The
while woman is horrified at such "immorality" and protests that it
..,1,ouldbe stopped.
ThE' movie gives the impression of being one long, very author-
11,,t Iv<•command from Charleton Heston, the undisputed "boss" of
1 v1•1 ything and everyone, 11unctuatecl by the sound of gun shots that
h~m• 110111lite pis I ol he carril•s constantly, I llC' <'<>lei
rationality of
whld1 b till' s11p11•rnl' sy111lwl ,d wl,ltP p11wn 111tlw pkt11re.
'l'l11·-pl11111•111ht", II•• lil}llt p11h11wl11·11I l1•};lrn1111111t•s 11p al-{ai11s1
:no YURUGU
tl1e "soldier ants." These are ants that "think" and travel in such
in11nense numbers that they can decimate the side of a mountain.
They hold most of South America in terror. Everyone on the planta-
tion wants to flee, but not Heston, whose image is nothing short of
I hat of a white god. He says that he will stay and fight! His friend, the
South American police officer, thinks he is crazy. He says to Heston,
"If you won't think of yourself at least think of your men [all indige-
11ous]." Whereupon Heston replies (in the voice of Moses handing
clown the Ten Commandments): "lam thinking of them. Fifteen years
ago they were savages. I took them out of the jungle. If I leave they'll
go back, and civilization will go with them."
Next comes the inevitable scene in which he confronts the
''witch doctor" (who also thinks that Heston is crazy). With good rea-
so11,the "witch doctor" is trying to convince the indigenous people
to get out as fast as they can. But Heston, the white god, tells them
to "be brave like his white woman." He is victorious, for the men
decide to stay, and the "witch doctor" slinks away, looking cowardly
a11dweak. Once again non-European cultural tradition is defeated.
The remainder of the film is concerned with Heston's death-
defying, heroic battle with the soldier ants, a battle that he, of course,
wins. And so Europeans are again successful; but then they deserve
tu bi>. Tiley are strong" and "brave," "intelligent" and "good." They are
,,hove all "unselfish" in their efforts to bring "civilization" to an unfor-
1unate "backward" land. The money and power they receive from
I hvir plantations do not contradict the altruism of their motives, for,
Hfl(•r nil, this adventuresome, expansionistic spirit should properly be
11•wardecl.
ht an excellent (and excruciatingly rare) satiric treatment of the
t 1HH1ueringutamaroho of the European, the British comic film Carry
, 11 Cleo lampoons not only the Romans and their incessant military
('Xpeditions, but all the Hollywood films that glorify this age of
Wt--stern imperialism as well. In the film, during one conquering cam-
p.i.lgn, Antony says to Julius Caesar, "You know, Julie, I don't think
these people want to be conquered," and Caesar answers, "I kncJtV
wltat you mean-apathetic! . .. They won't even use the nice new
mads I built them."
Kipling's message to his European brothers is that "Ymm; is the.
Earth and Everything that's in it." There is no doubt that nrnny or 1111'
Hsp1•ds of the European utur11urol10 a11d s<•lf-lmagt•an· ext n·111dy
"positive.'" i11the sense that, In terms of L11elrown intc·rpn·tallo11 of
tl11•it 11o1ll1111,1lbth·l11lt•11•sl, 1111•111111111w111l1t1 ~!IV(", 11H•111llw 1•111111
1•,,111dnptlt11h111111•11•s1,,11y to:-.11pp111I 1111'11
d1•11,,., ,l•lt .1•,s111,1111 01>!1•1
Self-Image 271
tives. The self-image is functional. This is the function of a national-

istic ideology. But the definition of European nationalism (which
becomes expansionism) and the European cultural ego are so
extreme and so massive that "positive self-image" in the context of
European culture becomes monstrous presumption and arrogance.
It is predicated on the degradation and demeaning of other peoples,
on the support and persistence of a negative image of "others," and
on a lack of respect for their legitimate self-deterministic expression.
It is European culture that cannot allow or coexist with "difference,"
yet paradoxically thrives on it.
The European Self-Image in the

Literature of White Nationalism
The literature of white nationalism is significant here not
because it expresses an erratic or bizzare element in European cul-
ture, but on the contrary, because the same themes are recognizable
in it as those found in European philosophical discourse, in the lit-
erature of European social science, in European aesthetic expres-
sion, and in the Western media-wherever Europeans (explicitly or
implicitly) give testament to their collective self-image.
The various manifestations of the European self-image reveal an
utamaroho that is consistent with that of white nationalism. The
descriptive term "racism," if not inaccurate, is certainly misleading. It
lakes attention away from the very special nature of white nationalism,
usually with the political objective of debunking any form of cultural
11ationalism-thereby ignoring the possibilities of nationalist ideolo-
gies. What is ethnologically significant is how the European-Caucasian
spokesmen define their nationalism and the characteristics they iden-
tify as "European," "good," or "white."
William Hepworth Dixon writes in praise of European man, the
conqueror:
The tale of a hundred years of white progress is a Marvelous

l listory ... The European races are spreading over every conti-
nent, and mastering the isles and inlets of every sea ...
l<w;sia ... has carried her arm~ into Finland, Crim, Tartary, The
C'aut·nsus and the Monhammedan, Khanales, extending the White
1•111p1r<·0111lw Caspi.1111'NIthe Euxinc ... Vaster still have been the
111,11ch(•s a1 ,ct 1IH• co11q11csls o( Great Britain ... llardly less strik-
1111(1t1n11111<'prowt>ss of H11ssiaand E11gla11d lms bcl:n that of the
I
272 YURUGU
China has been standing still, while England, Russia and America
have been conquering, planting, and annexing lands ...
The surface of the earth is passing into Anglo-Saxon hands. 70
In the writings of Joseph Arthur Gobineau, it becomes clear

how important the concept of "civilization" is to the white national-
ist position and therefore why the Western European discipline of
anthropology has been historically linked so closely to its arguments,
for it is this discipline that has contributed most to the European
nationalistic definition and use of the term "civilization." Gobineau
says,
I am continually speaking of "civilization," and cannot help doing

so; for it is only by the existence in some measure or the complete
absence, of this attribute, that I can gauge the relative merits of the
different races. 7 l
After describing the "negro" and "yellow" races, Gobineau offers

the following description of the white race. Interwoven in this state-
ment are European ideals, the themes of European nationalism, and
the attributes claimed by the European self-image.
We come now to the white peoples. These are gifted with reflective
('11crgy, or rather with an energetic intelligence. They have a feel-
i11gfor utility, but in a sense far wider and higher, more courageous
and ideal, than the yellow races; a perseverance that takes account
of obstacles and ultimately finds a means of overcoming them; a
urcalcr physical power, an extraordinary instinct for order, not
nwrcly as a guarantee of peace and tranquility, but as an indis-
pensable means of self-preservation. At the same time, they have
remarkable, even extreme love of liberty, and are openly hostile to
I he formalism under which the Chinese are glad to vegetate, as well
as the strict despotism which is the only way of governing the
Negro ...
The immense superiority of the white peoples in the whole field of

the intellect is balanced by an inferiority in the intensity of tlleir sen-
sations. In the world of the senses, the white inan is far less glftc•d
llli\11 t I1e others, ancl so is less tempted and less absorbed by ro11-
sicl<>r;11 ions of the body, although in physical sl ructmc 11<• is far tilt'
most vigorous. 72
W11y1lC' M,wLend, wlln 11•/1'ls lo h\up:,•11n:-;;1 "1,11'1,1lhl,"11mk•v.

· lg11llw.i11I11l1-..,•1v11tlt,11,
tl1,· l1,ll11wl1111.
Self-Image 273
Although many peoples have considered themselves superior to

their neighbors-the Japanese, the Jews, even some African tribes-
it has been the typical white variety of Caucasian with whom the self-
centered notions of race supremacy have been associated. 73
It is very important, as MacLeod observes, to recognize the fact

that ethnic or cultural nationalism does not necessarily imply theo-
ries of ethnic or cultural supremacy. There is a "natural" tendency for
cultural groups to believe that their ways are somehow better or
more desirable than the ways of other groups, for after all, these are
the implications of cultural commitment. It does not follow, however,
that they must impose that culture on others or that they must be
supreme or rulers among them.
For MacLeod, European peoples are "rulers of conquered peo-
ples and creators of civilization .... The tendency of people resem-
bling north Europeans to spread and conquer is one of their historical
characteristics. "74
MacLeod explains that historically it has been the Aryan race
that has transmitted the phenomenon of (and therefore the "capac-
ity" to generate) "civilization" from generation to generation. The
concept of "civilization" is again paramount in this statement of white
nationalism. MacLeod's concern is that it will be destroyed if the race
is allowed to die out. (It should be remembered as well that "purity"
and control of racial inheritance was an important aspect of Plato's
strategy.)
Below MacLeod recites those characteristics of Western
European cultural tradition of which he is most proud; those things,
i11his conception, the European has given to the world. (The cultural
I raits that Weber lists in his introduction to The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism as "Western" are very similar.)
Knowledge and observation based on mathematics, the systematic

forms of thought of Roman Law, the methods of experiment and the
lal)oratory, rational chemistry and science, spacial perspective in
painting, printed literature, the Press, the State with a written con-
stitution, the concept of the citizen, free labor, the orchestra with
sonatas and symphonies-were all unknown to the world before
I Ile c>mcrgenceof the Occident, not to mention the strides in inven-
11011ancl discovery, transport improvements, electrical communi-
r:ll irn1, <>le.,promoted bJ the same racial type, that is "like unto
ltM·ll nnly," 7"
11m-M.11·l.c·rnltlw •111111•1h11
type•:, ol lt•n11w111111Pntlhut will pr11-
d111•,· "p111g1,..,,,1v,••,t,1111L11d1,''1111•,l1,11,ll't1•1l,1•d by "pt•11:;lv1·, 1w1
274 YURUGU
vous, forceful dispositions"; as opposed to those who are "easy man-

nered," "lacking aggressiveness," and "given to animated extrover-
sion." "Intellect," says MacLeod, "is analytical, it dissects, divides."
And translated into the language of international political ambition,
all of this says that a United Empire of the Western World will be the
"ultimate expression of our civilization .... This is our natural des-
tiny."76
These are the images provided by Lothrop Stoddard in The
Rising Tide of Color:
The man who ... opened his atlas to a political map of the world
[in 1914] ... probably got one fundamental impression: the over-
whelming preponderance of the white race in the ordering of the
world's affairs. Judged by accepted canons of statecraft, the white
man towered as the indisputable master of the planet. For from
Europe's teeming motherhive the imperious Sons of Japhet had
swarmed for centuries to plant laws, their customs, and their bat-
tle-flags at the uttermost ends of earth. Two whole continents,
North America and Australia, had been made virtually as white in
blood as the European motherland; two other continents, South
America and Africa, had been extensively colonized by white
stocks; while even huge Asia has seen its empty north marsh,
Siberia, pre-empted for the white man's abode. Even where white
populations had not locked themselves to the soil few regions of the
earth had escaped the white man's imperial sway, and vast areas
i11habited by uncounted myriads of dusky folk obeyed the white
man's will. 77
Stoddard speaks of the "White Nationalist Commitment," and if

I he heavily racialist rhetoric is not allowed to get in the way, we can
sec that the political history of Europe in Africa up to and including
I he present is accurately described in his statements.
Fortunately the white man has every reason for keeping a firm hold
on Africa. Not only are its central tropics prime sources of raw
materials and foodstuffs which white direction can alone develop,
but t·o north and south the white man has struck deep roots 111lo tile
soil. Both extremities of the continent are "white man's country,"
where strong white peoples should ultimately arise. Two of tl1c•
\'11icfwhite powers, Britain ancl France, arc pleclgecl Lo lhc hill ht I ltls
racial task and will spare no effort to safcHuard the heritage oft I 11•ir
plom'l'ring ehildn'11 .... 111sl 1<lrt, Lile real danrt<'rIo white- cont rul
of Arrll'n 11,·snot in hHiw11alt ,wk nr lllnck I pvoll, h111111po•,·1lllk
wlilll• wc•11k111•1iH
ll11cu1v.l1
rl11onlr dl•i!'c1td wllltl11 1111•
wl11t,•w111hl
l1-!1•1l
711
Self-Image 275
In 1920, Lothrop Stoddard was calling for the unity of white peo-
ples in the cause of Western European nationalism. Today, the United
States, the European Economic Community, the former Soviet Union
and South Africa are displaying that unity for that cause, in spite of
the fact that they may find it convenient to use slightly different
rhetoric from that of Stoddard.
Stoddard describes what he calls "The White Flood"; i.e., the
worldwide expansion of the white race during the four centuries
between 1500 and 1900, "the most prodigious phenomenon in all
recorded history." 79 (Recorded by the "prodigious phenomenon"
itself!) Since Roman times, he says, the race had been diminishing for
various reasons including the Black Death and reluctance to "multi-
ply."so
But after the great discoveries [Columbus, 1492 and Da Gama,

1494), the white man could flank his old opponents. Whole new
worlds peopled by primitive races were unmasked, where the white
man's weapons made victory certain, and whence he could draw
stores of wealth to quicken his home life and initiate a progress that
would soon place him immeasurably above his once-dreaded
assailants.
And the white proved worthy of his opportunity. His inherent racial
aptitudes had been stimulated by his past. The hard conditions of
Medieval life had disciplined him to adversity and had weeded him
by natural selection ... the northern nations - even more vigor-
ous and audacious (than Portugal and Spain) - instantly sprang to
Lile fore and carried forward the proud oriflame of white expansion
and world domination. 81
It was Stoddard's hope that "the whites would universally form

,\ governing caste, directing by virtue of higher intelligence and more
n•solute will, and exploiting natural resources to the incalculable
proht of the whole white race." 82 His hopes have been realized. 83
Bllt Stoddard was writing in 1920. Is it still possible to find overt
c·l<presslons urextreme white nationalism? The answer is, of course,
yc•s. 111fact we have an instance in which the sentiments of white
11.1ll1111nlisrnare openly used to determine the governmental policies
11111 pow1,rful, albeit illegally constituted, state in Africa. The follow-
wnt> n1adc• by P.W. 13otha, President of the Republic
~:l,tl\·111e11ts
1111-(
111Snttl It Afrlt'H, In 198!),
My lu-l11wd Wltllc•Ati 1)<.1,1111•11-, (~1P1•1i11w, l11,ill iii vrn1 l11\1tlu·rsa11d

1 •1 l11I 11111,1111111111111r li11lvblood
r,I ,I,
:!76 YURUGU
Pretoria had been made by the white mind for the white man ....
We are superior people .... The Republic of South Africa ... has not
been created by wishful thinking. We have created it at the expense
of intelligence, sweat and blood ...
Intellectually we are superior to the Blacks; that has been proven

beyond any reasonable doubt over the years ...
Isn't it plausible (therefore) that the White man is created to rule

the Black man?84
The themes of the European utamaroho are what is significant

i11 this sampling of white nationalist literature: the European "man"
tile conqueror, world savior, bearer of order, and most importantly,
of "civilization," superior and therefore magnanimous in his effort to
impose on them the benefits of his knowledge and talents. It doesn't
matter for African peoples (for the "rest of us") whether Europeans
say that their blessed state of "civilization" is transmitted "racially"
(physically) or culturally; this is ultimately a very fine distinction.
The consequences of blatant "racialist" theory may be even less dam-
aging culturally, as they could "logically" lead to a noninterference,
separation-type policy. On the other hand, ethnologically, the
Furopean utamaroho is a subtle admixture of race, culture, and the
ideological conceptions of "civilization" and "progress." The white
nationalist statements are the statements of the liberal European
nationalist with the addition of a racialist rhetoric; a rhetoric that
has been abandoned by contemporary European intelligentsia. This
lat ler group is accustomed to hiding its nationalism in a barrage of
so-called universalistic terminology and methodology. Which is the
more formidable enemy?
For this reason, if for no other, African and other non-Europeaus
must not allow themselves to be frightened by the word "race"; and
the lesson to be learned is that "white man" really does "speak with
forked tongue."
These various aspects of the European utamaroho combi11<.> lo
form a self-image that externally supports European imperialistic
beliavior and internally or intraculturally supports extreme rational
ity, fanatical scientism, a superficial and analytic acstllelir, and 11
severe lack of spirituality. Imperialism is supported by tile sci1,rtllst s
who tonstnic1 tlworit·s by wl1irh tlw world is cm1s11mNI; hy l11frl
h·ct11als and ill'IHIP111irlans who 11s<'this "knowlc•cliw" iHi p11w1·1;l>y
111'<;sl1111111lc1s (111odc•111,tl,1y "rrns,tdc•ts") who ,<'l'I<only lo l11q10M•
ll11•lt ")WIii 1•" 1111I 111•WOI Id(',() tlu-y ",dl111l•:llc·,11ly" ollc•1 "1
Self-Image 277
in their empire). All of these types of individuals have the mentality

of the "world savior"-the counterpart of the "world conqueror." The
European "humanitarian" shares many of these features as well. He
often has the same image of himself in relation to others, as has the
European imperialist. Both believe that they are in possession of an
"absolute truth" that they would share with the world-like it or not!
European-style rationalism ends up in European hegemony, no mat-
ter how you cut it. The paternalism of the liberal or the scientific
humanist is still an expression of the European utamaroho as it
implies European superiority. "Humanitarianism" becomes in this
interpretation the sharing of that superiority. The intellectual-liber-
als may have the same self-image as the avowed white nationalists
and European cultural imperialists; they use the term "modern"
instead of one that is more obviously culture-bound, more blatantly
nationalistic. The problem is not the intention these people may have,
but to recognize that the ideology that underlies their scientific dis-
ciplines is a product of the same cultural/historical development as
that of white nationalism.
Again the concept of asili surfaces as our most valuable tool in
lhis critique. It demands that we place these various expressions and
characteristics of "Europeanness" into one meaningful reality: i.e.,
the only reality that explains them as parts of a cultural/ideological
whole. The asili of the culture dictates an obsession with power as
control. This can be sought through knowledge ("science") and/or
physical assault (military imperialism) and/or cultural imperialism
("progressivism"-Christianism) or the extremely effective combina-
tion of all three. The self-image that justifies these aggressive behav-
iors, and the national consciousness that demands them, are
111anclatedby the epistemology that separates the universe into "self"
,111d "other" and then makes an object of the other. It matters little
whether the object is called "pagan," "colonial subject," "underde-
vcloperl," or "black"-she is still "non-European." It matters little
whet her the self is avowedly identified as "civilized" scientist,
t'l1ristian, "savior," "modern," or "white"; the conquering self is
;\lways European. The concept of asili makes it apparent that the uta-
11111111azocreates a consistent se!f-image. Both utamaroho and self-
ll1Hl).lt· are prefigured In the cultu1 al germ (asili) and thereby carried
t11tlw "<'llltural j.(('nC's."
The native is declared insensible to ethics; he rep-
resents not only the absence of values, but also the
negation of values. He is, .... the enemy of values,
.... the absolute evil. He is the corrosive element,
destroying all that comes near him; he is the
deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do
with beauty of morality; he is the depository of
maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretriev-
able instrument of blind forces .... All values, in
fact, are irrevocably poisoned and diseased as soon
as they are allowed in contact with the colonised
race. The customs of the colonised people, their tra-
ditions, their myths - above all, their myths - are
the very sign of that poverty of spirit and of their
constitutional depravity.
- Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth
Chapter 5
Image of Others
The Complement of the European Self-Image
The persistence of the European utamaroho is inherently depen-
dl'nt on the image that Europeans have created of their "opposites."
'l'hc image of others, the dialectical antithesis of the European self-
l1nagc, helps to define it. The European image of others is a compos-
111•of all those things that represent lack of value; i.e., "negative"
l111111an characteristics, within the dictates of European ideology. It is
11w opposite of this negative image that they "breed for," that their
1·11l1ur<'strives to produce. The European self-image is a "positive"
1111t• In 1,•rms of nor.matlvl' l•:uropNm l)ehavior; it is functional in terms
nf E111 opt•,111 goals. IL cl<H'S Its Joh well. /\ rwgallvr conception of
"11tlw1" l!-1tlw baHIH11po11wllld1 Europc•:111s lrnlld tlwlr l11iag<"'
of other
p1•npl1•1,,I,•, 1111•
c11111·1·ptu,d l<1prnvl,h-d l,y lllf' n,1l11n·ol
1·1111'-lt11Irl
280 YURUGU
their culture, and Europeans create vivid images with which to fill it.
The utamaroho is such that they could not survive (as European)
without this image of an opposite upon whom they can "act out" all
those things that help to maintain their "positive" self-image. This is
important when people talk about "good" and "bad." If, in terms of
their own belief-system, they had to treat everyone as themselves,
they could not survive as "European." This is precisely why a "uni-
versal brotherhood-of-man" philosophy can only be ethnologically
interpreted as having a rhetorical function when it is stated within
European culture, since it is ideologically alien to and incompatible
with the value-thrust and definitions of that culture. It does not fit the
usili. The culture itself needs "nonbrothers"; it needs those who can
be treated totally as objects, as "other."
One of the strongest supportive mechanisms in and influences
on the development of the European image of others-certainly in the
early stages-has been Christian thought. This is a facet that sharply
brings home the hypocrisy of the identification of Christianity with
the ideals of universal "brotherhood." The Christian view of the "non-
European" is generally as "savage" in need of "the word," abandoned
lo the sins and evils of an ungodly existence, ignorant of the true
principles of morality. A missionary, writing in 1838, describes the
1lawaiians this way;
This people have much idle time on their hands, which we feel
anxious to have employed to some valuable end. It is a most diffi-
<'Ull task to teach industry to an idle people. But it is necessary to
the promotion of their Christian character. An idle, improvident
naristian is a contradiction in terms. And such have ever been the
I.tty habits of this people that they cannot improve on themselves
without the influence and example of those who are willing to per-
severe in teaching and encouraging them to work. A little labor will
suffice to provide a supply of food for their own consumption and,
hesides this, the wants of nature's children are few.... Their time
must therefore be spent in indolence or, what is worse, in exposure
to corrupting influences to which their fondness for each 01·her's
society peculiarly leads them. To this influence our churches will
continue to be exposed until some means of employment can b<'
devised which shall tend to raise them from their poverty and
clegradalion. 1
/\ st ro11gco111f'l1dl~rwith Christianity for l h~ dc•v1•lop111(•11t, 11111!11

11111,111<·1·,
,md p10hl'lytlznllo11 of tliii-. l11111ut'ls Ill<' r111tl11opologk,1I di!.
r·lplll11•,11dl-:1·lpllt1e•tl,ut lc·II 11,1l111ally
lo 1l1l:1 111 ...1( ..,llwt• It•, ~111>1«•1·1
111,1111•1 w/1 lo 111·
"wl111t1•v1•1 w,1°,111111°:11top1•,111," /\t, tlll' .111tl1111pnl11f(l•,t
Image of Others 281
defined "primitive" or "savage," she/he defined the "opposite" of

"European." In these descriptions the European self-image was
implied. They were essential to the idea of "civilization," a term by
which Europeans denoted themselves and the values of their culture.
The "primitive" was noncritical, nonrational, nonscientific, uncon-
trolled, immoral, irreligious, and, most of all, incapable of creating
"civilization." She was, therefore, in need of "saving" and of "civilizing.''
Anthropologists sometimes used these very terms to describe
Africans and other "non-Europeans," but more often they provided
the materials and the theories that, in terms of the European uta-
mawazo, supported such an image. Evolutionism in ethnological the-
ory relates the European utamawazo (culturally structured thought),
to European behavior towards others, and to the European uta-
maroho (vital principle). The primitive/civilized dichotomy has been
used by and large to project and substantiate the theory of cultural
evolution that, in turn, supports the European utamaroho. Use of this
dichotomy to provide meaningful alternatives has been neither char-
acteristic of the culture nor ideologically supported by it, and such
an interpretation certainly never contributed to what can be gener-
alized as "the European image of others." Without doubt the thrust
uf the anthropologist's contribution to the European image of others
l1as been to characterize others as culturally negative, i.e., as lacking
"civilization" ("high" culture) and as representing "early stages" in
I ltcir own development. Anthropologists have helped posit a kind of
''child to adult" relationship between Europeans and other people.
Tl1is theme can be found in the thought of almost any Western social
l I 1corist and is often quite explicit, where "primitive" (the non-
1:.11ropean)is likened to "child" of European culture and her culture
In I lie very early "childhood" of European "civilization."
This is a very significant aspect of the European view of others.
It is Implied in Edward Tylor's definition of "the primitive":
, .. the early condition of man ... can be regarded as a primitive

rnndition ... this hypothetical primitive condition corresponds in
,, <'onsidcrable degree to that of modern savage tribes, who, in spite
111tlwir difference and distance, have in common certain elements
of rlvilizalion which seem remains of an early state of the human
• ,ll'l' nt large ... t Ile main tendency of culture from primrval up to
111<Hl1•111 t iua·s has becu from savagery towards civilization." 2
1-'1,·11d's'/i,1,,in (lrl(/ 'fohm1 ls one of tlw most 11ntorious l11corel-

lc•nl wrnl<:tltt lllli; rf•Jl,lltl, 11111
II h-:uni 11typl1·.d;lls l1r1hit'tlSSlllllptinns
1111111111,1·nl F111op1•,111•1wl1111•1111sld1·1llw111:,l'IV<"• to lw lllwral
282 YURUGU
t1ncl"objective," even as they use others to theorize about their own

psychological and cultural development, one that is supposedly nat-
ural to all humans. Implicit even in enlightened anthropological the-
ory is the invidiously comparative image of Europeans with people of
other cultures, which manifests itself as unconvincing apologia for
I he "failure" of those who did not "develop civilization." 3
Harry Elmer Barnes offers the following characterization of "the
primitive":
Practically speaking, the primitive mentality is dominated by com-

parative ignorance, and by a type of attitude we call superstitious,
from which the civilized and educated man of today is relatively
emancipated. Primitive man also lacks the mental discipline which
comes from some training in logic. Consequently, his imagination
is more or less unrestrained. He creates and believes in a great
number of mythologies. He tries to control nature by magic-that
is, by incantations, prayers, rituals, and festivals. Such intellectual
advances as civilized man has made have been achieved mainly
through release from such naivete. 4
These are the statements in which one finds the European self-
image and their image of others. These images are to be found in
whnt they call "the intellectual histories of Mankind" and the "histo-
1 h's of Western civilization." They need not, and most often will not,
s,w"me" and "him" or "we" and "they" but will use terms far more
d,1111ngi11gto their "objects." We are concerned with the relationship
ht1IWe<>n European descriptions of others and their descriptions of
"1u•II."
Why "the Other" Is Black ("Non-white")

Gobineau, articulating white nationalism, describes firsl
Africans, then Asians:
The negroid variety is the lowest, and stands at the foot of the lad-
<lcr. The animal character, that appears in the shape of the pcfvis,
is stamped on the Negro from birth, and foreshadows his destir1y.
I lis intellect will always move within a very narrow circle. If his
mental faculties arc dull or even non-existent, he often has an inh·n
:;ity of desire, and so of will, which may be called terrible. Many of
lt1s senses, especially taste• and su1cll, are <levclopccl to an t·xt<·nt
u11k11ownlo the other two raC('S.
l'I It' v1•1v •,I 11•11)-!I

it ol Ills s1•w1,1Iirn 1-.I'! I Iw 1 111111
:llI ild11g ptool ol lib
11il1·1l11illy Ali l1111tli'I ~111111 Iii lib 1•y1•~.1111tlil111\ di· ~(11•1hIll 11·111+,
Image of Others 283
him. What he desires is to eat, to eat furiously, and to excess; no car-

rion is too revolting to be swallowed by him. It is the same with
odours; his inordinate desires are satisfied with all, however coarse
or even horrible. To these qualities may be added an instability
and capriciousness of feeling, that cannot be tied clown to any sin-
gle object, and which, so far as he is concerned, do away with all
distinctions of good and evil. ... Finally, he is equally careless of
his own life and that of others: he kills willingly, for the sake of
killing; and this human sacrifice, in whom it is so easy to arouse
emotion, shows, in face of suffering, either a monstrous indiffer-
ence or a cowardice that seeks a voluntary refuge in death ...
The yellow race is the exact opposite of this type. The skull points
forward, not backward. The forehead is wide and bony, often high
and projecting .... There is a further proneness to obesity .... The
yellow man has little physical energy, and is inclined to apathy ....
His desires are feeble, and his will-power rather obstinate than vio-
lent .... He tends to mediocrity in everything .... He does not dream
or theorize; he invents little, but can appreciate and take over what
is useful to him .... The yellow races are thus clearly superior to the
black. Every founder of a civilization would wish the backbone of
society, his middle class, to consist of such men. But no civilized
society could be created by them; they could not supply its nerve
force, or set in motion the springs of beauty and action. 5
If we compare Gobineau's first description with his characterization

of the "white" race (see Chap. 4 of this work), it becomes clear that
one is the antithesis of the other. In Lothrop Stoddard's view, another
avowed white nationalist, African's are also the "lowest" on the
l111manscale and the true converse of the European:
... the brown and yellow peoples have contributed greatly to the
civilization of the world and have profoundly influenced human
progress. The negro, on the contrary, has contributed virtually
nothing. Left to himself, he remained a savage, and in the past his
only quickening has been where brown men have imposed their
Ideas and altered his blood. The Originating powers of the
l~uropcan and the Asiatic are not in him. 6
Tlw black race has never shown real constructive power. It has
,wwr built up a native civilization. Such progress as certain negro
groups lwvc>mad<·has l>Cl·ndue to external pressure and has never
long 0111 llv<•d I lint pn•ssun•'s n•111oval,for the negro, when left to
I il1111wll, ,1:, 111
1lall I ,1111IJ.1111•rlH,
1apl11lyrcwrl s to his ancestral ways.
l'lw 111w11 l:111I,wll,·, ,,v.,111•,11t1>1ll111l,1ln1: 1)111 tlu•n· l1r stops. lh•
11111 lw du•"• 110l.,1<l,q1I,
,11,•,ll11ll,1t1•,,111tl~!lvc•lortlt l'l'l'illlvc•ly
284 YURUGU
again .... None of the black races, whether negro or Australian, have
shown within historic times the capacity to develop civilization.
They have never passed the boundaries of their own habitats as
Conquerors, and never exercised the smallest influence over peo-
ples not black. They have never founded as stone city, have never
built a ship, have never produced a literature, have never suggested
a creed .... There seems to be no reason for this except race. 7
"Whiteness" is central to the European self-image, just as their

image of others necessarily involves "blackness" or "nonwhiteness,"
as it is put negatively in European terms. This aspect of the European
aesthetic helps to define the content of European cultural national-
ism, and white supremism, in this way, becomes identifiable as one
of its most significant characteristics. Statements such as those by
Gobineau and Stoddard demand cultural explanation, that is, an
explanation in terms of the asili. No ethnology of European culture
can with honesty ignore the significance of color in the mind of the
European.
Joel Kovel uses Freudian analysis to argue that because
European-Americans are "white," they were able to discover the
"power" implied in the use of anal fantasies on a cultural level; the
white/black dichotomy of "purity" and "dirt." 8 But, in disagreement,
we could use terms of the same analysis to argue that European devel-
opment has been prematurely frozen in a stage of psychological
Infancy (anal stage), which people of other cultures outgrow as chil-
<1rc•11.Moving beyond Freud, however, in repudiation of European
soi-ial theory, generally, we can understand Europeans culturally as
y11mgu,the incomplete and forever immature being.
While in Kovel's view, Africans (blacks) represent "dirt" that is
<h.:splsed universally by human beings on a repressed, subconscious
level, two other theorists, Frances Welsing and Richard King, also
psychiatrists, have quite different explanations. In their views this
reaction is not common to all peoples. They understand European
1,ntrecl of blackness and of human color generally to be peculiar lo
1lwm. They argue that the phenomenon is very much culture-Sp<•
cl fie. Both Welsing and King focus on the absence of melanin as a key
to the etiology of white nationalism. In Welsing's view the Euro1wan
value of whiteness is a defense mechanism growing out of a sc•nsc·ol
Inadequacy as Europeans become aware of their cxtrC'lllC mi11nr!ty
slat11s i11t Ile world. This r<'alization caused a psyc-holo!,{IC'alrt'Sprntst·
Tl 11011gl1 ,1pro1·es~nf rl·a<·lion-fonna\1011they lrnv••{'ln111w·cl II dt•sln •d
, llo11,Hll•llsth (l>l,wl 111•ss,color) 111111 ,1 cl1•v11hwcl011t•, ,111d11111•v<•11w,
wltll1•11t•••••(01 ll1t• Im I<ol I olw ), lllt'll,, mild lw v,lllt<·tl Tlwv 1111 1 11, 11•
Image of Others 285
ated and have sustained a system in which the minority controls the
majority (the "system of white supremacy"). This process, in
Welsing's view, explains the substance of European civilization.
Richard King argues that for the Caucasian (Africans who
became "demelanated" [my term], as a result of their physical sur-
vival during the last glacial period in Eurasia), blackness is traumatic.
It is associated with the loss of their culture and spiritual conscious-
ness caused by a decreased functioning of the pineal gland which
secretes melatonin (a consciousness altering hormone) and by their
isolation from African ancestors. He argues that Caucasians reacted
to this loss with fear of what had become inaccessible (unknown);
then they turned that which they feared into that which they hated.
Blackness became evil in this process, and dialectically, whiteness
(the known) came to represent good or value.
These theories and others of European white racist behavior
will be discussed more fully in Chap. 8. In this instance we are focus-
ing on the significance of blackness in the negative European image
of others. The pivotal dichotomy of blackness and whiteness in
European symbiology are, of course, linked to that development. It is
visible in the mythology, as far as we can tell, from the beginning of
their cultural experience. Merlin Stone in her work on racism, calls
attention to the Zend-Avesta (ca. 600 B.C.E.), the religious literature
of the Aryans that is attributed to Zoroaster. Stone suggests that the
1nythology found therein expresses the beliefs inherited from a much
more archaic oral tradition. It revolves around the great and contin-
11ous battle between two gods and their respective followers.
Ahriman is dark and evil, and those who follow him are a dark "race
of clemons." Ahura Mazda is the god of light and goodness; his fol-
lowers are the foes of evil. 9
Vulindlela Wobogo reminds us that the caste system in India
huds its origins in the Aryan invasion of that civilization in about 1700
U.C.E.Wobogo argues that all racist theory can be traced to European
11rigins.In support of this view he uses Cheikh Anta Diop's Northern
( ·radle theory of lndo-European cultural development. (Diop's theory
I•, discussed in Chaps. 2 and 8 of this study.) Wobogo refers, as well,
tu 11nessay by Mlalaskera and Jagatil\eke entitled "Buddhism and the ,
1<111'<>Question," which discusses the ideas of early Buddhist religious
t1•11rlwrs.According to these ideas the human race is broken down
111111 six sp~t·lcs, lhc' charactc,lstics of which arc immutable, deter-
t11l11l11g ;1hllltics and-status, This is tile>orif{in o[ the caste system.
I ,Ii h "}ijH'C lt•s" Is d( 8IHt•11l1•d hy 1\ l'lllor: '1To tlw Rlack species
0
l1,•ln111w<1 tl1t~l>ttldt~·r:1, ll1wil'r!-t,l111111,·1s,

lh,lwn111,11,da<"oll, illtd l·xi·
286 YURUGU
cutioners and all those who adopt a cruel mode of living." (See
Mlalaskera and Jagatilleke. 1°) They were the lowest caste of darkest
complexion. The caste system that evolved has made those of
Dravidian origins, the earliest rulers of India, the outcasts or
"untouchables," whose shadows must not even touch a person of a
higher caste. The Dravidians are black, indeed as black as any human
beings on earth. Varna, which means "skin color," is the word that
designates "caste."
Here we see the Aryan image of others as black, repulsive, and
lowly. While the "pure white" species, the highest group, according
to the religious teachings of these Aryans, were the perfect saints
(Aryan self-image). 10 The ideas of reincarnation and Karma helped to
explain that this saintly condition was not due to anything that the
members of this group had done or achieved, but rather to their nat-
ural state of birth (ascribed), just as the black group was lowly and
evil by birth and could never hope to change.
The Cress Theory has some more immediately relevant impli-
cations that relate to our survey of white nationalist literature. There
is a theme that continually arises in the theories of white supremism
that seems to support Welsing's observations. Europeans express a
fear of being "outnumbered," and where this circumstance does not
already exist, they appear to anticipate the probability of a change in
the ratio between them and the black people ("nonwhites") who are
proximate to them. As Welsing says, the sheer fact of the composi-
tion of the world's people would be enough to fill Europeans with
this anxiety-given their perception of the world as a basically hos-
tile "other" that must be controlled. But Europeans have themselves
created forced environments in which their minority status is inten-
sified.
The nature of the European utamaroho both defines others as
competitors and enemies, and, at the same time, compels Europeans
to leave "home" (where they are at least surrounded by those who
look and act like them) and to move into alien lands in which they arc·
the "strangers." Colonial situations and slave plantations are cases i11
point. The European's sense of power is exhilarated by the fact llrnt
they are among a very few whites who control many dark-skinned
"natives." Yet imagine, as well, the deep underlying fear-the n·nu
ring nightmare-that some day these "natural underlings" will "~•·t
together" a11clovercome tl1ein by sheer numbers, or kill tht·11l 111t lll'lt
slt>1·p.Consider I li<•nilly prirl !RIiy rcpr<•sst•dt•nH>l lonal dynn111k:, of.,
wllllt• p1•1:-.n11111
"Hl111d1•st.1"wlto llv1•dwith 111<11•111 111,,tany 11101111111
It w1111ldli1•1111111·
i'.ll111},1hw1·1111cltll,11 •;111•wilt lw t1,..,1,11y1•cl111tlw
[mage of Others 287
process. In South Africa the ratio of whites to Africans is necessarily

a political issue, and whites are openly encouraged to procreate. In
America intellectuals allow themselves to rationalize their fears by
identifying ecological sanity with contraception, but it is black pop-
ulation growth that inevitably frightens white America.
The thrust of any eugenicist theory is the elimination of "non-
white" peoples and the proliferation of whites; for in the process of
making European culture what these architects want it to be, they
also make it "whiter." Eugenic "improvement" of the "white race" pre-
supposes indirectly the destruction and exclusion of other peoples.
Madison Grant's argument is representative:
Under existing conditions the most practical and hopeful method

of race improvement is through the elimination of the least desir-
able elements in the nation by depriving them of the power to con-
tribute to future generations .... In mankind it would not be a matter
of great difficulty to secure a general consensus of public opinion
as to the least desirable, let us say, ten per cent of the community.
When this unemployed human residuum has been eliminated
1ogether with the great mass of crime, poverty, alcoholism and fee-
blemindedness associated therewith it would be easy to consider
I he advisability of further restricting the perpetuation of the then
r<'maining least valuable types. By this method mankind might ulti-
mately become sufficiently intelligent to choose deliberately the
most vital and intellectual strains to carry the race. t t
Again it is possible to interpret this theme as being "ethnologi-

\ :d" in terms of European ideology; i.e., issuing from the asili of the
1·1111ur-e. It is consistent with and reminiscent of the Platonic social
1tl1·al. Lothrop Stoddard expresses precisely the concerns upon
wltkh Frances Welsing bases her theory:
'l'lw whites are ... the slowest breeders, and they will undoubtedly
lwcome slower still, since section after section of the white race is
, c•vc,ilingthat lowered birthrate which in France has reached the
''1'11p1ne of a stationary population. 12
'-tt,,cl,lanl refers, on the other hand, to the "extreme fecundity" of the

'11,•w·o''a11dlabels him as the "quickest of breeders." "In ethnic cross-
lnw,, 1ltt• ncgro strikingly disµlays his potency, for black blood, once
1·1111•Il11g !11111,rinslock, se •ms never really bred out again." 13
,lndd,1td\ 1•1!1lrt•work, '/111> /?i,\tfll-/'f'id<'of('n/011r, one ,)f the rnost sig-
111111 l!lt'n1y, le;,!11hwt, llll:w<l ou till' tliemc of
,1111lu .whllt• 11utlrn1,illo;t
1111l11111il111•11t
d,111111•1ul /\1111,111•,,t11d 11111111 p1•11pl1•111l'olor ov1·1t11r11
288 YURUGU
ing their common enemy, the white man.

For a contemporary expression of this European fear of being
out-numbered and an ethnographic example of the Western European
view of others, we offer the following statements from P.W. Botha,
taken from a speech delivered in 1985, addressed to his "beloved
White Afrikaaners":
Priority number one, we should not, by all means allow anymore

increases of the Black population lest we be choked very soon. [He
advocates the use of] Chemical weapons ... to combat any further
population increases [and] fertility destroyers.
I am also sending a special request to all Afrikaaner mothers to

double their birth rate ... we should engage higher gear to make
sure that Black men are separated from their women and fines be
imposed upon married wives who bear illegitimate children.
[He refers to Africans/blacks as] greedy savages who are after our
blood .... We cannot simply stand and watch all the laurels we have
created being plundered by these barbaric and lazy kaffirs...
It is our strong conviction (therefore) that the Black is the raw mate-
rial for the white man. So Brothers and Sisters, let us join hands
together to fight against this Black devil. ..
By now everyone of us has seen it practically that the blacks can-

not rule themselves. Give them guns and they will kill each other.
They are good in nothing else but making noise, dancing, marrying
many wives and indulging in sex .... Let us all accept that the Black
man is the symbol of poverty, mental inferiority, laziness and emo-
tional incompetence .
. . . Our experts should work day and night to set the Black man
against his fellow man. His inferior sense of morals can be exploited
beautifully. And here is a creature that lacks foresight .... The aver-
age Black does not plan his life beyond a year .... 14
Botha's white nationalism is obvious. It is of the vintage that

now embarrasses the typical white liberal American. Botha has 110111
ing to hide. He is what Kovel mighL call a "dominative" racist: dlre<'t
1111dobsessive. Tile white American liberal is a11"avt>rsivt'" racl!;I,
who, consciously or not, partlclpatt;is in n."nwtAr ac-lst'' soch•ty and
IIH•rt·fn1(• (',1111101PSC';\t)l' Its lnlwn·nl tnstlt1111011ulnWl>llll 1:, Tit,•
t If' of I lw do111ll1,11IVP ,rnd 1111';1vt'l 'ilVP 1,1rl•,I 111,1yy;11 y, I 11tl I lw
111•1111
1111clt•tlyl111( ,111<I
•~1•11111111•111 1d1l111,1t1•11°,1111 ,Ill' 1111'lhlllll'
Image of Others 289
Let us take, for instance, the argument of Ben J. Wattenberg as

expressed in his book The Birth Demth. 16 The book is subtitled: What
happens when people in free countries don't have enough babies?
Wattenberg does not say, as Botha does, that he is concerned lest
Africans and other people of color eclipse whites in the world, in fact,
he denies that race is an issue. His only stated concern with this "sen-
sitive issue," as he calls it, is that according to some projections, by
the year 2080, the American majority white European stock of 80 per-
cent (1986) will have dropped to 60 percent and will still be declin-
ing.17And while America, in his view, is not "essentially a racist or
bigoted country, anti-black or anti-Asian, anti-Hispanic or anti-
Islamic," given present patterns of fertility and immigration certain
doubts about the future arise. These "doubts," according to
Wattenberg, are not those of racists, "only of those wondering
whither we are headed and fearing that where we are going is not
where we want to go." He refers us to a book written by Colorado
Governor Richard Lamm and Gary Imhoff entitled: The Immigration
Time Bomb: the Fragmenting of America. The book addresses the issue
of increased numbers of nonwhite "third-world" immigrants, while
the numbers of Europeans immigrating diminishes. 18Wattenberg's
answer to this "problem" is quite simple. To white, middle-class
A1J1ericans he says start reproducing yourself! To the Afrikaaner
1nother Botha says double your birth rate!
Botha says that black people are "barbaric." Wattenberg says
I hat the "less-developed" countries of the world need "the West" for
111odclsof wealth, freedom, technology, "free markets," and "democ-
, al ic modern values." 19The implications are the same. If left alone
/\f ricans and other "nonwestern" peoples will not "progress." But for
Wn.lLenberg, the issues are those of culture, progress, and ideology-
11ulrace-or so he claims.
What is the problem in this so-called nonracist view? In this
"Western world" there will be no growth by the early twenty-first cen-
t 11ry(Wattenberg calls this "the birth dearth"), then there will be
•d11'1tlkage.He asks what this will mean for the world? His answer is
t I 111tI Ile decline in the birthrate in Western nations may eventually
I ,dw " ''heavy economic, geopolitical, personal and social toll. "20
Willtr-11hcrgis concerned with the good of us all! He says, "relying on
t 111•11 ll'chnological and organizational superiority, the industrial
ll1•1111)rt'ft<'les co11lrl protrct their position and perhaps even enhance
t 111 wowt Ii of dt•111ncrntk vahu's ,,lsc•whNe," 21 I low magnanimous!
1
Wo1t1c11dwrgnq ..(11<•t: tl1n1 wllh n clt•rllrw ln popul/\tlon llic• ''Wt'SlE:'rll

wn, lei" 1 ,11-lllOI •1111111•11II"•'' I 11·1ll'lr I~ wll II 11111s1·
le•:,s lurt 1111,ll•·, 1111r 1·;111
290 YURUGU
it bestow its leadership. The issue is ideological and cultural after all.
Those who threaten the power of "democracy" just happen to be
black.
Wattenberg compares the projected birthrates of the "indus-
trial democracies" with those of the "less developed countries plus
the Soviet bloc" from 1950 to 2100. 22 Lest there be any question as to
who the "industrial democracies" are, they are listed: Canada, U.S.,
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland,
U.K., Italy, Luxemborg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Japan. (In another listing Wattenberg includes
Israel.) With the exception of Japan, all of these nations are white
dominated and/or white majority nations. They may have different
names, but they are merely "provinces" of a single white European
hegemony. Japan sticks in the craw of the European cultural nation-
alist, included in the list because of technological superiority. But
then the Japanese projected fertility rate is also slow, with a median
age for the year 2025 projected to be forty-four. 23 So they are not a
numerical threat.
Wattenberg states his fear, "the Third World will be growing
larger both absolutely and relatively, in decades to come." He then
asks, "Could Third World culture become dominant? Could it erode
our culture?" 24 It makes little difference whether he is considered a
n1lt uralist or a racist. From an African-centered perspective, we are
011rculture. To deprecate one is to demean the other. To fear African
culture is to fear Africans. Wattenberg makes this fear explicit. In
<•He<.:t, he is saying that if there are more of them, their culture will
<·011taminate us. If there are fewer of us, there will be less of our cul-
l urc, and therefore we will have less power. 19 But, says, Wattenberg,
"Tllis view should not be seen simply as Western chauvinism,"
r ,ccause the West has so much to give to the world. 25 Here we see the
cllalectic of self-image and image of other as it functions to fulfill the
cultural asili and to express the utamaroho. The European is the "sav-
ior," the "civilizer"; therefore the "non-European" must be the sinful
''savage." Botha's bigotry is expressed through Wattenberg's blatant
paternalism. For Wattenberg "the West" is the "first world," offcrlni;?
hope of freedom to people in communist countries. 26 Therefore, tll<•
111ostserious world problem is the "decline of the West," becaus~ till'
nilturc bearers, middle and upperclass whitr P.uropN,11s a11d
l~11ropcan descendants have sucl1 a low fcrllllly rnll' ns to <.:mtsP 11
"hlr th d<•arth" ;H11ongtl11•irpop11lation.
Wa11,,,itwrl{ho~ pn•s1•11!1•d tl11•q11lnl<'Sst·111l11l i.tnlt•1111•11t
11111111
1,•111pot,11yIIIH•1,1I
wllllt• nnt1011alls111,l11wlll1•htlw llllil>(t• 1111
:11111111•1111•,
1
Image of Others 291
and the culture that they bear is "remarkable, potent, productive,

humane, beneficent"-"the last best hope of mankind." 27 The image
of others that he projects is as being "less-developed (therefore lazy,
indolent, poor), less able to develop (therefore incompetent, lacking
culture, self-indulgent), dependent on white Western European lead-
ership (therefore non progressive, unfit for self-rule, unable to plan for
the future), fertile and threatening to the American way of life. The
final analysis is that the white nationalist, whether of the Gobineau,
Stoddard, Botha or Wattenberg variety, is petrified of black fertility,
because it threatens white dominance. This anxiety is consistent with
the European asili, utamawazo, and utamaroho.
Slavery, Its Aftermath, and the Image of Others

The relationship between European enslavement of other peo-
ples and the European image of others is one of interdependence;
they feed on each other. As with all characteristic European behav-
ior, the enslavement of other peoples is dependent on the nature of
I he European utamaroho. By this I mean that it is not wholly accurate
to say that images proffered of African peoples served the purpose
of justifying or rationalizing slavery if by this it is meant to imply that
lhe fact of slavery was prior to the image. Although the defenders of
slavery were very dependent on negative images for their arguments,
ll must be realized that such behavior on the part of Europeans could
never have been initiated nor sustained had it not, from the outset,
been consistent with the European utamaroho. And the image of
Arricans that accompanied the slave trade existed long before it was
lnitlaJed, and still survives.
James Pope-Hennessy argues against those who hold that ini-
t l111ly
slavery had nothing to do with white nationalism. Proponents
oft his position point to a few isolated examples of Englishmen being
Pnslaved by Portuguese slave-traders, in other words, to anomalous
situations. Pope-Hennessy, on the other hand, makes clear the essen-
tial difference between a European's view of other Europeans and
Ids image of Africans.
U11doubtedly they suffered torinents, but they never came to be

lonk1•don, as were Negro slaves anct their descendants, as chattel
propNI y-as, that is to say, an automatically inferior form of
n ki11dof twn k1~gcddomestic animal. 28
1111111111,ity,
(l'l,1to w,,i. not 11pJ>11:.c•d

to slavt•ty, 011ly to llw 1·11slav1•111c11t
of
otlll'r 1\11·,·k~.)
i\1ui11111•11htt• •·cl to ·:-i11pporl l•:11rnp1•,1111•11 l11v1•1111•11\
ul i\f1h 1111
292 YURUGU
peoples are significant here, because of the image of Africans upon

which the arguments depend. This image, though presented
unabashedly and in terms that are now embarrassing to the European
intellectual, is consistent with and dialectically related to the self-
image expressed in the statement quoted from Harry Elmer Barne's
work. (See Chap. 4 of this work.) The presuppositions on which
Barnes' statements rests, lead ethnologically to the slaver's conclu-
sions. (See Barnes earlier quote in this chapter.) Here are two exam-
ples of the white slaver's image of others:
The social, moral, and political, as well as the physical history of

the negro race, bears strong testimony against them; it furnishes
the most undeniable proof of their mental inferiority. In no age or
condition has the real negro shown a capacity to throw off the
chains of barbarism and brutality that have long bound down the
nations of that race: or to rise above the common cloud of darkness
that still broods over them. 29
As to the black race, we have already drifted into a condition which

seriously suggests the limitation of the political rights heretofore,
perhaps mistakenly, granted them, the inauguration of a humane
national policy which by co-operative action of the nation and the
southern states, shall recognize that the blacks are a race of chil-
dren, requiring guidance, industrial training, and the development
of self-control, and other measures designed to reduce the danger
of that race complication, formerly sectional, but now rapidly
becoming nationaI. 30
The images are consistent with those presented by the

European nationalists whom we considered in Chap. 4 and by most
of Western European anthropology; they act to support the charac-
teristic European self-image. Yet the attempt is made to dismiss the
Images (and slavery as well) as being inconsistent, "out of character,"
not "in tune" with the main thrust of development or with the over-
all European world-view. The images and behavior with which they
correspond cannot be "disowned" by Europeans until the nature of
lhe European utamaroho has changed and that would require a dif
rerent asili, a new culture. (A qualitatively different culture cannot h1·
created by the same people.) It is because the 11tamaroho,whlcl1
serves as the basis for these kinds of images of others, is still ch,1r
aclcrlstic of European culture t·hat it Is possibl<! for F.11ropca11s tu
IH·hnvt• 111 ,1 systcmntlcnlly t1i,:g11>s~lv<•1111<1n1,ta!,1011lslk n1t1111w1
tow,11 ds "111111 l•:111 opc·,111" [H'oplt•s
11
/\111li•11t l'lllltlll",," •,,1y1,Wny1w M11cl.1•111I, "111•c•dc•d1111' 10111111,(
Image of Others 293
masses, whether aboriginal or imported, for menial tasks of life,

thereby freeing conquering man for higher thoughts and deeds." 31
"Non-European" man is "nonman." The apprehension of "the other"
"nonhuman" is natural to the culture that defines "humanness" in
terms of its own ambitions, its own "rationalism." There is no ques-
tion of morality involved here, since "slaves," quite simply, do not
enter into the European system of ethics. The "slave," like the
machine, is simply a tool or a prop used by Europeans to enact the
"history" that they perceive to be their "destiny." MacLeod says,
Although Germanic Man is the last of the conquering races, he no

longer needs the institution of slavery for cultural advancement;
machines have taken over slave functions. It is no coincidence that
the most slave-mastering race in the past is also the one that today
seeks to promote its technical possessions. 31
But did the nature of the European utamaroho and the image of
nt·hers on which it depends change with the demise of slavery? To the
contrary, Europeans/European-Americans continued to consider it
111eirobligation to rationally organize the world, and a white South
African regime represents to them that rational order.
Merlin Stone understands racism as a process that initiates in
illl economic aspect (motivated by greed), then rationalized in cul-
l ural terms ("cultural racism"). This results in what she describes as
"stages" of racism in which land, resources, and labor are stolen from
m,e group by another, and the supportive state of cultural racism in
which beliefs about the racial or ethnic group under attack are pro-
I iaga_ndized by the conquerors. Stone assiduously avoids the obvious
Ill I he presentation of her theory: that this pattern of behavior is char-
,wlcristic of Europeans. Yet the bulk of her "evidence" of racism is
I 11kcnfrom the Aryan experience.
Stone's "cultural racism" clearly involves our "image of others."
SI1 • says that the theft of land is supported by the assertion that the
vlt·l1111sare "innately immoral, even innately evil, e.g., demons, can-
1111,Jls,head hunters, savages, bloodthirsty, merciless, sadistic,
vlllous, child killers, rapists, heathens, in league with the devil, crim-
111;\l,devious, sly, sexually perverse, dishonest, cunning, etc." 32 In this
,l.1H<·,I lie moral inferiority of the "cultural other" (my term) is the
h•,1H·. She (.(<>t'Son 10 say that the purpose of cultural racism is to
llwltt• 1111p1·ovokvd agg1<>sslon;ind the extreme violence characteris-
111·nl 111<• h, st st;i'lt1 of 1•1·01101111<' n1<:fsm. (!1111these Images are not
1111itilw1L, ll11·v r111·p,111uf tfw 1111foldh11-!of tilt• asl/i.) t\c<'ording to
1 11
lllh
i...111111•, 11111(1Ill •11•1illut,1I 1,1( li.111' l,1t1I<;11111111111•111111•11-;"
,II'(' irnl,
294 YURUGU
dued; their land is now in the conqueror's name.

In the next stage of economic racism, overt violence is not as
necessary. The supportive form of "cultural racism" in this stage is
one in which the objects of aggression are said to be "innately men-
tally inferior, e.g., less able to learn, less inventive, less creative, less
motivated towards cultural accomplishments, at a lower level of
human mental development, etc. 33 These assertions are then institu-
tionalized, which forces their internalization on those who have been
enslaved or conquered.
This is the function of the European image of others: (1) to sup-
port the European self-image and (2) to be imposed on the "cultural
others" in such a way that they indeed become that which they have
been "imaged" to be. One becomes a "slave" when one thinks as a
"slave." Thus a reality is constructed. The most effective weapon
against this imposed image is a strong national consciousness:
Liberation is a question of consciousness.
Media and the Image of Others

In the aftermath of slavery, during "Reconstruction" in the
United States (the late 1800s and early 1900s), the image of the African
suffered under a systematic assault of visual propaganda, at the
hands of American whites. Now that slavery, as an institution, had
ended, the attempt to dehumanize Africans on the part of the
European would have to be continued using other methods. It was
important to the system of white supremacy that (1) white people
continually reinforce their European consciousness at the expense of
the African image, i.e., through our degradation, and (2) that the
Africans continued to act like "slaves" of a new sort and indeed
become what Europeans portrayed them to be. The objective of the
European was thwarted to the degree that an African consciousness
was sustained among people of African descent that allowed them to
reject the European-created image of them.
It was during this period that a Euro-American controlled media
began its long career as one of the most effective weapons used to
ensure the exploitation and dependency of people of African descent.
Black faces were used to sell everything from tooth paste to pa11
cakes. Distorted images appeared on boxes and tubes, A11dcvc11 011
vaudeville stages, to make white people laugh. H11t tlw nwdia 11,id
re-ally done its joh wrll wlwn l)lack pcopl<' lauglH•<l too, :111d111I !JH7
wt H.•11bin ck pt•oph• 11,,d"arrived'' and roulcl tlwrp(n11•<'i>ll<·<'t , IH•tw
vhtl,1111•ptodll( ts of ,11;1dsl u11•di11as "hllwk 111l•11101,il11ll.1,"
'111••"f,u eo'1"wltlt·l1 11ppc·1111•d, dl~,tmll'd c illt lltllv, IHhC 11 1'11,11
Image of Others 295
acteristics of the African physiognomy: the color of the skin, the tex-
ture of the hair, the contours of the lips and the nose. Images brought
attention to features that contrasted most with European features.
The asili of European culture demanded this kind of image-making
and destruction for the enhancement of the European self-image. If
they were to believe themselves physically beautiful, what they con-
sidered to be their opposite must be projected as grotesque. That
which had been positively expressed in the African aesthetic, i.e.,
braided hair, dark skin, and full features, were now made to appear
ridiculous. The intricate African braiding patterns became braids
standing straight up in an artificially stiff manner with ribbons tied
around their ends. Very dark smooth African skin became a shiny
plasticlike black, with accentuated rolling eyes and an enlarged, open
red-lipped mouth. These images, of course, had the double effect of
heightening European self-esteem (which must have been unusually
vulnerable to require such extreme reinforcement), while at the same
time devastating African self-esteem, as Africans replaced an African
ncsthetic with a European aesthetic.
Then Hollywood took over the image-making business, and not
only could black people in America be lampooned in this way but also
Africans on the continent. The result was that both Europeans and
l\fricans rejected what was visually African. Because Hollywood (the
film industry) reigned supreme in the creation and reinforcement of
t I 1cEuropean self-image, it also had to be the most devastating weapon
In the destruction of the self-image of "non-European" peoples, since
t liat is the flip-side of the coin. Seen another way, the films were tools
with which to create a negative image of others. From African safaris
Io Bob Hope comedies, with white Cleopatras and crazed "Indians" in
between, a motley array of blatant stupidity screamed, attacked, gig-
1-(11-<l, and shuffled itself across the screen, representing "non-
l~11ropean" peoples in European consciousness. In fact, the image
n1•at~rl in the Hollywood modality is a cartoonesque exaggeration of
t I1l' characteristics already conjured by the European psyche out of
tlu• depths of its cultural utamawazo (collective cognitive structure)
,111<1 utamaroho ( collective emotional tone). What had been added was
I I11· audio-visual negative image-making: First, the Amoses and Andys
,111cl t I 1e Bc•ulahs;ancl now the Neils (to replace Hattie McDaniel), the
tll'W downs likr George .Jefferson (to replace Steppin' Fetchit), and the
A111oldWilsn11/W1•bstcrpnennial puerility syndrome of anti-African
11.1tlrn111llst ~1:ntiluc11t ,Ill Hlnl<'k t]1eir blows for the European self-
h1rng1·.Musk vldt•o's vlt• with tlwiw otlll'r fnrr1ls 11f111rclir1 In Lht::pm-
d1w1J1111 ,-,11lw 8' nt, ..,q,w llw l•:11rn1w1111 11Iutlwr•,.
iln,111.1·
296 YURUGU
There is yet another, new genre of the expression of the

European image of others. The "comedy" in which, as sophisticated
movie goers of the 1980s, we laugh at contrived situations created by
the interaction of "modern," "civilized" European culture with "back-
ward," "primitive" isolated culture. Beneath the laughter is an image
of Africans that dialectically supports the positive European self-
image. In The Gods Must Be Crazy, na"ive Khoi-Khoi in the Kalihari
Desert become disoriented as they discover a Coca-Cola bottle.
Aspects of their culture are mercilessly held up for ridicule as they
attempt to understand the object's "meaning." The film is justified by
liberals-black and white alike-who maintain that it is making a
statement about the "purity" of African culture in contrast to the cor-
rupt European culture. Somehow this subtle point gets drowned in a
sea of laughter directed at the image of Africans that the film offers.
Similarly, in the movie Airplane, a white woman organizes a
Tupperware party for the "native" African women, and a white man
at.tempts to teach the African men basketball. This is all in fun, so we
are told. But this kind of racial humor is for us out of place in a world
still very much controlled by the system of white supremacy. From
an African-centered perspective, using the concept of asili, the objec-
tive of such films becomes clear. They are about the business of cre-
ating and sustaining images of others for the European that reinforce
their perception of themselves as superiors relating to inferior beings.
Exigencies of the European Utamaroho

The functionally "successful" self-image of the European is
dependent on a negative image of others and on the hypothesis of the
existence of inferior beings. This is not a universal dynamic of culture
nor, therefore, of human nature. The natural pride and commitment
to self-definition in other cultures is not predicated on, not dependent
on the existence of other people among whom these "cultural selves"
must be supreme. European world supremacy is part of the definition
of European ideology and helps to determine the character of th('
European image of others. In this world-view the universe is there to
be conquered. It is "just" (i.e., "rational") that inferiors should be con•
cp1crecl by superior beings. In this way European self-definition Mel
self-fulfillment became dependent on a "negative" image of otht>rs (ill
lt·rms of European value) and a correspondingly <Jehuina11izi11g c·m1
rl.'pt of otlH'rs. We might say that Europc•an cultur<' begins lls dc·v<•I
opnw11t, a:~ a (1istl11<'IIVC('llltural t'lllily, wlll1 tlw Bf{F,?r<'g:-itlon ol
pt•opll•~. till' rll,trnct~ 1 of wl1ost.· "'"11111111/11, Ii. p11•dk,1tt•cl 011 tilt•
of., wrnld 111oppo:,llh,11 In ptnJ1•1·tl1111
Image of Others 297
of themselves into that world as conquerors and as supreme beings.

We can identify "Westernness" as that definition of self and world
that naturally views "self" in a power relationship to "other" (the rest
of the world). In this view the asili, or seed of "Westernness," is the
power relationship and was planted very early in the Inda-European
experience. As a result, it is in the nature of the European utamaroho
that it cannot be sustained by a merely intracultural ethic or the idea
of a self-contained environment that generates the principle of har-
mony and mutual respect. It is European culture that is dependent on
the existence of other cultures. Perhaps the habit of relating to the
rest of the world on the basis of an unending striving for power has
spilled over and infested the internal fabric of the society itself.
Circularly, the need to relate to "others" in this way can be explained
by the functional need to mitigate internally destructive behavior.
Viewed a different way, the process begins with the embryonic
European (Indo-European) self, which fears all difference. This fear is
then translated into an epistemological paradigm by the archaic
European (Greek) where the self/other opposition becomes para-
mount. Then in Medieval and Renaissance Europe the perceived self
is expanded, so that the continuance of the culture may be assured
( lhe asili fulfilled), otherwise it would self-destruct. Therefore, aggres-
sion against "cultural others" becomes a necessity.
With this understanding the image of others becomes a "ratio-
, llll" or "logical" expression of the utamawazo; i.e., interrelated to and
lnt·crdependent with its other dominant themes and principles. When
Thomas Jefferson said, "Blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or
made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites
111 the endowment of body and mind," 34 he was simply manifesting the
lll'ecl of the European utamaroho for an inferior object. The extrem-
lt y of the image that was offered reflects the intensity of the need for
•,11premacyand power. It should not surprise us, therefore, that it was
1lw scientists, the philosophers, the "enlightened" people of
1•:111opcan culture who contributed most to the negative image of oth-
1•1s Given their privileged ideological status in the culture, the images
I lint I hey offered became normative. This function was not inconsis-
11•111 with their rationalistic commitments. It is only now in the con-
11•111poraryWest that it has become "irrational," i.e., dysfunctional,
••xpll<'ltly or overlly expressing a negative image of people of other
, ull 111 L's. In tl1c contcnipornry West, the mode of hypocrisy ancl polit-
lt ,ti I lwtorl<: ls llw "order of tlH' day." lndcccl, it was the theoretidans
111Wt"llt•rn 1•:ump!'illt n1lt un• who dc1hlwd Alri<'n11sas l'itlwr "not quite
1111111;111"111"j111~1 lt,t1c·ly 11111111111"lur llw c·t1ll1t11•
.,s ;\ whol1• Wli11wt1s
2.98 YURUGU
better qualified to make these pronouncements, since "humanness"

was associated by means of the European utamawazo with "ratio-
nality" and the ability to create European culture (civilization).
All of the following statements are consistent with the defini-
tions of the utamawazo as outlined in Chap. 1 and are therefore "log-
ical," given the nature of the asili and the values of the culture.
At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries,

the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and
replace, the savage races throughout the world. At the same time
the anthropomorphous apes ... will no doubt be exterminated.
The break will then be rendered wider, for it will intervene between
man in some more civilized state ... than the Caucasian, and some
ape as low as a baboon, instead of as at present between the negro
or Australian and the gorilla.
Charles Darwin 35
If their understanding is not of a different nature from ours, it is at

least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application
or association of ideas, and seemed formed neither for the advan-
lages nor the abuses of philosophy.
Voltaire ( concerning Africans ) 36
There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than

while, nor even any individual eminent either in action or specula-
tion. No ingenious manufacturer among them, no arts, no sciences.
. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so
many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original dis-
li11ction betwixt these breeds of men.
David Hume:l7
... incapable of contemplating any objective entity such as God or

Law.... Nothing remotely human is to be found in their [the
Negroes'] character. Extensive reports by missionaries confirm this
and Mohammedanism seems to be the only thing which can, in
some measure, bring them nearer to a civilized condition.
Georg l-lcgcf 111
I will say then, that I am not or ever have been in favor of brir11,1ing
about in any way, the social and political equality, of the white and
black races. That I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of 111aki11g
vol ers or jurors of Negroes, not of qualifying I hem to holcl offin·, nor
tn l11l1·n11nrrywltl1 wllltl• 1woplt' and I will sny i11:1dcllllt111 lo 1111:-,,
111111llit•f'l• Is" pl1ysi<·,1ldif11°11•11r1·l>t·lwv1•111111•wlillt• ,11ul hi.wk
, ,11 t''I, wllll'I I wlll 1·v1·r lw I,lei I lw I wo r,w1", IIv111~i •II wr 1111t 1•1111•1
t 111-(1
111·1111 I.II,11111p11ll111·,d v A11tl
1·q11<11ll w,111111Ii,,.,tlll'V • ,1111111I llv1·
•111
Image of Others 2.99
while they do remain together, there must be a position of Superior

and Inferior, and I as much as any other man, am in favor of having
the Superior position assigned to the White Race.
Abraham Lincoln (1858)
Our assailants are numerous, and it is indispensible that we should

meet the assault with vigor and activity. Nothing is wanting but
manly discussion to convince our own people at least, that in con-
tinuing to command the services of the slaves, they violate no law
divine or human, and that in the faithful discharge of their recip-
rocal obligations lies their duty.
Edgar Allen Poe (Southern Literary Messenger, 1836)
It is vain to deny that they [Blacks] are an inferior race-very far

inferior to the European variety. They have learned in slavery all
that they know in civilization. When first brought from the country
of their origin they were naked savages and where they have been
left to their own devices or escaped the control of the white race
they have lapsed, to a greater or less degree into barbarism.
Andrew Johnson (1867)
Why increase the sons of Africa, by planting them in America, where

we have so fair an opportunity, by excluding blacks and tawnys, of
increasing the lovely white and red?
Benjamin Franklin
(Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, 1753)
It will be seen that when we classify Mankind by colour, the only one
of the primary races, given by this classification, which has not
m&de a creative contribution to any of our twenty-one civilizations
is the Black Race. (Vol I, p. 233)
... within the first six thousand years, the Black Race has not helped
to create any civilization. (Vol. I, p. 238)
39
Arnold Toynbee
The Negro is a child, and with children nothing can be done with-
out lhe use of authority. We must, therefore, so arrange the cir-
<"11111sta11ces of our daily life that my authority can find expression.
WitI I rcg.::irclto the Negroes, then, I have coined the formula: "I am
yo1ir brother, it is true, but your elder brother."
t\lbrrt Schwritzcr (On the F.dge of Primeval Forest, 1961)
N11t1111·l1,1s,·11lnr•·cich•d grnups ol l11tlivld11alsso tllal stalistically

1C•ll,tlll1
.. p111dlrtln11s ol tl11•l1,111.lptnhlllty loi 1t111·1lt•<·t11ally r<•warct
1111:
,111d 1•llc•c·tlv1•l1v,.., 1 ,u 1 1w,lly lw 111,11Ii' ,111dp, 11ht11I 11s1·d hy
1ly 111•
:mo YURUGU
the pragmatic man in the street.

William B. Shockley (Nobel Laureate for Physics, 1956)
It is now entirely clear to me that, as his cranial structure and hair

type prove, Lassalle is descended from the Negroes who joined
Moses' flight from Egypt. That is, assuming his mother, or his pater-
nal grandmother, did not cross with a nigger. Now this union of
Jewry and Germanism with the negro-like basic substance must
necessarily result in a remarkable product. The officiousness of the
fellow is also nigger-like.
Karl Marx (Letter to Friedrich Engels, 1862)
The old antislavery school says that women must stay back, that
they must wait until male Negroes are voters. But we say, if you will
not give the whole loaf of justice to an entire people, give it to the
most intelligent first. If intelligence, justice, and morality are to be
placed in the government, then let the question of "white" women
be brought up first and that of the Negro last.
Susan B. Anthony (Reply to Frederick Douglass, 1869)
Of Kant's interpretation of the "Great Chain of Being," Arthur

Lovejoy says, "Kant concludes ... [that] the higher beings of these
other spheres must view a Newton as we view a Hottentot or an
ape." 40 Lovejoy says that Soame Jenyns held that
while the psychological difference between the highest animals

and the lowest men is scarcely appreciable between either of these
and the most highly endowed of civilized mankind the gradations
are many and the distance wide. 41
In Jenyn's own words, "From this lowest degree in the brutal

Hottentot reason with the assistance of learning and science,
advances through the various stages of human understanding, which
rise above each other till in a Bacon or a Newton it attains the sum-
mit. "41
According to Lovejoy, Fenelon says that it is in the natural order
uf things that men be provided with "ferocious animals" to kill, "so
that men might be relieved of the necessity of killing one anothcr."' 12
Ethnicity and cultural differentiation enter European ideology in pre
cisely this same form, and they dictate the discrepancy between tlw
European's behavior towards other Europeans and his l>ehnvlnr
towards "t11111-Eurnpetins'' or thosl! wllom he perc.-lvN; ;ts "1111l111nhl''
1111d llw11•l11r1•nf lt•ss v;iluc tl1:ir1 hhnsPII. Till,; tl11'1rW Is t·t111sl!-.l1•11I
lru111 Pinto to S11l11t to l.oll1111p 'il11dd,11cl It
SllllOll, fr11111('1111st.111tl11C'
Image of Others 301
is generated by an image of self and of others, the "logic" of which is

that the existence of Africans and people of color helps to assure the
"constructive" solidarity of Western Europeans. As long as they have
"nonwhite" peoples to conquer (like having animals to kill), to sub-
jugate, enslave, colonize, and exploit (morally acceptable behavior),
it will lessen the chances of their attempting to do so within the
Western European community (immoral behavior). This is not to say
that European intracultural behavior is typically "loving," "kind," or
"considerate" according to these definitions within other cultures,
but the culture sanctions behavior towards "others" that is of a totally
different and more dehumanizing character than is acceptable behav-
ior towards each other. If the Jews had not been able to convince the
Western world hegemony that they were part of the European fam-
ily, German behavior toward them would not have touched the "con-
science" of that hegemony with force. The European slave trade and
contemporary European complicity in the illicit white South African
regime bring home the point very sharply. This pattern of European
cultural behavior will be discussed more fully in Chaps. 7 and 8.
Documentation of the European image of Africans and other
peoples of color is not difficult to come by. And it becomes clear in
the "records" that we are considered to be the "cultural other" or out-
sider by the European. The authors of To Serve the Devi/ 43 present
vivid examples of this image and have made a commendable contri-
bution to its easily accessible documentation. In this way they have
made it more difficult for those who would attempt to disregard this
aspect of the American character. George Stocking's Race, Culture
ood Evolution (1968), while not as voluminous in its documentation,
is a greater cultural/historical indictment, as it reaches further into
tile depths of the Western European intellectual tradition. Rather
than attempting to duplicate these works, let us move on to further
l111plications of the European image of others.
The European Response to the

"Non~European" Utamaroho
Other cultural philosophies encourage radically different behav-
ior pat I crns than that of European culture. The initial encounter
hc•lwec:'11Europeans and "nou-European" peoples inevitably empha-
sl1:1•st I H'S(' <liffere11ccs. Even as Europeans come face to face with
lt11i11,111l>1'lll1{swl 10:w lwh,,vinr would seem to conflict with tile image
111'1('fVill,1tc•II hy 1•;ur11pt•;111l11l·lll11!-(y,ll1t•y ;\I(' ilhlt• illllomntically f(J
111111 tl11St• "vht11<•:-."
1
lnln ,1tl1ll>11lt-:1 tl1t1t wlll1 a 111•w1tlvL·
d1•l111ltl1111, 111tlalh w:,y pot,ltlv1 1 110.111•,, ,uul l111pt1•:,~,l1111•1111•11111w "p111
,'f()J YURUGU
downs" or derogatory appraisals. This reaction is overwhelmingly

t·onsistent and is to be found in the journals of European "explor-
ers."
Columbus describes his meeting with those he called "Indians":
Anything they have if it be asked for they never say no, but rather
invite the person to accept it, and show so much lovingness as
though they would give their hearts. 44
Captain Cook describes the behavior of the Hawaiians:
These people merited our best commendations, in this commercial

intercourse, never once attempting to cheat us, either ashore, or
along-side the ships. Some of them ... betrayed a thievish disposi-
1ion; or rather, they thought that they had a right to everything
I hey could lay their hands upon; but they soon laid aside a conduct,
which, we convinced them, they could not persevere in with immu-
nity ...
The civilities of this society were not, however, confined to mere

tcrcmony and parade. Our party on shore received from them,
l'vcry day, a constant supply of hogs and vegetables, more than
sufficient for our subsistence; and several canoes loaded with pro-
visiuns were sent to the ships with the same punctuality. No return
was ever demanded, or even hinted at in the most distant manner.
l'hcir presents were made with a regularity, more like the discharge
of a religious duty, than the effect of mere liberality; and when we
t·11quired at whose charge all this munificence was displayed, we
wt•n' told, it was at the expense of a great man ... the chief of
111l<•sts,and grandfather to Kaireckeca, who was at that time absent
,11tc11dingthe king of the island .... 45
He reacts and interprets the tradition of gift-exchange and gift-

giving in a characteristic manner; i.e., out of his own cultural priori-
lit>S and in terms of the concept of "private property" and the sanctity
of material possessions. He sees no contradiction in describing the
1lawaiians as "thievish" and generous at the same time.
They sc<>1n to be blest with a frank, cheerful disposition .... They

seem to live very sociably in their intercourse with one a not lwr;
aud, 1•xc.:eptfor I he propensity lo t ltkvi11g, wlliC'hSl'<'rns in11c1lehr
11,ostof I lie pcopk we· have visited 111I his ou'an, Llit•ywt•n· 1•X('c•1•d
lugly fli1•11dly lo 11s /\n<i II dot's lh1•lr s1•nsll1lllty 1111111111•111•cll1,
wit I 1111
rt tl.1111•1111~( sl'iv1 ",, t ilat wh1•11I I11•v-;,1wI ht• v,1111111•1
c1111 ,11tit It",
11111111l•,11111111•11111111111111,1111111,
ll11•yc•rnild 1101lwlp 1· pic•-.•1111111111 11
Image of Others 303
surprise, by a mixture of joy and concern, that seemed to apply the

case, as a lesson of humility to themselves; and, on all occasions,
they have appeared deeply impressed with a consciousness of their
own inferiority. 46
In the telling of these encounters, the Europeans are forced to

interpret the experience in terms of European meaning and definition.
They therefore express their image of others and in this way reaffirm
their self-image. Thereby, the descriptions become part of European
mythology; they become part of the cultural storehouse that affirms
European meaning and valuation. This is how the image of others is
to be understood; i.e., in terms of its relationship to the asili.
Cook's consciousness is informed by the nature of his own cul-
ture and knowledge of his own motivations, just as the people he
meets find it difficult to understand a cultural being so different from
themselves. These encounters invariably point to the operative value-
systems and behavior patterns generated by each culture. Europeans
come filled with arrogance and motivated by a lust for power and the
desire to possess whatever they find. Often as not this "mood" is
described in their literature as "the spirit of adventure," which is
related to their "enterprising nature," terms that are "positive" for
them. Because their motives are to usurp, to exploit, and to bring
what they find within their dominion, they necessarily come with the
distrust and antagonism with which one approaches a potential
enemy. This has always cooperated to their strategical advantage.
Their culture provides them with a "natural" political astuteness and
cunning. They are perpetually competitive and well equipped to deal
in p0wer play. On the other hand, the "natives" whom Europeans
meet most often greet them with open hearts, "smiles," gifts, and
I rust. They commit political suicide! Their culture has not "bred"
tltem for the necessary hatred and disdain conducive to an exploita-
1ivc, imperialistic, or effectively defensive nature. Ayi Kwei Armah
writes:
A ruinous openness we had,

For those who came as beggars
Turned to snakes after feeding.
The• suspiC'ious ntno11gus had pronounced fears
hH·o111prt'hc11sible to our spirit then,
Words ~('11l'roslly f.likcl to undcrslaud.
"'1'111"•1':tfl' 111alwr•;ol r111rlt111,"

111• w111vnw11; 1;,1111.
"1)111111I•,l11111I ll11•111
,'l(}t/ YURUGU
See their eyes, their noses.

Such are the beaks
Of all the desert's predatory birds."
We laughed at the fearful ones,

Gave the askers shelter
/\nd watched them unsuspicious,
watched them turn in the fecundity of our way,
Turn into the force that pushed us
Till the proper flowing of all our people,
The way itself,
13ecame a lonely memory
For abandoned minds. 47
What characteristics do Africans and others display? And what

would these characteristics indicate about our ethical systems, our
world-view? We, people of other cultures, all too often make the mis-
take of attempting to treat this European, who comes to take our land
and who looks so different from us as a brother or a sister! Africans
ancl other non-European peoples invariably seek to include him in our
system of gift-exchange, offering him love and peace. In other words,
th(• purely rhetorical precepts of behavior propagandized as the
"Christian virtues" are actually the models of behavior natural to
ot lwr cultures and older traditions than that of the European. And
Europeans naturally display behavior patterns that are in direct con-
tr;~diction to what they have labeled as "Christian virtues"; i.e., virtues
t I 1at are actually African/non-European values and standards of
1>1•havior,which their own culture does not generate, support, moti-
vnt <', nor sanction. People of other cultures often must be taught to
111lslrust their enemy; those who would destroy them. Europeans
l11stinctively "hate," or rather, do not love those outside their cul-
t 11rc,who are, a priori, "enemies." Cheikh Anta Diop says,
What I find remarkable is that in the individual attitude of Blacks

towards other races there's a difference of approach. Blacks are not
racists. Blacks are not afraid of ethnic contacts. Whites arc. I think
that much of racism stems from that fear. Is it an inherited trait of
the llornadic life of the primitive Aryan? I don't know. Is it a blolog
lt'al or other type of instinct? I don't k11owthat cilllcr. What is quit<•
<'Vicfp11t,liowcvcr, is that xcnophol>ia is definitely an c11tn•11dwd
trait of l-:urnpca11 cullun's from way bal'k. I thl11k t'Vt'll E111op1•1111
-:<'1111larswo1ilclagrt•1•wltlI11H' 011tl1ls In fut't, ns It t11rnscml, oiu• nl
lhP w••.1k111•1,s1", ('lvlll;,,1tl!J11,p.1111t-11l,1rlv
1111\1.11'11 tluil11g 111PdlPv,1I
-., 1111't't1•,111np11llt.11il'11111111111",1'
lln11 ,, W,h 1111'11p1•1111t" •,111ll'tlt,;
Image of Others 305
The medieval Black kingdoms were open to peoples of all horizons.

And today, one of the basic weaknesses of African societies is that
they still maintain this inherited cosmopolitan trait. Nationalism in
Africa emerged as a purely defensive reflex. Narrow nationalism,
xenophobia, exclusion of foreigners, has never been a policy of
African cultures. We always find it associated with lndo-European
cultures. 48
What is the reaction of a European when he is greeted by one

who offers trust and friendship? First of all, he regards such people
as charmingly "childlike" (as puerile, really), because in his culture,
where such behavior is not valued, only very young children, not yet
properly socialized, would behave in such a manner. Second, as Cook
says, such behavior is an indication to a European that the people in
question "recognize their own inferiority." In other words, it is cul-
turally impossible for him to view this automatic and natural trust of
strangers as a positive, valued characteristic (in contradistinction to
his "Christian" propaganda). He sees it, instead, merely as a sign of
"weakness" and lack of self-esteem. This reaction is a key to the
European utamaroho and to the European view of human nature. The
xenophilia of what Diop terms as "Southern Cradle" civilization
(Africa) is exploited by the xenophobia of "Northern Cradle" civi-
lization (Europe).
It is a recognition of the "naturalness" and consistency of this
view of the human and the behavior that accompanies it that must
inform more realistic and effective self-deterministic ideologies for
Africans and other primary peoples. But the vast majority of the
world's peoples are still unable to absorb the fact of European group
behavior. This raises, among other things, the question of whether
those other cultures are able to prepare their members for the pos-
sibility of the sort of deceit and destructiveness of which the
European is capable. It is part of the evil genius of the Europeans to
feed on this political "na'ivete," as it were, among First World peoples
by presenting them with their own "weakness" (i.e., the ability to
love) in the guise of a "new" and superior religion. This "new" reli-
gious statement is held up to them as a standard of behavior, inter-
preted as the command to "love one's enemies." The "enemy" who
presents it is much too politically astute to be affected by his own
rlwtoric. It is because of this aspect of the African atamaroho that
Cltrlsll,111lty wJs sllrlt n successful tool for E.uropean political cxpan-
ls
~:l011.(Tl1J:.;ISlilll' \Uk( 1 tl up ltl ('hnp. 6.)
lf11NH'1111dwn d l,y tlH' d1•1•l'llfulsln11c<>of 111usl wnuld lw c1111-
1
q1w1or:1, W11y111·M,11l.1•11111t" 11111•~;

1o ho111•i.1r,1lllt•1 lh,111rlw1mh ,11
'/()(j YURUGU
l•:11ropeanvalue:
Many consider amiability, rather than pervasiveness, to be the cri-

1<~rion
of racial
calibre; but amiability has no bearing on the essence
and decadence of civilization.
There is not a single instance where history has rewarded people

o! wealth, prestige and power because they were well liked, it has
Invariably been the aggressive nations that have been the promot-
ers of society. 49
Image and Value-Definitions

Johari Amini fixes on the cultural-political dynamic of value-
dc•finition. She refers to the "dialectic of definition" that helps us to
recognize the dialectical relationship between the European self-
Image and their image of others; for as Amini says, by defining some-
I hing its opposite is also defined. 50
The political implications of cultural imperialism become
astoundingly clear: "Functioning with someone else's definitions is
dangerous to the self-image, the self-concept." 51 Europeans are suc-
cessful in their efforts to economically and politically control others,
because culturally they are able to force us to assimilate their defin-
11ion of our inferiority into our own self-image, while at the same time
gaining support for their image of themselves as superior-again the
dialectic. As Amini says, the European definition of "good" functions
d<•structively for the African and other "non-European" peoples who
urcept it. "It functions constructively for the European by projecting
,1nd reinforcing his own positive self-image, and establishing a func-
t lonal cultural norm which has wide political/social/economic benc-
ht s. "5l Terms such as master/slave; man/boy are initiated by the
Europeans from their frame of reference and function to serve their
purposes, in opposition to those of the communities on which they
arc imposed. Here again we see the value of the myth of "universal-
ism" for what enables Europeans to impose their definitions so suc-
t'cssfully is, in part, their ability to convince their political objects that
they are not European definitions and do not serve European inter
t•sts, but that they are universally valid definitions, which serv<' llw
lwncfit of "humankind." The myth of "universalism" is always t lw
coup de ~race in the pursuit of Europran cultural imperialism; and
l11t•vitablyl·:11ropeai1"clefinitlons" nr<>translated into "unlvt-rsalistk"
11·r111-..This ;1spPc·1ol E111op<,,u,ldt•olo!,(yw111 lw dlscuss1•d mrnc· l11lly
111('l1,1p 10 of !Ills •1l11dy
I, c 11·al1•d.11111
1'111F11111p,.i1111/r111111111/i11,1111•11, ~11pp111l1·dhy 1111
Image of Others 307
dialectical relationship of self-image to image of others:

Europeans are rational Others are irrational
"critical" "noncritical"
"scientific" "superstitious," "magical"
"logical" ''illogical"
"civilized," "advanced" "uncivilized," "primitive"
"modern" "backward"
"lawful," "orderly" "unlawful," "unruly"
"responsible," "adult" "childlike"
"universal" "parochial"
"energetic" "lazy"
"active" "passive"
"enterprising" "apathetic"
"creative" "imitative"
white black, colored
These images and concepts of European value definition then

become translated into the power relationship that is demanded by
the utamaroho and asili of the culture:
Europeans are Others are
world savior objects to be controlled

conqueror and manipulated
organizer
peace-maker
The relationship between the European aesthetic, self-image,

ancl image of others are not only dialectical, but part of a circular and
1111endingprocess of value-definition. These aspects of the European
utamaroho continually interrelate in a way that is supportive to one
dnother. European philosophy of aesthetics is connected to European
epistemological definitions (utamawazo) of a rationalistic universe
and a rationalistic view of the human: The European sees himself as
I his "rational" being who is, most properly speaking, "man." The aes-
t lwt ic is supportive to the self-image; it generates the value of "white-
1w:-;s" and rationalism. The ego requires that the person views
1111iwlf/himself in opposition to other persons; it requires a ceaseless
1
p111 suit of power for its emotional satisfaction. Power is interpreted

0t <l<'luwclin terms of rontrol over objects (people, nature, material
-;) ( '0111 rol is aC'hlc•v<'dthrough rationalism, abstraction, analy-
1111]1'1'1
•1h, "nlilt·1·tlfirntlo11," 1111dtill' sul>jugntlou of 11alurl': :di this will! tlw
,tld ul "s~·ti•111'1•."h1 1111'1t•,11111 '.lr lium,111 rl'111I
in11slllps, 1·t>11trnlIs
308 YURUGU
achieved through imperialistic structures, i.e., subjugation and

exploitation of other cultures. These cultures are made up of people
who, in the European definition, are considered as objects. In the
rhetoric of European cultural imperialism this becomes "saving" the
world, and "ordering" it by a superior rational European "man," for
Ihe benefit of an inferior irrational "non-European" being. Europeans
sometimes even convince themselves of their own magnanimity and
altruism in their willingness to bear the awesome responsibility of rul-
ing the world: But, if not me, who else?-and what would become of
us all? The dichotomies charted here are essential to the logic of
Western European cultural nationalism.
James Baldwin describes the European image of others in this
way;
In the case of the Negro ... his shameful history was carried quite
literally, on his brow. Shameful; for he was heathen as well as black
and would never have discovered the healing blood of Christ had
we not braved the jungles to bring him these glad tidings. Shameful;
for, since our role as missionary had not been wholly disinterested,
it was necessary to recall the shame from which we had delivered
him in order more easily to escape our own. As he accepted the
alabaster of Christ and the bloody cross-in the bearing of which
he would find his redemption ... he must, henceforth, accept that
image we then gave him of himself: having no other and standing,
moreover, in danger of death should he fail to accept the dazzling
light thus brought into such darkness. 52
Baldwin hints at the relationship of our previous discussion to

what follows. In the subsequent discussion we are concerned with the
patterns of behavior encouraged by the European self-image and the
1•:uropean image of others; and with the characteristics of European
behavior within the culture as it is dialectically related to the nature
o[ the European utamaroho. These relationships and cultural patterns
arc dictated by the asili of the culture, which like a blue print estalJ-
lishes its developmental priorities. The asili is a template containing
the logos of the culture. In this sense it implies ethnological consis-
tency. Utamawazo, utamaroho, behavior, and image cannot be inco11-
slstcnt with one another. They must be compatible, working togctlwr
to forge a successful ideological construct. The concept of asili help~
us to understand this ethnological fact of r-:uropean cult un' and to
d<•nr ,1w;1yl11t• brush of rhrtori<' (Chap. G) tlH\I too often blocks m11
vlt-w
PART THREE
BEHAVIOR
AND ETHICS
In us has been the need to spend life . .. cutting
through deceiving superficialities to reach again the
essential truths the destroyers must hide from spirits
if their white road is to prevail; ...
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Dishonest words are the food of rotten spirits.

- Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 6
Rhetoric and
Behavior
Watergate is no mere accident of history. It is the
natural consequence of a government faced with
the problem of trying to preserve the facade of
democracy before its citizens while waging imperi-
alist war abroad, plundering the public treasury at
home, and supporting reaction wherever it can be
found. To maintain the myth of American righteous-
ness, the government has no other recourse except
to lie. Indeed, lying becomes the central political
behavior of the state. 1
William Strickland
What's in a Lie?
The Iranian Deal: United States sale of arms to Iran in exchange
f01 I Ile r ~lease orAmerican hostages.
Nuwrnb('r I :"l,I 1)8.6: R<.:agansays t·hat charges that his aclminis-

It.id swappNI arms for hostagc•s are
111111011
"1111,,,ly
:J/2 YURUGU
November 16, 1986: Reagan removes Vice Admiral John M.

Poindexter from the office of National Security
Advisor, for his role in the Iranian Arms Deal.
Background: The United States stands to gain from the con-

tinuation of the war between Iran and Iraq,
which retards progressive forces in Iran. The
goal of the United States has been to keep
either side from winning a decisive victory.
This is called "neutrality" on the part of the
United States by the American propaganda
machine. Actually the United States ships
arms to which ever side appears to be losing.
Documents of the Heritage Foundation "an
influential political strategist for the Reagan
Administration," make this position clear. In
"Mandate II" published in 1985, the foundation
says that the U.S. should maintain a public
posture of "Strict political neutrality" in the
Iranian-Iraqi war, but "quietly give military
help to whichever side is losing ... The U.S.
interest continues to be that neither side wins.
In the long term, good relations with Iran
remain far more important. With a population
of 45 million and borders on the Soviet Union
and the Persian Gulf, Iran undeniably is a
strategic prize. "2
.lnnuary, 1991: The United States invades the Persian Gulf.

President George Bush declares war on the
Iraqi Government for the purposes of "liber-
ating" Kuwait.
Hypocrisy as a Way of Life

Within the nature of European culture there exists a statemenl
llf value or of "moral" behavior that has no meaning for the member:;
of that culture. I call this the "rhetorical ethic"; it is of great lmpor
tau,·<.>for the understandlug of the dynamics of the tullure. The co11-
t·t·pts of trnclll ion al fa1ropcan anti 1ropology arc lnaclcq11ateto t·xpl,1111
llH• plw1101nt•uon10 whkh I Ml rf'frrrlng Iler<·, as It h.1s no 1·01111ll'I
p111t !11l lw l yp,,s of n III11rt·st owl llclt ,111111
r11polol,(l-th lt;1v1
1
)i1·1H't .Illy
dlr1•1t1•d 1111'11 hi tilt' p11sl H11Iwill, llw 111111
,ll1t•11tl1111 Ppt ol 11,1/1,
Rhetoric and Behavior 313
which facilitates an ideological approach to the study of culture, the

rhetorical ethic becomes visible; even compelling. It fits the logic of
the European asili, assisting the culture in the achievement and main-
tenance of power. Without this interpretation certain manifestations
within the verbal iconography of the culture appear to be inconsis-
tent with its underlying ideological thrust. And that simply would not
make sense. Let us see how the mechanism of the rhetorical ethic
works.
The related distinction used traditionally in anthropology is
stated in terms of "ideal culture" and "actual behavior" and is said to
be characteristic of all cultures, thereby helping to confuse the issue
of the uniqueness and problematical nature of European culture. The
conventional distinction is illustrated in the following manner by the
authors of a recently published anthropology textbook.
For example, an idealized belief, long cherished in America, is that

all doctors are selfless, friendly people who chose medicine as their
profession because they felt themselves "called" to serve human-
ity, and who have little interest in either the money or the prestige
of their position. Of course, many physicians do not measure up to
this ideal. Nevertheless, the continued success of television pro-
grams that portray the average American M.D. as a paragon of
virtue indicates how deeply rooted in our collective psyche the
ideal of the noble physician is.3
This is a common misconception that has led to a mistaken view

and superficial understanding of the nature of European (Euro-
/\merican) society. To refer to the images offered above as "ideal" is
a misuse or at least a misleading use of the term "ideal." The projec-
lion and success of the image of the committed, altruistic doctor do
not indicate that it is a "deeply rooted" ideal in the American psyche.
II is rather an indication of the fact that this is how Americans want
lo appear to others, most often to non-European peoples-their
"objects." In this case it is the way that the doctor wants to appear
tn his patients, or "objects," because this appearance works to his
advantage. On the other hand, an image that projects him as a poten-
t l.1Iexploiter can lead to the possibility of malpractice suits and to the
l11slll 11tionalizatioo of socialized medicine-neither of which is lucra-
t lvt.•for him.
/\11''Ideal" should be t,nderstoocl to be something that functions
1111111111tlvdy a11dsrnn ,1tilt11,(1h11tis emul,\tcd; lllat which has meaning
f III ti 10:11• wlto slH,11· ll. It l1,t IIf' E,1101w.i 11l'Xpt •rl1•11r<• 1hot <'n(·m ,ragt>s
tlu 1•1111fi111111llt1H11I 1111•,11d111-(,111d 111111111ll11w111 wltll lllt't(' v1·11lal
.i II YURUGU
Pxprcssion. (It was within the incipient European experience that

"rltetoric" came to be regarded as art.) In African culture words have
power. The European mind is a political one and for this reason con-
sl a 11tlyaware of the political effect of words and images as they are
11scdfor the purposes of manipulation. By "political" I mean to indi-
cate an ego that consistently experiences people as others; as rep-
n·sentatives of interests defined differently and, therefore, as
conflicting with this "ego." The individual is concerned, therefore,
with the way in which his verbal expression and the image he projects
ca11 influence the behavior of those to whom he relates, be they
patients (would-be consumers), neocolonial subjects, an opposing
candidate for office, or an African selfdeterminist/nationalist. This is
what is "deeply rooted" in the American mind-the psychology of
"public relations," "salesmanship," and political strategy. It is in the
l•:uro-American vernacular that the word "image" is used so fre-
quently. To be concerned with one's image as opposed to one's self
is a European characteristic.
To be aware of the strategical advantage of appearing to be altru-
ist le- when one is operating out of self-interest does not mean that
altruism is a meaningful "ideal" in terms of one's value-system. It is,
instead, an outgrowth of the propaganda that the Europeans have fed
"11011-European"peoples since they first sought to conquer them.
Bt•c,H1scthey exported ("sold") this altruistic image so successfully,
I lit>yltave had to project themselves as adhering to this "ideal"; sim-
11,u·ly,the projection of themselves or their motives in this way has
lle<-·11 essential to the successful imposition of this "ethic" on others.
Tile! basic principle to be kept in mind in order to understand this
dynaniic of European culture is that the major contributing factor to
I lie success of European nationalism has been its projection as dis-
llitercsted internationalism.
The use of "ideal" in the passage quoted above is simply an inad-
equate concept for the ethnological analysis of European culture.
1loebel, in an earlier textbook, offers his version, which is similarly
Inadequate: "Ideal Culture consists of a people's verbally expressed
standards and behavior." The examples that these anthropologists
offt'r from other cultures to explicate the distinction between "ideal"
und "actual" in no way represent the phenomeno11 in Western cult1m·
1111Ckr consideration.~
I lot'licl describes "normative postulat<'S or values" as "d<.·ep
lvl11f{,1ss11111pl ions nl>n111whctlwr things or ilct·s .tr<' rioncl amt to lw
',llllr(l1l,1111•1,Ill l>ild ,111dtu hl' n•ft'('INl."!o This Is prt•l'liwly wl1;1I1111•
' I ht<Ini le .II C'I1Ill " h nut. I l111•l>••l's 1·,111
d1•l111111011 111·11-.1•cl
to 111'1
,ti 1111
converse of the phenomenon I wish to describe. A "rhetorical ethic"

is not a "deep-lying assumption." It is a superficial verbal expression
that is not intended for assimilation by the members of the culture
that produced it. The "rhetorical ethic," a European phenomenon, has
been neglected in conventional ethnological theory, which has con-
sistently offered concepts devoid of political significance.
Anthropologists talk about the gap in all cultures between thought
and deed, between ideas and actions. The gap to which I am referring,
however, is between verbal expression and belief or commitment;
between what people say and what they do. Nowhere other than in
European culture do words mean so little as indices of belief. It is this
characteristic that is of concern here and this characteristic for which
the concepts of traditional anthropology are inadequate to explain.
As a cultural trait it has, however, been described by others, par-
ticularly those who have been made victims of European cunning.
Below an indigenous American describes European behavior:
They would make slaves of us if they could; but as they cannot, they
kill us. There is no faith to be placed in their words.
They will say to an Indian, "My friend; my brother!" They will take
him by the hand and, at the same moment destroy him ....
Remember that this day I warned you to beware of such friends as
these. I know the Long-Knives. They are not to be trusted. 6
It is an inherent characteristic of the culture that it prepares

members of the culture to be able to act like friends toward those
they regard as enemies; to be able to convince others that they have
come to help when they, in fact, have come to destroy the others and
their culture. That some may "believe" that they are actually doing
good only makes them more dangerous, for they have swallowed
1heir own rhetoric-perhaps a convenient self-delusion. Hypocritical
behavior is sanctioned and rewarded in European culture. The rhetor-
kal ethic helps to sanction it. European culture cannot be under-
::t ooct in terms of the dynamics of other cultures alone. It is a culture
t Ital breeds hypocrisy-in which hypocrisy is a supportive theme-
,, 8t rlllclard of behavior. Its hyporritical nature is linked to the Platonic
,11>s1 racllon, to objectification, to the compartmentalization of the
pt•r8n11and I he denial of the emotional self. Relow Havelock charac-
t ,•, Isl it ally 1111clcrs1«nds the case:
Arrut I wr I I 1111).{
1101 t lll'lll I"p1 ,. Plalonk" fi11•1•ksI in this
ln•1ll1l1·,ll>1111t
1w111utl:.1lwlt 1•11p,11 lly fw cll11•1I itl'IJ1111,11,clsl1wl't1•11<·llo111111dlt11
:i/6 YURUGU
direct and sincere expression of motive and desire. They almost

entirely lack those slight hypocrisies without which our civiliza-
tion does not seem to work. 7
The distinction and definitions that can lead to a better under-

standing of the Europeans and their culture can only come from a per-
spective that is not one of European chauvinism; for it is the method
of European chauvinism or cultural nationalism to conceal European
interest. As I use it, "value" is only meaningful value; it is that which
motivates behavior and is the origin of human commitment. Value
determines what is imitated and preserved, what is selected for and
encouraged. "Avowed values" on the other hand, which are merely
professed, which find expression only verbally, which are not indica-
tive of behavior, belong to what I have called the "rhetorical ethic."
The European rhetorical ethic is precisely that-purely rhetorical-
and, as such, has its own origins as a creation for export; i.e., for the
political, intercultural activity of the European. It is designed to cre-
ate an image that will prevent others from successfully anticipating
European behavior, and its objective is to encourage nonstrategic
(i.e., naive, rather than successful) political behavior on the part of
others. (This is the same as "nonpolitical" behavior.) It is designed to
sell, to dupe, to promote European nationalistic objectives. It "pack-
ages'' European cultural imperialism in a wrapping that makes it
,\ppear more attractive, less harmful. None of these features repre-
sents what can culturally be referred to as an "ideal" in any sense. The
rl1elorical ethic is, therefore, not dysfunctional in European culture.
It does not generate nor reflect conflict in European ideology or belief-
systcm; but it is, rather, necessary to the maintenance and projection
uf the utamaroho.and performs a vital function in sustaining European
, ultmal nationalism in the pursuit of its international objectives.
The rhetorical ethic is made possible by the fact that hypocrisy
as a mode of behavior is a valued theme in European life; the same
hypocritical behavior that its presence sanctions. Again, "value"
refers to that which is encouraged and approved in a culture.
European culture is constructed in such a way that successful sur-
vival within it discourages honesty and directness and encourages
dishonesty and deceit-the ability to appear to be something otll<>r
t llnn what one is; to hide 011e's"self," 011e's motives <1ndintent. PrQpl<·
who are duped by others and relate to a projected lm,,gc arr c:011
sl1krcd fools or "co11ntry b11mpkins." I lypocrisy in this W;'IYIH•c·omt·s
Jlot il 11 •g;lllVI' l)<'t'!iOllallty lrnll, llOI ln1111ornl()I 11!,11rn111nl
lwl111vl111,
1>111 1 1 tu lw 111·r1H·l1,l
ll Ii- liotlt 1 ,cp1 1·ll•cl:111dnil1lva1<·d It Is 11111-.icl,·11•cl
l111!11•dt1•11I111"..,oplihllt 1111,111,''ii l•:111up1•,111~:11111
E111npl't111 11111,11111
tural, political behavior is based on hypocrisy-as are business rela-

tions, the advertising media, and most other areas of public, and
social interaction. It is merely a manifestation of this theme when
Americans claim that politicians are basically honest. The claim itself
is hypocritical, and the public expects it to be so. We all know that
the objective of commercial advertising is to convince us to buy prod-
ucts so that manufacturers can make large profits, but the slogans
attempt to persuade us that the product is beneficial to our well
being, as though the producer has our welfare at heart. This
hypocrisy touches the lives of every member of the culture in their
dealings with one another, and yet it originates in part in the nature
of their intercultural relationships. It is a part of the mechanism of
European expansionism. All of these factors must go into the under-
standing of the rhetorical ethic and not an overly simplistic distinc-
tion between "ideal" and "actual" culture; perhaps a relevant
distinction with regard to other cultures that create and are created
by very different "cultural personalities." Let us look more closely at
this "ethic" and see how it has functioned historically.
The Rhetorical Function of the "Christian Ethic"

The idea inherent here is crucial for it implies an unfolding of the
asili. What I have argued earlier and wish to reiterate and develop fur-
ther in this discussion is that what is invariably referred to as the
"conflict" between Christian "values" and European imperialistic and
aggressive behavior has indeed never represented conflict but is to
be understood in terms of the intent of Christian ideology. As I said,
all religious statements are likely to be shaped in time so as to be con-
sistent with the nationalistic objectives of the cultures within which
they were created. Religious statements provide ideological, spiri-
tual, and emotional support for the maintenance of cultural entities
aud help to define, simultaneously as they reflect, the definition of the
collective personality of the individuals within them. European cul-
t tire is, in this respect, no different from any other. What varies from
rulture to culture is its ideological content; its asili. The character and
definition of its "nationalism," the religious statement and the cul-
tural 11tamawazonecessarily share the same characteristics. This is
I rue whether the culture is basically "traditional" and "sacred," in
wt I kl I case the two are barely distinct, or if it is "secular," where reli-
1:lmlbrcomcs separated and institutionalized. In either case, the reli-
l~lnw; st<1tcmcnt of a particular culture must by definition be
11111sl!-!l1•11t_will1
llw wllues of llwt cult11re, as hoth religion and value
1111· d l>v t ltt• O"i1l1 1111,t IH• f1111ctiq11
cl1•lt·1111l1H
1
nf ,1ny "official religion"
JIB YURUGU
to give ideological support to the culture as a whole. Once estab-

lished and formalized, all religious ideologies are, in this sense,
"nationalistic" ideologies. In spite of the elements in the Christian
formulation that can be traced to Africa (Kemet), Christian ideology
is essentially a creation of the European asili and can only be under-
stood as a statement that supports the values of that culture.
European cultural commitment is unique among "nationalist"
ideologies and in fact becomes internationalist in expression. its pri-
mary objective is the worldwide expansion of European culture and
the resultant control of other peoples. The Christian formulation,
when hardened into ideology, developed as consistent and not in
conflict with this objective. As European nationalism and the
European utamaroho were both dependent on and directed toward
"others" (people, places, cultures) to be controlled-to have power
over-so the Christian statement was a mandate for archaic Europe
(Roman) control, and propaganda was addressed to the objects of
that control as well. No matter how subtly and ingeniously this func-
tion was performed, the fact remains that what is usually referred to
as the "Christian ethic" ("universal love, brotherhood and peace,"
"the meek shall inherit the earth," "turn the other cheek," "love thine
enemy"), once officially recognized by the State, was not designed for
the assimilation or moral guidance of the Europeans. (What is
referred to as the "Protestant ethic" is another case to be discussed
in relation to European behavior in Chap. 7.) There is something
wrong with a cultural/historical analysis that maintains that a cul-
ture as successfully sustained and as persistent as that of Europe
could have been created, have survived, developed, and intensified
to such mammoth proportions under the continual handicap of a reli-
gious statement that basically contradicted and conflicted with that
growth and the form that it took! This is where the contradiction lies,
and this ethnological contradiction alone should have given rise to
other explanations of the "Christian ethic" in its European context.
The asili concept demands an ideologically consistent explanation of
cultural phenomena.
To recapitulate briefly: The Christian statement said that n•li
gion should be "universal," thereby discrediting other religions 1llat
were obviously and avowedly culture-bound. It claimccl, in fact, to tw
the properly "universalistic" religion; giving European conquerms
the moral justifkat ion they 1wedccl to turn their polil kally agl-(rt·sslvt
111•lions !1110s1•c•1nlnMlY
altruistic nnc•s. (Sel' Chap. 2) H111wliat is 111111 ,I
l II q 1111I ,1111
I 11•11• Is I li,tl I I II' <'I 11Isl lt111l<i<•olugyp111111111111
•1·d ,1-, vlt t un11•.
11111•,1• v11y 111111l1·-. of 1,1li.1vl111111,1Ill11111ohlll11·11111111111• p11llll1ullv,
render its members susceptible to European control, and less able to

resist: The pursuit of "peace," the "love" of one's enemy (which con-
cretely implies the betrayal of oneself), the "brotherhood of man"-
an abstraction that concretely manifests itself as the denial of one's
culture and therefore one's ideology and commitment. All of these
elements combined to form the ideal psycho/cultural counterpart to
political subjugation. And it succeeded in doing the job that it was cul-
turally designed to do. It did not affect the overwhelming historical
pattern of European behavior, which is characterized by antithetical
tendencies to those mentioned above. The growth of the empire was
not impeded by passivity and love; rather it thrived on the intensely
aggressive and hostile behavior that the asili of the culture encour-
aged. European theorists have invariably failed to interpret correctly
this function of the "Christian ethic" in its European context-a fail-
ure that has been endemic to Western social theory whether repre-
sentative of the right or the left-whether avowedly nationalistic or
"critical."
Joel Kovel says, "Within the original Christian world-view, there
was no way to rationalize or include the strivings for greed and dom-
ination that persisted within civilization." 8 Constantine apparently
r<>,ognized the value of Christian ideology for Western European
l'xpansion and had no difficulty using it without refashioning the
"original" Christian formulation. (If by "original" we are referring to
11s archaic European manifestation and not its earlier African ori-
gl11s.)A "use" that Kovel, himself inadvertently describes:
Christianity spread over the West and created a community out of

what had been barbarian splinters. It did this through the power of
a concrete institution, the Catholic Church. it was the Church's
Immediate influence that held aloft the subliminatory ideal of Christ
,u1d, through that ideal, gave Europeans a scaffold of identification
wll h which to bind themselves into a unified civilization. 9
Kovel says that Christianity turned "away form the world" and
111,11It "could only curse from a distance," thereby introducing "a
1
,pllt l1110the cultural universe." This "turning away" can be inter-
11111tl'das being "written in" to the definition of an early adumbration
, 1It I 1(• Iwo-sicted nature of the European ethic. It is not the European's
, 111111rrdu11ivcrse" I hat is split; that remains consistent and intact
pt t'I ls1·ly because of th<' dis1inclion between the standards of intra-
' 1ilt111,\IIH•llnvlw· a11tl tliv standards of huhuvior towards others;
I wl wc•c•11IJi:,;wo11h and I th <l(•t•<b,IH•I w1•1·111lw "rlwtorlnil ethic" ancl
lt1•l111vlot A•, ,1 11'!-illll of IIH'lt
11111 llih 111,111111.1!'1),lllld«", l•,111qpc•1111
320 YURUGU
utamawazo and the nature of their intercultural objectives,

Europeans have developed an entire semantical system designed for
export-for the purposes of nationalistic propaganda-for appear-
ance-for "others," e.g., like advertising.
The fact that some individuals may have begun to incorporate
the image that has been projected of them, does not alter the cultural
significance of that image. Their behavior is anomalous. The fact
remains that the "Christian ethic" never informed or reflected char-
acteristic European behavior. The behavior pattern it suggests never
corresponded with the European cultural self-image. That is the eth-
nological point. It always represented an image that Europeans found
to be politically expedient in terms of their expansionist and exploita-
tive objectives with regard to other people. And this relationship to
the nature of the culture is not a new one; to the contrary, it is an
aspect of the cultural affinity between the developing archaic Western
empire and the Christian formulation-a reason for the early coop-
tation of the latter.
If this seems unreasonable in terms of the behavior and psy-
chodynamics of most peoples, it must be continually kept in mind
that the European utamaroho is unique and must be understood in
terms of itself and its own peculiar dynamics-the asili of the culture.
In this theoretical context the "split" becomes ethnologically explain-
able. It is culturally designed to serve the imperialistic pursuit of a cul-
t urc whose dominant cohesive ideology is based on a power drive,
or, i11Nietzschean terms, "The will to power." To ensure success, it
was necessary to have a hypocritical element; an "avowed," professed
c-tllk that masked the European's true intent; to describe "arrogance"
as "humility." Raw aggressiveness towards other people would have
been resisted by them much more successfully without the use of the
·'rhetorical ethic." With it, Europeans could elicit the cooperation of
those within the cultures they sought to conquer. To view European
imperialism as beneficient "universalism" and "altruism" also helps
to enlist the aid of those individuals within European culture who
need to view themselves as "world saviors"; they can encourage Ill(•
imperialistic pursuit in the form of European paternalism. But this Is
not the primary function of the "rhetorical ethic"; it is primarily
designed for export.
Kovel says that as a result of tile "split," tile "West becan1<·fan•d
with au innt!asing gap twt wcr11its superego ideal alld Its <'f.(op, ;11·
11('<'."8 Not only do llit'Sl' so calll•cl ld(':tls fall lo n•pr<·:wlll llw
or ,111y otlw, p:11t 111 l11s psyrl11•, l,11t It

l·'.111111w,111•~"i-.11pt•n·H11"
lw1 01111•••q11t•~tl1111,d11t•wl11•ll11•1llw 1·11111111,111111111•111
lo "l11v1•" ,di pc•11
pie, including one's enemies, could ever represent a culturally viable

goal.
Since its early history, the "corruption" of the Church has been
the concern of the "good" Christians. These are the individuals born
into European culture who never understood Christianity in its
European interpretation. The fact is that the overwhelming majority
of Europeans automatically-not necessarily reflectively, but "natu-
rally"-"understand" how to use this ethic because of their mutual
participation in a common utamaroho; the ideology and collective
personality that they share. The isolated instances of those who do
not identify with this utamaroho (energy source) properly or totally
and those who become confused by the "rhetorical ethic" have
encouraged the illusion that it represents "conflict" in European ide-
ology. Kierkegaard represents the epitome of the individual who
seems to be searching desperately in the culture for something that
it was never meant to contain. He does not understand the asili.
Kierkegaard's accusation is that the "Christianity of the New
Testament" no longer exists, but in my view it has never "existed,"
certainly not as a European cultural possibility. Ironically, it is within
other cultures that some of the espoused "Christian" values exist,
Insofar as they are humanly meaningful and concretely realizable. It
Is outside of the West that peace, compassion, spirituality, the lack
of aggression, and intercultural tolerance are more likely to be found,
since it is here that cultural philosophies are found to support such
behavior. Kierkegaard's "attack" is representative of the awareness
of European hypocrisy, without the recognition of its ethno/histori-
nll significance. He says,
We are what is called a "Christian" nation-but in such a sense that

1101 a single one of us is in the character of the Christianity of
tile New Testament ... Christendom is ... the betrayal of
Christianity ....
I le adds that "Christendom" has done "away with Christianity by

,, I.Ilse way of spreading it, making Christians of everybody and giv-
111µ. 11ils activity the appearance of zeal for the spreading of the doc-
t I ltH 1," 111Ile Is in the position in which anyone would find themselves
w1·11•tlit•y lo expect European social interaction to be determined by
llll ,Ill, trlst k, humble-, or, simply, honestly verbalized ethic.
1
Sp(•t1!.(l1•r s con ct-pt !011 of t Ii<.·"Christia,, ethic" is much more
,111111111,•,a11d his ·vNy dllf1•n•11tIH'rsp<•<'tlvt· brings 111111 closer to a
1111111• 11•,tlbllc• ,1ss1•ss1111·111nl 1111• of tlw ('l11lsll,11110,l<'h
i-;l1:111fic•o111t·(•
lltJlli lt1 ,11,c•n111lt•)(I of Et11t11w,1t1lcl1•0l111{y
.'.122 YURUGU
My kingdom is not of this world . .. A ruler who wishes to improve

religion in the direction of political, practical purposes is a fool. A
sociologist-preacher who tries to bring truth, righteousness, peace,
and forgiveness into the world, of actuality is a fool also. No faith
yet has altered the world, and no fact can ever rebut a faith. There
is no bridge between directional Time and timeless Eternity,
between the course of history and the existence of a divine world-
order. This is the final meaning of the moment in which Jesus and
Pilate confronted one another. In the one world, the historical, the
Roman caused the Galilean to be crucified-that was his Destiny.
In the other world, Rome was cast for perdition and the Cross
became the pledge of Redemption-that was the "will of God."
Religion is metaphysic and nothing else. .. and this metaphysic is not

the metaphysic of knowledge, argument, proof (which is merely
philosophy or learnedness), but lived and experienced meta-
physic-that is, the unthinkable as a certainty, the supernatural as
a fact, life as existence in a world that is non-actual, but true .... To
ascribe social purposes to Jesus is a blasphemy .... His teaching
was proclamation, nothing but the proclamation of those Last
Things with whose images he was constantly filled, the dawn of the
New Age, the advent of heavenly envoys, the last judgement, a new
heaven and a new earth. [Italics added] 11
Spengler goes against the Judea-Christian teleological concept

of secular history, but otherwise his observations are informed by a
rharacteristically European consciousness. They have a certain accu-
racy. In the Christian formulation, in its European interpretation,
there is no authentic "communion" between the human and the
divine. This is rarely achieved, and so results in the "split" that Kovel
li\lks about. This is not true of all religious formulations, however. In
African thought, for instance, this meeting is achieved through the
apprehension of the world as spirit and the philosophical conception
of ancestor communion that it allows, as well as other cultural mech-
anisms such as ritual drama. The presence of sacred time and space'
are felt and evidenced in the ordinary existence of the people.
Spengler, in opposition to Kierkegaard, interprets the meaning
of Christian teachings in a way that is workable for the European uln
maroho. In this interpretation Jesus' life was not meant to he.'cn111
lated by those who would survive on this earth. especially as It l1,1s
bN:n tra11sforrnccl by the Europeans. A11c-l, in opposition lo Kowl, lw
l111plll'Sthat ('ltristh1111lydid 110I "1t11n Hway fr01t1 tfo• wotld" ;1ft1•1 t Ii,•
lat t hllt w,1~;l11ltlnllv , 11111·1·ivl·tl a·, "olllf•tw,11 Idly," as 11·1111111' lllld
d1•t.wli.-d !-tp1•11gl1•,•.,
1111111•111 h wllll 1111,-.,.wltu•.,· 1111~1
Olli Pptlo11•,
would cause them to attempt to bring these "abstractions" into the

"world of reality"; he is concerned lest those who do not understand
the "true" nature (i.e., function in terms of the European asili) of the
Christian teachings begin to convince the Europeans that they must
behave according to the "rhetorical ethic," and this would mean
changing the culture. But Luther and Calvin succeeded, in effect, in
fashioning a new ethical statement, which was more in accord with
the internal dynamics of the culture. The doctrines that they devel-
oped supported the competitive, individualistic, aggressive, ratio-
nalistic, nonspiritual, and detached behavior necessary for survival
within the culture. There was no longer a question of emulating the
New Testament portrait of Jesus.
Ayn Rand, like Spengler, is concerned that what she calls the
"humanitarians" are "in power," in fact, that their "antiscientific" influ-
ence has been felt throughout history. She is worried that they will
defeat capitalism. "Capitalism," she says "never had a moral base in
this country .... There is a fundamental contradiction between cap-
italism and altruistic morality-capitalism demands the pursuit of
one's own interests." 12 This last point is absolutely correct and has
deep cultural and historical significance. The historically exploita-
1ive, aggressive, cupacious, and selfish nature of European culture is
I Ile antithesis of the professed Christian virtues of "brotherhood,"
"meekness," "humility," generosity and altruism. But somewhere
nlong the line Rand has missed something vitally important. The very
l raits of capitalism and European culture that she values are perpet-
11ated not hampered by the claims of dishonest "humanitarians." The
Hockefellers do all they can to create a "humanitarian" image of them-
st•lvcs for public consumption. All of the most successful capitalists
(t l1c-reforesuccessful Europeans) are also Europe's (Euro-America's)
greatest humanitarians. It is precisely those characteristics that Ayn
Hand considers virtuous that have survived in European culture. This
should be an indication that capitalism most certainly does have a
•,tron~ moral base in the United States and that there is no function-
ing, 11orlllative "altruistic morality" in European-derived culture. She
l1i,s been the victim of the rhetoric of her own culture; rhetoric not
111t•a111 for her consumption.
Nittzsrl1c is plagued by a sm1llar concern in the "Anti-Christ". It
II,dlffirnlt tn u11dcrstand why Nietzsche does not see that he is fight-
111111u1 C'tw111ythat docs not exist. l lc is concerned that the "Christian
dill<"" wlll 11•L1rcltl1<·d1·v<•lop1nt•ntand s11rvlw1I of tile>"superniau." 1:1
I le· o11
1 111illl'ly d1•sc1IIH·s I I 11·<h•bllltat Ing Pfft•t·t of ('III Isl l;)nlty lmt dw•s
,.,,y
11111 ll,111lhb I tl1•1•t 1111"1111111•:11111p.,,11,"
pt•oplt•i, 111llll'ir
324 YURUGU
dealing with the West. Nietzsche says that it tends to "weaken," and
he is right. But it "weakens" other cultures, while strengthening
European power.
Christianity is called the religion of sympathy ...
Sympathy stands in antithesis to the tonic passions which elevate

the energy of the feeling of life: it operates depressively. One loses
force by sympathising. 14
And this is precisely the effect which Christianity has invariably

had on those who would oppose European control; i.e., teaching them
to sympathize with their enemies. Nietzsche makes the point that
Jesus "dying for others" is the epitome of the negative political
image-an amazingly astute observation. But he fails to make the
connection between Europe's overwhelming political success and its
complete rejection of this image. Nietzsche's fears are unfounded;
the rhetorical ethic does not effect the European.
What is interesting in the thoughts of Spengler, Nietzsche, and
0ven Rand is the lack of hypocrisy that I am considering here as a
theme in European culture. They apparently reject the European
rhetorical ethic; that is, they refuse to make the "Christian ethic" a
part of their own "rhetoric." Often theorists of the "right" in the West
Hr<' more honest in their denial of the professed values of the
"Christian ethic" than are European liberals in their verbal support.
All too often this is the only distinguishing feature between them.
The Rhetorical Ethic in Operation

Very few European theorists have fixed on the political use and
lun<.:tion of the rhetorical ethic. Below Chapman Cohen succinctly
describes the imperialistic use of the Christian statement-a use that
points to the hypocritical nature of the "love-peace-brotherhood"
rhetoric:
The conquering white professes the Christian religion ... in nearly

every case his conquest is advanced under cover of giving Lo llw
coloured peoples a purer religion and a higher civilisation. 15
But more oft0n in Western social theory, tlte r)l('torical l'I lill
llas hl'<'ll mistakenly usl'<I to cltarnctcrizt· E11rop1•a11lwhnvlor ,111d
v;d1ws. 'l'lw following stHIPllll'lll ls lro111l{ohlt1 Wllll,1111s, wliosP n~1<·11
"lllllc••,1,1111l' I•, (111(' nl IIIIC 11111111lltc-d, llt,11 l'l, "ol)J1•1 tlv•·" ',Ill l11l11u11 ,ii
i\ll,1ly•,1, 1111·111111•11111111
"' y 1\1111·1
!1,111•,tl!'lt'ly
The proverbial generosity of American people toward other soci-

eties facing mass disaster-for example, earthquakes, floods, fire,
famine-has elements of exaggeration and myth; but it does index
a real and persistent theme broadly based on religious or quasi-reli-
gious ideas of brotherhood, even though it has often been overrid-
den by dividing interests and competing values. The enormous
range of relatively disinterested humanitarian activities in
America-the commonplace United Fund, the "service club" activ-
ities, the public welfare agencies, the numerous private philan-
thropies, and so on-stand in striking contrast to the treatment
meted out to "the poor" and the "sturdy beggars" in many other
parts of Western society within the past two centuries. 16
Williams attributes the existence of this kind of behavior to a

commitment to the abstractions of "brotherhood" and "humanitari-
anism." This is to completely misunderstand the nature of the culture.
Care packages and the welfare system support European Americans
in the maintenance of their image of superiority. They are manifes-
tations of paternalism towards others, not of "brotherhood" nor of
disinterest. This "brotherhood" never prompted the American gov-
1•rnment to leave foreign countries, and it never dictated that
Europeans relinguish their hold on resources they had stolen. True
"brotherhood" rests on the identification with others as oneself, as
one's kin; Europeans could never respond to nonEuropeans in this
way. Indeed it would be "unnatural" for any culture to do so, but it is
1'$pecially contradictory in the context of the European utamaroho,
where self-definition depends on the existence of "others" consid-
1•n'd to be inferior, incapable, and unworthy. Philanthropic "giving"
r1·lnforces the European self-image as "superior," not as "brother."
Williams continues with his description of the values of
Alltl·rlcan society:
//1111wnilarian Mores
Wt• shall 11sethe term "humanitarianism" to refer to another impor-
1,utt value cluster in American society, meaning by it emphasis upon
,111yLype of disinterested concern and helpfulness, including per-
sn1till kindliness, aid and comfort, spontaneous aid in mass disas-
ll'n;, as well as the more important personal patterns of organized
phllnnthrony. Do Hiesc 1hings represent important values in
;\1111•,lccJ'I
11h ,,,,sy lo ,1nt1iss1'011trnrv 1·vid,•11cc'.We ,·ould sil<•the 1~xpulsion

loll 1111l1t·lwll,111,,:.l11v1•ry,I Iw sw1·111sllup p,,11l'rl1 of
1•xltt 111111,tl
.11111
111l hlld l,111111,ly111
l11d1n,t,V, 1111d,1 l1111ut ,,t,11111.( 11111~!,
vi1(ll,11111'11,
111111
111•1,tl
.
...n,·,·• 111111i111y
1',11!1111 f111111• l'111l1,d1ly l1•w p1·11pl1"1lt,,v1• ·,11
YURUGU
copiously documented and analyzed what they themselves con-

sider to be the "bad" aspects of their history-a revealing fact in
itself, for it was broadly the same culture that produced the behav-
ior and then pronounced it undesirable or wrong. Even so, the evi-
dences of humanitarian values meet all our tests for a major value.
For one thing it is striking that failure to follow the standards of con-
cern and helpfulness have not been defended as legitimate in them-
selves; they have been interpreted as deviance from a criterion that
is not basically challenged or "justified" in terms of other, allegedly
more vital values. Certain patterns of mutual helpfulness and gen-
erosity were already apparent in colonial America, despite the stern
theology and stringently disciplined individualism, and have per-
sisted to an important extent down to the present time. 17
While the avowed European chauvinist openly sings her praises

of the Western way, Williams "tests" his euphemistic descriptions
against criteria that he has established. He is right; it is most cer-
tainly "revealing" that only Europeans study, document, and label as
"bad," aspects of their own history-their own behavior-that have
been called into question internationally. What it reveals, however,
Is that it is in the nature of the culture that its participants can "say"
one thing and "feel" another; that words do not indicate commitment;
I hat hypocrisy is a behavioral standard; and that this kind of verbal
denouncing and superficial analysis, in fact, allows for the persis-
t 'nee of those very aspects that have been pronounced as "bad."
Williams is, at the very least, na·ive in his belief that verbal condem-
nation of exploitative and imperialistic behavior implies that
American culture emphasizes "disinterested concern for others."
Ag:\111,it is often the avowed European chauvinist who offers more
accurate descriptions of European behavior. Wayne Macleod makes
the following observation about Western European culture:
Although "Christianity" preaches the values of peacefulness and

kindly purposes, Europe has adhered to these virtues with diffi-
culty, and has preferred a war-like history. The 20th century "Nazi"
movement, that encouraged vigor and activity, is an example of an
ideology more suited to the north-European temperament. 18
Whil'c supremacy is characteristic of European culture- 11t,I

Px<.·eptio11alor aberranl. And Nazis111 is the mnnifcst,1t lun of t 111·
1•xtn·111• possihilit !cs of I h<'sC't c11de11cieswl lt.:11t lw c·011l rol 11wrl111
11is111s of tl1<•<'ttltun• l;ill; lhal is, wlw11 llw <k~lrtH llv1• 1.-11dt·11d1•s 1111·
1111l1•,1•,l11•d .11111111H F,1un1w,111•,,1<011111 Wtl 1l.1111•,, i'111I lw 01lw1 11,111d,
•.tI llr!l(li •<; t II tit 'l 11q11-.t111tI· th•• "loHlc. d" I111·1111•;Isl t ·1H V 111'' I ,11 I,II llt t t •1
minism" with Western ideals. 19 The strategy is simple. By verbally dis-

avowing white nationalism (the practice of white supremacy)
Europeans (European Americans) are thereby able to avoid dealing
with it. They cannot confront it, because intuitively they know what
they would never admit; that it is an inherent part of their cultural
heritage. They are committed to their culture and therefore, indi-
rectly, to white nationalism. To eradicate white supremist ideology
from the institutionalization of the culture would imply radically
changing themselves and what it means to be "European": It would
imply a different asili-a different bio-cultural being.
The European cultural imperialistic creation, projection, and
use of the theme "universalism" as a normative standard of human
behavior and commitment are a primary concern of this study.
Yehoshua Arieli gets at it partially in his discussion of Protestant
nationalism, which I have cited in Chap. 4. 20
Compare Arieli's statement with the following one from Robin
Williams on the same issue:
This sense of satisfaction incorporates supposedly universal val-

ues. A purely tribal patriotism conceives of its culture as having a
unique destiny and does not think of extending its values to the rest
of mankind. But American nationalism, like the religions that have
contributed so heavily to the culture, involves the idea that ele-
ments of the American way of life should be widely adopted else-
where. This secular counterpart of the missionary spirit is both an
index of the strength of nationalistic feeling and a potent source of
misunderstanding and resentment in international affairs. In peace
as well as in war, many citizens have believed that the United States
must have a mission as a crusader for righteousness. Other peoples
have not always regarded the matter in that light. 21
It is tempting to dismiss Williams' statements as being obviously

ll1<H:curateand superficial. But using the asili approach, these state-
111t·11tsbecome very significant as ethnographic data, since they exem-
pllly I he manifestations of western European cultural chauvinism that
11,,w been most difficult to combat. These manifestations have most
1•ll1•c·t1vclyinhibited the accurate cultural/political interpretation and
1 lt.11.1('\C'rlzation of that which is l:.uropean. "Analyses" such as that of
Wlllli1111s attest to the fact that contrary to their "self-image" and to the
",1clv,111<·t·s" lhal 1lw P!ato11ists wt·re co11vinced they were making, the
l•,1u op,•,u 1 1:-;no 111Circ• nit lctll (111I ltt• l'latnnic l ISl' of I hnt t crrn) I han m 1y
rmsys
11tlu•1 1·11l1_t11,lih1 1i11~(;111f,l!'I I 1i,,1,nlil111f• 1·011t.1l11s ,I ll1t'cl1i111ls111
t,•111 tilt dt•11·pllt111 111,11h 111111111011IIll 111111'1I 1111111«",
328 YURUGU
"Ethical Theory" and the Rhetorical Ethic

It has been part of the posture of the moral philosophers of
European culture to disavow cultural commitment, yet their work
has contributed significantly to the survival and intensification of the
rhetorical ethic-the hypocrisy and the deception that constitute a
vital and definitive part of the content of European cultural imperial-
ism-and, therefore, to nationalistic objectives.
To begin with the Platonic-influenced utamawazo provides the
theoretical basis for a conceptual ethics; an ethical system, the themes
of which are considered to be valid, as long as they are consistent in
terms of the logic of that system. What is "ethical" becomes what is
"rational" and "logical." The most "ethical" statement is the purest
abstraction. As Havelock correctly observes, the individual "thinking"
psyche becomes the seat of morality and the individual's ability to act
ethically is based on his ability to think "rationally"; i.e., "abstractly."
The result, again, is "talk." The European idea is that words divorced
from action, feeling, commitment, from human involvement can them-
selves be relevant to (and properly inform) human interaction-as
long as they are part of a consistent syntax; an approved semantical
system. This pursuit itself is an exercise in self-deception. Primary
cultures are characterized by an "existential ethic" (Stanley Diamond)
that is based on and refers to actual behavior. European culture gives
rise to semantical systems and instead of being concerned with the
inconsistency between "word" and "deed" (which could conceivably
b(' the determinant of ethical behavior), the moral philosophers are
merely concerned with verbal and what they call "logical" inconsis-
1ency. One result of this characteristic of the culture is a tendency to
mc1kephilosophers the most irrelevant of people and to effectively
divorce their work from any decision-making capacity or role that in
any way influences the ethical behavior of European peoples. What
this tradition has done instead is to support the culture in its ability
to use words without meaning, and to support Europeans in their
quest to deceive others and themselves as well. The body of literature
known as "ethical theory" has to a large degree been conducive to ti 1<'
growth of moral hypocrisy in European culture.
It is the "liberal" academic tradition in contemporary European/
European American culture that uses the rhetorical ethic best lo s11p
port Lile objectives of Europcau chauvinis1n. Ingeniously tht•sc tlwn
rists use t Ile seinanl In,! syst<'nts of 1IH' moral philosopltt·r~, t 11<'
"h, ot Ill·, hood" 1lli!Imlc of t IH• Cl 1rlsl f,111;; IaH111w,11 a, 1d 1·111ply ahst 1,11
lllu "lt11111,11iltllll,111ls111"
111111•, "1111lv1·r11lhth l'llth •," ,1•, 1•vlclc·111
;11111 c·
ol llw lcl1•<1lo.!h,ti 111111111lt11w11I•,
111lite• l•:u111p1,111•,;11111
ll11·11•lu11·'"'
indices of the nature of European culture. They are "critical," because

they say that the imperialistic behavior of the European has repre-
sented a conflicting theme or "negative" tendency in European devel-
opment. The result of their theories, however, is that they succeed
in making the European responsible for everything-the "good" as
well as the "bad"-and in the end the good far outweighs the bad
and will, of course, triumph along with "reason."
Norman F. Cantor provides an excellent example of the subtle
chauvinism of the European liberal academician in his work on
Western culture. He says,
The new ethos of the late 1960's sought to restore to their central
place in Western culture the religious, mystical, compassionate,
imaginative, and altruistic ideals that had been tarnished or ignored
by industrialism and secularism, by the mechanism and bureau-
cracy of modern life.22
The new ethos had indigenous roots in some of the central cur-
rents of the Western tradition-in Christian mysticism, in the
Enlightenment's vision of a happy and peaceful world, in
Romanticism's yearning of the union of self and nature and for the
union of all individuals in the Absolute Spirit, in anarchism's faith
in the spontaneous association of men in a harmonious community
when freed from the brutality and oppression of the state, in
Nietzsche's life-affirming ethic and Freud's revelation of the pri-
macy of erotic impulses, and in the existential philosophy of Camus,
Sartre, and Jaspers. 23
The trick is to "claim" ideas that have failed to influence the def-
111ltion of the culture: because they do not fit in with the asili. In this
w:,y, any critique of European ideology informed by a vision of the
l111man that could only have been created either by a rejection of
1·'.uropcan value or in a culture qualitatively different from European
1:!llllurc itself becomes a "Western" product. And this argument (if
",11gut!cl" at all) is made on the basis of values that were, for the
1-'.11n1pcan,never more than rhetoric! "Christian mysticism" becomes
"Wt•slcrn," and the "Enlightenment's vision of a happy world" is not
l,1111l~lwd by 1he fa,ct that this wor'.d was to be defined in terms of and
1 11111 rnllt:d by l·'.uropean "progress.''
( ·antor's characlerinlion of "Western liberalism" is a perfect
or wlin! I h;we t'Hll<'d tlw "rhetorical ethic.'' In the statement
•.1.11c •111t•111
111,11 lnllowl!, lnlw11 lrc11111111' ,01wl11cllng p.tragraphs of his three-vol-
111111•wc,d, 011 1•:111opi 1
ndt111,1I lllslo1y, ('a11tot dalm~. for Ill<• r11I
1111
11111, II•, 11111•,I ,,,·vc·1c• 1 rltk~ Muv1·1111•11I· 111,11 w1111lcl s1·c•k 1111
1
330 YURUGU
destruction of what the West has meant are characterized as expres-

sions of Western humanism and of Western ideals. This excerpt is evi-
dence of the characteristic of European cultural nationalism that we
are here delineating. This particular example is all the more signifi-
cant because it represents a fairly recently published text, used to
explain and interpret to the European-American college student, the
nature and meaning of Western-European history:
It is a pernicious misreading of history to identify Western civiliza-

tion with the racism, imperialism, and capitalism of the late nine-
teenth century. Even in their heyday, these attitudes and
institutions were only one side of the Western world view and way
of life. The destiny of Western civilization immeasurably transcends
the mistakes of one era. The West has had its confusion, horror, and
misery, its moments when anti-human doctrine have seemed on
the verge of carrying all before them. But it is the glory of Western
civilization that it has never stood still and has never neglected for
long the quest for institutions that can contribute to the realization
of human freedom. Soon its best minds have recalled the highest
ideals of the classical and Christian traditions; they have inspired
their contemporaries with the vision of a great age of beginning
anew, of the establishment of God's kingdom on earth or a secular
equivalent in their own time. 22
Cantor concludes his panegyric with the assurance that the

"great upheavals of the 1960's were collectively only manifestations
of the age-old western tradition by which Western 'civilization' peri-
ucllcally 'renews itself."' In this way he debunks the need for revolu-
tion; and in fact "claims" the revolutionaries, who, he says, will
inevitably and happily be overshadowed by the "rationalists and
111oderates,"
who have restructured the institutions of the past and redirected

the ideas of the present. The result has never been perfect justice
or absolute truth but sufficient justice and enough truth to satisfy
the anxieties of the contemporary era while reestablishin!,{ the
social peace and political order that the progress of civilization
rcquires.n
And so ends Cantor's historical stucly of the "genesis a11cldt•s-

t l11y"of West crn cult urc. Wil h ils greatrst n1lnds ns lll<>cusl orlla11s11f
"dvillzntlim" nut jttsl "huropt•,m clvilizallo11," My l11lC'rp1pt;1llo11ol
I ll;II Illsl111y I<:qllilP dlff1·n•111,11s it is irdOl 111t·cllly 1111
All11',1111 1•1111•1
Pd
pt•t•,p• 1·1lv1•,111d11wll1ud11l11~:~•(',111tw is, 011n•1111•d l,•sl tlwid11d1·11t•l
of the "new ethos" would "shatter" and irrevocably separate from

what has historically been Western European culture. Our conclusion
is that the European tradition must be "shattered" if a truly "new
ethos" is to replace the old. This means a new utamaroho to fulfill a
different asili. But then centered in African interest I understand
European culture to be identified with anti-Africanism, the imperial-
istic pursuit, and with a denial of the human spirit; whereas Cantor
finds this identification "pernicious" and makes the claim that the
"liberation of the human spirit" has been a "central current" in the
Western tradition. Ultimately Cantor's objectives are chauvinistic.
He is concerned with influencing students in such a way that they will
act to maintain the "peace" and "order" necessary for the continuance
of the European conception of "progress," i.e., the persistence of
European power.
The Ethnological Significance of the Rhetorical Ethic

The rhetorical ethic has its origins in the asili of the culture and
the objective of imperialism and is therefore directed toward
European political "objects" in an effort to disguise Europe's imperi-
alistic intent and to politically disarm those whom Europeans would
control. But it has also effected one segment of the European popu-
lation. Through continual efforts to deceive others by means of the
construction of an elaborate rhetorical systems, a small proportion
of the culture has no doubt succeeded in deceiving itself. This is pre-
cisely the same dynamic that often occurs within the European enter-
tainment milieu. A bizarre image of a performer is projected by the
rnedia and her public relations machine in order to "make" her and
to sustain her as a "star." Though the image is radically different from
I 1e>rtrue nature, she becomes a victim of her own propaganda and of
I he power of the media and begins to believe that she is what she sees
011 the screen, etc. The example is appropriate because it allows us
to ~we that even this kind of selfdeception must be carefully distin-
~!llisl1cd from a functional ideal or value. The confusion of her public-
rc•lations image with herself does not imply that the image is her ideal
111t lw scns1 of what she wants to be; it usually implies very much the
3
opposite.
This kind of cultural confusion can also have another effect. As
l\111us Wilson has rf'worked Pa1tlo Friere's concept of "false con-
,, l1111s11l•ss"(lhlagogy o/ th<' 0,>prr>s.wd).it becomes useful here. The
who 111·l«·s
l·'.11rnpc•:111 till' rlwtt11 lcal ,·thi,· st>rln11sly doHs so out of n
'l,,bw 1 1H1!11 l1111:-1111·s:..-• t 11,d p11·v1•11ts 111111 lrw11 Ills ow11
111·n·1•lvl111,(
i:11111p l11l1•11",l11•; d1•1t111 d l>yhi•,., 1!1111111,'l'lw ,,.·,11ltl~ d,t11g1•1011s lot
332 YURUGU
people of African descent and other non-Europeans who mistakenly

take the resultant anomalous behavior for a possible "rule." A
European acting out of a "false consciousness" debilitates the
"objects" of European oppression by lessening their ability to "see
straight" or to correctly analyze European behavior based on an
understanding of the asili of the culture. A European who is deceived
about who he is merely succeeds in deceiving non-Europeans. A
European who understands the nature of her culture, but does not
share the utamaroho of her culture (a highly improbable circum-
stance, since it contradicts the as ill), must act to change the culture's
utamaroho, to get rid of its "carriers": That is her only recourse, if she
is honest.
The nature of the rhetorical ethic is further complicated by the
fact that what are projected as cultural ideals are mere verbal abstrac-
tions without human content. No culture could be informed by such
things as "universal altruism," or the abstract "love of mankind." The
philosophies of many primary cultures might imply a more sympa-
thetic relationship to all peoples, but even here "universal" identifi-
cation cannot be a primary or immediate goal. The abstract terms of
the rhetorical ethic, even if conceivable, do not necessarily generate
moral behavior. "Loving mankind" is not existentially translatable
into respect for other people, and "international peace" is perfectly
compatible with "world rule," as it has inevitably been interpreted in
the West.
The confused liberal becomes the most dangerous European
chauvinist of all. His wearing of "two hats" does more to maintain the
European system than the work of those who are recognized as cha11-
vinists. If a missionary sincerely believes that he has come to help
Africans, then this can only be regarded as a dangerous form of <lelu•
sion. The politically wise attitude of his victims would be to regard
him exactly as they would any other would-be conqueror,
Unfortunately for them, in the past, First World peoples who haVl'
understood the implications of European missionizing, whether nf
the "secular" or the "religious" variety, have expended great energy
in the attempt to convince the missionary of the real cultural/pollll
cal effect of his work. This is a hopeless cause. Suell efforts only
involve them in the endless rhetorical abyss of European r111l11r(·,
instead orin active self-defense. The point here is that althougll 1111•
rlwtorical t'lhic 111ay sometimes rcprcsc·nt instances of s~lf dl·<·••p
tlon within Eurnpt•a11 t·11lt11r( Itself, till!, dm•s 110\ altt·r tl1c f1wt 11111••
1
.111dt'ff••1llvt•11c..;•, with ir•wud I•, WP~H•111lnqwrl.lll:,111. 't'lw

l11111'111111
u1ilv W,ty 111 lwlp 1111'1,IWorld 1woplc" Iii 111 flt I 111,11t•lvll'Plf •,PIii the•
nature of European culture and the motives of European behavior.

The decision as to what changes are to be made in our cultures are
ours, and must be initiated by us.
Frances Welsing has said:
People of color have not understood where white people were com-
ing from, from day one. Right now Black people keep assuming that
what they feel about other people, white people also feel. Non white
people all over the world are baffled by how easily white people
move into hypocrisy and deceit. We just have not been able to
fathom it. If you are operating on one logic system and you
encounter somebody who is coming from a completely different
logic system, you may not be able to figure it out, especially if they
are really fine in their methodology of deceit. 24
Welsing's statement hits the mark. It helps to drive home the

point that dishonesty, hypocrisy, and the "moral lie" are inherent in
and functional to the cohesion of European-derived culture. The nor-
malcy of these behavioral characteristics sanctions and defines the
rhetorical nature of the "Christian ethic," which is, therefore, not
actually in conflict with dominant European/Euro-American behavior.
It is impossible to understand the behavior of the European until this
is recognized, just as it is impossible to understand European behav-
ior on the basis of the ethical dynamics of other cultures and other
people. It is clear that this characteristic of the culture cannot be
reduced to the traditional anthropological distinction between "ideal"
and actualized values. Such distinctions merely obstruct the under-
standing of the nature of European culture. Listed below are the char-
acteristics of the rhetorical ethic that distinguish it from anything
that could be called a cultural ideal:
1. It is a statement that is in no way normative for the European; i.e.,
it is not a guide for behavior.
2. It is directed toward, i.e., meant to affect, people outside of
European societies - those who are the intended political vic-
tims.
:l. Its purpose is to facilitate Western European imperialism by
• immobilizing nationalistic resistance movements of other
peoples and
• rnt1klng European dominance appear to be the result of
disl11tn1•slPd ancl altntistlr motivation.
Tlwtt· Is nwlting In 11w Eurnpl'cln bt>lid-syslc111 lhat s11pporls
,H 111111 oM lwll,111of otl11•1•; II I~ ,11>s11rdIn d1•se1llw ".iltruism" as a
"111,1]111 v;ll111"ctt ''I 1•1111.d
111111•111"
l11l•:111op11111 ii'- Wllli,1111s
ld1•11lul-(y,
YURUGU
and Cantor have done. Rather, the claim to ideals of "altruism" and
"universal brotherhood of man" must be recognized in terms of their
crucial propagandistic value. There is no more politically cunning
and self-interested being than the European.
It may well be that European culture is the the only culture that
must have a rhetorical ethic in addition to the ethic that actually
influences behavior. Only the European utamaroho seems to require
a vision of itself in opposition to "other"; that is, where this vision
hecomes the fundamental and definitional aspect of utamaroho. This
nwareness of "other" does not originate in an abstract conception of
"humanity," but rather in the European fear of difference and the
need to feel superior. Indeed, the abstraction, if anything, can be
understood as having been conceived to clothe the nakedness of the
European power drive. It is dictated by the asili of European culture
tl1at the European should have "two faces" and a "forked tongue." He
must lie.
In European culture the "moral lie" is epistemologically rein-
forced by the methodology of "objectification" and ontologically by
a conception of the human that seeks always to invalidate emotional
responses. This makes possible, without ideological conflict, the cre-
ation of a rhetorical ethic for purely political purposes. What has
IH!C'll referred to throughout Western European history as the
"C'hristian ethic" has little meaning for the European. It does not rep-
n·scnl conflict in the European commitment but must be explained
Ill t<'nns of the overwhelming consistency and cohesion of the cul-
t 11rc:the as iii. The rhetorical ethic is, therefore, because of the pecu-
liar nature of European culture, in which deceit and hypocrisy
lwcome normal, functional to the European conative striving for
world supremacy.
The concept of asili brings the rhetorical ethic sharply into
focus. As the ideological core of the culture, it provides us with a
frame of reference-an authentic context within which to interpret
the conventional rhetoric used by Europeans to describe their alt i-
t uclcs towards others. Since the asili tells us that each significant
t rnit, each dominant mode of the culture, must fit accordingly to the
"logic" of its germinating template, we understand that the rlietori
< nl ethic could not lw a functioning ideal, a determinant of behavior,
Im that would cause a malfunctioning of the machine. It wo11lctmoll
vatt• inc-nnslstcnt behavim a11dideological conf11slo11011 t h<c'!HU t of
I Ill' HH'lll""' s ,Jf tlw culture. S1wlt l11<·n11slstc~1wy would <·a11sP I ltt• 1·111
t1111• (1111wltl1w) 111111•1·01111·rly•,f1111r·tl11md1111t•l.1t1011sl1lp lo it:{ nlll<•<'
tlv1•(pill po•u•) '1'111•t lll'tflf II-al 1itl1i1111tly111,d1•-; M'll:i< If It I~ l11dc•1•d
merely rhetorical; it "fits" the asili. At the same time the asili of the
culture "demands" a rhetorical ethic because of its need for
hypocrisy to render its raw aggression more effective. It is needed
for successful "P.R." The concept of asili, when applied to European
culture, tells us that if the rhetorical ethic were indeed to become an
operative determinant of behavior, the culture in its imperialistic,
mechanistic drive would be destroyed. Ultimately, its nucleic source
would become incoherent. The culture would cease to exist in its
prototypical form. It would die or become something else. But the
reverse has been the case. The European tradition has been over-
whelmingly successful in perpetuating itself. Destruction of its asili
must be effected from without.
The rhetorical ethic plays a crucial role in the maintenance of
the European utamaroho and the support of Western European cul-
tural imperialism. It is the primary factor in a successful proselytiza-
tion of the culture through the creation of a false image of the
European. And yet because of its subtly manipulative methodology
and inherently deceptive technique, it has, for the most part, gone
undetected as an expression of European cultural nationalism. With
a proper understanding of the functioning of the rhetorical ethic in
European culture, it becomes easier to understand the patterns of
European intracultural (Chap. 7) and intercultural behavior (Chap. 8).
... in these surroundings dominated by the walls of
whiteness built . .. to cut faculty from faculty, pull
member from member and drive person against
person ...
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 7
lntracultural
Behavior
The Question of Norms
What are the "values" or standards that guide the behavior of
Europeans within their culture; that is, their behavior towards other
Europeans? "Ethic," here, indicates the beliefs that are implied by (1)
the way in which they treat the other members of their culture, (2)
the goals towards which they strive, and (3) the methods by which
they attempt to reach them. These cultural conceptions of what is
"ethical" are handed to Europeans (European Americans) by the tra-
dition they share with others in their culture, and their acceptance
of these conceptions implies a system of "morality" to which
Europeans adhere. We can, then, look at European culture as a deter-
minant of patterned behavior.
In his study American Society, Robin Williams' characterization
of his own concern coincides with my objective in this chapter. He
says that he is attempting to describe "culture as a normative struc-
l II rc." 1 "Values,'' he says, "concern standards of desirability" (which
, date- the European aesthetic and self-image to the European ethic);
"they are couched in terms of good or bad, beautiful or ugly, pleas-
,1111 or unpleasant, appropriate or inappropriate." Norms "are rules of
c•ondu<'t" that "specify what should and should not be done." The
"11wm.11iv<' aspects of culture" ,omhinc to form a "set of guidelines
l>v wlildt J'('<>pk , q-!ttl,11\- 1hl'lr own l>(•ltavlor <1ml that of their fel-
l11w•,"'.' Sn tli.11 "vnlill's" ;111cl"11011ns" as llwy i\l'l' 11s(·dl1vrc c·;111 only
lw •,11ppu1kcl (IJ po~.111v,•ly"•,.Ill( tl111wd"wllltl11 1111•
('tilltll<' 111s11c11ii
YURUGU
way that behavior that conforms to them is "rewarded"-meets with

"success" and "approval"-while behavior that contradicts them is
"punished"-results in "failure" and is "put-down" by one's "fellows"
or is simply not rewarded in any way, i.e., is not recognized as "val-
ued" behavior.
What Williams refers to as "institutional norms" are precisely
I hose aspects of concern here. "For a whole group or society, prob-
ably the best index to an institutional norm is the occurrence of
srvere penalties for violation." Institutional norms are
1. widely known, accepted, and applied;
2. based on revered sources;
3. widely enforced by strong sanctions continuously applied;
4. internalized in individual personalities;
5. objects of consistent and prevalent conformity. 3
One final point that I would emphasize in focusing this discus-
sion is that Williams is correct when he says that a characteristic of
lit<.: normative aspect of culture: "It is inferred from observation of
helwvior." 4 [Italics added.]
The terms I have alluded to above are germane and basic to any
Pthnological discussion, and there is nothing objectionable about
1he way in which Williams here defines and describes them. Yet the
vnlucs of American society, as he ascertains them, do not to any
appreciable degree correspond to the behavior of its members. And
ht tl1is respect Williams' work fits into the pattern of Eurocentric
dc.•scriptions of European society, which fix on what I have called the
''1 lwtorical ethic" of the culture rather than its "normative struc-
t III c." This chapter is concerned with ascertaining the values that,
/11l<tct, df'lermine European behavior. I am not interested in clupll-
rat Ing the plethora of sociological descriptions of various European
(l·'.11ro-American)institutions, but rather in emphasizing the shared
1,clicfs, values and conceptions that provide the ideological founda-
l lnn of these institutions. There is no other culture in the world that
dt!votes so much energy to its own "analysis"; yet it is difficult to find
;1 work that contributes to the understanding of the underlying
nature of the culture.
We seek to demonstrate the relationship betweeu European
rationalism, "objcctificaticrn," and "abstractifiration," and sucl1
l·'.mopean conceptions as those of "self'' or "ego," "individuality," and
"ln•(•dom," which 111 turn help lo rcgulal<' lhe wny in whicl1 E11ro1H•arn;
,\n' It, 't\l l'd 1wd hf•I ,nvc• wit ltln t lwt r cultl1t1-'. Tills app1 n:1cll c•1npll,1
•,l11•1, tli1•t·llirn, ul c,1pll,llls111, frn lrn;l,llH'<', 1101;1•,o1nl'lnl,1t1•d111 dc•lc•r
•1y~,lt•1n,11111
111t1ll11g .t~ :i111H1l11l11gk,llly .111d "1•1lil1,illy" 1 011:.l:1l1•11I
Intracultural Behavior 339
statement of "morality" within the asi/i/logos of European develop-

ment. My emphasis is, then, more on the ideological implications of
European behavior than on the ethnographic description of that
behavior. As with any ethnology we are looking for a pattern and
characteristic behavior; as the concept of culture implies general-
ization, so we generalize. It does not make ethnological sense to
accept idiosyncratic or incongruent behavior as the expression of
"European culture." Instead we would expect this discussion to indi-
cate a "type of person" the culture has produced and is likely to pro-
duce; how he behaves and how he believes he should live. We seek
the "collective personality": the utamaroho. My objective, then, is the
isolation of the ideas that motivate and guide European behavior and
the understanding of the relationship of these ideas or themes to the
total picture.
We can discuss the areas of European intracultural behavior
and European behavior towards "others" separately. This approach
reflects the belief that there is a significant distinction between these
two aspects of European behavior, and that, while they are dialecti-
cally related, European conceptions about them generate two dis-
tinct "ethical" systems. This, again, is central, because the distinction
between "self" and "other," and that between the "cultural self" (the
group) and those outside the culture, is nowhere as significant as it
is for the expression of the European utamaroho. The assumption of
the existence of people who do not participate in the culture is essen-
tial to the European utamaroho and plays a definitive role in deter-
mining the rules of conduct both within and outside of the culture.
For this reason Chap. 8 follows with a discussion of the "rules" and
conceptions that govern the behavior of Europeans towards "out-
siders" or the "cultural other."
"Individuality," "Freedom," and "Self"

While Euro-American and European are not isomorphic, it is in
contemporary American culture that the dominant theme of Western
European development reaches greatest intensification. The concept
of "inclividuality" and "freedom" and their interpretations in con-
temporary American society are an appropriate starting point
IH"causc they arc so prominent in the European's own conception of
t lie: valm! and superiority of his c11lture. In his mind they are traceable
to hi~ ln<lo l•'.uropc·n11 ori1~l1ts.Moreover, tl1ese concepts are of inter-
1•s1 ht-('/lllS(' of I lw1r n·lnl l11nsl1ipto Itw t-:1Jrop<'ilO Ul(lfll(JIJ)(IZ(). In aclcll-
111111 w1• ,u1• 11ltl111.ilt-ly1·111111•11wd willl l-:111111H'dll 11,1tl1111:ills111 ,mcl ii~
dtt·,·t n11 "111111l•,111op1•.111"IH'upl• ,. tn tl1t11·011l1•1(1 nl r1ilt111,dln1p1•1I.-I
,'J10 YURUGU
ism. The unquestioning acceptance and attempted assimilation of

tile European concept of "individuality" and the related concept of
"individual freedom" has continually misguided and weakened First
World struggles for self-determination. Their noncritical acceptance
has delayed the victory. Where these movements have been strong
t I 1ere has always been a rejection of this aspect of Western European
Ideology, along with other related aspects, and alternative concep-
tions of "freedom" and of the person's relationship to the group have
supplanted the character of European conceptions. Therefore, a crit-
ical exploration of these related concepts is helpful in a comparison
of European, African, and other cultural ideologies, and it will also
bring us closer to an ethnological understanding of the unique char-
acter of European intracultural behavior. How does this behavior
relate to the asili? How does it make ideological sense?
The Euro-American idea of freedom is inextricably bound to the
Western European conception of "self." As Durkheim has said, the
value of the individual personality is a "cult" of European culture. 5
Williams says that the Western concept of individual freedom
sets a high value on the unique development of each individual per-

souality and is correspondingly adverse to invasion of individual
integrity; to be a person is to be independent, responsible, and self-
rcspccting, and thereby to be worthy of concern and respect in
one's own right. To be a person, in this sense, is to be an
.111lonomousand responsible agent, not merely a reflection of exter-
ll;'JI pressures, and to have an internal center of gravity, a set of
standards, and a conviction of personal worth.
I'll<>"value of individual personality" as impressionistically con-

<'dvt>d represents an extremely complex cluster of more specific
<lcsirable states or conditions, such as uniqueness, self-direction,
autonomy of choice, self-regulation, emotional independence, spon-
taneity, privacy, respect for other persons, defense of self, and
11i.u1yothers." 6
· His discussion is not very helpful since he does not explore the
rnnccpt that he refers to as "the value of the individual,'' but hC'Is
rf!,(ht in sayin~ that the concept comes from "the deepest levels of Its
Ii\111erica11society's] unconscious presuppositions" and tilflt t lw
''val11<:c-0111plcx"associated with ii "is embedder! int he cl'nt ml nfh•<·
llw co!,!11 lliw struct un• oft he rwr~onallt it•s ortlw t·ull 11n·."fiWil h t !tis
lt·t 11:;111111lo II d<•i'J)<'l' 1'iJ1Hil<lt•1,1II011 of 1lH1 ro~11t11vt
1
a11d 1Pl.1111d
lwlt,,vlrn ,d l111plhHI1011:,nl Iltl:, rn11n•pt
1111dltloi1It I•,, 11•,to111,11y
1!111111':1110111•1111 to )1l1111•,
,,,, WlJJl11111•,
does, the philosophical origins of the American concept of individual

freedom in seventeenth century European thought, but the work of
John Locke and others merely provided a verbal crystallization and
formal presentation of conceptions already implicit in the cognitive
structures of European culture; and even earlier, in the asili/seed.
Williams talks about the "autonomous" self and, again, of "moral
autonomy"; but we have seen this before-in Plato and in Eric
Havelock's discussion of Platonic epistemological conceptions. (See
Chap. I). The Platonic mode, and its methodology based on the
assumption of the "thinking-self" that exists separately and distinctly
from the objects it encounters, enabled Europeans to construct a
rationalistic science. It also provided a cognitive habit that would
house the contemporary European concept and value of "individual-
ism." Indeed, as Havelock argues, in Plato's day there may have been
only an inconsequential number of people "capable" (an indication of
Havelock's perspective) of conceiving in this way, but the layers
thickened and grew until it became characteristic of the "culture-
bearers" and the "ordinary" people of the culture. Now Europeans are
almost "born" with a concept of themselves as housing a distinct psy-
che necessarily isolated from all "others" and as being responsible
only to themselves. This conception is inculcated at a very early age.
What followed from this Platonic conception was the concept of a
rationalistic ethic, which, along with secularization, provided the
basis for an individualistic conception (or misconception) of human
happiness. If all of these related epistemological premises were valid,
then it followed that the individual herself had to determine what
was in her interest, i.e., what made her happy. Self-interest in this way
becomes paramount, and "freedom" is then the ability to pursue this
interest.
Havelock stresses the importance of the ability to separate self
from other: The lack of identification with other was in Plato's con-
ception the primary rational act. This idea is reinforced throughout
the culture, and so it is that the idea of "identification with," love of,
and sympathy or empathetic understanding for others goes against
the grain of the European tradition; it is in epistemological, ideologi-
cal, political, and spiritual contradiction. A morality based on "altru-
ism" is inconccivahlc in the European context. In the West the self is
pl'iinary, ancl survival clepe11ds on the cultivation of self-centered-
11<·ss.On<' rn11st be "allowed" to he properly selfish; and that is what
II me<ltl:'l tn lw "ln.•P."
111 of c·ss,1y•:, I )qrnl lty l.•1<·PXplort•s thi• t'Olll'Ppts of fre,•·
;1 sp1 l1-1:
tl11111,1111l-l11tllvld11.dlly 111llw W,,-.1 ;1111I1111-.,·s1111•q111•c;,ll1111 11I 1111•
YURUGU
meaning of these concepts, in juxtaposition with conceptions of other

cultures. As with other discussions of Lee's, these help us to go
beyond the taken-for-granted aspect of European value and to see
really what it does mean in the actual living situation for an American
Lo say that he has "a conviction of personal worth," as Robin Williams
does, or that in American society "freedom" is a "major value." 7
The first important observation to be made is that this concept
,ls Lee points out, is peculiar to European society. It is a concept
rarely present in other societies. Williams equates "freedom" with "a
wide range of moral autonomy in decision-making" and contrasts it
with "simple group conformity." But an African-centered perspective
helps us to recognize that (1) the kind of "freedom" that Williams
describes may be meaningless or undesirable to people whose con-
<'Cpts of personal worth and human value are radically different
and/or that (2) "freedom," as an abstract concept, may itself lack
value as a human or cultural goal. In other words, in America "free-
dom" is a household word that children are raised on ("I can so; it's
a tree country!"), but it may well be that within the context of a har-
tnonious communal grouping that does, in fact, protect and nurture
the growth of the person, this "freedom" is merely the description of
something negative.
As discussed earlier (see Chap. 4), this idea of "freedom" that
1'tn('rges in the European cultural psyche, has been handed down
tltrough the various states of the development of the European col-
li•t•IIve consciousness. The origins of this mythoform-love of free-
dom and liberty-are traditionally traced to the forest of Germany
wlil're the Saxons reigned, supposedly never having allowed them-
~t·lvt->sto be conquered. The "fierce individualism" and "love of free-
dn111"of the early Germans was to have been inherited by their
l .11ropean descendants, further developed by the English who devel-
oped parliamentary government based on this ethos of "freedom"
a11clpassed it to the American colonials, who have established the
, ilt i mate citadel of "liberty" with a "democratic" constitution that
saf~-guards the right to "individual freedom"; a social order that val-
11es"individuality" almost as much as material gain. They, in fact,
have developed to its greatest intensity an economic system in which
I lie• goal of unlimited gain is linked to this concept of inrliviclual frc<'-
clu111and liberty, with a ml11imurn of governme11t ("group") inl(;>1fc,
t•11n•: th<· novnn111cn1's main pnrpo:H' being lo ensure the prot(•ctlo11
of prtvnl<' propc•, ty.
l11,111dlt1tl lo IWI ;1t "the.•ld1•11nl fn·1·cln111whl<'h Is (11'1'\tllm lo
t\1111•11<•,111 ,111 I, ly," ll11rutlly l,1•1· 111>s1•1v1•dtl11 .111•,1•, 111 wlill 11
"Americans still expressed a sense of freedom in their linguistic

usage." 8 She found that "free" usually indicated a lack of constraint
or obligation; i.e., "freedom from entanglement" in regard to inter-
personal relationships. She found that oddly enough the idea of "free-
dom," as in "free" objects-tickets, for instance, meant that they were
desirable but had no value. One saves money when something is
"free" in this sense, but because it does not cost money, it is, there-
fore, not itself valuable. Then there is the idea of freedom as in "free
time," where free means "uncommitted." Again Lee found that such
"free time" was not itself valuable, that is, it became so only when it
was "filled" and in accordance with how it was filled. It is somehow
wrong to have too much "free time." "One has to go on and give an
explanation or a justification for such freedom, so as to endow it with
a validity which is certainly not self-evident." The person who has
"nothing that he has to do" is suspect and lacks value; "conversely, I
hear people speaking proudly of all they have to do, whether they are
referring to committed time, or to what they do during their 'free
time."' (fhe Protestant ethic, of course, regulates European behavior
in this way so that "work" is active and positive, and to be free from
work is to be somehow immoral.) Lee concludes that "free," as in
free time, is, therefore, a negative condition; "free" refers to emptiness
and must be "filled":
Our free time is "leisure" time, potentially passive and empty-and

subject to boredom, unless we plan it carefully and fill it with activ-
ities. In fact, we have now a number of professions whose function
is to provide means and aid to people for the filling of empty time.
And an increasing leisure is viewed with apprehension by many of
our leaders. 9
So what becomes even clearer as a result of this discussion is

I I,;it it is not simply the idea of "freedom" (per se) that is valued in
contemporary European society but a very specific kind of freedom
nsso<.:iated almost totally with the unique European concept of valid-
11y ,tnd necessity of the autonomous individual. "Freedom," as an
,ti I 1ih11Lcof space or time, has no worth so long as it remains in that
i;t,,1,~."Space is empty and to be occupied with matter; time is empty
,111d 10 be lillccl with activity." Whereas often in other cultures, "free
·,JHWL' a11d tinw have being and iutegrlly." In evidence of this, Lee
HfH'S 011 to ell<•examples from other C'Ulturcs in which "The experi-
1•111'1• nf sll,·111,., nl 111,·sp,11·t· b,·tw<·t•11 ancl wllhln Is meaningful." She
p,·,11<~ul •,111·11 1w11·c•pllo11s thul "1wrslsts 111<;pltf• of tlw
11d11ptl1,11 of w1• 1 ,t1•1111·11lt1111· .111cl ·u 11•111c·" 11111011 E11111p,·1111r11lt1111•:i,
311 YURUGU
1.eecontinues, "free time, through being recognized as valid exis-

tence, can and does contain value." Whereas, "In our own culture it
is perceived as the unallocated, the unscheduled, the nothing; and it
cannot contain value, as it contains no being." In addition to the fact
that they contain no value, "empty spaces" are indeed "uncomfort-
able" to the European, and he "experiences silence" as either embar-
rassing or frightening.
This "negative" freedom, Lee sees as being related to the
European concept of self and as helping to define positive freedom
nr freedom as value. The situation loses significance "with increasing
emphasis on the individual, on the self as a focus." The individual is
not interested in "what can be done," but rather in "what I can do."
Therefore the positive idea of "freedom" is "expressed as capacity in
the person." 10 And here it is possible to see how the concepts of "self"
and of "freedom" relate to the conative striving that is the life-blood
of European life and with the epistemological tools and definitions
I hat determine European cognition. All of these aspects are consis-
lc:nt and are dictated by the asili of Western European culture: they
help to construct the European utamawazo and express the uta-
11,aroho.
The concept of freedom that Lee describes here in its "positive"
ll11plications, i.e., as value, has to do with the "ability" Oack of con-
st raining forces) to do. This "freedom" is the existential prerequisite
to lndivi<lual power, and that is its significance for understanding the
European mind and European cultural behavior. "Power," as a
l•:uropcan concept, is the ability to control and to manipulate; control
of I I 1t'self-in order to control and manipulate objects external to the
wlf. One n1ust be a "free agent"-free in the interest of self. This also
l111pll<>s "freedom" from moral or ethical considerations. This con-
e ,•pl of power is synonymous with the European utamaroho; it is the
111ostbasic motivating force in the culture, touching every aspect of
belief and behavior. Within European societies, that is between
European peoples, the individual is the seat of this power, just as lie
Is the seat of the "freedom" that makes it possible. He is free to "wheel
a11ctdeal"; i.e., to maneuver, operate, procure, achieve (etc.) for self.
lnt<'rculturally, the entire culture bands together expertly in group
t 11fort lo ensure its power over other cultures.
It ls this same power that is achieved through the illusi011 nf
ol>j<•<·tlfiration. As cliscussccl In Chap. 1, it was only by :-;cparat111g tlw
,;,.IJ f1n111tilt• ohjc-ct nf knowled~(' th~tl, as dd11wcl by tlw Plnl<)llk
111111lt·, 11111•
1'ould "k1111w'' "Knowl<•<lgl',"llH'lt, 11,llsc-lf pnw1·1 In 1·1111
· 11111.ll,1vc•lo11-.·,,d1·sc1lptlo11s of tlw "lln11wrl1" t11 p11•l'l,llrndt"
11
Greek were all in terms of the lack or absence of power and control.
"Identification with" indicates "passivity" and "manipulation by" - a
willessness because the self is not separated from the other. The
Homeric man was not a "free agent"; he had no power (knowledge).
It is this all-important need to distinguish self from other (cogni-
tively, emotionally, and politically) and its relationship to the quest
for power on which the European utamaroho depends, that gives
direction to European cultural nationalism (the primary behavioral
manifestation of which is European imperialism.) The dynamics of
this ideology are linked to the separation of self, the related defini-
tion of ego as an isolate, and the resultant desire to control that
which remains (alien) when the ego is abstracted. In this frame of
reference to be "other than" is to be ''opposed to"; and so all "other"
is potential enemy and must be controlled (made powerless). (In
terms of African ontological formulations, on the other hand, the
"person" has her own "power" or "force" by virtue of being a part of
the cosmological whole.)
Dorothy Lee puts it this way: "The definition of the self in our
own cultures rests on our laws of contradiction. The self cannot be
both self and not self, both self and other; the self excludes the
other." 11Norman Brown makes a similar observation when he says
that Freud was "misled by his own metaphysical bias toward dual-
ism"12 and that "one can see Freud's thought inhibited by a concep-
tion of self and other as mutually exclusive alternatives." 13In this
respect, Freud's thought is simply manifesting characteristics of the
European utamawazo, an utamawazo besieged by irreconcilable
dichotomies such as "subject/object," "self/other," which become
the terms of European value distinctions like "knowledge/opinion,"
"reason/emotion," etc.
Paul Goodman has described this tendency in relation to
European psychoanalytic theory as "neurotic dichotomies ... some
of which are prejudices of psychotherapy itself." 14 Goodman dis-
eusses the nature of some of these "splits" that plague European
thou gilt:
"Bocly and "Mind": this split is still popularly current, although

among lhe besl physicians the psychosomatic unity is taken for
grunted. We shall show that it is the exercise of a habitual and
finally 1111awareclelibernt<'dness in the face of chronic emergency,
N,iw<·l;dlyt lil' I lireat to organic functioning, that has made this crip-
pl111Hdlvlsioi1 l11cvil11hl1•and al111osl i11clc1nir,rc•s1ilti11gi11liH' joy-
~tr,\Pl•l1•i.i.111•i:t,ol 1·1tit11n•
l11r,11w•t.~1111<1
346 YURUGU
"Self" and "External World": this division is an article of faith uni-

formly throughout modern western science. It goes along with the
previous split, but perhaps with more emphasis on threats of a
political and inter-personal nature. Unfortunately those who in the
history of recent philosophy have shown the absurdity of this divi-
sion have mostly themselves been infected with either a kind of
mentalism or materialism.
"Emotional" (subjective) and "Real" (objective): this split is again

a general scientific article of faith, unitarily involved with the pre-
ceding. It is the result of the avoidance of contact and involvement
and the deliberate isolation of the sensoric and motoric functions
from each other. (The recent history of statistical sociology is a
study in these avoidances raised to a fine art.) We shall try to show
that the real is intrinsically an involvement or "engagement." 15
The raison d'etre for these "splits" is to be found in the basic goal
of European behavior. The idea of separation is necessary for the
seusation of control, i.e., of European power. It must be experienced
as "control of" and "control over." One part controls the other; "I
control you." Where entities are merged or conceived as unity there
,·an be no question of "control over" or of "power" in the European
sv11se.
This conception of the self and the ontology that generates it do
11otexhaust the possibilites of human meaning or of conceptual mod-
t•lf;.I .cc says that it is possible to have a system that is not based on
,1 lriw orcontradiction. Among the Wintu, she says, "The individual is
p.1ttirularized transiently, but is not set in opposition." 16 Lee prefaces
1111 1 ro111ments on the Wintu conception of self by saying that this
e0111·cption probably no longer exists. But it is possible to find exam-
ph•s frorn cultures that remain dynamic survival systems, and it is
necessary for a viable critique of European culture that we do not
IH•comc locked into a continual comparison of European forms with
lhosf' that it has destroyed (or made obsolete); often such compar-
lso11s encourage the impression of the inevitability of the
Europeanization of the world-no matter how negatively one may
claim to view this process.
Vernon Dixon tells us that the African objective is "the use of
torc<'s in nature to restore a more harmonious relationship between
1111111 and tl1e univcrse." 17 Human beings and tile phenon1c11al wm ld
,ltt' lnterclcpenclr11t. "The phenomenal world l>cc-orncs 1wrso1111I
l11•d " 111111n!xon's ro111Jrnrism1of the- /\frlcan n11clE1tropt'illl world
. vli•w,;, lw dl'i('11%('S tl11•ll'Slll'<'IIVl' ('(1111'1 ('IIL<'lfl(' ft 0111
1 1)1: or h( 111111.11
tl11"H' tw11 pldl11!wpl1k-. 111llw l-:111np1·,111 vt,·w, lw ,1v·,, 1111· · 1•11I:, 111
lntracultural Behavior 347
a state of perpetual battle with "an external, impersonal system." The

self battles even with nature since "nature does not have his [the
self's] interest at heart." Dixon explains that this conception results
in a separation of the European self from itself predicated on the
assumption or perception of two distinct realities: the "thinking
being" and the being that experiences ("phenomenal man"). "The
individual becomes the center of social space. There is no conception
of the group as a whole except as a collection of individuals. We are
because I am; and since I am, therefore we are." 19 Or, more impor-
tantly, "I am, therefore itis."
According to Carlton Molette's description of African-American
ritual drama, its cultural "success" rests on the ability of those par-
ticipating to share spiritual selves-so to speak-as does so much of
African ritual. 20 The Haiku described by Suzuki depends on an under-
standing and identification that transcends the Western European
definition and limitation of self; a limitation that is rarely surmounted.
There are many such examples from the artistic experiences of major-
ity cultures. As our discussion of the European aesthetic revealed,
European art suffers from this concept of self as isolated and in antag-
onistic relationship to other.
Lee continues with her explanation of the European concept of
self:
In our own culture, we are clear as to the boundaries of the self. In

our commonly held unreflective view, the self is a distinct unit,
something we can name and define. We know what is the self and
what is not the self; and the distinction between the two is always
the same . , .. Our own linguistic usage through the years reveals a
conception of an increasingly assertive, active and even aggressive
self; as well as of an increasingly delimited self. 16
This juxtaposition extends even to characterizations of inter-

1wrsonal romantic "attachments" where one would expect identifi-
1•ntion to be paramount. Lee says:
Nol only do we think of ourselves as actors here, but we phrase this

"Hcl ivity" as directed at a distinct order. When I say: I like him, I cast
rny statement into t·he subject-to-object-affected mold; I imply that
I hnVC'done something to him. Actually, he may be totally ignorant
ol nty llkit11-!and unaffeclccl; only I lllysclf am certainly and directly
alkf'll'd by 11.21
Wi•M•' H 1)1'/lli•llly h11111f!hl h11ckIn tlw "11•vol11tloi1"that Plato

wrn k11d (I dlllrJl'III ly ICl III l1111, '1'!10111111,
,ii 111111 II', l•~t(I I l,1Vl'l1wkM!-1111'',,
,'{48 YURUGU
in his time his fight was all "up hill" and very much in opposition to
the traditional epistemological mode, Plato's successors were ulti-
mately overwhelmingly successful in shaping the Western concept of
self that presupposed its isolation as the prerequisite to objectifica-
tion. In this analysis his success is explainable by the intimate rela-
tionship of his ideas to the ideological principles already present in
the germinating asili of the culture. According to Lee,
Over the years, the English language has followed an analytic and
isolating trend and it is possible that in linguistic reference there
has been an increasing separation of the self from the encompass-
ing situation. 21
What is also revealed in the language of the European is that

"freedom" of the self to control implies "freedom" to possess what is
not self. Lee continues,
Our language implies not only that the self is narrowly delimited,
but that it is also in control. My is the pronoun which we call pos-
sessive; whose distinguishing characteristic, we are told, is that of
possession or ownership; and possession in our culture means con-
trol: mine, to do with as I wish. And My is a word frequently used. 21
In the international arena, as we have seen, the European cul-

tt 1ral ego expresses itself in the need to possess everything, and the
t •verse struggle against Western domination is that of other people
fl11cl majority cultures merely to "possess" and "define" themselves.
Tl1c European American/European use of the first person possessive
It: Indeed a significant point in an analysis of the culture. When one
11b.·crves children in European society, the words "my" and "mine"
',C'<'ITIto be said earliest and most often in their interactions with each
other. The "our" and "ours," which are significant in communal soci-
(•t ics, also signify possession. But Lee is correct, the difference is in
the relationship to the idea and experience of control. The commu-
nal "our" takes the locus of control away from the "individual" (the
"person" must consult others who share possession). At the same
Lirne it forces responsibility on the person to organize the community
111order to gain control (influence) which can only be exercised
lllrough communal participation. This kind of control is not <"11ough
In ~ntisfy the neecls of tile European utarnaroho, which is slinpL•d l1y
1111us/Ii tlmt demands power for its intc-grity.
l.1·1•t •mlncls w; uf l111•splltti111-!of tl1 • l·'.urop1•a11~wlr llt;\I 111,tlwt1
p11•;xlhl1•1111••H•n,;11t11111111,, <'nnlrnllh1g 111,<I .1\'IIV1·"11·11i-.011,"t,tllw,
than the perception of a controlled and passive ''emotion." Her com-

ments further demonstrate the relationship between the concept of
the human generated by the European utamawazo, and the concept
of self held by ordinary participants in the culture: One is self-con-
scious and speculative; the other is assumed. But they are both part
of the same whole. Lee says,
When it comes to the non-physical aspects, we note a reflection of

the dualism of mind, and matter and the hierarchy which is a corol-
lary of this. "Passions" are considered lower: I fall in love, I fall into
a passion or a rage. I delve into my unconscious, which is implic-
itly underneath: but I analyze my conscious, where I do not need to
excavate, since it is on my level. I lose and recover my conscious-
ness or my reason; I never fall into consciousness or reason.
Neither do I control my will; 1 exercise it. The self is most nearly
identified with consciousness-spell mastery and control. So here,
too, we find the implication that the self is in control of the other. 22
Lee makes some additional observations about the relationship

of the self to that which the self experiences (Dixon's separation of
"man from phenomenal man"). 23 Here again, we see the tyranny of
Aristotelian logic and epistemology over the European mind and the
consistently limiting effect of its absolutism on conceptual possibili-
ties.
Linguistic analysis further shows us a different relationship

between the self and reality in general from that which is basic to
our own culture. The Wintu never asserts the truth as absolute, as
we <:lowhen we say it is.24
According to Lee, the Wintu say, "I-think-it-to-be-bread" or some-

lhlng with similar implications rather than "It is bread."
The statement is made about the other, the bread, but with the
implication that its validity is limited by the specified experience of
the speaker .... For us, that which we sense or know according to
man-made rules of logic, is; and that which is beyond my appre-
hension, beyond my sensing or cognition, is fiction, that is, it is not.
The sci( is the measure of all things .... Art and metaphysics and
rl'ligio11sexperience are barely tolerated on the fringes of our cul-
tu n• ... Mysticism is defirlf'cl negatively as loss of self; and no one
In <·cstasy is tnkrt1 1H.•rlo11~1y, uulil he comes to his senses. Only
wll1•11 tllt- ~vlf 1,-;lo~lrnlly 1111(ICOl,(t11llvcly in rontrol. is experience
v,,llll, 111ut1•x1·<•1>l ltt lilt• arts ,u1d ri•ll!,llOllonly lhal which is ulti-
1r1,1l1•ty111)1'11In ••II!ll 1''1111'111•111•1•
['. ti 111•
''I
350 YURUGU
What is tolerated is the attempt to mold art, metaphysics and

religion into the shape of the "logically" controlled, thereby robbing
these aspects of culture of their worth.
The universe for the minority European is centered in the self.
This is radically different from world majority ontological systems. Is
it any wonder, then, that the corresponding European concept of
freedom would be lodged in the individual, isolated self as well? This
implies, to the European, that the individual has particular value in
the culture. But when the culture is examined, it becomes clear that
in the quest for the all-important self, much is sacrificed. Europeans
are accustomed to viewing other cultures from the heights of invidi-
ous comparison to their own in which traditional classical African and
other majority cultures represent the depths of constraint and lack
of respect for "individuality." Yet the priorities of European ideology
result in a kind of suppression of the human spirit unknown else-
where.
Among the Hopi, Lee found that "Every individual, young and
old, is charged with responsibility for the welfare of the social unit. "25
This supports Diamond, who says that in traditional society the aver-
age individual participates to a greater extent than does the ordinary
individual in European society. The result of this is that the person
has a significance that she lacks in European culture. Her importance
is qualitatively different. There is not simply a verbal commitment to
"valuing the individual." She means more to the group; her value is
Uiven content. 26
Again, what happens is that the asili of the culture demands the
creation of both conceptual and phenomenal (experiential) realities
I hat will work to maintain its wholeness and consistency. Since the
foundation or germinating seed of the culture puts in motion an insa-
1iable power drive, conceptions and definitions must be created that
facilitate the will-to-power. Power becomes defined/experienced as
control over other. This, in turn, necessitates the splitting of self from
other, as we have seen. What results is the concept of the individual
("not divisible"); the smallest unit of the social group. This atom of
l he human universe is invented by the European as the seat of ratio-
nal thought, the seat of moral action, the locus of power (since power
must be an intensely narcissistic experience). Is it any wonder th,11
ruopcrntion between such entities is problematical'! Clearly the coll
cept of the ''individual'' Is uniquely European, as is the resultant l<ll·
oloh,y of lndivid11nlis111and th<' economic systf'lll of rapitalis111 th,11
a1·c·nmpn1tlt·s 11 i\11 "l11dlvl<lunl" ('111111•vt>1 t1 uly PXpt.•rh-1H't' lltl' "W('
Ill"•'>" ut t 11111w1; ,lll "l11cllvld1111I"
l',111 lll'V1•r c·x1wt11•11t
(' plH'l)nllH'lllll
reality as an extension of self, only as a negation of self. What is

socially problematical is a communal impossibility. There is no coun-
terpart to the European "individual" in African civilization. It is sim-
ply impractical; it does not suit the asili of African culture and
therefore does not exist (except as destructive /"evil"). The concept
of "the person" in African thought extends to encompass the entire
universe. But then the objective is not personal control or power.
The social objective is the experience of "we." The African limitation
is difficulty in defining the political "they." The European political
advantage is that every experience is defined politically, based on the
identification of the threatening "other." This intense politicization
begins with "Inda-European" or archaic European xenophobia, per-
haps functioning to offset their minority status in the world.
European culture creates a being who thrives on competition
and, therefore, on individual and distinct achievement. Because there
is not a natural regard for personal worth born from and supported
by the culture-because a person's existence as a member of the
group does not in itself mean much-the individual strives to be "bet-
ter than," to stand apart from others in his craving for recognition.
This serves to reinforce his separate awareness and to further
decrease his ability to identify with others. He, least of all, can define
his good or his goals in terms of universal harmony. It should be even
clearer now that there is no supportive mechanism or precedent for
an "altruistic" ethic or spirit of "universal brotherhood." The only
t hfng that binds members of the culture together in the final analy-
i;ls-that binds them into a unified cultural whole-is the common
1-{oalof the suppression, exploitation, and control of the rest of the
worlc{; the environment, the earth and its people; that which is other
than the cultural self. It is a union of like-minded people, who have
rooperated in the creation of a technological giant-or monster.
In Lee's description of the Hopi, we see the possibility of an
,,ltemative definition of normative behavior:
It Is not only the physical act, or overt behavior, which is effective

arcording to the Hopi view. Thought and will and intent are at least
ilS effective; so that it is not enough for the individual to act peace-
hilly; he must also feel nonaggressive, think harmonious thoughts,
1111d he Imbued with a singleness of purpose. It is his duty to be
l1appy, for the sake of tile group, and a mind in conflict ancl full of
nnxh•ty hrln~s disruption, 111-belng, to the social unit and, al a time
ul prny(•r ,111dct•tcmony, to thp t•11tln univt'rscY 1
1
352 YURUGU
posed of anxious, aggressive, and always potentially conflicting indi-

viduals. The units within it are held together by the mechanisms of
Weberian-defined "rationality" (efficient organization); mechanisms
that control competition and ameliorate conflict only by delimiting
the individual. The European conception of being tends to eliminate
the need to consider the thoughts and spiritual states of persons,
since in that dimension they are considered "powerless." It is part of
the mythology that the European is motivated by strong "inner" con-
victions and a high degree of self-respect (Williams); while people in
traditional cultures are more like "non-thinking automatons," whose
spirits are ruled by their cultures. But it is often in majority cultures
that one finds impressively strong standards of behavior and per-
sonal commitment to ethical behavior. Identification with group well-
being should not be confused with lack of personal conviction or
inability to make ethical decisions. These are all the characteriza-
tions implicit in Williams' earlier statement of the Euro-American
"value of individuality." They are the same terms of Havelock's char-
acterization of the "pre-Platonic" Greek.
In the African world-view the European dichotomy of opposi-
tion between the "individual'' and the group collapses, and, instead,
the person and the community are defined in terms of each other.
They are interdependent, merging beings who together form the
meaningful reality. The person is nothing (spiritually dead) outside
of the context of the community because of the emotional, spiritual,
and physical necessity for interaction with other human beings: This
is necessary for the realization of humanness. The community is cre-
ated by the spiritual communion or joining of persons. Its proper
functioning and perpetuation is dependent on healthy, whole, com-
nutted, happy persons. That is why healing rituals have a communal
aspect and why the morally evil is represented by a person who
attempts to function autonomously (the "individual"), causing harm
to others and creating distrust (the sorcerer). The power of such
anticommunal thought must be neutralized if the community is to be
able to keep its members (persons) healthy. Thus the African world-
view leads to a very different concept of personal happiness. Just as
the aim of the Hopi ceremonial "is the well-being of the universal
whole." 28
It becomes ever more imperative that we understand the f11II
Itnpllcallons of the existence of a minority culture in our midst; a cul-
t un' that has no formal or lnslit11tional r<'flt•cllou of tl1~1111lvcu,,d
or<ll'r, 1•spt'!'l,dly slue·<·lhl.s ('lll\url' Is hy 11nl111<·
11xpi111,;lrn1lsll1•Thi~
1-. n n1lt111,· ll,tsi•cl 011 tlJL• lwlh•f tl1al tlw 011ly 11•altly I!, 111111
whllh
human beings create through manipulation of matter. It is based on

a series of destructive acts that disorder and deplete, but do not har-
monize or replenish. It may have taken centuries to reach the point
of obvious breakdown that the workings of European culture now
exhibit, but the seeds of destruction were always there in the asifi that
generated an initial ontology that attempted to eliminate the spiritual
from human consciousness. As long as the European believes the
autonomous individual can be the basis of his own happiness, or that
the "individual psyche," as Havelock puts it, is the seat of moral con-
viction and that rationalism can be a source of morality, so then will
his culture continue toward moral disintegration and his spirit con-
tinue to wither. The process started long ago, but the worst is yet to
come. It is precisely the "autonomous individual" in Western
European society who is its weakness. There are no longer guide-
lines for him to follow, and he has no tradition within his historical
awareness from which to create them.
What happens in the contemporary West is that the individual
feels overwhelmed by the institutions that surround her and power-
less to affect the whole (the group, the social entity). 29 As she grows
older she begins to feel more and more that she is interchangeable
;rnd so loses a sense of her own worth. This is the fate of the vast
,najority who do not achieve recognition beyond the crowd by
~•xlrcme competitiveness, aggression, and selfishness. Joel Kave!
says,
WItat we have thought to be an increase in our individual power and

freedom granted by modern progress, is in reality a much more
nmbiguous and complex process. To a large extent, people have
been freed by handing over to culture their autonomy, for which
I llcy are repaid with material bounty and the freedom from manual
toil. These are substantial boons, but for the mass of men, they are
obtained at enormous cost. For, along with the diminution of self-
1111to11omy, occurs the complementary growth of culture and its
111.1gkalmachines. As the self becomes dedifferentiated, society
t ak<'sover the process of history, becoming both more articulated
111111111ore conl'rnlled .... We are talking, of course, of that unique
11111d1•r11phenomenon, totalitarianism, which we have already seen
111lllls century in particularly !1orrid, and perhaps premature,
101111:-,but which seems to be given existence simply by the natural
30
1111loldlnj.(
of the lo~os of \lv'cstern civilization.
Thi:; IJ1sl phrn:,1• lllltls nf tlH• oslfi <'011rt•pt, wlll('II focuses 011
111111•11•111 fd,•ologlr,tl t1·111h•twl1·-. l1,1r:1dmck.1lly,,\s Kovc•l :wr11rnt~ly
II "I I IIt' )I•"I(' 111 I 11C·Y•., .Ji11•11·,1·:hII-(ltt·d III It 11ll hll ,II II I ·,I!ti I' ( ( ,11II C"
ltll'II 111
354 YURUGU
in European development, he does not seem to recognize the idea of

''self-autonomy," the loss of which he laments, as the culprit. He
seems to have confused "self-autonomy" with "personal integrity."
They are not synonymous, for "self-autonomy" is the converse of
community. In the oppressive and repressive state order that the
European asili generates, the self does indeed become more spiritu-
ally separate, thereby resulting in a collection of alienated selves. It
is spiritual joining that creates "community," and it is community, not
autonomy, that has the power to defeat the totalitarian order.
For Lee, "Respect for individual integrity, for what we call human
dignity, has long been a tenet in American culture." 31 But what does
this mean? And Williams in his sociological description of American
society does not raise the question of what actually happens to the
individual in that society but appears to merely accept the "tenet."
We can, however, provide a basis from which such questions may be
asked and a basis for a deeper understanding of the cultural mean-
ing of this supposed European value as well as the cognitive structure
that underlies it.
Stanley Diamond's discussion in The Search for the Primitive
helps, by offering another view of what becomes of the individual in
European society. Redfield, he says, described "ideological individu-
alism" as being a reflection of "individualization," which "denotes the
increasingly mechanical separation of persons from each other, as a
result of the replacement of primitive organic ties by civil, collective
conuections." Diamond touches on one of the most revealing illnesses
of contemporary Euro-American society: what he calls the "patho-
logical loneliness" of the individual. This loneliness is symptomatic
clf the spiritual failing of the culture, the result of an ontology that con-
C<.'tvcsof the self as autonomous. This ontology leads to severe "per-
sonal isolation." Diamond says that the Western technical order tends
to produce "standards" and "modal" types "rather than natural vari-
eties of persons" in spite of (or perhaps because of) the "ideology of
Individualism." 'The individual is always in danger of dissolving into
I lte function or the status. "32 He continues,
In the name of individualism, civilization manufactures stereotypes

... such stereotyping usually leads to a culturally formed sl upid-
lty, a stupidity of the job itself, which grows to encompass the pcr-
so11,feeding on itself as both a defense against experic11cea11clt lw
n·s1ill of being dcprivcd.: 1~
Y11t lll1· 111-11!•( tl1,1t E11101w1111 ::1oc·h•ty('tod11<•1•s 11t1dh p1ot111·tlv•·

111 otlll' tlJH'I l;II ltc•l'd0111 tli:11 f,; th1• llfc•hluud of 1111•l11dlvld11,,I1111111
very deep in the American psyche. In undergraduate, introductory

anthropology courses the instructor's descriptions of majority cul-
tures are invariably met with the exclamation, "But they have
absolutely no individual freedom. It must be horrible." And yet Jomo
Kenyatta can say, "The African is conditioned by the cultural and
social institutions of centuries, to a freedom of which Europe has lit-
tle conception .... "34 Contrary to ideology, group awareness and per-
sonal significance are not contradictory. As Diamond observes,
Anyone who has ever witnessed a ceremonial African dance will

certainly agree that the individual's sense of personal power and
worth is immeasurably heightened by the communal nature of the
event. 35
He makes the critical distinction between the idea of "commu-

nity" and that of "collectivity." And it is a significant one for the under-
standing of the failure of European culture in terms of what it does
not offer its members. "Community," he says, can no longer be found
in modern Western society, which is, instead, based on "collectives"
that are "functional to specialized ends, and they generate a sense of
being imposed from without. They are objectively perceived, objec-
tifying, and estranging structures." The mob, according to Diamond,
is the converse of the "organic group"; it is a "collectivity of detached
individuals." 35 "The image of the mob is part of our image of the city."
The word "community" itself implies the idea of a spiritual basis for
joining with others; as in "communion."
It is interesting here to take note of the two connotations of the
European term "jungle," related only via the logic of European chau-
vinism. One of these is that of an area of land, dense and thick with
vegetation, which has not been inhabited or cultivated. The other is
that of a grouping of "detached individuals," each one willing to com-
111itany amount of violence to another to ensure her/his own sur-
vival. This image carries with it that of pervasive fear that comes with
11w complete loss of communal and, therefore, moral order; when
one is continually aware of the possibility of being attacked from any-
where, at any time. The image is that of the Euro-American city. The
I rtw "Jungle," in this second connotation, are the "New Yorks.": The
rm1<.·rete structures that are truly opposites of the first definition of
''j1111tflt•."Tlint is where 1'11isextreme deterioration prevails, as
uppost·d to tl1osl~ ;irt•as least to11rhc<1 by European culture.
l',11101>1•;111sltnv • f111nllyn1;1d1lltl'ir own rw1cept11al lt1vrntio11-thr
1
nrlltllt,11 rnd1•1
( 0111plc1fp4,1ck ,1 l(•,1llty And this ls lilt' f111;1l
0\lltOlllt'
111llu "ltl1•11l111!Y
111l111llvl\ltt,llh111,.
356 YURUGU
It remains for us to see what kind of intracultural ethic supports

and is in turn generated by this isolating concept of self.
The "Protestant Ethic" and European Behavior

Most social historians would agree that Protestantism was the
religion of the merchant emerging from medieval feudalistic society.
Weber describes what he calls the bearers of sixteenth-century
Western culture as he relates the "Protestant ethic" to the "spirit of
capitalism," in his attempt to demonstrate
the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an

economic spirit, or the ethos of an economic system. In this case we
are dealing with the connection of the spirit of modern economic
life with the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism. 36
But Lewis Mumford takes exception to the overwhelming con-

currence with Weber's conclusions. In The Condition of Man, he says,
Max Weber's thesis, that Protestantism played a prime part in the

conception and development of Capitalism, has become current
during the last generation. In view of the patent facts of history, this
belief is as strange as it is indefensible: for it assumes that modern
Capitalism did not take form until the sixteenth century; whereas
ii existed as a mutation at least three centuries earlier and by the
fourteenth century it pervaded Italy: a country where Protestantism
has never been able to gain hold.
C.ipltalism was, in fact, the great heresy of the Middle Ages: the
chif'f challenge to the ideal claims of Christianity .... There is no
doubt .... that theological capitalism made its appearance far in
advance of any protestant doctrine in either religion or econom-
icsY
Mumford fixes on the issue of whether or not Protestantism was

prior to capitalism and on the initial relationship of the two ideolo-
gies, which in his view was antagonistic. 38 Mumford is most probably
right, the seeds of capitalism did not wait for the soil of Protestantism
to be planted.
But clearly the strength of Weber's observation is correct.
Jlrotf'stantisrn, itself, obviously had to have its "ori!-(ins" in tlw
( 'hu1 ell, yet this historical fact doc's not make.:ti IC' differences lwtwt•<·n
Its d1wtrtiws (rnl<·) n11ct that of tlw t\1wstollc Clturch w1y tll • less r1·al.
1,:1I111ol11).!l1·;11ly, ohl1 • f111·1h t I1.11 11t1 11111t
I 11(1l111llsp11I I 1•1 I111w 111111'11
1•,11
n1•1 tlt1111 1111'!,IXl(•t•11ll1 ('1•11l111y tlw -;i•(•<h 111 I 11plt,llh111,11111
Protestantism may have been sown, nor what form they may have
taken in these early stages, ultimately their development converged
to reinforce one another and to form a culturally and ideologically
congruent system that was to strengthen the tendencies of Western
European development. Both cohere in the European asili. Capitalism
could not have survived without a supportive ethical statement
within the culture; a statement that sanctioned the intracultural
behavior it dictated. Protestantism, and not the so-called "Christian
ethic" (rhetorical), provided that sanction. Mumford himself sees
ultimate correlations.
Thrift, foresight, parsimony, order, punctuality, perseverance, sac-

rifice: out of these austere protestant virtues a new kind of economy
was created, and within it, a new kind of personality proceeded to
function. At one end of classic capitalism stands Jacob Fugger II: at
the other end, John D. Rockefeller 1.39
The Protestant sought to curb the capitalist spirit and in the end he
deepened its channels: he challenged the political rule of the despot
and brought into business enterprise the ruthless ego that has hith-
erto dominated only the machinery of state. 40
Joel Kovel's assessment of the significance of Weber's theory

appears to be more to the point:
He was actually looking for an example of the organicity of cul-

ture-how, in this case, the "spirit," that is the psychology, of cap-
italist activity, was decisively influenced by the new style of
reiigious activity devised by Calvin, and by Luther before him.
Religion has been, up to recent times, the source of our cultural
worldview. A world-view must be presented as a set of normative
controls, which must in turn be equilibrated with the superego
structures of the individuals within culture. Thus the decisive
chnnge in the development of the capitalist spirit was the granting
l.)y Protestantism of a stern inner conscience to direct productive
artivity rationally.
And Kovcl credits Weber with having presented the "definitive

d1•scrlpllon" of "t·he new class whose rationalized activity so trans-
to1111Nl the globc."~ 1
011r task h<'n' I~ 11ot to n'capltulate Weber's observations nor
11,.. p!Hllm,1 of 11•lat1·cltll1•or1t,s that havt' 1->mprgt>d as n rPsult of his
wmlt, l111t to poll1l to o1 IH'W cly11alllil lh,1t P1nlt•~1ta11tts111 a11d lite•
l1111111-(hlto l·,11111p1·,111111ll11rt• I l1,1v1·t1•111wd lilt' v,lltll'S
l<c•f111111,lllo11
358 YURUGU
traditionally associated with the early Christian ethic as "rhetorical"

in function because they are not characteristically reflected in
European behavior. The rhetorical ethic is primarily for purposes of
export. Internally, it serves the purpose of conscience-salvaging for
those who need it, but it is directed outwardly (to a large degree);
toward the "cultural-other." To be properly understood, it should
come under the heading of "public" or "international relations" and
belongs to the arena of international politics. The functions of the
early Church in this regard left the culture without a set of normative
controls, for contrary to what Kovel says, religion was not the source
of the European worldview, but rather a systematically supportive
statement of European ideology. Prior to the Protestant statement
what tended to give direction to European behavior was (1) the com-
mon desire to rule the world and, (2) the shared commitment to build
a technological colossus. There was no formal intracultural ethic pro-
vided by an institutionalized religious statement. There were only
the informal normative directives of what would later become "sci-
entism" and the order imposed by the European interpretation of the
rational. (That is what is found in Plato's Republic.)
What Protestantism did for the Christian statement was to make
it relevant to the inner dynamics of European culture. For the first
time in the development of the West there was a correlation between
a formal religious statement and the actual valued behavior of the
European. The Protestant ethic was in this sense a moral or norma-
tive statement (a statement of ideal behavior), but it was only with
great difficulty a spiritual statement. It was not primarily informed by,
nor did it address itself to, spirituality. It was therefore consistent
with the "spirit," the utamaroho or life-force of the West. In other cul-
tures formal religion may be the source of worldview, but in European
culture, what is referred to as formal religion has always served the
politico-economic interests dictated by an ideology informed by a
nonspiritual base.
The Cultural Role of the Early Church

The discussion in Chap. 2 deals only with tbe Apostolic Church,
wlllch for what has been the major portion of Western European hi::;
tory was its predominant formal religious statement. But the Churcl1
l11Its reformed moclel-in lite forrn of Prote::;ta11t1sni ,,fter I lit>slx-
11-t•nt II r(•ntury-rC'lated to lhe matrix of I lie nllturc in a way I lli-ll was
<;Jjjlllfl('l\lllly cllffen•nt. /\ parL1;1ln•stal\'llWllt hc•rc·of-;01111• ol 0111'('/.II
llt', 1·1Hwl11•1lo11e. will lwlp to l•li1l'ld11lt•thl'{ dlfl1•rt•1wl'.
'l'lw 11hj1•1llv1· 111tlw 1·,11ly('llrlstl1111:,li1l1•1111•1il
w,1!~11111 tu lw .a
normative statement of European personal or "individual" behavior.

The European did not emulate Jesus "The Christ"; such behavior
would have been, as it was for him, suicidal in the context of European
culture. The Christian statement, instead, functioned to sanction
European imperialistic expansion by giving moral status to the
European concepts of "universalism" and evolutionism-progres-
sivism. The Church in this way performed a vital function in the cre-
ation of the Western European empire. Because of this objective its
"ethic" was directed not toward the European, which would have
been in direct contradiction to the imperialistic objective and to the
utamaroho, but to "cultural other," and did indeed complement the
imperialistic objective. Most of the imagery, cosmology and mythol-
ogy of the Bible has ancient African origins and is easily recognizable
as the product of other cultures. 42
The maintenance of these aspects greatly facilitated the impe-
rialistic objective as it made the early Christian statement emotion-
ally appealing and familiar to those whom the European wished to
conquer, and First World peoples were offered images created out of
a spiritual context with which they could identify. Catholicism
absorbed just enough of the characteristics of the culture it invaded
so as to ensure the loyal participation of its converts. It is the Catholic
Church that represents the early Christian mission-to complement
the political mission of the West-that of empire building. It is in
"Catholic" countries and communities that the celebrations and rit-
uals of African peoples reach the heights of bacchanal (e.g., during
the week preceding Ash Wednesday). It is the Church in its early form
111athas been most "tolerant" of majority world culture, because a pri-
ll!ary objective was political control of First World peoples, and polit-
ical control within Europe; not the moral guidance of Europeans.
A void existed; there was no normative religious statement intra-
<'1111u rally. There was no religious statement with respect to the stan-
cln.rclsof behavior of one European towards another. It is not that
~ucl1 values did not exist. Values that did, in fact, regulate internal
European behavior (i.e., behavior within European culture) did not
c·n111efrom and were not supported by what was recognized as "reli-
~11011" in the culture, i.e., prior to the Reformation. What directed the
l11•lwvlorof Europeans towards their "brothers" and "sisters" (other
l·'.11ropea11s) was a scculcir statement and a concurrence of material
\l,11l11•s 1111ddirectlvL'S (J\Uc1npts at reformulation within the Church
pt lrn lot lw Rl·fnt lllal 1011wt•n·, fort lw moi;t part, <>itl1c·runs11ccessru1
rn of 111111__111 1•, 111l~•r11mof Iii. H•l,\tlnnshlp to tlw do111I
1·1111:-.t•q1wnc
ldc·ult1~!Yul 1111'c·1ill111t·)
1111111
360 YURUGU
Because of the cultural imperialistic function of the Church, its

"other-dir.ectedness" in this sense, it has always been markedly pater-
nalistic. Its function was to encourage dependency, not to provide
moral strength, strong will, or independence in the individuals to
whom it was addressed. Obviously, for the purposes of cultural and
political control of First World peoples, individual initiative and self-
reliance are not desirable traits to encourage. Again, the early
Christian Church was ideal for European expansion, but not for build-
ing strength in the European in terms of European values and ideals.
It could not aid in the regulation of the behavior of the members of
Western society in accordance with an aggressive and strong indi-
vidualistic and self-reliant politico-economic system. An outgrowth of
the imperialist concerns of the Church was that within European cul-
ture it has fostered dependency and a kind of moral weakness (see
the film, The Rosary Murders 1989), because it offered no concrete eth-
ical statement applicable to the culture. All that was left was a resid-
ual of the paternalistic attitude with which "cultural others" were
addressed. In simple terms, it was excellent for the purposes of sub-
jugation, but not for the creation of the aggressive individual; not for
self-determination, nor for the budding capitalist. It was the objective
of Western European imperialism that accounted for the leniency
and paternalism of the Catholic Church.
A further related characteristic of the early Church that con-
trasts with the role of Protestantism was its unifying function. From
the time of its earliest cooptation by the Roman Government, the
Church functioned to unify the Western European Empire-again, to
facilitate its imperialistic-expansionistic objective. (When it began to
fail in this regard, also, it began to lose significance.) This function,
along with other imperatives of the European utamawazo, gave rise
lO the need for ultra consistency and the quest for doctrinaire sys-
tematization. The work of Augustine and others contributed to the
dogmatism and rigidity of the Church and later the Inquisition fanat-
ically attempted to weed out remaining dissension. This aspect of
Llie nature of the Church was, then, attributable to its intense politi-
1·alpurpose. Since the time of the early Church and subsequent to the
R<'form.ation and the growth of "non-Catholic" religious formulations
111the West, the political unification of Western Europe has never
l>t•cn provided by formal religion (i.e. the formally religious state
mcnt nf the culture has never been the vehicle of u11lficatlo11si11c1•
tltat llmc-). ll remains now for us to SCC'l1ow, in f:\(.'l, Ill!:' ft11H'lio11 of
1111111,d shifted wlll1 Ila• adw111 ol Pr(1l1•sla11tl•,111
rc•li1,1l1111
Reformation: the New Role of the Church

The essence of the change brought about by the Reformation,
within the context of this discussion, is that Protestantism repre-
sented not a statement fashioned for the missionizing of First World
peoples, but an inward turning of Western European religion. For the
first time in European development formal religion addressed itself
not primarily to imperial expansion but to the regulation of behavior
among peoples within European culture. This is not to say that
Protestantism did not support the colonialist and missionizing ven-
ture. It most certainly did and does. The point here is that its primary
function at the time of the Reformation, in terms of European devel-
opment, was to provide a normative statement for the behavior of the
individual within the culture. Moreover, in so doing, it emphasized
the individual self as the axis and regulating force of the ethic it put
forth.
This was an ethic, therefore, totally consistent with the values
of the West and supportive of the capitalistic venture that was to
play such a vital role in the political unification of Western European
culture and the further development of national consciousness. It is
" gross error for Ayn Rand and others of her persuasion to lament the
so-called contradictions between "Christian altruism" and the ethics
of capitalism, for in keeping with the organicity of European culture-
! he asili-the capitalist ethic received the sanctions necessary for its
success from this new religious statement, as well as from the
European utamawazo and ideology.
What was needed for the growth of the modern Western
European capitalist empire was a kind of person who could be
depended upon to behave in accordance with a particular code.
I 1rotestantism directed itself toward the civil order, rather than the
world order, and toward the inner person. It is in this context that the
ldC'asof Luther and, later, of Calvin supported one another. Luther's
l'll1pl1asis laid the groundwork for Calvin's political thrust. Mumford
111akes l'he following comments on Luther's ideas:
Safety and freedom were not to be found only in the inner world:
lint 1hat of the monastery, where authority also threatened, but
within 1he citadel of tile private self, outside the range of tyranni-
t•,11fathers and tQngued lightning.~~
l h•r nualn ht: poll its lo tlw extrC'mr inw;\rdness ;ind sC'\f-relianc.-e
111111
l.1111~1•1
'!1 ld1•,1s t'XPH"ViPd:
362 YURUGU
powers than those this doctrine opposed: the very fact that the
private world of the believer became sacred for him, prevented
him from acknowledging the criterion of sanity-the congruence of
private conviction with the historic experience and the common
sense of other men. 44
This is Kovel's description of this newly emphasized self:
A materialized world without intrinsic value is acted upon by a self

freed from that world by an inward turning. Superego at last moves
inward to rationalize gain and production decisively, and so
becomes the lord of history. 45
According to Mumford, then, Calvin applied this doctrine of self

to the maintenance of a special kind of civil order. He "fortified the
Augustinian doctrine of predestination" and "laid the foundations for
civil liberty and self-government: the City of Man."
... the civil order devoted itself to the systematic establishment of

the moral order .... A sin was a crime against the State: a crime was
a sin against the Church. 46
Mumford touches on the critical point I am making-that

Protestantism represented a new direction of attention of the formal
religious body toward the inner dynamics of Western European soci-
ety. But he does not seem to understand the real significance of this
new direction possibly because he is mistaken about the nature of
t•arly Christianity.
Calvinism was a real attempt to render unto God the things which
r1rc Caesar's: a return to that classic republicanism in which civic
virtue counted high in the human scale: a return to Christian prin-
ciples in realms from which it had been progressively banished: a
re-union of eternal doctrine and daily deed. 47
. Here I think Mumford is wrong. He speaks of "return" and

"reunion" as though there had not been an inherent separation
between these two realms in the very nature of Christian ideology as
IL was Initiated. It is Spengler who seems to interpret the "inte11tion"
of t•arly Christianity correctly, that is, in the European interpretation.
Ill Its adoption by tile West, it was never meant to apply to th<' COil•
rn·t.- exlsl<'llCl' of tlw daily lift' of tlw Euror1·;1n. Prol1'Sl,111llsJJJ w;1s
11111n ,·1•111111,11111 u 1r!lt' t l'fm Jllat ln11for IH'W p11rpu:ws.
ol pt'l
Tltt· h1lt·1tl of 1'1ot1·st,111th,111w.1s 11,111old., p,11t lnll,tr 11111<1
son. This person was suited to the growth of capitalism and the devel-
opment of modern Western society. He was an extreme individualist
(which, of course, had precedents in the earliest traditions of the
European utamawazo (culturally structured thought) only the empha-
sis was new). He was extremely self-reliant. He was the prototype of
the "good" and successful businessman. Mumford says, "the
Protestant personality was businesslike even when there was no busi-
ness in hand." 48 Calvin openly sanctioned the ethics of business; a
sanction that was absolutely necessary. If a modern capitalistic state
was to develop and prosper, a belief in the morality and sacredness
of personal property and the fulfillment of contracts was essential.
(We are only now beginning to witness the implications for the capi-
talist system and the Western empire when such an ethic is not
accepted; not in the advent of Russian socialism, but in the coming
of the "sky-jacker" and other forms of so-called "terrorism." "Terror"
to the West because the West loses control.)
In direct contrast to the Catholic posture, the Protestant attitude
towards adherents to the faith was one of severity and the presenta-
tion of exacting standards and goals of behavior that the individual
was expected to maintain independently; without the aid of a church
which forgave all and possibly served as a crutch for the morally
weak. The Protestant ethic implied a diametrically opposed philoso-
phy from that of the Catholic confessional. In support of this point
Mumford says,
So long as the sinner did not cut himself off from God by Heresy,
the Catholic Church was lenient to him. But Calvin's government
practices no such indulgence: its aim was to reduce temptation and
to root out sin.
By the seventeenth century Protestantism had created an ideal ego:

that which comes down to us in the image of the Puritan. The dom-
inant traits of this character were austerity and perseverance, a
narrowing of the circle of human interests and an immense con-
centration of the will ...
The Protestant shut himself off from the sensual expansion and the
<'rotic dilation of the baroque 01 dcr: and the avenues of sense were
now cardully gu~rdccl, sometimes completely shut. Not only did
and fi!.(ures disappear from his architecture, but even fig-
i111a!,{<'S
11rt•d p;1tl1•1ns. wliicl1 1111,silk 111a11t1fac1un•rsof Ill<' period had
'1•,111H•dIn 11rn1111{.irt1111•
lo tli1•lr~:tllll(lt11ous hnwa<IPs, clisappcarNI
It no1 jlt'IP,1111,d,1d11t111111111I
<l111v.-,1tln· 1111dlintnlwt rol11rs b1•r1111w
1111• m,11111nl 1111•
dl•,l111"'1l•,l1,d1l1• 1{1•1111111,lll11111'1
364 YURUGU
Catholicism has been historically successful in its vigorous mis-

sionizing efforts among majority peoples, while Protestant missions
have never been comparable in this endeavor. (The later "success"
of the non-Catholic church among First World peoples-African
Aladura, Puerto Rican Pentacostal, African-Caribbean Shango Baptist,
African-American Baptist Church-is ironically bought at the price of
the total denial of reformation Protestantism.) Again, the purposes
and objectives of these two religious statements were different.
Catholicism, representing the early Christian Church in its imperial-
istic role, would never have been successful in gaining First World
converts if it had approached them with the harshness of the puritan
ethic. And what is more important, such an approach would have
defeated the purpose of European imperialism; it would have been
the attempt to promote an ideology of self-sufficiency, independence,
and defensive strength among African peoples (much as the Nation
of Islam does).
The Protestant statement, on the other hand, directed inwardly
toward its own people, sought precisely to build such an individual.
Asceticism and sterility, the negation of the humanness and warmth
of other cultures, were interpreted as positive characteristics.
Therefore, whereas Catholicism found a valuable tool in the mainte-
11;\nceand incorporation of majority cultural forms, Protestantism
cliligently rid itself of all sensuality, emotional and artistic vitality,
and expansive ritual. Protestantism flatly rejected everything it con-
sidered non-European and in the process helped greatly to harden in
l·:uropean culture the sterile and the "abstract," the nonhuman ten-
dencies already recognizable in its development dictated by the asili.
Mumford says,
Not merely were the images of the Catholic Church rejected: all
images became suspect as superstitious idols, too easily wor-
shfpped for their own sake ... to dance, to attend theaters, to wit-
ness public spectacles, to participate in carnivals, and above all to
gamble at dice or at cards all lay outside the pale of his [the
Protestant's] daily practice; when he was not actively engaged in
business he turned to the sermon, the tract, the newspaper: the
world of black and white. 48
111Protestantism aesthetic imagery hecame more European.

( 'onstantine, Augustine, t\q11inas, and those they inrlurnn•rl con-
I ilh11lP<lto tilt" monument of polltlcr1I and doct,lllal sy!ilt•111;tti,mtlon
111,,1 Is ('r1tl1nllr·is111.Tl1cy It'll tlll.' ll'l,!i11•y of ;1 111wH1ll1lil1·,
«11111dmvt1
,ill, 11111f1t1cl
pqllth 111l'IIHl1111s s1.111•111t•nl:llw pt•1l,•1I v1•1lll'11• ly
11111•111
Western expansion. Mumford laments the fact that Protestantism did

not make the same contribution to European development. Again,
this fact must be understood in terms of its function within European
culture and its role and historical "timing" in European development.
Protestantism was not meant to unify the European empire. This pur-
pose was being fulfilled by secular aspects of European ideology and
culture. Its purpose was to aid in the regulation of the behavior of
individuals within the culture in order that that behavior be pre-
dictable and correspond to the controlling institutions and goals of
the West. Protestantism, says Mumford, has an "inherent tendency
toward fission," because "revelation" and not "reason' is thought to
be the appropriate means by which to interpret the Bible. There was,
therefore, in its early days a continual growth of antagonistic groups
and the creation of ever new sects based on differing interpretations
of the Bible. But Mumford does not seem to understand that these
"sects" only represented political decentralization. They were merely
variations on a theme, all of which, no matter how bizarre their inter-
pretations (from extreme Ascetism to snake handling), served the
purpose of providing strict moral statements for the guidance of
behavior within European culture and the necessary building of a
strong superego in the individual.
Thus individualism turned into mere atomism. And the final flower
of Protestant teaching was a willful denial of the need for unity:
each man lived in a private world, described by a system of private
science, edified by a private religion, governed by a private code,
subject to no law but his own conscience, obedient to no impulse
but that of his own private will. That was indeed the Utopia of the
irresponsible bourgeousie: it erected specious moral foundations
for the utmost caprice. 50
Mumford's observations here point perhaps to a much later

effect of Protestant individualism in combination with the European
utornawozo, but within the asili of European development, and in
Ienns of the needs of sixteenth century, it is not capriciousness nor
lrtr-sponsibility that Protestantism fostered, but consistent and pre-
clil't;ible behavior, oriented toward the goals of individual "achieve-
111t·11t" and hasecl oo a meclianism of control internal to the individual,
/\"i opposl'cl to ucing predominantly external as it had been 1111cter the
1•11rlyd1111c:l1.
Mnmforrl Is looking tor soirw1hlnP, in l'rotc•stantism tl1i1I is his
lot I, ,Illy •~1111Iot pl,H 1•"111I Ill' co11l\•XI o{ Ji:111
op1•;111 d1•v.-lcip1111•11t,
aud
tlt,1l (•. 11111•,tp1nli:1l1ly lw1 ,\Ilk<' 111lih, 11w1111111111tll11w11t lu ,, 'lp11rl111t't
366 YURUGU
"universalism" that is neither politically desirable nor culturally fea-

sible. It is pointless to evaluate Protestantism, Catholicism, capital-
ism, or any other ideological-institutional development within
Western European culture from the vantage point of an abstractly
conceived human goal of "universalism"-a consistent thread to be
found throughout Mumford's works. These European institutions can
be understood only in terms of the specific objectives and commit-
ments of European ideology. No European cultural form has been
created out of the need or desire to unify "man." The early church
never had this as its objective, unless European world expansion is
interpreted to be in the interest of all peoples, clearly a Eurocentric
interpretation. It is incumbent on the cultural historian to look at
Protestantism in terms of the needs of the specific developmental
period in which it flourished; that is, if she hopes to understand its
significance.
Catholicism, in its authoritarianism and concern for imperial
expansion, control, and unification gave no attention to the building
of the individual European superego. It could not do both, and there-
fore left a void in terms of an internal European ethical statement
and normative guide for behavior. Protestantism, on the other hand,
focused on the individual within European culture and did indeed
provide a model that the individual could internalize and that he was
led to believe could lead to "success" within the European value-sys-
tem and the new institutions that were taking form. This was in oppo-
sition to his reliance in the past on a systematized abstract theology
that he was not expected to understand and on the performance of
external ritual. It is Protestantism, and not early Christianity (and
certainly not all religion), that is the "opiate of the masses" in that it
Is designed to give the working classes the experience of a kind of
1,seudo-success within the European system through the adherence
to strlct rules of personal conduct; a "success" that is calculated to
compensate for the improbable success of the real capitalist, which
obviously is only accessible to a chosen few. Protestantism could
not.simultaneously fulfill the function of unifying the West; moreover,
II was not called upon to do so. Scientism, then industrialism and
progressivism would do the job. Historically Catholicism has furi-
u11sly weeded out heresy in its ranks. f'roin this perspective tile
l11quisilion makes "ethnological sense''; if we use the concept of usi/i,
-;1t1,·ctlw 11ec<.ls
of Europe were at that time the solidification of a11i<lt•
ulo~lc,\lly lllOllolithic world organiz«tiou. B111Prol r:-;t,\n I l:rn1rou lei
:,1trvlvt• wl "lnl1t•n·1it lt•ndt•11t•y 1ow..ird fission'' :111dsllll pt•t furt11 lit.
l11111·l10t1111 n1ll111.- JI rlilt'<'l<'<Ilh at11•11tlt1111ow,11cl
F.111111w:111 lilt· Inell
victual psyche. If that was properly controlled, there would be no

need for the paternalistic control of the unified Catholic hierarchy.
Protestantism and the European Ego

There are other features of Protestantism that help to explain its
place in the formation of these more mature stages of European devel-
opment. As Mumford points out, Protestantism did much to promote
literacy in the West. Literacy became more wide-spread to a great
degree because of the emphasis put on individual salvation with the
aid of familiarity with and interpretation of the Bible. 48
Protestantism, in its emphasis on the private "inner sanctums"
of the individual-being reinforced and was consistent with the devel-
opment of the European concept of individualism and the value of
individual freedom and autonomy. This emphasis and value were
encouraged by the already existing European conceptions of the
human psyche-a legacy from archaic Europe. While it is true that
this conception of "freedom" led ultimately to the tendencies of moral
decay in the twentieth century West, Mumford exaggerates and is
mistaken about its more immediate implications.
Seeking personal freedom to avoid the vices of an arbitrary eccle-

siastical authority, the Protestant finally became an advocate of
freedom in order to establish an equally arbitrary authority of his
own. If he lacked the outward power of a despot, he tended toward
negative despotism: nonconformity-ultimately nihilism. 51
The immorality of the West (the sacrifice of the human spirit in

the name of power) is not at all the same as nihilism (inherently
unsuccessful, since it does not seek to build): Again Mumford views
11,e cultural implications of Protestantism in such extreme terms
because of his "universalistic" ideology.
It should be understood that Protestantism further heightened
I I 1c momentum of Western European development in its commitment
t,,a nwchanical model and its alliance with the "machine." Mumford,
11kt'Friedrich Juenger (See Chap. 1), points to the coincidence of the
watd1111aking "capital" (Geneva) with the initial focal point of
(\dvl11islll. lie says,
'1'111•
111a<'hi11t• bc-ca111t'thus n doublc-lwaclccl symbol: it stood for
1111111(lr,i,pollc 1111thorily a11clfor the power that clrnllc11gecl that
.i11llw1lty It slnnd lrn 1111•111 u11d ii 1111il1•d1lw111The• ho11rg1•nisic>
1111·,11111• I; ,111cl1111•p111l1•l111l,1I,
!lit• IIC'W l•,11•1 1·v1•11/lo di',w11 l11 tlw
ltd,1111l1,11rlly11111of 1111•
1111•11• 1·t11tlli·, w1·11· 11l,vl1i11•,lytlioH•' plt•dt•N
3GB YURUGU
tined to damnation. Thus the Calvinist concentration on the will,

delivering into the world generation after generation of moral ath-
letes with bunchy spiritual muscles and proud ones, nevertheless
throttles the full human personality; and the City of Man was once
more undermined by the very engines of power that the Calvinists
themselves so ingeniously, so inventively, helped to install in its cat-
acombs.52
The attempt to understand the cultural significance of

Protestantism points to an important characteristic of European cul-
ture that can be easily misinterpreted. The Protestant ethic cannot
be understood merely in terms of the nature and function of formal
religions in primary cultural settings. Like religious statements in pri-
mary cultures, it both provided and reinforced the culturally
accepted behavior models and was in this sense a statement of
"morality," but unlike more spiritualistic religious statements. It was
in fact with the help of Protestantism and capitalism that the final
deathblows to spiritual awareness were dealt to the Western
European consciousness. Spirituality had never informed the direc-
tion of European development nor the character of European cul-
1ure; (it is not contained in the asill) but now it was thoroughly
t:xorcised.
For the sake of clarity, we should reiterate what is meant by
"spirituality," rather than assuming its definition. We mean to imply
a particular vision of a universal reality in which a given order under-
lies organic interrelationship of all beings within the resultant cos-
mos. This order, which is both perceived and is, at the same time, a
matter of faith, is of a metaphysical-essentialist nature. It is on this
ultimate, primordial level that meaning is derived, which then helps
t > explain material (physical) reality. Perhaps the most significant
characteristic of this concept of spirituality is its transcendent nature.
While one functions pragmatically within a profane reality, that "real-
ity" is never thought to be the essence of meaning. In spiritual con-
ceptions there is always a striving for the experience of a deeper
reality that joins all being. Learning is the movement from superficial
difference to essential sameness (Na'im Akbar). This "sameness" ls
spirit; beyond and ontologically prior to matter. It Is lite basis fo1
ltu111anvalue. One's spirituality involves the attempt to live anti st rue-
Ime one's 1i£eon a national, communal, and personal level in a..:c:or
dn1H·e with univNsal splrit'ual principles. It allows for tl11·
of spirit (<'twrgy) In 111att1·r(forn1)
apprt•l1t•11:-:lo11
L!•t••~look al an ,1 ,a1111pl<·
of 1·011t1•11q,01o1Yy t-:11r111w,111 llllt,H 1d
l111.tl lwl1.1vl111, wl1klJ p1·1l111p:..1·011<·11•1t•ly
d1•1u11111,lt,tl( 11, wh,1I I,
meant by the lack of a spiritual base in the culture. In March and

April of 1987, a controversial court case emerged in the headlines and
newscasts involving the custody of an infant, who became known as
"Baby M." The case brought attention to a new practice called "sur-
rogate mothering," in which a woman leases her womb to a couple
who cannot have a child. For a price, in this case $10,000, she allows
herself to be artificially impregnated with the man's sperm, carries
the fetus for nine months and gives birth to a baby, who then
"belongs" to the man and his wife. In the case of "Baby M," the per-
son referred to as the "surrogate mother," who actually gave birth to
the baby, changed her mind and wanted to keep the baby, claiming
that it was rightfully hers.
A situation such as this is inconceivable from the perspective of
a spiritualistic world-view. Everyone involved is reacting in a materi-
alistic manner to a profoundly spiritual event. And they have to
resolve it legally! The natural mother is called "surrogate" because
she has "sold" the rights to her body; she has "contracted" the func-
tion of her womb. Something she spiritually cannot do; that could
only be conceived of in the context of the European world-view,
which objectifies all reality. The body (womb) of the natural mother
is regarded as though it were a mechanical incubator on a hospital
ward. Yet the body (womb) is inextricably and interdependently
joined to a human spirit, soul, and emotional being. There may be no
other phenomenon that effects a woman's emotional being more
intensely than the act of carrying a child and giving birth. Only
Europeans would attempt to void the birth process of its spiritual
meaning-and treat another human being as a "womb" and biologi-
cal process only. In this instance, the most sacred occurrence, in
terms of the African world-view, becomes a business deal in which
not only a woman's womb but the baby to whom she gives birth is a
commodity: The ultimate profanation. Spiritual depth and maturity is
also lacking in the childless couple who, instead of adopting a child,
must desacralize a sacred phenomenon by "acting out" their extreme
and narcissistic egotism.
Centuries earlier in European development, Protestantism was
laying the groundwork for such an intensely nonspiritual approach
to reality. Protestantism was practical, mechanical, and materialistic.
It was in this sense "s<'rnlar" (or "profane" in the sense of Mircea
t-:liadt>'s oistinrtion). 53 A~ Mumford has inclicatecl, its concern was
th<' ro11<·n·t<•1,:l1rop1•at1 ''City of Man." Protcsl«ntism w«s about thr
ll'SS _or,,i.n-11
I >Iu,;11 n 1n1r•rlal SUI vlv,~I. Moral p~rsonul con
Ph~lv1. llf 1· ,111<1
lo dvll 111d1·1, l>lll lh1• 1·sst•1H't'
,lltd l11•lt,1Vlrnw1•1t· o11111•f1•q11l:itl1·
<111<'1
..,
.'170 YURUGU
of the human spirit was not the source of this morality, rather it was
being destroyed by it. Protestantism with its emphasis on the
Western conceived ego helped to destroy the self. Kovel says,
Through the expedient of abstraction, most forcefully expressed in

Calvinist theology, a God-symbol arose to justify individual suffer-
ing by turning it to economic use in the compulsions of work with-
out pleasure and gain without joy. 54
Clearly this describes a nonspiritual ethic or morality; a phe-

nomenon that is totally European, and one that should be under-
stood as such. Modern bourgeois man, says Kovel, "who began his
development propped up by the Protestant faith, succeeds in push-
ing God aside even as he worships Him."55
The implications of "anality" in the psychoanalytic description
of personality structure are diametrically opposed to what I mean by
"spirituality." It is the result of the denial of the human spirit. Kovel
identifies the Protestant ethic and its development with the anal per-
sonality. In his view it was a "natural" outgrowth of the anal Western
personality. This interpretation is the basis of his theory of European
imperialism and "white racism." He takes this explanation to its
extreme in his characterization of Luther. (Norman Brown has made
the same point. 56)
I lis personality was to a considerable extent elaborated upon anal

fantasies. Two of his personality traits, stubbornness and defiance,
were of decisive aid to him in his rebellion against papal authority
... the turning point in modern Western history, [was when]
Luther's idea of the power of individual faith, struck him in a flash
ol inspiration while he sat upon the privy, and that this genius was
not loath to stress the importance of this in applying fecal symbol-
Ism to all evil parts of the universe, and especially to the Devil,
God's black antagonist. 57
I .uther's personality is generalized and becomes that of the suc-

rcssfttl (and unsuccessful but ardent supporter of the system),
H!,11,tl'essiveEuropean. "Similar character configurations [have] aided
co1111tlessother westerners in their stubborn and defiant efforts to
l111posea new world culture upon other civilizations." Below Kovcl
lsnl:1tes the characteristics that describe the behavior of the
F.urop<'ttll,sunctlon(-'d and directed by the Protestant Nliic:
1·0111101, sl1il1l1m1t111•o;s, rlL'hlllH'I', ordt•rll u•s1.,1•lp1111ll111",'•·

p111,,
111.illty1111dflit 1ft tl11•t:1•1·n111plll',1t1•dtwit•. will! It l1av1•< 11,11,111111
ized the West more than any other civilization-devolve into anal
fantasies and the resolution of their logical incompatibility is
achieved through an unconscious symbolic root in infantile fan-
tasies about excretion. 57
Kovel is not the only one who has hinted at a relationship

between European anal development and European aggression. The
film, Cradle of Humanity, made by a team of European psychologists
for UNESCO,documents a study that they conducted of the relation-
ship between mothers and infants in West Africa. They concluded
that the closeness of this relationship encourages precocious men-
tal and physical development in very early childhood. In the course
of the film some comparisons are made with European childrearing
practices and attitudes. One point of comparison concerned toilet-
training, a very problematical transition in the development of the
European in which the child experiences rejection and separation
from the parent and from the self; it results in a kind of traumatiza-
tion in which fear and confusion becomes hostility and imposed order
(pleasure associated with control?). The European child is made to
sit alone on an alien, cold object and cannot "rejoin the group" in a
sense until he is "cleansed." Since the mother/parent is not sure of the
exact time of the need to excrete, this very young child often sits for
long periods alone or with a book or leaves only to be "placed in iso-
lation" again, (sometimes as a punishment).
As the film reveals, the traditional African practice is startingly
different. The mother and child, who are almost literally never phys-
ically separated, develop a special way of communicating that has
deep spiritual (even psychological) significance. The child uses this
special language to indicate to her mother when she wants to relieve
herself. The mother then takes the child from her back, where she is
carried, and sitting on the ground with her legs stretched out in front
of her, she positions the child so that she (the child) is sitting on her
(the mother's) legs facing her mother. The mother's legs are spaced
so that the child excretes on the ground. If for some reason the child
docs not relieve herself, the mother makes a "shushing" sound that
somehow encourages the child to do so. The result of this is an
t•xtrcmcly different kind of experience from that which children
r;i!se<I in Curopean societies uudergo. One ls a natural process
cl<•pl'llding on spiritual ('1>1111ection between the closest of human
I11•l11gs,Tl w ol I ll'r is a frl1,:htc11Jnglyartifkial prorcdurc that interjects
llc· 11i.11c·rl,1I
'-41••1 ohJ•·rls lnH, ,111nt}{,11tk pr<wt·ss a11d s11CTl'Cdsin allt·n
l1t•lt1W;h 111110111• ,11totl11•1,1:, I! l111pw,1•:-: 111·<l<.•1
,1tl111:l1111111111 011 l1t1111.111
1111'hv d1•11yl111{ l1111111t11
11plt lt1t11llly .,
:/72 YURUGU
This pattern of denial in European infancy is consistent as

babies are separated from their mothers at very early ages (at birth
in hospitals), and made to sleep in separate beds and rooms or to
relate to strangers for long periods during the day. This again is in
stark contrast to traditional African practice in which the mother car-
ries the baby everywhere on her back even sleeping with her at night.
She breast feeds the child on demand and refrains from sexual rela-
1ions with her husband until the child is weaned. In European culture
the baby must compete with the husband for the attention and affec-
tion of the mother. The film implies that the European child develops
the need to aggressively seek attention, since that attention is not
readily accessible. Aggression becomes the normal pattern of behav-
ior, since that is the way to achieve what is necessary. What kind of
adult develops from a lonely baby? Perhaps what Freud regarded as
universal human aggression, arising out of the trauma and conflicts
of the anal phase and infant individuation, are merely projections on
his part of a European syndrome that begins to intensify with
Protestant reformist thought and behavior.
What began to be referred to as the "Protestant ethic" also
resembled ideologically in several striking ways the cultural charac-
teristics of early Judaism. As I have said earlier, the Judaic statement
was fashioned for the creation and survival of a strong, self-sufficient,
ancl isolated cultural group. Its primary objectives were not those of
worlcl expansion. It possessed an inner-directed ideology; strongly
11atlo11alisticin the self-deterministic sense. In Judaism is found a
t nlional, political and material base (with the exception of the
(Jnbbala), as opposed to a spiritual supernatural one. In
Protestantism there is the same emphasis on self-improvement and
st>lf-rcliance that has historically characterized the Jewish popula-
t 1011.And it reflects a corresponding period in which Europe
addressed itself to its internal structures and to the kind of person
who would be appropriate to and supportive of the perceived cultural
mission.
. Without sacrificing the momentum of its expansionism, Western
nil tu re used the new religious formulation to build a culture that was
assured of survival and an individual who was loyal to its objectives.
M111nford,again, hits on this contrast between Protestantism and
( al iloliclsm, b11tshows no understanding of the cultural-political sig-
lllittttllC(.' of early "unlversalisl'ic" Christianity. He speaks of 1l1l~ dforl
nf tlll' slxtn·nth-rcntllry W,·st "lo Hdticw culturnl St!l1-i;11fh<"h·1wy: ,I
p1·1v1•1sl' tt•ho1111d lr11111 IIH· tlntv1•rs,d ('ll11r1·h,, l.111111·1 · .,sscwl
1
111 ,•cl1111 Pt 11,111011:iIJ•,10 wit Ii n 111, 'I 1111111
.111dh,ol,d 1111
il:-1u
I wit II p111IIy.'' '"
And from this perspective, Mumford recognizes a relationship

between Protestantism and Judaism:
Under the protestant [sic] passion for individual salvation, the com-
mon man lifted himself up by heroic mental efforts: he read and
mastered the history, the laws, the ethics, and the poetry of one of
the greatest cultures the world has ever known: that of the Jews. 59
Earlier, he says, "Calvinism was Christianity reinvigorated by

the morality of the Jewish prophets and the political and educational
traditions of the Jewish synagogue." 47 In the formulative stages of
Western culture it was precisely the isolationism and self determin-
istic emphasis of Judaism that rendered it inappropriate for the
expanded European ego and the newly conceived European world
imperialistic objective. The Christian statement of the ancient West
incorporated many of the cultural and ideological characteristics of
Judaism, while adding to it the universalism and proselytizing man-
date necessary to sanction the building of a world empire. Mumford
says of a much later period in Western European history that "Hitler's
religion of power, with himself for God, was an effort to overthrow
what was left of the universal and the human: an effort to turn the
world as a whole into the German fatherland." 58 What he does not rec-
ognize is that all "universalistic" statements and ideologies through-
out the history of Europe have been variations on the common theme
of turning the world into a European empire. Christianity was the
first such statement in formally religious terms, while Judaism was
politically inadequate, because at that stage of European develop-
ment it was too early for an inner-directed, isolationist, and self-deter-
minis tic religious statement. The first order of business was to
conquer the world; to expand "the self." By the sixteenth century the
European had gained his foothold on the world; now he was ready to
direct some of his attention to the inner dynamics of his culture and
to Lileethical control of the individuals within it. If such an "ethic" had
11ot come forth the insatiable European utamaroho would have
clirected itself toward itself as well, destroying the European empire
from wlthi11.It was time for Protestantism and the return to a more
.Judaic-like emphasis on the self and on the cultural entity; i.e., now
lllill tl1v "European consciousness" was assured and the cultural self
wns dd1nccl ht ~xpanded t,_.rrns.
M11111ford calls l'rotl·sta111·1smthe ''gospel or self-sufficiency and
•,1·lftll·t1•n111uatlon." 1i11lt 1•1h1tc·rtsti11gtl1at lh<..'Sc·i-lr(' prccis 'ly llw
~11,1hof ro11t1•111po1,11y 11•vqJutln11111y1111d111111 IJ11pt•tl:1llstii' n1ov1·
11w11t•,nl Af,k.1111.,111dnP11•11111jwlly p1•11ph•s-,.l11d1•1•d, llw 1111th111,II
374 YURUGU
ism of such peoples is defined in terms of self-definition and ideolo-

gies of independence. China's strength was not to be found primar-
ily in the adoption of an "international" political strategy, or even its
socialism-most certainly a viable tool for the implementation of a
nonexploitative ideology-but in its "nationalism," the ideological
emphasis on self-reliance. The Western imperialistic objective obvi-
ously needs subjects (i.e., political "objects") and is successful only
to the degree that there exist "colonials'' who lack confidence in their
ability to survive alone. This is why the European attitude towards
majority peoples is always characterized by paternalism. Ultimately,
Africa does not need "handouts" from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund; Africa needs Europeans to leave its nat-
ural resources alone. The objective has always been to prohibit inde-
pendence: psychological, political, and ideological. Africans and
other world-majority peoples, who are convinced that they need the
capital of the West to survive, will by definition be eternally depen-
dent and, therefore, "colonial."
The Protestant ethic also sought to create inner strength,
aggressiveness (defensiveness), arid self-reliance, but its presenta-
tion of "self" was an inhibitive and negative force rather than a ere-
Htive one for the European. The Protestant formulation dictates both
an isolated definition of the individual self and at the same time, an
inordinate control of the natural inclination of that self. It creates,
t lwrcby, a frustrated personality that characteristically suffers from
;1 lack of emotional fulfillment.
The emphasis on self and ethnicity found in First World self-
d •terminism is based on the awareness of a shared spiritual source,
.a11d a 11onindividualistic concept of freedom; i.e., a communally-based
"fn.•t.!dorn" and goal of well-being. The aggressive and defensive ener-
h «·s evoked are directed outward toward the European oppressor
t111clhis control-that which seeks to destroy the "cultural self." This
e111phasison self is, therefore, not based on a separation of self from
1)lher as the European utamawazo dictates, but rather on a discovery
of the importance of self through identification with the cultural
wllole-a discovery that is not possible in the absence of such idcn-
t lfkation. It is a spiritually based awareness of self that implies and
rc•lics on communion with that which is more than self. The expan-
sion of the self is, therefore, a spiritual phenomenon, not materially
busccl as in the minority European case. In this way it incorporal<'S
t IH• wls<loni o[ tn\ditional. First Worlcl Ideologies. Co111parcthe~ fol
lowl11~ sl:-itt•11wnt hy Willla111Strltklancl on A!tlrn11:;<'lf-dl•lt•1111l11l:,111
wlllt 1111·ldc·o!ur1yof l'rotc·st,intls111·
lntracultural Behavior 37.5
Blacks must build a new politics, with a new social vision-a poli-
tics of true revolution, which is always and finally, a politics of self-
reliance. Our future task is self-evident, it is self-development,
building anew like our fallen brother Amilcar Cabral, even as we
fight. Developing in the midst of depression, developing under
siege. Developing without resources, except human resources. 61
This is the only revolutionary possibility for a colonized people.

The self-reliance and self-denial of the Protestant ethic, on the other
hand, helps to maintain the existing order; and the self is taught to
be dependent on material capital and material resources.
Luther's emphasis on moral virtue as the proper performance
of one's task or "calling," no matter how menial, foreshadows a crit-
ical regulative role that Protestantism was to play. The European uta-
maroho is one of extreme arrogance and ambitions of power. This
expression is constructive (in terms of the European objective) as
long as it is directed outward. Protestantism allowed for identification
of the individual with the European/Euro-American imperialist objec-
tive, at the same time encouraging an attitude of acceptance and
humility among the less powerful within the culture with regard to
their inferior status. The Protestant ethic has been most successful
in this respect, as it is still one of the most impenetrable strengths of
the European empire that its "inferior" members can identify as
"superiors" of the world and, therefore, contribute loyally to the
European cause. As the culture became divided into capitalist and
wage-earner, Protestantism helped to assure that those exploited
within the culture would be not only content with their lot but would
feel that they were providing a vital function in a larger "order of
things." The "good" Protestant supported the system; in so doing he
was "answering his calling": opiate of the masses.
Themes in Interpersonal Interaction: Survival,

Competition, Control
We are attempting to give definition to the "ethic" that guides
l~uropean (Euro-American) interpersonal, intracultural behavior.
Protestantism was a partial formal statement of this ethic at a par-
ll<'Hlnrstage in European development. Capitalism, which it comple-
1tH•11l<id,is a dominant source of the intracultural ethic in the modern
Wt~st. 13ott, of t hcsc cllrcctlvcs of behavior, however, were born out
11f,m<I supported hy kt1<lt•t1C'i1:s111n11Ideological statement, visible
111I I 14' 1•111ll(•t l~ut 011(1/111 Pit! WI leuc.- {II 1d f 11rtlwr t'(lll\))l('tll(.ll1f eel by
111111'1 l•:r1111pP,111111•,111111l1111s (111·Hd1·111tr, •,ol'i,11, ,111<1plllltkal)
l•:tI 11111lnl(il I I I•, 11nt•,111p1 I 1hIH t lillt t lwy ,II!' Inl ally 1·011
111ly,1111•1t•lt111•,
37(i YURUGU
sistent and compatible with the rationalism and materialism that

became ever more pervasive in the course of European development.
This is because the germs of both the Protestant ethic and capitalism
are contained within the asili of the culture. They emerged as part of
its "natural unfolding."
Interpersonal behavior among European (European-American)
peoples is competitive, aggressive, exploitative, and based on a
European-defined "survivalism"; one made necessary by the nature
of the culture itself. This behavior is, therefore, characterized by hos-
tility and defensiveness. The European "personality" is above all a
product of a conception of self that isolates the individual. He is alone
and vulnerable, surrounded by other alone, vulnerable and therefore
defensive personalities. Once past the level of the primary ideologi-
cal substratum of the culture, which tends to bind European indi-
viduals together, there is no identification between him and other
individuals within the culture. Beyond this there is no commonality.
I le defines himself as their "opposite," and his interest as "opposed
to" or "in conflict with" theirs. "Meaning," at the level of secondary
or d~rived values, is determined by the needs of survival among hos-
1lie beings. The culture into which the individual is born provides him
with an individualistic and isolating concept of self, while it fails to
pr nvide him with a spiritual base of emotional inspiration and sup-
port. With these givens he has no choice but to go about the business
ol surviving as best he can. He is, indeed, in a "jungle." An initially
d(•fcnsive posture soon becomes aggressively offensive behavior.
'l'I 1c.'individual perceives that the best way to assure his own survival
Is lo disarm others; to "beat" them, to "win," to "get ahead," to usurp
IIH' objects of value before they do, to control them. He must do all
t •I I I1csc things before they are done to him (that becomes the Golden
httlc).
To make matters worse, the culture thrives on violence, and it
ts becoming more intense. The popular media is a laboratory for the
~, ucly of the European American need for violence. Eli Sagan places
11,e origin of the theme of violence in Homeric Greece; surely we can
I rare it further back into the source of European culture. Sagan says,
"C'ulturally we are children of Greece"; How could he possibly arrive
nl that conclusion? It might be said that Europe is the cultural child
ol (in~cce, but It is absurdly Eurocentric to say that the rest of I he
world's peoµle are.
At any rate, Sagan do<'s look specifically at ('nrly Cr<'<'lcc11IL101•
,11icI 11111 "foltII In I he (•ffic-ac-y
I:; I '1111 of v1oli'11re wns ri ,·,·11I rnl I H•ll1•fl11
t hr•( ir p11 1{vahu· systPtll," Hild I li,11"vlul(•11r,• w11s 11011111•11•ly 11111·ol t 111·
many important factors, nor was it an incidental expression of the cul-

ture. "62 Instead, in his analysis, "the characteristic form of immoral-
ity and aggression-a primary ambivalence-in Greek culture was a
commitment to sadistic violence, a love of killing ... "63
Sagan uses psychoanalytic theory and the examination of
Homeric literature, primarily the Iliad, on which to base his argu-
ment. Sagan reaches a different conclusion from that which, accord-
ing to Freud, is implied by the Oedipus complex. Sagan refers to the
"complex" as the "womb of antiquity," 64 then uses this explanation of
the development of the psyche to explain Greek ambivalence towards
violence and the need to enact it excessively. The Oedipus complex
is male-centered. So was Greek society. (So, of course, is Freudian the-
ory for that matter.) Sagan, therefore, feels justified in examining this
cultural process from a male perspective.
The Oedipus complex involves sexual feelings towards the
mother and competitive feelings towards the father. Aggressively,
the male child, according to Freud, wishes to replace (kill) the father.
At the same time he fears him. In Freud's view, since the child's sex-
uality becomes focused in his genitals, he both wishes to castrate his
father and fears being castrated by him. In fact, the Oedipus complex
resolves itself in fear of castration. It is at this point that Sagan dis-
agrees with Freud. He argues that such fear would permanently immo-
bilize the boy, never allowing him to become a man. Instead the
"healthy" response is for the boy to be able to "imagine" himself "hav-
ing" his mother and becoming or "incorporating" his father, i.e., tak-
ing over his role. "Incorporating his father" means that his father's
moral authority moves within the boy; admonishing, punishing, mak-
ing demands. Indeed this "father within" becomes the conscience or
the "superego." 65 According to Sagan, this imagining allows the child
to mature. If the child is never able to imagine the fulfillment of his
desires, they will continually return, never allowing him to become
an adult, preventing him from developing an inner moral conscience,
i.e., the "superego."
According to Freud, the "feminine" attitude develops in a boy
when he reacts passively to the Oedipus complex, wanting to take the
pince of the mother and become the love object of the father. The cas-
tration complex has this effect. 6(; C.aganargues that the greater a boy's
capacity lo imagine the fulfillment of his Oedipal desires, the more
"111;i~w111inl•" will be his sl:mre; "tl1e less will be his passive stance
toward Ill:. fatlwr 1111'1 towards all m<·n in .111thority."(HiHe reasons,
lllt'tP(o1t•, 111:itLl11'1t'Is ,1 i-1111111•<:!1011
IH'IWt't'll <:n~k n1nl1•hnmos<'X
,1gg,,..,.,lo11.1•7
ol <>,•11lp;1I
t1tlllly ,11111tlw 11•111
378 YURUGU
Myths allow people to imagine what they cannot do, Sagan con-
tinues. Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother; Zeus over-
throws his father, Uranos. In Sagan's view, these myths have a
healthy, psychocultural function. But Homer's consistent message is
that rebellion against authority leads to disaster. Sagan says that the
Greeks considered offenses against the father as the greatest sin;
hubris. This is clearly a reinforcement of the patriarchal world-view.
For Sagan, Achilles' violent behavior when he fails in his rebellion
against Agamemnon is like the tantrum of a little boy, which threat-
ens to take the culture "back" to a state of barbarism. 68
Finally Sagan attempts to use all of this as a foundation on which
to build an explanation of the "prevalence of graphic sadism" in the
lliud. He asks the same question about contemporary European
American society;
Why do well-dressed middle-class couples go to movie houses to

witness graphic scenes of machine-gun bullets perforating the
body of some unfortunate victim, or a group of small boys pour-
ing gasoline on the body of a derelict before setting him afire?
Why has our culture returned to the detached eyeball and the
inward guts? It is reasonable to make the assumption that the
escalation of graphic sadism in the popular arts of our society
l11dicatesthat we are going through a cultural situation similar to
t li,lt faced by Homeric society. 69
I le concludes that excessive violence in the life and popular cul-

I 111
P oft hese two related societies is caused by "a conflict within the
vnl111•system of the culture." For Sagan the "conscience" of ancient
I ln•1•t'<'. as with that of contemporary Euro-America, is "in advance"
111the behavior of its people. The society refuses to implement the
u iral goals that it has set for itself. "The promptings of the superego
den1a11da new order of sublimation of aggression .... The ego
lwco111esmore violent in order to protect itself against the demands
of <'onscience." 69 "When those in a culture will not do what con-
~cleuce demands, the tension rises," and people respond to the ten-
slo11·by running from the conflict. Oedipus ran from his parents only
to, u11 directly into them; "the culture flees from the problem into the
IH•;irt of the problem.'' The conflict originates with problems con-
n•rnlng legitimate aggression, says Sagan. The escape from the prob-
ll'tn tcsults in a popular culture concerned with vlolencc.<,v ''Tlw
vl1 nrlous, fanciful l)rulality of the movies::; 'rvcs the purpoiw of 1nak
l11g11IIvl(1lc11c1•u11rt'f1I.Tht• n•;il violence In 011rs(,('lt'ly, dlt1•1 It'd at
Jt•;JI J><'oplt•~01·s 111111olk1•cl."·m'l'lil' $adls111 of lht• 11/od,111~.1g,111's
view, indicates that the culture was not at ease with its conscience.
Sagan's explanation is interesting, even helpful, but it is based
on an incorrect assumption. European/European American culture
has no "conscience" in the sense that majority peoples would use that
term. It does have "moral" codes or norms concerning behavior
towards those whom it recognizes as "human," but that is not a "con-
science," it is a "superego" that functions to protect the machine; i.e.,
to protect the culture from itself. Conscience originates in ideas about
what is right and wrong, which in turn are related to the ideological
core of the culture. The ideology of European-derived societies is
that anything goes in the service of power.
Sagan is correct: There is a basic conflict, but the conflict issues
from the extreme individualistic and materialistic world-view of the
culture. These terms are so strong that they act in opposition to the
needs, even of a European social order-of a European conscious-
ness. That is the only conflict within the European asili: Individual
consciousness versus European consciousness. It is difficult for
Europeans to treat other Europeans nonaggressively. That is the
source of "moral," behavioral tension. The superego, to borrow
Freud's term, of the culture then instructs its members to direct unac-
ceptable violent aggression toward "noncultural" beings outside the
culture; "communists," "gooks," "niggers," etc. On this level the con-
flict is resolved. Such violence, like the movies, is not experienced as
violence, nor is the violence that is directed at Africans in America.
Sagan is a victim of the rhetorical ethic. His explanation gives this
''ethic" a function that it does not have. It blurs his vision, so that he
can say of the United States, "we have an ideal of love, a moral
vision." 71 But we, who have been victimized, know that to be a lie.
The Western ethic is the epitome of selfishness. Contrary to the
verbal expression of the rhetorical ethic, it is not considered immoral
in the West to act in one's own interest at the expense of the well-
being of others; rather, selfishness, competitiveness, exploitation of
others are necessary for survival, dictated by the ideology of the cul-
tu re, indicating, therefore, "moral" (acceptable, encouraged) behav-
ior patterns. These characteristics represent moral behavior in the
context of European (Euro-American) culture in that they are sane-
Iioncd by every aspect of the culture, and the individual within it is
ru11rlitionecl to manifest them. The successful "culture-bearers" of
Europe' (,is Weber puts if\ possess these characteristics. The truly
ts llw most <'0111peliliveanrl aggressive person. Wili!P
''W<•i,lt•rn 111:111"
rwrso11111lhc•c·ultmt•,who 111110
llw IPa:-tls11c·,~l'i.sf1il w«y cl<'tc·rn1im~s
h d1,11,11 t•·1lz<•dliy l111111lllty
wli.11 tl1c~Wc•sl IH•1·u111t•::, 1111d11,Vt',l.t·,
380 YURUGU
identification with and consequent respect for those around her,

resulting in nonaggressiveness (internal peace). This person is tram-
pled upon in and by European culture. She is considered "worthless."
What is more, she is "unethical" in that she attempts to defy the nor-
mative behavior sanctioned by the culture as a whole.
A person such as this must "possess" a radically different con-
ception of self than that which European ideology proffers and that
which the members of the culture are inculcated. Is it, then, any won-
der that such a person is rare in European derived societies? For as
Kovel says, "culture is organized into sets of symbols which are con-
gruent with the structure of the personalities within it." 72 The per-
sonality described by the early Christian or rhetorical ethical
statement is indeed incongruent with European culture. That person
contradicts the asili and functions from a different utamaroho. Can
such a person exist?
A self that must be distinct in order to know becomes emotion-
ally a self that perceives value in terms of itself in isolation. This is
not the natural context for the creation of human value-which is nor-
mally created out of shared emotional commitment. The values of the
European individual are, therefore, necessarily material. They are
not true "human" values. Such a self is alone, afraid, defensive, and
aggressive. Acquisitiveness, fanatical accumulation, and mutual
exploitation are merely the logical and rational outgrowths of such a
perception of reality. Because of the conception of self-the values
of a European-defined "individuality" and "freedom"-that the cul-
ture generates, the personality strives for a security not provided by
his culture, in an arena from which it can never come. Material accu-
1nulation becomes the tool of an assurance against the hostilities and
Hltacks of others. The individual becomes obsessed with the negative
.ind threatening possibilities of the future-with accident and with
rleath. He lives in a culture diseased with thanatophobia and one that
provides him with insurances "against" every kind of physical or
material possibility imaginable, yet knowing that no amount of finan-
cial gain can redeem his soul. He is truly Faustian man-but he did
not choose to be so. The "choice" is already implicit in the asili of the
rnlture: the bio-cultural, ideological core.
· European culture, then, fails in the primary function of a cul-
l ural construct, i.e:, to provide the human being with the emotional
s1•n1rlty brought hy spiritual comnrnnion. This sense of security,
which the• E11ro1wanfalls to achi<>vf',In majority <·1tJl11r<'s Is <'lf•at(l(I
0111 nf tlw splt1tun111y ol h11111n11 l11Lrrn•lnt!:d11l'SS arid a conn•pl of
),1l11in•d l111111,111
v,1li11•,1111
t1r<·11a lli.1t lrt111-;1•1'1Hh 1111•11111!1•rl,1I.
F11111p1•,111
culture is a culture with a nonspiritual ideological base. This essen-

tial and defining characteristic has allowed it to become the most
materially successful culture, the most aggressively political culture,
the most scientifically rational culture, and the most psychopatho-
logical culture the world has ever known.
It is at the same time the only culture that provides little or no
source of spiritual or emotional well-being for its members. It carries
little tradition of insight into the human spirit and virtually no knowl-
edge of the human soul. It is atrophied toward nonhuman realities.
European culture presents the individual it produces with only the
alternatives of materialism, scientism, and rationalism, when what
she needs is the inner peace that comes with communion (merging)
with others, the sense of oneness, and emotional identification with
other people. What she needs is "love." As Kovel says, "the current
state of our culture is inadequate to meet the full human need of its
people." 73 Using the concepts suggested by Alexis Kagame, and inter-
preted by Janheinz Jahn, European culture, as an oppressive Kuntu
(structured modality) destroys the Muntuness (human beingness) of
its participants, because it is based on the valoration of Kintu (mate-
rial objects). 74
The characteristics we have discussed are basically those that
determine European interpersonal behavior. The institutions and
forms of the culture can be understood as structured sets of rules
that are based on these given norms and that act to regulate the
behavior of individuals so that a support system for its intercultural
behavior is maintained. In other words, what accounts for the sur-
vival of the culture as a cohesive whole is its ideological objective of
the control and subjugation of all other peoples and the related com-
mitment to technological and material superiority. A friend of mine
points out that Europeans would indeed destroy each other if they
die! not have "others" to destroy. By the same token, the integrative
function of the culture could not have survived so long the disinte-
,Jrativc tendencies of an individualistic ethic had it not been for the
outwardly directed imperialistic objective and quest for world
~uprcmacy. That quest is definitive to the European utamaroho and
1lil' emotional satisfaction (itself a negation of spirit) with which mem-
lwrs of European culture identify.
Hccausc orthe spiritual void in European culture and its ideo-
lnHln,I l11tlivl<iualism, rnpitt1lism was able to gain hold ancl to flourish:
111I11111 It s11ppvr11'flI lwsc..•lhl'lllt'S, And bC'n111st• of tlw suc('<'SS of cap-
11,llh111I 11JI11' Wt·:.I 1111
• 1·01 u·1 1p1-; 11Ih II livid llitl f n•1•d11111
,111clIH>Ss<•ssln11
wlitl1• ,111y,itt1•111p1In dbt 11vc•t l111111o111
wc•11· 11•11111111·1•!1, !-.pl11l11nllty
382 YURUGU
was discouraged. The essence of the human spirit is inseparable from

communalism. The ethos of capitalism presupposes and thrives on
"moral" individualism and autonomy-the denial of human spiritual-
ity.
The themes that I have been pointing to recur in other descrip-
tions of European culture, not only in the more critical analyses, but
they are also recognizable in the noncritical, chauvinistic descrip-
tions. The juxtaposition of the analyses of Joel Kovel and Robin
Williams helps to demonstrate how similar traits of Western society
are made to appear both from a critical and a noncritical perspective.
From the perspective of a critical understanding of the European
concept of self it is possible to understand better the ideology of indi-
vidualism and the related assumed value of human freedom as it is
interpreted in European culture. The ideal of "democracy," a by-word
of American nationalism, is seen as the translation of the European
concept of self into a particularly European statement of value,
instead of a universally valid human goal. Robin Williams' description
of the theme or value of democracy is couched in terms that attempt
to cloud the issue of its uniqueness to the culture; but even in these
terms it is clear that the values expressed do not have universal sig-
nificance. In fact, Western "democracy" is necessary to assuage the
fear and distrust that individuals have of each other.
Mnjor themes in the gradual crystallization of the main democratic

treed thus included equality of certain formal rights and formal
equality of opportunity, a faith in the rule of impersonal law, opti-
mistic rationalism, and ethical individualism ... the theme of
cll:mocracy was, concretely, an agreement upon procedure in dis-
t ribut i11g power and in settling conflicts. Liberal democracy,
/\merican model, arose in reaction to an epoch in which the great
threats to security and freedom were seen in strong, autocratic,
central government. The new system was devised in such a way as
to limit and check centralized governmental power and to establish
an ordered pattern for agreeing to disagree. Such a pluralistic view
of social power was .clear and explicit on €J.uestions of procedure,
· alt hough it left the common ends of the society largely undefined?;
The European brand of democracy-a counterpart to the

European concept of freedom-is related to the desire to co11trol and
1·xert power over others, wllich motivates so rnuc-h of Europea11
lwhavirn. 1)(>111ucracy is cnvisio,wcl as the systt·111that g11ar;t11l<·t•:;
"ft pc•dom" of tlw lt1cllvlctualto do wllut sh<• 11111st1111lit•ltall nf 111•1
1111•
nw11 iwll lul1•,c•sl, wl1kl1111 l11r11slw h1ll'tp11·1s 11111111· 1·1111t111l ul 11111
,., • Tith p11w1·1drl\ft' ,H < w1111•.Im tlt1• l,111,l1lt1 t•,111lll,11, lt,11,tt 11111,,
..,
European behavior, as well as the institutions that guide and regulate

it. There are no compromises in the structures of European culture;
they are not tempered by considerations other than the "profane,"
materialistic ones upon which they are based. Once the human spirit
had been devalued as a determinant and inspiration of culture, the
character of the culture itself began to move further and further in the
direction of the denial of that spirit. Once "rationality" (in the
Weberian sense) had become synonymous with European value, the
forms of European culture became rational.in excess. The culture is
given to extremes and encourages intensely unidirectional activity on
the part of its participants. The balance is lost. The sense of power,
then, becomes not just sometimes desirable or pleasurable, or the
objective of just a few, but is an uncontrollable and predominant
directive of behavior. Theodore Roszak describes European behav-
ior this way:
The original sin to which science was born: hubris-at last becomes
pandemic. "We have now," the head of a prominent think-tank
announces, "or know how to acquire the technical capability to do
very nearly anything we want ... if not now or in five years or ten
years, then certainly in 25 or 50 in 100."
"And ye shall be as gods .... "
Our presidents still take oaths upon bibles; our astronauts read us
scripture from outer space. But the mark of the beast is upon the
appetites and aspirations that most govern our collective conduct:
demonic imbalance-endless distraction by unholy infinities of
desire: to produce and devour without limit, to build big, kill .big,
control big. Anything goes-but where anything goes, nothing
counts. No natural standard gives discipline. Mephisto's strategy
with Faust: to make absence of restraint matter more than presence
of purpose; to make liberation nihilism's bait. Until at last, even the
man in the street takes the unthinkable in stride, perhaps tries his
c,wn hand at a Faustian turn or two. Was not Buchenwald adminis-
tered by bank clerks-by good bank clerks, responsible employees
with clean fingernails? And My Lai massacred by last year's high
sd 1001basketball stars: nice boys, "not at all like that ... really?" 76
This Is the rcs11lt of the clcsacralization of the universe via the

F.111 "J>f'n11utama11Jozoancl ti i<' arrogance that acco111panleslt.
Wllllan1s' £harnclN1z.'.lllm1 of.this obsessiveness ls notC'worthy.
I It•l'nt n·< lly I t•latt·s II t111•:111111w1111
cosrnolol-(k11I ,111d<111luloglrnlton
IC ptln11••• r,111 1111•11 dhf{lllst", tlw wllnll' 111110d OI ,·1L.11,1r
ll'I ol ll1l•i
.184 YURUGU
essential trait by translating it into the positive euphemistic terms of

European jargon. Fanaticism becomes "single-mindedness." His
description has the earmarks of European chauvinistic expression.
Williams says,
In its most explicit and highly elaborated forms, this theme involves
a sharp separation of man from nature on the one hand, and of the
human from the divine on the other. In this view, however, man is
the child of God, or carries a divine spark or divine mandate. Set
over against the world, he is above all "lesser creatures." He has a
special charter to occupy the earth and to "have dominion over"
both inanimate nature and other living things. Cut off from the
omnipotent and omniscience attributed to the active source of cre-
ation, he strives to attain infinite powers-immortality, perfect
goodness, total control. Actual personal commitment to this
Faustian or Promethean world view would define a doing orienta-
tion to life. And the tangible expression of such a will to do and to
master must be concentratred purposiveness in task-like activity.
Such activity necessarily would tend to have a highly selective "sin-
gle-minded" quality. 77
The ethnological significance of capitalism is, of course, that it

is a system of ethics that regulates the behavior of individuals in def-
inite directions and in accord with a consistent image of the human
llclng and of his proper relation to others. It is the statement, and cre-
111 ion of specific values and ideals of behavior. Mumford gives his
view of the "morality" of capitalism, and his discussion points to the
way in which capitalism reinforces the inherent European tendency
I oward excess, toward extremity and fanaticism. It is a system of
tinlimited accumulation that gives the illusion and in many senses the
reality of ever-increasing power. Mumford stresses the "newness" of
the capitalistic ethic (as does Weber), but I would emphasize the
sense in which it encouraged and provides another vehicle for the
expression of the insatiable European "will-to-power" that was
already recognizable, both as potential an.d actuality, in the early
European utamaroho. In other words, the asili (cultural seed), once
planted, demanded an utamaroho (energy-force) for its fulfillmc11l,
which came to be expressed in the ideology of capitalism.
Capitalism gave a new and intense form to the characteristics
that already set European culture apart· from other cult urcs of the
· wm Id. Kovcl outlines the id<>ologicaloppuslllon between l~uropt.111
<·npitr1lls111 ;111(1 th~ traditional, 11011-Eurnpennsystl'lll of l!lfl !_.living.
'1'111· ud1kvl'J11l'11t,,rtlw 1·,tpllullst ..ysl1•111
111ll111,1t1· w,1-; th•· ,·rn1q1l1·tlrn1
nl ,l pi rn•,u:11I I1;11liq{i111wl w11 11w ,11>•,I
1 .ir 111111
nl 111111wy 1·111111•
l11I11 111,1•
to replace objects of value. Value itself in capitalism becomes defined

in terms of the accumulation of money; i.e., the representation of
power over one's fellows. In this system the "will-to-power" becomes
institutionally sanctioned.
Majority cultures-that is First World or primary cultures-
reflect an inherent concept of self in which the person identifies her
well-being with that of others in her community. This is, of course, not
to say that selfishness and conflicts of interest do not exist. It is to say,
however, that the epistemological conceptions support identifica-
tion rather than separation, and the utamaroho (life-force; collective
personality) is much less aggressive and more dependent on caring
communal relationships. Therefore the mechanisms that support
communalism are well developed.
The success of capitalism required an ever greater separation
of the self from the communal interest and from other individuals.
Capitalism, then, is thoroughly and completely Western in that it is
based on the European utamawazo and conception of self-which it
generates. And it is only within the context of capitalism as an eco-
nomic system that the peculiar European concept of "individual free-
dom" takes on meaning. 78
One of the most valuable aspects of Kovel's work is the way in
which he interrelates the character of European institutions with
European forms of thought, a primary objective of our study. He says:
By abstracting and quantifying everything within reach, the ambit

of the market could be widened to include the whole world. Things
abstracted can be given a number, and numbers can be equated
with each other; hence the magical value of material things could
be widely spread to elements of the world that had never previously
been held in much regard. The whole world became materialized
in consequence of this abstraction. The basic mental process of
the West had borne its strange fruit. And it was a potent operation,
for now all the energy that had been directed toward the simple
acquisition of wealth could be directed toward the generation of
wealth. With this new mystique, the process of gaining could be
continuous. Production entered the world through this reduction
of everything to its abstract quality, and through the union of these
abstractions into rationalized relationships. What was rationalized,
lww1•vcr, was the pure desire to gain lifeless, pleasureless, and
.1hslr,H·t1•d tnatlcr. 7!l
1,tplt,llb-:i11 provldt•cl an ldl•ctll/gll"rll ~1rnrl llrl' In which I he

fut pnw1•r.Its val11c·wa:,;
t•:11111tHWt1·111ildHIVI' ltill w1it l1Jhi:, cl1•::1l·1•
Ill.it It w11s1111111IPnI nll1•1ln1: 81>,tl•.tlt.11 w1·1,. liif11dt1· II .ac1·1•lt-1ull•d
YURUGU
the despiritualization of the world of Europeans as it "materialized"

it for them. The mode of abstraction on which the capitalist enter-
prise depends-itself the denial of the existential meaning of human-
ness-was already there, a theme that had appeared with the
beginnings of Western development: the unfolding of its asili.
In concrete terms, the patterns characteristic of European intra-
cultural behavior and sanctioned by the capitalist system were those
dictated by a hostile relationship. In Western European society each
individual considers his interest as defined distinctly from and in
opposition to that of everyone else. Human associations are often
only political and strategical compromises. They are transient in
nature and serve some specific end. "Natural" and timeless human
groupings ( e.g., the family et al.) tend toward disintegration, while the
political machine gets stronger. Success in capitalism is aided by mis-
trust of others; greater gain is made possible by hypocrisy and deceit,
by emotional control and detachment. The successful businessman
is competitive, aggressive, acquisitive, and exploitative. No single
object symbolizes European value as powerfully as does the abstrac-
tion that is money; so the system that controls and generates it
becomes the dominantaspect of the culture.
Materialism, the ideological denial of spirituality and its signifi-
cance, is supported by capitalism but is rooted in the very begin-
1ilngs of the European rationalistic drive towards technological
development,which perhaps originates in the mutant beginnings of
tl11:caucasian, in the struggle for survival in the caves of Europe
(Diop) ancl in the initial ontological conceptions of the European. The
l1uman being's purpose is to control nature. Nature is matter; the
a111ountof matter (material objects) one controls (possesses) indi-
c·;ites the amount of power (value) one has. Again, Robin Williams'
l.haracterization of this theme in European life attempts to mitigate
the extent and effect of this malaise on the culture.
0£ course, a kind of "materialism" may emerge in a society, even

lltough it is not initially a primary criterion of desirability-in the
sense that sheer availability of creature comforts and the inces-
irnnt·advertising used to sell them creates a social pressure to con-
ee111rate effort and attention upon them. It is in this derivative way
tltal an economy of affluence may drain away energy and commit-
mc11l fron1 values that stand higher in the nonli11alhierarchy of
prc>fcrcnecs.80
Willia, ll~ 11l'xpli1l11saway" 1IH' lad< of sptrll 11alvaht11'i l11A111

.., 1'•,111
1111•
a•. tllm11il1It w,•11·11nlIJ1tl111atc•lyllc•d 11pwlll1 tlw du111h1,111I t1•11
dencies of the European cultural tradition; as though materialism

were not in fact a characteristic of European ideology. He does not
use the concept of asili and therefore never reaches the ideological
core.
Willie Abraham presents a very different view of the matter. His
view comes closer to the ideological significance of "materialism" in
the culture. Abraham says "that synthesis of man which makes him
out to be an economic animal is accompanied by a culture which has
marked tropisms towards consumption and materialism." 8 l In his
view, "materialism" even affects Western social theory: "Social
research in European ... has had an intransient materialist basis; this
is because the European mind is materialist." 82 Perhaps this accounts
for Williams' inability to recognize the true ideological significance of
materialism in American life.
Abraham discusses culture in terms of what he calls its three
"facets": the material, which includes property systems and tech-
nology; the institutional; and that concerned with value. Material cul-
ture, he says, tends to have a corrosive effect on the value aspect of
culture. In Africa the value aspect is dominant and emphasizes what
he calls the "integrative function of culture." He warns that Africans
must avoid the "excesses which have been associated with a lop-
sided expansion of material culture in Europe." 83 it is this process of
lhe culture to which the materialism in contemporary European
American life is linked.
In concrete terms once again, European behavior is character-
ized by the overt striving for material possessions, which symbolize
value. The desired possession of these objects acts to motivate the
individual in the culture in a way that nonmaterial objectives do not.
Material gain is a more powerful factor in determining behavior than
achievements such as spiritual fulfillment and love. What is both
Ironic and tragic for Europeans is that their ultimate (nonrational)
concern is indeed with spiritual fulfillment, but they have been
dC'ludcd by the presuppositions of their cultural tradition into look-
i11gfor it in the "wrong places." They have been taught to erroneously
;incl superficially "resolve" the basic conflict between the will-to-
power and the will-to-love into a fanatical and inordinately destruc-
l lvr- will-lo-powc-r. ln this warpeli vision to have power means that
love b 110111er<ssary. A11d,of course, it is precisely love that they
11t•t•d1111dactually s<•<'k.Tile cy<"IPis <:>ndkss, and lhcy are placed 011
.1II PHdt1till, sll:ivl11r: l11rwl ,al I ht ·y c-:111
never ad IIeve for co111plction
111• t•II )'11rw:11 A11d1111·111lly 1111111! <lo(•s "p1ogrc~;s" ln a l111,.:1I
111111
dlt 1•1I 1011-,,111dcln1••l 11111
11•1:nlv1·,h 11ti' d1•nl111111011nl 11wI111111.t
11•,pit II
388 YURUGU
caused by this ideology. As Kovel says,
We see an ever-accelerating system of striving and craving, which

fills itself up with material pleasures that evaporate inside the
abstracted self .... Abstraction and splitting gain power without
awareness, and so serve the needs of repression. But they also
diminish the self, and progressively cut it off externally from what
is done to the world. 84
Williams talks about the value of "efficiency" and "practicality"

in Western culture. 85 This theme, which is such a strong determinant
of individual behavior and an important criterion by which value and
appreciation are judged, is related to the ideology of evolutionism and
to the idea of progress. This ideological commitment extends beyond
intracultural behavior to affect attitudes of Europeans towards other
cultures that do not share their emphasis on "material culture."
"Efficiency" is a nonhuman value; it is a statement of the means-ends
relationship characteristic of Weberian "rationality." This kind of
"rationality" gives shape to every institution in European culture, as
they are rationally organized towards technological and material
ends; not human goals.
We are presented by Williams with a noncritical, nonsynthetical
characterization of the place of science and rationalism in European
American culture. His euphemistic comments are representative of
the kinds of works that have helped to lock the European mind into
the µrison of "scientism."
Very broadly, emphasis upon science in America has reflected the

values of the rationalistic-individualistic tradition. Science is disci-
plined, rational, functional, active; it requires systematic diligence
and honesty; it is congruent with the "means" emphasis of the cul-
ture-the focus of interest upon pragmatism and efficiency and the
tendency to minimize absolutes and ultimates. The applications of
science profusely regard the strivings for self-externalizing mas-
tery of the environment. We think it fair to sa.y that science is at root
fully compatible with a culture orientation that attempts to deny
frustration and refuses to accept the idea of a fundamentally unrea-
sonable and capricious worlct.8G
(Nole: Th<>reader should compare the comments al>ovt' wit ll

·those of Arthur 0. Lovejoy anct William .James rlt<·d ht Chapl<'r I,
"St1p1r1n,wyof the Ahsol11lt•, lite Ahslnwt, iwd tlw An,dylk,11'')
Epistemology and Behavior

The European American's conception of self as separate from
others, and therefore in opposition to others, is an extension of the
European ontological conception of the human being as being against
or in opposition to nature. In isolating himself from nature he suc-
ceeds in constructing the illusion of a despiritualized world of which
he has complete control, because he can control and manipulate the
material within it with his science and technology. In isolating himself
from others he robs himself of a source of emotional definition and
security that comes with communal identification. However, within
himself he isolates that part of himself that he considers "proper" to
him (because he associates it with control and power) from that which
is "improper" (because it represents "passivity" and therefore weak-
ness). He trains himself to eliminate emotion and to replace it with
"reason," thereby achieving the illusion of superiority to those who are
part of Nature and whose source of power is spirit. This consistent
theme and process in the culture determines the possibilities of
European behavior, both toward "non-Europeans" (others) and
toward one another.
Beginning with the "Platonic abstraction," the abstract mode
came ever more to dominate and shape the cognitive world of the
F.uropean. Havelock lauds this "revolution"-after all, it enabled the
European to perform great intellectual feats. But what is culturally sig-
11ificantare the far-reaching, negative effects of this mental habit on
Furopean behavior and the interrelation of this penchant for abstrac-
t ion with the characteristics of the European cultural personality.
Much of Kovel's psycho-cultural theory of the nature of European
culture is concerned with the activity of "abstractification," and he
lluks the European quest for the pure with the Western anal person-
al lty. European culture functions consistently to remove the con-
c·rcte, the emotional, and the existential from the individual's
1.·011sciousnessand thereby from her experienced reality. An abstrac-
t Ion is devoid of all human and emotional possibility; it defies genuine
•·111otionalidentification. 87
''Abstractification," therefore, as Kovel points out, adds to the
cl1·J1u111ani:c:ation and despiritualization of the culture. Individuals
wit 11111 ll can avoid the concrete and existential implications of events
t 11111111,(11the various mechanisms of abstraction, and a by-product of
t Ills art llwl,llly rn•al<'d alnlllsphcrc ls that It becomes more ancl more
d1•vo1d 11f111!')'111i11f,lIt ls lrnnicnlly ;mcl tragically the rns1· tlial tlt1.·
"11111111•111~-.l•ll,'' Ill J\hl<'illl 1!•11;1!-i)t I 1,1t Kovvl dl'strlht•s
(11111"11111d1•111"
;d 01 ll(lrn, 111wl 1.11I l.1vPl1wk1·,alh t lw "l'l,1l111ilc111utll•" ,11111
I 111'1 It•, 1 1111111
390 YURUGU
an epistemology based on the mechanism of "objectification." "Moral

autonomy" (a term used by Havelock) is a contradiction in terms out-
side of European discourse. It generates the communally destruc-
tive, competitive, and aggressive ethic of "morality" that reaches its
height in the West. A rationalistic ethic, accompanied by an isolating
concept of self, is, in the context of majority cultural philosophies,
diametrically opposed to that which is moral, as "morality"-the
proper attitude and behavior toward others-is based on love or
identification, which necessitates a "joining with other." This "union"
is a spiritual rather than a rationalistic phenomenon and cannot be
achieved by an act of "reason" (conceived as abstracted from "emo-
tion"). It is a repudiation of the idea of "objectification."
Kovel says that the result of the "abstracted self" is an "inner
world, which is filled synthetically .... "88 As one becomes more
involved in the exploration of European forms, the "organicity" of
the culture (as Kovel puts it) becomes more and more apparent. In
our terms it is the unfolding of the asili that is revealed. The nature
of the aesthetic is influenced by the European conception of the self
and the materialist and rationalistic substratum of the culture. The
behavior and responses that characterize the individual in European
society are causally related to the epistemological conceptions and
ideological choices on which her culture is based; just as is the case
In any culture. The symptomatic and severe loneliness characteris-
tic of Europeans is an effect of the lack of communal function of their
culture. Europeans are bound to each other by virtue of a shared uta-
111orohoof power, domination, world supremacy, and expansion. The
l11nercultural dynamics of aggressiveness, competition, and mutual
distrust are all separating, not binding. The outer-directed drives
bind them into a tremendously efficient machine of aggression. The
\'.Ulture is supremely successful in this regard. European culture is not
based on a vision of the essentially human. It does not serve human
needs because it is not "designed" to do so.
In Kovel's view of European thought, "If something in the world
can be made clean and pure, and if it can be·made cold and nonsen-
suous as well, then it will meet the criterion of goodness. What is
good in the world is identified with what is good in the person-not
llis body, but his mind." 8 \l Abstractions are "clean and pure," and
they are also "cold anrl non-sensuous"; and so is a rallonally co11-
J;lrurted society; it becomes morC' so the more rationally construct Pd
1t l),,,·omPs. /\s Kovel co11tinu1s witli his rh:,rnctl-'ri7:1llclll o{ WPstt·111
1
1111•,IIH' r1•l,1tlrn1slllp l>t'lw1•1•11 wl1,1t we• llavi• d1•111 tllil'd as 1111•

11 (('ll,·1p I) ,1111I1':11n1p11.111 11111111,dlwti.,vlrn
Eu111pc•,11111ff111111111t1.
become more apparent.
One overriding quality determines what is good and bad within the
analyzed world: purity. And within the entire spectrum of reality,
one aspect of knowledge fulfills this quality: abstraction. An abstract
idea is a purified idea, freed from annoyingly concrete and sensu-
ous particulars. Words themselves are abstractions. The non-sen-
suous senses, sight and hearing, are the mediators of abstract
activity. Smell, taste and touch are concrete, syncretic, incapable
of making the fine distinctions necessary to sort out what is
abstract from what is sensuous. Abstraction means distance from
immediate experience, the substitution of a relatively remote sym-
bol for a given sensuous reality. Sight and hearing are thus those
senses which best fulfill the possibility of a remote relationship to
the world. Western civilization began its expansion with the dis-
covery of perspective, and the perfection of remote, visually orga-
nized, abstracted activities-whether in navigation or in the
development of firearms that could kill from a distance. 90
European culture began its history as a uniquely definable entity

not with the "discovery" of this kind of perspective, but when it
became the dominant cognitive mechanism and began to invalidate
other systems of cognition. Eventually it became, in fact, normative
in function, determining value and significance. It was indeed "per-
spective" (or what the Dogon in Africa call "word from the side,"
Renne so) that was lost, as the European excluded the possibility of
other epistemological methodologies, and therefore a wide variety of
experiences. Objectification became an ideological formulation, one
which (in combination with the "unbalanced" European utamaroho)
had many unfortunate effects. Kovel is also limited in his under-
standing of the significance of "hearing"j"sound." He does not make
I he important distinction between the audio and the visual. European
culture actually has a tendancy to reject the ear (receiving) in favor
of the eye (controlling). That is why the written word is more highly
valued than the spoken word.
A scientific ideology was unavoidably attractive to the European
111111<:I. What they called "scientific truth"-a truth stripped of its
liu111animplications-could be imparted and absorbed coldly and
rntJonally ("scientifically"). The extension of the scientific method in
1•v1•ry,1Spl'Cl of hL1111m1 ccntemplation a11d experience was dictated
i>ytile• Europ<·n11ft•111of th<· spiritual cmotio11al, which doc~snot lend
II 1,11ll 11•,11lllyl"nn1,111lp1il,1t lo111111(1 C'olll rol. Ob)<•<·llficatlonaud tile S<'I
1·11tlfk 1m·lllrnl ~!IVI'tlw 11111•1l1111 ut lllt' kl11<Iorr11111111I 1111d
pnw1•11l1;11
II It. Fi I I ( ,p,•.111 11/111111
II 11/11) I I ''I II I I.,,, III 11ti' I I II I il,11 I C'lt1111111'111
Ip tll l II I
3.92 YURUGU
tural phenomena, scientific-rationalism comes to shape European

behavior even as it is shaped by it. The success of the culture comes
from the fact that power is the ability to shape reality (Amos Wilson).
Therefore the illusion of control becomes a reality-where it appears
to be most significant: politically and materially.
Kovel says that the "central activity" of Western culture is the
"creation, production, abstractification and rational acquisition of
property, and the joyless passion which seeks ever more avidly that
which recedes into remoteness through the process of seeking." 91
Through the activity of "abstractification," Kovel links capitalism, sci-
entism, rationalism, "white racism," and the European imperialistic
drive. In his study, Kovel demonstrates via the terms of common
everyday experience in contemporary American life how the method
of "abstractification" affects the lives and perception of participants
in American society.
lt is the theorists who have moved beyond the impressiveness
of the overwhelming material success of European rationalism, whose
works are most helpful in sorting out the myriad implications and
effects that such "rationalism" has had on the totality of the European
experience. European rationalistic ideology has "created" a particu-
lar kind of person who can be expected to behave in certain charac-
t <-ristic ways. If the uniqueness to the culture is not understood, the
positive possibilities of other cultures will get lost and, whether con-
sciously or not, this is a thoroughly Eurocentric objective. For this
reason, we assume the particularity of the European form and there-
forc the need to explain its development, not as the result of some
"universal" process, but by understanding its asili-a unique combi-
nat•ion of factors that in circular relationship generate the personali-
ties and ideological commitments that form the influencing matrix.
This explanation is all the more compelling since Europeans rep-
resent an extreme minority culture. It is the realization that Europe
is in fact a culture in which imperial domination of others does indeed
become a "comprehensive world-view" that is important. This is
unique in the world and the characteristics (themes) of European
C'ulture-its "rationalism," violence, and lack of spirituality-are not
n1crcly isolated pathologies; rather these characteristics are linked
lo each other in a developmental matrix (asili) that is itself "patho-
logical" In li1e context of human societies. It is this rccognilio11 that
-is to Kovel's credit. l lc uses a Freudian model:
w,,11,IVC' 1101,•d 111.,1pOW('I 11,tt;H('('llh 1d Ill tlH• Wt•~t11111111).{II

lilt• y1)k
h1H111 1 111•••!v ,111d tt•,1i11111wit ll111mi,· n1ll, 11.II ''flll <11i 11•11 1111111, •., 11,uI
1
1111'l'lll'l~V, ·tllll 11tlt1•1•, lt,td 1111l'1)lJlt11I,,UHi •,111111•l'Vl'll 1111111,111,•d

the two; but no culture carried the combination to such extremes.

The very passion expressed by the western drive to power is rep-
resentative, on a cultural level, of the tapping of deep infantile
desires. This culture, at once the most advanced, is also the most
infantile .... The deeper one returns into infancy, the more pro-
found and limitless becomes desire. 91
In the descriptions of Robin Williams, it is impossible to recog-

nize the pathology of European culture, so that Eurocentric works
such as his perpetuate this pathology and contribute to its global
expansion. He helps to erect a battery of seemingly "morally neutral"
statements that inhibit the understanding of the culture ideologically.
But his work American Society, is not an anomaly. I have used it as cul-
tural data because it is characteristic of the portrait of the West that
has been collectively painted by the more respected Western social
theorists-who write from a Eurocentric perspective.
European "Self" and the Problem of Love

There are several cultural factors that combine and complement
each other in such a way as to successfully reinforce and direct a par-
ticular style of behavior in the participants of European culture. It is
inaccurate to say that one of these is "primary" or generative in the
chain that eventually makes up the European configuration of cultural
traits. What is generative is the asili itself, the germ/logos of the cul-
ture. Joel Kovel, whose commitments are to psychoanalytic expla-
nation, appears to lodge the etiology of European behavior in an
inordinate elaboration of the "anal fantasy." (See Chap. 8 for a more
thorough discussion.) However, it is not so important whether or not
one can rigorously "prove" that a particular theory of behavioral
causality is accurate, but rather that the approach used allows one
to isolate and to link the characteristic features of European behav-
ior to the matrix of European culture. We have attempted an expla-
nation of European behavioral characteristics that lays them before
us in such a way that their interconnectedness is felt and the ethno-
logical inevitability of the European style of behavior is demon-
strated.
In this discussion we have focused on the European conception
of selL ( )f Lile importance of the "conception of self" generated by a
1·1dt ur<' in dcteriuinl11g or i,1nuc.•ocl11g Lhe behavior of its members. A.
lrvl11g I lnllow~•II lias said,
'
•,1-ltlil,•111111<
,ttl,111 ,11111 1·1111111,dlyc onslit11lc•d 110111,11:.1,t 111<•
lhlhllt' t1l lJ11•,,,•II ,1)1 111t•,t111ll,d·10 till' OjH'l,1111111111
,Ill !111111,111
•,111I
.194 YURUGU
eties and ... a functional corollary is the cognitive orientation of the

self to a world of objects other than self. Since the nature of these
objects is likewise culturally constituted, a unified phenomenal field
of thought, values, and action which is integral with the kind of
world view that characterizes a society is provided for its mem-
bers. The behavioral environment of the self thus becomes struc-
tured in terms of a diversified world of objects other than the self. 92
Therefore our discussion of European behavior is grounded in

the earlier discussion of the European utamawazo (Chap. 1).
The following comments by Norman 0. Brown on "the self and
other," further illustrate the way in which the European conception
of self influences European cultural behavior. In discussing Freud's
views Brown says,
Close examination of Freud's own premises and arguments sug-

gests that there is only one loving relationship to objects in the
world, a relation of being-one-with-the-world which, though closer
to Freud's narcissistic relation (identification), is also at the root of
his other category of possessive love (object-choice). 93
Of the human experience of "love," he says: "If love seeks only

Identification with objects in the world, then possessiveness is not an
essential feature of love." 93 He continues: "The aim of Eros is union
with objects outside the self; and at the same time Eros is funda-
111cntallynarcissistic, self-loving." He speaks of "the expansion of the
self," and of "unifying our body with other bodies in the world."
8rown, then, as European theorists invariably do, proceeds to "uni-
versalize" what is essentially European psychology. 94
While the conception of lov.e as the desire and ability to merge
or unite with "other" may be accurate, "expansion" of the self is not
the same as unification of self and other. And this is crucial to under-
standing the problems that beset, not "humankind," but the European
specifically. If the ability to love is predicated on the capacity of iden-
tifying "self" with "other," then it is clear from this discussion that
European culture does not provide a basis for the love-experience;
Instead it imposes an utamawazo that inhibits (devalues) identifica-
llon and emotional parti,ipation and an ethic that complements ancl
is consistent with this cognitive structure. We have coml' full rircl('
. lo Plato. for him ''k11owing" was more importnnl I han ''lovlug," a11d
"lo know" nwa111 knowinf.{as "objecl," sonwthlr11-tscpatalt• illHI cli!l
1l11C'I
fror11~wll. f.',11r(lpw111s,
pl!rllnps, do 11<H lovt• 1111·111:wlvc•·,
,111dll,1vc•
1H1 I1,1~,hlrom wl1lcll lo lnvP "o\lH•t •;," Not 111,1nHt nw11•.ayr;,
Intracultural Behavior 39.5
Freud's later writings attribute to the human ego a basic tendency

to "reconcile," 'synthesize," "unify," the dualisms and conflicts with
which the human being is beset; Abraham sets the goal of achiev-
ing a "post-ambivalent" stage: Ferenczi calls for a "fresh instinctual
fusion." But the possibility of post-ambivalent instinctual refusion
must remain hypothetical until we have examined the cause of the
ambivalence and the nature of Eros' antagonist. 95
The European mind struggles to find rational means to synthe-

sis, but it is the genius of African and majority cultures that their uta-
mawazo(s) implicitly "reconcile" dichotomies that for the European
are inevitably irreconcilable. Through the spiritualistic modalities of
ritual and ancestor communion, through the sacralization of life, they
achieve what rationalistic theories cannot offer. It is by employing the
modes of participation and identification, by conceiving of the self as
properly joined with other, indeed as defined in terms of other, and
by valuing emotional response that unity and harmony are achieved.
Ambivalence and ambiguity only become frightening and culturally
destructive in the European context, which cannot deal with paradox.
Majority cultures contain sophisticated mechanisms that turn these
dimensions of human experience into yet another means of uniting
people spiritually.
I have said that the underlying principle that explains and unites
the various aspects of European life and behavior is the need to con-
trol; this is directly related to and easily explains the European prob-
lem with loving. While "control" represents value, "love" does not. In
terms of the European conception of human emotion they are oppo-
sites. In this view one loves to the extent that one gives up control of
one's emotions; one controls oneself by not allowing oneself to love.
The experience of control is predicated on the rigid separation and
distinction between self and other; love is the experiencing of self as
being merged with other. A lack of control is repugnant to the
European sense of self; conceived only as properly distinct from
other.
But this is not a universal conception of love. It is romanticized
(unrealistic), and it issues out of the inadequacy of the European self.
The African concept of love, while more pervasive (that is, it includes
mutually respectful and reciprocal relationships of many kinds), is
support<'<I hy th<' struttures within the culture and is at the same time
110\ c>hsesslw. W(• do not risk tile loss of self in love relalionsliips
lw1·.,11sl·lnv1· is 111,·11,1l11r,,Ist,il<• of lwi11~:offPrC<Ihdorc birth, gu;,r
nf tlw ,·1tll1tn:. and tl11•n·fore lnkt•11Im
hy tilt' ltl11h,1111' 11,111111•1-
i111t1•1·d
g1,111t1•d fl I•. 11111.111xlr•ly p1111ll11f11~(.It is 11,11\11111Ml< 11111•11'111dl1•y
J.96 YURUGU
says that the European conception of romantic love is necessary to

overcome the intense hostility between genders among the
Caucasians. He refers to this as the "truce of love." 96
Ironically, obsession with ego results in the loss of self through
a loss of meaningful contact with others. Fanatical self-autonomy
becomes painful alienation. In 1988 the chronic loneliness and alien-
ation reached new heights as people in America began to spend
money to talk to strangers on the telephone. Forced into the isolation
of their homes they "communicate" with others who, from their own
cells of self-imposed "privacy" cry out for human contact. Phone num-
bers are now advertised on television that intensely isolated indi-
viduals can call in order to "meet" people, hear other human voices
(in an effort to affirm their own human existence), make "confes-
sions,'' attempt to communicate in a world that has obviously robbed
them of the natural sources of human interaction and warmth that we
of majority cultures take for granted. (In this view anonymous sexual
encounters in the parks of America's cities, become cultural-not
individual-pathology.) Somehow the symbolism of these machines
(television and telephone) which mechanize communication as sub-
stitutes for organic human interpersonal interrelationship, is the
penultimate statement of the failure (and "success") of Europe.
This alienating condition is not universal. "Objectification," the
determinant of the isolating European conception of self, is dominant
only within the European utamawazo and in European ideology. It
does not have the same influence on other cultural ideologies. And
lhe quest for a truly revolutionary society must be to assign and limit
the epistemological method of objectification to its proper place on
the list of cultural priorities. While the conceptual modes of other cul-
tures may encourage "identification with other," those of European
culture are based on the separation of the self.
The Western European (Euro-American) State is Plato's
Republic. It depends on "objectification" and abstraction. It is an
ongoing attempt to create the perfectly rational; it is both theory and
method. It is an ideal based on mistaken conceptions of the "ratio-
nalized human" and of "moral autonomy," and on the costly error of
identification of the good with the scientifically provable. All moral
(ht1man) problems are C0llsiclered to be solved (inherelltly) In tltc
strudure of the State, so there is 110basis for a system of moralily in
• t lw Rq)uhlic. Moral ILy presupposes lrnnwn intC'rncl1011. II ,ilso pre-
<lll(l]H>Sl'Sa1nhig11ity Hild fnll;1blll1y. Thf• iss111·of 11101.dlty11rb,·sfm111
1111111•1•dlw 1111•,111l11g, lrn111 •·111otl1111nl 11•s1H111s1· tn 111111•1 1111111,111
lll'l11w,, ,111d111111111•g,11rl
1111llw111l1111·1,1111111111••, II I )JI( f flllll1111.lllv
seeks to answer the ethical questions of "acting" in the correct man-

ner. To be immoral is not to be concerned with this question. The
question of human morality requires a spiritual base. The Republic
eliminates spirit, emotion and identification with other, and, there-
fore, it eliminates human meaning. European (Euro-American) cul-
ture, at the other end of the chronological spectrum, ends up
deficient in moral sensibility; i.e., without a guide for human conduct.
The "love" that Plato talks about is without human meaning. It
is an abstract, philosophical, "ideal." In the Symposium, male homo-
sexual love between a philosopher (mentor) and a "youth" (student)
is the closest human relationship to ideal "love," since it most approx-
imates the love of "truth" (Symposium: 184). Love is of the "beauti-
ful" and the "good." (Symposium:206). And Diotima tells Socrates that
the mysteries of love involve moving from the concrete to the
abstract, from the particular to the universal and finally to the realm
of "Forms":
being not like a servant in love with beauty of one youth or man or
institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing
towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create
many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wis-
dom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the
vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is science of
beauty everywhere." 97
Ordinary love is problematical in European culture. What this

means is that in order for an individual who has been socialized in the
European tradition to act with love, she must overcome her traditions
(which are powerful). She must overcome the ontological-epistemo-
logical presuppositions with which she has been inculcated and the
constraints of social institutions that surround her. She will then risk
being "unsuccessful" (as success in European culture depends on
competitiveness and aggression, not love) and she will find herself
surrounded by individuals who cannot (dare not) return her love.
When love is translated into the terms of human phenomenal
reality for the European, its interpretation issues from a bedrock of
chronic illness, fear, and aggression. These inherited ancestral emo-
tions (experiences) generate an obsessive-possessiveness; a cling-
ing smothering, narcissistic, aud compulsively unrealistic "romantic"
conception of what lov(• should be.
Eclw,lrrl 'I'. I !nil, ;1 psyclinlo)-llsl and authropologisl. talks about
tltt· "ld1•u1lfw11llt111 ·,y11d11111w" 111u•latlrn1sltrp 10 l1,vlng Ill' 11s1·st111•
11•1111 ltl1•111llil,lll1111"
11
wfllt <1tl1t•1,
111111111111p11•,lllv1··11•111.t'nt 111111111H
.'?.98 YURUGU
but in the sense of the "projection" of the self that one does not like
onto another human "object." This syndrome comes about as a result
of an earlier process of "dissociation" in which the person has uncon-
sciously dissociated (but not changed/resolved) behavior from her-
self that her parents or other significant adults find to be
objectionable. Hall outlines Sullivan's psychological conceptualiza-
tion. The "bad'' behavior continues but is dissociated from the self so
that the self can be respected. 98 What happens subsequently is that
the person will "identify" with someone (often her daughter) who
has the traits with which she does not want to identify herself. She
then has negative and problematic feelings about the person, as she
does about the aspects of her own personality that she does not like
and has repressed. 98 Hall takes this concept beyond personal identi-
fication and says that it operates on a cultural level as well. Suppose
Europeans are carrying around the baggage of centuries of antihuman
behavior, of a pathological utamaroho. For Hall this syndrome has a
direct bearing on the ability to love,
The paradoxical part of the identification syndrome is that until it

has been resolved there can be no friendship and no love-only
hate. Until we can allow others to be themselves, and ourselves to
be free, it is impossible to truly love another human being; neu-
rotic and dependent love is perhaps possible, but not genuine love,
which can be generated only in the self. 100
Again what is evident is a description of European pathology,

originating from a deep sense of inadequacy; an unhappiness with
self, therefore the inability to give love as a healthy, energizing force.
European behavior, then, is not even "ideally" characterized by
Ilie love relationship, but by separateness, alienation, hostility, com-
petitiveness and aggression. The culture is an overwhelmingly effi-
cient machine, designed to consume the universe. The behavioral
pattern that this "machine" has generated has, as its primary concern,
the continued efficiency of the machine. If the "human" were coter-
minus with the "material," then European culture would, indeed, be
the most successful of human constructs. But human beings are not
machines, and the culture is, instead, rapidly losing its efficiency
(ratiouality), even in terms of its own rational ends. Watergate and the
"lr:iniau Contra Deal'' arc evidence of !ls "mechanical" breakdown
and oft lw inability of ti 1emac-hi11cto regenerate itself. Pun•ly and slt11
ply, H tl1oro11~llly inatcrl;\llst <-11ll11rcmust ,·w111!1,1llyf.tll 111It:-.,d1lllty
In 111t1llval1·H11<1111•rnl1l1• i'1hi<'. II rn11s 011I pf ~l1•11111, 1111:,11111114•11111•111
t,pltlt111dl,,1•,c· tll,11 'HllVIVt" 1111:tv1•l11•,plti1
11111· 1111•11•l'I Jlfl tt•1old1111l
tion when the human spirit has become bored with the possibilities
of materialism. Material values can only be temporary; they can never
be "ultimate." Love, spirit, empathy have all but escaped Europeans,
and their behavior is ethnologically explainable in the context of this
cultural "deficiency."
lntracultural vs. lntercultural

It is important to recognize the difference between the "other"
within European culture and the "cultural other" in terms of the
behavior of European: The discussion of European religion (Chap. 2)
demonstrates the important function of the "we/they" dichotomy for
European ideology. The cultural other is the "nonhuman" or the "not
properly human." European anthropologists have all too often
described majority cultural conceptions of people outside of their cul-
ture in these terms, but it is the behavior of Europeans that is most
characterized by the dehumanization of those outside their culture.
It is the ideological conceptual basis of European imperialistic behav-
ior that the "cultural-other" be conceived of as "nonhuman." This
conception is mandated by the asili, which seeks power.
On the other hand, however negatively and aggressively
Europeans may behave toward those within their culture, they are
considered to be "cultural brothers," and this has very significant
consequences for behavior towards them. Each person within the
culture is given space to do what she can to protect herself and to
stay out of the way of the other. That is really what "individual free-
dom" means in the European context. Other Europeans are not "fod-
der" to be used, their land cannot be stolen, they cannot be enslaved,
I hey need not be missionized. If you are a participant in a European
culture, they have the same rights that you have. They have the right
to be your "enemy," that is, to treat you with suspicion and aggres-
sion; they have "selves." Those outside of the culture do not have that
right: they are not "selves" in the European sense. The Protestant
ethic and the Capitalistic ethic are meant to encompass European
behavior toward European individuals. Quite clearly, non-Europeans
who live in European societies are treated as "cultural others." (For
example, the entire community of Africans in America: the Scottsboro
hoys (1931); the victims of the Tuskegee Syphillis Experiment
( 19:J2-l 972): Mi<'hnel Stewart (1983); Eleanor Bumpers (1984);
Mkhnd Grlfflth ( 19811):Edlll<lnclPerry (1986); Ashanti Bartlett (1987).
W1 know 111(list ol illlO('llit•I;
1 1 is f,11 l,(rt'alN,thnn this.)
ld1>idly111111 llw c·xlsl •11rP 1111111•
IJl•,111rl1·11lly, l-'.111npt·n11l1tqwrlnl
hlll 1•nd1•11v,11,1ll11w•,ll_111lh111-IH plll< Pil 011 tlu· ;1~11n•si.l1111
1
ol l11l1a
100 YURUGU
cultural European behavior. European culture is an arena in which

separate selves agree to compete without destroying the system and
agree to cooperate in the destruction and consumption of other sys-
tems (e.g. cultures). One of the signs of the breakdown of the
European system is that more and more Europeans begin to treat
each other as they have heretofore only "ethically" treated the "cul-
tural other." That is what alarmed the American public as they
watched the Watergate hearings. As William Strickland says,
The administration simply began employing at home the politics of

immorality used to build the American Empire abroad. Certainly it
was no big step from subverting elections in Vietnam to subverting
them in New Hampshire, Florida and Wisconsin. In the end, then,
Black and Third World exploitation, inside and outside America,
provided the essential experience out of which the White House,
covertly but systematically, scuttled the last vestige of American
democracy (even in its whites-only manifestations). 101
Majority peoples, who are also African/black and colored peo-

ples, are considered to be qualitatively different from Europeans and
are, therefore, treated differently. It is the "cultural other" or out-
sider who becomes the complete or total object. Other Europeans are
not totally objectified if only because of the limits placed on their
destruction. It is European cultural nationalism that provides the dis-
tinction between the European's behavior toward "others" and his
behavior toward other Europeans. In order for the asili to remain in
tact this distinction is of primary importance. The asili is comple-
mented by an utamaroho (energy source) that is by nature aggressive:
The endless quest for power over other. There must be an "other" to
subdue; at the same time, there must be an "other" on which to dis-
place the inherent aggression of the utamaroho, if there is to be a
successful cultural self. The distinction between self and other is the
fundamental distinction of the European asili, and it generates two
distinctly different, while related, "ethics" and behavior patterns.
Whereever there is life, even if it be only a possibil-
ity, the harbingers of death must go to destroy it.
See the footsteps they have left over all the world.
Wherever they have been they have destroyed
along their road, taking, taking, taking.
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 8
Behavior Toward
Others
Asili as Matrix
The European conception of and attitude toward those outside
of the culture together comprise one of the most significant and defin-
itive characteristics of European culture. It is the way in which the
European treats those outside of his culture, which is most indicative
of the nature of the culture itself. And to understand the nature of
European imperialism we must understand the cultural conceptions
that provide the ideological support for this kind of behavior; the
belief-system that makes it possible and that reinforces it.
We will not document the horrors that have amassed over
approximately twenty centuries of European imperialism. There are
such works to which the reader will be referred (e.g., the U.S.
Congressional Record contains an impressive listing of acts of "inter-
vcnlio11"by the United States from only 1798 to 1845, which alone are
1•11011gh to stagger the imagination; imagine what could be compiled
sinre the start of the Roman Empire!), and while there is a need for
mc1uy more works of this nature, the number of additional ones
11ppears to grow steadily. for an excellent historical record of
1•:11rnpl!a11aggression, written from the vantage of an African-centered
IH't sp<·,·tive, S<'C'C'hinw<.'izu's7'he Westand the /?est of Us. Chinweizu's
wrn I<rn11 sl1111cl,11,,,was J 11,0:.I dau1agl11g in<lic1 t11(>nlof Europe.mu
lu·ll,1vlo~ tow,11tb 111111·1•, '
lilt• plt1•1111\llf'lltlllo(
II I•, 1101 1•11rn11ll1,lt11w1•v1°1, In dot 111111•111
,J02 YURUGU
European imperialism. What is imperative is the attempt to offer an

explanation that ethnologically relates it to the culture that has pro-
duced it: To explain it in terms of the ideological core of the culture,
the asili. Eurocentric theorists and historians list the atrocity stories
as though they were merely pathological acts of an otherwise healthy
culture. And too often, the fact of European imperialism is presented
in the liberal tradition, as a destructive tendency in European culture,
that can be effectively counterbalanced by the "humanitarian"
aspects of its ideology. ("All we have to do is get rid of the bad
guys.") 1
The interpretation offered here leads to quite different conclu-
sions. The concept of asili helps us to demonstrate the way in which
the imperialistic-expansionist and exploitative drive is inherent and,
therefore, "natural" in the context of European culture: It is logically
generated by the asili of the culture. This activity and endeavor is not
in any way peripheral to the main thrust of the culture; it is not merely
an aspect among many, unrelated characteristics. It is, instead, a cen-
tral theme in European behavior with origins in the core of European
ideology. White nationalism and aggression, both cultural and eco-
nomic, are endemic to European culture: embedded in its ideological
matrix. To reverse the tendency of which European imperialism is a
manifestation would be to radically change the basis, the essential
nature of the culture itself. In other words, we would be dealing with
a different asili, which in turn would generate a different utamawazo
and utamaroho.
Kave! raises these questions concerning the pattern of European
behavior:
What kinds of conceptions of the world are needed for this, and
what styles of actions must be engendered in the inhabitants of the
West to make them so driven and so controlled?
... Let us look at the crucial aspects of our culture for an answer. 2
It is the answer to these questions with which we are concerned

In this chapter.
The Concept of the "Cultural Other"

A crucial aspect of European culture for the understanding of Its
l1111wrlalist i, posture· is what I term I ho Europc.•an co11<·rplio11 ol Llw
"<·11l1111'1tl
otlw, "TIiis t'Olt<'<'))llon lwlps to 111,IICC' 1-'.111npt•1111 lwh,1vl01
tow.11d~ ntlw1•, pn•;-.(1,11•Ith c-lwwly tl'litlt•d lo tlu- l·'.11tup1•,111 h11,11(••
of 111lw1 •1, I 1111 I•: 1 111 q11ltc· I lw •1111111•
I 11w,111 to l111ply I 11 ti It I 111111c• .1
Behavior Toward Others 403
conceptual construct-a mental category-that becomes the

"proper" receptacle for what would otherwise be considered unsup-
portable, unsanctioned behavior. The European image of others, of
course, reinforces this concept and ensures its continuance as a part
of the European world-view. The concept of the cultural other further
enables the continued existence of the extremely negative image of
others that is a dialectically necessary part of the European self-image.
Let us look, therefore, at this conception and the style of behavior
that it implies.
The cultural other is a creation of European culture, con-
structed, in part, to answer the needs of the European utamaroho. The
utamaroho is expansionistic. This, as a cultural characteristic, is itself
very important to understand. The ego seeks to infinitely expand
itself. This kind of self expansion should not be confused with the
desire to "give of oneself"-to "merge self with other" or to "become
one with the world." All of these are identified with the spiritual expe-
rience of love. Expansionism is the psychological, emotional and ide-
ological opposite of these. Expansionism is the projection and
imposition of the cultural ego onto the world. (It is possible to inter-
pret all manifestations of "universalism" in this way.) It is the expres-
sion of arrogance, greed, and an obsession to consume all that is
distinguished from self. In this setting, "discovered" phenomena auto-
matically become areas to conquer-to be made ours. European
expansionism is the delimitation and redefinition of the world in
terms of the European self; as opposed to the "losing of self" in the
world or in the "other," which is the obliteration of the isolating
boundaries of self.
In European ideology the cultural other is like the land-terri-
t ory or space into which Europeans expand themselves. The cultural
ut her is there for Europeans to define, to "make over." That is why
t lley can describe their new awareness of objects, peoples, and ter-
1 itories as their "discovery." This idea is coherent for them because
i\CTording to their world-view it is their role to impart definition to the
world. People of other cultural traditions and "persuasions" are part
or the world to be defined; it is a European world. And in this sense,
1111•c·o11c-cptionof the cultural ether is that of the nonhuman. It is
l•:111 opt'aos who define "humanness" in terms of their own self-image
.u 1t I with such int4;!nslly Lilat the etl tic and rules of behavior that apply
I 11 I hoi;1• wllo arc llkl• t lwm do not apply to those who are not. The cul-
l 111,d nt lt<'r is, tlH-11·.-frn
,., tlw 1wrso11 (nbjl!rt) who can bet rcatcd in any
111,1111w1 _ wltl, 1111111ill11111c•dd1·)1,t1't' ol llw:11ll!y w,d lir11l;1llty,as Is <•Vi•
tl••11Iwl It'll 011t• H'VII •w•,t ht' I11•,tnt v 11IIlic•1•:111op,•,111'•; 1l'lat l.1111:-1
t11pc>o
104 YURUGU
ples of other cultures. It is only nonaggressive and nonexploitative

behavior towards the cultural other that is negatively sanctioned in
European culture.
The thrust of my argument is that (1) the ethic that guides the
behavior of Europeans within their culture is quantitatively and qual-
itatively different from that which is acceptable and sanctioned
behavior toward those outside of the culture; and that (2) the char-
acteristic behavior of Europeans toward those outside their culture
is made culturally possible (i.e., the culture can support and sustain
it) by the existence within European ideology of the conception of the
cultural other. This conception, along with the utamaroho that sup-
ports it, makes possible a degree of aggression and successful impe-
rialistic behavior unique in human history.
European Versus "Non-European"

When I refer to the "intracultural" behavior of Europeans, I do
not mean to indicate merely their behavior within the geographical
or territorial confines of nations considered to be European. I refer
rather to the way in which one European is expected to behave
towards another. This excludes many people who are colonized
within European nations (such as the United States, part of the
European diaspora) and includes Europeans living within the terri-
torial boundaries of non-European nations. Though the European's
behavior is characteristically aggressive and competitive, there are
limitations placed on the "acting out" of that aggression within his cul-
ture, as there are acts that the culture does not sanction intracultur-
ally. Europeans are not supported culturally in the murder of other
Europeans. It is not allowed; it is difficult to get away with. War among
Western European nations is regretted and avoided in a way that war
between a European nation and a non-European nation could never
be. European intracultural behavior is characterized by a lack of trust
as a basis for love, as discussed in the previous chapter.
Aggressiveness and hostility on the part of the individual makes emo-
1io·nal life precarious within the culture. It is obvious that the culture
could not survive as a viable entity if there were not some "safC'ty-
valve" for this aggression. This cultural need creates the cultural
olhcr, whose existence makes possible, on a cultural level, tllc
absorption of dysfunctional internal aggression. Put simply: If th<:
·rull11ral other clicJnot exist, Europeans would ck-stroy Pfl<'h ot llt•r.
0111°ol tlw cly1ia1111L's In !ht• lllslorlcal Clflvc•Jop1111•11t
of ll1t•W1•st
I 111,11,1•, 1111•1·11itt111•m:ltm1•d ,1-.It d1•vt 111111'11 lh ld1•ol11~y"p111
g11•,;1.lv1·ly" ,11ll11~1t-d11•,c•II•;11 111,11Ilic• 11111lt,1ll1111•,
1111 l11•11l11w11t 111
Europeans became more circumscribed with respect to certain

extreme forms of political relationships. More precisely, the tendency
that can be recognized is that first slavery, then serfdom of Europeans
by Europeans became negatively sanctioned within the culture, and
in general it became increasingly less acceptable to hold extreme
overt political power over other European nations. This, of course,
was Hitler's greatest crime in terms of the European ethic; the meth-
ods by which he sought to control the Western world were obso-
lete-were no longer sanctioned. The European reaction to first
British and then United States world ascendency is very different. It
is within this cultural-ideological process of the redefinition and mat-
uration of Western European political nationalism that the call for
European unity became audible and the negative image of others and
the concept of the cultural other became intensified. In 1814 Saint-
Simon called for a "European Confederation."
All undertakings of common advantage to the European community

will be directed by the great parliament; thus, for instance, it will
link the Danube to the Rhine by canals, the Rhine to the Baltic, etc.
Without external activity, there is no internal tranquility. The surest
means of maintaining peace in Confederation will be to keep it con-
stantly occupied beyond its own borders, and engaged without
pause in great internal enterprises. To colonize the world with the
European race, superior to every other human race; to make the
world accessible and habitable like Europe-such is the sort of
enterprise by which the European parliament should continually
keep Europe active and healthy. 3
There is a subtle but important point to be made in this con-

nection. While it has been pointed out that what Eurocentricists call
the "civilization process" (we would call it "Europeanization") is actu-
ally one of ever increasingly repressive structures within European
rulturc, at the same time the concept of asili points to the simulta-
I1t•oustendency to obliterate the severely brutal and exploitative rela-
1Ion ships that become reserved for intercultural behavior. It is for
I his reason that a description of the European's behavior towards the
('t1lt11rnlother helps to explain his intracultural behavior. The nature
nJ tlH·rulture is, indeed, intrinsically repressive, and yet its survival
.111clsw·,·rssful fun ct io11ing clepend on contract agreement, coopera-
1111111;11111 Ill<' r11lt11ral ide11,titkntion among its members. European
1111•11lo11yr;11111nt ro11dc>iH' th • dc•struc:tinn of its own members; that Is,
ol <11·stnwllo/1.TIil' r011cepl'lo11 n{ tilt•
111l1•11111-,_nlltt-.ow1I ,ll·f1111111111
111lt1111ilotl11•t, ll1C•tl'lon•, 1)1•1·111111'•;
t'111twilld1 ,·,111111•dc•slroyc•d rn,
1/)(j YURUGU
more practically speaking, that upon which culturally destructive

behavior can be unleashed. The difference is that while the culture
may be repressive for its participants, they do not think it repres-
sive-it represents that which they value; while the cultural other is
l reated as they (Europeans) would not wish to be treated themselves
and as they would not be comfortable in treating each other. This is
why a class analysis is insufficient in the explanation of European
socio-political behavior. As Saint-Simon indicates above, anything
can be done to those outside the culture if it helps to keep the
European community "healthy."
As the slogans of European "revolutions" became those of "the
rights of man" and "liberte, egalite, fraternite," European behavior
towards majority peoples became more and more extreme in its
exploitativeness and its brutality. Africans and other majority peoples
became more and more excluded from the category of "man." Here
again it is possible to witness an "ingenious" creation of the asili of
the culture. The "logic" of European (Euro-American) ideology leads
to the continual intensification of the power drive, or acquisitiveness
and greed, and of the need to consume and destroy, to oppress and
exploit: the nature of the utamaroho. While the eighteenth-century
"humanists" were ensuring that these behavioral characteristics
would not be used to disrupt the coherence of European culture,
I hey accepted an image of those outside the culture that made such
peoples the logical, justifiable, and ethically acceptable objects of
I hat behavior. In Kovel's view, this definitional and behavioral
process continued and intensified until its more recent form, "the
deinstitutionalization of Africa allowed the West to discharge upon it
whatever was forbidden and dark, while that of America led to the
creation of a new, white, institutional order." 4
The ravages of European imperialism must not be viewed merely
as evidence of the indiscriminately applied abuses of European
behavior but of the patterned character of that behavior towards
people who are not European. What allows Europeans to act as they
clois the nature of their world-view, a crucial aspect of which is a def-
inition of other peoples as essentially nonhuman.
W. E. B. Dubois recognized the difference in behavior:
Tilcrc was no Nazi atrocity-conceotratio11 camps, wliolC'salc

1naimi11!,( and murder, defilement of women or gllust ly blasplwmy
nf c:hildlwo<l-whic.:h the Christ ia11 clvllhiat ion of F,11rop1•I 1,,d 1111t
lt1·1·11J)l,I( tkiug ,1g.il11stn1lrit1•d folk 111,1ll p.t1 t•, nl llw w111Id 111
l1111p,
ul ,111111111tlii• tl1·l1•11
1111'11111111' 1,1•111a S1qwtlrn l{,11, 11111111111 ttll' lilt•
w11tltl
Alphonso Pinckney makes the connection between the concep-

tion of the cultural other and European behavior towards others:
The American soldiers involved in the Mylai massacre were moti-

vated to commit such acts, at least in part, by deeply rooted prej-
udices against the Vietnamese people. Had they seen these people
as human beings it is doubtful that they could simply have annihi-
lated them. They were "dirty gooks," and some of them were sus-
pected of being "commie"; the combination reduced them to a
status less than that of human beings. 6
How do Europeans decide who, in fact, is the cultural other?

This, of course, has been "decided" for them. The tradition they
inherit is partially an historical process in which this definition has
taken place-hardened and matured. Then, as Johari Amini says,
"Interpretation and perception usually take place unconsciously, as
products of socialization." 7 And since in cultural settings the "dialec-
tic of definition" takes place whereby in defining "good" we hereby
define "bad," the cultural other (negative) is the dialectical opposite
of those with whom the European identifies (positive). This should
not be confused with emotional identification; there are certainly pre-
cious few individuals, even within their own culture, with whom the
Europeans "identify." Here we are discussing cultural identification as
it relates to value-definition and behavior. In this sense, Europeans
"identify with" those with whom they share a common "self-image."
The issue here is one of a cultural-political phenomenon. In the view
of the Europeans, other Europeans share with them those charac-
teristics and roles that we have isolated in the discussion of their
eollective self-image. (See Chap. 4). They share the position of being
among the "superiors" of the world. In fact, they share the world with
vach other in a way that is restricted to others (all the more peculiar
i.i11c.:e
they represent such a small minority of the world). The price
t lley pay for this cultural identification is that they must treat each
olhcr hi a "special" way.
They know that other Europeans are committed to the same
l1kol<>gyto which they are committed. This ideology is ontologically
1111dt•plstemologically delineated and expressed through the uta-
111111na::oir, the ways that have been discussed. But it also includes the
i 0111111itrncnl lo the supremacy of the European cultural group, as
w1•1l11s tq tlw contlnunl d wt'loprnent of a rationalized technology.
·n11• 1f11•11lnp,lr.-1t
rlcsnlpt 1011 of I hose with wl 101n t-:uropt•ans idC'11tlfy
111lt11111lly t11volv1•1,th,• ,·0111111l111wnlIn ti,~• vnllu.·s w1•h:¼Vt' l>N•l\
lit"H I llilllH ,Hid tlw 1·1ilt11rnldl'~I tfptl1111l11volVt'<l IIIP tl'lillt•d styl1•<;11f
408 YURUGU
behavior. If "racial" terms are used, they identify with those who are
"white" (Caucasian). Together, these characteristics form a national
and cultural ethnicity-a concept that combines the cultural-ideo-
logical and physical groupings of people. In the dialectical process of
the European definition of value of individuals, "whiteness" has been
central, overriding even the measure of successful performance
within the Western European value-system. A "white" individual can
be a failure and still be a part of the cultural group-that is, still
"European" and, therefore, treated specially. While a black person or
an individual of color, no matter how successfully acculturated, is still
an outsider. This is the way of the European tribe.
Even so, it is a mistake to focus on the issue of skin-color when
examining European behavior toward others; that is, it is a mistake
to isolate this aspect of European ideology as somehow logically prior
lo its other aspects. It should be viewed as one related theme, among
many expressions of the European utamawazo. Isolation of and undo
emphasis on "color" as an ideological theme in European ideology has
in the past and still continues to invariably lead "liberal" theorists into
I he trap of attempting to argue that physical traits are not related to
cultural-ideological ones and are, therefore, irrelevant. Franz Boas
argued that neither race nor genetics cause cultural "inferiority"
(t:::urocentrically defined). Acceptance of this position encouraged
self-hatred and self-denial among Africans. ("I really am the same as
they are.") That position is politically inept and itself concerned with
the irrelevant. What is pathological, and historically and politically
significant, is the European's treatment of and behavior towards
African/black and other colored peoples, not the fact that they have
linked color with culture. Their very existence argues for this link.
What should be of concern politically to Africans and people of color
is the recognition of European systematic behavior towards them.
The rhetoric or "logic" with which they support this behavior is, in
terms of political strategy, beside the point. We cannot allow their
arguments to distract us from our mission.
It is another testament to the political genius of Europeans (who
lack color) that they have been able for centuries to engage the ener-
gies of First world peoples in polemics that focus on the rhetoric of
their scientism and "logic." The issue is not whether or not majority
peoples arc different. We most certainly arc! And there arc rna11y
· other kinds of differences among the world's peoples ns w<'II.Tlw
n11clal Issue•is what the diffl•rn11cc implies {or bdrnviur wltlll11 n p.ir
11111lo1r ld1•oloHl1al sy:,11•111,
In Et1rnpc•n11 ld1•ol11~{Y,
t\lt 11,111s ,11111ollwt
1111111'
1111'l,11111t1·d
pl'nplt• ,111l11111,1111
,illy lw1111111t 1111111,II
11lltc•1•, '1'111•
way that Kovel poses the question points to a different emphasis

from that of Boas and his followers-the "liberals."
How have the meaningful presentation of the world and the mean-
ingful styles of historical action become harmonized with the
themes of white and black in the culture of the West, so as to per-
mit the generation of power by the nations of the West, most par-
ticularly the United States. 8
Our concerns in this chapter are with the character of European

behavior and the conceptions that determine that behavior. As such,
what has been called "race" is an important ingredient in the con-
ception of the cultural other and is undeniably a cultural reality-
made so by twenty centuries of European concepts in action if
nothing else. It helps to avoid the term "racism" by talking instead
about the character of European white nationalism, if only because
in the contemporary Eurocentric discourse there is a tendency to
lump together all forms of cultural nationalism under "racism." It is
an ethnological error to equate European nationalism with other
nationalisms and to ignore the qualitative differences in their char-
acter. And racism is not attitude alone, but the power to control the
lives of those who are despised. If we are politically astute, we are not
concerned with European feelings about us (we do not need them to
like us); we are only concerned with their power to oppress us. But
this confusion is presently in vogue because it furthers the objec-
tives of the more sophisticated European cultural imperialists who
wish to thwart ideological independence and self-definition among
majority peoples.
Let us return in the dialectic of definition to the "bad" or nega-
1lvc side of the coin. The cultural other for the European belongs to
,1 different ethnic persuasion, has a different racial origin. She is not
"white"; she is committed to goals different from those of the West;
sit' is unsuccessful in terms of European values (her style of behav-
ior Is different); and she was born into a different cultural tradition.
Sile, I hcrefore, shares a different cultural heritage. The significant
l,u·t In lerms of understanding European culture is what all of these
1wn•r>lved factors imply behaviorally.
1he "Cultural Other" and European "Law"

'I'll<.:;1utilnrs of 'l'n SC'rti<'the Devil offer a statc•mc11lpublished lu
llw S1111 Fra111 Ism 1\11-:on""'111I 902 cl<~£t
1
1Hll11.g11.S.i\ri11y n1·tlon int lw
l'lllltpphw h,li1111I:,. It 1,,,1 11•1,111111•.r·
tu 1·rltld:-;1n of A11ll'rirn11i,nldk1~
1111111 ol 1111•l'lllpli111111:,lll*'llls,
11111~•,1l1111•11I ,111d111,•,1111)ll h ,, l{<>Od
•II() YURUGU
ethnographic example of the way in which the European definition of

t Ile cultural other determines the European's behavior towards oth-
ers. Its additional value lies in the character of its frankness in depar-
ture from the European tradition of rhetorical hypocrisy. After stating
I he American objective and presenting the American image of the
Filipinos, the statement continues,
Doubtless, many of the excellent gentlemen in Congress would

repudiate these sentiments as brutal. But we are only saying what
they are doing. We believe in stripping all hypocritical verbiage
from national declarations, and telling the truth simply and boldly.
We repeat-the American people, after thought and deliberation,
have shown their wishes. THEY DO NOT WANT THE FILIPINOS.
THEYWANTTHE PHILIPPINES.[Their capitalization] 9
The authors are speaking for all wars waged by the European
111inorityagainst all majority peoples throughout the history of the
European diaspora.
The statement touches on a recurrent theme in the patterned
behavior of the Europeans toward the cultural other; the usurping of
our land and resources. Among Europeans governed by the capital-
istic ethic, there is nothing that approaches the sacred more than the
rights of property and contract. The successful capitalist can do any-
thing to rob the poor of whatever meagre resources they have, but
as long as what he does is "legal"-as long as 1ie fulfills his contract
with the wage-earner or consumer-his action~ are considered ethi-
tal. Similarly, European social institutions may take from Europeans
their initiative and creativity, their energy and spirit, but the system
will protect their right to their material possessions; for this is their
"property." Whatever they have, in this sense, is theirs to do with as
I hey please. That is the meaning of the right to ownership in the West;
indeed, in capitalist countries that is the meaning of "freedom."
An "ethical" implication of the European concept of the cultural
other is that there are those who have no right to such property;
they especially have no right to own land. A correlative of this is that
t hcsc cultural others are not truly human-not really people; there-
fore, they can no more "own" land than the wild animals that inhabit
it, ancl, therefore, cannot be "stolen" from. To take land from the cul-
tural other Is not to steal. As the authors of the statement quoted
llhovc indicate, a11otltcr by-product o( this contl'()t Is t lw idt·a that
l·'.11rn1wn11s(Eurn1wan A11lcrlc;1ns) ''know how" to ui;P ln11cl1111(1
11•sn1111·1·s. '1'111·111lt111;,I
ollwr Is not n1pallll· nl doit1H s11 ,11111 I,,,._1w
ll11•1f'fn11•,li,,vP tlw 1lgl1t ,111<1
lch•11ot lltC'11 prn1w1 IIKl''l; E11111p1•1111•1, llw
Behavior Toward Others 41]
duty to expropriate the land and resources and to make use of them.
This is, then, the ideological source of the contemporary typology of
nations as either "developed" or "underdeveloped." The natural envi-
ronment is there for "something to be done with it." Europeans know
what to do with it and, therefore, have rights to everything occupied
by people who are not of European descent-for that is the same as
being "unoccupied," and anything "unoccupied" belongs to the
European.
Kenyatta's discussion of land tenure in Facing Mt. Kenya offers
a good comparison of Gikuyu and European attitudes and values. In
their colonial penetration of Kenya, Europeans conveniently mis-
conceived the "big tracts of lands used for other purposes than cul-
tivation and which were equally important to the community" 10 as
being "underdeveloped"-a term that means "that which can and
should be taken over by Europeans" in the language of European ide-
ology. At the same time, the Gikuyu have a category of relationship
to the land termed Mohoi, meaning "one who acquires cultivation
rights on the ng'ondo or lands of another man or family unit, on a
friendly basis without any payment for the use of the land." 11 This
idea would be a violation of the European concept of self, of individ-
ual freedom; and a person who allowed her land to be used in this way
would be considered a fool. Yet the Gikuyu had a concept of them-
selves and of those outside their culture that allowed them to treat
Europeans as Mohoi,· "this generosity of giving temporary cultivation
or building rights to strangers was extended to the Europeans when
I hey arrived in the Gikuyu land. "12 Needless to say, such behavior is
considered evidence of weakness and stupidity by the Europeans
who use it to further their own objectives.
The colonial pattern was repeated again and again wherever
l•:uropeans "discovered" the cultural other. The land was taken, the
people were encarcerated, a colonial "government" was established
to import the morality and institutions of the Western Europeans and
11,regulate Jheir behavior among themselves. The government would
111:skeavailable to Europeans those lands that could best be culti-
vnttd: each "settler" receiving a large track of land, the idea being that
I11• deserved to be "rewarded" f0r his pioneering spirit and his will-
f11r(11cssto "settle'' "untamed" lands (e.g., lands previously inhabited
liy tile C'Ultural other). His "European presence" gave colonial gov-
1·111111culs the cxcusr to "1,rotect'' hhn.
This lwhavloral pattern Is ,011slstc11twith the F.1tropea11's image
", I.e., l ltl' h1ftlalor ol "o, dcr ." Tlw
nl I 1lt11st·II,1:,l I H' wmlcl "oq.:;11111.1·1
c 1111111,II
otlu 1, l111wr•v1•1, wo1tld lw plH1'1'd Iii tt•s1·1v1·d 111l',ll1 w t1·~t•r
412 YURUGU
vations that were invariably overcrowded and that represented the

poorest agricultural possibilities. Land ownership and property
rights are jealously protected among Europeans, but there is no com-
parison with the spiritual and ideological violation that is committed
against majority peoples when they are forcibly removed from the
land of their ancestors. But it is pointless to dwell on this fact in a dis-
cussion of European behavior towards others, because it in no way
affects the behavior of Europeans; nor does it reach their "moral"
consciousness. It is, therefore, irrelevant in the attempt to under-
stand European behavior and ideology.
Another purpose of the establishment of the colonial govern-
ment is to give the illusion of a kind of legality, propriety or ethical
presence that does not exist. There is no European concept of "legal-
ity" that extends to non-European peoples. It is the traditional politi-
cal strategy of the European to create the impression that such exists,
thereby disarming the cultural other whom they exploit, as well as
those within their culture who purport to be concerned with the well-
being of the exploited peoples. If this aspect of European behavior
could be understood by peoples of majority cultures, it would be to
their distinct political advantage. It is perhaps more significant than
any other single behavioral characteristic. There simply are no guid-
ing rules of conduct, no limitations, no inhibitions in the European's
relationship with the cultural other. Therefore, the first and most
important political achievement for us is to recognize that we are ulti-
mately and inevitably, in the European's world-view cultural others.
Next, the implications of this concept for European behavior must be
understood; it then becomes easy to anticipate their behavior in the
intercultural arena. If those who have been objects of European
aggression begin to understand the cultural context of that aggres-
sion-the asili, or germinating core of the culture that explains it-
they will be much more successful in counteracting it.
In interviews with Japanese Americans who had experienced
the second world war in the United States, statement after statement
attested to the fact that "relocation" was passively accepted in many
instances because not until they were actually in the camps did the
Japanese believe that the American government would go through
with what they had threatened. When asked why, the invariable reply
was "because it was unconstitutional for them to treat A,neri,ans l11
this way." These Jnpanesc victims oft he Europ<'an con(·t•pt oft lip rnl
t11ral otlwr had ffllle<l to 111ak<•tllC' distl1H't1on llrnt E11rnp1•a11s 1l11,111
-.,·lv.-s 111,1k1· till' nltl<.Hl clw11vlnlsllt• di· tl111·tl1111
lwtw1•1•11 l•'.111npc•,111
1111d11rn1 l•:111op1·1111, Wc•!llc•1111111d
111111 Wt",lt 111, wltllf' a11tl 111111wl1lt1•
The chimera of legality that inevitably accompanies the most

brutal and immoral acts of European imperialistic expansion is diffi-
cult for those from different cultural traditions to understand. Again
it can be understood only as it relates to the complex, atypical char-
acter of the European system of values. Dishonesty and hypocrisy in
dealing with the cultural other is the norm for European behavior.
This behavior is not negatively sanctioned within the culture. Indeed,
it is expressly for such interactions that the rhetorical ethic exists.
This style of behavior is so strange from the point of view of other cul-
tures that their participants find it difficult to believe that deceit and
fraud are to be expected-that it represents the rule and not the
exception-in the European's behavior toward them.
As a prelude to his sadistically brutal behavior towards Africans
in Central Africa, Leopold of Belgium formed the International African
Association, avowedly to be concerned with the well-being of the
indigenous African population. In a conference held~n West Africa in
1884, the European powers "gave" to this organization lands in
Central Africa. Chapman Cohen says,
The Conference gave what didn't belong to it to an Association that

had no claim to what it received. In August, 1885, Leopold notified
the signatories that his Association would henceforth be known as
the "Congo Free State," and that he himself was monarch of the
domain. 13
Having thus "legally" and in a "civilized" manner usurped land

that did not belong to him, he then proceeded to brutalize its inhab-
itants. This behavior fits the pattern of European behavior toward the
cultural other. Leopold "civilized" the Africans by chopping off their
hands. The "enlightened" Europeans (the Rockefellers, Morgans, and
Guggenheims) thought such behavior uncalled for; they simply
entrenched themselves in the Congo vowing not to leave until the last
drop of natural wealth was gone. They are still there. The following
is a report from an American missionary on events in the Congo:
I
It is blood-curdling to see them returning with hands of the slain,
1'111dto find the hands of young children amongst the bigger ones I
evidencing their bravery .... The rubber from this district has cost
hu11<1rccls or llvl-i:;,a11clI he scenes I have witnessed, while unable to
lwlp I lw opprcssC'd huw hr<.•n almost enough to make me wish I
w1·11• <l<·ad...• TIH· 111bh1•r I rilffie is Sl{'C'f)('cl In blood, and H the
11.,tlvc•swc·n• to t'IM•,111tl 1;w1·1•p1·v1•rywfllh•.p<•rs1111 0111111•lJppc•r
( '0111-{n v. I lu•r I wn11ltl •,IIll III' 11'11,1 11•,111111
111111l'I 1•11111 hnl11tl\'1•to
llwir r'tl'dlt 11
414 YURUGU
A part of that pattern is that the stealing of land must be accom-

panied by "treaties" and "agreements" between the European and
the "native," which are meaningless in terms of the European ethic
and invalid or immoral in terms of the traditional concepts of land
tenure. The ancestral lands cannot be "signed" away. "Everywhere we
have the same story: obtaining 'concessions' from native chiefs under
misleading pretexts, of childish bribes, or deliberate fraud." 15 For
Europeans, breaking such "treaties" is, of course, also the rule and is
in no way punishable or disapproved of by European society. What
deserves attention is the apparent need that Europeans have to
"legalize" everything; in fact their concept of legality itself bears
scrutiny. It is this spurious cultural institution that victimizes those
people unfortunate enough to get in the way of Europe's imperial
stride. Such victims unfortunately confuse the concept with "mor-
tality"; but the ideas of legality and morality have little relationship
in European ideology. "Legality" has to do with behavioral consis-
tency and order and is secularly sanctioned.
But why do Europeans go to the trouble of creating the appear-
ance of legality in their dealings with majority peoples? Why not sim-
ply steal and exploit without the charade? The answer is (1) that this
"acting out" constitutes a strategical tool that politically disarms the
victims of European expansion, and (2) it plays an important part in
the maintenance and support of the European self-image. The impor-
tance of this self-image must not be underestimated. One of the deep-
est beliefs of the Europeans is in the related notions of "civilization,"
"progress," and the "evolutionary" superiority of their culture. The
rnncept of "codified law" is a definitive ingredient of that of civiliza-
lion; for with civilization, according to European ideology, comes
order and legality assures "lasting order"-not moral conduct but
consistent and predictable conduct. So that the "civilized" way-the
European way-is to bring laws, however forcibly, and the structures
of European culture ("civilization") to those whom one treats
immorally and for whom one has no respect. Along with "develop-
ment," this justifies expansionism-for after all, Europeans bring "law
and order" to people who must have previously lived quite "disor-
derly" lives (or so they believe). "Good" law is written law and there-
fore truly legal; unwritten law is not really law; it Is "bad" and
backward. How many times have the victims of European hypocrisy
hcc11 duped into trying to deal with those laws rather lha11 wltll tl1e
tn,, nntur<' of thr European ,•tltic'l
Tlw slnry lwgl11s with llw Homa11swlto hlt·ss(•d lht• world wlll1
1 ,11lih v1 111w11IWIie,
tlwlt l11w•, l'Vl'lt 110w fllm1)!l1I to 111tllC'lr 1-l11•11l1••.t1
were the barbarians? Those who defied and ignored the laws-who
lived according to other patterns. Who are the barbarians now? The
skyjackers, kidnappers, and other "terrorists" (revolutionaries). We
are told by the European press that their acts are "uncivilized," and
indeed, their behavior poses a threat to European ideology. By refus-
ing to relate to Western order, these individuals and armies disarm
Europeans. They succeed in robbing them of a potent tool for psy-
chological and ideological enslavement.
To Reagan, Quaddafy is a "mad dog," who supports acts of "ter-
rorism'' against the "free world" (European, Euro-American interests).
Therefore Reagan could intentionally provoke Libya into a defensive
attack by invading the Gulf of Sidra, twelve miles within Libya's coast
line. Then "in retaliation," he could indiscriminately bomb the Libyan
city of Tripoli, perhaps in an effort to assassinate Quaddafy. Reagan's
act is called "defending civilization," while Quaddafy is accused of
supporting acts of "terrorism." But those who are called terrorists by
Europeans are people who have refused to accept the semantics of
European ideology and the rules of European culture. In the view of
these revolutionaries, Europeans are "war criminals," on trial for cen-
turies of systematic exploitation, rape, and murder perpetrated
against various majority peoples. Those whom the Europeans label
"terrorists" understand that we are fools if we accept the war-mon-
gers rules of war. If, indeed, we wish to destroy their power to defeat
us, we must deny them the right to judge us and our behavior. Who
Is Reagan to define moral or even political terms for the world?
It is always a matter of "the entire civilized community being
shocked by these barbaric acts." It is the "barbarian" now, as in
Ancient Rome, who is the true "revolutionary"; if only in the sense
I hat he poses the greatest threat to the European order. Those few
wl10 have come to understand the principles of the European's atti-
1utles and behavior towards the cultural other are considered to be
parnnoid, hateful, extreme, and violent by the rest who still relate to
I lw European fa<;ade. Since European "laws" never work for the cul-
l urn I 01 her anyway, the best thing for non-Europeans to do is to
lg1ion• them. That was one of the lessons of the Mississippi experi-
l'llCl· lha1 black people, learned at the Democratic National
C'o11vcnllon in 1964, much to the embarrassment of the Democratic
I 'Ml y: Lhat its rules for the election of delegates were not meant to
lt11•Judt•Mississippi; 1hal the whites of that state would be upheld In
tlit•lt 1\llnnpl to <•x~·htd~•bl(lcks, because t·o do otht!rwisc would,
I ltt• "01d1•t" of t lit• 1·1111v1
ti1tlc11•cl,11ps1•1 ·111
ton. 'I'll • •wparntIon of t110ral
lly ,1t1d 11l11w,"1111· pl11•11111111·111111ol 111,1ssl1yp1wrlsy; tlw 'if'p111u1l011 of
416 YURUGU
emotional commitment from action are all encouraged by the

European tradition in the use of words without meaning. To be "civ-
ilized" is to be able to hide one's true motives, and "civilization" is the
appearance of a moral order that does not exist. If these things are
understood then it is more easily realized that to be a cultural other
implies that there are no laws that govern or inhibit the European's
behavior towards you.
Where this becomes immediately apparent is in the European's
overt behavior; in their expressions of violence and brutality.
However inadvertently, the freedom rides and sit-ins demonstrated
that there was no "conscience" to be reached in white America sen-
sitive to physical brutality being enacted upon African people-in
spite of the intended objective of appealing to that hypothetical "con-
science." If the nature of European ideology had been properly under-
stood, this strategic error could never have been made. But, again,
perhaps it was a timely error, though it is difficult to imagine any gain
worth those lost lives or the physical and e,motional brutality suf-
fered by a young and naively idealistic community. The "gain," if any,
is to be reckoned in the removal of the hypocritical veneer and dis-
arming image that America had presented to the world. America's
behavior towards people of African descent during the Southern
Movement revealed an ugly slice of the European ethic that was not
meant to be shown. African descendants had, of course, long endured
such brutality; but they had been "invisible," i.e., "hidden" within a
conceptual construct that did not allow them to be seen as human.
This revelation helped a few more victims of European brutality and
exploitation to understand the implications of the European concept
of the "cultural other." Those few were accordingly able to radically
alter their political strategy for the attainment of the self-determina-
tion that they sought.
Political Violence: Seek and Destroy

Violence and physical and emotional brutality are part of the
Western way of life-a fact well demonstrated in Alphonso Pinckney's
The American Way of Violence (1972). This characteristic of the cul-
ture, along with several others (e.g., the capitalistic ethic, aggres-
siveness, competitiveness, the isolating concept of self) is a potential
threat to the survival and unity of the cultural whole. Clearly, it is 11ot
In the intcrrsts of Europran nationalism to allow suclt dC'struclivl-'
llt•ss to bv 11nlrasltcd 11ponthe very pt->opll.-on whos<' survival 1111• cul
11111• d1•pl 111ls.'l'hls h 11<lc•11cy
1 1
Is lllvn·fo1r• c·11rh1•dwltl11t1tlw t 11lt111c-,
,111dl 111op1•,111
1
td1•ol11Kv(llw v,dtll's 111.,tillt' 1111•,;1•111,•tl
tu 1111•
lttcllvld
Behavior Toward Others 41i
ual) inhibits or limits the violence and brutality with which one
European can treat another. The concept of the cultural other con-
tributes to the survival of European culture, i.e., to its internal cohe-
sion, acting to maintain the integrity of its asili.
The bombing of Japan was culturally supportable because the
Japanese were considered to be cultural others. The massacres in
Vietnam; the torture during the Algerian Revolution; the treatment of
Africans in South Africa; Leopold's mutilations in the Congo; the treat-
ment first of the indigenous population and then of kidnapped
Africans in America-all of these phenomena involved the interaction
of Europeans with the cultural other. The pattern presented by the
history of European behavior towards majority peoples must be eth-
nologically interpreted as evidence of a concept of us as those who
may be treated with any amount of violence and brutality. The pat-
tern indicates that acts of brutality committed against majority peo-
ples are not ethically condemned in European culture--there is no
ideological basis from which to do so. These cultural-historical facts
rnust be taken as evidence of the existence of the European concept
( 11the cultural other; a concept generated by the asili of European cul-
1ure.
The European is capable of decimating whole populations of
niltural others. Actions taken on behalf of the European imperialist
c·nterprise attest to the fact that, according to the "logic" of European
lckology, cultural others can be destroyed with impunity-without
1111iibitiveemotional reaction among those who kill or from within
tlw <"Ulture as a whole. Cohen describes the situation in the Congo
1111derLeopold:
Wl1ole districts were depopulated. Of eight villages with a popula-

tion of over 3,000,only ten persons were left. Of another district the
pop11lation dropped in fifteen years from 50,000 to 5,000. The
Bolangi tribe, formerly numbering 40,000, sank to 8,000. King
I .1·npold, it is calculated, netted a profit of between three and five
111tllionsterling, and could call to God to witness the purity to his
1110I iws and his desire to promote civilization. 16
< 111 i\ugust 6, 1945 at 8:15 <'.l.m.,Paul Tippin, acting for the
i\trwrlnm pPnple, dropped a11atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The
I u ,1111,was known tu lw more df'vastating than any previously devel-•
111 u•d i\pproxi1nill ~·ly,rnt· minut·c after dropping it, Tippin could feel
1111• ,•lfpc•ts of lr1·111nr·sill ltls pl;11wflyinF:ahout :rn.ooo
ff•(-''above, .111cl
wlic-11 lw [1111kc·cl tl11w11,1~11or I wlt1lc• lat Pr ,tll I '1;1I llt' t:011lcl sr-1• I ll:1I wa::
It'll 111Iii•• rlty w,1°, ,1 ltl11d ol "t,l,11 k dc·luls." ll1· l1jul l11•c·11 ,111xlt111t- d111
418 YURUGU
ing those first few seconds before the bomb exploded. "Maybe it
won't work," he thought. But with satisfaction and relief he sent a
message back to his superiors in the United States; "Results better
than expected." Back home President Truman and Secretary of State
Byrnes were quite pleased. Tippin reported a "routine" flight back; he
even let his subordinate take the controls and went to the back of the
plane to "get some sleep." On the ground 70,000 people had been
killed; 70,000 more were injured; radiation sickness would kill approx-
imately 1,000 more in the years to come. The President of the United
States called it "the greatest thing in history." 17
German reparations and Jewish statehood, after the atrocities of
World War II, illustrate the difference between the European intracul-
tural ethic and European behavior toward others. German treatment
of the Jews during Hitler's rule was effectively condemned by the
Western world as no other act of mass brutality committed by a
Western European nation has ever been. Yet, it would appear from the
record that it wasn't because this brutality exceeded any other ever
committed against a cultural group. Unfortunately the history of
European imperialism has much worse tales to tell. It was effectively
condemned by the West because of the identity of the victims in terms
of the cultural definitions of the European. The victims, in this case,
were ultimately considered to be Europeans and therefore not cul-
tural others. The Germans had made a mistake. The Boers in South
Africa; the Americans in North America, Japan, Vietnam; etc., the
Spanish in South America, the British in China, India, Africa, the
Caribbean Islands; the Christian Church during the Crusades-the list
could go on and on-but none of these actions by Europeans could
ever be forcefully or seriously condemned by the Western world, for
in each instance the perpetrators had chosen the "ethnically proper"
victims-non-European, nonwhite, nonwestern peoples. Ian Smith was
responsible for the murder of 30,000 Africans in Rhodesia, but he was
never charged with "war crimes." Africans must do that themselves.
On the southern tip of the African continent, a settler population
of 4.5 million Europeans controls a land area of 472,359 square miles,
which they identify as "The Republic of South Africa." This European
minority holds 21 million Africans (and 3 million others of mixed
Indian background) hostage in their indigenous homeland. Tlw
Africans cannot vote, cannot buy or sell land; they cannot live wherl·
they choose, move around at will, nor work when' llwy wlsll. Tlwy
c-a11notlw cl<1 ctC'Clto publlc offlc-e 11qr bi" 11w111ht'r~ of parll111111,nI,
tlwy, t l1t·rl'fon', 11,,vf'110 pollllrnl pow1·1 ,ind 1111 1'1111t10I ov••• 1111'11
llv1•·•·Afrh 1111'; .1r1·7'!.l)l'l<'1•11I of 1111•popul.1!1111101111 ,111· 11·lq{,d1•dt11
13 percent of the land, called "Bantustans." Eighty-seven percent of

the land is reserved for Europeans, who comprise only 16 percent of
the population. Africans earn 29.4 percent of the nation's wages and
can expect an average income of 330 rands per annum. Europeans
earn 58.7 percent of the nation's wages and can expect an annual
income of 1300 rands. All public education is racially segregated and
based on a philosophy of what might be called "racial pragmatism,"
to put it euphemistically. Prime Minister Yerwoerd, then Minister of
Native Affairs, put it this way in 1953:
Education must train and teach people in accordance with their

opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live
.... The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in
all respects. There is no place for him in the European commu-
nity above the level of certain forms of labor. Within his own
community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of
no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorp-
tion in the European community while he cannot and will not be
absorbed there. 18
During the 1982-83 school year the government spent $1,323

for the education of each European student for the year. For Africans
the figure was $178 per student. 18 In 1982 only 2 percent of African stu-
llf'nts went past high school; the figure for Europeans was 15 per-
('L'lll. (South African Perspectives, January 1984.) The teacher-student
rnllo is 1:18.9 for Europeans and 1:40.7 for Africans.
In the area of health, there was one doctor for every 330
l·'.11ropeansand one doctor for every 19,000 Africans. There was a
1'11ildmortality rate of 14 percent, and a life expectancy of 67 for the
1•'.uropeans, with a child mortality rate of 60 percent and a life
1•xp •rtancy of 55 for Africans. 19In 1983 it was estimated that 2.9 mil-
l1n11black children suffered from malnutrition.
This political situation is under constant attack from the African
• 1111llllltnity and has been, in varying degrees, since the coming of the
1:111 opc•a11sin 1652. Because of the escalation of organized African
11"1lst.1nce in recent years, the white government has intensified
"11•1:,11"repression. In 1982 the Terrorism Act, the Unlawful
l lt 1-1,111lz.lllon Act, and the Generai Laws Amendment Act were con-
·11,ltd,11 l'cl 1111dC'I'the Internal Security Act. This act allows:
• ltHl('fittitC' inrommunic-ado detention without charge or t·rial;
• 1111tl.1wl111,1of nny 01w,niz11tlo11nll<•gt:dto h<•th1ratr11it1g to ptJhllc
•1,\11•1
y or nrd1•1; ·
• p1Ullll1llhlll ol tl1t• p11t11l11J(,
1111l1lh·t1tlol1 nr 111,y
()I <lls:,1•1111t1,1tlt111
420 YURUGU
periodical or any other publication

• prohibition of any gathering or meeting;
• random police searches;
• curtailment of travel rights of any person, and restriction of rights
of communication, association and participation in any activity
("banning").
In order to control their movements, to inhibit their ability to
organize, to control their labor, and for purposes of surveillance-
Africans 16 years of age and over are required to be fingerprinted and
to carry a pass-book at all times. The book contains a record of their
Bantus tan identification, of their employment, permits to enter white
areas, and a record of taxes and family status.
South Africa had, until recently, the highest per capita prison
population in the world.(According to South African Perspectives, by
1991, it was second, after the United States.) For every 100,000 of the
population 440 people were jailed. Forty percent of the prisoners in
jail have been convicted of pass law violations, which only Africans
can commit. In 1980, of 130 people hanged, only one was white. In
1960, 69 people were gunned down by the police for expressing their
opposition to the regime in a nonviolent demonstration.
The international European community makes this reality pos-
sible. They need South Africa's mineral and human resources to make
up for the deficiencies of their own natural and human resources.
The major investors in South Africa are: Great Britain, the United
States, West Germany, Switzerland, France, Israel, and Japan (which
in many ways has become an "honorary European" nation in terms
of its materialist and technological priorities). The largest investor is
Great Britain, with closest historical ties to the area. The United
States, which has inherited Europe's imperial crown from Britain, is
the second largest investor, accounting for 20 percent of all direct for-
eign investment in South Africa. In 1982 more than 350 U.S. compa-
nies had subsidiaries in South Africa. Major American corporate
investments in South Africa include Mobil Oil ($426 million); Caltex
i.e., Standard Oil, Texico ($334 million); SOHIO($345 million); the list
continues. As of June 1983, loans from U.S. Banks to South Africa
totalled $3.88 billion.20 These companies are supported by European-
American society. New York State alone has invested over $6 billlo11
In companies doi{lg business in South Africa. 21 The United States
seeks to "free'' people from communist rule, but it suppm ts t Ill' l11fa
rnous white rej..fime i11So.11thAfrica. 'l'lw vi'ctlms nn· 1·11lt11r1d
ull1t•r:1
,llld lllt• l>ooty Is lrr1·slstlbll'.
'l'l1c• 11,1tlu11ol Cir1•11t1tl,1
h sltw,ic•d 011 ., ll11y 1'.1;11111
111Ilic
Caribbean, north of Venezuela on the South American continent. Its

population is approximately twice the size of Staten Island, New
York-110,000 people. On Tuesday, October 25, 1983, the United
States Government, representing a nation with a population of 220
million people, situated on the continent of North America, with prob-
ably the most powerful military organization in the world, invaded
this tiny country with a minimum of 6000 U.S. marines, paratroopers,
and the 82nd Airbourne Division troops. Ronald Reagan, the presi-
dent of the United States, authorized an illegal and unconstitutional
act that totally violated Grenada's national sovereignty.
The U.S.invasion included the use of fire bombers, gas bombs, and
military might of the type used in Vietnam. Grenadian and interna-
tional solidarity workers defending the island, its homes and work-
sites from the invaders, were brutally murdered, injured, and
imprisoned with no regard for international law.22
How did the United States justify such an act of imperialistic

aggression, against a tiny country that could in no way be perceived
as a threat to them? The Grenadian people were committed to a
socialist form of government; therefore they became the "enemy" of
the United States. It was up to the European Americans to "save" the
people of Grenada from themselves, so to speak; to save them from
communist dictatorship and Cuban rule. The Cubans were building
an airfield in Grenada that was to be used as a base for Soviet mili-
1ilry machinery, or so the story went. Following the assassination of
M:turice Bishop, the popular Grenadian Head of State, Eugenia
Charles, Prime Minister of the Dominican Republic; Tom Adams, the
Pt ime Minister of Barbados; and Edward Seaga of Jamaica-all pro-
I I.S.governments-"invited" the United States to rid the Caribbean of
I 111·clear and present danger which they said Grenadian instability
posed. The United States claimed that it was obligated to help in the
11·storation of stability. In addition, Reagan claimed that they had to
piolert U.S.citizens living in Grenada, a,large number of whom were
tll!'clkal students at a Grenadian medical school.
And so the United States did all that it could to destroy the
I:,Pnadinn Revolution; a revolution that was the attempt of a people
of Af rlran dcsc.:cnl' to cleterJ'!'line their own destiny. Their success
wo1ild have tanlishNI the ~<'Ir-imageof Euro-America, while provid-
1111{,1 IH::won of llgh1 for :w million Africans colonized within the
•d Statt'"·l<t-,1g,111
l 111111 ,l111ply1111<1
1
lwarcl l lw <'i\11
oft-:11ropec1n111a1tlf
t'sl
d, stl11v, ,lllll /111, 1d 111.11·1·01d w11l1 1111'p1l11C'lpl1•i,;nf lltl' Mo11101•
ll111 tr 1111•
Tith, ,11 lltut, ~ll 1111111·11d111h, ,ii lo 1<1·,11!,1111111cl
Wll', qttltc• 1111:II
422 YURUGU
fits neatly within the dictates of the asili of the culture. Such is the face
of European political violence against cultural others.
In 1981 Ronald Reagan was faced with the problem of the psy-
chological ill-effects caused by the United State's defeat in Vietnam.
He had to prove to the world and to the American people that the
United States was still more powerful than the Soviet Union. At the
same time the enemy-communism-was not just far away in
Southeast Asia but threatening close at hand, in South and Central
America. The Marxist-Leninists would not rest until all of Central
America was under communist rule. They would eventually get to
the borders of the United States, not satisfied until the entire planet
was under communist control. So goes the line of U.S. militarism, its
own obsession justified by the alleged obsession of others. What is
so bad about communism? The question might be asked in a more
intellectually free environment. The answer predictably is that com-
munism denies people "freedom to choose." It is not usually added
that socialism denies American capitalists access to the material
resources that they need, but do not own; indeed, the spread of
socialism limits capitalist control. The immediate issue is not whether
we agree or disagree with this view, but what kinds of Euro-American
behavior towards others is justified by the so-called communist
threat.
Their villages under attack, the people of Nicaragua are not phe-
notipically European. Their hair is dark and their skins are much
darker than that of European Americans. They look very much like
the original inhabitants of the Americas, from whom many of them are
descended. (Europeans have already decimated such a population.)
They are a poor, humble people. But they have earned the amnity of
a powerful cultural/racial enemy.
The Sandonista government came into power in Nicaragua in
July 1979. It proclaimed revolutionary goals, which automatically
placed it in opposition to the United States. But Nicaragua insisted
that they would relate to the United States on terms of full sover~
eignty and that their right to make their own decisions should be
respected. Yet they had to have known that the United States would
attack the Nicaraguan Revolution.
In 1981 the Nicaraguan government began supporting the revo-
lutionary n,ovcment in El Salvador by se11clingarms. Reagan JH)t111cvrl
on thC' opportunity to begin to reslore America's iniagc as the ovc-r
St'<'r of llw wm lei. On May !), 1981 Ronald Rcuj,{an sli-t111•d ,, $(·t·n 1I
di11·cIlv1·sl.11ll1g Ihill tweausc• Nlrnt ,1g11;1was n' t hrc•,11Io Fl S,llv.u1111,
1111dlt11111'IJ11ll1•dS·t,llc•s, lw w11·1:111tlirnl1l11Hllll' t'1•11l1,d l11t11 llltic't1C
t
Agency to organize rebel groups against the Sandonista Government.

The United States threatened to stop its aid to Nicaragua if the gov-
ernment did not stop its arms shipments. Nicaragua agreed to stop,
but aid was cut nonetheless.
In November 1981 Reagan issued another secret directive to the
CIA to develop a paramilitary force whose objective would be to
remove the Sandonista government from power. That was the covert
objective; the overt objective was to stop the arms flow between
Nicaragua and El Salvador. The military force was made up of South
Americans, not European Americans, and they were dubbed counter-
revolutionaries or "Contras." Among themselves their purpose was
clear; get rid of the Sandonistas.
In reaction, the Nicaraguan Government declared a state of
emergency, removing villagers from their homes, allegedly brutaliz-
ing the Mosquito Indians, who had been helping the Contras. By the
summer of 1982 the extremely violent nature of this act of political
violence orchestrated by the United States was clear. The Contras tar-
geted villagers, killing babies, attacking schools, health clinics, and
farm cooperatives. The CIA calls this "low intensity warfare." It sur-
passes even conventional strategies in violence and demonstrates
an unbelievable tolerance and ability for systematic inhuman brutal-
ity. Incredible, if we did not hear it explicitly described, explained in
drtail and supported by European American military leaders. But
:;ucli systematic brutality is demanded by European nationalism.
l~ttropean culture becomes the quintessence of means-ends rational-
1.wtion.
There followed a move within Congress to cut off funds to the
('rn1lras, as the realities of yet another "undeclared war" became
k11ownto the American public. The CIAwas put in the position of jus-
t l/yilllo{their actions to the American people. Edgar Chamorro, a for-
111t·1 Contra leader, is shown in films lying to the American press about
Ith lack of contact with the CIA, as the Agency instructed him to do.
111•s,1id that he had not been given orders by them. Congress
1c•spo11ded by authorizing more money. The Boland Amendment
1111tllorizcdthis money "as long as it would not be used to destabilize
t '"' Nlcara~uan Government." Everyone knew that this was the pre-
, I· 1• ll1tt>nt.The question was pur to Reagan: "Why the fiction? Why
11111 opt'llly Sltpporl the 7000 Contras?" Reagan answered: "Because
w,·w111111n k('l'P on obeying th(' laws of this country." Question:
'lh11"1t1'I tl11· lJ,S. wo1111tlw (;ovPrn1n~nl of Nic•:iragua changed'?"
\w,WPt: "No, IH•(';111•w tll,1t wrntld 1>1• 'tl1t'l,1w"lu M11yol l(Jl{7,
,1g111t1r.;t
1111• lwll1111w:1•1110lm1w•r 1w1·c•'llllllY,,111cltl11•rr·w,,..,c•vldt·111·1•
of :.l11t1
</24 YURUGU
tar involvement in Guatemala.

The "low intensity warfare" waged by the Contras under the
direction of the CIA,financed by the American Government was inten-
sified. "Low intensity warfare" means that the targets are intention-
ally civilian. The intent is to cause extreme suffering among the
people in order to make them unhappy with the present government.
In an interview on the television program Frontline the question was
put to Lieutenant General William Nutting: "What does this war
accomplish?" He answered: "It engages the Sandonista armed forces;
it alerts the populace, and hopefully results in uprisings." Question:
"How long will it take?" Answer: "Maybe five or ten years. It is evolu-
tionary." The advantage of this undeclared war when compared to the
one lost by the U.S. in Vietnam is that white people are not being
killed. In April of 1987, $105 million in additional funds were autho-
rized for the Contras.
Chamorro, the ex-Contra leader, realized that he had been used
in a process of intentional self-deception. In his words, he had been
"in the midst of insanity. You called someone a communist so that
you could kill him." 23
The situation of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua demonstrates the
cold remoteness with which European-Caucasians can plan and exe-
cute not only the destruction of non-European people, but somehow
what seems worse, how they can slowly torture people, mentally and
physically, over a long period of time-all the while attempting to con-
vince themselves that they do this in order to "free" those under tor-
ture. Any amount of violence can be tolerated toward the cultural
other without conflict. A pattern emerges. The rhetoric of European
ideology is always to say the opposite of the truth: We enslave you
to free you. Is there any wonder that the Nicaraguan national anthem
includes the phrase, "Yankees, the enemies of mankind!"
What was the attitude of European Americans to the Contra
scandal? The Contra hearings were called by the U.S. Congress in
order to ascertain what, if any, illegal or unauthorized acts had been
committed by United States officials with regard to the Iranian arms
deal. In the record-breaking heat of July 1987, the American public sat
glued to their television sets. The Contra Hearings even topped the
day-time soaps.
To what degree was tile President of llw United Stales involV<'d
in thl' lrnni;i,n arn1s cteal, in which the• Unit~d SltllCS h:\d sold .Jr!IIS to
111111, fte,•cl !>llnH' linslilf,W~ irl IIH' p1ott•ss, ,111clll!Wd IIIC' profit-; lo
1111,11 wt• ti II' ('011 Ir as 111Nl!'nr;igu;1, :,II wit li.1111( '011Hr
1•i;•,l011,1I ,I( 1prt 1v,11'!
'I II,• l 1 11••ld1·1ll ,11111•,tcit 11l1•d1111111111•11S li.111•,ultl ,11111 1• lo lt,111,tl1111
said that if the U.S. had sold them, he hadn't known about it, or that
if he had known about it, he couldn't remember! These were the
words of the President of the most powerful nation in the world!
In the hearings Oliver North testified that not only had such a
deal "gone down" in which he had participated, but that he had done
so with the approval of his superiors, and that he had prepared erro-
neous documents to "mislead Congress" so that a hearing would
never take place again. He said that he had also promised three heads
of state in Central America support for their counter-revolutionary
activity, and that the United States Government had promised him
"discretion."
The people of Nicaragua were never the issue in the Contra hear-
ings. Congressmen appeared either to be "hurt" because they had not
been trusted with the secrets of a covert action or appalled that gov-
ernment officials would take it upon themselves to make such impor-
tant policy decisions without consulting the President. Honesty and
integrity were certainly not displayed during the hearings, so that no
one seemed to know who was telling the truth, if it was being told at
all. But no one seemed to question the morality of such "covert
actions." Admiral John Poindexter, who was given credit for having
authorized the deal, said that he purposefully hadn't asked or told the
President in the event that there would be hearings. It was okay
though, because he "knew that the President would have approved."
The entire scenario would have been pitifully comic if it were not
for the fact that while top U.S. Government officials exposed their
lack of integrity to the world, the Nicaraguan people were being
slaughtered by American-paid mercenaries, tortured and denied their
right to self-determination in the process. No one cared, because they
WNe only cultural others .
.lohari Amini demonstrates the way in which the system of
European values operates to define people as "bad" or "subhuman"
,111dis therefore able to absorb any amount of violent acts committed
111,(ainstthem. Her explanation reiterates the behavioral implications
of tile European distinction between themselves and the cultural
1111,er. She correctly assesses the significance of the facts that (1) it
w,1s only tlie Japanese-Amerkans, and not Italian- or German-
J\1111•1lrnns who were "relocated" during World War II;and that (2) the
,11t1111k bon,b was used on the Japanese. Johari Amini says,
111 l!J.l!i, aft1•1 IIH· EtltOIH'illl /\lli<'S had clckatcd the Europt•ans ill
1,1 1111,111v ,1111111,dyth1111tl,(l1uwlltods ol cnirv1·11llo11HIw.irfart·, tlwy
p11111·1·1h•dIll 1h•l1•,111111A•.l,,11'1111.l.1p1111llv d,·~,1,oyl11H
1111• l'llil'~ 111
lllr11•.lil11111,111tlN,111,,,.,tl,Iwttl1 ,1111111111111111111,
11111•1'•,11
WP,1p1111-.
126 YURUGU
which had been developed in time for use on Berlin and Munich, or
on Rome and Naples. But they were not used in Europe. They were
used in Asia instead. And why? Because underneath of all the dis-
cussion and furor about the differences between fascism and
democracy, the European Allies' war against Europeans in Germany
and Italy was, at worst, a tribal warfare and not designed for their
genocide. The situation in Asia was quite different, on the other
hand. The Allies' war against Asians in Japan represented one more
stepping-stone in the decimation of Asiatic populations by
Europeans. By way of rationale, the Asians in Japan did not have
needs, interests, goals, or backgrounds similar to the European
Allies, whereas the Europeans in Germany and Italy did; therefore
it would not have been "right" or "good" or "positive" for Europeans
to use nuclear weapons in fighting their tribal wars in Europe, but
it was indeed "right" and "good" and "positive" and even "just" to
use nuclear weapons to destroy Asians in Japan. The act of the
bombing was legitimized by the European definition of "Japanese"
("Yellow Jap," "Tojo the Jap," slant-eyed, snake-like, vicious in char-
acterization). [Amini's italics.]
That these actions taken against the Asians in Japan were, and
remain, highly consistent with European working definitions of
"right," "good," and "just," as well as European values generally
(particularly religious values), is made obvious upon examination
of the prayer that was offered on behalf of the men who were flying
the bombers. The prayer was, of course, made to God in the hope
that this bombing would cause the war to end soon so there would
be peace on earth, that the bombers would go and return in safety
because they were in His care just as all of them were in His care,
and was prayed "in the name of Jesus Christ" ... [these themes] did
not then, and do not now, contradict each other within the
European framework of values. 24
In this last paragraph Amini describes the "rhetorical ethic" in

operation. The concept of asili allows us to properly assess the sig-
nificance of the verbalized Christian ethic in conjunction with the
pattern of behavior towards others. The concept similarly allows us
to identify interpretations of European group behavior that arc con-
sistent with the essential core, or nature of the culturt::. It· l<•ads 11s,al
the same time, to an analysis that explains the dominant modes of
European thought and bchav,ior as heing part or a co11slstP11tand
llrtil('d Ideological who!C'. Th• rnnc<'Pf of I he t11lt 11mlof lwr pl,1n·s t IH'
lwhilvlor th,11 A111initlt-s<"rllws sq11,11 ·ly wttlllt1 tlw 1·01111111", of Llial
l'tl,it'; ,1~:silt 1rny·,,<;111·11l1,•l11tvl11111-1
o;,111ctlrnll'd hy 1l11•l·.11rnp11111 ,·011
111'.t,111wit I I l•:111
PpP,111 "ww ldll~ (11 1!1111h111•,"
Cultural Violence: Destroying the Will

The capacity of one cultural group to commit acts of physical
brutality and destruction against another is proportionate to the
place of power (i.e., control over "other") in its ideology and the
degree to which its image and conception of those outside the culture
lack the characteristics of "humanness." European culture has an
enormous capacity for the perpetration of physical violence against
other cultures; it's integrity is neither threatened nor disrupted by
such occurrences.
The physical body may be critical to the maintenance of human
existence, but the quality of that existence depends very much on
our mental and spiritual condition. First World cultures tend to be
spiritually oriented, and therefore cultural violence (ideological and
psychological) is at least as damaging to their humanity as is physi-
cal violence. It would be difficult to say which does the most harm.
Indeed, they cannot be separated.
Here again, the European is the master. The West initially set out
to conquer the world with the might of its Roman armies, but the les-
son they soon learned was that building an empire was not a matter
of military superiority alone; it was necessary to impose culture as
well-and so the Romans "civilized" (did cultural violence) as they
went. And in the centuries to come Christianity became the tool that
dealt the deathblow to the objects of European imperialism. How
much easier it was to control a culture once the coherence of its ide-
ology had been destroyed; and wasn't this, after all, the way to really
take it over, to possess it? Again, it was the cultural other who was
I he only fair game for cultural imperialism. Only her forms of social
organization, her religion, her material culture, her art forms, were
"inferior." They could, therefore, be destroyed with impunity. The
destruction of the ideological structures of'Africans and other major-
lly peoples was far more costly to them than even incarceration; for
without these they had no rationale for defense; neither a reason for
llving, nor one for dying. Awoonor analyzes the process well:
lly fat the most powerful of European cultural contact and change
111Africa has been the Christia11Church ... missionary work began
li1 Africa as a sporadic attempt ... to extend the gospel to the
heathens [but) the metropolitan political machinery
"1111f11rtt111iltc"
. . lwcnmt' its <'losrst def<>n<ler,
ally, and ultimate beneficiary.
'1'1111 ('ltrlsil.111 ( 1 li111t'i1Iii Afrfril rd11s1•d lo }t(·1·q>t1111•

l<-)~111111,wyol
lite• i\l1k11111-. rl'll~!l1111:1 llt• wus n1•1•ll!wdof lwlitl,( a p,,ga11,
p1,~tlli1111.
11d1•vll wu1 -.l1tpp1•1,:iot1111 w11•,•whl It, lthVt' 1•111ployPdIth ,1~:i-111•y
111
428 YURUGU
erase every vestige of religious impression from the African's mind,

leaving him without a single ray to guide him away from the dark
and dread futurity. 25
The attack was cultural, aimed at the spirit and self-esteem of the
African, entities that had been held firmly in tact by a cohesive com-
munal organization. Christianity appealed to the outcasts in order to
subvert the solidarity and integrity of the society. It was individual-
istic, not communalistic like African spiritual conceptions. One
sought personal and individual salvation through piety and belief in
Christ. "The school was the most important instrument of Christian
missionary work in Africa." 26 Children entered missionary schools
only to cut ties with their families and with their traditional rituals and
rites of passage; i.e., those institutions that had given Africans such
a deep sense of security and identity. Africans were forced to change
their names in order to become good Christians-docile, humble and
obedient.
Speaking African languages was discouraged, while imitating
Europe was encouraged; including Europe's material culture.
This situation led to the development of a sense of insecurity and

inferiority in Africans, marked by a simple process of the loss of
identity and of independence in the most traumatic manner .... For
this group [the Europeans), the bulk of the Africans represented a
despicable lower level of creatures, with obnoxious religious and
·social habits who must not be tolerated around the precincts of
decent homes. 27
Soon the "educated" Africans would be taught to think these

things about their own people. They could then be used to "lead."
Africans were considered to be "half child, half devil." But "Christ
was a white man; the saints were white; the missionaries were
white." 28
Clearly, it has been the evil political genius of the West, since the
beginnings of European imperialism, to concentrate its efforts on the
cultural and therefore ideological destruction of the people it con-
quered. The instances of European military control in which its vic-
tims continued to deny E;uropean cultural superiority arc not
imperialist successes. Here Europeans have not been al>l<'to truly
impose aucl "expand" themselves. It Is for this rf-'ason that Vit•In;rn1Is
Ill(' most hitter failure' of 1::11rn.1wan inqwrfolism to rial<'. A11d yPI a
p1•11pl1• who l111w lit•t't\ ldt·olo}tlt:,1lly c 011q1tt·11•1( 1,11dy 11•1pilH• tlin
ul o11111-itu
11111·111 lw IH•pl 111,·111111111( 11111•1( 1 W11od•11111
1,•lh 11:1
If you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about his
actions. When you determine what a man shall think you do not
have to concern yourself about what he will do. If you make a man
feel that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to accept an
inferior status, for he will seek it himself. If you make a man think
that he is justly an outcast, you do not have to order him to the back
door. He will go without being told; and if there is no back door, his
very nature will demand one. 29
It is the nature of European behavior toward the cultural other

to enact cultural violence against her in the attempt to destroy her
spiritual as well and material culture. E. D. Morel says that the
destructive effects of the "scientifically applied" evils of western
exploitation are "permanent":
... in its permanence resides its fatal consequences. It kills not the
body merely, but the soul. It breaks the spirit. It attacks the African
at every turn, from every point of vantage. It wrecks his polity,
uproots him from the land, invades his family life, destroys his nat-
ural pursuits and occupations, claims his whole time, enslaves him
in his own home. 30 -
It is the consistent objective of Europeans in their behavior

toward the cultural other to destroy culture and thereby to destroy
dignity. Whether the vehicle is a chain put on her ankle, a Bible placed
in her hand, or a "pacification" or "development" program, the objec-
tive is always the same, and physical violence is just one (not neces-
sarily the most devastating or destructive) aspect of this endeavor.
The cultural other represents that which is negative in the
European definition of value; it is the symbol of nonvalue. Yet
Europeans have consistently acted to place themselves into a posi-
lion of proximity with the peoples whom they despise-whom they
consider unworthy. Only in terms of the dynamics of the European
utamaroho does this behavior make sense.
Tile principles of capitalism, and the greed that it unleashes,
n·rtainly contribute to the European quest for "relationship" with
11ll' cultural other and results in what appears often to be contradic-
1or y behavior in which the sentiments of a staunch, white national-
b111S('('mingly conflict with the interests of economic exploitation.
l-'1om I lit• point orview of Wayne McLeod (who describes himself as
., "rnd,dlsl"): "/\vnrl('ious Capitalism lwrunies <>vidcntas a11enemy
• IH'lll It 1¥,~, 1,II ,1 of W1•st1·r11Sod(•ty
111t lw <'111l1111 wllt•11It I c•c·nilts labor
1111·ltvdll1norl 111tllC' Wldlt•," 11Ttit:-
11I1111•d,1,kc 1 11111",,1•11d,1111i1•1l11~:
w111ilcl,1pp1•,11111l11 1111•"l111{lc
.1I" p11•,lll1111~lv11 11tlw 1111•111l-.1•,111wl1lii'
430 YURUGU
nationalist ideology. And if it had been taken consistently, once the

indigenous population had been exterminated, American society
would have been homogeneously white, Western European-or
maybe the first comers would never have left Europe in the first place.
But the patterned behavior of Europeans points to the presence of
other dynamics that lie beneath the surface of common white nation-
alist propaganda. White nationalism is, after all, white supremism
and, therefore, requires two variables-a superior and an inferior.
After the discovery of gold in California in 1848, the Chinese
were brought to America in increasingly larger numbers to provide
cheap labor. By 1852, 20,000 Chinese had entered the United States.
They had been transported under the worst possible conditions-kid-
napped and duped. With the settling in of the immigrant population,
the anti-Chinese mood of America heightened, initiating decades of
violence and atrocities committed against them in the 1870s. It was
when Chinese labor was no longer greedily consumed that Americans
became more concerned with the limitation and prohibition of
Chinese immigration. 32 Just as with the behavior of the European-
American population toward the Africans, whom they imported dur-
ing the slave trade, these episodes display the familiar pattern in
European treatment of peoples of other cultures. Europeans import
majority peoples to do their dirty work and simultaneously deprecate
them and rave about the negative effect they are having on their cul-
ture. They then legislate to change, control, and superficially segre-
gate·these cultural others. How such people came to be there in the
first place never appears to be a fact of consideration (it is not as
though they had "invaded" the West), and unfortunately for them,
there is almost never a concerted effort to return them to their horn~
lands. It was the greed and hypocrisy of the white southerner that
placed him in the position of having to be proximate to Africans. As
MacLeod inadvertently points out, a consistent position of white
nationalism should have prevented African slavery in the first place.
Scrawled across an advertisement written in Spanish on a New
York City bus are the words, "This is America. Speak English!" But
obviously the best way to keep America "English speakiug,"
European, and white is to bar entry to peoples of other cultures and
colors; neither to use them-nor to "annex" (colonize) their countries.
At the same time immigration policies will be more open to people of
European descent, while they allow e11oughdarker peoples to inllltl
1-(ral, (legally and Illegally) lo provicl<'lite type of lahot tlut whit us will
110! do, l)lstal11<1d work ts· rur dist,1!1wcl 1wopl11 Ev1•11u1,111v"lllc11-{nt
.dlc·11s"c·.111l1upt· lo 11•111,1111
111lht• \l11ltt•!I ~l,,lc•s l>1•c
,t.11m· llwy wlll lw
used as twentieth-century "slaves."

What kind of person allows someone from a despised race/cul-
ture to nurse and raise her children and to live in her house? The
peculiar perversions of the European utamaroho are dramatically
enacted in the Sembene Ousman film Black Girl. In this film a young
Senegalese woman is hired by a French couple to provide them with
a symbol of superiority-a requisite for success in European ideol-
ogy. She cannot endure the cultural violence that her condition
inflicts; liberating herself by committing suicide (the sacrifice of phys-
ical existence). In this way her spirit can return to her people.
The East Side, and now the Upper West Side of Manhattan
parades such symbols daily as women of African descent are to be
seen transporting small white children on and off the buses of
Lexington Avenue or walking them in strollers. What irony! Are these
children being sacrificed for the sake of white supremacy-or is it an
even more complex phenomenon in which a maternal superiority is
associated with the race of the original mother? Whatever the
answer, it is for us, the essence of exploitation.
But in the "logic" of European ideology the importation of
despised peoples is not contradictory, rather the action and the sen-
timent complement each other within the complex and unique con-
struct that is the European utamaroho. That is why capitalist
behavior and white nationalism do not conflict and why it takes more
t ltan the factor of the capitalist ethic to explain the European's need
for the presence of the cultural other. (Kovel talks about "ambiva-
lence" towards feces.) This historical pattern in the behavior of the
European, in so far as it is motivated by the desired presence of peo-
ples of other cultures, is ethnologically understood by the recogni-
tion of two related factors. First, as stated earlier, the nature of the
rnlture requires the cultural other as the "proper" object of its
destructiveness in order to mitigate these negative effects within
t Ill~ <"Ultureitself. (Other cultures can survive in isolation; European
c·1dtLire,by its very nature, cannot.) And second, there is the need of
t Ill' rnltural ego to feel assured of its superiority. The presence of the
, ultural other and her successful dehumanization is, for Europeans,
1Ill' necessary demonstration of Curopean supremacy. This constant
11•11fflr111allun is essential.
The clctcrmi11ing factor in the European's behavior towards
ll1rnw n11Lsidc lwr culture 1sthe driving power theme that clomiuatcs
lif't lcl1,11log_v.1t 1111dt,.rlhJ~I l1<'lrfonatil'al rc1tiont1llsm,lheir lack of splr
ll 11,tltlY, I IH'lt oh~11 l wtt It t lH• lll,llf'l II\] lltl'cl t IH• I N'illlk:tl, Hllcl t lwl1
•s:,lc11
l111pc•1 l11l11.1lc·c xp,111~ln11lt11n'1'111• 1•1dt111 .II 111l11•1 I lw uh11•1·tul
l11•cc11111•-.
432 YURUGU
the most extreme manifestations of this power drive and a necessary

component of the European world-view. This helps us to understand
why the object of cultural violence or cultural aggression is never the
transformation of the cultural other into a European. (This is why the
Ghanaian with a British accent is an object of ridicule for the
European.) The utamaroho does not demand the creation of more
Europeans. It needs, instead, the cultural other to fulfill the role of
"object." Cultural destruction is, therefore, achieved by convincing
people of other cultures that they are in fact destined or created to
be controlled by Europeans. Or, what is equally harmful, convincing
them that they can become European (an ethnological racial impos-
sibility). The latter is the ideological basis for the creation of the
African elite that Chinweizu (1978) and Awoonor (1975) discuss as pri-
mary banes of African self-determination. Cultural destruction is suc-
cessful when majority peoples accept the definitions of themselves
given them within the terms of European ideology. Chinweizu vividly
describes the "civilizing" process as he experienced it, i.e., a process
of "miseducation":
It was a miseducation process which, by encouraging me to glorify

all things European, and by teaching me a low esteem for and nega-
tive attitudes towards things African, sought to cultivate in me that
kind of inferiority complex which drives a perfectly fine right foot to
strive to mutilate itself into a left foot. It was a miseducation full of
gaps and misleading pictures: it sought thereby to indoctrinate me
with the colonizers' ideology; it sought to structure my eyes to see
the world in the imperialist ways of seeing the world; it sought to
internalize in my consciousness the values of the colonizers .... 33
The motivating factor underlying European cultural aggression

appears to be the power drive, which is fully acted out on the cultural
other. This is often quite literally and dramatically the case; it is not
merely a subtle implication of their cultural behavior. In 1816 a com-
munity of Africans, who had escaped from white slavers and who
were living a quite peaceful, constructive, and culturally coherent
existence in Florida, were attacked by a unit under the command of
General Gaines of the United States Army; they were subsequently
slaughtered .34
In 1945 the U.S. Gover.nment was capable of dcstroyl11g two
Japanese C'itics; wreaking unprecedented destruction :uul pnln In a
sl11gl<.•at·l nf violence wl,l'h t11.eobjective' of cllsplayh1i,i llt, 1H-wiy
ac q,itrC'd powct 111tile world. Till' J;1p11w·~t•JH•opli· wc·n· 1,•p,Mdc·d.,~
l.tl>ntalot y 0t HS 1111111111·q11l11~111n "11011· wl11cl1lW,
'111lt,. 111,1 ·.i l1•1111-;t's
Genocidal Behavior: "Wipe Them Out!"

This land is ours, not through murder, not through theft, not by way
of violence or any other trickery. This has always been our land.
Here we began. Here we will continue even after the thousand sea-
son's scattering and the thousand seasons' groping, through the
white death sometimes openly, often covertly, seductively now,
brutally at other times, changes means but always seeks one end:
our extermination.
-Armah
With a knowledge of the nature of European culture (its asill),

and being aware ,of history, the African-centered person similarly
understands that the European (European-American) is capable of
doing anything to destroy people of African descent (or any other
majority people), as long as it is perceived to be in the European
interest. The concept of the cultural other eliminates the question of
morality. That is its function. Since whatever moral issues are raised
pertain to the European only, the discussion is "in house."
Two circumstances come to mind that can be interpreted as
part of an ongoing attempt to destroy African people, both on the con-
tinent and in the Diaspora. One is the infamous Tuskegee Experiment
(1932-1972); the other is the current existence and spread of the AIDS
virus.
For forty years the United States Government via its Public
I lealth Service (PHS) conducted a study of the effects of untreated
syphilis on African men in Macon County, Alabama. Referred to as
''The Tuskegee Study," after the name of the county seat and the
famous educational institute founded by Booker T. Washington, the
experiment involved 399 African men with syphilis and 201 African
111cnfree of the disease, who were used as "controls." This "experi-
111cnt" is documented in a book entitled Bad Blood, written by James
11.Jones.
/\ variety of tests and medical examinations were performed on the

111c11during scores of visits by PHS physicians over the years, but
1lit>basic procedures called for periodic blood testing and routine
,,utopsies to supplement the intormation that was obtained through
< li11in1Iex,11ninatlons.:is
Thf' ltlt:II with Syphilis were chosen becausr- they were in the last
11r"11·(t Iii ry" :-t,1gc, ,f the dis1•;1sc.'l'hr• sf'i~nt ist·s want,•d to karn nbo111
tlw ·,1•1l11w11'1lllll)lk;1tlo111, tlwl lH'( llrYl'<I d1irl11gtill' n,1111 pil,ll!t'. TIit•
,l111ly 1•i.t,1hllslwdth.it 1111' wll Ii Sypl,llli. 1ll1•tl 111011•q11h kly I li:111
1111•11
434 YURUGU
those who did not have it. This conclusion hardly seems worth the
effort. But since the objective was simply to observe the devastating
effects of Syphilis, coldly, "rationally" and "scientifically,"-from the
point of view of the Europeans-the study was deemed a "success."
The physicians involved, in the service of the United States
Government, can be charged with antihuman, genocidal behavior,
behavior that makes hypocritical nonsense of the Hippocratic oath.
James Jones comments: "The Tuskegee Experiment had nothing to do
with treatment." No new drugs were developed or tested! No old
drugs were evaluated! "It was a non-therapeutic experiment." 36 In
other words, diseased patients were diagnosed by physicians and
then not treated so that their condition could deteriorate, leading, in
most cases, to untimely death.
If there is any doubt as to the severe nature of the disease under
discussion, let us take the time to describe it briefly. Syphilis has
been divided into three states of progression: primary, secondary,
and tertiary. The details of these stages were known to European
medical science in 1932. The primary stage lasts from ten to sixty
days and involves a chancre ulcer. The secondary stage begins
within six weeks to six months with a rash and often skin eruptions.
Other complications are the aching of bones and joints, circulatory
disturbances, fever, indigestion, and headaches. Skin lesions may
develop, causing hair to drop from the scalp. "The greatest prolifer-
ation and most widespread distribution of the infectious spirochetes
throughout the body occurs in secondary syphilis." 37 The tertiary or
final stage is the most severe and most significant for an under-
standing of this grotesque human experiment. In the tertiary state a
person develops gummy or rubbery tumors, lesions. and tumors
that coalesce on the skin forming large ulcers covered with a crust
consisting of several layers of dried exuded matter. They produce
deterioration of the bone, sometimes eating away the bone. The liver
may also be affected. Syphilis also attacks the cardiovascular and
central nervous systems, and patients often die of problems related
to this condition.
The tumors may attack the walls of the heart or the blood vessels.
When the aorta is involved, the walls become weakened, scar tis-
sue forms over the lesitrn, the artery dilates, and the valves of the
heart no longer open and dose proµcrly and begin lo h:i\k. The
st rl'lC'hing of th<' vessel walls_111ay procl11C:l' an illl<'ttrysin, n hnl-_
lnonlik(• liul~w in fht• .w,
tc1If the hulV,l'1>11r:1h,
111rn,Ido, 1111'H".itlt h -.11dd1•11
dl',lllt ·111
1111d,;1,111H•1 rn la1t•1
Neurosyphilis effects the brain. The most common form is pare-

sis, which is a softening of the brain that causes progressive paraly-
sis and mental disorder. Syphilis also can effect the spinal cord, the
optic nerve (causing blindness), or a cranial nerve (causing deaf-
ness).39
What is described above is what the physicians were able to
coldly observe in the name of "science." In Jones' book, there is tes-
timony from patients to the effect that they did not know that they
had syphilis but were told vaguely that they had "bad blood." And,
what is worse, that they were given the impression (some for over
thirty years) that they were being treated for whatever condition
they had. On the other hand, officials at the Center for Disease Control
in Atlanta told reporters in 1972 that participants had been informed
that they had syphilis and were given the opportunity to withdraw
from the program and receive treatment. But this was contradicted
by a physician who had been involved in the experiment in 1932. He
said that neither the attending interns nor the subjects knew what the
study involved. Why would anyone who knew that they were seri-
ously ill remain in a program that denied them treatment when they
could leave and get treatment elsewhere?
The implications of the Tuskegee Experiment are staggering but
only if one does not understand the nature (asill) of European culture
and the character of European ideology. Black men were asked to
allow themselves to be tested for "bad blood." If chosen, either
because they tested positive or as a part of the "control" group, they
were to come periodically to the clinics for observation. They were
11nderthe impression that they were coming for treatment. Why did
they respond at all? They were mostly poor and were given incentives
such as free physical examinations, free rides to and from the clinics,
llOt meals on examination days, and free treatment for minor ail-
ments.40 They were also "befriended" by a negro nurse, Nurse Rivers,
whoni they trusted and who served as a liason between whites and
their black objects of study. She made the men feel that they were
part of an exclusive social club and burial society that guaranteed
I lleir relatives $50.00 for their funerals. 41 Eunice Rivers was perhaps
I Ile most victimized of all: transformed into an enemy of her people.
'l'hc participants were denied treatment from the beginning of
t II, projl.'ct, and In 1940 when penicillin was in use, they were denied
th,tt dru~ as well. Care was taken to prevent them from gelling lreat-
1111·11I (•li;t.•wller<" If tlwy hnd hN·n identifi<•d rnr Lile study
1wl'll11}!pllyslcl,111s wl1111·11l11rld(•11t,ll'ly
dl,1~11ost.•d
1lll'lr t·1,1HII
would 111•
111111 told, 1111•f11•1·t, otl"
''ll,1111l11
436 YURUGU
After twenty-five years in the experiment the participants were

given "certificates." What images allowed such hypocritical, antihu-
man behavior? Europeans were saying to themselves: Let a group of
black men die and suffer from syphilis without treatment so that we
can observe its effects. Fortunately black people are available-the
cultural other.
In 1972 when the experiment was finally publicized, newsman
Harry Reasoner reported that human beings had been used "as lab-
oratory animals in a long and inefficient study of how long it takes
syphilis to kill someone." 41 But these men of African descent were not
considered "human beings." "Human beingness" is not merely a sci-
entific classification; it denotes a spiritual empathetic relationship.
The cleverness and deceit of Europeans as as cultural group is
systematic and effective. Syphilis, a notorious disease resulting from
sexual license and nonhygienic practices of a morally decadent
European society, was introduced to indigenous peoples all over the
world during European colonial penetration and its aftermath, in
some cases decimating whole populations. Then centuries later the
disease becomes associated with the victims of European contami-
nation, while Europeans admonish each other against contact with
cultural others, lest they be contaminated by the disease that origi-
nated among them.
"From our knowledge of the negro we should be inclined to the
opinion that a chance for an education or even its acquisition does
not materially influence his well known sexual promiscuity," wrote Dr.
Louis Wender." 42Another fifty years will find an unsyphilitic negro a
freak," said Dr. Bruce McVey.42This pernicious association of people
of African descent with sexual promiscuity established the atmos-
phere in which the Tuskegee Experiment could be tolerated. There
was another critical ingredient to the image: ignorance. "Ignorance
and uncleanliness have ever gone hand in hand with disease .... "43
Low moral standards were said to be in the "very nature" of black peo-
ple.44Ignorance and sexual promiscuity-the double barrel leveled at
Africans in America-set us up to be deserving guinea pigs; even
worse, objects of genocide~
It is a moot question as to whether the European physicians
failed to treat the Africans because they wanted to observe them
dying or because they wanted to kill them. From an African-<.:cntNcd
perspective, it is the same thing. (And what about ;1II of till' 1woplt•
who I ntilcl IHWL'hc•c•11 and Wf'rc> i1)k,lccl by llll: 1m·n willl syphllh who
w.,~
cllcl11'tk11owt h;1I t lwv h,,d It'! I 't·rhnps t Ills also-p,11 t nl t I11•"1•xp1·1
·11111
1111 ")
Knowing what we do of the European cultural asili, of the per-

verse nature of the European utamaroho, and of the implications of
the European concept of the cultural other, we can even conjecture
that they would be capable of injecting people of African descent
with the syphilis spirochetes if only for the same reasons that they
ostensibly conducted the "experiment." Certainly the Nazi doctors
did this, and germ warfare is now used as a matter of course. 45
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the most dis-
cussed and thought-about disease, without doubt, will be Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).Contrary to the projections of
the medical establishment and the U.S.Government, confusion is gen-
erated by and is reflective of the confusion of the European-American
and European scientists. If one keeps abreast of the information
released by various agencies and experts, the pattern of contradic-
tion, conflicting "findings," and vagueness becomes obvious. The
message is clear. They simply do not know what they are talking
about. The public is told repeatedly: "There is no proven case in
which AIDShas been transmitted by casual contact. Objects touched
or handled by people with AIDSare not contaminated and need not
be feared; the only possible exceptions are objects which might be
contaminated with blood-especially razors, toothbrushes, tweez-
ers." "Don't worry, HTLV-IIIis an extremely fragile virus." Yet at the
same time we are told that it is "lenti" or "slow" with an incubation
period of seven years. Statements abound such as "there is no evi-
dence that ... " and "there is only a small risk that .... " and "it is not
thought that. ... " This phraseology is not in the least reassuring. In
May 1987, three nurses contracted AIDSsupposedly from "accidents"
in which they touched contaminated blood samples. The point is that
AIDSkills and that there is no known cure. With an incubation period
of seven years ( Dr. Strecker doubles this figure) a person could be
infected without knowing it or without others knowing it. This cer-
tainly limits the exact knowledge that medical science has of the dis-
ease. Therefore most lay people, and justifiably so, are not willing to
take chances with speculation-scientific or not.
AIDS has been associated with the male homosexual commu-
lllty in the United States, which is by and large of European descent
l>lll Includes men of African and other non-European backgrounds. In
I HH:i, 70-75 percent of t lie people with AIDS were homosexual or
1,1:wxu.il 111en; 17 percent were intravenous drug abusers.
I lt•111opl1lll,1csand ulher blood transfusion recipients are also at h!Uh
1l:11<,Im t1hvln11s n·ni,011•;, Tlw rl't rnvlrll~ I l'rl.V-111ni AIDS-t·ausinR
vh·11•,I•; ~.aid Io l,1• p11.,:c·11t11111w liocl v f 11ild:-. (blood, :w1111·11,i,,1llv,1)ul
YURUGU
people who are infected. The virus is transmitted through exchange

of bodily fluids.
What does all of this mean from an African-centered perspective,
and how is it related to European behavior towards others? Suddenly
Africa emerged as the "probable" birthplace of the AIDS virus.
"Experts" on talk shows focusing on AIDSwould briefly make state-
ments to this effect, and then quickly move on to another point, never
giving evidence to support such a conclusion. Homosexuality is not
associated with African civilization since African cultural values place
priority on female-male conjugal relationship as the basis of the
"extended" family and for the procreation of children. Yet the experts
get around this: AIDSin Africa is a heterosexual disease, and the virus
has a slightly different chemical composition. They begin to talk
about the Green Monkey as somehow being associated with the con-
tracting of AIDS. In the minds of the American public were conjured
pictures of bizarre practices in which Africans had sex with mon-
keys. Later it was "clarified" that STLV-III(S for "Simian") was carried
by monkeys, but that they did not die from it and that Africans could
have gotten it from eating the monkeys or being bitten by them.
As of August 5, 1987, the World Health Organization (WHO) fig-
ures for known AIDScases worldwide were 54,661 overall; 38,160 in
the United States, and only 4,714 in Africa. That is one reality. But on
ABC's Nightline a very different reality was created for the American
public. On Wednesday night, May 13, 1987 (when the figures for Africa
were even less) Ted Koppel, (with Dr. Milton Silverman, Renee
Sabatier and George Strait) assaulted the international African com-
munity. The gun barrels had been reloaded. The parallels with the
Tuskegee Experiment were striking in terms of the associations, argu-
ments, and images that were presented. To a mind trained to recog-
nize patterns't>f European cultural/political behavior towards others,
the game plan was clear. People of African descent were being set up
as objects of "justified" genocidal behavior by people of European
descent. Our minds were being prepared to accept the self-fulfilling
prophecy that by 1992 5 1/2 million people would be infected in the
motherland, and that men, women, and children of African descent
in the United States would be the largest group at risk.
The program began with a visual focus on people suffering and
ctying from AIDS in Africa (at least we were told that l11edis<'ase In
question was AIDS). Mothers were shown wasting away willl ll!eir
chlldrt'll nro11nd them. Prqj1·ctions w<"re madt.' nf rapid gwwth in lfw
1111111lwr ul AIDS('i\~l•~ In Mri<'a hy IIH' y1,ar :WOOT111•111111ilwrof jH'll
·1111•
,il11•;Hly ftil1•1l1•d wlli11111'AIIIS vliw, WI\~:1•,,t1111,,11•tl
111tu• 10 11111
lion! The picture was one of disaster. Why did the future look so bleak
for Africa? The "experts" said because of "cultural differences," "lack
of communication" (lack of television sets), "sexual practices,"
polygamy, and the fact that Africans "like to have children." The
premise was that the spread of AIDS could be controlled by "better
public understanding."
The association was clearly made between AIDS and sexual
promiscuity. The inference was that African culture in general and the
practice of polygamy in particular condoned sexual promiscuity, as
well as undisciplined behavior with regard to sexual relations. It does
not matter that polygamy (polygyny) is not the predominant form of
marriage in Africa, nor that it involves a controlled situation of sexual
relations. It does not matter that the African value system placed on
having children does not raise the degree of sexual promiscuity;
Africans also value stable family situations that provide cultural and
emotional support for children. It does not matter that traditional
African culture is an extremely disciplined ( compared with contem-
porary American society), morally ordered, kin-based and spiritually-
based construct. None of these realities that abound in anthropological
descriptions were made visible. Instead a white woman was shown
teaching a coeducational group of 15-year-old Africans how to use con-
doms. It does not matter that both homosexual and heterosexual pros-
titution were introduced by Europeans into Africa or that moral
discipline breaks down with "Europeanization."
The conclusion reached was that since it would be difficult (for
all of the reasons listed above) for European "experts" to communi-
cate with the afflicted Africans so that their "behavior" could be mod-
ified through an "understanding of the problem," AIDS could be
expected to spread at an alarming rate throughout Africa. AIDSmeans
death. We must remember that as we listen to those arguments.
According to the program, women with AIDSwere not told that they
had AIDS, in this case supposedly for their own protection, which
hardly sounds like a program of "education." The "protection" pro-
gram is another interesting parallel with the Tuskegee Experiment. In
llwlr capacity as "saviors" they are now experimenting with Africans
who are "desperate." Dr. Daniel 7.agury, a French physician, has been
experimenting in Zaire. The program portrayed his experiment as
I wing highly secret but most probably involving the injection of puri-
fi<•cl/\IDS vlrw, iuto ln11mrnbeings in order to stimulate the Immune
~.ysh·111! Could thnt be done to Europeans"? The answ('r ls "no," 011ly
to 1111•"c111t11rnlollw1I"
w,,~;t lit PlllHllll',I: Im Mrl1·:1(wlll1111I11,llly011ly11l1rn1Irl,71il
'1'11111
,f,f() YURUGU
known AIDScases with forty-three countries reporting). By 1992 there

were reportedly 51/2million people infected in Africa. What about the
outlook for the United States (with about 38,160 known AIDS cases)?
According to Silverman we can actually be optimistic about the future
uf AIDS in the United States. Why? Because in America people can be
educated, they can be reached through the media (two or three tele-
visions in every home), and their behavior can be modified. How does
he know? Because the male homosexual community in the United
States has already, according to Silverman and Sabatier, responded
to education about the disease and demonstrated that it is possible
to consciously change sexual practices through an understanding of
the implications of AIDS. Americans have cause for hopel But does
that include all of those who live within its boundaries?
Ted Koppel raised the question: "You talk about polygamy in
Africa, but there is casual sex in the United States ... " (Note the incor-
rect association between polygamy and casual sex.) Silverman never
answered Koppel's implied question. But what he did say parallels the
position taken by the medical establishment as far back as 1913 with
regard to black people. 44 Silverman said, "I didn't say we wouldn't
have some problems. There are the inner city youths; the minorities;
the blacks and Hispanics who must come to grips with what we are
saying, and the drug addicts." The message is clear-just as it was in
1932 when the Tuskegee Experiment was initiated. Control comes
with "education" and change. European-American male homosexuals
can be "educated." Blacks and Latinos cannot. AIDS among male
homosexuals will be contained. AIDS among blacks and Latinos will
spread. Magically, everything is reversed. The percentage of known
AIDS cases is highest among male homosexuals, but in the future we
can expect it to be highest among blacks and Latinos across the
board. If AIDS is associated with sexual promiscuity, undisciplined
behavior, "cultural difference" (different from what?), and ignorance,
then what does this imply about Blacks and Latinos. People of African
descent are oeing set up as the victims who victimize themselves;
who because of their own inadequacies can expect to be ravaged by
a killer disease.
In 1913, according to James Jones (1986), the American Social
Hygiene Association took the position that "social hyglene 'for whites
rested on the assumption that attitudinal changes could produce
behavioral changes. A single standard orhigh moral behavior could
lw p1•ocl1wcclby moldin~ i;c,xuill ;tttl1ud1~s1hrougl1 moral 0d11enliGll
For hl,11·ks, l10w1•vc.•1,;i l'll,111}tt' i11 1111·11llilll(Yl• 'it•1·1111•dlo lw
11·q111t1•d " 111'l'lils ',llpp1i111•d tlu•lr p11~1ll1111111.
IHl:11·1t with 11'1{,lld 111
the African community. Later it allowed the United States

Government to watch black people die of syphilis and to allow it to
be spread. In the 1980s the stage was set for AIDS to be understood
as an African disease that spreads amidst "sexual promiscuity," igno-
rance, and drug abuse. With this understanding the scenario of the
suffering and death of our people will appear to "make sense," no
matter how much it may be lamented. The latest word from the
"experts" is that Africans have a blood factor GPC that makes them
more susceptible. This can be said even though initially AIDS among
Europeans outnumbered AIDS among Africans by 10 to 1. Now the
ratio is much closer. Already the AIDS"disinformation" is being used
to discriminate against Africans. In an article entitled: "AIDS: Racist
Myths, Hard Facts," correspondent David Dickson says the following:
Some have complained bitterly that the suspicion that Africans

have a higher chance of carrying the virus than populations of other
continents is already used as a covert form of racist discrimina-
tion. For example, in many countries African students complain
that they are being made the target of restrictions and health
requirement that are not being imposed on other nationals. 47 On
April 20, 1990,100,000 African-Haitians demonstrated in New York
City, protesting the fact that they were not being allowed to donate
blood to their relatives. 47
The asili concept tells us to look within the logic of the European
utamawazo and utamaroho in order to understand, predict and inter-
pret European behavior. AIDS is a mystery. That is clear. Let us sup-
pose that it is a human-made virus. Suppose that it is primarily a
product of biochemical warfare, secondarily spread through sexual
and other contact. Dr. Frances Cress Welsing puts forth this hypoth-
esis, which she says is as good as any until it has been proven to be
wrong. ls there any supporting evidence? In Dr. Welsing's view:
Indeed, a number of aware black people have systematically raised

lhc question as to whether or not this new virus was "man-made"
and possibly manufactured at a facility such as the center at Ft.
Derrick, Maryland or other such centers in the western world that
arc involved in the research on and the production of chemical and
lilnlogh:al warfare weapons.
Slw continues,
rll1u•11lsw1•11·ro11cl11rll'dliy llu• l h11lc-d!'ilnl<'s

l'lw '1'1hl11•g1•1,•x111
C:,,v,•1111111•111, t I If' I l11lt1•tl:-01
11,11111•ly, nil·~ I '11hllt I 1,•;,1111 r 11111111
Atl111l11l~I
•l12 YURUGU
and the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. It was even
then verbalized that allowing the spread of syphilis could be a
method used to destroy the black population.
Thus, aware black people do not find it at all inconceivable that per-
sons with the same mind-set and psychological orientation would
not go further and develop a deadly disease that could be spread
via the venereal route and then introduce this disease into black
and other "undesirable" population groups ... again for the purpose
of a systematic depopulation agenda. 48
The Vervet Monkey disease is referred to in A Survey of Chemical

and Biological Warfare (1969) as a disease created by European scien-
tists to be used to kill the enemies of Europe and Euro-America. It is
unrelated to any other organism known and impervious to any known
antibiotics. Handling of blood and tissues can cause infection. Infection
causes death in some cases and it can be transmitted venereally. The
Vervet Monkey and the African Green Monkey are of the same genus.
Vervet Monkey disease is similar to the African Green Monkey disease
found in East and Southern Africa. There is 95 percent nucleotide
homology between STLVI (Simian) and HTLVI (human). This is evi-
dence that the two are related and not for spontaneous mutation. Yet
SLTIIIand HTLVIIIhave only 75 percent neucleotide homology, a devel-
opment which would not be expected under the normal process of
evolution. This argues for intentional human manipulation. The other
evidence is what we know of the capacity of Europeans to destroy
those whom they consider to be cultural others. The African continent
is rich with resources needed by Europe, but they do not need large
numbers of African people. In fact, many Europeans believe that their
problems would be solved if we were to disappear from the face of the
Earth. Understanding the nature of the European asili as it works out
in the utamawazo and the utamaroho, it is possible to develop an inter-
pretation of AIDSthat makes sense. Dr. Robert Strecker and Dr. William
Douglass (along with Dr. Frances Cress Welsing) are convinced that
AIDS is a human-made retrovirus. For a thorough explanation of their
theory and the evidence with which they support it, the reader is
referred to The Strecker Memorandum (a video-tape) and "Wlio
Murdered Africa," an article by Douglass. 49 We will only mention a few
of the facts and suppositions here, which impact on the question of tlw
attempt<'d genocide of Africans anll other majority peoples.
Both Strecker and l)o11glass suggest· that the Wo1ld llealtll
llq,1;111i1,tlln11 is thP ('1tlp1ll 111fl dt•uclly crl11w 11-1.1111,,sl11,1dv1•1t,•11lly
l,1•1·111w1p1 lt,tl1 1d ,11{11l1;st llt,tl 11.,s
1111•1111111,1111,w,•·i\111•,111•111111•111
gotten out of hand, to put it mildly. According to both men, without

intervention, the continued existence of the human race may be in
question.
WHO [World Health Organization] is reported to have written in

their bulletin that, An attempt should be made to see if viruses can
in fact exert selective effects on immune function. The possibility
should be looked into that the immune response to the virus itself
may be impaired if the infecting virus damages, more or less selec-
tively, the cell responding to the virus. 50
AIDS does just that. It destroys the T-Cell system of infected

human beings. Dr. Strecker claims that the AIDS virus resembles
Bovine virus in cattle and the Vesna virus in sheep. He does not
believe that it is related to the Green Monkey. According to Strecker,
if the Bovine and Vesna viruses are crossed, AIDS is the result.
Experiments have, for a long time, taken place in which animal viruses
are grown in human tissue.
If the WHO had been successful in creating the virus that they
have evidently "called for," how would they test it, and how would
they use it? Clearly, knowing what we do about white supremacy in
European nationalistic ideology, the guinea pigs would not be
Europeans, and if they were, they would be "expendable" Europeans.
In the "numbers game" it is very important to understand that peo-
ple who prefer to have sexual relations with their own gender are
likely to produce very few offspring, if any. Therefore AIDS would
most likely be introduced in African populations, their descendants,
other majority peoples, and European homosexuals.
It is reported that a front page article in The Times of London
(May II, 1987)makes the connection between centers established by
lhc WHO, ostensibly to vaccinate people against smallpox and the
locations (dates and places) in which AIDS first broke out. They are
t I 1esame: Africa, Haiti, Brazil, Japan. In addition, 15,000Haitians were
working in Africa during the vaccination project and participated in
11.As for the male homosexual community, the connection was made
via the injection of 1-).omosexualmen with Hepititus B Vaccine in a
"prograrn'' in New York in 1978and in San Franscico in 1980.The
Ill•plllt us B Vaccine-Study limited itself to "males between the ages of
'10 n11d '10, wllo were not monogamous." 51
/\IDS ,.tll live outside of the body. An AIDSvirus can be carried
l1y a n1os<111l10, 'l'lw:w nrl! c-lnlms for whic-11Slrcckcr makes rather
1 1111vlI wl 11p.
.11 Ht11nc 11
0
h. IIWlliltSt r<•1·k<.•r
a11dDouglass say Is t rtl<'o''saf1,
1
,1•x" will 11111 p1t•v1•11t/\Ill~ All tlw "c·d111;lli1111''111IIH wrnld wlll nol
444 YURUGU
prevent or control an AIDS epidemic. An AIDS vaccine can never be

"discovered" because AIDS changes. It is estimated that there are
90004 possible kinds of AIDS viruses. It appears to spontaneously
mutate and recombine.
To develop smallpox vaccine, scabs are taken from cattle
infected with the disease. The Bovine virus could have been in the
vaccines used in Africa and other areas in 1971for people innoculated
in the WHO project. It could have been accidental. If so, what a costly
error! It could also have been intentional, since the creation of such
a deadly disease is consistent with the rationale for biochemical war-
fare and with European megalomania.* There is also a theory that
AIDS was introduced in a Polio Vaccine. (See Rolling Stone, Mar. 19,
1992.) The only mistake made by the "mad" European scientists this
time may have been losing control of the disease. It therefore threat-
ens to destroy those who it was intended to serve. But ultimately,
such are the implications of the European asili.
Dr. Barbara Justice, a New York surgeon of African descent,
believes: (1) The AIDS virus has been adapted to Melanin and is
related to the experiment in 1951with the death of a Diasporic African
patient, Henrietta Lass, in which European scientists were able to
grow viruses outside of the body in her cells after she had died: (2)
The purpose of AIDS is to "clean out" the European gene pool, i.e., to
eliminate "undesirables," Africans, and homosexuals; as well as to
finally capture the continent of Africa by destroying its present,
indigenous population. 52 She refers us to the work of Jack Felder and
Alan Cantwell, Jr. 53
In 1989African scientists in Kenya, after years of research, devel-
oped a possible cure for AIDS based on Interferons. Its success
attracted pharmaceutical companies, and together they are now man-
ufacturing a product known as Kemron. In July 1990,an international
conference was held in Kenya at KEMRI(the Kenya Medical Research
Institute) to announce what they said was a tremendous break-
through. According to Dr. D. Koech and Dr. A. Obel, writing in the East
African Medical Journal,
One hundred and ninety nine symptomatic and 5 asymptomatic

patients seropositive for the human immunodeficiency virus type
I (l llV-1)were treated with KEMRON,a natural human interferon
alpha (nHIFa) stabilized in a complex polysacharichc carrier.
Treatment was given for at least 10 weeks At a daily oral d<>S<'of
• For do,·11nw11111ll1111
ul ,lf'IU,,i 1•xp..•rln1t•111~.~••••( '/p111/,11/.\1•111•1 y, I ,1•rn1111
d A ! 'nlo,
Mel 1.111111,
"i11v111,w i\d,1111H ( l11,ill1vl 111p,•1h,1,k 111
1)!1
approximately 2.0 IU of nH!Fa per kg body weight. Karnofsky per-

formance score increased from an average of 60.5 on entry into the
study to 100 by the 10th week after treatment. Similarly, common
clinical complaints associated with HIV-Iinfection rapidly reduced
per patient from an average of 3.8 to 0.05 and 0 by week 8 and IOof
treatment. Eighteen of the patients serodeconverted by both ELISA
and western blot assays during the study period. These observa-
tions suggest that KEMRONused as recommended is beneficial in
HIV-Iseropositive individuals. 54
While this was obviously an event of enormous universal sig-

nificance, no European-American media personnel attended the con-
ference.
This fact demonstrates the relationship between the European
genocidal enterprise against African people, white and Western
nationalism, and the European self-image and image of others, which
we have discussed in Chap. 4 and 5. The idea of African scientists dis-
covering a cure for a disease that threatens to destroy the world's
human population is such an anathema to a "positive," "functional"
European self-image, that the Kenyans cannot be given credit, nor
could pictures appear of the African scientists in the Euro-American
media. We must remember that these are, according to Europeans,
the same people who were too ignorant and "backward" to under-
stand the nature of the disease.The United States media did not
report KEMRONuntil it felt comfortable discussing the "controversy"
in which it was "embroiled." At the same time Kemron is being dis-
credited, European scientists are working with Interferons in the hope
of implementing an AIDS cure, and a Euro-American physician from
Texas is claiming to have created it. So that African people, still lose,
for the manufacture, distribution, and "ownership" of KEMRON is
denied us.
Perhaps we are faced with the same situation as with the syphilis
experiment. Perhaps in both cases we were "given" this disease by
Europeans as a genocidal act. Our destruction is then justified to the
world by our supposed lack of humanity. The New York Times, in May
of 1987, printed an article that discussed the alarming rate of popu-
lation growth in Africa and the equally alarming decline in population
growth for whites. Dr. Welsing and white racists themselves have
told us that Europeans are afraid of the implications of minority sta-
l 11s. Now the United Stat<'s Ciovcrnmc11t is talking about mandatory
blnud L1•Sl$( l~1•ilg,111.M11y :i I, I9~7 speech). What l11l~lllgcnl /\fricn11
0
wo11ld t 111:,I SH\ Ii ll Pl 01(1'11111'?II /\IDS clot•:; llOl d(•St I oy llS, It ri\11 ('t'r
t.1l11ly 111•11,.;.-d lo 111111111!w, Tlw 11il1• l'1 In 11lw,1ys 11·v••1,1·l•:111111w1111
446 YURUGU
statements in order to ascertain the truth, and to always interpret

their actions and statements politically. When they discuss cures for
our diseases, we know that they may already be in the process of
causing our annihilation by giving us another disease they have cre-
ated.
There is, of course, another facet of the European genocidal
assault on the health of First World and majority peoples. Toxic waste
is dumped where we live! According to Donovan Marks:
• Although socio-economic status plays an important role in the

location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race is the
leading factor.
• Three out of the five largest commerical hazardous waste land-
fills in the United States are located in mostly Black or Hispanic
communities; these landfills account for 40 percent of the
nation's estimated landfill space.
• Three out of five Black and Hispanic Americans live in commu-
nities with one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
• 60 percent of the total Black population (15million) live in com-
munities with one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
• Cities with large Black populations like St Louis, Houston,
Cleveland, Chicago, Atlanta, and Memphis have the largest num-
bers of uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
• Los Angeles has more Hispanics living in communities with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites than any other metropolitan area
in the U.S. The higher the concentration of Hispanics in an area
of the city, the higher the concentration of uncontrolled waste
in the same area.
• About half of all Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans
live in communities with uncontrolled waste sites.
First World countries are considered garbage dumps by

Europeans. We are, afterall, for them the cultural other ("garbage'').
• NIGERIA:Between August 1987and May 1988,almost 4,000 tons of

toxic wastes were dumped in Koko, Nigeria. As a result, the peo-
ple of this small port town have seen a corresponding increase
in the number of cholera patients and premature births.
• GUINEA(Conakry): In February 1988,a shipment of garbage and
incinerator ash from Philadelphia, which had been prcviou:;ly
rejected by Panama ancl I laiti, was clumped on Kassa Island, a
short distance off-shore from th· cap)tal, Con<1kry.Rt•por11-dly,
II ".au:;i•cl t ret•~ 011 tlw 1sla11cl di1•.,
tot um brown a11<1 -
• :,( )1ITI I Al-'l{IC'A·Tilt• sc•fj11•g.ill'd to'vlw,11111·, ,IIHI, 111 nl l11,1111•la1ul'1
t I 11•,, v•t, •111
111whit-Ii Air h·,11h .111• f1111 1•tI t n !Iv,· 1111tl,-;1 11I,1p, 11t I 11•ld
are targets for both international and South African government

dumping. American Cyanamid exports 100 tons of mercury
wastes each year to Thor Chemicals in Cato Ridge, South Africa.
The mercury has contaminated the nearby marshes and
Mngeweni River, which flows down into the Valley of a Thousand
Hills where the local population uses the water for drinking,
cooking, and washing.
• HAITI:In October 1987,the Haitian government issued an import
permit for fertilizer to the Khian Sea. The ship's cargo, however,
consisted of 13,476tons of toxic municipal incinerator ash from
Philadelphia. 55
There are many more examples of this pattern of behavior,
including punitive measures taken by the European Economic
Community and other such European nationalistic organizations
when we refuse to be used as garbage pails for European waste. The
Environment Community Development and Race Project, directed by
Dana A. Alston is supporting a resistance movement.
Theories of Euro-Caucasian Behavior:

The Question of Cause
"The power of one man or group of men over others-in our
case, of white men over black-is the single most salient thread of his-
tory,"56 and slavery, Kovel asserts is, "the most extreme version of the
western symbolic matrix." 57 Kovel does not realize it, but it takes the
1-'.uropeanworld view to understand history as being based on power
rl:'lationships; such an understanding issues from a confrontational
11tamawazo that insists on definitions of dominance and submission.
Nonetheless his comments bring us to the question of the relation-
ship of what is commonly called "racism" to the power drive in
l~uropean culture. That these two phenomena are related is clear,
hut the nature of that relationship is not as easily understood.
In Kovel's view the problem of "racism" is "part of the problem
of western culture" and "the record of history is basically of the suc-
cessions of that power. All the complexities of culture are harmonics
,1tiout this basic theme." 58What happened to the thousands of years
lwfore I.::uropeans had any power to speak of, indeed, before there
w,,s n "Europe" at all?
II is because the dynamics of race and ethnicity are so intimately
1t']:1tl'cl to thr European po,.ver drive l'hat I prefer to particularize the
l•'.111
npt-·ru1co111uii1111e111to "white nationalism" or "white suprcmism"
i1•1 u <10111111.,1111•11111p011c•111ol Wl'slt'l'II Eump,t•1u111alin1mllsm.Wltlte
',llllll'lilhlllI 1111lll'Vt'I 111·t1·d11r1•d to 1111• 1111'11' d1•fi11ltl1111 or pc·opl<•s
,11111I 111\1111", Ill ll'I lll'I 111 l•ll ,. l{,11·1•Ill HlOllll I Oll:11 loll:,IIC'?- 1,, Wltlc 11
448 YURUGU
might logically result in the desire to remain separate and distinct, is

qualitatively different from an ideology that requires the physical
presence and dehumanization of other peoples for the "acting out" of
a power relationship in which the actor has supreme control over
those peoples. The conative striving for power as motivating factor
here becomes the crucial element.
Let us broaden the terms. The power drive is placed in the for-
mulative and originating process of European culture. The cultural
other becomes a creation of that power drive as valued behavior.
"Race" (the concept that ambiguously links culture with the gene
pool and color) is then one of the determining factors in a cultural
identification and, therefore, a definitive component in the European
conception of the cultural other.
The value of any theory of white supremism, from an African-
centered perspective, lies in its ability to lay bare the dynamics and
centricity of the power relationship in European ideology and behav-
ior. Whether it is the "anal personality" theory of Joel Kovel, the
"genetic inferiority-complex" theory of Frances Welsing, the Northern
Cradle theory of Cheikh Anta Diop, the psychopathic racial person-
ality theory of Bobby Wright, or the historical analyses of W.E.B.
DuBois and earlier Pan-Africanists-in each case their value lies in the
fact that they place white supremism squarely within the matrix of
European ideology and biocultural development. They particularize
what they call "white racism" within the spectrum of patterns of
behavior based on the idea of race. The significant and indisputable
ethnological fact in this regard is that the European conceives of the
desirable power relationship in terms of his (white) supremacy over
the (black or "colored") cultural other. Whatever its etiology the cul-
tural fact is that the self-image and concept of the European includes
"whiteness," while the "cultural other" is its dialectical opposite.
Welsing points out, as does Johari Amini, that the European gives to
people of other cultures "categories which are dysfunctional" for
them. 59
The present study seeks to explain the pattern of European cul-
tural (group) behavior in terms of the nature of the culture itself. We
have demonstrated European behavior towards others (exploitativ('
and destructive imperialism) and attitude towards others (discla111,
xenophobia) to be connected within the asili or logos of the cultur<',
both lo <'ach other and to other patterns within th(• cult11n•, arid our
ol)jc.,cllvL'Is to understand that csscnli:11.nalurt· ("sili).
l\111w,• lwv,· 11ot_gmu.·n11tsldt' of 1111• c·1ilt1111 lli,tl h,, 111,1 loi-:J
cal ~.1•11•,1• 111 look fo, ,111l'lifl'I 1111I
,·,111s1·nl lh pc•c1111,1111,11111c• W,
have sought to identify and understand its asili, but not to theorize
as to what could have caused such a strange asili; what could have
caused such an atypical, fanatical "seed" to have been planted in the
first place.
Perhaps that question can never be answered satisfactorily, but
there are those who have tried. And it is a question that begs to be
asked. Why is it that Europeans, who are "white" (a small minority of
the world), should exhibit this inordinate power drive that becomes
the basis of their culture, which they seek to exercise over those who
are not white, or stated positively, those who "have color" (the vast
majority)? Why is it that this culture created by European Caucasians
appears to be singular among the world's cultures? Why is European
culture different in ways that all other cultures are the same? It has
a materialistic world-view, whereas other cultural world-views are
more spiritualistic in nature. It is individualistic, whereas other cul-
tures have communalistic social structures.
Weber implies that the difference is intellectual. The intelligence
of these European Caucasians (whom he calls "western") allowed
them to create more "universal" forms. And of course the entire his-
tory of European civilization (culture in time) is one of such inter-
pretations. When a racial term is used we have called such
interpretations "racist." But this term obfuscates more than it clari-
fies, because of the moralistic undertones that accompany its use. It
never seems to have occurred to any European theorist that the prob-
lem was not association of white skin with greater intelligence, rather
it was with equating European culture with intelligence, value, or
superiority.
We must simply ask the question head on: Can it be an accident
I hat the only people who have built an entire culture based on the
dominance of others are also the only ones who are Caucasian? It
doesn't matter if it is argued that some few Caucasians do not par-
ticipate in this system of world-wide dominance. The generalized
question begs to be asked.
Bobby Wright, an African psychologist, says simply that the col-
l<wlive behavior of Europeans "reflects an underlying biologically
1 ransmitted proclivity with roots deep in evolutionary history." 60 He
s,\ys that the pattern of behavior that we have been describing is
sy111pto111alic of the "psychopathic personality," who, while usually
li11wtiuning well i11(Europenn) society,
• Is of nvt:rng(• or ,1hovl..!avt-ra!-(e"l11tclli!-(c11cc,"ril
• 1111111,llilt• to 1•x1H·1•ft'nrc·
g11llt,
• It.I'. 1111 l1•1•ll11H
nl 111~1•1·111
lty,
450 YURUGU
• is unable to accept blame or to learn from experience,

• is sexually inadequate and has difficulty forming close
personal relationships,
• appears to be honest and human, but has only selfish
motivations, 62
• has almost no ethical development,
• has almost total disregard for appropriate patterns of
behavior,
• consistently ignores concepts of right and wrong,
• and rejects constituted authority.
Wright's boldly African-centered posture placed him in the van-
guard (the Ankobia), ideologically and intellectually, among people
with an African consciousness in the early 1970s.His concerns were the
same as those of the present work: that we understand the nature of
European behavior so that we might be in a better position to achieve
African self-determination. His untimely death in 1982was a great loss
to the African victory, but his work has propelled us forward.
Psychiatrist, Frances Cress Welsing, also says "No;" it is not
coincidental that only Caucasians have based their culture on "dom-
inance." Welsing reasons that the European drive for superiority and
supremacy is pathological and that generally such "neurotic" behav-
ior is founded on a deep sense of inadequacy. She further observes
that "whites" or Euro-Caucasians represent a small minority of the
world's population. What allows her to place all other peoples into
the one category is the fact of melanin, which she associates with the
"ability to produce color." She says that "white" indicates "the very
absence of the ability to produce color." 63 She then defines "white-
ness" as a "genetic inadequacy." The fact that the vast majority of the
world's people do have some skin pigmentation, she says, suggests
that the state of color is normal and that the opposite is abnormal.
Her argument follows that European Caucasians reacted to this real-
ity psychologically (as they came in contact with, and observed peo-
ple of color), with a sense of inadequacy and inferiority, which in
turn caused defensive reactions of hostility and aggression towards
people with "color potential." The hostility and aggression is great-
est towards people of African descent, who have "the greatest color
potential." They are, therefore, most envied and feared.li4
This response led to a primary repression of feelings orinade
(luacy that in turn led t<>a series of "defensive mechanisn1s," the most
i111portc11llof whlc-h was a "r1c•M·tio11rorirn1tion" rcspon~k:
wllo-.1 ,11111 it w11s lo c·1111v1·tl(,\I Ille• p~'y1111,loJ,(lc

,11lc•vc•l) •,1>11ll'
w,,,, cl1..,lwcl ,111cl1•11v11•d ( ,11111
11111111111.,1 wllh Ii w,1•1wl1(1llv
c nl111I 11111
unattainable, into something that is discredited and despised. 65
Whites "then set about the long drawn out task of evolving a social,
political and economic structure with all attendant institutions, to
give Blacks and other "non-whites" the appearance of being inferior
human beings." 66
Welsing says that "white supremacy culture degrades the act of

sex and the process of self-reproduction because the whiteness,
reflective of the inability to produce color, is deeply despised. "67 This
would identify self-alienation as the cause of comparative European
infertility. She says that hate and lack of respect outwardly mani-
fested towards other groups is reflective of a deep self-hate and lack
of self-respect on the part of European Caucasians. This aspect of
her explanation certainly appeals to our common sense.
The thrust towards superiority over peoples of color, the drive

towards materialism, acquisition and accumulation, the drive
towards a technological culture and the drive towards power, all of
which are cornerstones of the universal white supremacy culture,
are viewed in terms of the color-confrontation thesis as responses
to the core psychological sense of inadequacy. 68
Welsing argues that European Caucasians are so "vulnerable" to

their minority status in the world that they fictionalize the "minority"
status of the true majority and project themselves as the world's
111ajority. (Indeed, that is the impression one gets after studying
"world history" from a Eurocentric perspective; or being steered
towards agencies whose titles begin with the word "minority," if one
Is African). European Caucasians are also concerned with the
birthrate of people of color and with their own comparative lack of
ft•rtility. We have seen evidence of that concern in Botha's remarks
(< 'hap. 1).
The collective pattern of behavior resulting in the present "sys-
h.•111of white supremacy" is, in Welsing's analysis, "the only effective
,111d functional racism existent in the world today." 69 She says that this
wsrem is presently one of the dominating forces determining char-
!l!'l~r d1·veloprnent and personality formation and that her "theory of
, olm ronrrontalion" gives people of color a rational basis for under-
'lt.1111ll111t ('ollcc-tive white l,ehavior. She reasons that European
(',1111,11,l,111s ,11,·sut'<'t•ssful In tlwir alt<:n1pt to (lomi11ale tile majority
1,I I IIt' WIii Id's p1•opk I 11'1,l\lst· I Ile•111njotIt v's <·x1w1lt•111·1·sdid 11111pr 1'-
p,111 11),•111In 1111<11•r .l.111d p,,tt1•111°.of IH'll,1vlt11h,1:,1•d ,1111111111' d1•1t
452 YURUGU
ciency and numerical inadequacy. 70 But we must bear in mind that

European behavior is pathological, i.e., not to be understood as the
"natural" reaction to "color deficiency." After all it is not the lack of
melanin that is a "disease," but rather the behavior and utamaroho
that, in Welsing's view, result from that deficiency. Still Welsing's the-
ory "works" for the most part. It is a bold and refreshing description
of a syndrome of cultural pathology.
Joel Kovel's theory of "white racism" is more complex, less
straight forward. We will simplify it, offering as much clarity as pos-
sible, for the purpose of comparison. Kovel, also a psychiatrist, relies
heavily on Freudian analysis of personality development. Freud's
analysis is based on supposedly "universal" phases of psycho-bio-
logical development, said to take place in infancy and early child-
hood. The dynamics of these phases issue from two basic drives or
instincts, again said to be universally human: These drives are sexu-
ality (eros) and aggression and are biological givens. They have an
organizing influence on mental development through a process that
can be reduced to sequential phases; oral, anal, phallic and oedipal,
the latter two usually being described as one; or else the oedipal
phase understood as a kind of culmination or "condensation" of the
first three.
The heart of the matter, in Kovel's analysis, has to do with the
facts that (1) in order to deal with potentially painful conflicts that
arise through these phases in infant and childhood development, in
which the child's personality is structured and individuation occurs,
fantasies structured around symbols are created; and (2) culture
both uses these symbols that are created by its members, and pro-
vides them for the members, again, on a socially structured level,
through the development of the superego which relates directly to
cultural norms. In short, Kovel's theory of white racism revolves
around the use of infantile symbolic fantasy.
The most important phases for an understanding of his theory
appear to be the anal, phallic, and oedipal. The anal is most impor-
tant of all, since it is in this phase that ideas about excrement arc
formed. The body is "split" into good (property to be incorporated
and possessed) and bad (all that is "dirty" and to be expellecl). While
the child is being taught -to control the elimination process, he
(Freudians always refer to males) begins the process of "inclivlclua
lion," the aw<1rC'nessof himself as being separate>fro111his motlwt.
'l'l1ls proc-pss, ilt>,<'Ssary for 1111rmall11111rn11 dt·vt·lop111t•11t, Is
y, t,wl 'i11 Wt•,111•l11t111d1w1·(1
p,ti1ll11l 'l'lw 1'11lltlls rn11fllrh'd ,111d1111g1
111 wl1,1I ,1pi,t·,11, In llu• ,I 111101111 "1·rndll1 I" l11•1w,1•11 1111'lwu di!
ves/instincts endemic to human life: that between eros (the desire to

join with other) and aggression (the desire to control and act upon
that which is separate from the self). "Anality is the form of drive
behavior which predominates during that time when a child is
painfully detaching himself from his mother and establishing himself
as a separate person." 71 Excrement becomes symbolically associated
with ambivalence towards separation from the mother and estab-
lishment of autonomy. What is defined as "dirt" or bad becomes the
object of anger because of the separation. (But what about cultures
in which dirt is "sacred earth" and even feces is associated with fer-
tility? Whom did Freud observe?)
According to Kovel, the love of possessions becomes the sub-
stitute for the love from which the child is separating. But aggression
is necessary for individuation, and yet aggression towards those
whom we love must be repressed. Repression "causes" the develop-
ment of the unconscious, into which many infantile fantasies are
pushed; it is also a necessary by-product of these complex and
involved processes. In the phallic/oedipal phase eros becomes asso-
ciated with the parent of the opposite sex, which is culturally unac-
ceptable. Somehow the male fears castration as the punishment for
the incestuous desires, since his sexuality is now focused in his gen-
iLals,and he secretly wishes to remove his father's genitals. The child
resolves this "complex" by establishing the superego, which "tames
l1is instinctual drives in the interests of cultural pursuits." 72 We have
Sf'Cn a slightly different version of this scenario in the theory of Eli
Sagan (Chap. 7).
The Freudian concept of the id appears to be the most threat-
t•uing to functional social life, since it is described as a "sea" of
rt'pressed striving, cut off from reality, unable to act on the world. It
Is unconscious. The ego, which seems to be the "personality" (in
ordinary language), appears to mediate between the unsocialized id
,Hid tlic supersocialized superego; one representing raw instinctive
hun1a11ity,the other their cultural control. The ego is responsible for
,H'livity and performance. In Kovel's view, "A historical group of any
pott·11cy must structure its culture so as to maximize this kind of ego
ct,•v<.'lopmentamong its individuals." 73 But Kovel is not clear as to
wll.il he rneans by "potency." It could be translated as "power," or
·•11~w t•ssion." Then he wo11lclhe stating the assumptions of European
lcl1•ciln~y.
Now wt• 1·n11 111ov1• low;1rrls a more specifically directed dlscus-
• l111111ll·'.t110pt•1111 nllitll(I<' toward:. o1h
t·t1lt111<•;11HI l11v l11•llt1vl11r111'1<1
• 1 1: 111.11It It' JU r,11t••: oft,·11 ,,,f,•111•dto,,-; ·1 1111•1,;111" ('11111111•, '>:tY'i
454 YURUGU
Kovel, is parallel to personality. Infantile aggression is translated into

cultural terms, and culture must provide us a "nuclear representation
of what men need in order to lift themselves out of the impossible sit-
uation of their infantile conflicts. "74 Culture provides meaningful sym-
bols that are "congruent with the personalities of the people within
the society." 75 What is important will "endure and matter," influenc-
ing other aspects of the culture and remaining part of human con-
sciousness. 76 "Culture provides a worldly scaffolding on which men
can erect their inner conflicts." 74 Kovel says that in this way culture
helps to give autonomy to the person and a "measure of peace" to his
ego. "In this way culture accumulates infantile fantasies through his-
tory." The mind gets to know culture through the infantile experi-
ence of the body.
All of this allows Kovel to conclude that racist belief is based on
fantasy. Racism is a specific historical situation "in which some ele-
mental aspects of human experience are turned toward the classifi-
cation (and oppression) of people with different ethnic traits." He
argues that race fantasies are only secondarily related to racial real-
ities; that they are "actually generated in the universal human setting
of childhood, and used by the culture to handle its historical prob-
lems."77 These fantasies are "remnants" of infantile wishes and prod-
ucts of developing human drives and forms of thought. We must
remember that during the anal phase "dirt" (bad; to be avoided)
becomes the focal point of anger at separation from the mother, while
"the Oedipus complex provides the fantasy substratum for the entire
historical progression of patriarchal power." 78 The superego that
emerges directs aggression back into the self, thereby achieving inner
control.
By adjusting his superego to the set of cultural controls a person

adapts and becomes "normal." If he is a white American, it is likely
that he will then find an outlet for some of his infantile fantasies
about dirt, property, power and sexuality, in his culture's racism. "711
And further,
The historical power we study as part of the problem of racis1n is

in some way derived along.with race symbols and fantasies-"along
with" and not "from" for power is 11otderived from racis111n11ymort•
than racism is derivNI directly from power: bnlh lhc 1n1·11tal alll
t11tles 11r•<·cssurvfr>r power within our t'11lt11111111dlho<w tf1(1t
1
,
t11Hl1•1ly 11111varla111 q( 1;11ls111, ,11t•l{l'IH't 11l'dlto1111 n111111011 v,r11111HI

11111111 In 1,li11wllt,11lltt• )lllWl•I 111wllh 11rw,111•11·111 1111111,1 vlt•w
111Ill• IIIIIVl'I'., 111,1IIHl11••· lilt• ,y11il111h .. , 111/11/1,,,,,, 111111li/<11 /a,1•\·,
with a deadly seriousness, spreads them out to the whole of human

activity, and from that point, onto the many-hued skins of men,
thereby reducing them to categories of race. 79
We have come all this way and still the question looms: Why
Europeans? Why should they be so power-hungry, aggressive, and
"racist?" What accounts for their difference? Kovel talks around the
issue throughout his book. But his treatment frustrates our desires
to account for the peculiar nature of European culture. After all,
according to Freud and Kovel, we all experience the same phases of
mental/biological development. Is Kovel's argument that the phases
are actually cultural phases as well and that European culture some-
how experienced a distorted or unresolved anal phase of develop-
ment? No, that is not what he says. What follows is the closest he
comes to a causal explanation:
A lightly-hued people-aided perhaps by fantasies from their skin

color-came to dominate the entire world, and in the process
defined themselves as white. The process that generated this white
power also generated the fear and dread of black. 80
Here we have the reverse of Welsing's analysis. In Kovel's view

"whiteness" initially represented something desirable to Europeans,
and "blackness" represented something negative. No inferiority com-
plex here. Kovel goes on to ask the question: How has the West used
the themes of black and white to generate power? His answer: All
people always have been afraid of darkness. (Quite an assumption to
make. We will see that darkness can have a very different connotation
Indeed!) But "what has distinguished the West from other cultures is
t'hat these elementary issues, without their infantile core, have taken
011 fantastic elaboration: They have been used systematically and
nrganically in the generation of power. No other culture has so drawn
upon these primitive beliefs to superordinate itself to others." 80
Kovel's conclusion with regard to the cause of Europe's strange
hr·llavior is certainly disappointing. It seems that on the one hand
t-:11ropeans became racist because they happened to be white ( or
,d111osl) and therefore to "fit" infantile symbolic elaboration con-
11·111ingthe feces and "good" and "bad" body in the right way-a way
t Ilill places I he111i11a position to achieve power over the rest of the
wmlcl, wl1icl1wns darker (''bad" body). Other groups roulcl not make
1111• 11st· r,r I li1s "t11ilv1•r!-i,ll''
>1,11111• (a11lnsyslnn· llll'y wcrv darker. t\l t IH'
HIii!' 111111· 1111'p11rlty lltrll I!-! tor llw111 (E11,;,p1•n11:-)sy111hollz1•d l1y
1111•11 wlilt.-111"1:,1!•1111'. Tltt'Y l1,1vl', rn11l1h11•d.i "p1111•
1111,1tlrn1111l:;111
456 YURUGU
form of thought" (utamawazo) with an endless source of energy (uta-

maroho) a "restless zeal" or "fanaticism." 81 First, Europeans split "rea-
son" and "energy"; then, they combined them as part of an inexorable
momentum. The result is that "the western genius," which yields
pride in whiteness, pulls together these divergent styles into one cul-
tural entity; and Europeans are therefore intensely driven and
intensely controlled at the same time. 82 For Kovel this is a "gift" that
succeeds in achieving wealth, technological skill, social organization,
as well as power. And it is based on racist belief or at least the cul-
tural elaboration of the symbols of black and white that are created
during infantile fantasizing.
And so we have a fascinating-if not totally satisfying-explana-
tion of European behavior. Kovel suggests a cause for racist behavior
and a reason for the achievement of power but neither a cause nor a
reason for the inordinate desire for power over others. He seems to
assume that all human groups desire power but that the "genius" of the
"West" is to have discovered the best way of achieving it, or put
another way, to have been fortunately endowed with white skin! From
an African-centered perspective, this explanation is not acceptable
since it embraces the values that are supposedly under criticism.
This brings us directly to the limitations of Kovel's analysis. He
has universalized the particular! It is ironic, but not surprising, for this
is a typically European mistake/weapon. This penchant for univer-
salizing is a characteristic of European ideology (discussed in Chap.
10). Kovel leads us towards a piercing indictment of European culture
in terms of the depth to which its racialist ideology reaches. Indeed,
he is arguing that the success of the culture depends on the symbols
of white racism. But the pessimism with which his book concludes is
a result of his having dug a hole from which it is impossible to escape.
Why should Europeans want to yield power? If their racism, aggres-
sion, and materialism assure their power, then these forms of behav-
ior must be maintained.
Kovel, just as the theorist on which he depends so heavily, has
perhaps brilliantly described the workings of the European mind; but
it is precisely because he relies unquestioningly on Freudian analy-
sis, that he cannot step outside of European assumptions. Freudian
theory assumes the Europ~an world-view. It is based on conccptio11s
dictated by the European utarnwvozo. Whatever hrilliancc of analy
sis contributed to this theory, it had to lw form11latc•cll11t<•rn1sof
l•:11rop(•;11Jc·oni·ept l<-,nsof reality. Tlw i'rN1dic111111orl1•I Is t ll<'tt"low
111,1t1•!1;1llstk ll l1el{ln~n11d c•111hl11ltlnlol--(1<
,u1d 1111•1·l1,11ilstlr. ,1111 ..,,.,
.11tl11!•111,l d1••,pt1tl1•d l>lnl111-1y
1
111tli,11 ·
On what grounds does Kovel universalize a split between body

and spirit? How many First World or majority cultures were studied
before it was agreed that all human beings go through the phases of
mental organization and psychological development as described by
Freud? The very definition of racism is limited if one's conceptual-
1zation remains within the European frame of reference. To those of
us who are African, Freud's distinctions between "primitive" peoples
and "modern civilized man" are offensive. 83 In these distinctions the
only value of African and other majority cultures is that they afford
Europeans an opportunity for studying their own neurotic ambiva-
lences. In Totem and Taboo, Freud says that he will focus on "the
most backward and miserable savages, the aborigines of Australia,"
because of their relationship to "prehistoric man." He appears to use
"primitive" and "prehistoric" imprecisely, sometimes linking them
together. Nevertheless, according to Freud there are contemporaries
of Europeans who resemble "prehistories":
Such is our view of those who we describe as savages or half-sav-

ages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we
are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of
our own development.
If that supposition is correct, a comparison between the psychol-

ogy of primitive peoples, as it is taught by social anthropology, and
the psychology of neurotics, as it has been revealed by psycho-
analysis, will be bound to show numerous points of agreement and
will throw new light upon familiar facts in both sciences. 84
Such presumption! Do Europeans become mentally healthier as

I hey "evolve?" This is the theorist upon whose assumptions Kovel
bases his theory of white racism! Freud, who admittedly relies on the
descriptions of First World peoples by Europeans, arrogantly uses the
t llcories he, a European, has developed to analyze "non-European"
peoples. He fits the asili of European culture. Kovel is caught in the
sarnc trap. It is the trap of the cultural behavior that he describes.
\Jlthnat<'ly Kovel fails to place Europe in the world. He isolates the cul-
t urc i11a cocoon of Freudian theory, then (falsely) extends the threads
nf I he cocoon that prevents him from understanding its peculiar
11111un· in t otnlity. To understand the peculiarity of the European
11wnnsIn 1111cl<•rsta11cl other people, i.e., the rest of humanity; and the
,1m,11111pll1111 wnrld-vir-w precludes that 1mdersta11d-
of llw l•:11ropc.•n11
t11glly ll:-. Vl'tV 1t,il11n· ,
1111'lu1p,i1 l,lll<'t• n{ Kovc•l •1;111,tly1,bIs: (I) lllill II 1·u1111c·1·ts
Wltllt-
0
458 YURUGU
racism to capitalist aggression; (2) that it leads to the conclusion that

since white racism generates power, Europeans will never cease to
be racist; and, most impressively and significantly when critqued
from an African-centered perspective, (3) that European attitudes
and cultural behavior towards other racial/cultural groups are linked
ethnologically or psycho-culturally to rationalism or to what Kovel
calls "pure thought."
In our terms it lodges white racialist ideology comfortably within
the European utamawazo, while the European utamaroho dictates
white racist behavior. It is important to understand that "rationalism"
does not mean "reasonableness" in terms of African and other major-
ity conceptual systems. European rationalism, again, so clearly elab-
orated in Platonic thought, is predicated on the separation of reason
and emotion, with "the will" being placed at the service of the now iso-
lated, uncontaminated "reason."
It was Plato who postulated the "Forms," which represented a
higher sphere of existence, untainted by the vulnerability and falla-
bility of ordinary human perception, a cognition that was unable to
guarantee its conclusions. European logic becomes the guarantor.
The "forms" are pure. The pursuit of this mental purity is rationalism.
As a human cultural attitude it sacrifices much. Rather than leading
to the perfect morality, as Plato would have us believe, it leads to sys-
tematic racist behavior and the construction of institutions that yield
power. In this sense the most "rational" Europeans (the Harvard pro-
fessors?) become the most effective supporters of the superstruc-
ture that guarantees European (minority) power over non-Europeans
(the majority): i.e., white racism. (What does this imply about an
African Harvard professor?)
The limjtation of Kovel's analysis is that it cannot help us to
look critically at the European world-view, because he uses its
assumptions. He, therefore, cannot explain the source of the fanati-
cal European power drive. In my view, the inordinate power drive is
lodged within the formulative and originating process of the culture;
this is the asili. It becomes visible only from the vantage point of an
other-than-European world-view. Its visibility is aided by an African
centered perspective.
For Welsing, "white" represents the absence of melanin or llw
absence of the ability to produce color. This "absence," as well as tlw
fact that most of the world's people possess "color polt'11lial," cn·t1lt>s
fl·t'llngs of lnft•riorlty'on. the part oJ Eumpcnns, "wliilt! 1woplt• '!. Fo1
Kovt'I, wllil(' (whic·h l)l' ~;1ys Is sc·it•11tlfit,11lytlw !-.11111c,I ,Ill n1l111·)
111•1111111s llw -.y111h11I
of tlw ,d1i,1•111 t ol I nlrn ,11111111•
11•tn11·11·p1t•
sents purity. It is therefore the root of the feeling of superiority. Both

theorists use psychoanalytical models: Welsing, the language of
"reaction-formation"; Kovel, the language of infantile anal fantasy. An
advantage of Welsing's theory is that it is not based on a universal-
ization of the European experience or European particularity. While
Kovel's theory leads to the conclusion that basically all cultures (all
people) are potentially "white racist" and driven to have power over
others if they had the opportunity or the "genius" or the "whiteness."
Both Welsing and Kovel recognize that white racism is a form of
behavior that is systematic. This is important, since it helps us to
understand that Europeans have constructed a system of institutions
which depend on and encourage a particular pattern of behavior
towards "people of color"; i.e., a form of behavior that has been called
"racist." The style of behavior is, therefore, lodged comfortably within
the matrix of European culture-not a blight to be removed by cos-
metic surgery.
Michael Bradley offers another fascinating theory of European
racism in his book, Iceman Inheritance. Certainly more convoluted
than Kovel's, and perhaps even more complex, Bradley's theory is
troubled with contradictions but, nonetheless, brings some signifi-
cant peculiarities of European culture to the surface.
A uniquely aggressive creature shivered beside his cave fire during

the icy Wurm, a uniquely alienated creature, a creature uniquely
conscious of physical differences among people ... and distrustful
of those differences. 85
Here we have Bradley's theory of the strange story of Western

civilization and of the origin of its extreme aggression, violent behav-
ior, and propensity for sexism and racism. Bradley begins his book
with the statement: "This book is racist." He never elaborates on the
statement. But from the analysis offered in his book, it can be inter-
preted to mean either (1) that since European Caucasians are "natu-
rnlly" racist because of their genetic inheritance and since he is a
European Caucasian, what he writes is necessarily racist, or (2) that
t I 1t• terms that he uses deal with racialist categories and conceptions,
ll11kh1gcultural a11d behavioral traits to biological and evolutionary
t.1etors (circumstances).
Si111plyoutlined, Brad 1ey's argument is that:
I. ('tnHl!111porary European Caucasians have evolved specifically
h 0111t !ti' l·~ttropt •,111N1•,11ulv1
t 1ml ;111dll,,ve ti tt'reforP inhcrll<'cl cu lt11raI
p101"1lvltlt11,tli,tt llev1•lopPd ,1•: a 1c-s11lt nl tl1t· 111•t•t•ssltil•s 11r
N,•r1111l1·rll1.d11tl.1pl.t1l1111 11111liq{ 1111,1:l11<Lil p1•1Ind (W111111I), will, h
460 YURUGU
effected Europe "the cradle of the Caucasoid race." 86

2. These Neanderthals were also the first humans to "discover
time" or put differently, since for Bradley this "discovery" is the mark
of "humanness," they are, strictly speaking, the first "humans." It is
important for Bradley that Neanderthal's passed over the "threshold"
of humanness while surviving the ice age.
3. Since, according to Bradley, animals are naturally aggressive
with regard to territory (especially males), these first humans
extended their animal aggression to the new territory of time, i.e., "the
Chronos complex," therefore developing a competitive/aggressive
relationship to their past, which they must "outdistance" (progress),
and to the future, which they must limit. The future, represented by
their offspring, threatens to "usurp their territory of time." Therefore,
they are, to say the least, ambivalent about reproducing their own
kind. This last point fits Welsing's theory, who says that European
sexual ambivalence comes from a lack of self-esteem, since they can-
not produce color. For Bradley this ambivalence results in "psycho-
sexual conflicts." He assumes that aggression towards the past and
the future is a "normal" or "natural" human response. (Wright,
Welsing, and Bradley all appear to agree on the characteristic of sex-
ual conflict.)
4. Because of the demands of physical adaptation caused by
the extremely harsh, frigid environment during Wurm I, "nature's
sexual adaptations conflicted in large measure with Neanderthal
glacial adaptations." 87 Nature, says Bradley, works against human
temporal territorial approach-avoidance" so that human beings will
procreate. Nature does this through sexual adaptations that tempt
males and females to engage in sexual intercourse. But in the case
of Neanderthal evolution it was also necessary to combat the
extreme cold. Neanderthals had to be extremely hairy, heavy, and
squat. The male genitalia could not be large or else it would be more
vulnerable to 'the cold. At the same time, says Bradley, nature com-
pensated to a degree by making the female breasts extremely large
in the Neanderthal. (Don't they get cold?) The female pelvic area
also had to be quite large in order to allow passage of the head of
the Neanderthal infant, which he says was "huge." 88 Bracllcy usc-s
the "Venus figures" to sub.stantiate his claim as to the appeara11Ct'
of the Neanderthal female. 89 But Chcikh Anta l)lop uses I hcsc Srlmr•
figures as evidence of the presence of African.Grimalcly hu111ansIn
F.urnsla. lie also brings attc11l1011 10 r1'<'('lll finds of Nc•a11<lr1thnl111
i\lrk11 ,111CI 1·n11ll1111sthat all n( 1111'l,H·t• 11w11'I 111wltll 11•1{111dlo ti:,
pl,l('f' 111flt IJ,{1111111
5. The exigencies of Neanderthal survival resulted in extreme

sexual dimorphism. Males and females looked so different, says
Bradley, that he is "inclined to believe that ... each tended to regard
the other as something of a distinct species." 87 Caucasoid sexes,
whom he links to Neanderthal (while contradictorally denying them
generic continuity), "have never really got used to each other, never
really completely trusted each other." 91 A high degree of sexual
dimorphism heightened the aggression surrounding sexual encoun-
ters given the "temporal territorial behavior." The result is xeno-
phobia, or fear of difference.
6. The dominance of patriarchy and sexism in European culture
Bradley explains by drawing an analogy with the tendency of male ani-
mals tend to be more territorially aggressive. And therefore as this
aggressive behavior extends to temporality, males approach the act
of sex with a greater degree of anger and frustration than females. 91
Bradley says that while this is normal to all human males it would be
more extreme with the increased sexual dimorphism resulting from
Neanderthal development.
Using the approach outlined, Bradley attempts to explain

European Caucasian aggression, violent behavior, racism, xenopho-
bia, sexual ambivalence, comparative infertility, alienation, and sex-
ism. In Bradley's view, religion results from the need to communicate
with the past, while writing develops because of a need to commu-
nicate with the future. The priests and intellectuals, more aware of
"time," are more sexually ambivalent, less sexually active, and there-
fore less fertile. The "average" Caucasoids imitate these "men."
Therefore aggression, which would be displaced in sexual activity, is
instead directed in violence against other people. The few occasions
where males and females do join must be enveloped in the illusion of
romantic love-a "truce" made necessary by the severity of European
xenophobia and aggression.
Yet, after all this, Bradley says that Caucasoid aggression is not
Innate, not "racial," and not immutable. Instead, he concludes that
western civilization can avoid aggression through sexual-sensual
:1c.:livity,as did ancient "Egyptian" and Chinese civilization. Since, for
l\radlc:y, patterns of European behavior towards others is caused by
,111lnorrlinatc degree of undisplaced aggression,
tr we Hrt' goi11i,:lo borrow somt>thing of the world-view from t hcsc

IEJ(Ypllun 111HI( 'llhH"H'I rlvlllznllo11s In CJrdf'r to 1·ombnt om own
111111111,1111111d tlw11w,•
,1ntt 11,11l1tP pi-.y<'1111lotty, to
1111111,w nl 1•v111
•.i1111P!lill11t W,· lwvt•till••
vtldt11{lto111 tl11•1tl'1•111!1111::,
462 YURUGU
obligation because we do not know which of their cultural and

racial traits prevented them from making our mistakes. 92
Perhaps the most unique aspect of Bradley's argument is his

conclusion that European values and behavior towards others may
be causally tied to European sexual-sensual life. For Bradley, the sex-
ual-sensual is the key to combatting the "anti-human-mono-culture"
that is Western civilization. And yet his explanation is not of the
Freudian mold; in fact it would seem to contradict Freud's slavish
commitment to supposed universal phases of psycho-intellectual
development; a model that paints Europeans as normal rather than
pathological.
Bradley's theory is creative and speculative. He is accurate in his
identification of European pathology, but unfortunately, like Kovel, he
assumes certain European conceptions of reality. "Time," so impor-
tant a part of his theory, is lineal time. It is not a "discovery" but the
invention of a materialist understanding. Ironically, Bradley reveals
his own ignorance of the spiritualistic and cosmological world-views
to which he says Europeans need expose themselves. The African
philosophical conception of ancestor communion transcends lineal
time and allows people to avoid the limitations of their mortal and
finite existences. Africans exist, through cosmic and sacred time,
both in the past and the future, as they experience the present. In fact,
the distinctions between past, present, and future disappear since the
conception is not lineal, but cyclical, spiraling. Having children
becomes an honor of participating symbolically in the primordial act
of creation. It is a spiritual necessity, a cultural obligation, since birth
represents the continuance of the group, and of the "self," our own
immortality. Our ancestors and origins are repeated in sacred sym-
bols through which we unite with them, not compete with them.
Such ignorance leads Bradley to a mi~understanding of religion
or at least of spiritual concepts. He correctly says that all religions
have a concept of time beyond birth and death. 93 But because he
again perceives through European eyes, he understands religion as
"a symptom that man has claimed a territory which is larger than a
single life." His language is the language of the European. For us the
religious sense would be the recognition that we are indeed "claimed"
by a universe that extends beyond the finiteness of our si11glc,phy:,;.
ical selves. This is where the concept of the s011Icom<-'sin;« con<·<>pl
that Bradley never mentions. Our spirituality Is UH' H·rn~111tion,11f
o;plrl111.1l
co111wr1Pd1wss, h<'yo11cllln<'nl, 1,nll11,,ry, p1nf.1111•ll11w Tith
n•1 ov,11111011 1·1w11,tl11•s0111 h11111,11llty,111tllw1,n·s rn11 p1l111lllt",, ,11111
lli.d 1•:11111p1•1111-.1•:1Cp1·1l1·1111·
111•v1·111•.tlt1• ;1ll1•11.1lf1111
If we accept Bradley's definition of humaness (the discovery of

lineal time), a by-product of superior intelligence, and his explanation
of the "religious" conceptions that human temporal aggresssion
necessitates, then Europeans contradictorily emerge as the most
intelligent and religious of human groups, since in his view, their
direct evolutionary ancestors "discovered time," and therefore
Caucasians are the most temporally aggressive of all.
But if we say instead that the natural evolution of sapienism was
not with aggression, but with the articulation of consciousness and
the creation of culture that limited aggressive and violent behavior,
then a very different picture emerges. In this view, the aggression of
the European Caucasian becomes even more of an anomaly, and the
key to the humanity of African, and other majority civilizations is due
to more than their sexual-sensual life; rather it is due to a deeper,
more profound cultural existence of which the sexual-sensual is only
a part.
Bradley tries and successfully recognizes a connection between
biology and psycho-cultural development, though perhaps not their
correct connection-and in a different manner from Welsing and
Kovel. He understands some of the failings of the culture and styles
of thought of Europeans, such as their inability to deal with paradox
and inconsistency, which for them represent irreconcilable contra-
diction.94 And he understands European technology and "progress"
as "future-limiting," "present-identity assertions" that function to
enhance the power of the present. 95 But he misses the point in
attempting to lodge all of the ills of European cultural behavior in the
"ugly" "precociousness" of the Neanderthal.
Cheikh Anta Diop, in the process of refuting Engles, Bachofen,
Morgan and others on the origin and significance of "matriarchy" and
rnatrilineality, elaborates a theory of the origins of the European
world-view and the pattern of collective behavior that it generates.
We have already introduced his ideas in our discussion of European
religion (Chap. 2); now it only remains to highlight some of the rele-
vant aspects of his approach.
In explanation of European behavior, Diop, like Bradley, makes
much of the nature of the environment in which the Indo-European
ur Aryan has developed. He refers to this area as the "Northern Cradle
of Civili7.ation." T3utunlike Bradley he does not focus on supposed
• psyehn-l>iologiral (;'V0lutio11arydevelopment of early pre-Caucasoids .
111st t>acl ht: concei ti r<.ll<'S on a 111uchInt er period (ca. 1H,000 13.C.I.:.)
Wll!'ll 1·11lt11n H Wt'ri' l11·~(l1111llll-{
1
tu lw lornw,r llC' po::;lts IW(l "Cr:td!l'S
nl ('tvtll1;,tll111," N<11llw111(Aty,,11) ,111(1SoIIt111·111(J\trl1·1111), wllldt
464 YURUGU
because of their vastly different geographical environments, gener-

ated two very different world-views and therefore two very different
life-styles and modes of behavior.
These different environments created different "collective per-
sonalities." Again the harshness of the environmental conditions of
Eurasia comes into play, but this time it is at a later period, subse-
quent to the ice age, when the Eurasian steppes and forest areas of
Northern Europe had been formed. Diop's focus on cultural evolution,
rather than physical evolution begins here. These conditions did not
allow for the agriculturally sedentary, peaceful life of the Southern
Cradle. They forced these early Aryans into a nomadic existence in
which women and children were regarded as liabilities, since in the
absence of agriculture, their contribution to material survival was
extremely limited. The lack of agriculture and of other survival
resources severely limited the opportunities for cooperation as a
model for social organization; instead these meager resources
encouraged a competitive, aggressive attitude toward one's neighbor,
i.e., a fierce individualistic battle over the little that existed.
The ferocity of nature in the Eurasian steppes, the barrenness of

those regions, the overall circumstances of material conditions,
were to create instincts necessary for survival in such an environ-
ment .... Here, nature left no illusions of kindliness ... he must learn
to rely on himself alone ... he would conjure up deities maleficent
and cruel, jealous and spiteful. .... All the peoples of the area
whether white or yellow, were instinctively to love conquest
because of a desire to escape from hostile surroundings ... they had
to leave it or succumb, try to conquer a place in the sun in a more
clement nature. 96
Survival in these circumstances rested more on the ability to

view others with suspicion than as potential allies. As they encoun-
tered people who looked different, they reacted xenophobically and
treated others first with suspicion, then aggression. This behavioral
mode evolved as a way of life. Diop goes so far as to associate the com-
paratively larger amount of meat in the Indo-European diet ( compared
with that of the "Southern Cradle") with their aggressive nature.
Diop's treatment of European patriarchal social structure Is
interesting. Devalued as functional social beings, women, he says,
became viewed with <lisdain. ln fact, the• dowries offerf'd by tlw
wo1ncn's parents became th~ inclt1ct>rne11t for m<~11tn ltikl· wlvPs. Tlw
p11r:illi\111 s11bjug;1tlon of WOllll'II ('H'lll(-'d 1-(111111111111•
t·11lllll'(', whfdl.
1
,H'I Ill dh1Hlo I llop, 11•~p; lt H h·d wl I Ii t ll' t I rlj.jt•tly ol (lpcllp111,, '11.,,
I•., 'I If
tragic perspective. This certainly is a very different interpretation of

the significance of this infamous tragedy from that of Freud, Kovel and
Sagan. The world-view of this Northern Cradle is characteristically
pessimistic and guilt-ridden, giving birth to such concepts as original
sin. 97 Diop appears to be an environmentalist.
An ideal of war, violence, crime and conquests, inherited from

nomadic life, with, as a consequence, a feeling of guilt and of origi-
nal sin, which causes pessimistic religious or metaphysical sys-
tems to be built, is the special attitude of this [Northern] "Cradle."98
Diop may very well be correct in emphasizing the questions of

resources and their deficiency as a major influence on the shape of
culture and behavior. There are few facts clearer when viewing the
contemporary relationship between Europe and its diaspora and the
rest of the world than of resource control. Europe, itself an environ-
ment with very meagre natural resources, is dependent on the
resources of the world's First People for its survival. Europeans, who
have almost nothing, have empowered themselves through system-
atic aggressive behavior (genocide, colonialism, imperialism, slav-
ery), by which they have appropriated the resources of others. If
they ceased to have access to those resources, they would be at the
mercy of the majority.
Wobogo says that for Diop, European behavior toward other
racial/cultural groups is a result of the early experience of the
Northern Cradle, since a people's collective personality is determined
in their first intense experience as a group, much as a child's per-
sonality' is determined in its first, formulative years. The personality
t ypc persists even when conditions and geographical locations
change. 99 This theory is compatible with the concept of asili, the cul-
tural seed. The theorists discussed are speculating as to how the
st·cd is planted.
For Welsing, European behavior issues from their minority sta-
t us nncl lack of melanin, not primarily from their lack of natural
11•snurces. The ideas of Richard King, who like Kovel and Welsing is
11tral11ed psychiatrist, brings the issue of melanin back into focus, but
lu n stnrl'ling ancl intellectually radical manner. More than anyone
t•b,•, It Is King above all who turns European symbolism on its head;
rllscarcllllf.( th<' Eurnpcan conceptual framework, he explains
n1wan lwhuvlor usi11g an African understa11di11g
l·'.111 of reality; i.e., the
Aft!1•1111
WIii Id Vlt•w,
A•, with ll1t• ntl\1'1 lll1•01ht•1, W•' 1•;111110! l111pt•lo tlo j11stl1·1•lo
Ki111(' t 111•01 y h1 .i fc•w p.11.1µ1 ,1pl1•.It lh 1•v1•1111H1tt• rllflw111t111Ith 1 ,11,1•
466 YURUGU
because that involves the introduction of a non-European set of

assumptions about the nature of the universe, which even we
Africans are not accustomed to viewing in a reflective manner. But we
will try to introduce his ideas if only to demonstrate the way in which
they radically oppose those that issue from the European conceptual
mode.
Since our framework is not limited to Europe, but encompasses
the human universe, we must begin thousands of years before Europe
or Europeans existed. And we must begin with an African definition
of science as spiritually based and holistic. For his authority King
returns to the source: the symbols and sacred texts of ancient
Africa-Kemet (Egypt). Here he finds evidence of the scientific study
of human consciousness. King's theory fixes on the pineal gland,
which, though ignored by Western medicine, he says was known to
these ancient Africans as "the eye of Heru," placed in the middle of
the forehead, indicating the substantia Nigra, or black substance of the
middle brain. This, he says, they knew to be the key to "inner vision,"
or the door to the collective unconscious, perhaps closest to what we
now call "intuition." According to King, a process that takes place in
the pineal gland in the brain releases chemicals that allow human
beings to learn from their ancestors. 100 Already the concept of and
attitude toward time that Bradley assumes is negated in this view.
And Freud's perspective is reversed. We learn from these ancient
people, because they knew more than we know now; they were more
in touch with their humanity. We do not study them as "children" or
"neurotics," as Freud implies.
According to Webster's dictionary, the pineal gland resembles
a pine cone in shape and unknown function, being present in the
brain of all vertebrates having a cranium; it is believed to be vestigial.
But for Richard King, the pineal is not only quite functional but the
key to biological and conscious life itself. How does this relate to
European behavior?
The pineal gland secretes melatonin, which activates the pitu-
itary to release M.S.H. (Melanocyte Stimulating Hormone). It is in the
melanocytes that melanin (Fr. Greek me/as="Black") is produced .
Melanin is somewhat analogous to chlorophyll in plants. While
chlorophyll allows photosynthesis to occur, or the transference of tlw
sun's energy into food, melanin in animals takes the sun's energy and
makes it useful energy for the body. Whilt> the growth ol plants Is
directl•cl tow,\l'Clphysical sunlight, King contcrHh, tl1at ll11·l{rnwth ul
lwlngs ls dlrvrtt·d toward l1i!,!IH'IslalL'S ol c1111sl'lu11s1wss. 'l'lii•;
'111111,111
'
wn11ld floply 111.11s11111l-•l10w I•, n•lntc•cl tu lll~ltly dt•v1•lopc•d
11H•l;111l11
states of consciousness, or "spiritual light." "The human form," he

says, is attracted toward meaning. 101
We are familiar with melanin in relation to the pigmentation of
the skin. But we are not taught about the relationship between the
skin and the brain. The ectoderm or outer layer of the skin is where
melanin is produced in the pre-fetus. 1n the core of the brain are
found twelve black nuclei, or melanated centers. This outer layer of
the blastula (the pre-fetuus) invaginates to form the spinal column,
the end of which balloons out, becoming the brain. The twelfth of
these "centers," and therefore the "highest," is the locus coeruleus. 102
King says that they are related to spirituality and consciousness and
also allow human beings access to the world of dreams, thereby
learning from ancestral experiences. In animals other than humans,
fewer of these "centers" will be pigmented, therefore their degree of
"conciousness" is affected.
Melatonin is released from the pineal gland during darkness
periodically between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. It induces sleep and increases
the amount of melanin production. fn King's terms, it "unlocks the
door to the unconscious." At the same time heat and sunlight cause
melanocytes to produce melanin so that internally melanin produc-
tion is regulated by light and dark (hormonal secretion) and exter-
nally by heat. Pineal melatonin induces puberty, while, King
maintains, melatonin is also related to fertility. (Certainly world pop-
ulation figures and relative fertility rates bear out this contention.)
In addition, it seems that melanin is essential to the life process.
The primary and fundamental atom in all biological systems is car-
bon, which is black. All organic matter comes from a carbon atom.
Melanin in the early blastula develops into the spinal cord, 103 the cen-
t rnl nervous system, a significant part of the brain, as well as parts of
skin, retina of the eyes (the lack of melanin severely impairs vision),
the hair, and the ears. The cerebral spinal fluid made in the brain that
llC'lps to regulate various glands in the body contains melanin. The
chemistry of melanin is that melanocytes contain tyrosine, an amino
ttcicl, and an enzyme tyrosinase. Melanin is made when tyrosinase and
oxy!-{cn cause tyrosine to convert to DOPA, a "precursor amine" that
dH1111{esto melanin. 10~ The lack of tyrosinase results in the genetic
dhwase known as albinism, which has a deliterious effect on the eye-
•,l!-tl11.Melanin 111 lhe retina protects the sensitive eye from the ultra-
v111l1•1 mys oft I 1csun, jttst as ii protects lhe skin. It also allows for the
p1•11·,·ptlrn1qi l'lll0l's. l)OP;\ Is lhollf!hl to lw 1c>l,1IC'<1to C'rcaliv~ think
111~: l>y till' rP~ulallon c,t
1111d1111 l1Httl{I•~111:-.tHll's nl c·1111s1·lo11s111\:-s
pt 111!11<llntt
1111•!,111l11
168 YURUGU
King argues that blackness or carbon is life and is therefore

divine. He says that ancient Africans understood this, and called
themselves by various names meaning "black," such as "Kemites"
(people of the black earth), from which the Greeks developed the
word "chemistry" (and the Arabs "alchemy"). Recognizing the special
significance of their blackness, which far transcended the color of the
skin, according to King, these ancient scientists studied the work-
ings of their own minds, which they understood as being identified
with their entire bodies. (So much for the mind/body split so basic
to European thought.) This is what Frankfort describes negatively as
cosmic thought. According to King, the ancient Africans studied
themselves until they came to understand the relationship of "black-
ness" to spirituality and inner vision; the higher levels of under-
standing on which synthesis occurs. For them "Blackness"
represented the divine. In his series of works entitled, The Black Dot,
King supports this contention with an impressive array of references
to ancient Kemetic texts and symbolic images and to a host of other
theorists and historians. 105 What did these early, advanced scientists
discover?
These original titans found that all life came from a black seed, all
life was rooted in blackness, all things possessed a memory of their
collective ancestors. Blackness, the universal solvent of all was
seen as the one reality from which spun the threads of the loom of
life. All colors, all vibratory energies, were but a shade of black;
black was the color of the night sky, primeval ocean of outer space,
birthplace and womb of the planets, stars and galaxies of the uni-
verse; black holes were found at the center of our own galaxy and
countless other galaxies; black was the color of carbon, the key
atom found in all living matter of our world; carbon atoms linked
together to form black melanin, the first chemical that could cap-
ture light and reproduce itself, the chemical key to life; and the
brain itself was found to be centered around black neuromelanin.
Inner vision, intuition, creative genius, and spiritual illumination
were all found to be dependent upon pineal gland blood bourne
chemical messengers that controlled skin color and opened the
hidden door to the darkness of the collective unconscious mind.
allowing the ancient priest-scientist to visualize knowleclgc fro111
the timeless collective unconscious memory banks of t hP millCI.
Indeed, the Black Dot was found to be the hiddc•n cloorw:iy 10 uni
vc>rsalknowledge of the past, present, and futun'. irw,
1\111wlwt IJ;1ppP11s to Kuvcl'i, llwo,y nl hl1wk1ll'S'i, llw "lil,11le

llt"t'" lli.11 I•, ,I','"" l,1l1•d wlll1 tlJ,, da, k1ll's<i 111wllli Ii .di 11111111111111•111~•
are afraid; and the "dirt" about which they fantasize as they learn to
control the excretion of their bowels? For King, blackness is life itself
and, as such, is understood as divinity; the sacred force of creation.
But we are taught that it is evil. How did that come to be? And is it
connected, as Welsing would argue, to a reaction on the part of
Europeans to their human condition, their history? Perhaps this leads
to an explanation of Euro-Caucasian behavior.
In explanation, King turns, as Bradley does, to human evolution
and the process through which the earth was populated; in particu-
lar., Northern Europe during the glacial period. The evolutionary par-
ents of all human groups were African with very dark skin
pigmentation. Human life began in the equatorial zones of tropical
Africa. While direct sun seems to have been a creative force, its rays
can also be quite harmful to the skin. In this instance, dark skin is an
advantage. As early hominids became more sapien and less hairy,
their skin became darker as the melanocytes produced extra melanin
that blocked the ultraviolet rays of the sun, protecting these First
People from their harmful effects. But between 50,000 and 30,000
years ago one of several migrations out of Africa into Europe
occurred. 107 In the colder climate, where the sun rays were directed
at an angle and therefore not as intense, dark skin was no longer nec-
essary. It was, in fact, in this situation, a disadvantage. The sun's rays
are needed for the photosynthesis of vitamin D, which allows the cal-
cium in food to be used by the body. In low sunlight highly melanated
skin acted to prevent the body from converting vitamin DI and D2 to
its active form of D3 and D4. 108 As a result these early African immi-
grants into Europe developed soft bones or rickets characterized by
curvature of the bones. The cold climate made it worse, since thick
animal furs had to be worn, which further blocked the sun. As a result
over a period of 20,000 years, the skin color of these "Africans" light-
t•ncd as they became "Caucasians" through selection (of mutants);
more physically adapted/suited to their new environment. Those
with darker skin had less chance for survival. With less melanin
greater amounts of the energy from the scarce sunlight could be
11bsorbed. Later they began to get vitamin D from other sources such
11sfish oils.
Even from the little that we now know about melanin, we can
nss11mcthat there were other side effects as well, for melanin does
1101011lydfr('I lite• ski11. ht King's view, with less melanit1 we could
1·xp1·rt ,u, nyPr-all lnwc•r I 'VC:'Iof 11ervous systl-'lll intc>gration, lt.:ss
,wllvllv ol llw pli1e•1II~11111<1, .ital tlwn•fm<' f.(n•alt•r h1sli\l1('<' of pi1wal
< ,llt 1111 1111
,111011 ' 'l'ltl•,, (11tw11, 111l~lit1111111
.11·1·1•s1, 111 rlf-!ld hrali1 f11111
470 YURUGU
tions associated with the pineal gland (see Chap. l); e.g., the devel-
opment of intuitiveness, holistic, or "global" thinking, the ability to
synthesize mentally, and the ability to comprehend spiritual truths. 110
The comparative lack of melanin in the melanocytes (for all human
beings must produce melanin contrary to Welsing's implications)
would render them less capable of understanding their emotional
life. In King's view, this, in combination with the demands of harsh
environmental conditions caused the intensification of left-brain func-
tions, which are cause and effect oriented, and it cut off the uncon-
scious as a source of knowledge. This would account for a materialist
world-view, the emphasis on technology, and an inability to get
beyond lineal concepts. It would also account for intensely destruc-
tive behaviors on a cultural level stemming from the need for control,
power, and aggressiveness. For King, melanin and the pineal gland are
the keys to a deeper spiritual consciousness on which level human
beings can integrate their understanding/knowledge to reach meta-
physical truths that unlock the doors of the dark unconscious, bring-
ing with it an emotional, and psychological sense of security: a
oneness with self, an inner peace.
These immigrants, whom King comes to regard as "European-
Africans, "* because they were cut off from this inner and deeper real-
ity, developed a fear of it. They had been traumatized by their ice-age
experience. To a severe degree, they developed what King calls "post-
traumatic stress syndrome." 111 The fear of their unconscious, ances-
tral selves manifested as a fear of others (c.f. Diop's xenophobia).
Edward Hall says that others are experienced as the uncontrollable
part of ourselves. 112 This would make sense if we particularize it as
being true of Europeans. The others in this case, were/are more
deeply pigmented, depending on the areas of the world from which
they migrated in Africa. Ultimately for King, Africans-their "moth-
ers," "parents," their source-become the most feared "other." They
feared that which they were incapable of knowing, which came Lo
represent to them the sensation of a loss of control, of chaos, and dis-
order. For spiritual reality becomes overwhelming if one loses on ''s
connection to it. Simultaneously, it could be argued, the need to con-
trol became a pathological need. It gave birth to a cultural style, a ..
world-view, a civilization, and a pattern of bizarre behavior Lowards
others. Once set in motion this pattern of behavior (uto111aro/10)
• Thii; 1s a 111isleadi11g·tern1, lo irny lhc leas!, sin<'I' ·11w t•vol11flo11 of IIH"ll.!

"F111opl'a11:.." h,1d 10 h,ivt· involvl'd 1111' sdi.:t 11011of 111111,1111,11111111wl,111,111•d
1111111·1
lhi•y1·1111lrlll,1t!lly Ill' t 1111~,ld1•r1·d
"/1(1k,111•;"01 l<IPt1llllr·clwllli 11111
111l1jh11il1!111111111
l.111111
would be culturally inherited (asilr) by subsequent generations.

King's theory explains why blackness came to represent evil
and why the "dark side" became threatening. Blackness indeed was
the spiritual, metaphysical realm to which Europeans had little if
any access. The "dark side" of things was the inner vision of the
unconscious that opened the door to communication with ancestral
symbols and wisdom. 113 His theory would also help to explain the
patriarchal nature of European culture, since for C. G. Jung, the
matriarchal principle is the key to this primary, spiritual conscious-
ness. The matriarchal principle also represents the African womb.
European fear of the knowledge of their own origins would, in addi-
tion, account for the reason they work so hard to make it appear that
everything of value began with them; a complete reversal of reality,
since they know that they and their culture are comparatively young.
This accounts for the "progress" theory in which the true place of
human origins (Africa) represent a universal state of ignorance
(darkness).
King says that towards the end of Freud's life his desk was cov-
ered with Kemetic (Egyptian) figurines of Aset (Isis), Hern (Horus),
and WSIR (Osiris), God of the underworld or unconscious life. 114
Freud published Moses and Monotheism one year before he died. In
it he argued that Judaism had ancient Egyptian origins. One wonders
what he might have been moving toward. How can Freud be credited
with the "discovery" of the unconscious when the unconscious life
liad been so important to people for millenia before his existence?
.Jung, in his autobiography, talks about his own anxiety when expe-
riencing deja vu as he went into Africa. He said he felt as though he
had been there 5000 years before. (see Memories, Dreams,
l?eflections). 115 Freud is correct. There is much to be learned about
l~uropean neuroses from the study of First World cultures. We learn
of a cultural pathology of the abandoned "child" who developed first
111isolation, then in anger at the "parent" (elder) whom he could no
longer understand and therefore feared. That is what we can learn,
as we use an ancient world-view as a frame of reference. King's the-
ory is most consistent with the obvious lack of spirituality in
1•:11ropean culture. A pattern of coliective behavior, a world-view that,
while not caused by "white skin" in a simplistically physical sense,
,nay be related to the cultural/historical/spiritual experience of an
l:.olat(•d hrl'ecli11gpopulation that inllially suffered the relatively sucl-
d1•11,111(1sPVl'rt· lm;s of melanin flt nn cvollllil1n:1rlly sll_.(11lfka11t
point
111lh1•1td1•vdnp11wnl ,1!> ,1 wrn1p, plty11lrnlly,ltl(I rnlt11rnllv. '1'11<:rehy
tllC'""'' w,,,, ll11pl,1111t•cl
l11 tlw 111lll1r11I
172 YURUGU
According to Kobi Kazembe Kalongi Kambon (Joseph Baldwin),

white supremacy is a "delusional construction of reality." In his bril-
liant and creative extension of Welsing's and Wright's ideas, he con-
cludes that white supremacy is the synthesis of a process through
which the European "relates" or, in a sense, does not relate, to the
rest of the world. Kambon says that "in the first instance," i.e., on the
first "occasion of Europeanness," the coming into being of the
European takes place as a realization of extreme "differentness": a
recognition of being "outside of Nature."
He agrees with Welsing: The relative lack of concentration of
melanin in Europeans is an abnormality. Because of this unnatural
state the European had to make enormous psychological adjustments
to survive. Rather than being in tune with nature, as is the case in
normal human development, the European experiences adaptation as
a struggle. Nature is therefore perceived as being antagonistic. This
antagonistic relationship with nature (the creative and nourishing
force of the universe), in Kambon's view, causes a tremendous sense
of alienation. The sense of being "other," "not natural," "apart from,"
of being born as "disordered" caused overwhelming fear, anxiety,
and insecurity. This psychological state, in turn, results in perennial
suspicion and distrust of the environment. The embryonic European
was forced, therefore, to take a vigilant posture; i.e., an aggressive and
defensive position with regard to the rest of the world (which was
indeed "nature" itself). He existed in an ontological condition defined
by a sense of "otherness." He had to reconstruct reality in order to
survive reality. Being outside of the natural order, the European,
indeed, made himself "the order." Nature, then, became the object,
and alienation from nature was reconstructed by them as being nat-
ural. This perception served to defend their uniquely alienated con-
sciousness: the phenomenal gap. Their psychological defensiveness
resulted in psychopathology; a fabricated reality in which the value
of the European "white" self is exaggerated. Their creed, says Kambon
becomes: I am perfect. In a reality that reverses reality, "Nature
(Blackness, Africaness, color) is imperfect." Kambon seems to be say-
ing that Europeans have not only remained severely damaged psy-
chologically, but all of their cultural behavior can be understoocl as ..
a defense of this condition. t 16
All of the theories presented offer pieces of tlte puzzle>;off Pring
various reasons why Europeans should so co11sistently bchaw 111
such a st ra11gcly aggressive• ancl violcn1 111nt11H~·r 1uwarcl~ I llrnw wliu
took 1111d ly; i11dPLd, I l1;11IIll'Y~lt11t1ldh,1v1•, nnsl n wl t·d ,111
ac-t cllffc·rc111 1
1•11llrc·l'lvlll1.,1ll!lll ,110111111111(•11pp11•-;1,l0111111«11•xplulli1tlo11
01111;\jlll
ity peoples. One of the most significant facts about these theories is
that they are offered at all. What is in keeping with the European cul-
tural asili is that the ideology of its academia, its political liberals, dic-
tates the terms for such discussion. The issue of the peculiar nature
of European behavior is so threatening to the integrity of the culture,
as it now exists, that they cannot allow this question to be asked; at
least not in the proper form.
If we call European behavior towards others "racism"-and such
behavior appears to be characteristic of a culture created by
Caucasians, who represent a small minority of the world's people,
then obviously our intelligence forces the question-why? What is
the connection? Yet in Euro-American social and academic institu-
tions that question is never addressed in the ways we have seen it
addressed in the above discussion. Rather a new area of discourse is
created called "race relations," which implies first of all that all
"races" are equally involved in the "problem" of conflict. In addition,
the concern is very pragmatic, quite materialistic in fact. "How can
we minimize conflict in the work place or other social situations by
understanding our 'differences' and attitudes towards one another?"
"Differences" apply to all of those groups that may be brought into
contact in an urban situation; Africans, Asians, Latinos, Europeans,
etc. In other words, even the reactions of "non-Europeans" to white
racism become part of the "problem," with the eventual result taking
the focus away from the real problem-the European. Anyone who
euters this discussion with honesty-Le., placing Europeans firmly in
the spotlight where they belong, focusing on their behavior towards
others as the pathology that has set the syndrome in motion-that
person, by some ingenious double-think reversal (the familiar pattern
of European ideology) is called "a racist!" But we know what the real-
11y is and it is not so much a question, in this instance, of which the-
mist is "right," but of their courage and ability to ask the right
question. It matters little, after all, if the discussion is uncomfortable
ft ,r E11ropeans. Certainly we Africans are mandated by ancestral char-
h·r to seek answers to the question of European difference.
l:uropean Ideology and the Concept

of the Cultural Other
We live in u world so polluted with the effects of European ide-
11logy n11dslylt->s of thought that it may appear to be the case that a
"pusltlvi•" st'IJ-hn,\f.{C'within tlw ,·ontcxt of Ollt->n1lt11rnl philosophy
of ot'l11>1s;that lo d1-fltH' 111,,
Jly l111pll1•s:i "111•~ntlw" h11agc•
111·1·1•N,;:11
11w11tlw1·i nf c111t'1 •1 11w1111rll1111· .,..., "l1111111111"1111•,111sll1ut utl11•11111111st
474 YURUGU
be "nonhuman"; that for those with whom one identifies culturally to

represent "good," those in other cultures must be "bad." But this is
not a universal phenomenon. It describes the particular dialectic of
European ideology and the needs of the utamarohobecause of the his-
torical reality of European imperialism (the pattern of their behavior
toward others), has become a necessary political dialectic in the self-
deterministic objectives of majority peoples. Because all cultures
without exception have been forcibly placed into a power relation-
ship with European culture, an effective affirmation of their own
nationalistic commitments must necessarily be a negation or denial
of Europeans insofar as they (Europeans) are the proponents and
agents of European ideology. But these ideologies do not inherently
imply the dehumanization of the European, while European ideology
does inherently imply the reverse, i.e., the dehumanization of those
who are not human beings. For this reason, it is the explanation of the
interrelationship of European ideology, the European philosophical
tradition and European values that is most helpful in the attempt to
understand the pattern of European behavior towards others. The
documentation of the more blatant acts of European imperialism
alone is necessarily of limited consequence.
It is in the nature of the culture to allow for the verbal "disap-
proval" of the most dramatic instances of European abuse of others;
since such disapproval has no existential consequences. Its rhetori-
cal, hypocritical, and abstract style make it possible for the culture
that produces such behavior to simultaneously disown it. The mas-
sacres, the bombings, the mutilations, and the enslavement of others
are singled out as the isolated and horrendous acts of an overzealous
or evil militarist, colonialist, imperialist, or slaver. In this way the
society's academia, its political liberals, its clergy, and its social the-
oreticians disassociate themselves from these patterns and absolve
their guilt. But such behavior, in terms of the European world-view,
is on firm ideological ground and can only be superficially and inef-
fectively criticized by those whose own ideological commitments arc
to progressivism, evolutionism, scientism. These assumptions and
thought patterns have the same cultural origins as those of King
Leopold and Harry Truman; moreover, they are consistent with 011<•
another. The theorists who share these Western European traditions
make political decisions based on the same premises as the "com-
manders in chief" and the colonialist adventurers (or they makt• no
df'clsions at all, which is the sa111f' thing). ·
J-:11rnpt•wi thc•lmp(•tl.tllsllt• lwl1,1vloi.1l
i11tell1·ctual 1rn<litlo11-;1111<1
hi.111•horn 111·0111111011 ltlt•11logh,ti ~1rn111d'l'l11·y
p111l1•111s 11f l•:1110111•,\11~
are dictated by the utamaroho, they are explained by the utamawazo,

and they cohere in the asili. It is symbolic of this relationship that the
name of Cecil Rhodes can represent simultaneously the essence of
European colonial-expansionism and one of the most valued intel-
lectual traditions of the West; they are simply different manifesta-
tions of the same utamaroho. Yet the "Western way" is deceptive,
because it is in the nature of the culture that a contemporary "Rhodes
Scholar" can separate herself from the history of "Rhodesia." The
concept of asili shows us, however, that this quasiseparation is not
ethnologically (ideologically) sound. The relationship between the
concept of the cultural other and European cognitive structures is
adumbrated in our earlier discussion of the European utamawazo
(Chap. 1).
By providing the conceptual and valuative constructs within
which European behavioral patterns and thought are formulated, the
philosophers, scientists, theologians, and social theorists become
the idealogues of the culture. The "isms" of European thought are all
based on an image of the cultural other that in turn regulates the
behavior of Europeans towards majority peoples. It will help to look
carefully at the dominant themes of European thought (utamawazo)
in the context of European imperialist ideology (utamaroho and
behavior).
In Chap. 2 we attempted to clarify the relationship of Christian
ideology to European imperialism and pointed to the way in which
Christian thought has contributed to European nationalism by inten-
sifying the "we/they" dichotomy on which it depends and by provid-
ing corresponding images of Europeans and majority peoples that
mandate the unlimited expansion of Western European political con-
trol. The essence of the Judeo-Christian tradition is its assumption of
theological and moral evolution leading to the superior and humanly
proper conception of "one God" (or "pure spirit"); the ultimate
r1h:-traction. The Christian mandate to impose this conception on
other peoples represents the epitome of the European utamaroho.
Essential to this proselytizing mission is an invidious comparison in
which the non-European (or as Chinweizu put it in 1978, "the rest of
11:-J") comes out not only "the loser," but is dehumanized as well. The
"paga11," "heathen," "idolater," or "polytheist" have no religion in
I 1·rms of European definition, yet these are all terms used to describe
1,ur i,pirllw1I rnnceplions. We i\re cultural others; we are morally infe-
1 lt,i: w<• ill'l' less l I iau llumm1. Therefore, whatever is clone to us wit Ii
llw ulij11C'liv1·<ti 111,ikl11H (1· g., glvl111,{
11s"111011· l111111rm," 11sr1•iiglo11)ls
l1t•,llttnbl1·
476 YURUGU
Christian ideology provides moralistic and universalistic terms

of disparagement for the peoples who are objects of Western impe-
rialism, as well as moral justification for their subjugation and
exploitation. Katherine George provides an example of the Christian
image of the cultural other (see Chap. 2). What she demonstrates is
the way in which Christian ideology enables Europeans to behave as
they do towards people of other cultures. She speaks of
"Christianity's influence upon the civilized view of the primitive."
European ideology provides the conception of the cultural other that
supports the varied manifestations of European imperialistic behav-
ior. This conception, in partnership with other aspects of the
European utamaroho, is one that encourages a particular attitude
toward peoples outside the culture; an attitude of paternalism and
superiority that mandates the quest to control and manipulate them,
and one that encourages rather than inhibits their destruction, abuse,
and exploitation. Christian thought was a major contributor to this
conception and its attendant attitude, particularly in the formulative
periods of European development and during the major periods of
European expansion.
The Judea-Christian tradition interlocks with other aspects of
European ideology that have played similar roles in terms of the def-
initions of European cultural nationalism. From the frame of reference
of "progressivism-evolutionism," which, it must be understood, is not
easily distinguishable from Christian thought, the "pagan" becomes
not only nonreligious but pre-religious. She becomes "backward" and
"ignorant." She lacks the intellectual acumen to develop (reach) "civ-
ilization" (European culture). She becomes "primitive," which, as
Ashley Montagu has pointed out translates into "backward," "retro-
gressive," "arrested," "retarded," 117 in evolutionistic terms. The
"primitive" man is not really in a human state but is at best repre-
sentative of an evolutionarily earlier stage of the European.
Charles A. Beard, in his introduction to J. B. Bury's Idea of
Progress,says: "This conception of a continuous progress in the cvo
lution of life, resulting in the appearance of uncivilized anthropos,
helped to reinforce and increase a belief in the conception of the hb
tory of Civilized Anthropos as itself also a continuous progrcsslv•• ..
development." 118 The European becomes, in this view, "ma11ki11d,''
since at any given time he represents thc- highest and thcrcfoH·
proper level that man has reached. Marvin Harris says, "We c,1111101
appreciate the strength of the conviction nrnoi1g I lIP evol11tlonbti-. Ill
I IIt' Pl'riod of I 8(;0 18!)0I h;tl cn1111•mpur.11 y prl11111 ild pr ovld1·
lws 1·111
volld ll1f11rn1o1tlo11 " 1111
alm11I 1l1t· a1wl1•11Ir0t1<lltl1111ol l111111,11illy '1'l11",t
premises can be used subtly, with respect to contemporary European

behavior, to support European control via "modernization" and
"development" programs or in their extreme interpretations to sup-
port the enslavement or genocide of "the rest of us."
In combination, then, progressivism and evolutionism transform
people of other cultures into "savages," while the proponents of these
theories themselves become "civilized" and therefore responsible
for the guidance (control) of those who are not. It is European evo-
lutionism that places the cultural other under the microscope. When
she becomes a savage in the mind of the European the assumption is
not only that she is a "wild beast," but that she is an object to be stud-
ied as well, since she and her culture represent the earliest stages of
the European's ("mankind's") existence. The cultural other has
exactly the same value as a Neanderthal skull. The assumptions and
mood of a scientistic perspective make the above combination of
ideas coherent for Europeans. They cohere in the asili of the culture.
The following clipping appeared in a New York African newspaper in
the early 1900s:
Ota Benga, the African pygmy, is to stay at the Zoological Park a few
days longer. This was decided at a conference between Director
Hornaday and the committee of Baptist clergy men appointed by
the Colored Baptist Minister's Conference, to save Benga from
appearing on exhibition in a monkey cage, and if possible, also to
get the custody of him. The length of time he is still to remain an
inmate of the primate house in the park is dependent on Dr.
Verner's return from North Carolina. As soon as he returns he,
Director Hornaday and the Rev. Hames II Gordon, the Chairman of
the Committee, will have another conference. The clergymen will
then try through Mr. Gordon to get possession of Benga, so that
they may send him to Lynchburg, Va. to be educated .... Director
Hornaday ... is not willing to give him into the hands of the clergy
men without an agreement that he will be delivered to Dr. Verner
r1gainwhen he wants him.
New York Age, September 20, 1906
It ls scientism that makes universalistic schemes compelling. It

gives credence to a value-system that defines European culture as a
1111tvcrsallybeneficial and evolutionarily inevitable stage of human
1•xlslcmce: olher cultures represent various stages of development
luw;1rd thHt cullure. What scicntism adds to the concept· of the cul-
I 111,ii oll 11-'I<h-·pl<'lt-d11111:.
f;n ts t Ililt of !);\Ssivity. Tlw tntE' objf'<·ls of
1w1·n1dl111~
1 1111t1.•111pl,1t1011, to sclt•ut lstk r-pl:-:ft•111olo~y,HH', by dt'filll
111111, 1·1111q1l1•tC"IV :i·,
p11•1•dv1•Tlwv 1111· l11m·tlv1· tl,011!{11l111l1'11hi lluw
478 YURUGU
This is the impressive power of the reflective thinker: His act of think-
ing about an object alone gives him the ability to render it motion-
less-powerless. It must "sit still" for his circumspection; i.e., his
theoretical consumption. The cultural other becomes the total
"object" of European thought. She is the most fitting object of study.
She is otherwise meaningless.
The "isms" of European ideology combine into one idea system
that cloaks the sentiments of European cultural imperialism in a syn-
tactical maze of universalistic terminology and logic. Each component
of the system is dependent on a conception of the cultural other as
the embodiment of the negation of value; for each provides the ide-
ological function of supporting the European self-image as the uni-
versal "agent of change," the "doer," the personification of
intelligence, and the "inheritor of the earth."
What follows is an equation of European collective behavior
towards the "Cultural Other":
European European Cultural Other Cultural Other

Ideology
+
Self-Image
= Image as Must be
Christianity Religious, Heathen, Saved

Moral, cultural Non-religious,
being. Immoral.
Idea of Progress Progressive, Backward Developed,

Modern, cultural Advanced.
being.
Evolutionism Civilized Primitive Civilized

Cultural being.
Scientism Scientist, Object Studied,

Knower. Known,
Controlled.
White Supremacy White racial being, Black, dirty, Avoided, ...

Pure, human. Non-human. Pitied,
Enslaved,
Oestroy1•d
It musl lw undPrs1ood llial tlw ldL•as nl "si1vl11~," ",1dv,1111•l11g,"

"dc·wlnpll1~," '\ lvlll1Jt1~."or "s1111lyl111.('
rlo 11()1 l11dlc,lit• ,111lcl(•t111fic,,
Behavior Toward Others 47.9
tion with the cultural other, or a desire to make her into a European.
They all translate into the idea of "control." They symbolize, primar-
ily and essentially, a power relationship in which Europeans are
supreme. Each ideological component contributes to the support of
European imperialism and expansionism, because each ideologically
supports the objective of power over others and attempts to trans-
form European choices into inevitably and humanly desirable uni-
versals. The difference between the militarists and the missionary is
only one of modus operandi; the blows of one are more physically
apparent; those of the other leave battered souls and cultures in their
wake.
Each ideological component contributes to the creation of an
image of those who are different from the Europeans, which generates
a conception that encourages the style of behavior that has charac-
terized the European's relationship to majority peoples. This con-
ception is that of the cultural other; i.e., a being who is justifiably the
object of missionizing, or of scientific consumption and manipula-
tion, or of mass brutality. In either case, the cultural other is "grist for
the mill"; she is material to be used; she is expendable. This web of
interlocking ideological systems is the vehicle by which meaning is
injected into European life. What they accomplish is the devaluation
of people outside the culture. The essential characteristic of the con-
ception of the cultural other, however, is not merely that she is worth
less than a European-but that she is worth nothing. The cultural
other is a being who lacks meaning, whose existence has no human
significance in terms of the European utamawazo. The cultural other
has significance only syntactically as a concept that assures
Europeans of value in their own terms; therefore as a concept on
which the utamaroho thrives and as a concrete object on which
Europeans existentially act out their most destructive instincts.
Utamawazo and Imperialism

What is the relationship between the way in which Europeans
i·onceive of the world and the way in which they relate to majority
111•1,pies? Put another way: What is the relationship between the dom-
111,111tmodes of European thought and the dominant modes of behav-
1111towards others? What kind of behavior does the utamawazo
1•111·nurngc?.Joel Kovel asks a similar question and feels justified in
l111kl11g wliat lw calls "ahstractification" to Western "cultural aggres-
,1011'' 1u1d''whit{' rnc-l:1m." AtI C'ff
cc-tiv<'<"rlllquc llf Europet\n nilt ur;il
h1•li.1vlnt 11111~1
,11ld11•.,sllsl'II lo 1hr lwli\•f-sysl1•111llt:'tl genrnlti•:, 111;11
lwlrnvlor.
480 YURUGU
The conceptual realities presented by the European utamawazo

(ontology/epistemology) combine to promote a mental attitude and
outlook that make imperialistic-expansionistic behavior possible and
preferred (normative). The Platonic and Christian conception of
nature is as sensate disorder, hostile to intelligence (order). Value
resides in the "rational," again associated with order. The irrational
represents nonvalue. "Man" (the human is properly male) is intelli-
gence and nature, reason and emotion. "His" properly human func-
tion is to control the emotional (nature) within "himself" with the aid
of "his" rational faculties and "his" will. "His" role in the universe is
to use "his" intelligence to give order to (to make proper use oO
nature. This involves struggle and conquest, since nature is hostile
to rational order. "Man" subdues nature. These ontological concep-
tions, when placed at the service of the European utamaroho, are
translated into the concrete terms that become the "working defini-
tions" of European political ("intercultural") behavior.
In the State that Plato constructs, it is the role of the most "intel-
ligent" and "rational" individuals to control those within the State who
are "less rational," more emotional, and, therefore, less human. And,
indeed, the formulative process in the development of European cul-
ture involves the successful ascendance of a particular definition of
"intelligence"; the weeding out from positions of power and influence
those committed to other ontological/epistemological systems. As
this constellation of characteristics and values becomes solidified into
a well-defined cultural entity, there is a simultaneous process in which
the desire to order and control becomes directed more and more out-
side the culture that is defining itself in relation to the universe. (It is
this above all, that makes for European success.) The object of
European intelligence (order, power, control) becomes they who are
not European, i.e., the cultural other. For nothing represents irra-
tionality so much as a world-view, an utamawazo, an ideological sys-
tem that is not European. The cultural other, then, in terms of the
Europea,~ utamawazo, becomes part of nature, to be ordered, con-
trolled, used, and destroyed at the will of the European. In the "Chain
of Being" the cultural other is ontologically mere "uncivilized anthro
pos"; not easily distinguishable from other nonhuman animals. Robin ...
Williams' statement (see Chap. 7 "Themes in Interpersonal Inter
action) can now be interpreted properly in terms of the Europ<'an 111<1
rnaroho. The Europeans sec themselves as "111a11" wl1CJis "sc•l (Wl''
agnlnst th<' world," and the cul1urnl other, a "k•sstr <'n•«llll<'{t;),"-(,dl!-1
.i11H111~ "lnani111att· nat 11n· :111dnt llt•r 1lvl11u
I hl11!-{s,"wlllc h Ilwy i1n· tu
ovt·r "Ith, 1111·
"li;1v1· d11111l11l1111 11
E11top1•,111, ,11t 11111,
0111" tl11s 11t,m1w11/tri
who sees himself as having a "special charter to occupy the earth." 120
The cultural other is excluded from this category.
Christianism, progressivism and evolutionism, which have ide-
ologically contributed to the dehumanization (devaluation) of the
cultural other, are for the European mind logically supported by an
utamawazo characterized by a lineal conception of time and motion.
It "makes sense" that cultures and peoples must relate "lineally" if
they are conceived to relate at all, and it is a simple conceptual step
to turn the line vertically into the hierarchy of progressivism. The nor-
mative Platonic abstraction provides the epistemological support for
the universalism so essential to the presuppositions of the ideas of
progress and of unilinear evolution. There is no truth but immutable,
nonrelative truth. There is no good but universal good. To be in pos-
session of truth is to know what is universally good for humankind.
Everything must come to be, or at least be judged in terms of, what
"we" are. The European utamawazo provides the conceptual frame-
work in which these "isms" become acceptable.
It is the epistemological tool of "objectification" that perhaps has
Ihe most critical implications for the nature of European culture and
behavior towards others. The mind is trained to objectify. The person
liclieves that by disengaging herself from the phenomenon she wishes
In understand, she comes to "know" it; it becomes an object of her
lwowledge. She therefore attempts fo transform all phenonema into
1•ltlwrtotal "matter" or pure mathematical symbol. She despiritualizes
II. But let us suppose that Plato was essentially mistaken; a good math-
1•111atldanbut a weak humanist (social theorist). If human intelligence
tr-uot limited to rationality as defined in terms of order and control
( power), but rather is revealed in spirituality that may include but
, 1•1tainly transcends rational order, then the European utamawazo
d111•snot equip Europeans to deal successfully with the "human" in
IIH•mselves or with other human beings. Instead, it enables them to
11hj<'clifytheir experiences with and behavior towards, other people.
1'111· more remote such people are from their own culture (from
I 111 oJ>t'), the more they become "objects" only, for the greater is the
l.111111wc.u1's abi.lity to eliminate emotional reaction to his interaction
wll!J tllem. The c11ltural other is at the end of the spectrum; she
I 11•tOllll'S the total object. The outrages of European imperialistic
I 11•1,,,vlor 11r<•tult urally "possible" because their object is the cultural
111 I w, with whom Et1ropca11sfeel no cmotlonal iclE>nlification.
In 1,nv<'l's l111rrrwrtntlon, E111 npenn cull Ufl' is "packaged" or pn•
11•11ltd to Its 1111•1111>1•1 s ,1s ,, st•rlt•s ul ul>strn<'llons, and hl't'I\WH' lllt'y
1 I 1,11,11'111 11-.1Ii ally d11110\ ,tllow 1111•111s1•IVI'~I II clt•ll I wll l 1 1•1)111'11 1!c· pl w
482 YURUGU
nomena in terms of their existential implications they are able to

behave and live as they do. 121 In terms of European behavior towards
the cultural other, then, the abstractions in which it is packaged are
"progress" versus "backwardness," "Christian civilization" versus
"the heathen barbarians"; rather than the concrete realities of bru-
tality, aggression, and exploitation.
The point is that the epistemological and ontological presup-
positions and imperialistic behavior "agree." They both issue from an
asili that demands power/control. The utamawazo creates a mental
fortress that sanctions European behavior towards those outside the
culture. The utamaroho encourages and motivates such behavior. To
be effectively critical of European imperialistic behavior we must
reject the verbally rhetorical and hypocritical character of the cul-
ture. This implies a serious exploration of the behavioral implica-
tions (i.e. concrete and existential) of the particular uses of
ontological and epistemological assumptions that one tacitly accepts
by "successful" participation in European society. To the extent that
these assumptions result in the ability to regard human beings as
objects-whether they be "scientific," "military," or "religious"
objects-imperialistic behavior will not be effectively discouraged
or prohibited. It is the essential nature of the asili of European culture
that must be destroyed if that indeed is the objective. Europeaness
must be rejected.
Conclusion: The Logic of Supremacy and Destruction

The relationship between European intracultural behavior and
European behavior towards others is that the lack of love (sympa-
thetic relationship) for each other requires an "other" to absorb
aggression and to allow a bond of identification to form between the
members of the culture. Therefore, while power and racialism may
play a part in the collective behavior of other cultural groups, only
Europeans are racist by nature and because of their culture. This is
so because (1) they are the only people whose cultural asili is ener-
gized by the drive for power, (2) because racism can be defined <ls
systematic behavior resulting from xenophobia, in combination wit l1
the concrete circumstances of power, and (3) finally because only t lw ...
European utamaroho is insufficient, in itself, therefore demanding ,,
cultural/racial "other" to relate to. This comhination m:lkes "racism''
endemic to European culture ancl define~ tile goal of whit•·
•,11prc·milcy,Eurupc;.rn power ovc-r otlwrs, ns th<' s11pn•rn~• 1-{o:ilOf tlw
nlllwt• 'l'hnt Is ll1l' s(;tlt•111e111 tltat 110 ollwr 1 (llt111c-
1 ,Ill 111,,kl'
/\Ith 1111atld ntl11•1 u111Jnrltypt•oplt": 111t• 1101 pn'l1tlv1· vii tllni.; nl
European aggression. And we do not intend to give that impression.

History is as much the history of our forms of resistance as it is of the
power of Europe, to say nothing of the long period of history before
Europe came into existence as a cultural entity. But the focus in this
discussion is not on "other than Europeans"; it is on Europeans them-
selves. This is not to say that Europeans have not been effected by
the "rest of us." In fact, part of their success issues from their ability
to use that influence to further dominate those from which it comes.
We are concerned here, however, with the specific relationship
between European behavior and the European utamawazo (culturally
structured thought system). In that regard European conceptions of
others become important. We are at present only secondarily con-
cerned with the reactions of other peoples to European behavior;
these reactions have only been infrequently discussed when they
helped to clarify some aspect of European behavior or ideology. My
t1ltimate concern is to favorably influence the rest of us in our capac-
ity to realize self-determination, i.e., to eliminate Europe as an imped-
iment to our progress and as the cause of our destruction. I believe
that scrutiny of European culture will lead us in that direction.
As Johari Amini says, it is our "working definitions" that "are at
t Ile foundation of the ways in which we live." 122 The European con-
1·1·ption of the cultural other is such a definition. Clearly all cultures
ddine its members as "different" from those outside; that is part of
what "culture" means. And this difference is a meaningful one; i.e., the
111L'111bers of one's culture have priority, are more important, emo-
t lonally closer than those of other cultures because of the things they
•,l1are, just as the members of a family mean more to us than those
wl10 are not included in the family. It is indeed part of the function of
, 1111 ural definition to define a group in this way. It follows, then, that
Im any group there are the definitions of "we" and "they"; "self" and
"1 ,I lier." And for any group these definitions should carry with them
lwltnvioral implications; "they" are not treated the same as "we," if

•111lybecause "they" do not have priority-"we" come first. Even
11111111,111 this may appear to be "logical," it is not, given the asili of
\ft l1·a11{;ttlture in which nonmembers are often given the same priv-
llq.(1•s..is rnembers. Diop has remarked on this xenophilic African ten-
,1, IH'Y,
Thi' t•:uro1wa11"we/they" dichotomy has implications that it docs
11111li,1v1 · wit llin the philosopnics of 01'11er{;Ultures, and the "outsider,"
1, rl1 11111'11 hy r,th,•r cultures, Is qualitatiuely different from lltr c:011-
, , pt 11111ol t li1• 1·1ill11nllot lit•1, ·l'lw 1•:11rnpvu11
t·t>lw1•pllo11uf t lw 1·111Iur,d
frlpoln1,1y!lt••;IHIJt•dlo ,111~,w1•1
11llw1h,11111lq1w p111d1wl ot l·~11mp1•a11
484 YURUGU
the particular needs of the utamaroho that houses an inordinate

power drive. The outsider as defined by other cultures does not have
the features of the cultural other. A cultural other could not be con-
ceived of in these other ontological/epistemological systems. In
majority cultures inanimate objects have more meaning (significance)
than do cultural others for Europeans.
The cultural other is not the same as the traditional enemy. She
does not have the status of an enemy. She is less than an enemy. The
concept implies the ultimate in dehumanization-in devaluation.
European behavior towards others is so extreme in part because their
conception of the cultural other is so negative. Atrocities are no longer
atrocities if their objects are invisible. They become atrocities only
because those on whom they are perpetrated have some meaning.
The cultural other is significant only insofar as its existence (cre-
ation) is necessary for the maintenance of the European self-image and
utamaroho, and provides for the survival of European culture. It is the
essential nature (asill) of the culture that is revealed in the conception
of the cultural other. It is this conception that services the needs of
European conative strivings for power, supremacy, and control; all of
which are basically destructive to the necessarily integrative function
of culture. By creating the cultural other as the proper object of these
strivings, Europeans ingeniously use the power drive to keep their
culture intact. The result is a culture whose primary rationale is uni-
versal supremacy. The culture has survived as a coherent entity
because (as stated before) the European's intracultural behavior has
been effectively held in check by an ethic that differentiated between
the European other and the cultural other. The tendencies of
European behavior mandated by the asili are so inherently destruc-
tive that the cultural other is needed for their uninhibited "acting out."
There is no other utamaroho or self-concept that demands a cul-
tural other. There are "enemies," even "barbarians"-but not a cul-
tural other. It is actually a deep-rooted European need. The a.'till
demands it. The attitude is unique among cultural groups; it helps to
explain a style of behavior that is also unique. Imperialism is not
unique to Europe; neither is power. But both the extremity of impt·
rialism and the intensity of power enacted and possessed by ...
European culture are unique-to the great misfortune of I he rc·:;t ol
us. Europeans are not the rnost powerful people in tlw world brcaus,•
they are the smartest, as they would have us hell eve. The at:t uall, .•,
tim1 or pow1.:ris a h:1nclion of tht! 11('<:dfor powc:rH~dirt ;,t 1•dhy ti w
11f<111u1mho ~l.d11gII ll'C-h,111h111i,l·'.111op1•1111·, 1H•pd
of I lien 11tII n•; II s t•11<:r
1111w1·1,1•1110 ntlwr p1•11plt·tit, 'l'IH' 1·11lt1111•Ji; 'lo 'ltllTt",i,1111 at ~:1111l111<
power because there is nothing within the culture that effectively

conflicts with the achievement of power. What this description of
their behavior has shown us is that "anything goes." The "power
need" is compounded by and related to the lack of a spiritual sub-
stratum on which to base a viable morality. Europeans in a very real
sense have no spiritual community. This is a malaise inherent in the
formulating (asi/1)and definition of the culture, only now overtly man-
ifesting itself in such a way that it becomes apparent to a tiny portion
of its own participants. The pattern of European behavior towards
others is inseparable from the European utamawazo and therefore
the intellectual life of the culture. This pattern of violence, aggression,
and destruction is not an aberration. Our study demonstrates that the
asili mandates all three, and unless the collective cognitive and affec-
tive definitions change, that behavior will continue. And these defin-
itions cannot change because of the nature of the European himself.
/\II are part of a coherent ideological whole.
"Ideology" is, of course, implied throughout this discussion, but
1he final section of this study concentrates explicitly on European ide-
ology and explores the critical themes in all European ideological
statements. These are the themes that the concept of asi/i has brought
lorth. They have emerged from a discussion of European culture, using
,111 approach that looks for consistency and coherence. It is ideology
,ll>ove all that forms the asili or explanatory principle of the culture.
'l'he ideological substratum unites the various aspects and modes of
Ilie culture. The workings of the culture become crystallized as the
t t•lationships between utamawazo (cognitive structure), utamaroho
( nffective style), behavior, and ideology are made clear.
PART FOUR
IDEOLOGY
"People headed after the setting sun, in that direc-
tion even the possibility of regeneration is dead.
There the devotees of death take life, consume it,
exhaust every living thing. Then they move on, for-
ever seeking new boundaries. "
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 9
Progress as Ideology
Whose "Progress?"
The "idea of progress" as it is euphemistically referred to by
Europeans provides an essential dynamic of the main thrust of
European ideology. The idea is a fundamental aspect of the European
philosophy of life, providing moral justification for the technical order
and giving supposed direction to the strivings of individuals within
Ihe society. An exploration of the nature of this concept in terms of
its profound cultural/ideological implications reveals that its effects
have been powerful, though most often subtle, and have spread to
other cultures. The idea of progress has been a potent tool in
European hands. It has contributed to the formation of the social
organization by providing the ideological substratum out of which the
oppressive technical order was created. This technical order in which
l 11<'European is imprisoned leads inevitably to the current ecologi-
l'Hl Imbalance, thereby linking the European condition ethnologically
( ideologically) to the "idea of progress."
Approaching this discussion armed with the concept of asili will
,1ll11w us to discover the ideological connections that exist between the
11fofl1r1111azo(thought) and the uniqueness of the European technical
111tier. Even the most critical of contemporary works generally iden-
1lly I hP intensity of the technological mania with something called
"111wl1:rnlty." This merely reveals the progress philosophy to be a part
ol I lwlr pcrspcclivrs. The advantage of the asili concept is that it
In, 1TH uti to he.:spt·\.·lfi1~,I.e., lo den1011stralc the n•lationship bctwee11
l'.111op1•1111ld1•nlo~y 11mltit(' E111t,pt:U11 lt•t·llnt't·nl ortlt'r, lliurc•by pilrtk
11111, IPIIOI I .ItI!>t "~ "111
l I , ,,, ,1 1·11lt 111, ii pl 11•11011
I1111)! nl(ll '"'•" , 111;111al>•,l,:11
490 YURUGU
tion is a European ontological concept and ideological belief, so the

oppressive technical order created within the context of the Western
European cultural-historical process is the product of European pri-
orities, the European utamawazo, and the European utamaroho. The
philosophical problem is that of what exactly "modernity" can mean
outside of the context of the idea of progress.
The Anatomy of "Progress"

In the setting of European culture, the parochial nature and ide-
ological significance of the idea of progress is difficult to discuss. Like
"lineality" in the utamawazo, it is more than a conceptual tool in that
it becomes part of the meaning of existence for members of the cul-
ture. In the classroom, the attempt to present the idea as being cul-
turally bound is met with blank stares. "What do you mean? Everyone
wants to make progress!" Moreover, because the idea combines
European ontological presuppositions and value in such intricate
combination and is so deeply embedded in them, finding the right
way to present it, so that its ethnological implications for European
behavior, attitude, and value become evident, is not an easy task.
The critical conceptual leap is that by which action directed
toward a concrete objective becomes confused with change that is
merely reflexive, i.e., in which the object is change itself. The
"progress" toward which Europeans perceive themselves to be "mov-
ing" is neither concrete nor reachable- a spurious goal indeed. Why
then has the idea such attraction for the European mind-a mind
that is at once rationalistic and empirical, a mind that seems to say,
"Show me?" The answer lies in the fact that this ingenious inven-
tion-"progress" born out of the European utamaroho- is ideally
fashioned to encourage the growth of the technical order while jus-
tifying cultural and political imperialism.
We have said that Europeans are expansionistic. To Europeans,
the universe represents actual physical space into which they can
impose themselves. Their movement in this respect is never from
place to place (they are no longer nomads); it is not displacement, but
extension. They expand and extend their possessions, never relin-
quishing territory they have claimed. They never migrate, but always
conquer and consume. By this process they themselves become "bil,{-
ger." The idea of progress allows for this same kind of n1ovcmcnt and
C"xtcnsion.Concrptually, ''progressive" motion-consumes all of llw
(MSI within It, 1111d"proE(r<'ss" Is not 111\'rt'IY"cllff<·r,•111fru111,"It h
"1111111•
111.111,"'l'l1t•ldt•a Is, 111this w11y, i"i~l•t1tl.illy1•'lp1111slt111htlr
A 1·11,11 It•,/\ lt1•,11d ... ,vs,"It 111111.1111-.
w~tl1ll1IIM•IItl11 1•1•1111·,
111
Progress as Ideology 491
indefinite expansion." 1 What it implies is that there is no fixed limit

to change, no limit beyond which the expansion of "our" thrust can-
not go. That is how they think. "We" (Europeans) are morally obliged
to continually move/change/expand "ourselves"; that is the nature of
"progress." For the European it is the abstractness of the idea that
makes it fit to be "ideal." Interestingly enough this is precisely the
nature of Plato's ideal state; it can only be approximated by humans.
The commitment to imitate it necessarily entails endless and infinite
effort and therefore assures a certain style of behavior. Both Arthur
Lovejoy and J.B. Bury argue that Plato's conception is antithetical to
the idea of progress in that it involves a commitment to an absolute
order already conceived. As a reason for the failure of the Greeks to
"discover" the idea of progress, Bury suggests:
They believed in the ideal of an absolute order in society, from

which, when it is once established, any deviation must be for the
worse. Aristotle, considering the subject from a practical point of
view, laid down that changes in an established social order are
undesirable, and should be as few and slight as possible. 2
But, as Theodore Roszak points out in his introduction to

Sources,3 the establishment becomes the agent of change ("the more
it changes the more it stays the same"); in fact it changes in order to
remain the same. Admittedly change is much more the order of the
contemporary West than of Ancient Greece, but Plato's "absolute"
can still be interpreted to ideologically support a certain kind of
change, in a particular direction, within a determined and well-defined
form. The idea of progress does precisely the same thing. What it
limits is the kind of change that can take place. Ecological sanity, for
instance, is not "progress." Bury, himself, says that Greek thought
foreshadowed the idea of progress.
The idea should not be considered as a "theory of history" in a
lltnited sense. It is a misunderstanding of the concept to think that it
1wcessarily indicates optimism; for it never presents a clear view of
1I1P future. The infinite future, once it has been postulated, becomes
It t'clcvr1nt. It is the subtlety of this phenonemon (idea) that con-
11thutcs lo its distinctiveness. It is c1mood-not one of optimism-but
c>11L' of arrogance, supNiority, power, and exploitation. These need
111tllw syllm1ymous with opt imlsm. It is common for one corn milled
In ''llw Wt•sl<·rn way" to c~xpte>ss c·o11t<'rtt over where "il" Is <-111 lcacl-
111>!, ,111dyt•I lo ht• 1·n11vlnc·1•dof Ills uhllHntio11 to "tak<-'II" 1lwr1•;IP
IJ1"1luw llw lc•111lc·1 -.ltlp 111ltls 111lt1111• 1tpt111 ll111s1· "lc·s:-if11tl1111;11!-:."
who do 111111<11nw llw w,1v
492 YURUGU
The idea of progress is a directive of European behavior, a deter-

minant of attitude, a device by which the European judges and
imposes those judgements on others. Europeans who "ennoble" the
"native" do so from the pinnacles of a state of progress that they
believe it is incumbent upon "man" to achieve. It is the European coun-
terpart to what is meant by "tradition" when it is said that tradition
functions normatively in "traditional" societies. It is the idea of
progress that helps to guarantee that European commitments and val-
ues will not change but will always remain within the same modality.
The "idea" is more a methodological commitment than a theory
of history. It is a process; an operational mode. Its referent is "ratio-
nalism"-not a euphoric or glorious state of perfection in the future
(only for Marx does it seem to have this connotation). In fact, its via-
bility contradicts the possibility of such a state. Its mood is much
closer to a "survival of the fittest" aura. It is concerned with the evolv-
ing, not with the end product. Progress is always there to be made,
because its index is wherever you are at a given time. There is always
"progress" to be made-always a proper way to attack a problem
"rationally." Rather than the presumption of a perfect state to be ulti-
mately reached, it rests on the presumption of ceaseless "prob-
lems"-always tension; it presupposes disharmony, disequilibrium,
imbalance. It is possible to interpret Plato's Republic in this way; i.e.,
a paramount guide to activity, in an endless approach to unattainable
perfection. An ideal which, like the dynamic of Zeno's paradox, allows
for an infinite degree of approximation without the possibility of
duplication. It is the solving of the problem in the most "rational"
way that is progress. That is the thrust of the idea-intraculturally. Its
outward thrust (i.e., in relation to other cultures) is to make the "ratio-
nal" way (the European way) best.
E. 0. Bassett says that, in Plato's view, "society executes an infi-
nite progression .... The end of progress is progress; the aim is but a
directing principle .... Since the social as well as the universal aim Is
maximum orderliness, progress must be perpetual." 4 But Lovejoy
and Boas argue that "the Romantic idea of endless progress for
progress' sake is alien to Plato's thought." 5 Karl Popper agrees:
Plato's sense of drift had expressed itself in his theory that all
change, at least in certain cosmic periods, must be for tile wona·;
all change is degeneration. Aristotle's theory arl111itsof rhnngcs
which arc improyen1ents; this change may b<' progn'ss. Plato IMt~
ta11)1.hlllul all riPvt•lop111t'11I slarls frrnn lllt' ot!i~lilill,llt1• p1·rf1•1l
Fnr111,11 1111•,,,
s11 tll.11 tltt· dl'v1•lopl11v.1111111( lt1sf' 11,,p1•1l1•c1l1111
11111•,I
1t11111' 111wt,tf'I,ti,; ,,11,t1I,1111v
11«'1{11•1• 111111
.
.. ,,rtgl11,IIr1,,,11., ., ... "
The trick is that the perfect form exists only as "idea." If one's
interpretation of Plato emphasizes the concrete social and cultural
implications of his theories for human organization, then it becomes
clear that all actual development in the sensate "world of becoming"
may properly start from a conceptualized perfection, but certainly
not with the "perfect state." Actual movement is, therefore, not away
from, but toward the "ideal." If the Ideal could be actualized, then,
once this had occurred, all change would, indeed, be for the worse.
But such, for Plato, is a contradiction in terms.
Joel Kovel says that the "practical genius" of Protestantism and
of the West in general "was to discover that the more remote a
desired goal, the more passionately a man would seek it." 7 I would
insert European before the generic term "man." This is one of the
cultural/behavioral functions of the Christ image, in its European
interpretation, in relation to a diety conceived as "pure spirit." He is
the "human" who is not human. The more than "human being" who
only incidentally, and very briefly, took human form. This image calls
for the emulation of that which is "superhuman" and therefore unre-
alizable by humans. As Kovel says, "All that 'counted' was Movement,
striving for an endless goal that became ever more remote precisely
through the process of striving." 8 One never reaches "progress"; one
makes "progress," and in the European view, there is always more of
it to be made. This supports the ego that must extend its domain
indefinitely; the utamaroho that manifests an insatiable "will-to-
power." It developed out of the asili that demanded it.
We have said that the European self-image requires an "inferior"
to which it relates as "superior." The idea of progress helps to explain
to Europeans in what way they are superior. They believe, and are
able to make others believe, that since they represent the most "pro-
gressive" force at any given moment, they are most human, therefore
best; others in the world represent varying degrees of inferiority.
This characteristic of the European utamaroho is already observable
in archaic Europe. In comparing the Romans with other peoples,
Aristides claimed not only that they are greater than their contem-
poraries but that they are greater than anything which preceded
t IJem. "Hence the inferiority of those who lived in former times
appears because the past is so much surpassed, not only in the ele-
ment at the head of the empire, but also in cases where identical
grnttps have hccn ruled hy others and by you lRome]."!1
Whlll:! a 1rnrtk11lal' kine!of "lmprov<•ment" may be es~ent ial to tl1C'
ol p1ogn•s:1,t•lll11olo~lc·ally,1111,,,
1111·11 IIIs nf tl1<'·l•:ur11pt•a1111/<1111uro/10,
HII c•q1111lly ,14p1•1I 111llw hl1•11I:, 11H',1 ,sw11ptlo11 1l1.111111·
1,lg11'lw,111t
494 YURUGU
present is properly better than and superior to the past. The way the
idea is put firmly into the service of European cultural imperialism is
that the superior "present" becomes something more than merely
what is occurring (or exists) now. What is "progressive" or "modern"
is the proper form or model for what ought to exist in the present.
Therefore, existent forms that do not conform to the "progressive"
(modern or European) model are not part of the "present"-they are
"outdated" and "backward." In this way, the culture, in the vernacu-
lar of European cultural nationalism, is made to be superior not only
to what precedes it-as does its own past-but also to coexistent
"unprogressive" cultures. In other words, the idea of progress pro-
vides a scale on which to weigh and by which to compare people via
their cultures (their group creations).
The European utamaroho requires a self-image of not merely
superiority but supremacy, and the "idea of progress" makes
Europeans supreme among humans. It is superiority placed into the
dimension of lineal time and then the logic of lineal time placed into
a timeless dimension. Without the idea and this conceptual sleight of
hand, cultures would merely be different; European culture would
merely be intensely and obsessively rational; with the assumption of
the idea of progress Europe becomes "better." In the ways indicated,
then, the idea of progress supports the expansionism and supremism
inherent in the European utamaroho.
J. B. Bury's description of this idea firmly supports the point
being made. He discusses the way in which certain ideas prevalent
in and before the Middle Ages set the stage for and were conducive
to the emergence of the idea of progress, even though the ascen-
dency of the idea could not be complete until the "idea of
Providence," which characterized the Middle Ages, lost hold. Bury
demonstrates how the idea of progress supports the European uta-
maroho; the way it functions in a similar manner to the rhetorical
Christian ethic; and its compatibility with European imperialist ide-
ology. Using an interpretation based on the concept of asili, his obser-
vations provide evidence of the meaning and uses of "universalism"
and the objective of a "world order" in the context of European cul-
tural imperialism. (See Chap. 10.) For Bury the conception of tlw .i..
"whole inhabited world as unity and totality,'' like the "imperial t·he•
ory of Rome," are themselves signs of progress and essential lngn·
clients or what later crystallized as tbe "idea of progress." Using I lw
c01wept of osi/i, and an i\frlcnn-c<'nlcred IJ<•rsp1.:ctiv1·,
tlwy ar<· sll{11H
of s11111ctliln~ 1·ls1•.
If Wt' 11',I' 1111•
('l)ll( !'pl qf ""'' Ill lttl1•1 pr-t•IIIH .ti ltl1•,1•·
"l'I 111111•11!1
that Bury discusses, we will understand that it marks the develop-

ment of an important aspect of the European utamaroho. With
Alexander this utamaroho gains recognition in the political philoso-
phy of European nationalism. Remember always that "nationalism" in
this sense connotes the commitment to a particular cultural definition
and ideology, not necessarily the isolation or limitation of group defin-
tion. In this way, European particularism becomes expressed as cul-
tural imperialist/expansionism, because of the nature of the culture's
asW. The "Ecumene" is the European empire. Plato had already pro-
vided the design for the European state, but the vision of this state
as world empire would come later.
The Inevitability of "Progress"

The idea of progress is a "philosophy of change" and as such
tends to support any innovation, anything new. Wherever this force
leads is by definition "good"; whereas in the context of other world-
views what could be defined as "progressive" activity depends on a
concretized goal. The idea of progress transforms what is merely
change into directed movement. Participants in European culture
perceive change in this way. Continually influenced by the images of
technology, they are provided with directive signposts and the stan-
dard that gives order to otherwise directionless motion. Technology
provides the model of efficiency, a model that more perfectly than any
Imaginable concurs with the "philosophy of change"-for, in the
E11ropean view, there is no end to efficiency either. No matter how
('Hectively a machine may perform, its function can always be made
more effective, thereby creating a new and better machine. Progress
Is in this way "proven," and Europeans can be said to "advance" as
technology "advances." It does not matter that there is nothing
1,,wards which they advance. Their innovations all seem to contribute
lo greater order in their society-at least a certain kind of order. The
1 alionalization of their culture (in the Weberian sense) gives them the
l111prcssionthat they have organized their lives more efficiently. This
klncl of organization is proof of "progress," just as their machines are.
'rukc,11together, this means that they are smart and getting smarter-
I 111·best and getting better. To the European self progress is obvi-
1111sly,nore than an iclea.
Wlw11te<.:l111ology dominates In this way, it is the ''inexorable
cl1lv1··•10 for power nnd control cllaractcrizing the F:uropcan 11t"-
111,111iho lllill l:4 tcl1i1lly ( oinpl1·nw11ttid; h11l f.1m,pe:111s 1tnchJrsta11d
1
1111It 11,11111!' lo 111•Ill!' 11,1l1111•of 11llhlllllf\ll l>Pll1g~,,\IHI lht.·n•forc tlu•y

p1nl1•1 I 1111•. ,11tlt1ul1•1111l111111' wrnltl, I 1·, d11111l1111tl11~ II
496 YURUGU
The idea of progress had an irresistible attraction for Europeans;

it was, after all, created out of their own sentiment, their utamaroho.
It corresponded to their utamawazo and comprised part of the con-
quering mood. But it was technological efficiency that "clinched it"-
that provided tangible evidence of material gain and accomplishment.
Technological success gave Europeans the illusion of an objectively
("universally") valid criterion by which to judge their progress. If
power over others is the ultimate and ever-present goal, and clearly
technological superiority brings this kind of power, then the progress
ideology that assumes lineality (change) must certainly be right. The
African cyclical view of sacred time is characterized by Beard as "the
belief in the vicious cycle" and has certainly led to "powerlessness"
(or so goes the European argument).
The themes of European culture and ideology complement one
another and converge in this way until "progress" becomes a cultural
fact imbedded in the asili. The more particularized and hardened it
becomes in the European experience, the more housed this fact must
be in the language of "universalism." Europeans are not like "the rest
of us"; their goals and ideals do not seem to work for them unless they
can be conceived as universal goals. The idea of progress is nothing
if it is not projected as having universal significance, otherwise it
does not work. It must be an implicit statement of value, explicitly
stated as a "neutral" fact. As with other aspects of the ideological
matrix, progress cannot be acknowledged as value-based, because
the "scientific" (highest value) must be valueless. Statements, dog-
mas, positions, European "choices" can then be imposed upon the
tastes of others. European predilections, tendencies, perspectives,
become that which is "proper" for all. The idea of progress pervades
the European intellect-the European consciousness, as well as the
European moral sense. And all who succumb to it are duped by the
"magic" by which a chosen way simultaneously becomes "inevitable''
change and a European goal becomes "the human goal."
The idea of progress accomplishes all this, so that when some
one who describes himself or herself as a "racialist" talks about tlw
"importance of race in civilization," 11 he or she is merely maklnl-(
sense of the "facts." Once "progress" becomes ideology, one(' ll ,.
becomes incorporated into the presupposed matter of culture, tlwt 1•
is no way out. It is inextricably bound to European tcch11ology, t111d
the technical obsession is the white man's creed; j11st as is tlw id1•,1
of power over "nonwhitc•s." Wayne Macleod (tlw ''rnrlnlist") Is q11ll1•
right wh1•11l1t• points lo 1111• wc11k11ess 111 J\shh•y Mo11l:\H11's111gu111e·11h
1
Mo11l111(11,11•ptc•s1•qt111!!I l11•"(•11ll~l1t,•1wd" lllw1 ,,I po•,lt 11111/,111{1t«•r.
that technical "advances" are due to "accidental factors." Montagu

says that
cultures differ from one another .. .in the kind of development they
have realized. This does not mean that any culture .. .is... incapable
of realizing or achieving the same degree of development as any
other culture, but merely that most cultures have not had the same
or similar opportunities to do so, and largely for that reason differ
culturally from one another. 13
Montagu's "apology" for "primitive" cultures assumes the

European concept of progress. Cultural "development" depends not
so much on "opportunity" as it does on world view. This is what the
"Idea of Progress" precludes: the viability of other world-views. But
changes are not due merely to "conditions." They occur in greater
numbers where they are encouraged, even mandated, by a culture
that lives for them and by them. The possibility that European-style
progress could be rejected does not occur to Montagu any more than
it does to Macleod. To the European mind there is no such possibil-
ity. "Enlightened liberal" and "racialist" alike, both have uncon-
sciously universalized the particular. Both think that they are
"progressive." For both, progress is a given in experience and
assumed to be everywhere. The idea of progress is inherently racial-
ist. Once it is accepted, the "progressive" person must always be
identified as Euro-Caucasian.
The Critique of European "Progress"

The ideology of progress indicates a cultural phenomenon that
functions as something more than an idea among ideas. As an ideol-
ogy it becomes a frame of reference, a substratum from which other
concepts are created and by which they are judged. It is a permanent
criterion of suitability. Progress as ideology refers to the European
way of life. It determines much of what is meaningful to them and
what is not; what is ethical and what is not. Henry Skolimowski puts
it this way:
The idea of the fulfillment on earth has in time become institution-

alized and known as the pursuit of progress, which in its turn has
lwconw the clriving force of the whole civilization and a justification
of a [,(real variety of purst1lts and aspirations of man. Indeed, it has
lw1.:omr an ovvrridl11J1, prlrwlpk with tlw force of a moral lmperalive
••xp111~1wd Otw 't11tl$l
h1 11111· 1'11111111r1111h111'11t: 1101 ht• a1:,1alns1
prtl)/,l'l''ll-l 11
498 YURUGU
In this view, the idea, though initially metaphysical-religious,

becomes "pragmatic, empiricist, scientific, exploitative and elitist" in
the elaboration of European culture. 14
The function of the absolute and abstract in the European expe-
rience is the movement from utamawazo to determinants of behav-
ior, to real choices; the relation between what Lovejoy calls the "other
worldly" to the "this-worldly." The function of the idea is quite prac-
tical. Its abstractness is forgotten-unnecessary once it has been
assimilated. Its total meaning becomes linked with the scientific-tech-
nical and the power relationships their development suggests.
Science represents something pristine to the European mind,
supposedly untouched by cultural predilection. Once progress had
been identified with scientific knowledge the character of its present
uses were inevitable.
Frances Bacon proclaimed the pursuit of scientific knowledge as
being somehow beyond moral judgment. This is an ideological act.
Science became morally self-justifying, indeed, "morality" itself. The
ideology of progress makes this possible. The "mad scientist" of the
European nightmare fantasy is simply "acting out" zealous loyalty to
the Baconian-Western creed. Descartes, who became fanatically com-
mitted to this creed, took on the task of contributing an "invulnera-
ble" method to the edifice that was being constructed. One must also
note the intensity with which he worked at severing "mind" from
"body" in the Meditations. All such epistemological manipulations
contributed to the success of the progress of ideology and the sci-
entific world-view. And both the "Baconian attitude" and Cartesian
epistemology were intensifications and developments of possibilities
already present in the germinating matrix (asi/1) of the culture.
In Skolimowski's view, "forces which significantly contributed to
the formation of our concept of progress" are "the crusading spirit of
medieval Christianity," "the white man's mission," "the expansive
restlessness of the white man," and his "acquisitive instinct." 15
Skolimowski believes, however, that it is its "interplay" with science
that has a "profound influence" on the European world-view and 011
"our [European] ultimate ideal of progress." And so, this relation-
ship-between science and progress-must be examined. The idea
of progress in its properly European context leads inevitably to Liu'
technical order. And, in Skolimoski's view, it is tile comhi11At·ionortlw
8aconia11 influence with that of the Encydopcdist$ that earn(' to clc.•tt·r·
mine r.11rop<''s sricntilk world-view. I le>skillfully illus I rntt•~; I Ill' w11y
Ill wl1lcll tlw rullurc, OIH.'.L' llnvllll,l "C'llo:;1 •11" till• p,1tlt ot "sdc•111ltlc·
pt opt c",s" 1 cu ii lill ll'S ..' n "c I 10! ,s1•"I !IC'ld11i1:-.
,111d I lwrn hh ( lelc•11l11g1t1"1)
by which it will be influenced; i.e., those who are, indeed, compatible

with that path. This is what we mean by "Europeanness," the nature
of which is defined by the asili of the culture. Various ideas may be
produced from within European culture, but only those that are sup-
portive of the utamaroho and do not contradict the asili will survive
and will be ultimately determinative. Skolimowski says,
Did Einstein have a decisive influence in changing our notion of

common sense and in reconceptualizing the physical universe that
science explores? We are told that in this respect the lesson of
Einstein has not yet been fully digested. Quite so. It thus seems as
if in spite of his genius, and in spite of the shattering novelty of his
ideas, Einstein was pretty irrelevant for our civilization, which is
bent on a certain course of progress. For once again, how did he
change the course of this civilization? ... Einstein's influence on cul-
ture and civilization at large was negligible because his concept of
science and his particular advancement of science did not parallel
the general idiom of progress. For this reason we have selected
from Einstein's science some parts of it, which are relevant to our
pursuit of progress ... and ignored other parts of it. 16
All ideologies must state choice in terms of necessity; what has

been ideologically created in terms of what is given. The functioning
of culture as a synthetic whole requires the commitment of people,
and that commitment requires the conviction that one way of life is
right for them, as opposed to having been chosen by them-even
I hough they mean precisely the same thing. But only in the context
of the European utamaroho does it become necessary to create a cat-
l'gory of thought and action (scientific progress) that is said to be
void of ideology and belief. Because it is the imposition of that belief
I hat becomes paramount. By dehumanizing science, Europeans have
~ought to place themselves above others who are not "scientific."
Europeans have convinced themselves that the character of their life
and culture is not a result of ideological choice, but rather one of uni-
wrsal human needs met by the principles of science. And
Skolirnowski correctly points out that the idea of "need for inven-
111111"should be viewed as a "nnrmative or ideological component of
l I1c.•,1,1 of invention." Yet in European culture it is a phrase or idea
11sl'd tn impress others with the inevitability of European-style devel-
11p1nL•111 "l)ifferent ideologies deh'ne tlw need for invention in differing
//Ju}1.,.'' 17Yel tile ideology of pro!,(rPss Is i11lwrc·ntly inip<'rialistic and
1·,1111101acl1111t of IIH••;11 111lw, posslbllil IL'S. ·
flow It. 1111'1·11111•1·pl 11l"111111lt•1111ty" ltsl'll rt•l,1l1•dto IIH• ''nill11~
idc·11l111:v"•11I 11
1111'W1°1f'I "l 11ow1 'l', 111 I 11111lil11,,t11111 with .. ,1 lr•tttl ,111"
500 YURUGU
acts to encourage the use of the term "modern." "Modern" is, indeed,
so much identified with "Western" that it is difficult to see how it can
be useful as a tool of analysis or description. In so far as it means any-
thing other than "that which presently exists," it has been tied to
European technology and the way of life that accompanies it. Even the
term "contemporary" connotes for Europeans a quality possessed
by the most advanced evolutionary stage and level of progress. The
critique of progress too often identifies "modern man," as the culprit.
The identification of European with "modern," whether "good" or
"bad," leads away from, rather than towards, meaningful alternatives.
Again, it assumes a universal line and the inevitability of European
"progress."
Skolimowski views the momentum of European culture from a
perspective other than that of the "ruling ideology":
It is interesting to observe that in the past relatively simple tech-

nologies led to splendid and lasting results whereas, in the present,
complex and intricate technologies lead to shoddy results ... the
overall balance increasingly shows the progressive trivialization of
our lives through increasingly sophisticated technologies.
In summing up, the story of the inventions of a given society or civ-

ilization is intricately woven with the values and social ideals, pro-
foundly influenced by the idea of material progress, have made us
favor, if not worship, one kind of invention, namely, the mechani-
cal invention, which is the tool of increasing efficiency acting on
physical nature. It is egocentric and megalomaniac on our part to
view inventions of other cultures through the telescope of our cul-
ture.18
It is the particular kind of tyranny of the ideology of progress (its

universalization and unidirectional character), in combination with
the overwhelming success of Europeans ("the conquerors") that
makes the argument all the more plausible-in spite of its inaccu-
racy-that "European forms are universal." The process of the "mech-
anization of the cosmos" 19 has displayed development along a
consistent theme. The Platonic emphasis, while not on the mechan-
ical tool, mandated the use of "objectification" as the essential "tool"
of conceptual rationalism. The etiological and ontological relati011
ship between "objectification" ancl "mechanization" is iniporta11t.
lnU-·nsf'objectification is a prcrcquisil<-' for the despirit11aliz:1tiul\ nl
IIH· 1111ivN~r,nntl l11rougl1 it tlw l-:urnpc.•n11"world" wns 111Mlt'r1·t11lv
lrn (•v••1l1wH•a:,lnJ.(111,1tc·11nl!z,,tf1111
Pluto pn•1>t)1ctl l•:11t11p1•
Im 1•,t<P!-1
111,1 p,11tlc11l11rt1h·1·.tloi1; p,1v1•d ll11 w,1y 101 tlJ1•
,,lvri dt•v, l111i1111•1•t
influence of Frances Bacon and for commitment to the idea of

progress in its material emphasis. The ideology of progress is indeed
a part of Europe's "rational heritage."
Skolimowski says that to the "believers," progress "signifies suc-
ceeding stages in the amelioration of the human condition," but in his
view, "The metaphysics of progress is based on an exploitative and
parasitic form of philosophy. Progress has been a cover-up for
Western man's follies in manipulating the external world." 20 He out-
lines his conclusions regarding "the Legacy of Progress":
(I) We have better medical care. (I) We have destroyed other cultures.
We have eliminated We have either treated
contagious diseases and them as barbarian or savage
altogether cope better with and therefore unimportant, or
illness. we brought them our technology,
thereby disrupting their ways
of life without giving them our
standard of living.
(2) We live longer. (2) We have depleted natural resources

We have reduced infant We have heedlessly exploited
mortality and expanded the the resources of the entire world
individual life. as if they were infinite or easily
replenishable.
(3) We live better. (3) We have caused ecological imbalances.

We have a higher standard Our superior scientific under-
of living; we live much standing did not prevent us
more comfortably, we eat from radically misreading the
better, we dress better. behavior of Nature.
1) We travel faster, we
( 1 (4) We have created unhealthy,
rommunicate faster. if not insane ways of life.
We have more access to We have disengaged the
I hlngs: planes, cars, books, inctlvidual from the variety
t t•c•orcls, reproductions. of interactions with nature and
other people in which he was
ni'lturally engaging in former ways
of 11r.. 20
.502 YURUGU
These are what Skolimowski refers to as the "ambiguous bless-

ings" of progress. (He is writing in 1974 and obviously had no knowl-
edge of the AIDSvirus.) Skolimowski continues,
It is a mistake to think that. .. science and technology are universal,

rational and externally valid forms which can be mixed with differ-
ent contents. We have made of science and technology the kind of
instrument our civilization required for its pursuit of progress; as
a result we evolved Western (not universal) science and Western
technology, both being a part of our acquisitive, conquering, mate-
rialistic ideology. 21
Of course, Skolimowski's "we" is a European "we," and as the

rest of us know, the political dominance of Europe has allowed for the
cultural dominance of Europe. When Europeans speak of "culture"
they assume that "technology" means mechanical technology. But
cultures have many kinds of "tools," and a people's ideas and spirit
are part of their "technology." Superior mechanical technology has
led to political superiority, and it is therefore definitive in the
European ideology of progress. This is because of the nature of the
asili: the will-to-power.
For Michael Bradley, "Progress as we have institutionalized it
and as caucasoids understand it, is a symptom of undisplaced aggres-
sion resulting from psychosexual maladaptation .... "22 He views the
Eurocaucasians as suffering from an extreme case of the "Cronos
Complex," in which technology and progress are used as "future-lim-
iting" mechanisms, assuring Europeans that they will control and
"conquer" the future. Ironically, it is through the European concept
of progress and an anti-human, mechanistic worship of technology
that their future becomes "unknown" and oppressive; indeed it con-
trols them.
European "progress" has been made at the expense of the qual-
ity of human existence. Where is the progress toward greater spiri-
tuality, toward human understanding, toward tolerance, toward a11
appreciation of diversity and plurality, away from aggression'!
Obviously European "reason" has not performed well in these arC'a:;,
because the template of the European asili does not include a 111odt•I
for the development of humanity, only of its negation, of tech11olni.tl
cal efficiency and of greater capital gain: the tools of power. I 111111,111
oriented mechanisms conflict with the driving power force'. Soclulls111,
till' <.loscst thing 10 a humanistic paraclii:{mwitlil11tlw l•:11111rwi\11frr1
dltlo11, has t,1kt•11tlw shape ol another 1111•(·lt,111ls11<111dc·, In 1111'lilt·
nloHy 111 l:,1~lc Ill E111op1•,\11s l>c-v1•l11p1tll'ttl'i
l11 1:,1-.i.•1111.111111w,
beginning with the "collapse" of the Berlin Wall in 1990,attest to the

spiritual inadequacy of European socialism. It is yet another materi-
alist conception and therefore cannot compete with, in fact must ulti-
mately succumb to, the superior materialism of capitalist ideology.
The effects of "progress" in Bradley's view are that now,
"Resource wastage and environmental pollution can cripple the
future's ability to surpass the achievements of the present controlling
lifetime. They are conscious attacks on the future in the interests of
present identity-assertion." 23 So that the arrogance of Europeans
causes them to even be destructive of their own future. "Progress,"
says Bradley, "is vindication of all the crises which threaten our sur-
vival. It is the materialist conception of hope itself." 24
Utamawazo, Utamaroho, and "Progress"

Via the idea of progress it is possible to see how the ontological
and epistemological definitions of a culture translate into its ideo-
logical (value and behavioral) aspects. The assumptions of cause
(especially Aristotle's "Final Cause"), of lineality, and the sense of
telos in the European utamawazo, as well as the dependence on
abstraction, are all the necessary conceptual ingredients of progress
ideology. Its assimilation depends on the mental habits encouraged
by these forms of thought. Its acceptance as a predominant molder
of group activity is dependent on a frame of mind already or simul-
taneously conditioned by lineal codification and causalist episte-
mology. Phenomena must relate to one another within a lineally
defined whole, where "causes" precede "effects," and growth implies
the incorporation and surpassing of that which has come before in a
way that precludes repetition. "Progress" does not recur; it is tri-
11rnphover past. The need for and feeling of "triumph" is an essential
Ingredient of the idea of progress. In this view, life is a continuous
struggle, based on competition, and meaning is derived from "win-
ning." Hidden behind the so-called universalism and humanism of
Ilie concept are the exigencies of an utamaroho that feeds on subju-
gal ion-surpassing, conquering, winning. "Progress" means "we are
winning"; "we have triumphed over!" The enemy is vaguely felt, not
conceived, to be "everything else out there," not only nature, but
ol her people, other ways, ideas, forces, beings. The enemy against
wliit:h Lile European competes is everything he or she is not. The
ldt•it Involves continual movement bet:ausc the enemy is never totally
,11t,ch11•1I. "Slit'" s<'1•k!I.lo r'lose the gap, "a11d Wt! must stay ahead of
1111 "l'mi,:11"i', b ,:/avf11µ11/lc 111t! it Is "d1•ft•n1't11g"
tlw pH•Af•11t.
( '0111, ,11y I" wl 1.11I :111
np1•1111phtl<l',Ophy pt oil-· s111:, I1·1wll,rn,t lie·
504 YURUGU
conceptions of European thought respond to European aesthetic and

emotional needs, to the needs of the utamaroho; not to a purified
"reason." The idea of progress evokes positive sensations from the
European self. This is what Lovejoy refers to as "metaphysical
pathos." 25 William James talks about the feeling of "absoluteness" in
much the same way. 26 The idea of progress achieves this "sensation"
by seeming to both create history and to stand "outside" of the his-
tory which it creates. Here again the power-need of the European uta-
maroho is being fulfilled. It achieves a unique combination of the
illusion of "unchanging-change" thereby providing a dynamic princi-
ple (energy source), while at the same time satisfying a sense of the
eternal.
The assumption of lineal time is an ontological prerequisite to
the idea of progress. Evolutionary development, an ingredient of the
idea, necessitates that points be connected; this is the conceptual
function of "the line." The written medium is the medium of the line,
and it is evidence to the European mind of progress because words
accumulate. In this way "more" becomes "better."
Progress is an argument for the discarding of the past. Yet evo-
lutionism, its sibling idea, involves a strange kind of incorporation.
Evolution requires the perception of reality as the continual devel-
opment of a single entity-a single being. Yet while the form is evolv-
ing, its essence is being defined. Progress makes "garbage" of the
past. It is for this sense of denial, as necessary technological change
(as "progress"), that Eric Havelock argues. He characterizes the "pre-
Platonic," "nonliterate," "nonhistorical" oral medium of "Homeric"
Greece in the following manner:
The confusion between past and present time guarantees that the
past is slowly but continuously contaminated with present as folk-
ways slowly change. The living memory preserves what is neces-
sary for present life. It slowly discards what has become wholly
irrelevant. Yet it prefers to remodel rather than discard. New infor-
mation and new experience are continually grafted on to inherited
models. 27
For Havelock, literacy is the new technology; it reµrcsc11ts •

progress and struggles against the oral sense. It discards the pa~l.
The concept of "newness"-value in progress ideolo~y-d0Ps11't
n1can "uew" in the sense that a baby is new. It means "dHfNc~11t"fm111
that which has heen se<'n before; wher<•c.1s l11tlw African vfPw t·v.-1 y
1u·wliorn IMhy ls the tl11wlt•ssn•c-reathu1 nf tlw li11111Hll 111p111g11•,,
ld1:11lttl!Y,wt1,II pn•• 1•d1•!.e1111111'lltlf' I-; 11lw,1y•1dl'~l111Vt'd .i11d d1·11l«•d
Europeans "represent the sequence of time as a line going to the

infinite." 28 That is a description of the idea of progress. Uniform and
undisturbed flow of time can only be imagined as a line. If other con-
cepts of time are admitted as plausible or operative, the ideology of
progress doesn't work. In order for it to work, what must be assumed
is a single, infinite, and infinitely divisible time.
In Dorothy Lee's words, the line "underlies our [European] aes-
thetic apprehension of the given," 29 and progress is the "meaningful
sequence" for Europeans. A people who are not progressive "go
nowhere." The idea of progress "makes sense" because Europeans
think in terms of "climactic historical sequence." 30 They are con-
cerned not with events themselves but with their place within a
related series of events. 31 As the idea of purpose permeates European
life, so the idea of progress gives the impression of purpose in change.
There has been very little critical work done on the idea of
progress; it is so essential to the Eurocentric idea. In 1931, J. D. Bury
devoted an entire book to the discussion of The Idea of Progress, but
his Eurocentric assumptions prevented him from being able to clar-
ify the distinctive "Europeanness" of the concept. Bury's discussion
lacks philosophical depth; he says,
This idea means that civilization has moved, is moving, and will
move in a desirable direction. But in order to judge that we are
moving in a desirable direction we should have to know precisely
what the destination is. To the minds of most people the desirable
outcome of human development would be a condition of society in
which all the inhabitants would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. 32
It is certainly tautological to say that people desire happiness

und to define happiness as that which people desire. This does not
p111 content into the European view of the desirable, which the idea
nf progress certainly does. Its peculiarly European flavor is the cru-
t·ial element in "progress"; for certainly if happiness were really
l l1ought to be something that other cultures had long ago achieved-
progress or "movement" would be of no consequence. The issue goes
dt·t:pt>r, for who is to say that human beings are "moving" towards
Hllyllling? Bury does not question the fact of movement in lineal time.
11••makes this assumption because European culture oppresses one
wll I 1 k11owleclgcthat is most certainly becoming more and more some-
tlilnp,.
~,uy ho1yslhnt nhst.u.:lcs to lhc development of this idea were
11111 ov,·,-c-01111· tlu·
1111111 slxt1•1't1lh n•11t111y.:nI wn11ldp11t it diffen.>ntly:
l'llt• 111'( t'·l~.. 11y I 11w1ltlv1•.t,tll'lt111•~ 11.,d11lr1•,1dyl,1•1•11 sl'I Ill 111ntlo11 ht
506 YURUGU
the archaic West in which a subsequent ideological synthesis could

take place. The germs of the idea had been planted and some of its
ideological functions were already in operation. Sixteenth-century
Europe embraced the idea as a fully-matured concept, because it was
also in the process of embracing an individualistic, accumulative,
technocratic ethic in the form of materialistic capitalism.
Protestantism supported this tendency just as the ideology of
progress did. These aspects of European culture reinforced one
another, became identified with one another, and grew together;
because they were all generated by a common cultural seed (asi!t).
Their combined momentum in the sixteenth century merely repre-
sented the final unbridled commitment to rational forms. The seeds
or germs of all of them are to be found at whichever point there are
enough uniquely combined traits to be identified as "European cul-
ture." This is the manifestation of the asili.
The distinguishable periods in European history are ethnologi-
cally a matter of difference in emphasis, intensity, and stage of devel-
opment. At one point cognitive structures (utamawazo) and
tendencies (utamaroho) exist; at another hardened and definitive cul-
tural facts are present that inescapably shape the forms within which
people live. But it is not until the appearance of men like Francis
Bacon in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that "sci-
ence" triumphed and with it the idea of progress became the unchal-
lenged cultural philosophy of the West. The significance of the
Baconian attitude was the formal demise of the tension (albeit inef-
fective) between European arrogance and the European sense of the
supernatural. The scientific pursuit became "religion" and Europeans
were no longer embarrassed by their own lack of humility.
It is, of course, with the European "Enlightenment" that the idec\
becomes full-fledged, respectable ideology. Robin Williams puts ii
euphemistically:
In the form in which it had been molded by the Enlightenment,

progress was conceived as the beneficent unfolding of man's capac-
ities for reason and goodness .... 34
From an African perspective, the idea represents the unfoldln1-!

of the European's capacity for unscrupulous imperialism an<I
exploitation of others: It is the supreme rationale. Within the cult w 14,
rationalistic epistemology would he totally irlcntificd with rallc111alh
t le culture; I h~ marriage argued for in Plat nnlsm wo11Tcllw fi1w11y·c•1111
s11111111HtPrl.Wllll,rn1sc·o11th111c•s,
By the late nineteenth century, the concept had been largely assim-
ilated to the values of a complex and expanding industrial order.
Progress could now become a slogan to defend the course of tech-
nological innovation and economic rationalization and concentra-
tion.34
But the ideology of progress defends much more than that, it

becomes a more attractive and sophisticated packaging for the ugly,
raw European utamaroho. Nietzsche enthusiastically embraces the
spirit of the idea via his commitment to the ideology of "power" and
his accurate interpretation of the power drive as the essential domi-
nating force within European culture. "Life itself," he says, "I regard
as instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for
power: where the will to power is wanting there is decline." 35 In
Nietzsche's words it is possible to find an accurate reflection of the
European utamaroho. In a very real sense, his work is a "mirror" for
the European.
An Ideology of Imperialism
It is "progress" in its absolutist definition and ideological func-
tion that explains to Europeans why it is their duty to exploit, con-
quer, and control Africans and others who are different from them.
IL is an ideology of supremacy, a well-constructed mythology of supe-
riority. The point is that the rationale for an oppressive technical
order, the rational ordering of the universe and the endeavor to dom-
l11ate,oppress, and destroy majority peoples, unite in a single ideo-
logical concept, the European ideology of progress.
Long before the idea of progress was part of the language of
l·'.uropean social theory, Christian ideology was providing the justifi-
l'alion for European imperialism and its accompanying white
•aipremism (see Chaps. I and II). Roger Shinn agrees:" ... the idea of
progress is a secularization of the biblical view of history." 36 And
Rltclnhold Niebuhr says of the European Renaissance: "Its concept of
lilslory as a meaningful process, moving towards the realization of
lilglJer and higher possibilities, is derived from Biblical Christian
1 s,·hatology."
37 Christianity and "progress" became bedfellow ide-
' ,Joglt•sas the scienfitic world-view slowly superceded the supremacy

111, c•lil-{ionas the dominant mode of sanction. Together Christianity
111ulllw i<l<:ologyof progre~-s now provide the mythological concep-
tlo11:, ..111clsymbolic systems that provide ideological support for
1:11101u•audo11tlua11r1•. llotlt ldcnln~l\'.S nrt.• Inherently lrnpcrlallslk,
1'111•111qw1L,lhllc· cltlvc· IH•c·n1.rn•s"rnot,il" In llw 1·011t1•lftof lltl'lW
ltlylltnluHll"I l'l11•v•1y1111l11llr1•l•'llt'opt'IUl', ;,~. "1111111,111
IH•ltll(!" 111111
tl',
508 YURUGU
"civilizers"; while the rest of us become only "potentially human"-

"heathen" and "primitive." After using either Christianism or the ide-
ology of progress to transform people of other cultures into
"savages," Europeans can make themselves "morally" responsible for
their "welfare," e.g., imperial control and rape.
The ideology of progress allowed Europeans to speak with
impunity of "uncivilized" and "superior" races in the nineteenth cen-
tury and later allowed them to speak of "developed," "advanced,"
and "modern" nations. Europeans have no resources of their own,
but, in their view, they have the "expertise" and the "drive" that
allows them to make "proper use" of the resources of others.
Colonialism and neocolonialism in Africa, South African apartheid,
white dominance in Zimbabwe, American treatment of Native
Americans, Jewish settlers on the Gaza strip, the existence of ''Israel"
in the land of Palestinians, are all part of one culture, one movement,
one ideology that expresses the attitude, "This place was nothing
before we came here." The ideology of progress vindicates this
European attitude towards our resources and our political integrity.
Euro-Caucasians the world over can never honestly condemn white
control in South Africa, since to them the whites have brought
"progress." Even Marxian theory understands colonialism as having
helped to "progress" Africans from feudalism to capitalism; necessary
lineal progression towards eventual communist revolution. Here
again we have the assumption of the European utamawazo. But while
for Marx "progress" stops with the achievement of the communist
state, the ideology of progress says that "progress" is never totally
"possessed"; it is a never-ending process. 38
"Civilization" and "progress" are synonymous in this ideology;
both are supposed blessings of the European. While Europeans "civ-
ilize" us, they also bring "god," to us. For us to want to be civilized,
to want to find "god," is to want to "progress" toward being white. We
accept the ideology that supports our exploitation. We participate in
our own oppression.
Myths are a crucial aspect of self-determination and devdup
ment. But they are culture-bound. African myths must explain t, 1
African people why and how we are a great people. When majorll,v
peoples accept the mythology of European progress, we are accepl
ing a system of myths and symbols that explain us negatively. This IM
because no single concept represents the asili of European c,t!t un• 11:.
fundamentally as the idea of progress. It is fundamental lwc·au~t• ol
lls i<knlogiral strength.
Tht• pmgress ldrolo~ lms 1)1•1•11<·1111tl1111,dl,v
vlklhlt· like•;1 lli1<•11tl
connecting the various aspects of European culture throughout our

discussion. It performs an essential function by helping to give coher-
ence to European forms. In this sense it has a special connection to
the asili of the culture. We have seen that the ideology of progress jus-
tifies the pattern of European behavior towards others and that it is
instrumental in the creation of both the European self-image and the
dialectically opposed image of others, which combine to make that
pattern of behavior possible. The ideology of progress is born out of
the European utamaroho that seeks and thrives on the power rela-
tionship. It provides the definition of superior and inferior beings
that the utamaroho demands. We have also seen that conceptualiza-
tion of this ideology assumes the cognitive structures of the European
11tamawazo.It is abstract, absolutist, oppositional, and lineal. It is
based on the alienation, devaluation, and control of nature. It pre-
supposes the objectification, despiritualization, and materialization
of reality. It is the secularized statement of the Christian mythology
of saving the world. It thereby is used to justify contemporary
American imperialism. Finally, the ideology of progress imparts
"respectability" to European xenophobia and aggression.
In the final analysis, European progress brings economic profit
and political and cultural power. Since this is obviously the case, the
question becomes, Why should Africans and other majority peoples
embrace the European ideology of progress? Europeans have been
Hble to convince us that we are in a "race." We enter the race some-
how not realizing that by its very definition, its locus of control, and
I he nature of its organization, we can never win. We are losers even
hefore we start: Since the rules are defined by those who need our
resources in order to win. We are afraid to remain distant-to refuse
the terms defined by our enemies. We are afraid to organize our own
"race" in which we set the goals. We never question the degree to
which European "progress" carries with it the accoutrements of cap-
italist-Christian Europeanism. We assume that the decadence of
1•:mope (its crime-filled, drug-laden cities in which, because of spiri-
1t tfll retardation, disintegrated families, and the negative images pro-
ll11ced by a capitalist media, alienated children are forced into
pt ostitution) is a natural by-product of "progress." Africans colonized
111America are told that ''progress" tor them means buying-in to the
A111t•ricansystem. "13lackAmericans must be a part of the great tech-
nological rcvol11tion In order to advance" (Ronald Reagan, Tuskegee
( '011vol'nl 1011,M;iy l 0, nl8't). Hut our hope lies ln those critical, yo,mg
1\11lt-n11s wltu ltnv4' I Ill' lntt•lligcmr~ 1111d<TNlivlty to nsk I 11(:'
African
C[llf"lll1111.
t\dvmH'4' luwnrds what'/
510 YURUGU
The reality is that given the European asili the ideology of

progress is a powerful ideological construct. It works. But it works for
Europeans. It brings them power. It justifies their existence as
European and provides momentum and direction for their cultural
lives and group behavior. It helps them to shape the world in their
image. The ideology of progress not only functions for Europeans, but
part of its success lies in its ability to seduce "the rest of us," so that
we validate our own oppression. We accept its universal applicabil-
ity, not realizing that its success as an ideology of imperialism is
totally dependent on the syntax of "universalism." If we can reject the
validity of that syntax, then we can rob it of its power as a tool of
European imperialism. The ideology of progress is a European cul-
tural-political tour-de-force; the syntax of universalism is its hand-
maiden.
Power is the ability to define reality and have other people
respond to your definition as if it were their own. " 1
- Wade Nobles
Chapter 10
Universalism:
The Syntax of Cultural
Imperialism
The Tradition
As Europeans present their culture to the world, they do so con-
sistently in universalistic terms. This representation takes the form
of a relentless command to universalize. It is our purpose to criti-
cally examine the nature of this "universal" that so dominates
European rhetoric, using the concept of asili to demonstrate the way
in which it functions to support and proselytize European ideology.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to call attention to the most
subtle and ideologically effective manifestation of European cultural
Imperialism: the use of the semantics of "universalism" by European
social theorists and "liberal" ideologues. But first let us briefly reca-
pitulate and enumerate some of the ways the "universal" manifests
Itself in those patterns of European culture already discussed.
In terms of the European utamawazo, it is the "Platonic
Abstraction" that represents the universal. It is the nature of the
Platonic "forms" that they represent the "whole" and not the "part."
The struggle towards and search for the universal is, for the
t•:uropeans, a movement towards the ontologically and epistemolog-
Jc;tlly independent. Mircea Eliade has said that it is "sacred space"
I lial becomes the "center of the world" for "religious man" and
llll'rl'l)y orients him in the universe; i.e., creates cosmos from chaos. 2
l·:111opcans, we could say arc essentially "nonreligious." They there-
1011 lwco1nc enn,cshe(I in ..i maze of ontological relativity, lacking a
"1 c•ntn" of snrri,d SfHtl'l' Th· S('rtt('ll for "tile 1inlversal" Is a primary
111111:,1 In IIH'h ,1ttc•111pttut 11•n1·c·
urdt•r, 111l>1•c-rn111•rt·11t1•n•d, and lo
512 YURUGU
find their place in the universe.

The "whole" for Plato represents "being" (value and the possi-
bility of knowledge); the "part" or partial is mere "becoming" and
meaningless by itself, i.e., dependent. It is the nature of the "rational"
that it is associated with universal characteristics. The "particular,"
therefore, becomes the "irrational" and is associated with mere "opin-
ion." Continuing in the same syntactical mode, but in terms of the ide-
ology of progress, as people become more "rational," they become
more "universal." "Culture" is associated with the particular-with
opinion and with the irrational. "Civilization" becomes the "univer-
sally" valid and adaptable cultural form created by rational human
beings. It represents knowledge and, therefore, progress. All of this
is the European's attempt to make order out of chaos. It is the
European utamawazo.
The related Platonic dichotomies of reason/emotion, knowl-
edge/opinion, the whole and the part are involved in the logic of all
European value distinctions, and the "universal" and the "particular"
(extensions of these) are the "good" and "bad" of European ideology.
Nationalism is particularism and, therefore, represents nonvalue in
terms of European mental categories. And just as it became necessary
for Europeans to represent their culture by the term "civilization," it
became necessary to represent their expressions of nationalism as
internationalism as well; i.e., their interest as the interest of all peo-
ple. (The small minority speaking for the overwhelming majority of
the world.) This imparts additional value to their cultural commit-
ments in terms of their own system of values, but it also does mucl1
more-it acts to support their goals interculturally.
By camoflaging European political interest as universal human
goals, Europeans disarm the victims of their imperialism. Culturally
inspired flames of resistance to European aggression are extinguished
by a sea of universalistic rhetoric. ("We are seeking the good of
humankind, while you are acting merely to further the ends of a nar
rowly defined nationalism.") The circle is, indeed, a vicious one, £or
the more successfully European culture is imposed on majority cul
tures, the more convincing becomes the rhetoric, until we, rlrst
World "intellectuals"(European-trained), struggle also to reprnSl'lll
not our own, but the "universal-humanitarian" interest, wl1irh, ul
course, has already been defined in terms of European value. (Y/t· frnd
it "unintelligent" to talk in terms of "Race.")
An example of how this works <.:anh~ clemonst1at<·clby a1·11111
111011contt:'mporary us• of tlw E11ropl't1ll v:1l11c<llrl10\0111yof ,ilr:.tr,11t
l'OIH n•lt' (II.id)
(µ,111,tl) 11111! Allh,111 (lllllrlq 1·hlldrt·11, II 1-l i,.11t1,,111
Universalism: The Syntax of Cultural Imperialism 513
severely handicapped in that they tend to think only in concrete

terms and are generally "unable" to think "abstractly." An unfortunate
reaction among people of African descent is to seek to prove that
African (black) children can think just as abstractly as white chil-
dren. But they are jumping the gun, for the following questions have
not been asked: What does it mean to think abstractly? What value
does it have, if in fact people do think "abstractly"?" What does it
mean in terms of the interest of the white society? When the charge
is made one could conceivably ask: What kind of abstraction? If
European values are assumed, then one has no choice but to become
as "European" as they, for they are most certainly "best."
There is only one way to break the hold, and that is to be able to
recognize the phenomenon of European cultural imperalism, no mat-
ter what form it takes. This recognition can be facilitated by a critical
examination of the concepts that are used to "package" it. Its disguises
range from so-called universal religion to "objective scholarship"; from
the abstractions of progress, science, and knowledge to the pseudoal-
truistic goals of "humanitarianism," "internationalism" and "world
peace." Our objective is to make the subtle manifestations of European
cultural nationalism more easily discernible.
The early Christian formulation exemplifies the function of
[uropean "imperialism." While it is projected as a "world religion,"
fashioned for the salvation of all people regardless of their cultural
origins, it is in fact interpreted as a mandate for the spread of
European culture and European control. It preempts other religious
formulations in terms of the syntax of European ideology, because
they are nationally or culturally defined; while the Christian state-
111cntsupposedly has universal significance. And yet, of course, the
reality is that Christian ideology is clearly defined in terms of the
E11ropean nationalistic endeavor; that is, in terms of European polit-
lC'al interest. Simultaneously, as Europeans march throughout the
world "saving souls," the numbers of those who accept the rhetoric
111their ideology are increasing. Christianity is a "superior" religion
Iit•rause it is "universal"; the indigenous religions of the would-be
1·1111verts are "Inferior" because they are nationalistic and "culture-
l1u11ncl." I lence European nationdlism goes unrecognized while it
11prw1rlsand destroys. That is the function of the "universal" in terms
of l•:uropcan cultural imperialism. The monotheistic statement cor-
rt''ll H 11,elstot he ohj<•ctivc of universal control--of monolithic control
wit llll I I 11· W( St ~ncl of farropean <'Ontrot throu~hout th,· wurld. If
1
t l11·n•1:-011ly 011t• ~!ntl lo olwy h•I It IH' I lw Christ l1111"(;od" of thl' West;
I•·. till• ElllOl)t',\11 lll11lt1t'ILM11i'1ntl1t'ls1111·0111·1•pt11,dly al•u
ro11fo1111:-.
514 YURUGU
to the normative structures of the utamawazo, characterized as well

by the universal imperative. Its political purpose, however, is to dis-
credit other national gods and thereby other nations.
Several African-centered theorists have drawn attention to the
way in which the European statement of the standard of a "universal
art" serves to impose its aesthetic judgements on African and other
majority artistic expression. 3 (See Chap. 3 of this work.) This use of
the universal in the cause of European nationalism is classic; it dis-
plays a pattern repeated over and over again, so that the imposition
of all facets of the value-system is facilitated. It is becoming more and
more obvious that to neutralize the effect of the universalistic
rhetoric one need merely reject "the universal" as a viable goal,
thereby eliminating the force of the rhetoric of European ideology.
Understanding the nature of the European asili enables us to
explain the various modes of European thought and behavior as issu-
ing from the generative core of the culture. Universalism then
becomes one of the themes that contributes to the creation of a cohe-
sive and well-constructed whole. That entity is in this case a culture
able to project itself consistently as superior to others and yet nor-
mative for them. The need for such a relationship to other cultures
is within the European asili; within its cultural germ. Universalism,
then, becomes part of the natural unfolding of the asili.
All manifestations of the universal in the culture find their ori-
gin in the character of the utamaroho. Europeans use universalistic
terms to describe themselves; they are "modern man," "civilized
man," and "universal man." It is above all the nature of their uta-
maroho that they project themselves onto the world. They are world
saviors and world conquerors; they are world peace-makers. Qn 1991,
the stated objective of European Americans was to save the world
from the "mad man," Saddam Hussein.) They give religion and culture
("civilization") to the world. In this view, their national and cultural
creations are those that are best for all people.
It is ultimately the European obsession with unlimited "power
over other" that brings universalism into their conceptions. This
desire for and definition of power can be found at the base of all of
their cultural creations. "Power" for them is not force or energy; it Is
control. The origins of the universal in the European utamawazo an•
precisely the same. Obsessive nationalism represents, for I lit•
European mind, the ability to control the universe. By this proc1•s:i
lli\;! unknown becomes known; the disordered bN·o,11e~ orll1 1 rt 1<l
Nnlhlng Is "unknow,,hlc." Till' t111lv1•rsnl rP111•s11 1d~ ln<l1•pt'IHlt•1u·1
(tl,,11 wllkll !'orttrnl.s). wl1i11•llw p11rlk11llll' tt·p1t•1H•11t11
tltt' d1•111'1Hlc111I
(that which is controlled). Let us see how this characteristic of the

utamaroho, manifested as the theme of universalism, works in terms
of liberal ideology; and how the rhetoric of "disinterest" serves the
interests of the intellectual expression of European nationalism.
The "Myth of Objectivity" and the Uses of Scientism

An aspect of the contemporary discussion of theoretical anthro-
pology and sociology concerns itself with the question of "objectiv-
ity" in the social sciences. European social scientists have found
themselves confronted with the question of the epistemological valid-
ity of their own methodology and rhetoric; a question, to a large
degree, forced upon them by the growing strength of First World self-
determinists. In the United States this critique grew out of the radi-
cal political movement of students of African descent that initiated in
the South in the early 1960s. As this movement matured the students
began to question the nature of the Euro-American establishment,
including the orthodox left, and its formal and informal decision-mak-
ing process. Their activism consciously exposed the hypocritical
nature of Euro-American politics and pointed to the covert U.S.
agenda with regard to the exploitation of African people. The move-
ment grew to college campuses across the country where black stu-
dents called for "black studies" to be added to their college curricula.
White students, inspired by this uncompromising confrontation with
"the system," began to expose the covert connections between U.S.
imperialists and U.S. academia.
The work of the Frankfurt School, the fairly recent area of "the
sociology of knowledge," the social responsibilities symposium in
Current Anthropology (1964), the series of related "crises" in the ranks
of the American Anthropological Association, and documentation of
I he political nature and objectives of most of European social
research abroad have all contributed to the realization of the mythi-
c·al 11ature of the "politically detached" social scientist whose work is
"rree of value-judgement." By no means has the "lie" been exposed,
but there is at least enough recognition of the political nature of
l<uiopean social theory that it is becoming more and more difficult for
,;ndal scientists, or anyone else for that matter, to make claims of
"ohJ<'ctivity." How does the scientific view and the myth of objectiv-
lly function to further the iTltercsts of European imperialism?
0111· of I Ile rrwl11ini;til utional forres facilitating I h<>survival nnd

•1pn•i1dof 1111 • v11h11•,lrt •t • my IIt w,1s 11
s 11sd11hlt>SS In 111id11t 11lnin~both
1111•1•11l1t111lm1 ;1u<ililt• ,111l111lcilllY ol llll' 11111(11•111
1111lv1·l'illy, 111~c•11
,.,,,1,
,111dl111•111•w1•1•11111,11 dl:H·lpll111°,,It, p,11111111,11
,1 IP111·,· 1
516 YURUGU
We must go much further than Alvin Gouldner does in the above

statement. The main cultural force that dictated the creation of the
myth and supported its continuance was the fact that it provided
pseudoscientific support for the imposition of European ideology.
There has always been a voice-sometimes barely audible-of
African (black) social scientists who have pointed to the
Eurocentricism in European social theory. They have experienced
its ideological strangulation and its inability to accurately reflect the
African experience. They have realized that approaching our people
as objects has allowed European social scientists to immobilize us
and to exploit us. European social science has not helped us to under-
stand who we are. John Gwaltney 5 attempts to lift the "veil of objec-
tivity" and calls for the contribution of "indigenous analysis" to the
formulation of theory. 6 In other words, perspective is important. As
William Willis7 reminds us, "White rule with its color inequality is the
context in which anthropology originated and flourished, and this
context has shaped the development of anthropology." Again,
Africans are the "objects" both empirically and politically. The ideo-
logical connection is clear.
In his article "Objectivity in Anthropology," Jacques Maquet
describes the "existential situation" of the anthropologist in colonial
Africa in the belief that it is a factor that must be taken into consid-
eration if one is to correctly interpret the anthropologist's conclu-
sions about the area he studies. This emphasis is important because
it is diametrically opposed to the stance of European social theory in
which theorists strive to "eliminate" themselves-their own particu-
lar circumstance-from their analysis. Maquet says that "an unfon~-
seen consequence of the decolonization process is to throw doubl
upon the scientific character of anthropology," 8 because from the
perspective of the victim of European colonialism, it is clear that
anthropology generally represents a European perspective. This con
flicts with the European definition of "science," which does not admit
of perspective, therefore calling into question the status of anthro
pology as a science.
It leads as well to the questioning of the "scientific character" of
any information gathering and its subsequent interpretation. M::icpwl
concludes that subjectivity is encountered throughoutti 1e"s<:lcntlf11
process." He attempts to redefine the concept of "objectivity"
Conventionally, in kPcping with Platonic epistemology, It me,1111"ro11
fonnity wit 11the objf-'ct" and indt•penclencc from t Ile ~~1b]l l'I. Hut,
0
iinyi;, Maqtwl, "llw ,·011!(•111of k11owlccl!,{1• Is 1wv<•t i111tll1•lyl11tlc•p,1t

0
d1•11l,111111111II 111tlw lf",lilt of tlw 111t•t•tl11~ of 1)11•s1il1J1

1
< I ,llld th,
Universalism: The Syntax of Cultural Imperialism
object." 9 This, he says, is true of "scientific knowlege" generally, for

there is always the possibility of different perspectives. Maquet sug-
gests therefore that the only requisite for "objectivity" be that one's
observations and conclusions are partly determined by the object;
elimination of the subject is not necessary.
The implications of Maquet's proposed redefinition are radical in
the context of the European utamawazo. A change that the phenome-
nologists have been attempting to effect for over a century. It would
mean a complete break from the epistemology that is based on the
idea and methodology of "objectification," on which the total separa-
tion of "subject" and "object"-of the "knower" from the "known"-is
predicated. Ultimately the implications of a radical change in the def-
inition of knowledge or "what it means to know" are not only a change
in epistemological methodology, but a change in the European con-
ception of the self, with corresponding changes in the conception of
"other" and behavior towards others as well. If the traditional mode
of European science-"objectification"-loses its position of primacy
on their scale of values, the redefinition of the culture itself theoreti-
cally becomes possible. But the utamaroho will not allow such a
change. Any other conception would be inconsistent with the asili.
The culture would be in basic conflict and therefore cease to function:
It would not "fit" its members. Change would have to occur at the
most fundamental level; the level of the asili. We are talking about
destruction. My suspicion is that neither Maquet nor the phenome-
nologists are ready for anything that drastic.
European thought is locked into an utamawazo in which "sci-
ence" plays a normative role. But there are questions to be answered:
Why does science dominate? And why is science defined
Eurocentrically? The ascendancy of science corresponds to other
European characteristics and values. It supports a particualr kind of
1nonolith, the assurance of a particular kind of order, and behavior
,tnd development in a desired direction. These seem to have been
Plato's "reasons." But what the illusion of objectification and the dom-
inance of the scientific mode also succeed in doing is to allow
Europeans to conceal their nationalistiic objectives; e.g., their per-
'iJ1ective. Scientism is science as ideology. It occurs when science
11\'comes morality itself and, therefore, is above moral considera-
tloJ1s.
Maqlwl b; not wlllin~ to rellnquisli the dichotomy between sub-
w,~1nnd objrr1 I h:u lrnpllcs t lwlr lnclcp<'nocncc nf one :mother, even
tl1ci11~l1his hlt•11c,f tlwlr "111t't'l!t11-!''
might in1ply ii pnrth1I joining.
518 YURUGU
The object in its independence from the subject influences the

knowledge that the subject has of it, even if the subject has an indi-
vidual and social situation which limits his possibilities of percep-
tion and thus partly determines his knowlege. 9
It is possible that the concept of "object" as something isolated

and distinct is damaging rather than helpful. It seems to prevent or
inhibit thought without its use; that is, it might be the case that once
the concept becomes hardened in the mind, it determines all thought.
If the activity of "thinking" were believed to involve feeling rather
than being opposed to it, then it would be more like "experiencing"
something than distinguishing oneself from it. "Knowing" and "under-
standing" then become more humanly and existentially meaningful
than what has been meant by "scientific knowledge"- defined
Eurocentrically (something we are finding more and more inade-
quate). In Karl Mannheim's words,
Just as pure logical analysis has severed individual thought from its
group situation, so it also separated thought from action. It did this
on the tacit assumption that those inherent connections which
always exist in reality between thought on the one hand, and group
activity on the other, are either insignificant for "correct" thinking
or can be detached from these foundations without any resultant
difficulties. But the fact that one ignores something by no means
puts an end to its existence. Nor can anyone who has not first given
himself wholeheartedly to the exact observation of the wealth of
forms in which men think they decide a priori whether this sever-
ance from the social situation and context of activity is always real-
izable. Nor indeed can it be determined offhand that such a
complete dichotomy is fully desirable precisely in the interest of
objective, factual knowledge. 10
Maquet makes "objectivity" possible ifwe take all the perspec

tives into consideration, a difficult, if not impossible feat. 9 The prob
lem of "object" still presents itself, as long as the European conccpl
of objectivity is maintained. The studies that Maquet suggests woulcl
themselves be plagued by the same difficulties that he has so per
ceptively pointed out in the article. Karl Mannheim says,
... the examination of the object is 1101· an isolated act: ii I ak1'f,

place in a context which Is coloured by values nnd collc<'liv<. .. u11crn1
scio11s,volitional impulses. In the social scil>1wcsii Is till'{ 11111'111•1·
l1wl intl•n•sl, oriented 111n 111at1lxor 1·olli•1·1lv1· ,itllvlly, wlil1It
p1 ovl<lt•.;1,101oiilv 11w ).(1·1 I111111w <'•11w1Pt•• llyp111lw
l1111s,
l!'r,11<1111\/'il
•1t:•11111""'"•" ·Ii ,111tltlw 1111111~11111111!11.J
lrn 1!11•tHclt 11111(1111•>.111
rience. Only as we succeed in bringing into the area of conscious

and explicit observation the various points of departure and of
approach to the facts which are current in scientific as well as pop-
ular discussion, can we hope ... to control the unconscious moti-
vations and presuppositions which ... have brought these modes of
thought into existence. A new type of objectivity in the social sci-
ences is attainable not through the exclusion of evaluations but
through the critical awareness and control of them. 11
The danger here is that one becomes committed to the creation

of a super-rational human being; a person who gains independence
from (i.e., control over) even her epistemological presuppositions. In
this view the Platonic conception is not rejected; it is "improved
upon." Having found subjectivity (the ''person" as irrationality) to
have crept into the epistemological methodology of objectification,
the goal becomes that of recognizing and controlling this subjective
element. This view has very different implications from one that
rejects rationality and control as "valued" modes of understanding.
Relying to a degree on Piaget's theory of the development of
cognition, Jiirgen Habermas argues for the "decentration of an ego-
centric understanding of the world." 12 It is as though we must mature
intellectually and emotionally, learning to separate the "objective"
and "social" worlds from the "subjective" world. In this way we can
move towards "communicative rationality," which is necessary for a
rationally conducted life. And even though this rationality may take
a "lifetime" to discern, Habermas is insistent that this be the human
objective. 13 He does not reject the vision of rationality, but clings to
It, even as he attempts to redefine its meaning. It seems he cannot
reject the Platonic model, even while he recognizes its flaws.
I labermas has not escaped the European utamaroho and therefore
needs a universal standard of thought and behavior, which he is con-
vinced will achieve commonality as a basis for moral action. He
1:1Uemptsto circumvent the particularistic aspects of the Western
conception of rationality, because of its emphasis on the "cognitive-
Instrumental." 14 His solution is to discover a more "universal" under-
sta11ding. Even the most critical Western theorists move towards
1111lvcrsalismand rationalism. "Universality" has, within the context
oft h _.European utamawazo, been the most significant ingredient of
"ohjr~ctivlly." It is the myth of scientific objectivity that allows
l·'.uropenns to s1wak for -ti!orus. Let us see how the E>arllerscientists
lnt<'nrh cl t-:11ropc•i1n
sol'lfll srlc1wc to he usf'd.
520 YURUGU
Claude Henride Saint-Simon

Maquet concludes that social phenomena differ from physical
phenomena in that social phenomena may have several meanings
and that their meanings are rarely obvious. The meaning of social
phenomena can only be ascertained by interpretation; interpretation
necessarily brings the personal into the process of social knowledge.
And the question arises: Who is the interpreter? His or her perspec-
tive is important, and subjectivity comes into play. Factual general-
izations synthesize, then, magnify the subjectivity. 15The point is that
social phenomena must be considered specially and differently.
Human beings are special.
Claude Henride Saint-Simon didn't see it that way, and it is his
distinction to have played a decisive role in the conception and def-
inition of sociology-the academic "father" of anthropology. In his
view it is the purpose of the social sciences to apply the "scientific
method" of the natural sciences to the study of social phenomena,
thereby achieving "truth" and "objective knowledge" with regard to
the nature of the social. In Saint-Simon's words,
Every science, of whatever kind, is nothing but a series of prob-

lems to resolve, of questions to analyse, and they do not differ from
each other except in the nature of these questions. Thus the method
applicable to some of them should be applicable to all, for the very
reason that it is applicable to some of them; for this method is an
instrument entirely independent of the objects to which it applies and
changes nothing in their nature. Moreover, it is from the application
of this method that every science derives its certainty: by this it
becomes positive, and ceases to be a conjectural science; and thil:i
only happens after centuries of vagueness, error and uncertain-
ties.16 [Italics added.]
Aside from the questionable methaphysical assumptio111,

implied in Saint-Simon's thought, the question is, Why was it so co111
pelling for Europeans to make social science "positive?" Saint-Sh111111
answers:
Hitherto, the method of the sciences of observation llas not bct•11

introduced into political questions; every man has imported hh
point of view, method of reasoning and judgi11g,and hence I lien, h
not yet any precision in the answers, or universality ln the rcs11lh
The ti111ehas come when this infancy of the scl<!nrc-should c,•n:w,
and Cl'I tainly it is d('Sirahlc il should C('i\St', 101 tllt'·l1t111blcu; 111 lltt
soc·l.11 nnlc•t arls,· frn111 ol1s1·11rlli<•s 111p11lllk,tl lltt•111y 11 jll.1111,
,Hldl'rl I
One of the reasons for this compulsion is the European need to

make everything-all of the culture-every aspect of life, conform to
the rationalism of the European cognitive structure (utamawazo).
But it is not enough to say that this quest for universality is a psycho-
intellectual need, a compelling thought-form. It is more than that. It
has an ideological (i.e., cultural-political) objective. If there is any
doubt, Saint-Simon's writings make it quite clear.
He begins with the belief that by employing the "scientific
method" it will be possible to get rid of points of view, of perspective.
According to Maquet and Mannheim this is not the case. But if it is
accepted as true, then social scientists who employ the method can
have their ideological and nationalistic expression pass for "univer-
sal objective truth." Used properly this strategy became a formidable
cultural/political weapon.
As with Plato, Saint-Simon was no "ivory tower" theorist, con-
structing theoretical systems for mere intellectual gratification. Like
Plato, he was a man with a plan; a design for society. The "scientific
principles" ascertained as a result of applying the scientific method
to the phenomena of society would serve as guidelines for its reor-
ganization. It is in this context that the European claim to objectivity
and, therefore, universal validity must be understood. Saint-Simon is
not just a harmless social theorist struggling to fit social phenomena
into the European scientific tradition because of the "high valuation"
of science in the culture. "Science" in this sense is valued because it
can be used as a vehicle of ideological control.
Saint-Simon is a committed European nationalist, concerned
with "The Reorganization of the European Community." He wants to
build a European confederation that will unite its peoples by "uni-
formity of institutions, union of interests, conformity of principles, a
common ethic and a common education." 18 Saint-Simon is quite
human, and being so, his goals and objectives are no more universal
11orobjective than those of any other human being. They are instead
c-xpressions of culturally determined values; ideas of the European
self in relation to the "cultural other." They reflect the obsession with
power and dominance. In short, sociology is for him a vehicle of
European cultural nationalism. 19
John Stuart Mill

The.-objcc-liws or European cultural imperialism, Le., the uni-
vns;1I lmpnslt Inn of E11ropra11orcl(>r a11clldcoloi~y. rcqulrcci the con-
11•1111t·111t•fltof t I 11•~odul st'l<'nn•:-. Ill t hl' I radii Ion of Saint -Simoll,
111111HI
l•1111111cl.111lc• w1•11 letl1111illtc·d In lil1• f,1sk of h11p,11tl111:
111l11d!-l "ohjc•c
522 YURUGU
tivity" and "universality" to Western social science. John Stuart Mill

made an impressive contribution, and in his view,
The social science (which, by a convenient barbarism, has been

termed sociology) ... is a deductive science, not, indeed, after the
model of geometry, but after that of the more complex physical sci-
ences. It infers the law of each effect from the laws of causation on
which that effect depends, not however, from the law merely of
one cause, as in the geometrical method, but by considering all the
causes which conjunctly influence the effect and compounding
their laws with one another. Its method, in short, is the concrete
deductive method, that of which astronomy furnished the most
perfect, natural philosophy a somewhat less perfect, example, and
the employment of which, with the adaptations and precautions
required by the subject, is beginning to regenerate physiology. 20
For Mill the inability to predict human behavior has nothing to

do with a qualitative difference between the social and the natural or
the physical. His conclusion in this regard is not influenced by a
recognition of the human spirit, but is rather based on what he thinks
is a quantitative complexity of causal factors. 21 But the desire to pre-
dict and to control (the uncontrollable European need to order) com-
pels him to apply the "scientific method" to social phenomena. 22
And so on the level of theory, that is, superficially, sociology
becomes, at best, a collection of insignificant descriptive generaliza-
tions, which reflect and encourage a dehumanizing concept of human
nature, characteristic of the culture in which the discipline was cre-
ated. Its epistemological purpose is to give Europeans a feeling of
intellectual control that they do not have, in an area that they do not
understand. Something else is happening here. The ideology of
progress (while on seemingly sound footing when applied to till'
arena of technology), when viewed critically, reveals the ineptness of
Europeans in the social, psychological, moral and spiritual spheres
Europeans needed to be able to "prove" to themselves and othC'I'',
that they also represented the epitome of moral and social progrcs1.
It is for this reason that the edifice of European social science ww,
constructed. Most importantly this "social science" provides a wlil
de for the exportation of European ideology by giving Europeans Il 11·
"right" to speak for all people.
Emile Durkheim
TlH' pmrl·Ss hy wlllrh F,urupNlll mdal sl'lt·11<i' I:, lll,ulc· lo Ill'
tlvt·"·t:. ,1 ptm·•·'-S or st•lf dl'lt1sln11 Its ,Ill l1tt1•1f, 1,l111ply•1p1c-,1tl
"11hj1•1
misinformation. That's why it becomes clear that it is the practical

implications of this process that are its raison d'etre. It is not so much
that Plato, Saint-Simon, Mill, and countless others were convinced of
the truth of what they were saying in any imagined "absolute" sense
of that term; but rather that they were convinced of the form social
theory must take if it was to succeed. They were committed to, what
for them, was a "social truth." Emile Durkheim says that one corollary
of the "observation of social facts" is that "all preconceptions must
be eradicated." 23 It is doubtful that he believed that this was possi-
ble, even if desirable. He is consistently concerned that "sentiment"
"interferes," an inheritance from the Platonic reason/emotion value
dichotomy. Above all "objectification" allowed for the elimination of
"subjectivity:"
... the degree of objectivity of a sense perception is proportion-

ate to the degree of stability of its object; for objectivity depends
upon the existence of a constant and identical point of reference to
which the representation can be referred and which permits the
elimination of what is variable, and hence subjective, in it.24
"Social phenomena" (human relationships, human emotion, the

human spirit) can be treated as objects; as "things." And if not, then
let us pretend that they can be. That is the unspoken agreement made
by the architects of and adherents to the European social scientific
tradition. Durkheim continues,
... social phenomenona are things and ought to be treated as

things ... to treat phenomena as things is to treat them as data, and
these constitute the point of departure of science. Now, social phe-
nomena present this character incontestably.
We must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves as

distinct from the consciously formed representations of them in the
mind; we must study them objectively as external things ...
If this exteriority should prove to be only apparent, the advance of

science will bring the disillusionment and we shall see our con-
ception of social phenomena change, as it were, from the objective
to the subjective. But in any case, the solution cannot be antici-
pated; and even if we finally arrive at the result that social phe-
11n111e11a do not possess <1IIthe i11trinsk characteristics of the thing,
W(' Ollgltt firnt to tn•:-it th~lll ;rn if they hncl.~~
524 YURUGU
been a costly experiment, if that is how it is to be regarded. Did

Durkheim think that it would take place in a vacuum - a politically
isolated laboratory? We are presently in the midst of the great "dis-
illusionment"-forced to witness many of its destructive results.
The Political Function of "Objectivity"

A CaseStudy
The myth of objectivity and the use of the methodology of objec-
tification (scientism) is one aspect of universalism as an expression
of the European utamaroho and as a tool of Western cultural imperi-
alism. By offering an ethnographic example from contemporary Euro-
American society, I can demonstrate how this works.
In 1970, the African and African-American members of the
African Studies Association(ASA) challenged the work of the then
twelve-year-old organization as being "fundamentally invalid and ille-
gitimate." The ASA represented the American academic establish-
ment. Its members were mainly from the "socio-economic middle
stratum of the white colonial minority" just as Maquet describes the
"existential situation" of the European anthropologist abroad. 26 The
dissenters said that instead of furthering Euro-American interests in
Africa, "the study of African life should be undertaken from a Pan-
Africanist perspective." These Pan-Africanists acknowledged their
own perspective and wanted it, and their participation to influence
the ideological thrust of the activities and work of the ASA.In an arti-
cle entitled "Confrontation at Montreal," Professor John Henrik Clarke
said,
African peoples will no longer permit our people to be raped cul-

turally, economically, politically and intellectually merely to pro-
vide European scholars with intellectual status symbols of African
artifacts hanging in their living rooms and irrelevant and injurious
lectures in their classrooms ...
We suspect that this is a new area of academic colonialism and tl1a1

it is not unrelated to the neocolonialism that is attempting Io
reenslave Africa by controlling the minds of African people."• 7
The group argued that scholarship was indeed polili(al In II',

conclusions and uses. They stated their perspective and ldcol11f(lt•ol
commitments openly and said that the political Interest of I lit· Alrlr1u1
1woples should dct<>rii1lncthe chnract er ol Mrh·,111sl ttdh•s. 'l'III' Ht1111p
n-jc•c•l(•dllw offc·r of tok •n n•p1cst•11l1tllo11111,1<!1• hy ASA,:111d1111dc•r ll1t
1
hul~r •,hip c',t .l1il111l h•11r1lc ( 'l,11lw, J,111H''>'111111111,('11111••
I )11w11,11ltl
and others, the African Heritage Studies Association split irrevocably

with the ASA.
Now let us look briefly at the method of counterargument used
by their opponents. In an article entitled "Politics and Scholarship"
published in the ASAjournal, African Studies Review, Benjamin Nimer
begins patronizingly by saying that "two good goals are in collision
in African studies in the United States-the fostering of certain black
interests and the untrammeled pursuit of scholarship." 28 The word
"certain" is a signpost signaling the limitations of the Pan-African
position; while scholarship represents the "universal" and therefore
that which is valued. This meant that the Pan-Africanists were oppos-
ing "scholarship"-an indefensible position. Like "science" and
"progress" or "truth," scholarship is something no one wants to tam-
per with. Who among us, after all, wants to interfere with the "pursuit
of science"--or with the course of "progress" on which it takes us. We
are encouraged to perceive these to be universal pursuits-not "par-
ticular" or "parochial" like Pan-African self-determination. There is no
question in Nimer's mind as to who will survive the "collision."
Nimer continues: "untrammeled scholarly inquiry is recognized
as rational inquiry in pursuit of truth; and very few people are in prin-
ciple against the pursuit of truth."
Of course not, because "the pursuit of truth" is nothing but a
meaningless abstraction; a rhetorical phrase used to cloud issues, not
clarify them. Nimer's article is riddled with these kinds of abstrac-
tions-which, interestingly enough, are designed to appeal to the
emotions of his audience [the "metaphysical pathos" (Lovejoy) of
the European tradition], while pretending to appeal to reason only.
By using these terms he succeeds in erecting a wall of rhetorical dis-
interest, designed to disarm the avowed African nationalist who is
admittedly politically and ideologically motivated. But the demysti-
fication of the syntax of universalism can prevent us from being intim-
idated by s1,1chterms. We must demand that the writer concretize his
abstractions and put meaningful content into them. What exactly is
"untrammeled scholarship?" Whose truth? Certainly Nimer would not
accept Fanon's definition of truth.
Truth is the property of the national cause .... Truth is that which
hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which
promotes the emergencE' of the nation; it is all that protects the
natives, and ruins the foreigners. 29
Nlnu•r silYfi I lt.ll t I 1c'n11l for African control "can be ... construed
.i:i 11111111d,.. ,trnl>l1•itli'ilni; to j11t;tl1't' nncl thl' i111pla11tatlo11
1Hlvo<·11tll11(
526 YURUGU
not of truth rationally arrived at, but of dogma." 30 He cannot quarrel

with the quest of African Americans for "justice" without embarrass-
ing his own community of liberal academics, but he can condemn
their method of pursuing it. His own method assures that his argu-
ment is not "dogmatic." This position is a familiar echo from the days
of the Southern Student Movement of the 60s.
Basically, Nimer is concerned that he and others like him might
lose their access to Africa- and their control of the character of
African studies. But his argument cannot be stated in terms of a
parochial interest, it would lose all of its force. He must argue in terms
of "universalism." He must claim his concern to be that African stud-
ies continue to represent "truth rationally arrived at" (which means
"you must play by our rules"). The position of the Pan-Africanists
doesn't have the hypocritical bent characteristic of European
rhetoric; they are concerned that African Studies represent an African
perspective, and they say so.
The values of European ideology are discernible in Nimer's argu-
ment, once we have become adept at recognizing them through the
use of the asili concept. He says that some people argue that politi-
cal or social objectives should be primary and that although those
espousing this position are often considered to represent "radical"
political interests, they can be called "reactionaries" because if suc-
cessful, "they would take men back to the time before they attained
the level of civilization which entails respect for a disciplined search
for rational truth." 28
The entire force of the Western European world-view-the pre-
suppositions of the European utamawazo, as well as the themes of
European ideology- are behind this statement. The trick is to deal
with it in just that way, as though it represented nothing more than
European commitment, as opposed to the "universality" on which
the force and success of Nimer's argument depends. It is the politi•
cal effect of the objectivity argument that is of paramount impor-
tance. And this is the reason Nimer insists that in spite of the fact that
"objective truth" may be unattainable, it is still a standard to be S<!I.
Nimer's argument proceeds this way: (1) If the notion of truth 111-1:,
practical meaning and (2) if "scholarship" is the "search for ratio11al
truth," then (3) "untrammeled scholarly inquiry" is necessary for 1111'
good of society. (It is unnecessary to say that this means schol,11ly
inquiry untrammeled by Pan-Afric~nism). His argument co1tlllllll'S 111
a wry Platonic vein: The good of society is (a) "j11stln·'' fn, ,di It·
11H•nibt·rs nnd (Ii) Cliltiv;1tlonof h\lllli\11c•x<··ll •11(.'t'; tl1i•1dwc•
from the standpoint of the good society whose politics consists of

such an ordering of human relations as will maximize the cultiva-
tion of human excellence, untrammeled scholarship is politically
good. [Nimer's italics. ]31
With this view of the good society, "scholarship" cannot be sub-

ordinated to other goals. "Scholarship is good in and of itself" -a goal
to which we can aspire. It is a basis for judgment. "It is for this reason
that scholarship should be autonomous from political action in our
present world." 32 (Scientism at its best!) In other words, scholarship,
like religion, is unquestioned, and so its methodology becomes ide-
ology. Nimer is really saying: How dare these Africans question our
authority?
"Failures," says Nimer, "are individual failures." 32 But the point
made by the African dissenters was that the ideological commitment
and cultural environment of the Western European scholar in Africa
has, indeed, been responsible for specific kinds of failures; most prob-
ably those which, from Nimer's perspective, would not be recognized
as such. The essential thrust of Nimer's statement is counter to that
of Jacques Maquet and Kathleen Gough Aberle. Macquet insists on
the relevance of the anthropologist's "existential situation," while
Aberle points to the fact that:
Anthropologists were of higher social status than their informants;

they were usually of the dominant race, and ... were protected by
imperial law .... 33
Of course, it is, in one sense, the "individual" who fails, but the
µcrspective of the individual is most certainly influenced by her cul-
ture. And while others may come to realize that ideas are culturally
mediated, Nimer must hold fast to the belief that certain epistemo-
logical methodologies ensure "purity" and guarantee that scholar-
ship is not contaminated by group interest. He must similarly avoid
the concrete and stick to the abstractions that merely indicate the
!'>yntax of European argument. His article is a good example of I I
l~uropean cultural imperialism as manifested in the rubric of
European scholarship. The tacit pivotal issues in Nimer's argument
r,111be st·atecl in terms of objectivity (good) vs. subjectivity (bad);
l11<1fviclualism(good) vs. nationalism (bad), where individualism is
lru11lc;:dlylnrnsformcd into universalism. Stanley Diamond, in speak-
Ing ol llw "obJ<>1·tlflrnlion" of n1I1urnl rl'latlvism, hns stnted this
p1m·c•:,:,111tl'v1•1~w: "p.irtklpntlon l11 nll ,·111l111l'~•.•• Is S( lt•11tlfkc1lly
1 d a•: «'lflllVi1h•11I
J11•:tllH to p,11tklp11ll111111111oi1c·
,1.1,iII w1·mov«·Mot111tl
528 YURUGU
the circle in the other direction, "individualism" is understood to rep-

resent the lack of specific group interest and therefore to represent
the interest of all people. This is a fallacy predicated on mistaken
assumptions, but it is habitually used to project European commit-
ment as universal disinterest.
This example demonstrates the way in which the myth of "objec-
tive" scholarship allows Europeans to claim universality, which, in
turn, represents "the good" syntactically in terms of their values and
their epistemology. In addition, "objective" scholarship serves to
camoflage the proselytization of their own nationalistic interests. It
also allows us to see concretely how the Platonic use of the method-
ology of "objectification" still works, these many centuries hence.
Once we have understood the nature of the European asili, i.e., as the
facade of scientistic argumentation disintegrates under scrutiny,
European nationalism will be exposed.
The illusion of objectification in social science facilitates the
creation and encouragement of whatever social order to which the
theorist is committed. The Platonic epistemology was one aspect.
Once his epistemological definitions were accepted as being eter-
nally and universally correct, then the Republic-which corre-
sponded to them and which was their material and ideological
embodiment-had also to be accepted. Through the efforts of Saint-
Simon and others, by which the illusion of objectification was made
part of the definition of a nascent social science, European ideology,
European cultural forms, and European value could be projected as
having universal validity. With this realization, arguments that
demonstrate the nonvalidity of the methodology of objectification
become ammunition in the battle against the objectives of European
nationalism. Put simply, in the context of European ideology, "objec-
tification" becomes a means of claiming universality where there is
none. European cultural imperialism is therefore an inherent part of
European scientism.
Implications of European Internationalism

Another expression of the expansionist European utamarohn,
the need to dominate, and the theme of universalism in the c-ulturl·
has been in the form of the push toward international organlzat 1011
These are not the only implications that Internationalism ra11 hi1v1·
but we om illustrate some characteristic instances of Europr,11111111•1
nat ionallsm and rntse lite issue of what I hf' Eurn1w,~11 lr1t1•r p11•t,1tf1111
or111IPrll/11lot1i\lls111I1:IS nwant. espt1clally Will'II l11td1•1sl 1111(1ItI I111111'1
nf tlw cll,u·:i111 r of 1111•l•:111n111•n11
11//1111wn/1r1 'l'lw 11111r1pl nl 11,1/1
Universalism: The Syntax of Cultural Imperialism 52.9
insists that we interpret European ideas and behavior in terms of the

intense drive for power. Conversely, the power drive is found to be
the determinative core of the culture, since all of its forms generate
European power.
Western internationalism is not new; it was part of what has
been called the Roman vision. Aristides describes it this way:
Homer said, "Earth common of all," and you have made it come
true. You have measured and recorded the land of the entire civi-
lized world; you have spanned the rivers with all kind of bridges and
hewn highways through the mountains and filled the barren
stretches with posting stations; you have accustomed all areas to
a settled and orderly way of life.35
Aristides does not say it was only through the contact with the
African "Southern Cradle" (Diop) that Rome's nomadic northern
ancestors "settled" and "ordered" themselves. That is partly because
he defines "order" as "Roman control."
It is worthwhile to look at a lengthy passage from J.B. Bury in
which he discusses the idea of the "ecumene" of Alexander and its rela-
tionship to the rationale for the building of the Roman empire. In Bury's
typically Eurocentric description, we see imperial conquest become
"universal brotherhood," imperialists become "saviors," and cultural
aggression become the attempt to unite the human race. But we are in
a position to interpret these behaviors from the vantage point of the
asili concept and therefore to recognize them as expressions of
European universalism: intolerance of difference, the need to control:
In the latter period of Greek history, which began with the con-
quests of Alexander the Great, there had emerged the conception
of the whole inhabited world as a unity and totality, the idea of the
whole human race as one. We may conveniently call it the ecu-
menical idea-the principle of the ecumene or inhabited world, as
opposed to the principle of polis or city. Promoted by the vast
extension of the geographical limits of the Greek world resulting
from Alexander's conquests, and by his policy of breaking down the
barriers between Greek and barbarian, the idea was reflected in
the Stoic doctrine that all men are brothers, and that a man's true
country is not his own particular city but the ecumene. It soon
became familiar, popularised by the most popular of later philoso-
phies of l ~re-ere;a11clj11sl as II hacl been implied in the imperial tlle-
ory nf Rnnw. '1'111•lclt·a nf till' Roman Empire, ilf: theoretical
j11~11fw,,1fo11, Ill' 11co1111n1111
111ff-(l1I Ol'<f•r, llw 1111l1tcatton
of mankind
w111 ld,1•111l11m
111,, ·,111)-!lt· 1111-1
p,1ll11\111oi ~(1111h111 Thi• t1•n11"Worl<I,"
111/m(f,•11,1111111),witl, It 1111111·111111H11•h
ll'lt' ln•,•ly 111•,1w,tlilt11,(
1111111
530 YURUGU
Empire, is more than a mere poetical or patriotic exaggeration; it

expresses the idea, the unrealised ideal of the Empire. There is a
stone from Halicarnassus in the British Museum, on which the idea
is formally expressed from another point of view. The inscription
is of the time of Augustus, and the Emperor is designated as "sav-
ior of the community of mankind." There we have the notion of the
human race apprehended as a whole, the ecumenical idea, impos-
ing upon Rome the task described by Virgil as regere imperior pop-
ulos, and more humanely by Pliny as the creation of a single
fatherland for all peoples of the world. 36
What sounds good in terms of European rhetoric ("Earth is

mother of all; fatherland for all the peoples of the world") is actually
an expression of the European world-projection of "self." It is a
response to the need to make the world habitable for Europeans; the
need to spread European order throughout the universe. The uta-
maroho dictates that Europeans must have unrestricted access to
the world. These are the things that Roman "internationalism" meant.
As it does for Pan Am Airlines, it meant "making the world comfort-
able for us," i.e., for Europeans, and, above all, making it more con-
venient. This concept links the ancient and contemporary West.
Macleod compares the reality of ancient Rome with the dream
of the contemporary internationalist:
What a grandiose age! If we could transpose ourselves back into

those times, and see the teeming harbours of the Mediterranean,
enriching the empire with an unbelievable quantity of goods; if we
could see the sophistication and pursuit of material well-being by the
respectable populace, and the resulting progress upon every land;
and the concern for peace, security and riches, all presided over by
an international government, Rome, that outlawed conflict, that fused
nation and nationalities into one human union; any modern rational
humanist would, without the least hesitation, conclude that there
was a period when mankind achieved nobility. Are these not the
same goals that our "humanist one-worlder" is advocating today? 37
MacLeod's comment is very significant. Writing from an avow<·1I

"racialist" perspective, he can see what the self-proclaimed llht•1 ti
cannot; for the latter is too often preoccupied with abstractions tl1.1I
tend to blur realities. The internationalism of the liberal Is concrct l1t·1I
in the achievement of the Roman Empire and in the aspimt Ions 1,f 1111
conlt'mporary F.uropl'an hegemony. It Is rcalizecl Ir) tlw rnonollllil
If t·vldL'lll'I' is IH'Nh•d of llw n·nl l•:ur 11wn11ohj1•rtiv1· n,\ 11111,"l1111·1
Olli' 11c•11d
111.1ll1111;1!1•,1r1," 1111lynhsc•, v1•till' pr1•'11•11I
11111Vl't1w11tlo 111111<1
,1
European conglomerate of twelve nations considered to be part of the

"European Community." This movement is clearly not based on a love
of humankind, but rather the pursuit of power. Europe wishes to speak
formally with "one voice." We are actually witnessing the atttempt at
the formulation of the European "empire." Referred to in an article by
Gene Hogberg 38 as the process of "Europeanization," the movement
seeks to break down barriers between the twelve European nations,
between European ethnicities, and to encourage the growth of a
European national consciousness. Ravanna Bey has ably chronicled
this process of European "supra nationalism." 39 The 1957 Treaty of
Rome was a major step in this process of consolidation, to which
amendments were made and approved in 1986 by the European
Communities Council of Ministers. The new legislation is called the
Single European Act. 40 Of economic significance is the European
Currency, a Monetary System, and the use of the European Currency
Unit. According to George Kourvetaris, ratification and implementa-
tion of the Single European Act and Final Act would replace the present
diverse population of Europe with "a mammoth state representing one
of the world's most extensive array of populations to fall under the
jurisdiction of a single governmental and legal system."/41
If successful this will merely be a formally institutionalized man-
ifestation of an already existing reality. Saint-Simon, like Plato before
him, has been vindicated. His vision has been realized. A European
national consciousness is not new. All of European history is the story
of the development and reaffirmation of that consciousness. This pre-
sent process of "Europeanization" means what the collective European
objective has always meant: The consolidation of power. This kind of
"internationalization'' is an expression of intense European nationalism;
all the more essential for Europe since Europeans and their descen-
dants actually represent only 10 percent of the world's population.
They, like their antecedent slavers before them, live in fear that
Africans and other majority peoples will one day speak with "one
voice."
Raymond Aron says, in critique of the progress ideology,
Traditional cultures were different, they were not unequal . ... It

requires the conjunction at once logical and contradictory, of pride
In technology and the egalitarian ideal for the universalistic design
of industrial civilization to divide the very humanity it tends to
l lll it~. 42 -
'('I wtt· Is no I uni 1111111 t ltlll fort I wn• I-: nn ",,gnlit;irln11 ldt•nl" h 1 1111•
l·'.llllliH',lll "lltllVl'l'Hlllr,tl, 11111 tw1 "II 11wn·lv l111p11~1•!-l fl Etlt'OIH',lll "Vill'd
532 YURUGU
stick" universally, while silmutaneously delineating access to the

European inner circle, thereby using the natural distinctions among
people as invidious measurements of worth. The "universalistic
design of industrial civilization" is, at best, a response to the demands
of technological and rational efficiency.
This is the internationalism of Coca Cola and the international
business community (a very "national" business community-writ
large!). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is not "international-
ist," it is Euro-American "supranationalist." Theodore Roszak offers
a view of the future consistent with this brand of internationalism:
The ideological rhetoric of the Cold War may continue for some
time; but the main course of world affairs will flow toward urban-
industrial homogeneity, spreading outward from five or six increas-
ingly suave centers of technocratic power .... If things continue on
the course they now follow, it is likely that for those looking back
from a century or so in the future the most prominent feature of our
time will be the global consolidation of the artificial environment,
carrying with it the cultural dominance of western science and the
politics of technocratic elitism. 43
The "international person" is considered to have undergone the

process of "detribalization." She has grown up and no longer relates
to the "backwardness" of nationalism. So goes European rhetoric at
least. But isn't the internationalization of the business world-the
building of a "world business community"-a very lethal kind of
nationalism. Jacques Gaston Maisonrouge, president of the IBM
World Trade Corporation in 1972, is described as "the prototype of
the detribalized man of the twenty-first century." 44 And the position
of the business person, and the scientific-humanist alike, comes down
to what European ideology cannot tolerate -difference; differences
are to be done away with.
The internationalist, well-meaning or not, must become sensitive'
to the expansionist and European nationalist implications of his qucsl
to make the world one. Marcel Griaule makes the following point:
The staunchest upholders of the cultural superiority of the West an•

precisely those who, unlike the racialist, proclaim the equality of all
mankind and the futility of a qualitative classification of cult11n•s,
This egalitarianism om and should, i11their view, be i11lerprctcdorily
iJs a recognition of llH' right and duly of all mankincl Lo attain 10 llw
stc_111darcl
of living anct to nrn'pl t IH' ways of thl11kh11t11f
Ilw W1..,t,·111
'ilH'lc•l l1•~
This is no doubt due to the fact that the European, and the
American too, even when he got rid of his superiority complex with
regard to coloured people, cannot abandon his devout attitude to
science, regarded on the one hand as the perogative of his culture
and on the other as an entity outside mankind with a life of its own,
blindly subjecting stars and infusoria alike to its laws, and inevitably
leading to organized happiness. 45
"Science," says Griaule, is a "vast seismic convulsion" that, as it

is expanding and moving towards progress, "breaks down and cov-
ers the subtleties and peculiarities which distinguish individuals and
nations. "45
The value dichotomy between "internationalism" and "nation-
alism" is most often predicated on the assumption that all national-
istic ideologies must be defined in terms of the imperative of cultural
aggression. Ironically, this is a concept based on the historical defi-
nition and content of Western European "nationalism" and European
cultural commitment. It is the commitment to European forms that
necessarily implies aggression. The aggression is demanded by the
asili.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy criticizes a tendency of "romanticism," which
he says originates in the individual ego, becoming collective egotism
or "vanity," then "nationalism" or "racism." 46 Clearly Lovejoy is
describing idiosyncratic European nationalism and not the politically
necessary and healthy cultural nationalism that other cultures must
nurture if they are to protect themselves against that same European
nationalism. The study of European culture reveals an asili that has
created a nationalism that becomes cultural imperialism. This is in
essence what Lovejoy describes;
The belief in the sanctity of one's idiosyncrasy-especially if it be

a group idiosyncrasy, and therefore sustained and intensified by
mutual flattery-is rapidly converted into a belief system in its
superiority. More than one great people, in the course of the past
century and a half, having first made a god of its own peculiarities,
good or bad or both, presently suspect that there was no other
god. A type of national culture valued at first because it was one's
own, and because the conservation of differentness was recognized
as a good for humanity as a whole, came in time to be conceived of
as a I hing whi<'h one had a mission to impose upon others, or lo clif-
l11sPovc>r as lurgc a p<.1rtQf the surface of l11epl,rnet as possible.~ 6
I le•i-..1y1,I 11,11
I Iw ol I1111 1-ildc• ol I!lb I 1•11d1·111 In n•sl:,
y orl){l11111t:s
l11111c• In lt111 , •., : IH Ii 11!1 "dt•1111ll'tll( y ilnd 11•1111111101:ll';tl
p1111(11•:,!,,"
534 YURUGU
which tend to do away with the cultural differences that make human
beings interesting and valuable to one another. 47 Here again we can
use the concept of asili for clarity of analysis and synthesis. The
nature of the European asili is to seek power over other. "Other" is
that which presents itself as threatening because it is not controlled
from the European center. The need to obliterate "difference" issues
from European xenophobia, the same need to maintain difference of
status so that there can be "other" that the self can control. Here we
have the formula for the creation of power. In the European asili, cul-
tural expression and cultural aggression become synonymous.
By focusing on positive or healthy manifestations of the phe-
nomena of culture, alternative possibilities become visible. If the par-
ticular context of the cultural entity is the natural environment in
which human beings learn to value one another, then ultimately tran-
scultural (international) respect can only exist to the extent that par-
ticular cultural philosophies are compatible with the idea of mutual
respect. Nationalism is the love of a people for themselves and their
commitment to their group survival. It is the affirmation of the cul-
tural self. It is what motivates the pockets of resistance to European
oppression. European nationalism, on the other hand, has meant
what Arieli describes as the character of Protestant nationalism; i.e.,
the mandate to universally impose its European ideas. 48 The political
left has traditionally assumed the same invidious distinction between
internationalism and nationalism that is characteristic of European
ideology. This assumption has led to their general distrust of African
nationalism and nationalist ideologies of other majority peoples.
European leftists usually discourage nationalism in these groups
where possible. This stance is itself an expression of the Europca11
utamaroho. Just as it is possible for cultural nationalism to take a
positive form, it is also possible to define internationalism in such n
way that it is not in basic conflict with nationalism. Just as the fani
ily unit is not generally thought of as being opposed to the mainll'
nance of cultural unity, so nationalism and internationalism do n111
have to represent a dichotomy of opposing tendencies. In the Afrlni11
world-view diversity and unity coexist, indeed, are defined in tcnu,
of one another. Diversity is the unfolding of the universal pri11rlpl1•,
while the human intellectual/spiritual mission is the µercepliur1 (JI
the commonness in all things. If the African utamawazo wNc u:wd to
llnderstand the normative relationship of cullural/politlcal l'111111t",,
we wo11lcl r<'a('h very different co11<.:lusio11s
than l·~u101wan tho1wlit
lw~ ltlllgllt us. Tlw followf11g stillt·1111'11l f10111Wflllt• t\l11,tl1,1111pt'H Ip
llv1•ly lcl1•11tlh1"•,011w of 1l11·ltttpllr,1111111~uf 1•:111op1•,1111t1t1•111,1tl1111,d
ism and its relationship to other characteristics of their social theory.

Significantly, he suggests the possibility of a desirable international-
ism that is not contradicted by nationalism:
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a number of theorists

thought they could detect the emergence of the truly rational man,
a universal man in knowledge and sentiment, freed from his regional
and narrow loyalties. His actions were to be based on the idea of
the universal brotherhood of man, without differentiation. The
hope of the emergence of this kind of man in political life appears
to have been set back by the latter half of the nineteenth century
and our own century. Those who disliked this international man
thought him to be ruthless, too cerebral, too intellectualist, cut off
from the warm fullness of life. Those who liked him thought that the
resurgence of nationalistic feeling was an atavism or even bar-
barism ... Nationalism, even when it reverts to roots, is, of course,
not atavism or barbarism. It can be reconciled with international-
ism. Indeed, internationalism presupposes nationalism, and the lat-
ter ensures that development and progress in the world shall be on
a broad front. 49
In the midst of this profoundly critical and African-centered

statement, however, Abraham's idealism gets the better of his good
judgement, and he equates the U.N. and the World Bank with "the idea
of universal brotherhood." We have learned painfully that these agen-
cies - either well-meaning and powerless, or simply conceived in the
interest of European capitalism (like the IMF)-only use the rhetoric
of "universal brotherhood."
The Call for a "World Culture"

While the ambitions of European aggression have always been
worldwide, the visions of European humanists have inevitably been
those of a world culture. The objectives "fit" the cultural asili. It is pos-
sible to interpret both phenomena as expressions of the theme of
universalism in European ideology and as manifestations of the
expansionist utamaroho.
Woven in and out, and around Lewis Mumford's critically his-
torical analysis of European culture, is the theme of universalism. It
Influences his int'erpretatlon of Plato's objectives and the Roman
"an.'0111pllshrne11t."In his view, Plato's ''real problem was one he did
1101 t:V~n consider us a logical possibility." Mumford continues:
linw lo n1•,1l1· 111·011111)1111w1•,tlll1

c;1pahl1• of ov1•1t•11111!111-<
llw 11111
II111101p, nl I lc•llt111k v. 111lcl!,!l11g
11111·11'1 II11•dlvl ,11111 wc•1
111•1 111I 111
1
.'i.'{(i YURUGU
and the free; the gap between the Hellenes and the Barbarians, that
is all other groups; the disparity between a continent rural life and
an expansive mercantile economy tending toward mechanical uni-
formity .... How to turn the new fellowship of the religious mystery
into a fellowship for political mastery: that was the problem of prob-
lems .... Plato never conceived that transformation. 50
Mumford aligns the self-determinist, isolationist objective with

a certain kind of "primitivity" of political vision. He says that Aristotle,
like Plato, was concerned with the question: "What size of territory,
what numbers, will enable a people to live to itself and survive by
itself. To this Mumford responds:
That question can only be answered on a pre-civilized level; for it

is the capacity for entering into a wider world in time and space,
through linguistic communication, religious communion, political
cooperation, that permits men to pass from the closed society of
the tribe to the open society of the commonwealth. 51
The assumptions inherent in Mumford's statement are that

"tribal," kin-based, relatively small, and relatively isolated societies
represent an undesirable stage of human moral and political devel-
opment. Is it that "civilized" societies allow their members to better
identify on a human level with those who are different, or is the real-
ity simply that the "open society of the commonwealth" simply forces
more people to become more alike? Using this concept of asili, this
"capacity" of which he speaks can be interpreted, instead, as th '
demand of an expansionistic utamaroho. What Mumford expresses in
terms of moral development can be interpreted as the development
of peculiarly Western worldwide imperialistic ambition and the kin<l
of organization necessitated by this objective, rather than as
inevitable universalism. Mumford explains the reasons for Plato's
"failure" in terms of his own objectives of a world culture:
We can now see why Plato failed so completely to regenerate his

own culture or to lay down even an ideological basis for renewal.
What undermined him, what undermined the Greeks, was their fail
ure to be concerned with the whole life of man and with every mem-
ber of society .... Plato's message was addressed solely Lohis dass
and his culture. It called for a radical reorientalio11 to life, :ind y1•t
it kft the chief sacred cows of his world, sl;wcry and class rule, c-011
l<'lllPc lly chcwillR t hc• cud. Priclc•of fan1ily, pri<I<•o( <:Ity, prldl' 111
l11tPll1TI Wi.'rl' ,Ill 1wll 1.lt'ft-11li11f( Fall111gto P111lm1<·••
lt11111.111l1y,1111•
pllll11•,c1pltl'11-ic·111ild1111I1•vc•111,,1v1•
th1-111'l1•lv1•ft
•,1
Mumford has projected his objectives on to Plato. It does not

seem, from an African-centered perspective, that Plato "failed to
regenerate his own culture" or ideology. In point of fact, he succeeded
overwhelmingly in doing just that; "his own culture" is regenerated
in the immense political reality that thrives as European culture. Was
Plato concerned with "the whole life of man?" Slavery and class rule
were not contradictory to his objectives nor to the principles of the
society he envisioned any more than it has been in European culture
at any stage of its development-or in any of the particular histori-
cal forms it has taken. Mumford's dichotomy of "family pride" and the
"embracing of humanity" is of questionable value. What does it mean
to "embrace humanity?" Does it mean to expand practically? That is
what it meant for Alexander and for the Romans. If it means the denial
of family, kin and community identification, then in our view it is not
desirable. But the compassionate identification with humanness in
others is predicated upon, not contradicted by, the sharing of love
with those with whom one shares life. To use Sapir's distinction
between that which is "genuine" and that which is "spurious" 52 in a
new way, love on the level of family and community is potentially
"genuine" and naturally realizable and concrete; while the idea of
love on a universal level is "spurious," unnatural, and abstract. But,
says Mumford, "So much for the vain and fatal parochialism of
Hellenic man." 51
What was lacking was a political and religious ideological state-
ment of world conquest. So that while Plato created the formulative
structures, European utamawazo, the full impact of the aggressive-
ness of the European utamaroho could not be realized until it was cul-
turally supported by a combination of the Judea-Christian and Roman
mandates. We, First World peoples, would have preferred "parochial-
ism." Where the Greeks failed, in Mumford's view, did the Romans
succeed?
Politically the new Roman order accomplished in time what the indi-
vidual polis had never been able to do: it unified the peoples of this
world and brought them the boon of peace and orderly administra-
tion .... But this unification was superimposed and therefore
onesided: not a partnership of equals but a system of patrol. ... With
all Rome's generous show of law, justice, order, the underlying eco-
11orn!cfact was pillage and extortion, and the cornerstone of the
whole system was hurnan slaveryP
<l !1 ('llllr11<'1Nlz,1llnn of tlw l<onrn11nrdc•r 1:- wh;il ,1

M11111lo1 1
l11lll,11t•d
Ji:111opc•;111 1111lv«'11-,11I Tltt• ol>Jc•c
occl1•1wn1ilcl h11•vll,11\ly11tt•1111.
538 YURUGU
tive of universalism affects Mumford's vision; "humanitarianism," as

always, in the European context, becomes paternalism. He makes
that clear:
... when the protestant sense of duty was wedded to a rational col-
lective aim, the result was the creation of a new kind of martyr and
hero: Cromwell at the head of the Parliamentary armies, Milton sac-
rificing his ambitions as a poet to perform the office of political sec-
retary; Livingston bringing the Gospel to the remotest tribes of the
African jungle; John Brown leading the revolt of slaves at Harpers
Ferry; Abraham Lincoln rising to saintly tenderness and charity in
his high-principled conduct of a stern war. Better than these, what
creed can show? 54
Mumford's "universal men," framed in an African reference, are

anything but heroes. Livingston was quite simply a cultural imperi-
alist facilitating colonial control; Lincoln perhaps displayed courage
in terms of Euro-American political history, but was acting in the
interest of white people. Cromwell and Milton were simply European
nationalists. John Brown was the only one who can be interpreted
as acting consistently with African interest, but he should have orga-
nized among his own people. He could never be considered an
African hero.
Mumford, himself, wishes to distinguish between the universal
good society, which is his objective, and the imposition of "irra-
tional" European order. 55 And the "mechanical intercourse" that he
disparages results in the internationalism of the business executives
(Jacques Gaston Maisonrouge, the "detribalized man"). His recogni-
tion of the validity of the "regional" (i.e., cultural) seems to admit of
possibilities generally denied in European univ~rsalism. But gener
ally Mumford's call for world culture issues from the valuL'
dichotomy of universal (good)/regional (bad), which seems in hi:1
use to be equated with that between the "human" (good) and tlw
indigenous (bad). This culminates in what is consistently the utopia
of the European progressive. The danger this dream poses for ot lw,
peoples is that in the process of striving for this conceptually rcmot 1
goal, which seems to contradict the logic of human groupings, lh
concrete and realizable approximations always take the forn1 ol
European rule; for they are inevitably European initiated. Tlw
"humanizing'' forces within European culture, H they do cxisl wu,1111
do helter tu co11ccntratc on changing the culture tlwl prnd111 t·d
tlwin; I<•., changing their r1si/i-cha111,1lt11'
ll11•in1wlvcs:But 11111I
wrnild
,1l,;11
Imply 1l!t'it dt•-.ttlH'llou
The "world culture" objective protects liberal Europeans from

self-examination. It is the method by which these would-be benefac-
tors avoid focusing on their own cultural/historical roots, less these
same roots be identified as the source and matrix of systematic
exploitation in the world. European intellectuals can justify directing
their attention everywhere except on that which is peculiarly
"European." Soon they will not have the choice. The critique will
come from without, in the form of First World victory.
It is the nature of the utamaroho and the character of the
European self-image that make us suspicious of any sustained or
proclaimed "interest" or involvement of Europeans in other cultures.
European anthropology, for instance, has provided undeniable sup-
port to the European self-image. It has, at various periods, in differ-
ent "schools" and colonial situations, ranged from the more overt
encouragement and support of European imperialism to the subtle
expression of European paternalism, and therefore implied superi-
ority. Because of the character of the utamaroho, these things are
automatically implied in European relationships with majority peo-
ples. Such interactions are always initiated, chosen, and dominated by
Europeans.
This is the most difficult thing for the European "progressives"
to understand, because it goes so deeply into the nature (asilt) of the
culture and is rooted in centuries of European behavior towards and
conceptions of "others." The fact is that the utamaroho and self-
image are not in any way supported by introspection. When
Europeans limit the arena of their considerations to themselves-to
their culture alone-they are no longer afforded the image of the
power relationship, i.e., the supremacy over "other." They cannot
"expand"; they can only transform. They must work with and on
themselves. Sociological theory has, for the most part, not repre-
sented self-criticism or introspection. It has merely been descrip-
tive data-gathering, supportive of an already existing order that
assures European power over others. In the authentic critique of
Europe, we will have to take control.
The only way of negating (short of destroying the culture from
without) the inherently paternali!"tic nature of European interaction
with other peoples would be to alter the European self-image, and
Ihat would mean changing the character of the utamaroho and the val-
1ws diclated by the ideology: The ideology is, of course, embedded
lit the nalul'c• of the asili. That is a frightening truth for the European
": ti•~ rll'fl ll~r plc•t1s11rnhlt•nor rcwanlln~ ill ;-111yimmcclia1(•
"ll111t1,111lst
www Mm 1•ov1•1, ti I•,l11t•llll)St 111ornllydlffk11II lm-11< (·1111ld
l•:111op(•n11s
540 YURUGU
undertake. The call for a world culture is an escape from such an

unpleasant prospect. It has been, in the main, a way of procrastinat-
ing-of putting off a painful, but necessary, ordeal- much as one
puts off a tooth extraction, knowing full well that the tooth will even-
tually have to come out. The issues are how long it will take the decay
to cause untenable pain and how extensively it will be allowed to
spread. There can be no viable process of European self-criticsm,
because this goes against the nature of their utamaroho. The decay
will spread until the infection is expunged by the world's majority
(those external to the culture), otherwise the culture will simply rot.
A case in point: Edward Sapir's answer to the problem of cul-
tural dominance is the call for internationalism that will do away
with "spurious" culture or at least with "infatuations with national
prestige." The internationalism that he calls for comes admittedly
from the model of the international capitalist community. That is
not accidental.
Agreeing with Sapir, Kurt Wolff says,
We have reached a stage where we must realize our "immediate

ends" on a world-wide scale, precisely in order to devote our cul-
tural activity to such "remoter ends" as we have come to envis-
age.56
But it is precisely the "immediate," the circumscribed, the

indigenous that the Europeans should be concerned with. They must
learn to think of themselves as limited beings with limited powers,
existing in a culture among cultures. They are the problem.
Wolff seeks a united vanguard of radical-anthropologists with
political activists and "hippies" to "enter history" and do away with
"alienation" and "disenchantment." 57 But this "vanguard" would have
its hands full. Their task is nothing less than the destruction of a mas
sive system at its ideological base; the prerequisite to the con
struction of a new culture. The delusion is that making all people tht·
same will change the nature of European culture. It would in fact
leave European culture completely intact, while destroying other
valid visions of humanity in the process. We must constantly remern
ber that in order for Europeans to approach others with hont'.st y,
they must artificially make them (the others) like themselw,
Therefore, in even their infrequent efforts to promote an harr1111
nious environmC'nt, they seek to do away with cliffcrenrc. But nwjrn
lty peoplt•s are not like F.urop<'a11s,who c\rl', ll 11n1st.ber(•111t•111l11•n•cl,
only ;1v<·ry snwll 111lnorltv.
Tlw "Wrnl<I 111111111•"llw1111•,11, ii p,1111·1l1•clgo,11l111111IIH·r,111111•
of progressive European social theory can be interpreted as an

escape from self-critique, as antithetical to First World self-determi-
nation, and as a further manifestation of the European utamaraho,
in that the recognition of European malaise and disorder is projected
onto the world instead of being lodged in the nature of European cul-
ture itself. It is endemic to the asili. Unconsciously, this conception
of self emerges in the writings of some of the severest critics of
European ideology and behavior, so that inevitably their descrpi-
tions are no longer of the horrors that Europeans have perpetrated,
but of the crimes that "man" has committed. This element of the uta-
maroho is so strong that Europeans not only project their values
onto the world, but their weaknesses and failings as well.
Concrete Humane Behavior

versus Abstract European Humanism
The moral philosophy or attitude of humanism is regarded as a
development of European speculative thought and as being charac-
teristic of the highest form of European moral behavior. It is defined
as a commitment to things "human," to the eliciting of, to the culti-
vation of the "human." The humanist is sensitive to "humanness." To
the perceptive cultural scientist these phrases would describe a pri-
marily majority culture (not European) world-view and would explain
the apparent nature of classical/traditional kin-based societies: (not
European culture). But there is another idea associated with
European humanism, and that is the implied commitment to and "love
of humanity" as an abstract conception. This, in opposition to the nat-
ural attachments of family, kingroup, culture, or, as it is derogatively
termed, "tribe." If one is a European humanist one loves "Man," with
a capital "M."
But it doesn't work out that way, for the demands of the latter
have no relationship to the concrete love and identification with other
human beings. One represents a very controlled, and purely specu-
lntive and theoretical attitude; the other is a reflection of an emo-
t Iona! tie, a sympathetic relationship, a feeling of identification.
European humanism is in this regard an extension of the universal
Imperative in European ideology to conceptual ethics, to speculative
1noral philosophy. The rhetoric of ethical motivation is placed into
I lie syntax of universalism and "abstraction."
/\s with the other correlative terms of European value distinc-
t Inns, lhls c-n111·l'(1linnof ''h11rrninism" is used to place European 1.:ul-
t11n• :11 tlw lnp of:, s('lllt· 011 wl1l!'h llw "lc;,s1 E11ro1wnn," I.e., 1h<>
• ·1tiI111•ti
pill l111,np rllllPt llto-; l Imm 11lls ,\IHHt ,1t I 11111111,,11l' ,ti
lil1": 111,11
542 YURUGU
the bottom. It is the same scale as the one that places Christianity at
the top, because it is supposedly monotheistic and universal; the
same scale that is used to denounce religion in favor of the "scien-
tific," the same scale by which European forms become the most uni-
versally valid and therefore "progressive." According to this scale,
this means of valuation, the least European is the "lowest." This is tau-
tological, since it is in fact a European scale.
In terms of European humanism, the higher motives are the
more abstract and belong to higher cultures. The "better" and more
"moral" interests are the more "universal." Self-interested action rep-
resents lower morality. This is the logic of European humanist
rhetoric, it does not matter that this obviously does not describe
European motivation. In these terms, commitment to or sentiment for
one's concrete surroundings represents a low degree of develop-
ment. R. S. Rattray typifies this view in his description of the Asante
of West Africa:
[the respect which] an Ashanti was taught from an early age to

show for the lives and property of others outside his own group was
not due to any abstract regard for the "sanctity of the lives" or
property of his neighbors; it was due to purely materialistic con-
siderations; a desire for his own preservation and safety; but some-
what similar results were attained, as when man, in a more
advanced stage, followed the same course of action from different
and higher motives. 58
Rattray's implied association between the sanctity of proper

and "higher motives" reveals his own materialistic and capitalistir
"considerations."
We are concerned here specifically with the way in which tlw
rhetorical mode of this aspect of European humanism is used to sup
port the European self-image and how it manifests itself in European
expression. Mary Kingsley characterizes the motivations of the Wt•st
African this way:
The individual is of supreme importance to himself, and he valtt('S

his friends and relations; but abstract affection for huruanity iit
large, or belief in the sanctity of lives of people with whon1 he Is
unrelated, the African barely posseses. 59
t\ccor((ing to ll1is same "humanistic" allituck refr>rrvd to 1111111

stalt'rncnts, 1.lIs through th~ t·xpm,1m•Io "01 lll'r" n1urallt ii", I hat Iw11
pit·< a11 l1•ttrn 111 "ovt•rcot11l'" tlwii ow11 "1111>,d" 1110,nlllv 1\111 llw
,1111l11opolo..it•il:t wll 11 1
.d ,ovc• ·,l,1h·1111•11t•; ,It 11 111;1tl1•hv l•:111111w,111
much more intense and lengthy exposure to "diverse moralities of

unfamiliar groups" 60 than the average European will ever have, and
their comments are representative, not exceptional, among those
made by Europeans who have "knowledge" of other cultures. It is the
misconception of the value and possibility of abstraction that gets
in their way. But this misconception is not easily avoided, because
it is reinforced by the European utamawazo and other aspects of
European ideology.
In both descriptions the implication is that Africans are some-
how morally deficient because they do not have these "abstract con-
ceptions." What is significant is that in neither case is the actual
behavioral pattern of the persons being called into question. This is
a manifestation of the hypocritical character of the European system
of morality and the rhetorical and purely verbal form that their ethics
are able to assume. By no stretch of the imagination can these social
scientists say that they have observed Europeans generally exhibit-
ing a more profound regard for the "sanctity of human life," nor
greater affection for other human beings, than the Africans whom
they observed. But that is not the point; not for a person who has
been trained to think in terms of European modalities. Such a person
will more than likely manifest the subtle and intellectual expression
of European cultural nationalism.
Within the logic of European humanism one can talk about
"morality" that is not reflected in behavior. One is considered to be
highly moral if the language that one uses is couched in the syntax of
abstraction and of universality; that is, of disinterest. This makes no
sense in other cultures where morality is concerned with behavior
only and is meaningless unless it is indicative of a behavioral norm.
Which is the more "human"-the way of life that dictates respectful
behavior or the one that attempts to encourage an "abstract affection
for humanity at large," which has no relationship to behavior and to
which the individual cannot relate? The answer lies in part in a com-
parison of behavior toward unrelated peoples. It is European exploita-
1ion and aggressive behavior towards others that is consistent with
nbstraction as a normative goal. It has been to the detriment of other
peoples that their conceptions have not allowed them to act with as
l11tPnseand sustained hostility as Europeans have. It is their very
llttinanity that has obstructed their political vision. (Via European
"douule-lhink" Africa11s became xenophobic and Europeans
X1•11ophllid)Tl1ls Is the l0sson 10 be learned from tlw Glkuyu kgcnd
11
, 0111 n11lng tlw ,·01111111,1or tilt' E11rupt•i:u1si and Ayl KwPi Arniali's
11111•111 "A
:-.t,11,•11w111 1<11111111111~
< cs~•,·
,p,•111ws:," <111.,
11. !i) ,,.,
544 YURUGU
It has been pointed out that the more abstract the conceptual-
ization, the greater the difference between verbalized moral "atti-
tudes" and concrete acts. Stanley Diamond demonstrates this
distinction between verbalized abstraction and concrete behavior as
manifested in the morality of European and majority cultures, respec-
tively, in the following quote:
Among the Winnebago ... no mere mouthing of an ideal of love can

gain an individual either admiration or respect in the absence of the
appropriate behavior. Consonant with this attitude is the degree of
love insisted upon: one cannot love everybody equally. Above all,
say the Winnebago: "Do not love your neighbor as you love those
of your own house. Only if you are wicked will you love other peo-
ple's children more than your own .... " To love everyone alike is
impossible, and a statement to that effect would not only be insin-
cere, but unjust, because it would lead to the neglect of those whom
one ought to love most, if one is to learn to love at all. In this mode
of cognition, one deserves neither credit nor discredit for giving
expression to normal human emotions. It is in the context, the con-
crete effects that count. It is wicked to love other people's children
as much as your own ... "it is wicked to love your enemy while he
is your enemy. "63
And Frantz Fanon admonishes African and other majority peo-

ples to:
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet
murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one
of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. For centuries
they have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-
called spiritual experience. Look at them today swaying between
atomic and spiritual disintegration .
. . . That same Europe where they never stopped proclaiming that

they were only anxious for the welfare of Man: today we know with
what suffering humanity has paid for every one of their triumphi.
of the mind. 64
In terms of the asili concept, universalism and abstraction 1,1l<t·

on very specific meaning when they are expressed as aspcrti. 111
European humanism. Using asili as a conceptual tool, Wt' c:in t-xpl,ll11
why "humanism'' has a very different m<'anil1g wl1cn 11i-cclwl1l1tt•lt-r
PIIC<'to llw African worlcl-vl<>w.African culture traclitlo11111lyls liu11i.111
t't•1111•rc·d, 111w'~1111111,rnlly
1111CI lly a spli !111111
ls c·nnsl<k,c•d to Ill' prlt11111
pl1t'!lllllll't1Ci11Y,·1ll1lt,l"111•1ll11•11lwtrnh,d 1111111•ll••~llvl'JIIJIulmt1,u I
Such concepts are continually abstracted through symbolic expres-

sions of many kinds, and they are ritualized. But they are also lived
and felt, and that is very much a part of what "humanism" means in
the African context.
The intellectualist posture of European humanism often allows
scientists to become confused and to confuse others as to their own
motivations and the real nature of their activities. As a representative
example of how the projection of European self-interest can be made
to sound like a universalistic interest in "humanity," read Ralph Beals'
book, The Politics of Social Research. In it, Beals describes the "anthro-
pological concern" of "anthropologists throughout the world," but, of
course, anthropologists do not come from "throughout the world."
They have come overwhelmingly from the West and have, therefore,
represented European culture. It is their continued access to major-
ity cultures with which they are concerned. The same concern as
that of the U.S. Government and the International Business
Community. How is this access to be assured? Again we are asked to
believe that all of these concerns are based on the commitment to
"untrammeled" scholarly inquiry and a desire to understand "human
nature." The concrete results and relationship of this "inquiry" to
European government and capitalist interests lead us to believe that
the commitment has been to something much more immediate and
closer to home.
The anthropologist, says Beals, "should not represent hypothe-
ses or personal opinions as scientifically validated principles." 65 The
words are easily pronounced and more easily written, but do
European social scientists understand the implications of that state-
ment? Their works, including Seal's "inquiry," would indicate that
they do not.
Beals explains some of the objectives of social research:
Ultimately it was hoped to establish a computer-based model that

would permit the rapid prediction of various types of outcomes of
social change and conflict situations and the assessment of the
effectiveness of different action programs in resolving or averting
conflicts. 66
This, indeed, is what the "advancement of science" means. Its

::lgnificancc is neither noble nor transcendent. Rather it is quite prag-
111;1\
le, "µrof.ane," ancl provinclal-clesigned for the sake of prediction
,ind ('n11tml nf n•volutlonary 111nverne11ts. Beals is also pragmatically
t'11iWl'rlli'd 111,111111·:,rn•lal :1<'11•1u•<•s
nn• provldl•d "wltll tlw proper
1°rn1dlllq11•, ,11111 to do tlw jnh,"
l1111rl•,
546 YURUGU
To Science he [the anthropologist] has the responsiblity of avoid-

ing any actions or recommendations that will impede the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge. In the wake of his own studies he
must undertake to leave hospitable climate for future study .... 65
His own "inquiry" was initiated as a study for the American

Anthropological Association "into the ethics and responsibilities of
social scientists." These are some of his "findings":
Empathy is a most valuable quality for the investigator but, when

extended to involvement in actions, it may cause difficulties for
current research and hinder access to the field for future investi-
gations.67
(Beals calls this the possibility of "over-identification.")
"Primitivism"-praising the "primitive" is an affront to national

pride ... all social scientists concerned with development prob-
lems may easily fall under criticism if they are careless in termi-
nology or too blatantly use their own standards as the measures of
progress or development. Such terms as "backward" or-even "unde-
veloped" may be regarded as perjorative if not clearly qualified ...
Increasingly the relevance of social research is being questioned

abroad. It is noteworthy that this question is asked least often in
those countries with an active group of local social scientists, where
the public has greater understanding of scholarly and scientific
procedures. 68
His book represents neither European self-criticism nor sci{

reflection. Rather it fits the over-all pattern of mainstream Europca11
social theory and reads like a manual for successful rapport in Ilw
field. It avoids any really meaningful statements and therefore SIH
ceeds in saying nothing that could not have been said without ex1<·11
sive "study." My purpose is not to criticize this work as an isolall·d
instance, but rather to illustrate a dominant theme in the stann• , 11
European intellectual-liberalism. This is one way in wllieli I lw
European concept of "humanism" is used to circumvent conn <•t1
issues and implications of behavior. The syntax of the concept lts('[t
its universalism and abstractnesss-allows this to happen. A "1111111.111
ist" in this conception becomes a social scientist who studies 111111 1
soci<>tics [or the ''sake of human welfare-"; l>11L,13c·alswnrns, lw 1n111 I
avold "ovl'r ldt•ntifkat1011," i.t'., 1101too rn11rl1"l1111111111lsn1."
l'lil•i U•,1•nf tltl' 11l>•,l1,1el 1lwtorl1 t ,111,, ...iilt 1111111
"1111111,rnlst"
most pernicious manifestation of European cultural imperialism, sim-

ply because, if misunderstood, it gives the impression of represent-
ing the opposite of nationalistic self-interest, in the form of
humanitarian "altruism," while serving to sustain and proselytize
European ideology. This brand of "humanism" is considered to rep-
resent the most progressive form of morality and is all the more detri-
mental from an African perspective, as it is most attractive to
European intellectuals and scholars who give the impression of look-
ing critically at their own culture. It is these individuals who are in the
best position to influence First World nationalists, because it is they
who gain easiest access. It is not surprising that it is the avowed
European white nationalist, the separatist, who rejects the humanis-
tic rhetoric and is usually more straightforward in representing his
intentions.
The abstract concept of the "good person" is consistent with the
European utamawazo. He is the "universal man," in that he is com-
mitted to the welfare of all and identifies with no particular group of
people. He is not parochial; he is "international." He is not motivated
by limiting and constraining emotional attachments, therefore he is
liberated through reason and intellect so that he can identify with the
"universal suffering of man." He doesn't love people, he loves "human-
ity." He does what he does out of a commitment to abstract ideals.
He has risen above nationalism; he is internationalist. This is the syn-
tax of the European rhetorical ethic. But Europeans resemble this
description no more than do majority peoples. The successful pro-
mulgation of the European empire is, in fact, due to the intensity of
their nationalistic or particularistic commitment and to the uniquely
inhumane definition of their national cause.
Universalism in the European concept of humanism is the trans-
lation of scientific-rationalism into the area of conceptual ethics. An
irnµlication of "progressivism" in Dwight MacDonald's critical use of
the term 69 is that morality can be derived from independent ratio-
nality and that superior people do not form moral opinion from their
own human associations. The result is a very nonhuman concept of
111orality.Dwight MacDonald defines a radical approach to morality
that is inconsistent with the European asili. "It rather defines a sphere
which is outside the reach of scientific investigation, and whose value
judgements cannot be proved (though they can be demonstrated in
,tppmpriate a11d<:0111pletelyunscientific terms); that is the traditional
'iplll'H' of ;i°rt t111il111oralily."70
l'l,110 11111~111 lw1d ,1111I :ill1'< t•:;-;h11ly11galt1sts11d1 a po:-;slhlllty,
( >111
I' till' Vol
(111111111 ,11i~.,
1,11 I, 1111lv1•rs,1l
w111lsW,1:-.1•:.lnl1llsl11•tl,illl
548 YURUGU
entire system of rational conceptual ethics could be constructed

based on that premise-a system without "normative implications''
(Stanley Diamond). Intraculturally, that is the function of the "rhetor-
ical ethic": it agrees syntactically with the "rules" of the European uta-
mawazo and is no more in tune with human nature or with the
spiritual universe than is that cognitive structure.
Stanley Diamond has said,
The result to which relativism logically tends and which it never

quite achieves is to detach the anthropologist from all particular
cultures. It does not provide him with a moral center. 71
As a result the anthropologist's "self-knowledge," "engagement"

and "involvement" are discouraged. In general, the abstractification
of morality tends to create an unreal context for commitment, and the
emphasis on the transcultural can result in a deemphasis of the con-
crete and immediate. It can be a form of dehumanization. It leads to
what Wade Nobles calls a "transubstantive error." Transubstantive
errors are literally "mistakes of meaning." They occur when the cul-
tural manifestations of two groups of people are similar, yet the cul-
tural substance, which gives the manifestations meaning, is different.
The knower of one culture will attribute meaning, for instance, to the
behavior of a member of another culture utilizing his/her own cultural
substance. To the extent that the cultural substance of the groups dif-
fers, the knower will erroneously interpret the behavior in terms ol
his/her own perspective and thereby commit a "transubstantive
error." 72
Europeans are not the only ones who make "transubstantiw
errors"; although they may be the only ones who make them intcn
tionally. We, Africans, and other primary peoples also make sucli
errors when we trust Europeans and treat them as "family," takln~
them at their word. The concept of asili has been created to prcv<'11t
us from making these mistakes. Using it, we can interpret Europ1·,111
culture in terms of its own nature.
The ultimate goal of the cultural/political survival of all pcopll' .
does not necessarily imply the denial of culture by an affirmatio11111
the transcultural experience. It is a question of strategy and lwlt11v
ior, of where you start from, and of what possibilities are th<'r0hy It'll
to you. The stated desire to "rise above culture," to univers.1llzt•c rn11
rnitment, has most often resulted in au lneptn<'ss at pnllllcal 1111ilil
liz~1tlon and a failure to rhangt' EuropNH1 •;oei •ly,
E11ropl•,111 t>plst1•11111loglrnl lll'cclllc•1·ttrn1!-!
1 l111·w11hh1t1llrn1 wllli [111
l~tll(.!IH'o11111i111111111/1,, (l'IINl(Y l011c•), IJ.C'tll'111l1•IW!I c l11 ,c•ly 1t•l,111•d
styles of thought that are generally connected under the rubric of

"humanism." On the one hand we have a tradition that is incapable of
extricating itself from the behavior it purports to criticize, and suc-
ceeds in a hypocritical stance, merely paying lip-service to moral-
sounding abstractions about humanistic behavior, while being
immobilized politically. At the other end of this very limited spectrum
are the "progressives" who run into a strangely related set of prob-
lems. Karl Marx offered an analysis of history and of capitalist society.
Most of those who have accepted his analysis have raised it to the
level of ideology; they have made of his analysis an "ism." In so doing
they have succumbed to the European world-view, in which science
becomes religion (scientism) and universalism is expressed as "inter-
nationalism" (the obliteration of cultural difference), in which "revo-
lutionaries" are expected to commit themselves to the universal goal
of a classless society. Ironically Marxian analysis, because of its nar-
row materialism, only inspires viable revolution when it is rooted in
cultural circumstances, where it can be supplemented by more spiri-
tualistic world-views and therefore nurtured. The resultant move-
ments arise, therefore, from the specific historical experiences of the
people involved. The more intellectualized, abstract, and universal
its application, the less its viability as an effective organizing tool.
The most "liberal" and "progressive" Europeans take the posi-
tion that they are best qualified to lead the rest of us in our war
against their people. Of course, enemies become necessarily
abstracted as "forces" and not cultural beings in order to support
their position of continued superiority as our leaders. But Europeans
are least able to universalize authentically, since their world-view is
myopic, while the African world-view is more genuinely "universal"
in that it is "global," wholistic, and synthetic. But we have no need to
speak for everyone. Roszak has this to say:
Marx failed to see that-once having endorsed the fundamental

values of industrialism-his socialist alternative might have no
choice but to let its dynamic capitalist competitor pace it along the
course of history. The two centers may bear different banners, but
they are in the same race .. .it becomes somewhat difficult to tell
them apart. 73
The most profound critique of Marxism, however, comes from

"the Black radical tradition," as Cedric J. Robinson tells us. And his
work proh11l>lyr,•prc•Sl'l11sIlw apogee or t l1<1ttradition; ;i synthesis of
tli1• Afrlnlll <'< 1·1lllq1w h1 this ro~itrd. l<ohl11souu11dcrsta11ds
1 11t1•11•d
111.,t"M,11xl<.111, 1111•
du111h11111Ilw 111tliHt ll1t• < 1lll1p11· ol 1':tpllalls111 li,1:1
550 YURUGU
assumed in Western thought, incorporated theoretical and ideologi-

cal weaknesses which stemmed from the same social forces which
provided the basis of capitalist formation." 74 Marxism, therefore,
while providing an effective analytical vocabulary for the critique of
capitalism, failed to place its origins firmly within the specificity of
European experience. Marx's critique would, as a result, ultimately
lack viability from an African frame of reference, because his own
thought was "forged from the same metaphysical conventions" as
that of Hegel, Darwin, and Spencer. 75 And while Marxism claims to be
"intenationalist," it, as well as capitalism, Robinson argues, grows
out of European nationalist sentiment. 76
This is to be expected, since sensitivity to the characteristics of
"humanness" is not implied in the European concept of humanism. A
culture responsible to human needs is more to the point, and this ide-
ological commitment does not require universalism or abstraction.
European humanism has issued from the tradition of European ratio-
nalism. It suffers from the same insensitivity to spirituality as the cul-
ture does generally. It is in that sense consistent with the European
utamaroho. European humanism has not been properly distinguished
from the European scientific tradition. Science in European thought
is defined mechanistically not humanistically. If humanism is defined
as the recognition of the possibility of spirituality in human beings,
and in terms of concrete behavior, then European "abstract" human-
ism is not a viable means to a more human society. True "humanism"
is spiritual, not rational, which places it outside of the West not in. ll
involves more of the transcendence and wholism characteristic of th(•
African world-view than the "universalism" of European thought.
Universalism and the European Asili

Universalism in European definition is an expression of the"·"''
of European culture. The seed (asilr) of the culture gives birth bot Ii
to the intellectualist, liberal-humanist tradition and to the pattern ol
European behavior towards others. These patterns of thought ,rnd
behavior are therefore related. By focusing on the concept of cm/1
the essential ideological core of European culture-we are abl«' 111
demonstrate and to understand how the modalities of behavtw ,111d
thought cohere in a consistent cultural construct, thc-r<>hyglvl1111
force to one another. This is an essential step in the politlcnl a1111lv
sis of European interest, which in turn leads to an undt•rstn11dl11~ 111
the inlwn•11t 11at11re
of the European attitude• townrds otlwt 11111111,·
lwl111vimth,11allll11clt•dln•1·t ·, .A'it/1allows 11stu 11111<
nntl nf 1111• npp,11
,·11t~v''11111(•volt•11t" !•:w111w,111
liPhitVlnr wlll1 ulivlt,11•,ly d, '11111111,
11
European behavior; and further, to understand how the "humanistic"

posture becomes a debilitating ideological weapon complementing
the overtly aggressive and violent behavior discussed in Chap. 8. In
one instance the weapons are visible, tangible, and physically
destructive; in another they are difficult to discern- subtle and spir-
itually and ideologically destructive.
It is very helpful to examine an example of one of these more
subtle expressions of European nationalism. In her discussion of
"Three Thousand Years of Racism," Merlin Stone universalizes the
phenomenon of "racism" into an historical "process" and tells us to
remember that there are "moral qualities in all peoples" and that "no
race or ethnic group has been totally morally and ethically perfect." 77
She barely mentions African descendants in her "study." The result
is two-fold: If one accepts her analysis (description), she, herself,
becomes one of the "good guys," separated from "3000 "years of
racist behavior, and our justifiable rage is diffused as we come to
"understand" ourselves as only insignificant, if unfortunate, targets of
a universal process that has significantly victimized "darker"
Europeans! 78 She tells us to combat racism by the study of "the ethics
and morals of pre- and non-Christian religions," 77 and by "Explaining
that the earliest known cultural accomplishments of humankind were
those initiated and developed by darker skinned peoples .... "79 (She is
vague as to the identity of these "peoples.") Yet blatantly missing
from her bibliography are the very people who have committed their
lives to this endeavor; from Edward Wilmot Blyden to Cheikh Anta
Diop, Duse Muhammad, Yosef Ben Jochannan, John Henrik Clarke,
and a host of other scholar/warriors from the African Diaspora.
We cannot mobilize for effective resistance to our physical
destruction unless we are ideologically liberated. What impedes that
liberation is cultural imperialism. European ."universalism" and its
attendant spurious "humanism" are very dangerous and effective
forms of European cultural imperialism.
Universalism, when translated scientistically, becomes objecti-
fication. The illusion of objectivity promotes the myth of universal-
istic commitment, that is, it is a stance that disavows political or
woup interest. It thereby services group interest more subtly by call-
Ing ii something other than what it is. We can conclude that this uni-
V<'rsalisni scma11tlcally represents European value, is not a
11nlversally .valid !,(onl, and, as an "imperative" serves the interest of
1:11ro1wt1nntllltr,11 i111111·rl;llismin tlw following manner: Oner• inrli-
•d t ll,111111IV<
vld11als n re 1w1:.1111<11 •1s,11d\i1raclt'rlsl i<·s Hrt' t lw prnpt.•r
Hnnh, 1:,11,11w,111
1111111,111 p,1111•111•,
,11111
vnl11,..11·1111ht• pJ1•s.-1ttc•d11•,uni
552 YURUGU
versa!, while others are labelled as "particular." Then European ide-

ology can be proselytized without the appearance of imposition, inva-
sion, conquest, exploitation, or chauvinism.
The European claim to "universalism" is a formidable weapon,
and victims of European aggression can successfully combat it if they
/we proceed as follows:
1. refuse to accept "universality" as either humanly possible or
desirable.
2. critically assess all universalistic concepts, including
monotheism, scientific objectivity, progressivism, abstract human-
ism; and reject them when they are found to represent European val-
ues only and to conflict with conceptualizations based on our own
ideologies.
3. accept nationalism, that is, cultural commitment, as a poten-
tially positive, liberating, and constructive expression of human
energy, depending on the specific content and definition that is given.
If we are mindful of these cultural facts, European self-interest
expressed as "universalism" will become highly visible as an expres-
sion of European nationalism and cultural commitment and will
thereby lose its intellectual and ideological effectiveness. We will be
able to recognize ourselves as victors. For it is now clear that
European universalism acts to fulfill the expansionist utamaroho, as
it serves the ideological function of utamawazo (cognitive structure)
and the power needs of the asili (cultural essence). Rather than bein~
understood, then, as the new nonpartisan morality of an international
order, we must interpret universalism, in its European context, in
terms of the particularity of the European asili. It is the quintessen
tial statement of European nationalism.
CONCLUSION
I
I
It was not always so. The desert was made the
desert, turned barren by a people whose spirit is
itself the seed of death. Each single one of them is a
carrier of destruction. The spirit of their coming
together, the purpose of their existence, is the
spread of death over all the earth. An insatiable
urge drives them.
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Conclusion
Vurugu,
The Incomplete Being
What It All Means
The concept of asili has been used throughout this study in the
search for pattern, consistency, and logos. It is a concept that seeks
to identify the germinating principle of the culture and to explain its
forms in terms of their ideological source. The concept of asili helps
us to understand that the distinctive character of Europeaness lies
precisely in Europe's resistance to exotic ideas or the ability to incor-
porate them in such a way that the asili is reinforced. The scattered
disssonant voices of the European tradition are made ineffective
through the power of the asili, itself power-seeking.
Europe and its diaspora emerges, then, as a monolith; as formi-
dable, persistent, and unidirectional. Its culture has the driving force
of a machine. The cultural scientist must ask: How does this machine
function? Why is it so successful in achieving its objective? Wherein
lies its uniqueness? (Other cultures have at times exhibited aggres-
sion, intense technological orientation, imperialistic behavior, and
other characteristics associated with European development, but
they have_,wvcr lwcn as successful in these pursuits as Europeans
have coll<'rlivt•ly. Tlwsc 1l'ndc>1Kicsnever combined or sustained
1ht•111s<•lvc•s ;\s tl11•yhav<· in llH' Wc•st.)1Tlw a11SWNS
ll101111•11·11111111·s
w,1v111wliti·II 1111•drn11l11,111t1111Hlt•sof till' <·11111111·
1.iywlllll111111' ,·0111
556 YURUGU
bine; the way in which they interrelate with and reinforce one
another. This synogistic effect, in turn, has as its source the ideolog-
ical premise of the culture, i.e., the logos of its asili. Having used this
concept to facilitate our study, we conclude that the success of
European culture depends on the symphonic meshing of its dominant
modalities around the theme of power.
The Workings of Yurugu

Yurugu, originally named Ogo, is described in Dagon mythol-
ogy as acting with "anxiety and impatience." He is "incessantly rest-
less," in search of the secrets of Amma (the creative principle), of
which he wants to "gain possession." He is known for his aggres-
siveness and incompleteness. 2 He is in a state of solitude, having
been deprived of his female principle; he is also impotent. 3 When
Yurugu, "the pale fox," reaches his final form of development, he is
"the permanent element of disorder in the universe," the "agent of dis-
organization." He was "marked" from birth for failure, to remain for-
ever incomplete; to search perpetually for his female principle. He is
not only the agent of cosmic disorder, but also of psychological indi-
vidualization.4
Perhaps we should begin with the despiritualization of the world
and its effect on day-to-day life. This is meant in an existential, onto-
logical sense, not in a strict theological sense. In essence, Europeans
have denied themselves the possibility of transcendence. This is cen-
tral because many of their creations are explicable as surrogates for
transcendence. The objective becomes that of attaining a sense of the
divine, an awareness of the sacred dimension, the experience of eter-
nality, which implies the suspension of ordinary time and profa1w
space, along with the capacity to exceed the boundaries of a con•
ceptually limited ego. Abstract categories of thought, conceptunl
absolutes, the syntax of universalism become the means by wllic-11
they are able to achieve the illusion of transcendence. But the cullw 1
forecloses on the consequences of faith and love, while in hi bit h11(
their precondition; i.e., spirituality. The universe loses its richness n-.
it is tranformed into lifeless matter; the supernatural is reduced l<> t I11·
"natural," which means to them, the merely biological ur physk;1I
Consequently, time can only be lineal; space, three-dimensional; ,ntrl
material causality, the ultimate reality. In European religious lhn11rtltl
the human and the divine are hopelessly split; tlwn· Is no suc1t·d
ground on which they ml!<'I. In sucl1 a s<'lting, tl1v <'lWHg1•n\11•d 111,1t1·
rlnl pllw·ll l<'s of 11it· <·111!111,, HI'!"'slr11plya 11•sultoft IJ1•pr ,,xi:. ol It•, p,11
tlr'l1~111t·, 111'tllt'li111ltl!•V. '1 lw 11",1tl11111I
11•,llltli•-.uff Ptt•d hy tl11•t 1111~111
Conclusion 557
materialism further despiritualizes the culture. So the circle is joined;

and European culture gives the appearance of being a self-perpetu-
ating system.
Let me explain further what I mean by the process of "despiri-
tualization"; how it occurs, why it is compelling. The answers lay in
the fact that only by obviating spirit can the world be made to appear
rational. The illusion of the appropriateness of the supremacy of the
rational mode requires an effectively despiritualized universe. It is a
process by which the human being is split into rational and irrational
(emotional) tendencies. These are thought to represent warring fac-
tions of her/his being. The rational self offers the possibility of knowl-
edge (control), while the emotional self is a constant threat to the loss
of control. The possibility of knowledge can only be realized when the
rational self is in control of that part of the self that interferes with
the rational pursuit. In this view the human being becomes properly
rational, only improperly, immaturely emotional. Other cultures are
experienced as the emotional, uncontrolled self. This control of the
emotions begins to imply the elimination of feeling, since the defini-
tion of knowledge is that which has been decontaminated of emo-
tional response. Since this definition comes to dominate and supplant
all others, Europeans learn to value unemotional behavior. It is by
being cold, uninvolved, "rational" that they gain respect; this is
referred to as the achievement of "objectivity."
But affective sensibility and response are crucial for the appre-
hension of spiritual truths; a prerequisite for the realization of the
human spirit and for the mode of participation. Rationalism and its
ascendance to the position of a dominant cultural mode, then dehu-
manizes humanity as it consciously despiritualizes the universe.
"Abstractification" (Kovel's term), a critical part of this process, helps
to remove the contemplated "object" from the human context,
thereby making it remote from the "knowing self." What is not near
cannot be felt. The more intensified this process becomes, the more
European intellect focuses on the things and objects it has created
through "abstractification" and objectification, and the less is under-
stood of what is truly human, as it escapes perception. Since this
activity of "knowing" (or controlling) is a means of experiencing
power, definitions are very important; naming, identifying and delin-
eating things conceptualizes them as claimed objects-a part of the
<'ll1pire. What is said to be "human" then becomes knowable by ratio-
nally dehumtuti,ing il: That is, it is made to fit into the system that the
"lc11owl'r" ,·nnt rnlH hy UH.:dt:finltion he or she i;:ivcs it. Thus spirit is
"1h'fi11p(I" 011I ol 1•xhl<'W 1•,
558 YURUGU
In terms of the reality that transcends that system, of course,

the spirit is there, and it suffers, contorts, and atrophies through
neglect and ignorance. It is impossible, after all, to ignore the spirit
without ignoring the "person." Consequently, such rationality helps
to create a certain kind of person ("individual"). Even as Europeans
seek to effectively despiritualize their surroundings, they are aware
of the spiritual aspect of existence. But given the premises of their
rationalisitic epistemology, it must remain forever unknowable, unat-
tainable. Spirituality represents a constant threat to the ordered sys-
tem they have constructed. They therefore suffer from a chronic
fear of spiritual implications; they distrust spirituality and human-
ness in people and in cultures. They must pretend that these phe-
nomena do not exist, and therefore are embarrassed by their
manifestations. (This, for instance is why African ritual has a ten-
dency to make Europeans uncomfortable or causes them to overre-
act.) European science serves as the supremely valued activity,
replacing "religion" (spiritual knowledge) as the primary means by
which anxiety is relieved. It succeeds only to the degree that it is able
to despiritualize the world.
The result of this many-faceted process is that all of these mech-
anisms are breaking down since the problem is spiritual in nature
and demands another perspective on existence, another world-view.
As formalized religion has taken on the character of the over-all cul-
ture, as it has become increasingly institutionalized, it has ceased to
be a repository of spiritual wisdom and is unable to function as a
source of spiritual-emotional well-being. "Religion" is thought also to
be properly rational, and the presence of the metarational in reli-
gious belief and activity is labelled as improper to human beings; this
thinking reaches its height in Protestantism. The natural cultural
function of religion is a vehicle through which one's world and one's
people become special and life sacred. As European religion
becomes more rationalistic, it loses the ability to sacralize the pro
fane, while simultaneously intensifying the political wasteland or
European experience. Indeed, the advent of European religion is t lw
pronouncement of its historicity. 5 This necessarily limits it to m1111
dane space and time; to temporal categories. Secularization .11111
desacralization are by-products of the process of rational ordering
There is no source of conflict with this process from "religious" q11,11
ters, since formalized European religion has itselr been sccul,u l;,t•cl
If nothing ls sacred, l'h<:!n110 acl is sacrilegious. Tlw n·:wll Iii" wrn Id
view tlt:11 t•11cou1<1f.lcS
attitudPs of arro~anc,• ,rnd dlsrc•sp1·1•I, ,1111
t 11dr•.;I lial ,tr.{' 1111IH' n1od11llty ul l111pos«'d011ln, rrnit I ol, ,111dp11wl'1
Conclusion 559
Conversely, humility, respect and a reverence for the natural order

are in the modality of harmony and balance.
What effect does this have on the "self" and other European
selves to which the world is forced to relate? It is a "self," or an "ego,"
for which no reservoirs of spiritual sustenance are provided, yet it is
faced daily with the granite surface of a materialized world. This ego
loses spirituality and frequently becomes deformed, or it maintains
its spirituality and goes "insane" as the culture defines "insanity." By
controlling the emotions and dulling the senses, "it" (the ego) is able
to project "itself" and is in a better position to seek the domination
of others. This attitude is supported by a rationalistic epistemology,
which, as we have seen, requires that the "self" be split and that its
emotional ground be denied. Yet that which is denied represents pre-
cisely the aspects of the human soul that allow one "self" to join with
another. It is spirit that allows for participation, identification, and
love; all are devalued modes in this minority. But they are the valid
repositories of authentic morality and creative aesthetic experience.
Intraculturally, there is no basis for morality. Instead, there is
merely a competitive ethic. The well-being and "success" of each
disparate "self" (or ego) is threatened by that of others. Instead of
being dependent on their well-being, European social structures
depend, for their proper, efficient functioning, on mutual aggression,
distrust, and competitiveness; i.e., fundamentally hostile relation-
ships. If love were to enter into these microsystems they would break
down. But they are ensured against this occurrence, since they breed
for cold calculation and reward competitiveness and aggression. In
a recent psychological test, the "male" personality was described as
"aggressive, assertive, ambitious, competitive, dominant, forceful,
independent, self-reliant"; while the "female" personality was "affec-
tionate, compassionate, gentle, loving toward children, loyal, sensi-
tive, sympathetic, understanding, warm." 6 Obviously, the "male"
characteristics correspond to the European self-image. They repre-
sent those behavioral tendencies that are valued in the culture and
are necessary for success in its systems. The so-called female traits
are those with which the culture does not wish to identify. They are
liahilities in a materialized world, all right for those who are to
remain in the home, but not for the leaders and bread winners.
Imbalance enters the picture.
In I his host ilc arrna of competing selves, Europeans guard their
sl'parnten1..;ssJcalonsly, under the lllusio11 that they are guarding their
I w, so11s, t I 1l'lt worth 111I wl11g,'l'ht•lr "fn.wclo111"Is tl1ought to lie l11till'
dlllllty lo 1,,. 111•111111l 'l'lwy ,fft' l,llt~ltl tu think 11ftllt•111s1•lws M, 111<•
560 YURUGU
"free-est" of people; a powerful agent of change. But the European

concept of individual freedom is only a reflection of the conceptually
delimited European "self" (ego), which, in painful isolation, becomes
increasingly passive. 7 The capacity for action has been defined only
in terms of a power relationship; i.e., either I am dominant, or I am
dominated-which again inhibits love. Moreover, along with spirit,
the mode of participation is devalued, since this "rational psyche" has
little basis from which to identify and merge with "other." The result
is that European forms do not allow for the active participation of the
mature self. You play according to the rules, or you don't play; and
you guard your reactions or you wilt be rejected as "unsophisti-
cated"-as subhuman. The creative and performing arts, normally
vehicles of transcendence, in the West are most often reflections of
the European utamawazo; i.e., analytical, impersonal and secular.
And since European art is primarily an individual rather than a com-
munal experience (the two become oppositions in the West), those
few exceptions who manage to perceive and express a vision of a dif-
ferent reality can only communicate it to others like themselves. The
culture as a whole remains untouched.
It is possible to start from any one aspect of the culture and gen-
erate its other aspects. And, what is more, these links do not follow
one fixed order. They are so closely and so well related that the rela-
tionship may be explained in any number of ways. But there is a level
on which they all become the same. They cohere and merge; they
come together on the level of the utamaroho and ideology in the orig-
inating asili. Through an understanding of the European utamaroho
and the asili, which demands it, every theme becomes one; every
mechanism a method of engaging in the same valued activity, of
achieving the same goal. The various modes of European culture arc
integrated by its ideological premise.
Utamaroho in Disequilibrium
The immortal gods have willed the Roman to rule all nations.
Cicero: Phillipics: 333
Utamaroho (the energy source of the culture) is the force t llnl
determines collective behavior. It manifests as the collective affectlw
being (personality) of the members of the culture, tending to sl;111
dardize their tastes and behaviors. It is the vital quality of the cult 1111•
and is uniquely defined according to the needs or the osi/i, wllh'll II
helps to fulfill. The phenomenon of th<' EurnpeHn 111011,wofw dt•rn,11uI•,
c•tl1110lof(l1·nl nttent1011. OtH'<'its (•ss<'lllid cl1t.r,1( ll'r b 1111cl1·1stn11d,It
ll1•1·11111t"• 1d111lvt•ly1•11-;y to "1n,1lwM'tlst•" of llll• pntt1·111of l-:11111111•,111
Conclusion 561
development. What are the characteristics euphemistically associ-

ated with this utamaroho'? "Spirit of adventure"; ''the love of challenge
and exploration"; "the conquering mood"; "a certain inventiveness,
ingenuity and restlessness"; "ambition"; "love of freedom.'' These
phrases signify the misinterpretation of an intensely devastating spir-
itual disease.
Twisted by the ideological demands of the culture into valued
characteristics, they are made to seem positive, superior, even
healthy. They are, instead, manifestations of a cultural ego in dise-
quilibrium. Created in a spiritless context, the European utamaroho
lacks the balance that comes from an informed experience of the
whole self. The self that then emerges-defined in disharmony-
seeks further to despiritualize its surroundings. The effectively
despiritualized context it creates redefines an utamaroho that is in
essential imbalance, in basic disequilibrium. Chronically insufficient
and spiritually inadequate, this utamaroho ever seeks spiritual ful-
fillment, a harmonious condition. Europe is a cultural statement of
Yurugu (see Author's Note, p. i), the male being, arrogant and imma-
ture, who caused his own incompleteness, and so is locked into a
perpetually unfulfilled search for the female twin-soul that would
make him whole, the part of himself he has denied.
The European utamaroho is seeking the self it lacks. But the pos-
sibility of spirituality as a recognized and valued dimension of expe-
rience has been denied to Europeans by the presuppositions and
definitions of their utamawazo, by their world-view, and perhaps, as
in the case of Yurugu, by the circumstances of their birth. They, there-
fore, interpret their needs to lie elsewhere; an error that sets in
motion the process of European development. Because assessment
of their needs is blurred by what Theodore Roszak has called "single
vision," because they search in the wrong dimension of human expe-
rience, and because they are, by definition, deficient (Yurugu), their
search is unending. The more unsatisfying the pursuit, the greater is
the assurance of the continued existence of an utamaroho in dise-
quilibrium; an unfulfilled spirit. The unchanging character of the
European utamaroho and the unidirectional driving force of the cul-
ture are therefore guaranteed. Its "success" and failure are insepara-
ble and causally linked.
This search is, after all, the expression of a universal human
need; It is I he need for peace (completion, wholeness). But the
Europcau has hl•c•11111lslNl hy 1he icl ological architects of his culture.
111•hat; h~ic>11tr1111-(l1I111lclc·11ttfy"pt•1wt•" wit II rntlonul order, ratlwr
I llan wll II I1:11111t111yH,allrn1,llnt clt•t ,11Hlhat 111m1lou~or d1•1n, ,. vr, y dlf
562 YURUGU
ferent. They represent two radically different modalities of being.

Remember that for Plato "justice" in the individual and in the State is
achieved by the rational ordering of conflicting elements; that is,
through the control of the irrational by the rational. The struggle to
control can never lead to harmony-the essence of spiritual well-
being. Rational ordering is predicated on the assumption of conflict
and opposition and, in European intensity, becomes a sublimated
form of violence. Rational order can never be more than a creation
of human beings in partial recognition of who they are; that is, in par-
tial recognition of their cosmic significance. Rational order is the
order of lesser beings, in this sense. Through it, they can only expe-
rience a part of what is possible. If they limit themselves to this order,
which they have created, they and their world become distorted,
which is how the asili was initiated, through a distortion of nature.
The apprehension of harmony requires the ability to "feel" for
and intuit a pre-existing order, pre-existing not in a temporal sense;
but in the sense that its existence is more comprehensive than that
which we can rationally consume or generate. Greater than we are,
its discovery takes us beyond ourselves, and yet is ourselves (but not
as persons are thought to think of themselves in the West). Its per-
ception requires, at least for the moment, transcendence beyond the
cognitively rational self. The experience of harmony is lodged in the
recognition of spirit, to which human intuitive response and interac-
tion are guideposts. It is predicated on interdependence. It is the
sense of this cosmic harmony that typically has lent majority cul-
tures their human and moral order; herein lies the philosophical pro-
fundity of African thought. 8 Human-made rational order has its place
but is only meaningful when understood to be a small part of an
ordered whole. It is only on the level of spirit that rationality can be:
positively integrated into the human context. When that level is nol
reached, that which is rationally ordered merely succeeds in clis
torting the environment and impairing the spirit.
The European utamaroho translates the search for fulfillme1ll
into fanatical expansionism. The expansionism endemic to Europea11
culture is constantly reinforced by the insatiable desire for compldt•
rational order; which, in concrete terms, comes to mean the F.uropl'ill t
ordering of the world. For the European utamaroho order couws 111
mean European control, since it is by projecting the ratio11al iwlr I h,ll
the world becomes ordered-a cultural definitio11 tlli'll ltl'lps lo 1·11·
ale a 1111lque 11/amwoho;a11utomomho that dt>rn,11Hls<·x,\rtly 11th,·111
ll1t,ll vl1·w 011ly hy 1l<:•st1nyi11g tilt• rnclL•r l11lwrt·11l111llw ,·11x11111•111111
ll1h 11/111111110/11111'1-(C
1w1,1l1•lt•;1•1fl't11Jt'c llrn1 uf 1•..:111:-i:-i11lrnllt11l1•d
l111
Conclusion 563
fulfillment of self. This utamaroho eternally seeks an emotional satis-

faction it cannot experience.
The ideology of progress is but an expression of this utamaroho.
It is predicated on the destruction of a harmonious, organic order and
seeks to replace it with a rational and mechanical one. This ideology
proffers a goal that can never be realized, for the sake of which human
beings consume as they destroy. Technological rationalization and
exploitative capitalistic enterprise are the social activities correlated
with this ideology and the utamaroho that created it. Global imperi-
alism (the destruction and consumption, or reordering of other cul-
tures) is the form of intercultural behavior the utamaroho demands.
The syntax of universalism is the ideological and cognitive manifes-
tation of this expansionistic utamaroho.
It is important to understand the relationship between expan-
sionism and control, since they give shape to the dynamics of the
European utamaroho. "To control," for this utamaroho, means to ren-
der passive. Once a thing, person, or culture can be "acted upon" at
will by the European self (ego), that self is considered to have
expanded. Expansionism is the increase of its domain. Hence the
European concept of "power," is the ability to manipulate and con-
trol-to make passive as an agent of change. It is power "over," not
power "through."
Power as Logos
This concept of power, then, born out of the nature of the
European utamaroho, becomes the pivotal term in European ethnol-
ogy; i.e., the nature of its center, its asili. The chronic disharmony and
imbalance of the utamaroho perverts spirit into lust. As emotional
security is sought via material control, the need for fulfillment
becomes the ceaseless will-to-power; i.e., the self-realization of the
asili. The nature of the utamaroho is itself the guaranteed source of
continued energy to be put at the service of the European quest for
greater and greater power. And this power-drive becomes the
"premise" of the culture-that fundamental aspect on which all oth-
ers depend. It is the European asili. All European forms cohere in its
dominant ideology. It has been the objective of this entire discussion
to demonstrate the historical and synchronic depth and pervasive-
ness of this iclcolngiral force, which the concept of asili has enabled
us to rcc-og11i1.t·. wit ll the prernise of the need for power as
l\<'~i11ni111,t
It l1Rs IH•1·111h mudc'.sof t•xprcssions orE11rop<'an
1 fi1wct,tilt• t11u11i11i111t
t 11<11 I Ill'! 111vlct1

l}!I,t 11111 t•tl111olo1-1ln11ly
I11•, 11111c• t.'Xpf;1ltrnhll'. Tl It' w1tl1111
wl111·1tHu•wlll 111p1,w1•1111lf!l11,1l1•~. .is wc•IItl1,1t tlw world lw
d1•111,1111ls
;i{j4 YURUGU
redefined in terms of power-relationships; every characteristic and

theme discussed can be understood as a mechanism designed to
achieve the illusion or actuality of European control.
It is not simply the aspects of the culture taken in isolation that
give them European definition. On a nonideological level, and along-
side other themes and values, they are to be found in all cultures. It
is the concept of power lying at the ideological base of the culture
that mandates the artificial "splits" that characterize the utamawazo.
It is the mode of power and dominance that requires abstraction to
be separated from concrete thought, which then become the two
sides of a value dichotomy. The "true" European becomes committed,
then, to the universalization of this value dichotomy; reifying one of
its terms (abstraction), while he demeans the other (concrete
thought). These are all steps in the "power process," which in terms
of thought issues from the utamawazo, the cognitive manifestation of
the asili. It is the mode of power that eliminates the possibility of
conceptual unities. It is in the mode of balance and harmony, on the
other hand, that unity can be perceived even in ambiguity, contrast,
and inconsistency, where the European mind sees merely a battery
of irreconcilable opposites (paradoxes).
European culture unfolds as a series of (1) definitions in which
the world is consistently, and on every level, divided into the "con-
quering self" and the "controllable other"; and (2) mechanisms by
which this self is assured emotional remoteness from the dominated
object. This is the origin of the "impersonalism" Diamond recognizes
and Roszak has called the "alienating dichotomy." 9 The cognitive self
is split into that which controls and that which is or should be co11-
trolled, and this projects into a self-image in which the Europeans
become the "destroying saviors." "Others" are simply imagined to
be like that part of themselves that is to be controlled; that part or
themselves that is "object." Just as they must not allow themselves
to be defined by that irrational/emotional part of themselves, seek
ing always to decrease its potential, so the culture as a whole gains
power by denying these "others" the capacity for self-definition.
Since all spirituality conflicts with the European concept ol
power, the possibility of spirit threatens its achievement. 011a p1·1
sonal level this makes love relationships even conceptually pro!)
lematical, since love and power, as they are understood In the W,•~I,
an' opposites; love representing loss of scH and thf'rdore of cnr1l10I,
wlillr pr1w1•rclcmancls control of S(>lfa11clcrnol io11r1l n•11101c•1wssIt h
011 ,rn fi1lc-rr11ltw:II lt·vel ll1nl llw PXpri,• slu11 of tl111 l·'.11111pPIIII 11/11
'""'"''" 111·1 0111, .. , 11111·,t .. ,11 A•, w,• llt1Vl'i;t•1•11,
,,v1<1 1111111•l.11r11p1•1111
Conclusion 565
understanding, power is predicated on destruction. The maintenance

of the European utamaroho requires the destruction of other peo-
ples. They are the ideal objects of European power since they are
most remote from the European self-image. With the redefinition of
"humanness" in terms of "rationality" (European power), other peo-
ple become subhuman; they must therefore be controlled ( culturally
destroyed). This can be done without the moral disruption of
European culture, since with the help of objectification such destruc-
tion is either not experienced or elaborately rationalized.
While the utamaroho demands the destruction of others, it is
simultaneously dependent on the existence of the "cultural other" for
its definition and functioning. It is, after all, the European utamaroho
that is least self-sufficient. Without "other" there is no possibility of
powe~. It is in this sense that European culture can never be self-
reliant or even constructively isolationist. Europe itself is barren,
depending on the resources (spiritual as well as material) of others
for its existence. In accordance with the historical record of European
intercultural behavior, capitalism demonstrates this well; it is acquis-
itive and exploitative in principle. It must ever seek new markets to
control, new resources to exploit. It can never be a system at rest.
Communalism and the African world-view, on the other hand, are
predicated on balance and interrelationship, on the eternality of the
moment.
Ontologically, the European experience demands that the uni-
verse become an aggregation of distinctly disparate beings, eternally
independent of one another. The cosmos is reduced simply to the
superhuman, rational, European cultural ego, and all other forms of
life are despiritualized. This justifies our exploitation; use without
replenishment, without regard for natural order or being.
Universalism, in European thought, is the translation of the
omnipotence-ideal into a mental category, and ideological and ethi-
cal mandates. All modes of the utamawazo and ideology state the
normative imperative of universal forms and act to create the illusion
of total control. Science, representing the epitome of rational control
and manipulation to the European mind, becomes, as Kovel says, a
primary means of power. Scientism is but its universalistic expres-
sion. Since the desire for power-Le., ever expanding control-is the
basis of European culture, its values must necessarily be presented
ns universal valut·s. Tlw characteristics of the European uta-
mow(1zn It's h11t•mw 1:1tlonali:-;r11, analysis, objectification, and lin-
l'tLllly ,Ill t•o11ltlh111,,to 11H' lll11slo11 of lntt'llcctual power a11d
tlu•n•fn,c•111llw 111 llll•v1•1111•11t
11l111,1INl:tlpowN. Tlwy 1111• 11wnwC'11
566 YURUGU
anisms of mental control and manipulation necessary for the episte-

mological transformation of the world into something that does not
question the European asi/i, but complements the European uta-
maroho, and guarantees white supremacy.
The ideology of progress is a power ideology. It states the desir-
ability of total control of the environment through an increasingly
rationalized technical order, at the same time providing the moral jus-
tification for universal European supremacy. European religion is an
aspect of this progress ideology; shaped by the utamawazo and uta-
maroho, it also morally supports the dominance of European forms
by mandating the universal imposition of the culture. Even European
scientific humanism acts to enhance the illusion of power for the ben-
efit of the utamaroho. This exalted ethical statement is a perversion
of that which is morally valid. "Abstract love" is the absence of love.
Like the Christian concept of "agape," it is love uncontaminated by
humanness. Through rationalism and abstractification, European
humanism helps to remove the moral agent from the human context.
What is considered moral action loses existential meaning. The ulti-
mate result is the ascendency of European definitions, which helps
the European to become, once again, the protagonist. There is no
aspect of intercultural behavior in which the utamaroho will allow
the European to be "taught" by majority peoples or to participate as
a noncompeting equal. (fhis is why the idea of Africans seeking
"equality" "from" Europeans is an apolitical approach to reality.
Equally absurd is the attempt to "enlighten" or "change" them.) The
success of the culture is due to the fact that nothing within it ideo-
logically conflicts with the quest for power. So-called European
humanism, at best, redirects the power drive by emphasizing its intel-
lectual expressions; and humanitarianism becomes paternalism, "
disguised form of European supremacy. The culture itself is designed
to be a dehumanizing force; European humanism is a contradiction
in terms.
All modes of European behavior and dominant styles of actlo11
act to increase and ensure material control. Protestantism is the ultl
mate ethical statement of the individual behavioral pattern rwct•s
sary for control on all levels. In terms of the logic of the culturt•, .ill
of these cultural phenomena become mechanisms of power, which 111
turn feed an already deformed utamaroho. The power ideology t !tat
defines the total culture keeps it off-balance. The c11lturc•it:wlf
always "progressing," never "progress<"d"-ls 11nidln•ctln11,d,0111·
d111wnslo11ul, ram1tic:al, and ntrophied, a nilt1trl• tlt;it 11111st
t'w1s11111I
11tltc•1~1\1111lltlt11att'ly tills l<l1•0l11gyf:; lt1<'olw11•11t;
11 lll1•1,11lylack
Conclusion .567
human meaning. It is the compulsiveness, the drive, the insatiable

appetite of the culture that are its distinguishing features (Kovel
speaks of a "cosmic yearning," an "endless striving," a "bottomless
longing"). It is as well-constructed as a power machine can be. Its
asili guarantees power over "others." In this respect, Spengler is right.
The culture is Faustian. For success it has sacrificed "soul." What is
left is profane. Aesthetically, and in terms of self-image, it identifies
as white. Europe is the cultural home of a people who identify as one
race; i.e., banding together for survival and destruction of others.
They would destroy each other if there were not others to destroy.
They fear and hate blackness, which they associate with spiritual
power-a power which they can neither possess, create, nor con-
trol.
Imposing the Cultural Self

Here is an example of European nationalism:
A cooperative attitude of unity must eventually take place amongst

all western peoples for the naked purpose of survival. In this age of
anti-westernism the ideal of common brotherhood must take root
amongst Americans, Scandinavians, South Africans, Australians, or
whatever. IO
Explicit statements such as this one are not hard to identify,

and they resemble nationalistic expression of other cultures, only
the names are different. European nationalism generally, however,
finds more indirect and complex means of expression. It is the com-
mitment to sustain the conventional definitions and themes of
European culture. We have identified these, as mechanisms by which
power and supremacy are maintained. Since the success of the cul-
ture conflicts with the survival of other cultures as self-defining enti-
tities, European nationalism becomes cultural imperialism and
therefore denies the validity of the self-determination of other cul-
tures. With an understanding of the European asili, the ideology of the
culture and its nationalistic expression become more visible. This
new visibility makes the European assault easier to assess and to
combat ideologically and politically.
As a single phenomenon, European cultural imperialism is the
attempt to prnst·lyt lze, encourage, and project European ideology.
The w;lli is i11qwrlallhtIC'hy <kfinition. The cultural self is spread in
ordt'r Io rout ml ot l,1,, •,, ,111'I hv t'Ont rolling others the culture spreads
l11q1l11•sE11ropean t•xpanslo11isrn, ti 1111,In
ftp,1•lf.l·'.111np1•,11111,,11111i.ilh111
111111, 1•'1111,111
1 1111
ll11p1•1l11lh111.1'.111·np1•;1111111tl1111,dl-;tll'
1·xp11·1'
568 YURUGU
sion takes the form of rhetoric or behavior which seeks to increase

European power. In this sense, the European utamaroho is by defini-
tion nationalistic. The culture is inherently expansionistic; it seeks not
self-determination, but imperial dominion (for that, as Cicero has so
aptly put it, is European self-expression). Above all it seeks the uni-
versal imposition of European ideology, and the most effective means
of achieving this has been by packaging it in what appear to be non-
valuative terms. We can now enumerate the general categories into
which the various manifestations and forms of European cultural
imperialism fall. The various chapters of this study are replete with
specific examples of each of these forms of expression.
The Forms of Expression of

European Cultural Nationalism
European imperialism/expansionism:
All cultural statements and styles of behavior that aid this objec-
tive. Included in this form of expression are all wars in which the
Europeans have been involved, as well as such cultural mechanisms
as the rhetorical ethic.
Theories of white supremacy:

This includes the systematic attempt to destroy positive self-
images of African and other majority peoples.
Theories of European supremacy:

This is exemplified by the ideology of progress, the Judeo•
Christian formulation, unilinear cultural evolution, etc.
All vehicles used to promote theories

of white and European supremacy:
This would include the use of their popular media to dcpi<.:I
European invaders as morally heroic victims of non-European "sav-
agery" and brutality; such mechanisms as I.Q. testing; the dominant
thrust of European social theory and European speculative philosopl 1y
The defamation of all African and other majority nationalisrn~,
cultural and ethnic identification, and attempts at self-definition.
European humanism:
This Is nationalistic insofar as it tends to promote E111op1•,111
forms, I he European utamcrwazo,a scient Ifie-rat lrnrnl vl<•w nf I111
lHllllilH. lht• 111ythology nf F.11ropt·a11 1;11t'\IN'l1mls11111•ilrnlly,H11d
°'''I wrtkl,il l1111'n·1111·111
all:,111.
Conclusion 569
Liberal ideology:
This is characterized by a deemphasis of European limitations
and deficiencies, by the attempt to place them on a nonideological
level, as well as the attempt to co-opt critical thought (that is, to make
it ineffective). This acts to maintain the culture with the same ideo-
logical commitment and in the same power position vis-a-vis other
cultures.
The devaluation of spirit:

This can take the form of the debasement of spirituality in other
peoples and other cultures, and the attempt to spread cynicism-
convincing others that there is no spiritual reality. When successful,
this is a very powerful weapon of European cultural imperialism.
The celebration of material power:

Along with the devaluation of spirit, when effective, this suc-
ceeds in reducing everything to European hegemony.
As a general rule for identifying expressions of European cultural
imperialism, statements must always be put into the context of
European ideology; that is, they must be interpreted in terms of the
European asili. It is here that they become statements of nationalis-
tic commitment, and only in this setting can their relationship to our
political interests be determined.
Towards a Vision of the Human Spirit

Ayi Kwei Armah writes:
What a scene of carnage the white destroyers have brought here,
What a destruction of bodies, what a death of souls!
Against this what a vision of creation yet unknown,

higher, much more profound than all erstwhile creation!
What a hearing of the confluence of all the waters of life
flowing to overwhelm the ashen desert's blight!
What an utterance of the coming together of all the peoples of our
way, the coming together of all people of the way. 11
Their news was also of relationships of a beauty still to be realized,

of paths to be found.
Their news was of tl1e way, the forgotten and the future way.12
t\11l>NH11yIs 111tlt1· n1•11tlw p11rposl" of our relationships;

,Ill ugly1H•1,sh, 11111\1•d1111l1111·tiv1•al111so( tlw cl<'slroyr•r's ;1r1·a111{C.
...
111,1•11I
s
570 YURUGU
The mind that knows this, the destroyers will set traps for it,
but the destroyers' traps will never hold that mind.
The group that knows this and works knowing this,
that group itself is a work of beauty, creation's work. 13
The image of the West with which the world has been bom-
barded is one that has served the purposes of continued European
political and cultural/ideological domination. European cultural
imperialism has done a formidable job. Since Plato the intellectual
energies of Europeans have been devoted to convincing themselves
and others of their superiority. As a result, the European tradition
is a bastion of propaganda, and those who do not share European
commitments have been forced to occupy themselves with denying
the validity of this portrait; i.e., with refuting its inherent arguments
and with offering a different view of the meaning of European devel-
opment.
But in this endeavor there is a danger of becoming "possessed"
ourselves by the very definitions that we have denied. Now that we
have broken the power of their ideology, we must leave them and
direct our energies toward the recreation of cultural alternatives
informed by ancestral visions of a future that celebrates our
Africaness and encourages the best of the human spirit. Each of the
cultures historically victimized by Europe must reclaim its own
image. As for those of us who are African, our salvation (redemption)
lies in our ancientness and connectedness; not in a romanticized glo
rification of the past, but in a return to the center in which all con-
tradictions are resolved and from which the spiral of development
can continue with clarity. From the center, ikons can be retrieved in
our image that will allow us to tap the energy of the collective con
scious will of our people.
It is our destiny not to flee the predators' thrust

not to seek hiding places from destroyers left
triumphant; but to turn against the predators advancing,
turn against the destroyers, and bending all our
soul against their thrust, turning every strategem
of the destroyers against themselves, destroy them.
That is our destiny: to end destruction - utterly;
to begin the highest, the profoundest work of creation, tlw wnrk
that is inseparable from our way, inseparable
from the way.
Notes
Introduction
1. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, Nok Publishers, Lagos, 1978,p. xiv;
Carter G. Woodson, The Mis-Education of The Negro, AMS Press, New
York, 1977.
2. Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie, and lhechukwu Madubuike, Toward the
Decolonization of African literature, Vol. I, Howard University Press,
Washington, D.C., 1983; Iva Carruthers, "War on African Familyhood," in
Sturdy Black Bridges, Roseann Bell, Betty Parker, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall
(eds.), Anchor Press, Garden City, N.J., 1979.
3. Kathleen Gough, "Anthropology and Imperialism," in Monthly Review, April
1968, pp. 12-23.
4. Dona Marimba Richards, "From Anthropology to African-centered Cultural
Science," unpublished paper. New York, 1984.
5. Wade Nobles, Africanity and the Black Family, Black Family Institute
Publications, Oakland, Ca., 1985, p. 103.
6. Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force: African Heritage in Afro-American Religion,
Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1974, p. 6.
7. Willie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p. 27.
8. Raymond Betts, (ed.) The Ideology of Blackness, D.C. Heath and Company,
Lexington, Mass., 1971, p. v.
9. Barrett, p. 6.
10. Morris Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," in American Joumal
of Sociology, Vol. 51, 1945, p. 98.
11. Robin Williams, American Society, 3rd ed., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970,
p. 22.
12. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, Anchor Press, Garden City, N.J., 1976, p. 42.
13. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York, 1979.
14. Wade Nobles, "Alrican Consciousness and liberation Struggles:
Implications (or the Development and Construction of Scientific
l'aracligms, l'Mt I," Jnumal of /J/ucl<Studies, Vol. I, November 3, 1985,San
Fr.indsco St.11!·IJ111v1•r<illv, Blark Studies Department.
I:>. l lu11lt•r i\cl,1111!., ":-it,,,t,•gh••·'l'nw:irtl the Rl'('OVl'ry ol Meta-Conscious Alriran
1'11111wl1t ill N(•W York. (i .lurw I !)87; Mol<.•lrKt'l('
," (t•t I111,. Ht ( 'It V ( '11lleov,1·
/\•,111t1, \1111,,•11111,1/1• II,,· J/11•111v11/','11,/11/f'l111mw,11·v l'<l,Alrl1·11Wwltl
!'11 11, I 11•1111111 1'1/ll,, "' p11ltlt11h1•tl1!11{11.
572 YURUGU
16. Robert Armstrong, Wellspring: On the Myth and Source of Culture, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 94.
17. Ibid, p. 96.
18. Professor Ibrahim Sherif (African Studies, Rutgers University) and
Professor Jaffer Kassimali (African and Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter
College) have helped me with the construction of these terms.
19. Gregory Bateson, Nauen, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958, p. 25.
20. Ibid, p. 220.
21. Ibid, p. 115.
22. Ibid, p. 311.
23. Ibid, p. 212.
24. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1976, p. 439.
25. Nobles, pp. 104-105.
26. M. Karenga, Kawaida Theory, Kawaida Publications, Inglewood, N.J., 1980,
p. 90.
27. Eli Sagan, The Lust to Annihilate: A Psychoanalytical Study of Violence in
Ancient Greek Culture, Psychohistory Press, New York, 1985; Joel Kovel,
White Racism: A Psychohistory, Vintage, New York, 1971.
28. Norman Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. I, Scott,
Foresman, Atlanta, 1969, p. 3.
29. Ibid, p. 4.
30. Ibid, p. 5.
31. Ibid, p. 8.
32. Quoted in George 0. Adams, "The Idea of Civilization," in Civilization,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 45.
33. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. I, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1928, p. 3.
34. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, rev. ed.,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, p. 13.
35. Stanley Diamond, Search for the Primitive, Transaction Press, New
Brunswick, N.J., 1974, p. 118.
36. Dona Marimba Richards, "Toward the Demystification of Objectivity," in
Imhotep, Journal of Afrocentric Thought, Vol. I, No. 1, Department of
African American Studies, Temple University, 1989.
37. Nobles, p. 104.
38. Asante, Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change, Africa World Press,
Trenton, 1986.
39. Ibid.
Notes 573
Part I - Thought and

Iconography
Chapter 1 - Utamawazo:
The Cultural Structuring of Thought
1. Plato, Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.I, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Random House, New York, 1937, p. 10; George James, Stolen Legacy,
Julian Richardson, San Franscisco, 1976; Theophile Obenga, "African
Philosophy of the Pharoanic Period," in Egypt Revisited, 2nd ed., Ivan Van
Sertima (ed.), Transaction, New Brunswick, 1989.
2. Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1967, p. 200.
3. Ibid, p. 236.
4. Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics, Bantam Books, New York, 1977, p. 9.
5. Plato, The Republic, Bk. IV:431,The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, trans. Benjamin
Jowett, Random House, New York, 1937.
6. Paul Goodman, "Polarities and Wholeness: Gestalt Critique of 'Mind,' 'Body,'
'External World,"' in Sources, Theodore Roszak (ed.), Harper and Row,
New York, 1972.
7. Iva Carruthers, "Africanity and the Black Woman," in Black Books Bulletin,
1980, Vol. VI, No. 4.
9. Ibid, p. 116.
10. Ibid, p. 117.
11. Page duBois, Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-history of the Great
Chain of Being, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1982, p. 16.
12. Vernon Dixon, "World Views and Research Methodolgy," in African
Philosophy, Lewis King, Vernon Dixon, and Wade Nobles (eds.), Fanon
Center Publications, Los Angeles, 1976.
13. duBois, p. 2.
14. Dixon.
15. duBois, p. 5.
16. duBois, p. 9.
17. Stanley Diamond, Search for the Primitive, Transaction Press, New
18. Frances Cress Welsing, The Isis Papers: The Keys to the Colors, Third World
Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 1-14.
19.Havelock, Ch. 11.
:W.Dixon, p. 55.
21. Havelock, p. 22:{.
:a. Thcoclorc.l<oszak, Wlw,v Ille• Wastetnnd J:.'nds,Doubleday, New York, 1972,
p, 68,
r1 1'11110,n11•11/1
1
/11.~,11111111 I 1111111111),
I 1.1111111 '1'111• Art!!l1rc•~11,Ni•w Yrnk,
I.IIJ1•111I
Ill ,11,JI. II{I
574 YURUGU
24. Richard King, "African Origins of Psychobiology," lecture at City College,

New York, 1987.
25. duBois, p. 132.
26. Ibid, p. 138.
27. Plato, Phaedrus, p. 264c, quoted in duBois, p. 138.
28. duBois, p. 138.
29. Quoted in duBois, p. 139.
30. Jurgen Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society Vol. I, Beacon
Press, Boston, 1984, p. 68.
31. Richard King, "African Origins of Psychobiology," lecture at City College,
New York, 1987.
32. Francis Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Bobbs Merrill Educational
Publishing, Indianapolis, 1957, p. 102.
33. Plato, Theatetus, trans. Francis Cornford, Liberal Arts Press, New York,
1959, p. 102.
34. Plato, Timeaus, p.12.
35. Friedrich Juenger, The Failure of Technology, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago,
1956, p. 107.
36. Havelock, p. 197.
37. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner Books, New York, 1978.
38. Carl Sagan, The Dragons of Eden, Ballantine Books, New York, 1977.
39. Henri Frankfort and H.A. Frankfort, "Myth and Reality," in The Intellectual
Adventure of Ancient Man, Frankfort et al. (eds.), University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1977, pp. 14, 20, 21.
40. Habermas, p. 70.
41. Ibid, p. 74.
42. Diamond, p. 192.
44. J.B. Levi, The Ancient Egyptian Language: Pathway to Africa, unpublished
paper, 1984.
45. Frankfort and H.A. Frankfort, pp. 3-27.
46. Havelock, pp. 190-210.
47. Amos Wilson, "The Mis-education of Black Students," lecture at Hunter
College, New York, April 29, 1988.
48. Plato, Republic, Bk X:605.
51. Edward T. Hall quoted in J. Brown, "Plato's Republic as an Early Study 111
Media Bias and a Charter for Prosaic Education," in American
Anthropologist, 1973, Vol. 74, No. 3.
53. R.A. Schwaller De Lubicz, Symbol and the Symbolic, trans, Robert awl
Deborah Lawlor, Autumn Press, Brookline, Mass., 197H,p. 5!5.
54. Ibid, p. 44.
!55.Ibid, p. 27.
5/.i.Dii1l11()11d, pp. 3-'1.
11•'1•1,N,•wVrnl
!i7 111. S!•,1rl,..,, /,11/{wrmr!Scw111iftr M1•//1ot/,. :lllll t·d, 1<011,11111
1
I'1',(,,'p •I
Notes 575

59. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, Anchor Press, New York, 1977, p. 9.
61. Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1959,p.117.
62. Ibid, p. 91.
63. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophies, Anchor Press, New York,
1970, pp. 127-129.
64. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1959,
p. 21.
65. Dona Marimba Richards, "European Mythology: The Ideology of Progress,"
in Black Contemporary Thought, Molefi Asante and Abdulai Vandi (eds.),
Sage Publlications, Los Angeles, 1985, p. 218.
66. Juenger, pp. 35-36.
67. Ibid, p. 39.
68. Ibid, p. 46.
69. Ibid, p. 48.
70. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967,
p. 57.
71. Edmund Carpenter, "The New Languages," in Explorations in
Communication, Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan (eds.),
Beacon Press, Boston, 1960, p. 162.
72. Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, Harcourt Brace, New York,
1954,p.xi.
73. James, pp. 114-130.
74. Aristotle, Introduction to Aristotle, Richard McKeon (ed.), Modern Library,
New York, p. 248.
75. De Lubicz, p. 78.
76. Frankfort and Frankfort, pp. 15, 20.
77. Cedric X. Clark, "Some Implications of Nkrumah's 'Consciencism' for
Alternative Coordinates in Non-European Causality," in African
Philosophy, Lewis M. King, Vernon J. Dixon, and Wade W. Nobles (eds.),
Fanon Center Publication, Los Angeles, pp. 117-118.
78. Leonard Barrett, Soul Force, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1974, Ch. 2.
79. Clark, p. 118.
80. Carl Spight, "Towards Black Science and Technology," in Black Books
Bulletin, Fall 1977, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 6-11, 49.
81. Hunter Adams, "African Observers of the Universe," in Journal of African
Civilizations, 1979, Vol. I, No. 2.
82. Quoted in Adams, p. 5.
83. Quoted in Adams, p. 6.
8'1. De Lubicz, p. 9 l.
85. Hall, p. 1I.
8G.lbicl, p. 24:t
100:-m.quot\•d 111Dixon, "World Views and Researd1
87. Aristotle·, M1,1a11//y,\ICs,
MctlwdoloJ<y,"p, /h
MA 111xon, pp 71, 71i
80 I luvdoc k, p nr,
576 YURUGU
90. Francis Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978.
92. Ibid, p. 194.
93. Alvin Gouldner, Enter Plato, Basic Books, New York, 1965.
94. Lewis Richards, Ancient Greek Literature in Translation, Vol. II, Chicago,
1986, p. 372.
95. Ibid, p. 64.
96. Gouldner, p. 190.
97. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press.
Cambridge, 1966, p. 12.
98. Ibid, p. 45.
99. Norman Brown, Life Against Death, Wesleyan University Press, Middleton,
Conn., 1959, p. 274.
100. William James, The Writings of William James, John H. McDermott (ed.),
Random House, New York, 1968, pp. 498-500.
101. Ibid, p. 431.
102. Willie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p. 19.
103. B. Edwards, Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain, J.P. Tarcher, Los
Angeles, 1979, p. 29.
104. Hunter Adams, "Strategies. Toward the Recovery of Meta-Conscious
African Thought," lecture at City College of New York, 6 June, 1987.
105. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982, p. 47.
106. Ibid, pp. 59-65.
107. Ibid, p. 66.
108. Ibid, pp. 69, 72, 73.
109. Ibid, pp. 103-104.
110. Ibid p. 93.
111. Ibid, p. 79.
112. Ibid, pp. 104-105.
113. Ibid, pp. 101-103.
114. Ibid p. 221.
115. Ibid, p. 106.
116. Ibid, pp. 439-440.
117. Erich Neumann, "On the Moon and Matriarchal Consciousness," in Fo.tllf'1--.
and Mothers: Five Papers on the Archetypal Background of Family
Psychology, Spring Publications, Zurich, 1973, p. 46.
118. Ibid, p. 48.
119. Hall, p. 191.
120. David Sidney, "The Concept of Meta-Anthropology and its SignIfie amt' 1111
Contemporary Anthropological Science," in Ideological Difference:; (lftr/
World Order, F.S.C.Northrop (ed.), Yale University Pn•ss, Nc·wI h1v1•111
1949, p. 325.
121. Cioulcl11er,p, 191.
1:!2. lhld, p 121
Ii:1 111111,p 'IOh
Notes 577
124. Katherine George, "The Civilized West Looks at Primitive Africa: 140(.)..
1800," in The Concept of the Primitive, Ashley Montagu (ed.), The Free
Press, New York, 1968, pp. 178, 182.
125. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1937, pp. 26-27.
126. Ibid, p. 26.
127. Roszak, Where The Wasteland Ends, p. 164.
128. Ibid, pp. 170, 173.
129. Ibid, p. 168.
130. Ibid, p. 248.
131. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 21.
132. Ibid, p. 327.
133. Ibid, p. 59.
134. Ibid, pp. 183, 63.
135. Ibid, pp. 58-59.
136. Ibid, p. 199.
137. Ibid, p. 187.
138. duBois, p. 13.
139. Niebuhr, p. 14.
140. Abraham, The Mind of Africa, p. 42.
141. Ibid, p. 24.
142. Ibid, pp. 15-16.
143. Ibid, p. 48, pp. 61, 51. •
144. Havelock, Preface to Plato, p. 205.
145. Ibid, p. 197.
146. Plato, Laws, Bk. IX:875C. The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Random House, New York, 1937, p. 620.
147. Lovejoy, p. 324.
148. Ibid, p. 198.
149. Juenger, The Failure of Technology, p. 155.
150. Lovejoy, p. 328.
151. Ibid, p. 329.
152. Ibid, pp. 331-332.
153. Ibid, p. 333.
154. Dixon, "World Views ... " p. 57.
155. Ibid, p. 56.
156. RA. Schwaller De Lubicz, The Sacred Science, Inner Traditions, New York,
1982, p. 9.
157. Ibid, p. 18.
158. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago,
1979, p. 4.
159. Capra, pp. 10-11.
160. lbld, p. 7.
161. lbld, p.9.
162.Ibid, p. H.
10:-1. 1 N,·wYork, 1!!57,p. 102.
Vin~•ll<'lorl,1,(iotl /,, /~1•,/,1)1•lt,1ll11111i
1(1'1lhld, p. 10:1
l(i', lhld, p. I l'i.
578 YURUGU
166. Frankfort and Frankfort, p. 4.

167. Jennifer Brown, "Plato's Republic as an Early Study of Media Bias and a
Charter for Prosaic Education," American Anthropologist, Vol. 74, No. 3,
1973,p.673.
168. Armah, p. 321.
Chapter 2 - Religion and Ideology

I. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Williard R. Trask, Harcourt
Brace, New York, 1959.
2. John G. Jackson, "Egypt and Christianity," in Journal of African Civilizations,
Vol. IV, No. 2, Nov. 1982, pp. 65-80; Yosef Ben-Jochannan, African Origins
of Major "Western Religions," Alkebu-Lan Books, New York, 1973; J.M.
Robertson, Pagan Christs, University Books, New York, 1967; Gerald
Massey, Ancient Egypt: Light of the World, rev. ed., Random House, New
York, 1973; T.W. Doane, Bible Myths; And Their Parallels in Other
Religions, University Books, New Hyde Park, New York, 1971.
3. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Anthropological
Approaches to the Study of Religion, Michael Banton (ed.), Praeger, New
York, 1966).
4. Plato, Republic, Bk. VII: 531, 525, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Random House,
New York, 1977.
5. George Steiner, Language and Silence, Atheneum, New York, 1967.
6. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard Universtiy Press,
7. In European culture, this conservative function must be self-conscious,
mechanical, and exacting in order to stabilize the culture and maintain
its ideological thrust, since a crucial aspect of the ideology is constant
superficial change. In traditional, classical African and other non-
European cultures, this relationship between stasis and creativity is a
much more organic one, i.e, until the intrusion of Europe.
8. Hugh J. Schonfield, The Passover Plot, Bantam, New York, 1967, p. 16.
9. Ibid, p. 195.
10. Terence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, Random House, New York.
1971, p. 6.
I I. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. II, Alfred A. Knopf, New Yu1I<,
1928, p. 219.
12. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, p. 42.
13. Schonfield, p. 8.
14. Ibid, p. 4.
15. Ibid, p. 211.
16. Arthur E. R. Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD., 4th ell., Mac111illa11, Nt•w
York, 1955,p. 393.
17. Norman Baynes, "Consta11tine Tht' Grent a11d th~ Chri:ll 11111 C"l111rd1,"
In 'l/11
l',nn•edings of tlw n111M1Anu/v111y,Vi1I.XV, I h1t)1plir1•yMlllw d, Lo11du11,
l'IW,,p :1
"'l'I ,t• <'1111v1•1
I IL I•11111'1111''1 111l'i 111•11111111111•,"
Nl1111 111/ft,11111
1 11/ II 1•~/1•111
Notes 579
Civilization, Topic IV, Christianity in the Ancient World, University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, p. 9; orig. published 324 A.O.
19. Ibid, pp. 13-14.
20. Boak, p. 432.
21. Timothy Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1981.
22. Ibid, p. 210.
23. Boak, p. 433.
24. Ibid, p. 434.
25. Eusebius, pp. 10-11.
26. Boak, p. 502.
27. Baynes, Constantine The Great, p. 15.
28. Ibid, p. 17.
29. Ibid, p. 20.
30. Ibid, p. 19.
31. Ibid, p. 31.
32. Ibid, p. 26.
33. Aristides in William H. McNeill, History of Western Civilization: Selected
Readings, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 31.
34. Baynes, Constantine The Great, p. 5.
35. Ibid, p. 36.
36. Ibid, p. 3.
37. Jackson, pp. 65-80.
38. Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels, Vintage, New York, 1981, p. 5.
39. Ibid, p. 4.
40. Schonfield, p. 4.
41. Pagels, p. 7.
42. Ibid, p. 8.
43. Ibid, p. 12.
44. Ibid, p. 14.
45. Ibid, p. 17.
46. Ibid, p. 30.
47. Ibid, p. 32.
48. Ibid, p. 56.
49. Ibid, p. 48-49.
50. Ibid, p. 51.
51. Ibid, pp. 44, 46, 47, 52.
52. Dona Marimba Richards, "Let the Circle Be Unbroken: The Implications of
African-American Spirituality," in Presence Africaine, Nos. 117/118, 1981,
pp. 247-292.
53. Spengler, Decline of the West, Vol. 11,p. 217.
54. Norman Baynes, The Political Ideas of St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei, George
Philip an<I Son, London, 1949, pp. 89.
55. Ibid, p. 7.
56. Aug11stlric·,/'1/y p/ (;(I(/, 111Th<' Basic Writings of St. Augustine, Vol. 11,
Whl\H\'Y I, 01111.., ("d ), l(,ll1(li>111110,,sc, New York, 1948,p. 86.
[,7 "l'olllic',111,h•Hi.," 11 1:1
!lK Nif•l111ln,Vt1I l,p ''Iii
580 YURUGU
59. Baynes, "Political Ideas," p. 14.

60. Augustine, p. 491.
61. Carlton W. Molette Ill, "Afro-American Ritual Drama," in Black World,
Vol. XX.II,No. 6, 1973, pp. 54-56
62. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man Vol. I, p. 216.
63. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophies, Doubleday, Garden City,
N.J., 1970, p. 5.
64. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, Vintage, New York, 1965, p. 232.
65. L.J. Cheney, A Hisrory of the Western World, Mentor, New York, 1959, p. 89.
66. William H. McNeill, History of Western Civilization: Selected Readings,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, pp. 337-338.
67. Philip Curtin, The Image of Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1964, p, 299.
68. Ibid, p. 415.
69. Ibid, p. 420.
70. Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America, Schocken, New
York, 1965, pp. 30-31.
71. Katherine George, "The Civilized West Looks at Primitive Africa: A Study in
Ethnocentrism," in The Concept of the Primitive, Ashley Montagu (ed.),
The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 182.
72. Paul Jacobs et al, To Serve the Devil, Vol. II, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 19.
73. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 19.
74. William Howitt, Colonizarion and Christianity, Green and Longman, London,
1838, pp. 19-20.
75. Chapman Cohen, Christianity, Slavery and Labour, 4th ed., Pioneer Press,
London, 1931, p. 46.
76. Chapman Cohen, War, Civilization and the Churches, Pioneer Press, London,
1930, pp. 56-57.
77. W.E.B. DuBois, The World and Africa, International Publishers, New York,
1965, p. 51.
78. E.D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden, rev. ed., Monthly Review Press, New
York, 1969,pp. 15-16.
79. Special Forces Handbook, Commandant Army Special Warfare School, Fort
Bragg, N.C., 1965, back cover.
80. Quoted in Cohen, War, Civilization and the Churches, p. 96.
81. Cohen, Christianity, Slavery, and Labor, p. 44.
82. Ibid, p. 28.
83. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, Nok Publisher, Lagos, 1978, p. 137.
84. Ibid, p. 49.
85. Ibid, pp. 76-77.
86. Ibid, pp. 128-129.
87. Jacobs et al, p. 26.
88. H.R. Ellis Davidson, Gods and the Myths of We.stemEurope, Penguin, N<·w
York, 1964, p. 48.
89. Ibid, p. ,1!).
90. Ibid, p. 70.
HI lhld, p 71
!I:! ll1ld, p !J•I,
Notes 581
93. George Dumezil, The Destiny of the Warrior, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1970, pp. 46-47.
94. Ibid, p. 47.
95. Davidson, p. 14.
96. Random House Dictionary, unabridged ed., New York, 1971, p. 655.
97. Ibid, p. 1036.
98. Davidson, p. 14.
99. Mircea Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, Vol. I, trans. Williard R. Trask,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 187.
100. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press.
Chicago, 1979, p. 29.
101. Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, Vol. I, p. 187.
102. Ibid, p. 188.
103. Ibid, pp. 189, 190, 197.
104. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminisl
Theology, Beacon Press, Boston, 1983, p. 53.
105. Ibid, p. 54.
106. Pagels, p. 57.
107. Ibid, p. 59.
108. Ibid, p. 61.
109. Ibid, p. 59.
110. Ibid, p. 68.
lll. lbid, pp. 71-72.
112. Ibid, p. 73.
113. Ibid, p. 75.
114. Ibid, p. 79.
115. Ibid, p. 83.
116. Page duBois, Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-History of the
Great Chain of Being, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1982, p.
136.
117. Ibid, p. 140.
118. Plato, Republic, Bk: 90e-91a, qouted in Page duBois, p. 135.
119. E.I. Allen, Guidebook to Western Thought, English Universities Press,
London, 1957, p. 15.
120. Niebuhr, Vol. I, p. 13.
121. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Chapter XV, London, 1923.
122. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on
Reason, Leibniz: Philosophical Writing, trans. Mary Morris, E.P. Dutton,
New York, 1934, p. 27.
123. Robert Lowie, Primitive Religion, Liveright, New York, 1970. p. xiii.
12'1.William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Longmans, Green and
Company, New York, 1919, p. 4.
125. See Peter Berger, A Rumor of Angels, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1970, p.
:19.
I 2fi Wllll111n.J;1111l1:l,p ti
127 J\r1l1111 "Thi•11C1·t•ptunct<1fChr!i-llaulty was mort> rapid ,111<1
I•:.Jl(JHll•111y•1,
I 0111pll•lf• 11,111"I 111101lh1111thrn11ul11111I tlH· l'(llllltty11t(lr• '1'l11:; 1-(IIVI•rhu• 111
( Ir rn11 t.111l11I '11M11111111,
I h111uu nl ti 11•I 1•111111111e1111 "r 11ml," 1111lw 11e•11~1· 111
582 YURUGU
"barbarian") to designate non-Christians; a usage which had become offi-

cial by 370 A.D. Between the fifth and ninth centuries paganism virtually
disappeared within the boundaries of the Empire." (A History of Rome to
565 A.D., p. 502.)
128. Kofi Awoonor, The Breast of the Earth, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1975,
pp. 28, 30.
129. Ibid, p. 26.
130. Ibid, p. 27.
131. Ibid, pp. 28, 30.
132. Ibid, p. 30.
133. Niebuhr, Vol. I, p. 24.
134. Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,"
in The Subversive Science, Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (eds.),
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, p. 345.
135. Eliade, A History of Religious ideas, Vol. 1,p. 354.
136. Reuther, Ch. 2.
137. Ibid, p. 76.
138. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 116.
139. Ibid, p. 118.
140. Ibid, p. 11.
141. Ibid, p. 12.
142. Ibid, p. 13.
143. White, pp. 347-348.
144. Ibid, p. 349.
145. Ibid, p. 350.
146. Ibid, p. 346.
147. Niebuhr, Vol. 1,p. 217.
148. The Broadway show Pippin was much more accurate in this regard than
Niebuhr.
149. Niebuhr, Vol. I, p. 215, footnote 5.
150. Ibid, p. 214.
Chapter 3 - Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols

1. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott
Parsons, Charles Scribner's Son, New York, 1958, p. 15.
2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, Vintage, New Yqrk, 1951, pp. 54-55.
3. Ibid, pp. 67-68.
4. Willlie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p. 111.
5. Kofi Awoonor, The Breast of the Earth, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 975, p.
53.
6. Ibid, p. 55.
7. P.A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age, E.P. Dutton, New York, 19'11,p. 56.
8. Ibid, p. 58.
11als<'liSuzuki, "Buddhist Symholism," i11Cxplom1ions IrrCrm1f111miro1ums,
Ed11111nc1 Caqwntcr and Marsh;ill Mcl.uli/111
(l'll::;.), l'\1·at1111
l'r 1•1:s,l\w,l1111,
I !Hill, p 1H
111ll~d, p l!l.'
Notes 583
11. Wade Nobles, "Ancient Egyptian Thought and the Development of African
(Black) Psychology," in Kemet and the African World View, Maulana
Karenga and Jacob Carruthers (eds.), University of Sankore Press, Los
Angeles, 1986, p. 100.
12. Suzuki, p. 40.
13. Abraham, p. 193.
15. Aziza Gibson-Hunter, personal conversation, 1987.
16. Robert Goldwater, "The Western Experience of Negro Art," in Colloquium
on the Function and Significance of African Negro Art in the Life of African
Culture, Vol 1,Society of African Culture and UNESCO, 1966, p. 342.
17. Ortiz Walton, "A Comparative Analysis of the African and Western
Aesthetic," in The Black Aesthetic, Addison Gayle, Jr. (ed.), Doubleday,
Garden City, N.J., 1972, pp. 154-155.
18. Ibid, p. 156.
19. Weber, pp. 14-15.
20. Walton, "Rationalism and Western Music," in Black World, Vol. XXII,No. 1,
November 1973, p. 55.
21. Walton, "A Comparative Analysis of the African and Western Aesthetic," pp.
159.
22. See Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1974, p. 83;
Nairn Akbar, "Rhythmic Patterns in African Personality," in African
Philosophy: Paradigms for Research on Black Persons, Lewis King, Vernon
Dixon, and Wade Nobles (eds.), Fanon Center Publications, Los Angeles,
1976; and Kariamu Welsh-Asante, "Rhythm as Text and Structure in
African culture," in The Griot, Fall 1990, on the significance of rhythm in
African cosmology. This point is well made by Joseph Okpaku in New
African Literature, Vol. I, Thomas Crowell, New York, 1970, p. 18.
23. Quoted in Okpaku, p. 18.
24. Carlton Molette, "Afro-American Ritual Drama," in Black World, Vol. XXII,
No. 6,1973, p. 9.
25. Dona Marimba Richards, "The Implications of African American
Spirituality," in African Culture, Molefi Asante and Kariamu Welsh Asante,
(eds.), Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 1985, p. 213.
26. Molette, pp. 10-12; also Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive,
Transaction Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1974, pp. 197-199.
27. Rene Wassing, African Art, Harry N. Abrams, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 5.
28. Armstrong, p. 114.
29. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1921, pp. 229-230.
30. Addison Gayle, Jr., "C11ltural Strangulation: Black Literature and the White
Acsthctir," 111ThP IJ/ocll Aesthetic, Addison Gayle, Jr., (ed.) Doubleday,
Gar<h•11City, NJ, 972. p. 40.
:-11.ll>ld, p. ti I
'.ll. Muafa lriKl'1w,1hlll lcu "1!11•111 I )l•iil'ill'r," This term n•ft-rs lo lhe <•raof llw
1~1110111•1111.. i.,v,•It 1111,111tlIt ,,11;,u 011 i\lrka11 pt•upll·: 11v1•r100 111llll1111
p1•11pl1• 1111,t1111 h llv, 11111111,,11 ,1i..,,.,·,1d11111,Wl'rt• 1111•11
:iy;,lc 111,1111
,illy
584 YURUGU
and continuously assaulted through institutionalized anti-Africanism.

33. Gayle, p. 42.
34. Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohisto,y, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 107.
35. Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophy of Art, Ithaca: New York, 1972, p. 279.
36. Molefi Asante, Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change, Africa World
Press, Trenton, 1988, p. 46.
37. Aristotle, The Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle, trans., Friedrich Solmesen,
Random House, New York, 1954, p. 235.
38. Gentile, p. 14.
39. Armstrong, pp. 14-15.
40. A question posed by the children of the African Heritage Afterschool
Program in Harlem, New York.
41. Okpaku, p. 14.
42. Johari Amini, "Re-Definition: Concept As Being," in Black World, Vol. XXII,
No. 7, 1972, p. 11.
43. Gayle, p. 42.
44. Matila Ghyka, "The Pythagorean and Platonic Scientific Criterion of the
Beautiful in Classical Western Art," in Ideological Differences and World
Order, F.S.C. Northrop (ed.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, p.
99.
rtS. Germaine Dieterlen and Marcel Griaule, "The Dagon," in African Worlds,
Daryll Forde (ed.), Oxford University Press, London, 1954.
'16. Ghyka, p. 100.
'17. Ibid, p. 92.
'18. Ibid, p. 93.
'19. Plato, Symposium: 211, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, trans., Benjamin
Jowett, Random House, New York, 1937, p. 355.
50. Plato, Philebus: 51, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II, trans., Benjamin Jowett
Vol. II, Random House, New York, 1937, p. 386.
5 I. Quoted in Ghyka, p. 112.
5,. Ghyka, p. 94.
5:t Kariamu Welsh-Asante, "Commonalities in African Dance: An Aesthetic
Foundation," in The African Culture, Molefi Asante and Kariamu Welsh-
Asante (eds.), Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 78.
!i4. Aziza Gibson-Hunter, personal conversation, 1988.
55. Asante, Afrocentricity, Africa World Press, Trenton, 1988.
Sfi. Amos Wilson, an African psychologist, offers this concept of the "creation"
of the person, in Black on Black Violence, Afrikan World lnfosystems,
New York, 1990, p. 55.
Notes 585
Part II - Image and National

Consciousness
Notes to Chapter 4 - Self-Image
1. E.D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969,
p. 3.
2. Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-History, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 104.
3. Ibid, p. 287.
4. Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, Vol. I, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press,
Boston, 1954, p. 43.
5. Ibid, p. 44.
6. Ibid, p. 54.
7. Ibid, p. 42.
8. Eric Havelock, A Preface to Plato, Grossett and Dunlap, New York, 1963, p.
199.
9. Ibid, p. 219.
10. Iva Carruthers, "War on African Familyhood," in Sturdy Black Bridges,
Roseann P. Bell, Betty Parker, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall. (eds.), Anchor
Press, Garden City, N.J., 1979, pp. 8-17.
11. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, Beacon Press, Boston,
1983, p. 44.
12. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will, Bantam, New York, 1976, p. 4.
13. Erich Neumann, "On the Moon and Matriarchal Consciousness," in Fathers
and Mothers: Five Papers on the Archetypal Background of Family
Psychology, Spring Publications, Zurich, 1973, p. 55.
14. lfi Amadiume, Afrikan Matriarchal Foundations, Karnak House, London,
1987.
15. Iva Carruthers, "Africanity and the Black Woman," in Black Books Bulletin,
1980, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 14-20.
16. Plato, Symposium, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Random House, New York, p. 185:192.
1962, p. 31.
18. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner Books, New York, 1978,
p. 123.
19. Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western
World, Vol. 1,3rd ed., Dover, New York, 1965, p. 43.
20. Ibid, p. 53.
21. Hugh A. MacDougall, Racial Myth in English History, Harvest House,
Montreal, 1982,p. 91.
22. Quolecl 111 .1\rnl .Jarobs l!t al, To Serve the. nevi/, Vol. II, Vintage, New York,
197,, pp. :\a:1 :1:1!1,
.!:I. M11rll11Slww, 1/7m•11/'l1111r.w"'/l'1•r/f.\of Rnt1.~111,Nvw Sibyl line /looks, New
Y11rk, IIIHI, p 1 1
i!•I Ail'll1tl1•11,"1'111(111111
," ht /1/~ltl/} 1 "'w,,,,•.,,,
('/tl(/1 1tllllt1 ','1•/1
1, flt,/ N11111//11f/,,
.586 YURUGU
Supplement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, pp. 18, 19, 23,
24.
25. Kovel, pp. 133, 144, 182.
26. Norman Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. I, Scott,
Foresman, Atlanta, 1969, p. 4.
27. Philip Curtin, The Image of Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1964, p. 415.
28. Ibid.
29. Kovel, pp. 164-165.
30. Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology,
Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 250-251.
:{I. Aristides, Section 88, pp. 31-32.
p. 116ff.
33. Aristides pp. 38-39.
34. Curtin, p. 303.
35. Aristides, p. 43.
36. Leon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in
Europe, trans. Edmund Howard, New American Library, New York, 1974,
p. 82.
:H. MacDougall, p. 344.
38. Poliakov, pp. 82-83.
39. Ibid, p. 14.
40. Ibid, p. 15.
41. Ibid, p. 20.
42. Quoted in Poliakov, p. 18.
43. Ibid, p. 18.
44. Quoted in Poliakov, p. 25.
45. Ibid, p. 25.
4G. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press,
Chicago, 1978.
47. MacDougall, p. 11.
48. Ibid, p. 26.
49. Ibid, p. 31.
50. lbld, p. 2.
51. Quoted in MacDougall, p. 44.
52. Ibid, p. 44.
53. Ibid, p. 46.
54. Ibid, p. 49.
55. Ibid, p. 91.
56. Ibid, p. 82.
57. lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Bobbs-Merrill, lndianapol\s,
195G.
58, Quoted in Ma<.:Dougall, p. 92.
S!).!hid, p, 9:t
llO,()11111,•rl
h1 l'ollakov, p 27,
(jJ ()n(lli'tl 111M,ll'lJ011wd1,p, !lH.
I,:.!,ll1ld, p !J!),
Notes 587
63. Dona Marimba Richards, "European Mythology: The Ideology of Progress,"

in Black Contemporary Thought, Molefi Kete Asante and Abdulai S. Vandi
(eds.), Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1980.
64. MacDougall, p. 89.
65. Ibid, p. 90.
66. Ibid, p. 99.
67. Quoted in MacDougall, p. 100.
68. Ibid, p. 121.
69. Kovel, p. 166.
70. William Hepworth Dixon, White Conquest, Chatto & Windus, London, 1876,
pp. 368--371.
71. Joseph Arthur Gobineau, Selected Political Writings, Michael D. Biddiss
(ed.), Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p. 84.
72. Ibid, p. 136.
73. Wayne Macleod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide Press,
Los Angeles, 1968, p. 6.
74. Ibid, pp. 6-7.
75. Ibid, pp. 22-23.
76. Ibid, pp. 28, 45, 71.
77. Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Colour, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1920, p. 3.
78. Ibid, pp. 102-103.
79. Ibid, p. 145.
80. For a contemporary statement of this concern over European comparative
infertility, see Ben J. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth, Pharos Books, New
York, 1987.
81. Stoddard, p. 148.
82. Ibid, p. 149.
83. For more ethnographic material of this sort, see Barry Schwartz and Robert
Disch, eds., White Racism, Laurel, New York, 1970, especially, "The
Jdeology of White Supremacy," by James Vander Zanden. See also both
volumes of Paul Jacobs et al., To Serve the Devil. Of course, the writings
of the white nationalists themselves should be read.
84. P.W. Botha, "Why We Hate Blacks," in The Shield, the official African
American newspaper of Hunter College. Reprinted from the South
African newspaper, Sunday Times, Aug. 18, 1985, in the by-line of David G.
Maillu, p. 4.
CHAPTER 5 - Image of Others

2. Edward Tylor, The Origins of Culture. Vol. I, Harper and Brothers, 1958.
~- Ashley Montagu, "The Concept of 'Primitive' and Related Anthropological
Terms: A Study in the Systematics of Confusion," in The Concept of the
Primit/tJCJ,Ashley Montagu, (ed.) The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 4.
'1. 1lflr, y Eluwr Bnroq;, /\11/11/<'li<•rt11al ond Cr1/111rol I li.~tory of the Western World,
Vol I, I >nv11r, N1,wV,1rl:, 1911:i,p. '1I.
!, <:obl11m11,S, 11'11t111u.,,
1 /i•d11,/ /'<1/lt111tl Mkl1,,1•lI) lllddl;,:; (<'ti.), ll,1rp1•r(V.1<,1w,
N,•wY111k.l'lf0,1111 l'I!, I'll{
5HH YURUGU
6. Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Colour, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1920, pp. 91-92.
7. Ibid, pp. 100-101.
R.Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-History, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 107.
!"J.Merlin Stone, Three Thousand Years of Racism, New Sibylline Books, New
York, 1981, p. 20.
10. Quoted in Vulindlela Wobogo, "Diop's Two Cradle Theory and the Origin of
White Racism," in Black Books Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter, 1976, p. 26.
11. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1921, pp. 53-54.
12. Stoddard, p. 17.
13.Ibid, p. 90.
M. P.W. Botha, "Why We Hate Blacks," in The Shield, the official African
American newspaper of Hunter College. Reprinted from the South
African newspaper, Sunday Times, August 18, 1985, in the by-line of David
G. Maillu, p. 4.
15. Kovel's terms: Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-History, Morningside edi-
tion, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984, p. xi.
16. Ben J. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth, Pharos Books, New York, 1987.
17. Ibid, p. 113.
18. Ibid, p. 115.
19. Ibid, p. 98.
20. Ibid, p. 33.
21. Ibid, p. 89.
22. Ibid, p. 45, Chart 4J.
23. Ibid, p. 67.
24. Ibid, p. 97.
25. Ibid, pp. 97-98.
2G.Ibid, p. 99.
27. Ibid, p. 168.
28. James Pope-Hennesy, Sins of the Father, Capricorn, New York, 1969, p. 47.
29. Quoted in James W. Vander Zanden, "The Ideology of White Supremacy," in
White Racism, Barry N. Schwartz and Robert Disch (ed.), Laurel, New
York, 1970, p. 128.
30. Paul Jacobs,et al., To Serve the Devil, Vol. II, Vintage, New York, 1971, p.176,
footnote.
31. Wayne MacLeod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide Press,
32. Ibid, p. 3.
33. Stone, p. 4.
34. Quoted in Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological 11,eory, Thomas Y.
Crowell, New York, 1968, p. 69.
:35. Quot eel in George Stoc-king, Race, Culture and Evolution, The Free Press,
New York, 1968,p. 113.
:1ri C)110Le<I In I larris, p. 87,
:17 llllrl, p. HH
'IH U11t1tt•rl111IM 11.1,"Frnlu•11lui;, St·11l(lt11r1111(1 111Al,h-n," 111,.,,,.,,.\
') lol 11,1,11w
11/ //1w1Hlil,·l{olll11 ,uul Hnth Fhtnt•H•"' (t•dN ), (,',d11•1untl 111h1•1,
!111111111
Notes 58.9
London, 1973, p. 310 from Hegel, Die Philosophie der Gerschichte, Reclam
Vertarg Stuttgart, 1961, p. 155.
39. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Oxford University Press, London,
(1934), 1961.
40. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press,
41. Ibid, p. 88.
42. Ibid, p. 187.
43. Paul Jacobs et al,Yols. I and II.
44. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 13.
45. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 38.
46. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 37.
47. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago, 1979,
p. 3.
48. Cheikh Anta Diop, "Interview," in Black Books Bulletin., Vol. IV, No. 4, 1976,
pp. 30-37.
49. MacLeod, p. 73.
50. Johari Amini, "Re-Definition: Concept as Being," in Black World, 1972,
Vol. XXII,No. 7, p. 6.
51. Ibid, p. 10.
52. James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son, Beacon Paperback, Beacon Hill, 1957,
p. 30.
Part Ill - Behavior and Ethics

Notes on Chapter 6 - Rhetoric and Behavior
1. William Strickland, "Watergate: Its Meaning for Black America," in Black
World, 1973, Vol. XXIII,No. 2, p. 7.
2. A.R. li'araz, The City Sun, December 6-9, 1986, New York.
3. Carol Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New
York, 1973, p. 29.
4. Eric Hoebel, Anthropology: The Study of Man, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, New York,
1966, p. 29.
5. Ibid, p. 23.
6. Paul Jacobs et al, To Serve the Devil, Vol. I, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 12.
7. Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1967, p. 158.
8. Joel Kovel, White Racism, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 146.
9. Ibid, p. 145.
10. Kierkegaard's Attack Upon Christendom (1854-1855), trans. Walter Lowrie,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944, pp. 304-305.
l l. Oswald Sp<'ngler, The Decline of the West, Vol. II, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1928, pp. 21fi-217.
12. Ayn Ra11d011 Srwn/li11N fr<'(l/y, NBC,August 12, 1972.
t'.l. Frl<·1lt11'11 lw, "'I'll\' /\utl Christ," In Worhs of Friedrich Nietzsche, Yul.
Nli•t111t
XI, t1r111• ·111,,111,1,, /\lt•x1111dPrTill<·(ed.), Macmillan, New York,
('rn1111u111,
llliM, p :.!•111
590 YURUGU
14. Ibid, p. 242.

15. Chapman Cohen, Christianity, Slavery and labour, Pioneer Press, London,
1931, p. 117.
16. Robin Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation, 3rd ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 463.
17. Ibid, pp. 462-463.
19. Williams, p. 499.
20. Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology,
Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1966, p. 256.
22. Norman F. Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. II, Scott,
Foreman, Glenview, Ill.,1970, p. 626.
23. Ibid, p. 624.
24. Frances Cress Welsing, "A Conversation with Dr. Welsing," in Essence
Magazine, October, 1973, p. 51.
Notes on Chapter 7 - lntracultural Behavior

I. Robin Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation, 3rd ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 26.
2. Ibid, p. 27.
3. Ibid, p. 37.
4. Ibid, p. 28.
5. Emile Durkheim, Suicide, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, Ch. 1, Book Ill.
6. Williams, pp. 495, 497.
7. Ibid, pp. 495, 483.
8. Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1959,
p. 53.
9. Ibid, pp. 54-55.
10. Ibid, pp. 55-57.
11. Ibid, p. 131.
12. Norman 0. Brown, life Against Death, Wesleyan University Press,
Middletown, Conn., 1959, p. 53.
13. Ibid, p. 50.
14. Paul Goodman, "Polarities and Wholeness: A Gestalt Critique of 'Mind,'
'Body,' and 'External World,'" in Sources, Theodore Roszak (ed.),
Colophon, New York, 1972, p. 139.
15. Ibid, p. 140.
16. Lee, p. 132.
17. Vernon Dixon, "World Views and Research Methodology,'' in African
Philosophy: Assumptions and Paradigms for Research on Blacll Persons,
Lewis King, Vernon Dixon, and Wade Nobles (eds.), Fanon Center
Pul>lirations, I.os Angeles, 1976,p. 63.
I H lllirl, p, (i2.
1!1lhld, p 'iH
;•o(',11111111 W Molf'lt 11 Ill, "Alrn-A11wrlr11n Hlt1111l
I lr,111111
1 " 111 /1 IVwill, V11I
/1/111
X!-11,Nuti',/\ptll, l'17;1
Notes 591
21. Lee, p. 133.

22. Ibid, p. 134.
23. Ibid, p. 63.
24. Ibid, pp. 137-138.
25. Ibid, p. 20.
26. See Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, Transactions Books, New
Brunswick, N.J., 1974, pp. 68, 172.
27. Lee, pp. 20-21.
28. Ibid, p. 22.
29. For a contrasting view of the individual, see Lee, pp. 23-25.
30. Joel Kovel, White Racism, Vintage, New York, 1971, pp. 160-161.
31. Lee, p. 5.
33. Ibid, p. 166.
34. Quoted in Diamond, p. 166.
35. Ibid, p. 167.
36. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott
Parsons, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, p. 27.
37. Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1944,
pp. 159-160.
38. Ibid, p. 183.
39. Ibid, p. 199.
40. Ibid, p. 201.
41. Kovel, pp. 150-151.
42. John G. Jackson, "Egypt and Christianity," in Journal of African Civilizations,
1982, Vol 4, No. 21, pp. 65-80; John G. Jackson, Christianity Before Christ,
American Atheist Press, Austin, 1985; Gerald Massey, Ancient Egypt: Light
of the World, Samuel Weiser, New York, 1973; orig. pub. 1907.
43. Mumford, p. 185.
44. Ibid p. 188.
45. Kovel, p. 150.
46. Mumford, p. 189.
47. Ibid, p. 192.
48. Ibid, p. 198.
49. Ibid, pp. 189, 197.
50. Ibid, p. 196.
51. Ibid, p. 197.
52. Ibid, p. 194.
pp. 22-24.
54. Kovel, p. 137.
55. Ibid, p. 151.
56. Brown, life Against Death, p. 202.
57. It was Luther hinisell who tho11ght this information significant enough to be
r<'cordPd; i1c•1·Kovel, p. 131.
58, Mu111fnrcl 1 11 I H7,
Ml. lhfcl 11,I!IH

(iO ll)lrl p I HH
5.92 YURUGU
61. William Strickland, "Watergate: Its Meaning for Black America," in Black
World, Vol. XXlll, No. 2, 1973, p. 9.
62. Eli Sagan, The Lust to Annihilate: A Psychoanalytical Study of Violence in
Ancient Greek Culture, Psychohistory Press, New York, 1979, p. 4.
63. Sagan, p. 3.
64. Ibid, p. 23.
65. Ibid, p. 35.
66. Ibid, p. 36.
67. Ibid, p. 37.
68. lbid, pp. 41-42.
69. Ibid, p. 59.
70. Ibid, p. 60.
71. Ibid, p. 216.
72. Kovel, p. 129.
73. Ibid, p. 167.
74. Alexis Kagame, La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l'Etre, Arsom, Bruxelles,
1956.
76. Theodore Roszak, ed., Introduction to Sources, Harper and Row, Colophon,
New York, 1972, p. xvii.
78. See Kovel, pp. 114-115, for an extended discussion of this point.
79. Ibid p. l 16.
1962, p, 34.
82. Ibid, p. 193.
83. Ibid, p. 31.
84. Kovel, p. 158.
86. Ibid, p. 488.
87. Kovel, p. 156.
88. Ibid, pp. 158-159.
89. Ibid, p. 132.
90. Ibid, p. 133.
91. Ibid, p. 130.
92. A.I. Hallowell, "Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View," in PrimiliUP
Views of the World, Stanley Diamond (ed.) Columbia University Press,
New York, 1966, p. 50.
93. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 42.
94. Ibid pp. 45, 48, 52-53.
95. Ibid, p. 54.
96. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner l3ooks, New York, Hl7R,p,
130-131.
~7. Pia tu, Sy111po5iu111 The rnalogues of Plato, Vnl. I, trans., Bc1tjamln .low,·11,
l{a11do111 I louse, N<>wYork, 19~7. p :tM.
~lit 1-:rlw..rll 'I', I ltlll, 11.•yoll(/r11//tll(', i\11rll111'Prc•:,3,u.,,d1•11 ('tty, N I,
1'117 11 1·11
Notes 593
99. Ibid, p. 235.

100. Ibid, p. 238.
101. Strickland, p. 9.
Notes on Chapter 8 - Behavior Toward Others

1. See Norman Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. I, Scott,
Foresman, Atlanta, 1969, Part II, Ch. 12, Sect. VII for an example of this
argument.
2. Joel Kovel, White Racism, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 108.
3. Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, Social Organization, The Science of Man, and
Other Writings, trans. and ed. Felix Markham, Harper Torchbooks, New
York, 1964, p. 49.
4. Kovel, p. 181.
5. W.E.B. DuBois, The World and Africa, International Publishers, New York,
1965, p. 23.
6. Alphonso Pinckney, The American Way of Violence, Vintage, New York, 1972,
p. 69.
7. Johari Amini, "Re-Definition: Concept as Being," in Black World, Vol. XXl, No.
7, 1972, p. 7.
8. Kovel, p. 96.
10. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, Vintage, New York, 1965, p. 37.
I l. Ibid, p. 23.
12. Ibid, p. 41.
13. Chapman Cohen, Christianity, Slavery and Labour, 3rd ed., Pioneer Press,
London, 1931, p. 121.
14. Quoted in Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, Nok Publishers, Lagos,
1978, p. 64.
15. Cohen, p. 118.
16. Ibid, p. 122.
17. The World at War, WOR-TV,New York, March 2, 1974.
18. Mokubung Nkomo, "Education for Blacks in South Africa: Fact vs. Fiction,"
in Interracial Books for Children Bulletin, Vol. XVI,Nos. 5 and 6, Council
on Interracial Books for Children, New York, 1985, p. 5.
19. NYPIRGand South Africa Perspectives, Africa Fund, American Committee
on Africa, January 1984.
20. South Africa Perspectives, Africa Fund, American Committee on Africa,
January 1984.
21. NYPIRG.
22. Committee in Solidarity with Free Grenada, November 1, 1983.
23.. "War on Nicaragua," Frontline, PBS, April 21, 1987.
24. Amini, p. 7.
25. Kofi Awoonor, The !Jrca.~tof the Earth, Doubleday, New York, 1975, pp. 21,
23.
2G.Ibid, pp. 2:1,l5
27 lhl!I, pp 2!1,'1'/
2H 111111,pp, Z"i,!IH
~11 ( '" 11,1(l Wn,111111111
""' Ml\ J,,fw 11111111
,,/ II/I' Nt•u1r1, 1
1\11,j11/l,llt•d 1 111111
l11•Pt,
594 YURUGU
Washington, D.C., 1977; p. xiii.

30. E.D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969,
p. 8.
31.Wayne MacLeod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide Press, Los
Angeles, 1968, p. 86.
32. Jacobs, Vol. II.
33. Chinweizu, p. xiv.
34. Jacobs, Vol. II.
35. James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, The Free
Press, New York, 1981, p. 1.
36. Ibid, p. 2.
37. Ibid, p. 3.
38. Ibid, p. 4.
39. Ibid, p. 4.
40, Ibid, p. 4.
41. Ibid, pp. 6, 10.
42. Louis Wender, quoted in Jones, p. 27; Bruce McVey, quoted in Jones, p. 26.
43. A physician from Virginia, quoted in Jones, p. 26.
44. Jones, p. 48.
45. Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of
Genocide, Basic Books, New York, 1986; John Cookson and Judith
Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Monthly
Review Press, New York, 1969.
46. Jones, p. 48.
47. David Dickson, "AIDS:Racist Myths, Hard Facts," in AfricAsia, No. 41., Panos
Institute, London, May 1987.
48. Frances Cress Welsing, "To Whom it May Concern," Letter to the African
Descendant Community, February 25, 1987.
49.William Campbell Douglass, "Who Murdered Africa," in Health Freedom
News, September 1987.
50. WHO (World Health Organization), Vol. 47, 1972.
51. Douglass, p. 42.
52. Barbara Justice, "AIDSand Genocide," lecture at Hunter College, May 1990.
53. Jack Felder, AIDS: United States Germ Warfare at its Best, with Documents
and Proof, published by the author, 1989; Alan Cantwell, Jr., AIDS and the
Doctors of Death, Aries Press, Los Angeles, 1988.
54. D.K. Keach and A.O. Obel, "Efficacy of KEMRON(low dose oral natural
human interferon alpha) in the Management of HIV-I Infection and
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)," in East African Medical
Journal, July 1990, Vol. 67, No. 7, July 1990, Special Supplement No. 2,
pp. (54-70.
55. Dana Alston, ed. We Speak for Ourselves/Social .Justice,Rac:eand
£noimnment, The Panos lnst'itute, Washington, D.C., 1990, pp. 9, 32, 3:t
56. Kovcl, p. 8.
fi7.l1>1rl,p.1'18,
li~. llllcl, p. !J!i,
!i!I l'rn111·t•11 ! ·, 1·•1•1W,•l;lt11(,''A C1111Vl·r1,,ittu11 wit II i)r W<·l!llttll,"Ii I fh1'1111•
M111/u,,,,,, <)1111111•1I'.17'.I
Notes 595
60. Bobby Wright, The Psychopathic Racial Personality and Other Essays, Third
World Press, Chicago, 1985, p. 2.
61. Ibid, p. 7.
62. Ibid, p. 6.
63. Frances Cress Welsing, The Isis Papers: The Keys to the Colors, Third World
Press, Chicago, 1991, p. 4.
64. Ibid, p. 5.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid, p. 6.
67. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
68. Ibid, p. 10.
69. Ibid, p. 12.
70. Ibid.
71. Kovel, p. 49.
72. Ibid, p. 277.
73. Ibid, p. 273.
74. Ibid, p. 284.
75. Ibid, p. 11.
76. Ibid, p. 44.
77. Ibid, p. 47.
78. Ibid, pp. 49-50'.
79. Ibid, p. 9.
80. Ibid, p. 95.
81. Ibid, p. 107.
82. Ibid, p. 108.
83. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey, W. W. Norton,
New York, 1950.
84. Ibid, p. 1.
p. 125.
86. lbld, p. 67.
87. Ibid, p. 122.
88. Ibid, p. 90.
89. Ibid, p. I 09.
90. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press,
Chicago, 1978, p. 76.
91. Bradley, p. 123.
92. Ibid, p. 175.
93. Ibid, p. 112.
94. Ibid, p. 14.
95. Ibid, p. 18.
96. Diop quoted in Iva Carruthers, "War on African Familyhood," in Sturdy
Bloch Bridge.~.Roseann Bell, Betty Parker, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall, eds.,
t\11cl1orPress, Garden City, N ..l.,1979, pp. 8-17, see especially p. 10.
97. Diop, p. 167,
DH.lhl<I, p HIS
'.J!IV11ll11dlt•l11
WolH11-to,''I l'wc1 ('111<11'•
'l'hL'()ry nnd I he•Origin nf Wl1ll1•
l<11tl>,111,"111/1/1111, Vril ,1, Nn 11, Wl11ll'r, 1!171i,p ' 11.
/1110/1,/1111/1'///1,
596 YURUGU
100. Richard King, African Origins of Biological Psychiatry, Seymour-Smith,

Germantown, Tenn., 1990, p. 35.
101. Richard King, "African Origins of PsychoBiology," lecture at City College of
New York, 1987.
102, King, African Origins, pp. 31-32.
103. Ibid, p. 32.
104. Marguerite Lerner, Color and People: The Story of Pigmentation, Lerner
Publications, Minneapolis, 1971, p. 13.
105. King, Ch.1-3.
106. Ibid, pp. 13-14.
107. Children of Eve, PBS Documentary, 1987.
108. King, p. 57.
109. Ibid, pp 58-59.
110. Ibid, p. 64.
111. Ibid, p. 63.
112. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, Anchor, Garden City, N.J., 1976, p. 239.
113. King, p. 64.
114. Frank Sullowway, Biologists of the Mind, Basic Books, New York, 1979,
p. 361.
115. Carl Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections. Aniela Jaffe ( ed.), trans.
Richard and Clara Winston, Pantheon, New York, 1968.
116. 1st National Conference on Global White Supremacy, presentation by
Joseph Baldwin, Chicago, Oct. 12, 1990.
117. Ashley Montagu, "The Concept of 'Primitive' and Related Anthropological
Terms: A Study in the Systematics of Confusion," p. 161.
118. See Charles A. Beard's, Introduction, to J.B. Bury, Idea of Progress, Dover,
New York, 1955, p. xviii.
119. Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell,
New York, 1968, p. 146.
120. Robin Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation, Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 501.
121. Kovel, pp. 154-155.
122. Johari Amini, p. 6.
Notes 597
Part IV - Ideology
Chapter 9 - Progress as Ideology
l. See Beard's Introduction to J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress. Dover, New York,
1955,p.xxviii.
2. Ibid, p. 11.
3. Theodore Roszak, ed., Sources, Colophon, New York, 1972.
4. E.O. Bassett, "Plato's Theory of Social Progress," in International Journul of
Ethics, xxvm,1927-1928, p. 476.
5. Arthur 0. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in
Antiquity, Octagon Books, New York, 1965, p. 168.
6. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II, 5th ed., Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp. 4-5.
7. Joel Kovel, White Racism: A PsychoHistory, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 125.
8. Ibid, p. 128.
9. Aristides, "To Rome," in History of Western Civilization: Selected Readings,
Supplement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 40.
10. Charles Beard's Introduction to J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, Dover, New
York, 1955, p. xx.
11. See Wayne Macleod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide
Press, Los Angeles, 1968.
12. Ashley Montagu, "The Concept of 'Primitive' and Related Anthropological
Terms: A Study in the Systematics of Confusion," in The Concept of the
Primitive, Ashley Montagu (ed.), The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 3-4.
13. Ibid, p. 4.
14. Henryk Skolimowski, "The Scientific World View and the Illusions of
Progress," in Social Research, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1974, p. 53.
15. Skolimowski, pp. 56-57.
16. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
17. Ibid, pp. 70-71.
18. Ibid, p. 72.
19. Ibid, p. 75.
20. Ibid, pp. 77-78.
21. Ibid, p. 82.
p. 12.
23. Ibid, p. 18.
24. Ibid, p. 4.
25. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1966, pp. 10-14.
26. William James, The Writings of William James, John J. McDermott. (ed.),
Modern Library, New York, 1968, pp. 498--499.
·n.l".rlc·1lavelock. l'rc,/(lce to Plato, Grossett and Dunlap, New York, 1967, p.
12,
28, 1-'rlPcltle II lt1t•11gi•1, /111h11/11w11/ Ti•cll1wl11w,,I l1•11ryl<(•~11Cry, C'hlcal{o, I 9!'i!i,
PP l'I I()
111 1)(111111,v 1,,,,.,n,,,•t/11111111u//'11/1111, I' 11.,11,
1 , l'11•11lh 1:111t•wrn1d l'IIIIH,NI, 1%'.I,
598 YURUGU
p. 110.
30. Ibid, p. 91.
31. Ibid, p. 94.
32. Bury, p. 2.
33. Ibid, p. 7.
34. Robin Williams, American Society, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 469.
35. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Anti-Christ," The Works of Nietzsche, Vol. XI,
trans. and ed. Alexander Tille, Macmillian, New York, 1924, p. 241.
36. Roger Shinn, "Perilous Progress in Genetics," Social Research, Vol. 41, No. 1,
1974, p. 83.
37. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, p. 154.
38. For the quintessential critique of Marxist theory and praxis, in relation to
the European and African experiences, see Cedric J. Robinson, Black
Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, Zed Press,
London, 1983.
Notes on Chapter 10 - Universalism: The Syntax of

Cultural Imperialism
1. Wade Nobles, Africanity and the Black Family, Black Family Research
Institute Publications, Oakland, 1985, p. 107.
p. 22.
3. Johari Amini, "Re-Definition: Concept as Being," in Black World, 1972, Vol.
XXI, No. 7; Molefi Asante, The Afrocentric Idea, Temple University Press.
Philadelphia, 1987.
4. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Social Science,"
in The New Sociology, Irving Horowitz (ed.), Oxford University Press,
New York, 1964, p. 199.
5. John Gwaltney, Dryslong: A Self Portrait of Black America, Vintage, New York,
1981, p. 26.
6. Ibid, p. 27.
7. William S. Willis, "Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet," in Reinventing
Anthropology, Dell Hymes (ed.), Vintage, New York, 1974, p. 122.
8. Jacques Maquet, "Objectivity in Anthropology,'' in Current Anthropology,
Vol. 5, No. 1, 1964, p. 53.
9. Ibid, p. 54.
10. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1936, p. 4.
11. Ibid, p. 5.
12. Jurgen Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1,Beacon
Press, Boston, 1984, p. 69.
13. Ibid, p. 43.
14. Ibid, p. 74.
15. Maquet, pp. 51-52.
16. Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, Social Orga11iwt/,1n,I/le Sc:ienc<• of M1111,
,11,r/
Other W,itinus. i r,ins. an<1ed. Fcllx Markh1u11,llarpcr Tor rlllmoki,, N1•w
Ynrk, l!/(111, pp. :rn
-'IO,
17 llthl, p. Ill
Notes
18. Ibid, p. 49.

19. See Saint-Simon, p. 49, quoted in Chap. 8 of this work.
20. John Stuart Mill, John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, Ernest
Nagel (ed.) Hafner, New York, 1950, p. 332.
21. Ibid, p. 312.
22. See Mill's discussion, Ibid. p. 313.
23. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method, The Free Press, New
York, 1964,p. 31.
24. Ibid, p. 44.
25. Ibid, pp. 27-28.
26. Maquet, p. 51.
27. John Henrik Clarke, "Confrontation at Montreal," in Negro Digest, Vol. XIX,
No. 4, 1970,p. 10.
28. Benjamin Nimer, "Politics and Scholarship in the United States," in African
Studies Review, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1970,p. 353.
29. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963,p. 40.
30. Nimer, p. 323.
31. Ibid, p. 357.
32, Ibid, p. 358.
33. Kathleen Gough Aberle, "New Proposals for Anthropologists," in Current
Anthropology, Vol. IX, No. 5, 1968,p. 403.
34. Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, Transaction Press, New
Brunswick, 1974,p. 111.
35. Aristides, "To Rome," in History of Western Civilization: Selected Readings,
Supplement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 42.
36. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, Dover, New York, 1955,pp. 23-24.
Los Angeles, 1968,p. 89.
38. Gene Hogberg, Plain Truth Magazine, March/April, 1972.
39. For an excellent discussion of contemporary European supra nationalism,
see Ravanna Bey, "Supra Nationalism and the European Community,"
unpublished paper, association of Afrikan Historians, January 1990,lnnt-r
City Studies, Chicago.
40. Hogberg, p. 2.
41. George Kourvetaris, The Journal of Social, Political, Economic Studies.
Summer, 1986.
42. Raymond Aron, Progress and Disillusion, Praeger, New York, 1968,p. 1611,
43. Theodore Roszak, ed., Sources, Colophon, New York, 1972,p. 49.
44. Plain Truth Magazine March/April, 1987,p. 35.
45. Marcel Griaule, "The Problem of Negro Culture," in Interrelation ofCultm,•,
UNESCO, 1953,p. 352.
46. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, 'f'l1<'Great Chuin of Being, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1966, p. :i13.
'17. lhlrl, p. ~II Z.
'18.Y<'h()sh1111 /11h•II, l111l11u1/11altw1
nnd Nationalism in American Ideology,
1'1•11g11l11Hmi~'I l111111111111•,I %fi, pp. ,MH-2:i0.
1111 Wllll1• Al 1111h.1ui/ /1,•A/111,/ :.lty of ('hll ,11{11
11/ ,1/111t1 1 I f11lvt•1 f'n•ss, ( 'I 1h ,1uo,
l'Hi'', JI 11,:1
600 YURUGU
50. Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1944, p.
31.
51. Ibid, p. 32.
52. Edward Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," in Edward Sapir, Culture,
Language and Personality: Selected Essays, David G. Mandelbaum (ed.),
University of California, Berkeley, 1970, pp. 78-119.
53. Mumford, p. 39.
54. Ibid, p. 200.
55. Ibid, p. 403.
56. Kurt Wolff, "This Is the Time for Radical Anthropology," in Reinventing
Anthropology, Dell Hymes (ed.), Vintage, New York, 1974, p. 101.
57. Ibid, pp. 113-115.
58. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford, London, 1929, p. 291.
59. Mary Kingsley, West African Studies, Barnes and Nobles, New York, 1964, p.
150.
60. Gouldner, p. 47.
61. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, Vintage, New York, n.d., p. 41.
62. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago, 1979,
p. 3.
64. Fanon, p. 252.
65. Ralph Beats, The Politics of Social Research, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago,
1969, p. 197.
66. Ibid, p. 197.
67. Ibid, p. 5.
68. Ibid, p. 40.
69. Quoted in Roszak (ed.) Sources, pp. x-xi.
70. Ibid, p. xi.
72. Nobles, p. 109.
73. Roszak, pp. xii-xiv.
74. Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical
Tradition, Zed Press,London, 1983, p. 9.
75. Ibid, p. 19.
76. Ibid, p. 67ff.
77. Merlin Stone, Three Thousand Years of Racism, New Sibylline Books, New
York, 1981, p. 26.
78. This later analysis is a collective product of the participants in a seminar
on "White Racism" held at Hunter College in Spring, 1991.
79. Stone, p. 25.
Notes 601
Conclusion - Yurugu: The Incomplete Being

1. See Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory, Vintage, New York, 1971, p.
130.
2. Marcel Griaule and G. Dieterlen, The Pale Fox, Continuum Foundation, Chino
Valley, 1986, pp. 198-199.
3. Ibid, p. 285.
4. Ibid, p. 290.
5. Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J.,
1972, p. 131.
6. Of Men and Women, NBC-TV,Jan. 9, 1975.
7. Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, Transaction Books, New
8. Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force, Anchor Press, Garden City, N.J., 1974, p. 17.
9. Roszak, p. 168.
11. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago, 198'1,
p. 321.
12. Ibid, p. 7.
13. Ibid, p. 321.
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INDEX
absolutism, 74-75, 106, 349 anglo-saxon, 163, 253, 262, 272

abstractification, 106, 338, 389, 392, anthropology, 3-4, 10, 16, 224-225,
479,557,566 265, 272, 292, 312-313,315, 355,
academia, 2, 24, 46, 261, 473-474;aca- 457
demic, 16-18,41, 46, 59, 73, 328, anxiety, 61, 63, 166,194,286,291,
375,473 351,471-472,556,558
aesthetic, 8-9, 15-16,59, 75, 93, 199- apartheid, 446, 508
211, 213-215,217-223,225-227,229- Apology, The, 111-114,191
234, 242,271,276,284,295,307, Apostolic, 138-139,141, 176, 356, 358
337,347,364, 390,504-505, 559 Aristotelian, 64, 68, 98-99,349
African art, 22, 204, 216; conscious- asceticism, 364
ness, 24, 66, 161, 233, 294, 450; cul-
ture, 2, 65, 186,211, 217, 230-231, Bad Blood, 433, 435
290,296,314,351,439,483; Ballet, 229-230
enslavement, 291; nationalism, barbarian, 34-35, 41, 167, 169, 262,
161;self-determination, 432, 450; 319, 415, 501; barbarians, 74, 104,
symbolism, 51; thought, 97-98, 129,154,170,254,415,482,484;
322,351,562; world view, 37,346, barbarism, 35, 91, 292, 299, 378
352 bicameral brain, 79
Ahura Mazda, 249, 285 birth rate European, 288-289
AIDS,433, 437-445,502 Blackness, 220, 284-285,454-455,468-
Akan, 92-94, 203 469, 471-472,567
alienation, 47, 68, 86, 103,396, 398, Black Man's Burden, 158
461-462,472, 509 British Niger expedition, 154, 254
ambiguity, 50, 55, 69, 98, 395-396,564 British parliament, 154
American nationalism, 231, 327, 382 Britons, 258
anal, 284, 370-372,389, 393, 448, 452, brotherhood, 120, 124, 144, 149, 160,
454-455,459; personality, 370, 389, 183,223,227, 280,318-319,323,
448; stage, 28-1 325,328,334,351,567
analytical. lO, 62, 69, 76-77, 106-107, Buddhism, 207, 285; symbolb,m, 201;
202,208,217, 2'1:1,258,274, :'188, 207
!ifi()
!lll('l'tllOI' ~1:1,I!l!i,:122.
('n1111111111l1111, l'aplt all:;111, 11i8,lH!i IHO,2:1I, '1!1H,
'/./:I, :12:1,'.l:IO,:1:1H,
:1rin,:1!1(,:1~17,
r,11 111t•111ory,
111111•111 :/1II, ~;!2 :.!.I.I lld I ,IIU, l(l!,, lt1H,17', 1711,'IHI
622 YURUGU
382, 384-386, 392, 429, 506, 508, 232,313

565 Columbus, 157,275,302
Captain Cook, 302 competition, 153, 265, 351-352, 375,
Carolingian, 196 390,503
Cartesian, 498 complementarity, 33, 67, 174, 243
Catholic Church, 319, 359-360, 363- confrontation, 10, 13, 24, 34, 106,209,
364 451
Caucasian, 219, 233, 273, 285, 298, Congo,the,413,417
386,408,449,459,461,463 conqueror, 248, 250-251, 253, 263,
Caucasoid Aggression (Bradley) 461 271, 276-277, 294,307,332
causal, 11, 68, 88,101,207,455 consciousness matriarchal, 81-82;
Center for Disease Control, 435, 442 patriarchal, 81-82, 243
Chain of Being, 35, 87-89, 95-96, 300, Contra Hearings, 424-425
480 conversion, 65, 128-133, 141, 153-154,
Charlemagne, 196 186, 226, 252; Constantine's, 130,
Charles Martel, 196 132-133, 141; sentiment, 153-154,
Christian apology, 128; Church, 111, 251
132, 136, 138, 152, 155, 160, 163, cosmic interrelationship, 45, 67
194,360,364,418,427;Ethic, 144, cosmology, 4, 76-77, 82, 87-90, 99,
317-321, 323-324, 333-334, 357-358, 149,161,218,359
426, 494; Holy Wars, 152; ideology, cosmos, 29,37,44, 51, 56,82,96, 110,
84, 127, 134, 145-146, 149, 152, 155, 188-189, 197, 204, 227-228, 254,
159, 162, 184, 187-188, 191, 251, 368,500,562,565
317-319, 362, 475-476, 507; mythol- Council of Aries, 134
ogy, 129, 138, 141, 509; symbol- Cradle of Humanity, 371
ism, 220; Christianism, 138, 170, Cress theory, 286
185,187,194,481,508; crucifixion, 127, 219
Christianity, 95, 102, 111, 124, 126- cultural
141, 143, 146, 149-151, 153-156, chauvinism, 120, 122, 125, 128,
158, 160-162, 165-170, 174, 183-187, 185,209,327;deficiency,399;ego,
190-194, 196,220,223,230, 253- 238,245,250,263,271,348,392,
256,260,280,305,319,321-324, 403,431,561, 565 genes, 12, 34, 53,
326, 356, 362, 366, 372-373, 427- 277,471; ideology, 117,417; impe-
428,476,478, 498,507; rialism, 73, 84, 88, 105, 120, 122,
Christianization, 142, 185-186 129, 137, 143, 151-153, 162, 192,
Chronos complex (Bradley), 460 222-223, 225, 230, 239, 277, 306,
Church hierarchy, 142, 260 308,316,328,335,427,478,494,
CIA, 423-424 567-570; inferiority, 408; national-
Clovis, 196 ism, 51,103,141,144, 150, 155,
codification, 24, 32, 58, 114-115, 117- 191-193,214,246,271, 273,284,
120, 122,503 308,316,330,335,345,400,409,
cognition, 31, 36-37, 39, 45-46, 94, 476,494, 568; nationalisl. 290:
103,106,344,349,391,458 other, 11, 19, 103, 14-1,192, 22G.
cognitive style, 14, 33, 62, 82, 105, 230, 238, 2'1:l,261, 29:l, :JOI, '.122,
231 327, 339-340, :l59,:l!Hi,:l!I!)·Hltl,
< oll<.'ctiVI' t·o11sdo11s11ess.5, 24. '.l42: 40'!-407, 4tl'l-41:t •1l!i 111. -1:11rn.
p1·1~•1111lllty, l!i, 17. t:W, ,M5,:\17, •l'l!), 11:\1-4:1:1,11:lli1:17,11\!I, 11,!(11
.1:11-,
·1:111,:t/i!1, 11(,;,,p•1vdw, >l,VI 1 IH ,Jill), 111:i,117!,11111,!ihi1,IHIYIhf'.
Index 623
232,342;violence,427,429,431- eros, 394-395, 452-453

432 eternal cycle of life, 67
cyclical order, 188; time, 60 Eternal Moment, 214
ethic, 55, 110, 144, 167, 183, 197, 206,
democracy,263,290,311,382,400, 218,223,273,297, 312-321, 323-
426;European,382,426 324, 328-329, 331-335, 337-338, 341,
desacralization, 80, 83, 104, 107, 110, 343,351, 356-359, 361, 363-364,
115, 188-190, 383, 558 368, 370, 372-376, 379, 381, 384,
destructive, 81, 85, 170, 172, 193, 268, 390, 394, 398-399, 403-405, 410,
297,326,351,353,387,390,395, 413-414, 416,418,426,431,484,
402,406,429,448,470,479,484, 494, 506, 559, 568; ethical, 44, 72,
503,569 109,114,144,304,323,328,333,
dichotomization, 32, 77, 105 337,339,344,352,357,360,366,
dichotomy, 33, 35, 39-40, 43, 52, 86, 373,380,382,397,410,412,450,
120-122, 141,165,192,208,220, 497, 565-566; ethics, 18, 54, 93,
238,281, 284-285, 352,399,475, 145,150,160,279,293,309,328,
483,564 356, 361,363,373,384,400;ethos,
disequilibrium, 82, 244, 492, 560-561 3-4, 14-16, 75, 161, 166, 190, 216,
Divine Feminine, 174, 188; Will, 112 266,329,331,338,342,356,382
dominance, l, 35-37, 41, 46, 58, 61, 68, Euro-Caucasian behavior, 447,469
77, 90,106,108,168,171,188,190, Eurocentric, 4, 10, 18, 21-22, 24, 52,
195,197,204,226, 242-244, 291, 59, 64-65, 70, 78, 82, 124, 152, 162,
333,447,449-450,461, 502, 507- 165-167, 171, 209, 223, 338, 366,
508, 564,566 376,392-393,402,409,451,505:
Donatists, 134, 146, 148, 196 Eurocentrism, 155
DOPA, 467 European
aesthetic, 59, 199-200, 203-204,
ecological, 92,102,173, 188,190,287, 206,208,210, 213-215, 217-222,
489,491, 501; crisis, 188; ecology, 227, 229-230,232,234,242, 271,
171 284,295,307,337,347,504-505;
efficiency, 67, 96, 99, 117, 168-169, Asili, 13, 48, 53, 65, 74, 103-1().1,
187,212, 233,388,398,495-496, 108, 118, 125, 130, 141-142, 1,14,
500,502 180,183,205,245,291,313, :rn~.
ego,37,65,95,98, 174,192,216,238, 323,354,357,379,400,442,444,
245,250,253,263,271,307,314, 502,510,563,566-567,569;
320,338,345,348,357,363,367, Christianity, 111, 161-162, t(i/,
370,373,378,392,395,403,431, 174, 185, 191, 220, 2:!0;
453-454, 493, 556, 559-563, 565 Community, 211, 30 I, tl0S~IOI,,
eidos, 14, 75, 88 419-420; conscious11css, 34..:1!,, I,',,
Eleatic, I 00-102 67, 105, 170, 196,232, 261, :mI '1'1:t
elite art, 209,216, 227, 230-2:l I 322,368,373,379, '196: cult111,1I
elitist, 71. 1'19,205,208, 21:t, 26!i, '198 nationalism, 51, ltll, 150, l!'i',. I'll
cpister11ology, 8-fl, 2!1-:ll, 15-36, ;!9, t 92, 230, 246, 28'1,:ws,:11,,. :1:m,
Sfi !'i~. 70, Hfi 88,
t12-'1(i.48-'19,!i'.c!-!itl, :!:35,:1,15,400, '176,'1fM,!ih8, clt•v1•I
%, l(M, 10'/, 1/IH,'!ll'i, 'JOH,'277. op11w11t !i, 22, :12,III, 47, i,i, loI,
I
:1-1°1,'IK!I '1'10, I II, om,•l'IH, 1,0:1, ti!I, 7:!, 71, it,, K-1,1110,1:111,I Ii,,
'1llb, i1!1H',/,II l to l111, II,~•,lliti ltll, 11,'Jltll, llfl
1•q111III
II 111111,
'", IHI, IKK, 1% 1117, '01, ' 1 111,'11,
624 YURUGU
246,251,256,258,284,329,339, 103, 120-122, 130,155,414,424,

354,357,361,365, 367-369, 373, 449,459,463, 469,500,504;evolu-
375-376, 476, 555, 561, 570; hege- tionism, 62, 218,281,388,474, 477-
mony, 135, 169-170, 218, 277, 290, 478,481,504
569; imperialism, 4, 21, 24, 87, 135, existential, 53, 57, 69, 95-96, 183, 190,
141, 148, 150-151, 155, 162, 168, 193, 328-329,344,386,389,474,
194,214,320,333,345,360,364, 482,556,566
370, 401-402, 406,418, 427-428, expansion, 23, 127, 141, 145, 152-153,
474-475, 479,507,510,568; mytho- 157, 167-168, 172, 225, 253-254,
form, 63, 90, 166, 223, 241, 258; 275, 305, 318-319, 359-361, 363,
nationalism, 19, 23-25, 55, 135, 365-366, 372, 374, 387, 390-391,
137, 141, 151-152, 154-155, 165, 393-394, 403, 413-414, 475-476, 491;
170, 185, 192-193, 213, 223, 230, expansionism, 22, 169, 194, 233,
261, 268, 271-272, 275, 314, 318, 248,250,263,271,317,372,403,
339,409,416,423,447,475,495, 414,431,479, 494-495, 562-563,
567-568; paganism, 111, 162, 168, 567-568; expansionistic, 97, 125,
170; patriarchy, 171,174,185,461; 167,169,231,270,352,403,490,
psyche, 63, 232-233, 246, 295; self, 563,568
107, 170, 244, 347-348, 393, 395, exploitation, 1, 3, 59, 61, 85, 91-92,
403,495,504,560,563;theology, 126, 148, 185-186, 190, 294, 308,
110, 116, 179, 181; utamaroho, 17, 351,361, 379-380, 400, 415-416,
37, 47, 75-76, 81, 91, 111, 120, 122, 429,431,476,482,491,506,508,
124-126, 138, 142, 151, 167, 170, 565; exploitative, 119, 188, 258,
172, 180-181, 194,216,218,220, 303,320,323,326,376,386,402,
222,225,229,237,240,248, 250- 405,448,498,501,563,565
252, 255-258, 264, 266-268, 270,
276-277, 279, 281, 286, 291-293, false consciousness, 331-332
296-297, 305-308, 318, 320, 322, fanatic, 245; fanaticism, 246, 382, 384,
325, 334-335, 339, 344-345, 348, 456
373,375,381,384,391,403,429, Faustian, 16,38~383-384,567
431,437, 458, 475-476, 480, 482, feminine, 174-175, 188-189, 243, 377
490,493-495,499,504,507,509, fertility, 172, 288-291, 451,453,467
560-566, 568; utamawazo, 33-35, First World, 22, 129,290,305, 332,
51, 58-59, 61-62, 64, 75, 80, 84, 90, 340, 359-361, 364, 374, 385, 408,
97-99, 103-107, 110, 118, 126, 128, 427,446,457,471
174,178,180,183,187,197,206, Form, 9, 12, 16, 20-21, 33-34, 40, 42,
214, 227, 230-231, 240, 243, 248, 44-45, 51-52, 54-57, 59, 69, 77, 79,
252,281, 298,339,344-345, 349, 81-82, 85-86, 88, 104, 106, 114, 121-
360-361, 363, 365, 374, 383, 385, 122, 129,141,144,148, 150, 163-
390,394,396,408,441,456,458, 166, 168, 177, 184-185, 191, 196,
475, 479-481, 483,485,490, 503, 200-201, 203, 205-206, 208, 210-21 I,
508-509, 560,565,568; world view, 213-214, 220, 223, 225, 228-229,
447; Europeanization, 176,346, 231,234,238,242,244, 251-252,
405,1\39 259,264-265, 271, 27!i 27fi, 29I,
Ewwl>l11•, 1:11,I:n 2!M,:1()(),:ll8-~$20,3:12,:l:l!i,:1:11,
'l'lw, 69, 111, I l'1 I )II
l:'111/,y11l1111, '~!i2 :1Gti-:l!iH, :lllfi,:lllH,;17/, ;1FM.
, 1 vnl11tl11111111Jy,11p1•1lw, I 17 :1112,,11t1,, •IOH,In, 1n:1, •I 1'1,•l f I,
•'V!llltllHIIIUy; I', H,, ,,'.,,Ill, t,\ 71,, 111:1, l',t,, l','I, If, I 11,11, I /,1, IH'.l,
Index 625
491-494, 501,504, 506,556,562- 563; harmony, 32, 35, 42, 85, 91,
563, 566, 568-569; Forms, 13, 16, 95, 100, 105, 118, 189, 205, 210,
18, 22,40,42,47,51, 58,62, 70,81, 212,297,351,395,559,562,564
83, 85, 90, 97, 100, 102, 105, 118, Hawaii, 156
140,162,174,186, 199-201, 203, heathen, 122, 148, 152-153, 155, 158,
206, 209, 212-215, 217-218, 225, 162-163, 165-166, 170, 308, 475,
229-232, 234, 242-243, 273, 295, 478,482,508
325, 346, 353, 363-364, 381, 383- Hebrew, 91, 117, 119-120, 128, 188-
385, 390,397,405,409,419,427, 189,260
434,449,454,456,458,470,483, Hellenistic, 254
485,494,500, 502-503,506, 509, Henry the Navigator, 157
555, 560,563,565-566,568 heresy, 138,143,356,363,366
freedom, 59, 73, 91, 94, 127, 159, 253, heretic, 139
255, 258, 261-264, 289-290, 330, hierarchy, 34-35, 41, 67, 88-90, 116,
338-344, 348, 350, 353-355, 361, 125,142,148,175,260,349,367,
367,374,380-382,385,399,410- 386,481
411, 416, 422, 559-561; individual, historicity, 58, 100, 118, 120, 558
340-343, 355,367,381,385,399, Hollywood, 218, 269-270, 295
411, 560; love of, 342, 561 Holy Roman Empire, 196
Freudian, 16, 243, 284, 377, 392, 452- humanness, 44-45, 47, 50, 58, 94, 121,
453, 456-457, 462; Freudian theory, 293,298,352,364,386,403,427,
243, 377, 456-457 460, 558, 565-566
future, 2-3, 36, 59-60, 63, 68, 97, 116,
140,184,215,232,239,287,289, hypocrisy, 168, 280, 297, 312, 315-
291, 298, 375, 380, 439-440, 460- 317, 321,324,326,328, 333-335,
462, 468, 491-492, 502-503, 569-570 386,410,413-415,430;hypocrlt~
cal, 9, 154, 315-317, 320, 324, 410,
genes, 12, 34, 53,104,277,471; cul- 416,434,436,474,482
tural, 12, 34, 53, 277, 471; genetic,
448,450,459,467 ideal state, 36, 50, 54, 113-114, 227,
genocidal, 2, 433-434, 438, 445-446; 491
genocide,426,436,442,465,477 Ideas, 5, 8-9, 13, 15, 18, 30, 34-35, 39-
gentile, 122, 128, 148, 222, 224 41, 43, 49, 5~ 61, 65, 67, 70-72, 75-
geometrical form, 228 76, 80-81, 83-85, 87-88, 90, 110-111,
germ warfare, 437 124, 144, 166, 172, 188, 192, 20:1,
German heritage, 257, 259 205, 222-224, 227, 230, 249, 2fi~,
germanic, 163-165, 169, 196, 257-262, 283, 285-286, 298, 31s, 325, :mi
264-265, 293 330, 339, 348, 356, 3fi 1, 379, 11I '1,
gnostic, 138-140, 142-143, 174-175; 452,463, 465-466. 1n, 477 17H,
gnosticism, 138, 141-143 481, 491, 497-499, 502-50:3,;,!i!i
Great Chain ol B~ing, 35, 87, 300 ideological matrix, 12, 21:3,:n1, 111' 1,
Greek culture, 52, 2'11, 376-377 496

Grcnacl<1,'120.JJ21 idolatry, 87, 188 JH9
Ikon, 231-2'.~tl
lwllrn, :.mG-207, :1'17 I, :11, 8 !1,:II, r1 ~11,,111,
hnp~•rl,111:..111,
llt111l11 1 l:W,21-1 7:J,fM,H78H, IO'i, 1:10, In, I''(,
11,111110111111111, :1!1,hi, 'II, '111, I 7'1, 111!,, 1·111,1:1:1,1:1r,,1:1'1,1,11, 111, 1rn
'' I '1, ' 118, 'l'"I, I I 1, 'I 111,'I!, I, !1hI, I 1,·1,l 1i'1 111'
1 , lh7 ll1H, I /ti, 111'1 ,
626 YURUGU
194,197,214, 222-223,225,230, 259,268,318, 343,47~489,497,

233,237,239,246,252,256,263, 507,566
270, 276-277, 306,308,316,320,
328,330-333,335,345,360,364, Kemet, 51,56, 67, 78,100,102,118,
370, 401-402, 406, 418, 427-428, 176,227,318,466
448, 465, 474-476, 478-479, 484, Kemron, 444-445
490, 494, 506-507, 509-510, 563, King Arthur, 259
567-570; imperialist, 131, 150-152, King Leopold, 417, 474
161,277,311,360,375,417,428, kintu, 189, 381
432, 474-475, 494-495 knowing, 30-31, 45, 70-71, 76, 78, 81,
impersonal, 65, 347, 382, 560 106-107,208, 228,380,394,437,
incarnation, 129, 177 443,470,557,570
individualism, 65, 171, 187, 263, 326, kuntu, 77, 381
341-342, 350, 354-355, 365,367,
381-382; individuation, 372, 452- language, 2, 8-10, 16, 31, 41-42, 45, 49,
153 52, 55-56, 66, 79,110,116, 210-211,
lnclo-European, 104, 163-164, 167, 218,228,238,240,260,274,348,
169, 171-173, 177, 196, 218, 233, 371,411,453,459,462,496,507
242,244,249,258,285,297,305, laws, 55-56, 64-65, 68, 73-74, 94, 118-
339, 351, 463-464 120, 122, 133, 147, 151, 157, 210,
inorganic, 96 239,241,255,262,274,345,373,
International Securities Act, 419 414-416, 419,423
mtuition, 67, 141, 204, 466, 468; intu- Licinius, 131-132, 134-135
itive, 30, 42, 55, 58, 64, 77, 81, 107, lineality, 56, 58-59, 62-63, 68, 107, 118,
207,562 490,496,503,565
lrrPllgious, 121-122, 129, 165, 185, 281 linear, 58, 61-63, 68, 122
lsolalion, 47, 70, 87, 96,194,285,339, literate modality, 56
'.{'16,348, 354,371,380,396,408, logic, 7, 9, 12-13, 29, 33, 35, 40, 55-58,
'131,171,495,560,564 61, 66, 68, 73, 81-82, 95, 97-99, 108,
hwlat ion ism, 372-373 113, 115, 117, 122, 166, 170, 180,
Isolationist, 373, 565 182-183,217, 253,263,282,301,
hm1el, 120, 125, 127, 290,420, 508 308, 313,328,333-334,349, 355,
406,408,417,431,441,458,478,
Jesus, 124-130, 138-141, 144-146, 149, 482,494,566
157-158, 164,170,175,189,219, logos, 12,41-42, 108,308,339,353,
:322-324, 359, 426 393, 448, 555-556, 563
J,0 wish Nationalism, 124-125, 127-128, loneliness, 354, 390, 396
148 lord of the Flies, 268
lttcJaic, 111, 117-118, 120, 122, 124- love, 87, 111-112, 129, 142, 144, 147,
126, 151, 189, 372; Judaism, 117, 158,162,245, 258,260,262,26(~
l 20, 124-125, 128-129, 139, 174-175, 267,272, 304-305, 318-319, 332,
1Hs, 196,2s1, 372-3n, 471 341-312, 349, 377, 37!),381.387,
.ludf'o-('hristian Schism, 124 390, 393-399, 403-404, 45:{,461 I
J1111KI ', 269-270, :l55, 376 4(i4, 482,556, 5fl9-561,5(;11, 5(i(i

\111tllu·, :12,:l!i, ,1(i, l:l(i, 14-1,1-18,15-1,
2:11), 2ti?.,:lOO,:tlO, 11'1'1,165, :i(i2 111arhl1w, ~5 !Hi, 1%-1!16,:!\l:t,:11:!,
p111tlllc·11ll1111,'IIJ, ,l(i, :l•J,41, 11l l 111. :m, :1.M,:11i1,:111,, :mtl,:111(1,a!l}l,
1' 1, 1:M. 1111, 11I I. l'i'I. l!i',, :1,l1J,
1 ~!E,, 111,'.1, ',H7
Index 627
male, 34-35, 41, 159, 171, 173-174, 177, lithic, 4, 9, 47, 50, 69, 121-122, 134,
242-245, 300,377,397,437,440, 143,148,196,246,256,364,366
443,453,460-461,480,559,561 monotheism, 114-115, 120-122, 142,
Manifest Destiny, 251-252, 266, 421 149, 173-174, 179, 471; monotheis-
masculine, 174-175, 377 tic, 113-114, 120-122, 142, 185
materialism, 99,346,376,381, 386- Moon, the, 81
387,399,451,456,503,557; mate- morality plays, 220
rialistic, 17, 64, 67, 96, 105, 138, Mother Earth, 173
258,369,379,383,449,456,473, Mother Goddess, 171
502, 506; materialization, 30, 96, multidimensional, 30, 60, 62, 98; mul-
139, 181, 500, 509 tidimensionality, 30, 60, 62, 98
mathematics, 50, 78, 81, 114, 210-211, music, 2, 210-213, 229, 295
228,273 mysteries, the, 71, 397
matriarchal, 81-82, 243,471; matriar- mystery, 57, 70, 100-101, 107,119,
chal consciousness, 81-82 139-141, 227,441
matrix, 3, 12, 141, 174, 190, 213, 231, myth, 4, 33-34, 54, 62, 174, 182, 222,
240,258,358, 392-393, 401-402, 226, 230, 233, 242, 249, 255-262,
447-448,459,496,498 264-265, 306, 311, 325
Maxentius, 131-132 mythoform, 10-11, 13, 33, 63, 90-91,
mechanical causation, 67 163-164, 166,197,215,223,227,
mechanization, 500 241,243,258,342
media, 43, 54, 56, 62, 77, 115, 117-119, mythology, 10-11, 36, 63, 67, 91, 117,
199, 214, 218-219, 222, 232-233, 129, 138, 141, 182, 195, 240-241,
241, 265-266, 269,271, 294-295, 255-256, 259, 263, 285, 303, 352,
317,331,376,440,445,509,568 359, 507-509, 556, 568
mediated experience, 207
Medieval, European, 152; Medieval Naked Jungle, the, 269
period, 134, 152, 204 narcissistic, 350, 369, 394, 397
melanin, 284, 444, 450, 452, 458, 465- nascentEurope,52,62;nascent
472 European,35,58, 119,126,170,
melatonin, 285, 466-467 230
messianism, 120, 127 national
metaphysical pathos, 75, 504 consciousness, 5, 137, 169, 196,
metaphysics, 64, 68, 145, 349-350, 501 201, 209, 230-232, 255-256, 258,
Middle Ages, 89,116,147, 188, 196, 261,265,277,294,361; myth,259-
200,210,220,230,356,494 262
minority, 22, 36, 76-77, 80, 82, 99, 125, Nationalism, 9, 19, 22-25, 36, 51, 55,
208, 211, 284-286, 350-352, 374, 103, 124-125, 127-128, 135, 137, 141,
392, 407, 410, 418, 445, 449-451, 144, 148, 150-152, 154-155, 161, 165,
458, 465, 473, 559; minority cul- 170,185, 191-194, 213-214, 219,223,
ture, 76, 352, 392 230-231, 246, 252-253, 258, 260-261,
missionary, 109, 154, 162, 185-187, 265, 268, 271-273, 275-277, 282, 284,
251,255,280,308,327,332,413, 288, 290-291, 305,308,314, 316-318,
427--128,479: schools, 428 :327,330, 335, 3:39,34!'>,374, :{82,
Modnl chnnf,(t•i;,I (18, It)(j 400,402, 405,409,416,423,429-
IIIIHll'llilly, :22,IOI, 110,2'''1.,
48!1•1!)0, 431, 44!), 447, 475-47G,4~Jll-'l!l!i,!i!l7
111)!) 568
11111111111th,;!!1, !:1 1, I /•I, t /1,, h'1h, 111111111 N11tlvi•A111t•1h H:!. 10'', l'l',
1111, 1:o,
628 YURUGU
natural theology, 179, 190 paternalism, 252, 277, 290, 320, 325,
Nazism, 326 360,374,476,566
neanderthal, 244, 459-461,463, 477 patriarchal, 81--82,173-175,177, 242-
Neo-Platonists, 148 243, 378, 454, 464, 471; patriarchy,
Nicaragua, 422-425 171, 174, 185,461
Niger expedition, 154, 254-255 Pax Romanus, 255
nomadic, 172-173,262, 304, 464-465 Phi/ebus, the, 228
Non-Orthodox Christianity, 137 philosopher, 30-31,38, 75, 83, 112-
Norman Conquest, 196, 265 113, 177, 200, 397; philosophy, 13,
Normans, 258 16, 18--19,29, 31, 43, 49, 53, 55, 57,
normative, 46-47, 110, 114, 125, 193, 60, 64, 73, 75-77,86-87,89-90, 95,
197, 208, 223-224,238, 241-242, 99-102, 113, 115-116,119, 177-179,
279, 297,314,323,327,333,337- 182-183,202,206,213,216,223,
338, 351, 357-359,361,366,380, 227,247,280,298,307,322,329,
391, 480-481,499, 565 346,363,419,473,489,495,501,
norms, 117,337-338,379, 381, 452 503,506,568
Northern Cradle, 171-172,285, 305, physical, 1, 16, 33, 62, 64, 76, 82, 100,
448,463,465 109-110,128, 138--140,174, 190,
196,215,219,221,228,230,242,
objectification, 37-39, 56, 68, 70, 76, 272,277,283,285,292, 298,351-
86-88,91, 94-96,99-100, 106-107, 352, 368,371,380,408,416,427,
114-115,200, 216, 307, 315, 334, 429, 431, 435, 448, 459-460,462,
338,344,348, 390-391,396,481, 464,466,471,490,499-500, 556
500,509,557,565 physics, 101-102,300
Odin, 163-164 pineal gland, 285, 466-470
Oedipus Complex, 377, 454 Platonic, 29, 31-33,35, 37, 39, 41, 43-
Old Testament, 143, 151 47, 49, 52-53, 56-58,64, 69-75,81,
n11tological, 8, 62, 70, 82, 88, 90, 93, 91, 93, 104, 111-112,114-116,128,
95, 103, 110, 121, 148, 188, 190, 148, 168, 178--179,181, 183, 188--
230,242,345,350,383,386,389, 189, 202, 205, 220, 228--229,238,
472,480,482,484,490,500,503- 255,287,315,327,341,344,389,
504, 556; ontology, 4, 57-58,83, 88, 458, 480-481,500; epistemology,
%-96, 121. 207, 346, 353-354,480 35, 39, 45, 52-53,56-58, 70, 188,
oriposing, 43, 104, 106, 222, 268, 314 205; thought, 29, 33, 41, 43, 75,
opposition, 6, 32, 34-35, 52, 62, 77, 84, 104,178,181,183,255,458
95, 103, 105-106,129-130,136, 186, political violence, 416, 422-423
193,208, 226, 24:3,296-297,306- Pope, the, 147, 153, 157, 196, 256
~07, 322,334,346,348,352,366, popular art, 199,209, 218, 227, 230-
379,384,386,389,420,422,562 232, 234
oppositional thought, 244 power,
obsession with, 277; to do, I 05;
pngan, 122, 127, 129, 132-133,135- over-other, l 05-107
136, 147 148, 164-167,169-171.190, pra~rnatisrn, 76, 168,388, 419
l!Hi, 277,427, 475-476; f)agnnism, r,reclictabillty, 6'1, I 07
Ill, 128, 1:1:i,1117, 162, 16Gl(i8, prltnll Iv<', 48, 51, 5:i, fi(i,(;;,,82, I 0~!,
1711 1:1.2,127, 141. I W, IS:I, lf11-l,IHI,
p,11,tdlMIII, I, 111,1'10,:'!l7, 'iOl :M7, :mx,~!1!1,~•HIlH'',
lH7, 1,()11,
p111 11111 'IH, 'l'J!,, lf,'.I 111;• •1111;,:m.1,:uJ7,·1r,
1. t~,r,,1'17,1rn.
Index 629
478,497,508 religious wars, 121, 185

projection, 11, 124, 129-130, 193, 223, Republic, The, 30, 50, 53, 69, 94, 111,
296, 313-314,316, 327,398,403, 113-114, 121, 148,177,239,248,
562 275-276, 396-397, 418
proselytization, 139, 149-150, 161, Resurrection, 126-127, 138-142
167, 169, 197,223,280, 335 retrogression, 128
Protestantism, 197, 356-358, 360-370, Revelations, 175, 182
372-375, 493, 506, 558, 566; ethic, rhetoric, 18, 54, 73, 121, 124,143,145,
273,318,343,356,358,363,368, 151, 162, 169,194,223,226,247,
370, 372, 374-376, 399; national- 274-276, 288, 297,305,308,311,
ism, 252, 327 313-315, 317,319,321, 323-325,
psyche, 8, 30-31, 44-45, 47, 54, 63, 75, 327-329, 331, 333-335, 408, 424, 568
86,94,205, 209,215,221, 231-233, Rhetorical Ethic, 223, 312-317, 319-
246-247, 295,313,320,328,341- 321, 323-324, 328-329, 331-335, 338,
342, 353, 355, 367, 377, 560; cul- 35~358,379,413,426,568
tural, 232, 342 Rhythm, 213, 229
psycho-cultural, 30, 252, 389, 463 right brain, 79
psycho-historical, 16 ritual drama, 75, 214-215, 231. 322,
Pythagoras,227 347
ritual sacrifice, 163
quantifying, 107, 385 Robinson Crusoe, 220, 226
Roman Citizenship, 135
race, 49, 57, 69, 85, 105, 154-156, 162- Roman Cooptation, 129, 141, 196
163, 185, 219, 247, 252-255, 257, Roman Policy, 144
263,265, 272-276, 279,281, 283- Rome, 129, 131, 135, 142, 168-169,
285,287,289, 292-293,297, 299, 176, 196, 249, 253, 255-256, 260,
301, 405-406, 408-409, 431, 442-443, 322,415,426,493-494
446-448, 454-455, 460, 473, 496,
509, 567; racism, 3, 36, 155, 160, sadism, 378
222,226,252,258,271,285,288, salic law, 257
293-294, 304, 330, 370, 392, 409, salvation, 61, 130-131, 145, 147, 156,
447-448, 451-454, 456-459, 461,473, 186, 251-252,367,373,428, 570
479, 482; racism white, 155, 160, Sandonistas, 423
370,392,448,452,456-459, 473, sapienism, 463
479 savior, 138, 195, 219, 251-253, 276-
rational man, 39, 74, 238-241 277, 290, 307
Rational Religion Syndrome, 114 Saxon, 152, 219, 261
rationalism, 9, 49, 75, 93, 95-100, 107, schizophrenic, 79-80
179-180, 182, 200-202, 212, 218, scholastics, 116, 183
222,239,246,277,293,307,338, scientific
• 353,376,381-382,388,392,431, man, 48, 103, 244-245; thou!{ht, 11;!,
455,458,492,500,557, 565-566 48, 71-72, 76
reality European C(llKPpllon of, 409 scientism, 8, 56, 64, 66-67, 107, I 10,
llcformation, 19, 140,256,.!GO,'.157, 204, 276, :!58, 366, :l81, ;{~. l!l'',
:J59-~64:l·'.11ro1H•,111.:!~7, :{(ii 408, 474, 477-'178,11!)\),!i(i!l
rt'l{I !'~Sloll, :wn,
1t•~11•s!.IVl', :wH i:t•rulnr, !ill, !iO,!i2 li:J,GH,7:1,7 1,, 100,
rplhrntln11, :ui,101, 1, 11 I 10, 110, l•l'..1I 1:1,IHi, IHI, l'I I,
t 11111,1:1;1
I 1•llijl1111'I'111111 ·,o I :!fl!,, ''OH,:.'l!l, :u,H, ,,, I,
630 YURUGU
269,317,322,327,330,332,359, 555, 557-564, 569-570; communion,

365,369,560;art, 204,208 214,352,380; ;void, 381; spiritual-
self, European, 107, 170, 244, 347-348, ity, 66, 82, 91, 96, 102, 110, 180,
393,395,403,495,504,560,563 203-204,208,215,217, 243,276,
self-determination, 1, 125-126, 144, 321, 358, 368, 370-371, 380-382,
185,340,360,373,416,425,432, 386,392,431,462, 467-468, 471,
450, 483, 508, 567-56; African, 432, 481, 502, 556, 558-559, 561, 564,
450; First World, 340 569
selfishness, 94, 353, 379, 385 State, the, 30, 32, 35-36, 42, 46, 50, 53,
sensation, 44, 47-48, 76, 200,346,348, 55, 57, 73-74, 93, 104, 110-112, 114,
470,504 121, 129-131, 135, 146-147, 149,
separation, 30, 35, 37-38, 56, 71, 77, 152,177,214, 233-234, 273,311,
86, 94, 99-101, 105, 110, 127, 204, 318,329,362,396,450,472,480,
207, 213, 219, 242-243, 345-349, 508,562,565
354,362,371, 374, 384-385, 395- subliminal level, 232
396, 415, 453-454, 458 superstition, 128, 268; superstitions,
sexual 128
ambivalence, 460-461; conflict, supremacist, 121, 127
460; dimorphism, 244, 461; sexual- supremacy, 23-24, 57, 59, 68-69, 74,
ity, 176, 377, 452-454 91-92,218, 252,259,273,285,294,
single vision, 87, 561 296-297, 326-327, 334, 381, 388,
sixth century, 102 390,407,431,443,448, 450-451,
sky-god, 173 472,478,482,484,494,507,557,
slaver, 158, 292, 474; slavery, 42, 46, 566-568
148, 155, 157, 291-294, 299, 325, survivalism, 376
405,430,447,465 symbol, 12, 29, 39, 54-56, 61, 71, 74,
Socrates, 40, 43, 47, 58, 69, 111-113, 107, 170-171, 174, 206-207, 219,
119, 178, 227-228, 397 222,269,288,367,391,429,431,
Son of Man, 126, 182 481
sophists, 40, 57, 73-74 symbolic, 29-30, 39, 51-52, 55-56, 99,
South Africa, 275-276, 417-418, 420, 110,118,140,188,195,207,221,
446-447, 508 228,240, 250-251, 371,447,452,
southern cradle, 172, 305, 464 455,468,475,507
sv,1ce, 38, 58, 60, 65-66, 75, 78, 112, symbolism, 29, 51, 55, 82, 103, 138,
120, 169. 212, 230, 232-233, 250, 174, 206-207, 220,370,396,465
254-255, 261,322,343,347,383, symposium, 202, 228, 397
399,403,446,468,490,556,558 syphilis, 433-437, 441-442, 445
Spaniards, 157
Special Forces Prayers, 159 technical, 54, 67, 108, 114, 128, 130,
spirit, 2, 15-16, 29, 32, 56, 67, 70, 81- 161, 167, 184, 186-191, 197, 200-
82, 85, 89, 91, 93, 95, 100-101, 107, 201, 205, 210-21l, 213,217, 230,
113-11'1,118-120, 128,148,153, 233, 293, 354, 383, 431, 489-490,
174,181,183,190,203,212,217, 496-498, 507,566; order, 108, 184,
:l21, 22H-229,2:31,264, 270, 273, lHG-188, I 90-191, I 97, 2 I 1, 2:13,
27!>,:io:i.:122.327,329, a:n, 3fio- 3S'1,'189-490,498, 507, :,(ifi, IC<'hllO
:111,3r;:i,:m1;:lfiH,'.Hi7-:no,:181-.18:l, soda! ord<'r, IH:I, lH(i, IHH, lt'<'h110
:nn,:11n,:11HJ,'110 1111,,12M2!l, loHlt',1I H0-61,llli. !JU,117, lliH l!l!l,
•III, 1111/ 1
1 I t'!11 •1'1:l,1l!l81 '.iO:!,!i07, I8•1 J X!i, 187 IHH,~XU'l!HI, 1!1I, l!iX,
Index 631
381,386,388,420,451,456,489, value, European, 8, 54, 120, 199, 238,

496,502,504,507,509,555,563; 284, 296, 306-307, 329, 342, 345,
efficiency, 99, 117, 496, 502; tech- 354,383,386
nology, 60-61, 77, 95,104, 121, 183- Vikings, 163, 165, 170
188, 191,203,212,289,387,389, violence, 163, 167-168, 266, 293-294,
407,463, 470, 495-496, 500-502, 504 355, 376-379, 392, 416-417, 422-424,
teleological, 66, 187, 322 427, 429-433, 461,465, 485, 562;
telos, 63, 503 cultural, 427, 429, 431-432; politi-
Tertullian, 143, 175 cal, 416, 422-423
Teutonism, 259; Teutons, 170, 263,
265 war, 2, 17, 34-35, 38, 49, 91, 113, 121,
Thales, 102 151, 163, 167, 169, 173, 311-312,
thanatophobia, 380 327,404,412,415,418, 423-426,
the Church, 84, 111, 127-130, 132, 465
134-136, 140, 142-143, 146-148, 150, warrior, 91, 163-164
152-153, 157-158, 175-178, 191, 196, watergate, 311, 398, 400
211, 254,319,321,356,358-362 western liberalism, 329
the Crusades, 152-153, 159, 249, 418 westernization, 184
The Franks, 196 white aesthetic, 221
Theatetus, 40, 47 White Man's Burden, 237,251,266
theocracy, 120,124 white nationalism, 9, 219, 258, 265,
Theodosian Code, 133 271,273,275,277,282,284,288,
Timaeus, The, 41,177,228 290-291, 327,402,409, 429-431, 447
time whiteness, 199, 219-220, 222, 230,
lineal, 60-62, 120, 186, 462-463, 248, 251, 257, 284-285, 307, 337,
494, 504-505; sacred, 60, 68, 120, 408, 448, 450-451, 454-456, 459
186,322,462,496 Will-to-power, 91, 105, 350, 384-385,
Totem and Taboo, 281, 457 387,493,502,563
Toxic Waste, 446 Wodan, 163
transcendence, 67, 75, 85, 112, 174, world culture, 290, 359, 370
190,224,556,560,562 World Health Organization, 438, 442-
transform, 25, 75, 156,220,477,479, 443
481,508 world imperialism, 133
transformation, 30, 64, 81-82, 139, writing, 31, 39, 51, 55-59, 62, 80, 117-
186,432,566 119, 122, 135, 161, 165, 173, 180,
tribal, 104, 126, 150,327,426 184,187,210,217,221,259,263,
tribe, 4, 85, 117, 126, 250, 268, 408, 275,280,444,461,502
417 written codification, 58, 114-115, 118-
Trojan Myth, 258 120,122
Tumuli, 171, 173 written mode, 51, 55, 62
• Tuskegee Experiment, 433-436, 438-
440 Xenophanes, 100
xenophilia, 167, 305
utw11aroho, 1:l, 15 17, 21, J:I, 3:, :17, xenophobia, 168, 30'1-305,351,448,
U/U//1(1111(1:0, 1:1 17' 21' :w':ll .:{5':17 461, 470, 482, 50!1
;ICJ, ,cc11opl1ohlr,II>'/, IG!l
Zt.'lld, i\Vf'sln, 28!1
v,,lrn 1,,,11,111, IT,,,•,IHI, 1 , 1, 1 n,,vul /t'll'I "1/H
Ill I. II, if1, /If,
Index of African Names
Abraham, Willie, 5, 76, 92, 203, 207, Gwaltney, John, 516

387 Jackson, John G., 2, 138
Adams, Hunter, 67, 78 James, George, 2, 102, 119
Amini, Johari, 225, 306, 407, 425, 448, Justice, Barbara, 444
483 Kagame, Alexis, 381
Armah, Ayi Kwei, 2, 29, 101, 109, 199, Kambon, Kobi, 2,472
237,303,311,337,401,489,555, Karenga, M., 2, 15
569-570 Kenyatta, Jomo, 150, 355
Asante, Molefi, 2 King, Richard, 40, 284-285, 465-466
Awoonor, Kofi, 186 Mbiti, John, 59
Baldwin, Joseph, 2,472 Molette, Carlton, 214, 347
Barrett, Leonard, 5, 66 Nobles, Wade, 2, 4, 7, 15, 24, 67, 207
Ben Jochannan, Yosef, 2, 138 Okpaku, Joseph, 213-214, 223, 225
Carruthers, Iva, 2, 33 Robinson, Cedric J., 2, 220, 226
Chinweizu, 1-2, 22, 160-161, 401,432, Spight, Carl, 66
475 Strickland, William, 311,374,400
Clarke, John Henrik, 2 Walton, Ortiz, 211
Diop., Chiekh Anta, , 2, 171-174, 285, Welsh-Asante, Kariamu,229
304-305, 386, 448, 460, 463-465, Welsing, Frances Cress, 2, 441-442,
470,483 450
Dixon, Vernon, 37, 68, 97, 346 Willis, William S., 516
Dubois, W.E. 8., 158,406,448 Wilson, Amos, 2, 331, 392
Fanon, Frantz, 279 Wobogo, Vulindlela, 285
Gayle, Addison, 220, 226 Wright, Bobby, 2, 448-449
Gibson-Hunter, Aziza, 2-3, 232
.,,
Index of Non-African Names
Achilles, 378 Dumezil, George, 164

Alexander VI, 157 Durkheim, Emile, 340
Alexander, 157, 495 Edward IV, 157
Anthony, Susan B., 300 Eliade, Mircea, 60, 62, 171-172, 188-
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 100, 116, 148, 189, 369
179-181, 246, 364 Eusebius, 131,133
Arieli, Yehoshua, 252, 327 Ferdinand, 157
Aristides, 130, 135, 249-250, 253-255, Franklin, Benjamin, 299
493 Freud, Sigmund, 96, 281, 284, 329,
Aristotle, 35, 64, 66-68, 88-89, 93, 97, 345,372,377,379,394-395,452-
116,177,181,183,202,206,223, 453,455,457,462,465-466,471
227, 246,491-492, 503 George, Katherine, 84, 155-156, 476
Arius, 135 Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, 272
Armstrong, Robert, 10, 33, 224 Gouldner, Alvin, 72, 83
Augustine, Saint, 116, 143, 146-148, Grant, Madison, 219, 287
196,210,229,246,360,364 Habermas, Jurgen, 43, 49, 239
Bacon,Frances,498,501 Hall, Edward, 7, 57, 68, 397, 470
Bateson, Gregory, 14, 75 Havelock, Eric, 31, 38, 44, 72, 86, 93,
Baynes, Norman, 130, 146 341,347,504
Beals, Ralph, 545-546 Hawkins, John, 158
Beard, Charles A., 4 76, 490 Hegel, Georg, 32, 89, 264
Bury, J.B., 476,491,494 Homer, 31, 37, 52,378
Caesar, Julius, 270 Isabella, 157
(;alvin, John, 61,323,357, 361-363 Jaynes, Julian, 78, 82
Capra, Fritjof, 101 Jefferson, Thomas, 297
('lt•111l'lll of J\l1•xamlrla, 1'13,464 Jensen, Arthur, 248
('olw11,('hapn11111, 157,:12-1,-113 Johnson,Andrew,299
1:m 1:17,l'10 l'11, 1-15,
C'o1111tnntl111:, .Juenger, Frederich, 44, 60, 95
l'17 1-18,lf,I, 1(,/ lfiH, 1%, :mo, Kaut, Immanuel, 72, 93,201, 201i,:ff/,
:l t!J, :wit 2c;2,26-1,:rno
Darwin, ('h111l1•11,' 111H Kov,•I, .lol'I, Iii, 2:18,250,252. LH-1,
dt' I .11hlc1,,IU\ S1 hw,1ll1 11 ',[, I I 'l, :1(,:I,:l!l7, :182,:l!l3, '1'18, l',;1 ,
l)l11111rn1d, St,111l1·v.1,0, ,,,,, 1l, 111,
:1:.iK,:l!,-1
lll,11111,Wllll11111 ll1•pw111ll1, ''71
,11,11111"', l'11w•,10'' , l,11tlltl1·tl, 11)0,IHO IHI
I 1111111
636 YURUGU
Lincoln, Abraham, 299 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 173-174,

Lovejoy, Arthur 0., 75, 388 189,242
Luther, Martin, 256, 260 Sagan, Carl, 376-379, 453, 465
Mannheim, Karl, 518 Sagan,Eli,376,453
Macquet,Jacques, 516-518, 520-521 Saint Simon, Claude Henri de, 74
Marx, Karl, 300 Schockley, William, 24 7
Mill, John Stuart, 479 Schonfield, Hugh J., 120, 127-130, 139,
Mumford, Lewis, 356 182
Niebuhr, Rheinhold, 85, 91, 127, 147, Schweitzer, Albert, 299
149, 178, 187-188, 191-194, 507 Skolimowski, Henry, 497
Neumann, Erich, 81, 243 Spengler, Oswald, 19, 126
Plato, 29-33, 35-58, 65, 69-76, 82-84, Stoddard, Lothrop, 274-275, 283-284,
86-88, 90-91, 94-95, 97, 104-105, 287,291,300
112-114, 116, 118-119, 121, 148, Stone, Merlin, 285, 293
177, 179,181,202,211, 214-215, Toynbee, Arnold, 18
220-221, 227-228, 239-240, 244, 246, Voltaire, 298
273,291,300,341, 347-348, 358, Weber, Max,21, 99,200,212,356
394, 396-397, 458, 480-481, 491-493, Williams, Robin, 324, 326-327, 337,
495,500,562,570 342,382,386,393,480,506
Poe, Edgar Allen, 299 Wolff, Kurt, 540
Roszak, Theodore, 86, 92, 383, 491,
561

Yurugu - An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior by Dr. Marimba Ani

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Yurugu - An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior by Dr. Marimba Ani

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Copyrigh{~ Marimba Ani, 1994

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Text Design by Jonathan Gullery

I .lhrary of Congress Cataloging-ln-Publlcatlon Data

Author's Note .............................................................................. xi

Archaic European Epistemology: Substitution of Object for Symbol ...... 29

Chapter 2 - Religion and Ideology

A l'oi11t of Departure .................................................................. 109

PARTII - IMAGEAND NATIONALCONSCIOUSNESS

Chapter 5 - Image of Others

Chapter 7 - lntracultural Behavior

Chapter 8 - Behavior Towards Others

Chapter 9 - Progress as Ideology

Chapter 10 - Universalism: The Syntax of

Noli'" ................................... , .............................................. 571

llll1llnw1111l1y ................. , , , .................................................. GO~

In the tradition of Afrikan Ancestral Commemoration,

It is for all Afrikan people, therefore,

And it is especially for those who do not understand

For those Afrikans who would be seduced into the

It is for and to our Youth

When in 1492 Columbus, representing the Spanish monarchy, dis-

The above statement indicates the arrogance of the Europeans

studied people without understanding them and interpreted them

What is the relationship between the way in which Europeans con-

John Henrik Clarke

Two thousand seasons of restless sleep

They knew even as we slept

In our will-less sleep

Confusion in Maafa aftermath

No - We are the Springwater

Balancing the scales

Rhythm is the key to the Way

We call upon Onyame, Olodumare, and Amma

Ancestors and Children to be born

To Whom Praises and Thanks are Due:

diction led to a dissertation meant to uncover the roots of anti-

Asante Sana to my daughter, Djifa, who has also sacrificed, suf-

Staton, and Spencer Forte.

To You All, Asante Sana!

Utamawazo Culturally structured thought. It is the way in

Utamaroho The vital force of a culture, set in motion by

Cultural Other A conceptual/existential construct which

Rhetorical Ethic Culturally structured European hypocrisy.It is

and political imperialism. It is meant for

First World People African descendants throughout the world.

Majority Peoples The members of the indigenous core cultures

Nationalism Ideological commitment to the perpetuation,

European Nationalism All forms of thought and behavior which pro-

White Nationalism An expression of European nationalism which

Cultural Imperialism The systematic imposition of an alien culture

l.id1•11tis111 Tlw ickologkal us<'of "scl1'1Wl'," d1•fi11NIl•:1no•

Objectification A cognitive modality which designates every-

Desacralization The alienation and objectification of nature. In

Materialization This begins with the separation of spirit and

Despiritualization The denial of spiritual reality. The inability to

Reductionism The reduction of phenomena to their most

Reification This occurs when theory is used as law rather

Lineality The intP.rpretation of phenomena as being

denying ancestral ontological experience.

Dichotomization A mechanism which accompanies objectifica-

Spirit The creative force which unites all phenom-