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Yurugu - An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior by Dr. Marimba Ani
Yurugu - An African-Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior by Dr. Marimba Ani
Yurugu
An African-centered
Critique
of European Cultural
Thought and Behavior
/
by Marimba Ani
(Dona Richards)
0
Africa World Press, Inc.
P.O. Box ! 892
Trenton, New Jersey 08607
IUPUI
UNIVERSITY LIBRARl£S
755 W. MICHIGAN ST.
INDIANAPOLIS,IN 46202-5195
AfrlcaWorld Press
P. 0. Box 1892
Trenton, NJ 08607
Anl, Marimba
Yurugu : an african-centered critique of European cultural thought
ancl behavior / Marimba Ani.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN0-86543-248-1.- ISBN 0-86543-249-X(pbk.)
I. Europe-Civilization. 2. Ethnocentrism-Europe. I. Title.
Cl3203.RS 1992
940' .01-dc20
91-71027
CIP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Charts
A. The Process of the European Utamawazo ............................. .xxix
B. European Utamawazo: Mind Control for World Domination
(Chapter I) ........................................................................ xxx
C. Christianity as a Core Mechanism of the European Asili
(Chapter 2) ....................................................................... .xxxi
D. European Aesthetic and European Dominance
(Chapter 3) ....................................................................... .xxxii
E. European Cultural Ego and World Domination
(Chapters 4-5) ................................................................. .xxxiii
F. European Behavior and Ethics in Racial and Cultural
Domination (Chapters 6-8) .............................................. ..xxxiv
G. The Ideology of European World Domination
(Chapters 9-10) ........................................................... ....... xxxv
11. The Tangle of European Cultural Pathology Creates
the System of European World Domination (Conclusion) ........ .xxxvi
Introduction
/Jolelwj(I/ .................................................................................... 1
Th Psis ancl l)roccss ........................................................................ 3
l•:vldrncT ..................................................................................... 9
C'onn:pts and '!'Prins .................................................................... I0
l'1•1i.p•·1·11v,·s<111(1
(Jl)Jt•1·llv•·s ......................................................... i:1
PART I - THOUGHT AND ICONOGRAPHY
Chapter I - Utamawazo: The Cultural
Structuring of Thought
CONCLUSION
Vurugu: The Incomplete Being
What It All Means ........................................................................ 555
The Workings of Yurugu ............................................................... 556
/Jlomaroho in Disequilibrium ......................................................... 560
l'ower as Logos ........................................................................ 563
Imposing the Cultural Self ............................................................ 567
Tl1e Forms or Expression of European Cultural Nationalism ............... 568
J'owards a Vision of the Human Spirit.. ........................................... 569
of the world, they colonized information about the world. They devel-
oped monopoly control over concepts and images. The hallmark of
their colonization in this regard was the colonization of the image of
god. After a number of years under European domination, the slaves
and the colonial subjects of the Europeans would not dare to mention
I he word god in a language of their own creation or visualize god
through the lens of their culture.
The political and social sciences and other academic disciplines
used to explain human existence and to prophesy the possibilities of
progress came under European control. The Christian church in
many ways became the handmaiden of European world domination
and to some extent it still ls.
If the people in Africa and Asia and the former European colonies
are to emerge into full independence, statehood and world respon-
sibility, they will have to answer the above question creatively and
in their favor. Then, in a collective sense, they will have to participate
with others in a world that can be free, that can recognize European
influence without accepting European dominance.
Inasmuch as there are not enough soldiers in Europe to hold
down five empires of people that outnumber the population of
Europe, the victims of European aggression need to ask, "How did
they do it?" The European conquest of the mind of most of the peo-
ple of Africa and Asia is their greatest achievement. With the rise of
independence movements and millions of people demanding the right
to rule themselves, the European monopoly of the minds of most of
mankind was over. Imperialism and colonialism will not die easily.
The former colonial subjects of Europe are fighting to regain what
slavery and colonialism took away-mainly their self-confidence and
the image of god as they originally conceived him or her to be.
In order to understand the new information and revelations in
this book, the readers might have to approach it as carefully as the
writer has. This will be an intellectual experience that has its own
reward.
We are awakening,
Announcing ourselves, self-determining
With Nubian will
Crystal vision
Shaping a new reality
Ancient genius rediscovered
So Dayi - The Clear Word.
Ase!
Acknowledgement
Tiko Ba Si Igi Le Hin Ogba Ogba Ma Nwo *
"ll l1·1111•
tl111" 11111l1,1v1•
pt np•; It will 1·oll11p1w,"(Ym 1il1.1Pr11v1•rll)
xxii YURUGU
Had it not been for Kassahun Checole's judgement that this book
was worth publishing, it may never have "seen the light of day."
Asante Sana, Kassahun.
I give thanks to my cousin, Sandra Lawrence, for keeping our
family together while I immersed myself in this project. I also thank
my father, Franklyn Richards, and the other members of my personal
family and lineage, for their support during this endeavor.
Medasi to my sister Gerri Price for our friendship. She supported
me in this project without even knowing about it, for she taught me
about the Victory in confronting the enemy which is ultimately only
fear.
. And finally, I want the African world to know how grateful I am
to my sister and brothers, Aziza (Claudia) Gibson-Hunter, Jawara
Sekou (Keith Hunter) and Kobi Kazembe Kalongi Kambon (Joe
Ba!dwin), for their African-centeredness, for their love for me and for
African people, and for their consistent encouragement and imani
(faith) in this project. They share the vision.
MarirribaAni
(Dona Richards)
Glossary
Asili The logos of a culture, within which its various
aspects cohere. It is the developmental
germ/seed of a culture. It is the cultural
essence, the ideological core, the matrix of a
cultural entity which must be identified in
order to make sense of the collective creations
of its members.
THE PROCESS OF
EUROPEANUTAMAWAZO
Mlnua Equal
THINKING
BEING - SPIRITUAL
BEING =( •KNOWER•
i[ J- =(
MEANING•
REALITY FULNESS •FACT•
C)
Ii.I
II
-~cn1=[ •oeJECT·
FULFILLMENT THROUGH
PROPAGATION,
AND ~,~:mTli~OF
Denial of 8plrttual
Pr1dlallecl on lelf-Allenatlon
l!.g. A .-hod ot oontrol
1111p1le."'- devaluatlon ot
1M Afl1aan .. If and the IOllrN
ot AfrtoM lllnowledge (8plrtt)
fUlltfflH AMo&n .,,_YHIMlt
Ind e,iq,lollatlon,
EUROPEAN UTAMAWAZO:
MIND CONTROL FOR WORLD DOMINATION
tfil•
Pla10's discovery: The UTAMAWAZ.O
EPISTEMOLOGY (The W8:f Europeans ant talgrt
(concept of tru1h) 10 think) defines the uniYerse
CAN BECOME IDEOLOGY for use of European power
(politicized mythology) over other&
OBJECTIFICATION
ESTABLISHMENT BY DENYING SPIRIT
OF & DEGRADING NATURE
WE ARE EDUCATED
IN THEIR •TRUTH•
-o \
s
CHRISTIANITY
<ti
DSYLET\Z~
~ififilL ~fr]jilll'
n Cultural Imp
~= [OEOt.OGY OF
OPEAN \ 1/0RLD DOMINATION
\),~MAWAzo uTAMAROJto
Universalism
the ideologlC?9I
lmperlallstlc
Absolutlstlc
Monolith le
TANGLE OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL PATHOLOGY CREATES SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN WORLD DOMINATION
Lacking_
Spirit/Seeks
power
~lofillvo1d
REINFORCE
I
r'IStitutionized Ideology Image Behavior
lntracultural
religion - and Aesthetic Seit-Image of Towards
christianism Behavior
Values Others Others
I~ Manifested Through
1·
Mutually Supportive
Utamawazo
.. Cognitive Manifestation oftheASILI AffectiveEnergyof theASILI
"Knowledge' = an actof aggression Consuming
Nocosmicview/separatiing • Expansionist• Unbalanced
Confrontational•
Fanatically rationalistic 'Political"- Needsan Enemy_
Reorders the· Objectifying
• Denialof spirit Expresses
universe through itself and seeks
and is justified by
Asili fulfillment through
Entropic• Pathological
• Unnatural
Introduction
Bolekaja!*
This study of Europe is an intentionally aggressive polemic. It is
an assault upon the European paradigm; a repudiation of its essence.
It is initiated with the intention of contributing to the process of
demystification necessary for those of us who would liberate our-
selves from European intellectual imperialism. Europe's political
domination of Africa and much of the "non-European" world has been
accompanied by a relentless cultural and psychological rape and by
devastating economic exploitation. But what has compelled me to
write this book is the conviction that beneath this deadly onslaught
lies a stultifying intellectual mystification that prevents Europe's polit-
ical victims from thinking in a manner that would lead to authentic
self-determination. Intellectual decolonization is a prerequisite for
the creation of successful political decolonization and cultural recon-
struction strategies. Europe's political imperialistic success can be
accredited not so much to superior military might, as to the weapon
of culture: The former ensures more immediate control but requires
continual physical force for the maintenance of power, while the lat-
Ier succeeds in long-lasting dominance that enlists the cooperation
of its victims (i.e., pacification of the will). The secret Europeans dis-
covered early in their history is that culture carries rules for think-
I 11g,and that if you could impose your culture on your victims you
rnuld limit the creativity of their vision, destroying their ability to act
with will and intent and in their own interest. The truth is that we are
,tll "intellectuals," all potential visionaries.
This book discusses the evolution of that process of imposition,
,,s well as the characteristics of cultural beings who find it necessary
to Impose their will on others. It is not a simple process to explain,
the tools we need in order to dissect it have been taken from
•,lt1<·<'
11•, through colonial miseducation. 1 It is necessary to begin, there-
lurt·, wl!ll 11 painful weaning from the very epistemological assump-
tions that strangle us. The weaning takes patience and commitment,
but the liberation of our minds is well worth the struggle.
My chosen field is African-centered cultural science - the
reconstruction of a revolutionary African culture. I teach Pan-African
studies. The experience convinces me more and more, however, that
teaching Pan-African studies well means teaching European studies
simultaneously. To be truly liberated, African people must come to
know the nature of European thought and behavior in order to under-
stand the effect that Europe has had on our ability to think victori-
ously. We must be able to separate our thought from European
thought, so as to visualize a future that is not dominated by Europe.
This is demanded by an African-centered view because we are
Africans, and because the future towards which Europe leads us is
genocidal.
Chinweizu describes himself as an "occidentalist"; Iva Carr-
uthers calls for the study of "Aryanology." 2 These African-centered
scholars have made contributions to the demystification of
European thought and behavior; the African liberation movement is
indebted to them. And there are others (far too many to be men-
tioned here); Ankobia* who are paving the way for an African-cen-
tered social theory. In the spirit of Cheikh Anta Diop and Bobby
Wright there comes Ayi Kwei Armah, Kwame Agyei Akoto, Kobi K. K.
Kambon (Joseph Baldwin), Molefi Kete Asante, Ifi Amadiume,
Frances Cress Welsing, Wade Nobles, Jacob Carruthers, Amos
Wilson, Na'im Akbar, Kariamu Welsh-Asante, Maulana Karenga, Linda
.lames Myers, Aziza Gibson-Hunter, Asa Hilliard, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o,
K.C. Anyanwu, Cedric Robinson, C. Tsehloane Keto, Haki Madhubuti,
Abena Walker, and others; a vanguard that is codifying the language
of African-centered analysis. The standards for bold African affir-
matior,had already been set by Harriet Tubman, Nat Turner, Ida B.
Wells, Anna Julia Cooper, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey,
Carter G. Woodson, George James, John G. Jackson, Chancellor
Williams, Yosef Ben Joachannan, John Henrik Clarke, Malcolm X, and
the names we cannot mention, the names we do not know, the hun-
dreds of political prisoners and prisoners of war, who have spent out
their youth since the early 70's in jail. Most of all, the intellectual tra-
dition of African affirmation cannot be separate<! from the sµiritual
force which exists in every African person, as they sing and make
music and protect their families and raise tl11•lrc-l1lldnn. !\radPinia-
1
I
Introduction 5
often make costly political errors because of the lack of this rhetori-
cal and hypocritical component in their own culture. They misinter-
pret European language and fail to predict European behavior. They
are always therefore shocked by the intensity of the hostility and
aggressive nature of that behavior.
Part IV closely examines the themes of "progress" (Chap. 9) and
"universalism" (Chap.10) in European ideology. Together they are
the cutting edge that intellectually and culturally disarms the victims
of European domination. The study concludes by offering an inter-
pretation of European culture that relates its extreme rationalism to
its intensely imperialistic behavior towards others. The various
themes, modes, and patterns under discussion converge to form a
single monolithic reality. Imperialism emerges as the overwhelming
persistent theme of this critical statement, which demonstrates how
epistemology, axiology, aesthetic, iconography, and behavior all link
together in such a way as to form an impressively solid and sup-
portive network, girding the quest for European power.
Evidence
Once we have discerned the explanatory principles of European
C'U!ture, we discover many varied sources of information. They
Include the historical record of European behavior, both from the
viewpoint of those with whom Europeans have interacted and from
t l1c viewpoint of Europeans themselves. The emphasis, however, in
t <·rms of information-gathering, is on the various vehicles of European
Sl:'lf-expression, in the belief that it is by looking at the statements,
behavior, and modes of expression of those who have considered
t hcmsclves European that we can begin to get at what "European"
lllcans. It emerges then as a desired "way of being" for a particular
l(r1.n1p of people. Our ethnographic sources are those vehicles of self-
1·xprcssion that reveal how Europeans see themselves and their cul-
t 111c-;i.e., what they would like to be and how they wish to appear to
, ,, I1c,rs.Wc can then understand the logic of the behavior implied by
Il1t•se Ideas, using the record of European behavior towards others.
Western European literature is also a very valuable source of
l11lur111r1tion. I have used European social theory because there is so
11111< 11axiology to be founcl hicldcn in its jargon and in the thought pat-
l1•111-: tl1nt i>merh'("'frnn1 it, a11dI have occasionally used the literature
111wliltP nationHlis111,as it manifests crucial aspects of European ide-
olnJ:Ynncl llw f;:urope;in sPlf frnage <-1ncl Image of others. Often I have
11 1•d ,u1<1t!'l<•rit'd lo lilt• w111d~;and ldr•:11;111tltnsc pllilosophcrs and
tlw111l·,h wlto 1111· 11111•.ltl1·11•d l-:111np1•'•1 •,1·111lnt1l
t llh1k1·rs TIits dis
10 YURUGU
a lineal process, we always come back to the center; the asili is our
reference point; explaining cultural phenomenon within the context
of a specific cultural tradition. Asili has an ideological focus, since it
is concerned with that which compels and demands particular forms
and content of expression. Asili allows us to recognize culture as a
basic organizing mechanism that forges a group of people into an
"interest group," an ideological unit. This is the case even when the
descendants of an original culture and civilization have become dis-
persed in other areas of the world; as long as they are connected
through a common asili, they constitute a diaspora, manifesting the
continued life of the civilization. Asili allows us to distinguish the
peripheral, the anomalous, and the idiosyncratic, and at the same
time asili allows us to interpret patterns of collective thought and
behavior (in terms, of the cultural asi/1). Asili is both a concept and
a cultural reality. H we assume it (the concept), then it helps to
explain a culture in terms of the dominant and fundamental principle
of its development (its reality).
Asili, then, will enable us to understand and explain the behav-
ior, thought, and creations of a people in terms of the origin and logic
of their culture. In this case, it enables us to understand European
thought and behavior as being part of an ideological whole. European
religious philosophy and aesthetics become particularized in the con-
text of the European asili. It remains now for us to determine the con-
tent and nature of this particular asili. Once we have done that,
European culture becomes explicable as an ideological totality. This
does not mean, however, that a definitive asili is conveniently visible
for us initially; rather its nature emerges from the most forceful char-
acteristics of the culture as they are "felt" through confrontation and
observation. It is a question of the perception of emphasis, focus,
and priority. These gel into our conception of asili as the seed, which
is then understood as being the formulative germ. But asili is not an
idea, like Armstrong's mythoform. It is a force, an energy that asserts
itself by giving direction to and placing limits on cultural creativity.
Asili is the primary determinative factor of cultural development and
an essential explanatory principle of cultural theory.
In the present study, I have used two other concepts to com-
plernent the asili concept. I have borrowed other Kiswahili terms to
connote the ideas in question. Utamaduni means "civilization" or "cul-
1ure": wazo mC'ans "tl!OlJ~ht''; and roho is "spirit-life." I have created
t I tl' r·o11t·t'pl 11/wll(t11Jazoto t<J11vey11,cidea of "thought as determined
l1y t·ult urL'." Allfl 111FJv1•11it HHh1<t-cl11/omamlw,IP.:;ll~htly more difficult
to 1•xplnli1, d:• tlw ''•,plilt lllt• ol a 1·11lt11n•,"ali;o lite.•"colleclive 1wr-
14 YURUGU
and presuppositions about the nature of reality, and the way in which
the culture presents its members with definitions and conceptions
with which to order experience. Utamawazo, however, places more
emphasis on conscious mental operations and refers to the way in
which both speculative and nonspeculative thought is structured by
ideology and bio-cultural experience. Utamawazo allows us to
demonstrate the ideological consistency of the premises of the cul-
ture and to identify those premises as they tend to be standardized
expressions of a single cultural entity. Julian Jayne uses the expres-
sion "collective cognitive imperatives," 24 and this is very much what
we mean by utamawazo. It focuses on epistemological definitions in
the belief that as culture acts to fix definitions of truth and truth-
process, the culture constructs a universe of authorization that
rejects and incorporates ideas with reference to a cultural predispo-
sition in intent and style. And, what is more, the asi/i adds dimensions
of purpose and direction, that are forceful. Utamawazo, then, cannot
be understood unless it is placed in the context of asili. Utamawazo
accounts for perspective.
Wade Nobles defines the ethos of a people as "the tone, char-
acter, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mode.
It emerges as a set of guiding principles that define the underlying atti-
tude they have toward themselves and their world." 25 Karenga defines
ethos as "the sum of characteristics and achievements of a people
which define and distinguish it from others and gives it its collective
self-consciousness and collective personality. "26
Utamaroho, like ethos for Nobles, accounts for "attitude," "char-
acter," and "aesthetic" in a collective sense, but it does not include
the "guiding principles" that have a determinative function; that
would be closer to our asili. In terms of Karenga's use of "ethos," uta-
111arohodoes include the idea of "collective personality,'' but it is not
In any way self-conscious. Utamawazo has a self-conscious expres-
sion, even though it originates in the meta-conscious asili, but uta-
maroho remains on an unconscious level of feeling. Utamawazo is
cognitive in expression, while utamaroho is affective. Utamaroho is
many things at once. It is a concept that denotes the way in which the
usi/i acts to forge a collective response among the members of a cul-
ture to life anct to the world as they confront it. But this response, in
1lw sense of utonwrohu, Is 11otthought out or planned. It is more of
,111instincl'iw renrtlon caused by their "spirit.'' Used this way "spirit"
1pf('l'S to I 11~•PSM'llt lnl n,11llrP of i1 lll'illj{. It is I he idea I hat a person,
(111 .,v. It 11-i111tltls r;11,r1 ), ., c11ll1111•,m gr1111p or 11•11plepossess an
l111111,1(1•11.11
(111111pl1y~l1 ,ii) 11li•,l.1111·,, 111111
d(•INlltllH·K tllt'lt lllll((lll'
16 YURUGU
How and why did the West attain intellectual, economic, and mili-
tary preeminence in the world by 1900?Why does the history of the
West, in spite of many retrogressions and failures, appear to be a
story of progress toward new forms of thought and art toward the
achievement of greater and greater wealth and power? 29
He continues:
Some qualities of European thought and social life are unique. Other
civilizations have merits that the West lacks, but certain ideas
occurred only to Europeans, and certain techniques were discov-
ered and applied only by them.
sesses. But this does not lead to any kind of lineal or temporal prior-
ity, nor is it "seen" in the same way that a material object is "seen."
What is European will forever be, in part, a product of how it is expe-
rienced. To abstract these reactions from its definition would not
only be impossible, but would leave very little of value or relevance.
What is European is not simply a group of characteristics, and
to attempt to enumerate such characteristics would not only mis-
represent my intention, but would leave this study open to obvious
criticism. Any one or a number of the generalized characteristics that
will be discussed as European can be found to some extent in other
cultures. And a discussion of the etiology of "Europeanness" using
such an approach would be further complicated by the fact that it has
been one of the more significant manifestations of European chau-
vinism to claim cultural creations that can be shown to be of non-
European origin. The contradiction in this attempt is obvious, since
the self-conscious identification of the cultural entity that would be
referred to as "Western" occurred chronologically much later than
many of the institutional developments with which Europeans choose
to identify. As cultural traditions go, the "West" is, after all, quite
young and biologically or racially Europeans are, of course, the "new
boys on the block." Individual characteristics do not identify them
as being "European": rather it is the way in which they are combined,
and the fact that they are reinforced throughout culture, that fuses
them into an ideological force. It is only in the context of European
culture that the identified themes take on ideological significance. It
was this realization that led me to the concept of asili, as the orga-
nizing and meaningful center of culture.
With this understanding and objective in mind, we need not
become involved in the argument as to what cultural institutions are
'European inventions," and "how much" or "how little" a particular
culture has "contributed to the progress of civilization." These are
merely the polemics of European chauvinism, and they become sig-
nificant only as ethnographic data in this study. For part of the defi-
nition of what is European is to be found in those things with which
those who call themselves Western or European have traditionally
chosen to identify, and, similarly, the way in which they view them-
selves in relation to other peoples. What is presented herein is a
unique configuration of characteristics that arc c-ornhhwd in such a
way that the c>mphasls, prlorlti(•s, and manifest •cl twhuvlor.1I 1en-
d1•ndl-!s fon11 i!ll t•xp1•r(!•111•ecl ~111111ral/lllsl
n, knl , e.illl y I hat lrns lra
dlt lo1111llyIH't'II tt•C1•11t•clto ,1s"Wei.11•111 1-:,1111p1·1111,""W,..,tc·n 1," 111, .,~:
we l\ll,11l11•f1•1 In 11,"l.',11111p1•1111"
Introduction 21
Max Weber has asked the "right" question for Eurocentric rea-
sons and therefore cannot offer an answer that is useful to us. The key
to the African-centered answer lies in his parenthetical statement -
"as we like to think." That is the only element that is universal about
"Western civilization." Its utamaroho ("we like") and its utamawazo
("to think") combine in a manner dictated by an asili that causes the
culture to consistently project itself in universalistic terms. This ten-
dency is specifically discussed in Chap. 10, but it is a recurring theme
throughout the book.
Is European synonymous with "modern?" Is it, after all, a stage
in universal cultural development? The answer depends on one's per-
spective. The question is, therefore, moot. Part of the difficulty is
with the definition of terms. The significant point from an African-cen-
tered perspective concerns what happens if we say that European cul-
ture merely represents what will be the eventual form of all cultures.
The answer is that there is no possibility for a viable critique of what
Europeans have created, because there is no other ("non-European")
perspective. Other ideologies become impotent, because to identify
"Europeanness" as an inevitable stage in "non-European" develop-
ment is to say that they ("non-Europeans") do not exist - certainly
not as directives, as influences, or as agents of change.
Most of the potentially valuable critiques of European culture -
of which there are a precious few - have suffered from a common
malady. Since they syntactically make European culture into a rep-
resentation of a universal stage in human development, they are left
with no place to look for solutions or creative alternatives. "Western"
problems become the problems of "modern man" in these critiques.
Thereby they are superficially universalized, and Africans must
become "modern" before they can even deal with them. Europeans
nre, in this view, the only ones with the authority to criticize their cul-
ture, and the criticisms they make and the solutions they find are
said to have universal significance. European imperialism, in this way,
Is 1111t sC'cn as the product of the behavioral patterns of a particular
<'l1lturC1lwn11pnor of cNlal11 kind~ nf peoph-', but rather of the "nat-
111111" lt'tHlt•m•h•s of nll pc-oplt•nt n pmtlt1\tl;11JWrlod of r11lt11ralclrvc•l-
• "l~v•,, v , 11111111·I1t•1·1111H''l l·'.11111p,·., 11
op11 u-11 t Tl If' ., q,<111111•11t1·11111Ii111111-,
22 YURUGU
THOUGHT AND
ICONOGRAPHY
/
' ~-d.
..,..
f
Iii .
..
... unconnected consciousness is destructions
keenest tool against the soul.
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter I
Utamawazo:
and origin of European epistemology must focus on, if not begin, with
Plato. This is not to say that he was not influenced by the pre-Socratic
African philosophies that preceeded him. 1 But what Plato seems to
have done is to have laid a rigorously constructed foundation for the
repudiation of the symbolic sense-the denial of cosmic, intuitive
knowledge. It is this process that we need to trace, this development
in formative European thought which was eventually to have had
such a devastating effect on the nontechnical aspects of the culture.
It led to the materialization of the universe as conceived by the
European mind-a materialization that complemented and supported
the intense psycho-cultural need for control of the self and others. ...
Contrary to our image of the philosopher as being otherworldly
and remote, even irrelevant (Aristophanes, The Clouds), Plato
appears to have been very much aware of himself as a social and ide-
ological architect. His success was eventually overwhelming. The
power of his ideas is evidenced by the way in which they have con-
tributed to the growth and persistence of a new order. This is pre-
cisely the power of the Euro-Caucasian order: its ability to sustain and
perpetuate itself. Plato's innovations were ultimately incorporated
into the culture because they were demanded by the asili.
The dialogue the Republic is Plato's ideological justification of
the State he wishes to bring into being. What we witness in the dia-
logue can be viewed epistemologically as the creation of the object.
In previous and disparate world-views, we see a knowing subject inti-
mately involved in the surrounding universe. The acquisition of
knowledge involving immersion in this universe until, through sym-
pathetic participation, meaning is revealed, expressed, and under-
stood via complex and multidimensional symbols. But in the "new"
epistemology we exchange symbols for "objects." The creation of the
object requires a transformation of the universe, no longer experi-
enced but rather, "objectified." This transformation is achieved
through a changed relationship of the knower to the known. In the
Republic, Plato performs this feat: a psycho-intellectual maneuver by
which the subject is able to separate her/himself from the known.
This separation is at once the key that opens the way to "knowledge"
as conceived by the European and the key that locks the door to the
possibilities of the apprehension of a spiritual universe.
Two things occur, one effecting the other. First, the psyche
tmdt•rgoes a Lransformatinn: Slowly the "self" Is pt•rn•lvcct clifkrently
fr0111 twrnr,·: ti 1t•ll, I lw unl'-'.<'rst•ln which I hat sl'lf rl'l,11t·sls 1wrn•ived
dlfl1·11•11tly, l,1•1·.111~1· I lit• tlill 11n• ol 1111'rt·l,1ll1111·,l1tp111111.1111.(l'd
TIil' !WII
I, lltl 111111{1'1,1111•11f1h llt IIIH,111'1!1•1111It 1>1•1·111111·
I ''1111'tlll11ld11~1,1d1)t•1 I"
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 31
... in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle;
and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said
to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise; but when owing
to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also
the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse-in
this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled
... look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of
these two conditions realized; for the words "temperance" and "self-
mastery" truly express the rule of the better over the worse ... the
manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally
found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so
called who are the lowest and more numerous class .... Whereas
the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under
the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few
and those the best born and best educated .... These two ... have
a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held
down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.5
was the realization of the cultural asili. Plato had layed an elaborate
trap. Once the "person" was artificially split into conflicting faculties
or tendencies, it made sense to think in terms of one faculty "winning"
or controlling the other(s). And here begins a pattern that runs with
frighteningly predictable consistency through European thought,
continually gathering momentum for ages to come. The mind is
trained from birth to think in terms of dichotomies or "splits." 6 The
splits become irreconcilable, antagonistic opposites. Holistic con-
ceptions become almost impossible given this mindset. First the
dichotomy is presented, then the process of valuation occurs in
which one term is valued and the other is devalued. One is consid-
ered "good," positive, superior; the other is considered "bad," nega-
tive, inferior. And, unlike the Eastern (Zen) conception of the Yin and
the Yang or the African principle of "twinness" (Carruthers refers to
this as "appositional complementarity"7) these contrasting terms are
not conceived as complementary and necessary parts of a whole.
They are, instead, conflicting and "threatening" to one another.
The process of dichotimization in the European utamawazo is of
great significance, for it is this dichotomized perception of reality on
which the controlling presence (imperialistic behavior) depends. The
11(//maroho,which needs to control, is dependent on the antagonistic
oppositions presented by the cognitive style (utamawazo) of the cul-
tural myth (mythoform). Realities are split, then evaluated, so that
oue part is "better," which mandates its controlling function. This, we
will see, is a pattern throughout Platonic thought. Moreover, it is a
pattern that develops consistently as a continuing characteristic of
I lie European utamawazo grounded in the nature of the originating
11sili.Robert Armstrong says it this way,
I le•i'mttlllll(.!S,
properly human until his reason controls his emotion, i.e., men were
to control women. The political implications of this consistent and
unified theory are not difficult to extrapolate. Plato has already
described what for Europe becomes the "Ideal State," one in which
the human being who has gained control of himself in turn controls
those who haven't (women, of course, were perceived as not having '
the necessary control). It would follow that the universe is then put
in order by the nation of people who are "higher" (controlled by rea-
son). It is also significant that Plato indicates that the "higher" ten-
dencies will always be "less" in number and the "lower" of greater
mass. This rationalizes an ideology of control by the few within the
State and world dominance by a small racial minority. 18 If indeed this
splitting of the person is artificial, inaccurate, and undesirable-if
indeed emotion is an inseparable part of the intellect and of human
consciousness-then this new epistemology ("mental habit") can be
interpreted as a justification of what was to be manifested as
European racism, nationalism, and imperialism. The group that has
the power to enforce its definition of "reason" so that it becomes the
most "reasonable," consequently has a mandate to control those
whose reasoning abilities are judged to be less (and so there is a
need to "measure" intellectual ability: enter I.Q. mythology).
On the level of epistemology we have seen that this splitting of
the human being facilitates the achievement of that supreme mental
state (of being) that in European culture has come to be identified
with the ability to think, at least to think rationally. Unless the intel-
lect is separated from the emotions, it is not possible to talk about
them distinctly, to concentrate on gaining knowledge by controlling
or eliminating the emotional relationship to a given situation, thing,
or person.
But this, I think, is what you would affirm, at least, that every dis-
course (Logos) should be constituted like a living being, having its
own body (Soma), so as to be neither headless nor footless, but hav-
ing a middle as well as extremities, which have been written so as
to be appropriate to each other and to the whole. 27
... his views about slavery, state, man and the world, all illustrate
a single hierarchic pattern; and ... the key to the pattern is in his
idea of logos with all the implications of a dualist epistemology. Th<>
slave lacks logos: so does the multilucle in tlw state, lhc body i11 the
1rian, ,ind material 11ec~~ssity
i11tlw 11nlvers<• . C)tdn ls in1pos1•cl
011 1l11·ml;y a lw11Pvol1•11t s11p<-r11,r: uta!ilL't, 1,t1i;11dla11, 111h11I,
d1•111l
111uc I II IP 1,~ .1111I 1111
I lw t 111111111111 It y b ti 11•I111,,w,.>111111 ht
of 1111!11~
.111Iir1111111dl•'• 111,11•11Ii, 1111,•,l,1v1·1y h ,,.1t1u,II 111111•if1·11lt,111111111'r
WIiii 11111>'• 1111111111,1!1111111tlw 111111111111 ll1t• w111 Id ,1111111!111111" 1 •
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 43
Why did Plato so persistently and unrelentingly drive home the def-
inition and confines of this epistemological mode? It was an episte-
mology that implied a social, ethical, and even political theory. Plato's
epistemology did indeed eventually become the foundation for a form
of social organization that would facilitate domination of the many by
the few. It helped to create a world-view. The epistemology took on
ideological implications in Plato's presentation and his commitment
to its assumptions. His dialogues were ammunition for the prosely-
tizers who would follow until the assumptions of his epistemology
became the assumptions of a cultural tradition. These epistemologi-
cal assumptions translated into an ideological statement in the civi-
lization that would claim them as tradition.
Theory of Humanness
A theory of the human being has already been implied in our dis-
cussion of Platonic conceptions. We, as humans, are not whole
beings, but rather made up of parts that are in continual conflict with
one another. We are made up of "reason," "intellect," and our "better
natures," which are constantly seeking to control our desires,
appetites, emotions and to put our "senses" to proper use. The bet-
ter part must control the "baser." According to Eric Havelock, Plato
"discovered" the "psyche" that came to refer to the "isolated, think-
ing self." The self was no longer conceived as a cosmic belug, thal is,
a being that experienced itself as intimately involvc-d with other
beings in Lhe cosmos. A "cosmic self" implies lhnL the reality of setr
is phcno1n<.'nally part of ntlwr rcalitlt·s pn•s<•1111 1d m; a rt·8ult of Sl'll•
this way. That makes historical sense, since Greece developed out of
its cultural and intellectual association with early African traditions.
The African and Native American world-views have similar cos-
mic concepts. Their intellectual traditions and thought-systems rest
on the assumption of cosmic interrelationship. These conceptions
form a basis of communal relationships as well as a sympathetic rela-
tionship with the natural environment. How would such a conception
of the human being interfere with the ground rules of Platonic epis-
temology? Why was it essential that he cast doubt on the validity of
such conceptions? A cosmic being must be whole. In such a being rea-
son and emotion cannot be experienced as disparate, unconnected,
and antagonistic. A cosmic self cannot objectify the universe. The more
"intelligent" such a self becomes, the more it understands language
as merely metaphor. This idea is common to the thought-systems
mentioned. The highest, most profound truths cannot be verbalized,
and one reaches for the dimension beyond the profane word where
the meaning of the symbols becomes clear. But for Plato the "cosmic
self" is incapable of knowing; it can only perceive, sense, intuit, and
have "opinions." (The ascendancy of the so-called "left-brain.")
Plato establishes instead the "autonomous, thinking self."
According to Havelock, this "self" or "psyche" is a thing or entity
1·apable of not only scientific cognition, but of moral decision. 36 Plato
not only put forth the idea of the "thinking self"-an idea which must
llnve predated him-but he simultaneously discarded other aspects
of our "human" beingness as invalid or unworthy (unreal) and
dc•clared this superconceptual function-this totally cerebral activ-
11y-as the essence of humanness. Therein lies its uniqueness,
•;trnngeness, and significance all at once. He had preferred a new the-
.,, y of humanness (man/woman). Much later, caught in the throes of
1•vult11'ionarytheory, it became very important in European thought
I 11 t•mphasize those characteristics that were thought to separate
,111ddistinguish "humans" from animals. "Intelligence," of course, was
k,•y; the essence of man/woman. (For Michael Bradley it is the "dis-
c owry of f'ime.")37 Using Platonic conceptions and elaborating them,
l11tt'lli1,{('ncetook on a particular definition.
S<.:lentistshave talked in terms of two parts or "hemispheres" of
1111brain for some time. The left hemisphere is believed to control
, ,., t,dn kinds of thought processes, while the right hemisphere con-
11 oh otlH'I' kinds of thought processes.~ 8 The implications involved
,,, ,. l111p011n11tlo this cliscussio11and w!ll be discussed later.A related
p11t111 lo I w 11iad1· I w,,.Is l I 1,11whlh>nl I c-1111
un•s and all people Involve
111.tli"l11•111lspl11•r1· 1t1Wh",," :H1 to •;p,•,11<, 111"ll(Jtlllitl" fu11~tioninl:(,rul-
46 YURUGU
tures and therefore their members can value one style of cognition
over another. In such cases one will be emphasized and encouraged,
while the other is not. A person will be rewarded for thinking in the
valued mode, and such habits of thought will be reinforced in the
formalized learning and socialization processes. The same person
will be "punished" for thinking in the "devalued" mode, and will "fail
for doing so."
In nineteenth century Europe, in which unilinear evolutionary
theory reigned, European scientists said that the left hemisphere was
"major," because it was associated with "thought" and "reasoning,"
which set humans apart from animals. The right hemisphere was
labelled "minor" and less advanced or less evolved. It had a "lower"
capacity, dealt with "emotion," and had to be directed by the left
hemisphere. Clearly this was a nineteenth century version of the
Platonic conception, which split man/woman into reasonable and
emotional tendencies, superior and inferior faculties, and mandated
the dominance and control of the emotional as normative state of
being. And so "order" and "justice" were achieved. Plato stated the
case for this kind of order in the person and, by extension, in the
State. Nineteenth century evolutionists were giving "scientific" back-
ing to the same kind of imposed "order" among the world's cultures,
with the more "reasonable" (higher and rational) cultures controlling
the more "emotional" (lower and less advanced) ones.
The point that is critical to this analysis of European thought and
behavior is that Platonic theory and epistemology and its subsequent
development, enculturation, and reformulation provided the most
effective ideological underpining for politically and culturally aggres-
sive and imperialistic behavior patterns on the part of European peo-
ple precisely because the argument was stated in intellectual and
academic "scientific" terms. Plato not only helped to establish a the-
ory of the human that would valorize "scientific" cognition to the
exclusion of other cognitive modes, but he established the Academy.
It has since become a characteristic of European culture that asso-
ciation with academia represents association with truth, superior
reasoning capacity, and impartiality or "objectivity"-this also means
a lack of commitment to anything other than the supposed "abstract
truth." What Platonic conceptions allowed for, consequently, was
that the most politically motivated acts (e.g., wnrs of aggression,
r:>rially based slavery) r·oukl he j11stified l11wltnt passed for u-pnlit l-
r,11."sc1t-11ttflc•"
kn11:;: the lc>nw; of n s11ppwwcl "111tlv1·1~fll trntl1," tl11•
1•t1•111.d,11111 'lcln,1 ,,·TIiis wns nut 111•11•1t'li11lly
l1.u1Hl11f.( th1• l'l,1l011lr
tlv1·, 1!111II I:, 1111·11•11•to wllh 11tllb1111w1•ptl1111w.1: p111wl1hl11
111i11•1
•
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 47
recognition of values. 39
The artist does not believe in abstract systems; he deals with felt
and ordered emotional ideals and believes order is attained
through the contradictions, the tense unities of everyday experi-
ence. Thus, the artist himself may be unstable, a changeling, and
this is a threat to any establishment. 42
On the other hand, the mal hcmatician would rair m11chbetter i\S
IJlato's view nf th(' id<•al,nan fort 11<' Ideal State·. I IL•1•mpl1asl;,.<:smath
1•111:,lksin tlH' c1n-rlc11l11m for-1111'g11111dln11s. Fo, h1111"m.,t!1l'111,1tks''
llw ,h,tlH' c,f trntll 11111
11,1•1 p111vld1•tlll' ·,ol11llo11t11nll prul>l1•t1P,.
<';111
111•11•,111,1111 ,l p,1111<
111111I 11111,•pl1111111111,111
11,tl1111•I ll11pll1" /\111I II
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought SJ
people were in fact not like this, he would make them so. He would
fashion their minds to think the way they had to think to make his
plan work. He would train them with the "syntactical condition of the
mathematical equation," because "numbers drag us toward
Beingness." 43 In other words there were changes that he had to make
in the cognitive habits (utamawazo) of the participants in the culture
if he was to succeed in the creation of the new order.
cultures that are labelled "primitive." And these are the terms they
use to characterize the abilities of children of African descent and
other groups who are seen as lacking cultural and racial value within
the societies in which Europeans dominate. In fact, European acade-
mies "create" such nonminds. 47 In each of these instances, including
Havelock's critique of the mental habits of humankind "before" Plato,
the statements made have ideological significance. They are sup-
porting a chosen way of life, a set of beliefs. The objective is to estab-
lish the "way of life" as superior to all which either preceeded it or
that is different from it. It is the ideological nature of Platonic episte-
mology that makes this possible: an epistemology dictated by the
European asili, carried in the cultural genes.
For Plato, the poet does not appeal to the proper "principle" in
the person or to the proper part of his or her soul. And so the poet
would not be able to help in the task of lifting us out of the darkness
of the cave and correcting our ignorance towards the "light" of truth.
The poet obstructs the proper functioning of reason and does not
help us to gain control over our emotions.
The imitative poet ... is not by nature made, nor is his art intended,
to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will
prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated ...
his creations have an inferior degree of truth ... and he is ... con-
cerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be
right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he
awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs
the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have author-
ity and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of the man,
as we maintain, the imitative implants an evil constitution, for he
indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater
and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another
small he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from
the truth. 48
Plato's argument with the poets is that they do not foster the
view of the State and of the "good" of which he wants to convince peo-
ple; of which they must be convinced in order for them to play their
p~,rts well. The Republic is perfect because it is absolute. But what if
h111nanrealities are not absolute? Suppose there are ambiguities
c•11rlcn1icto human existence'? Plato solves this problem by simply
"t1l1minali11g''the a111bil.{uous nature of our existential reality, by pre-
I t•11dl11~1 tltitl It isn't tlwr1•. Whn, aft1•r n\11 Is rrc<1ting "illusion" anti
wl 11, l!i I IP11ll11~ wit I1 "tt'illlly'I" Tht• 111
,llosophy 111H lcrlyll If( ll ,e t?,'flt1hfir
,.,,y•; Ill/II lllllll,lll 11.-1t1w, Iii 11110111•,11('lllt'),(111 l1•-..,111,11tlwy 111(' l'IH II
54 YURUGU
suited to specific tasks by nature, and will be happiest doing that for
which they are best suited and that such is best for the order of the
whole. Isn't that convenient? Plato doesn't need the poets "messing"
up this picture-they won't help him sell his myth.
If the poets and the poetic in us is bad and backward, certainly
the other side of the coin is that our better, more rational natures are
brought out by the literate mode, the substitution of object for sym-
bol. When the literate mode dominates, we nurture a new and differ-
ent mindset. That is the important thing. That is the significance of
Plato's work. Contrast Havelock's characterization of this "new" man
with that of the "old." The new man is governed by "self-conscious
critical intelligence," "individual and unique convictions," a "critical
psyche," "inner stability," "inner morality," and "calculated reflec-
tion." He is "self-governing," "emancipated," "reflective," "thought-
ful," "self-organized," "calculative," "rational," "self-generated,"
"awakened," "stimulated," "thinking abstractly," and "autonomous."
In the rhetoric of European ;Value the deck is clearly stacked. This
"new" person is smart/What we see is the epistemological basis of the
conviction that literacy renders progressiveness and that when the
literate mode becomes valued and finally dominant, we have a
"higher" form of culture in terms of European ideology. So that in a
meeting on general education at Hunter College in New York City in
1984, it was assumed that to educate our students we must teach
them about "Western" European civilizations, since that is where
human beings learned to be "critical," indeed to "think."
But the European is certainly not very "critical" if that means
questioning the European world-view as Plato inspired its configura-
tion. The world of literacy, it is believed, is a world of objectivity, a
world of "impartial" truth. Oral media is "subjective." In it personal-
ity is merged with tradition. How do we change this? "The funda-
mental signs enabled a reader to dispense with emotional
identification .... "49 Plato urged a move away from "emotional
involvement," "unquestioned precepts," and "imitation." (Today
Habermas urges us away from predecisive validity claims based on
cultural tradition. 50) Plato supposedly introduced "technical" learn-
ing "on the highest level of consciousness." 51 So while Plato is seek-
ing to produce minds capable of the "highest" form of thougl1t,
"nonlitcrate man'' emerges as being barPly able to "think" at all.
lndt•l 1cl, Wt' nrn11ot be sure that he is f'YCn "conscious." A11d,what ls
tnon•, lltb; Pplstl•tnolugy is sc..;cnto llavl' moral l111ph1·ntl1111s ns wdl.
'l-'111• llh•1.,11' p.utl1 lpall1 of 1111• ld1•,1l •,l11t1• 1-.1110H' 111111,II lwc111J:,1•l11s
,·tlil• •• 111,· ·,ttlll••ct t1rq11, ,1111111111{,1·1 Ille l'.111, 011d 111,1ly•,I•,,wl!JI,, lit••
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 5.5
earlier Greek ethic was not. (Of course, once the "questioning" takes
place in the Socratic dialectic, not too much more "questioning" is
necessary.) Within the logic of European nationalism these ideas were
to be later echoed in nineteenth century evolutionary theory where
Victorian culture was judged as the "highest" form, representing a
more objectively valid moral state, the assumption being that
European values were arrived at "critically" and "rationally" and were
therefore universally valid. This was a legacy from the "enlighten-
ment," so-called.
Plato had set the stage for important ingredients of the European
self-image. He sees himself as a critical being, rational and in absolute
control. His mission is to control and rationalize the world, and this
he achieves through the illusion of objectivity. Plato himself must
have been something like this. Stanley Diamond draws a portrait:
glyphic writing, which uses the symbol to lead us toward the sym-
bolic."55 The significance of these passages is that it affirms my belief
that the MOW NTR of Kemet does not represent a "primitive" form of
secular or profane script and is not therefore "pre-European." Rather,
it represents a quite different view of reality-a mindset that sought
to understand the universe as cosmos, therefore careful not to
attempt the separation of spirit and matter. So that when we speak
of the literate mode as championed by Plato, we mean to stress a
unique definition and use of that mode: one devoid of the "symbolic"
in De Lubicz' sense. This writing lacked something. It was only able
to deal with "one-dimensional realities," and as Diamond says,
ifiable truth. Anything else was mere opinion, subject to the whims
of human nature. Logic helped one to maintain one's "objectivity"
(emotional distance). The statement below, from a contemporary
introductory textbook by H. L. Searles, demonstrates the ideology of
Platonic epistemology. According to the author, the study of logic
should enable students to:
While I am arguing for the seminal nature of Plato's work and its
powerful influence in the formulation of the European utamawazo, I
do not want to give the mistaken impression that his work was very
influential at the time of his writing. Only a tiny fraction of the Greek
populace followed, had access to (i.e. was literate and privileged) or
was convinced of this new epistemology. And its accessibility was to
remain restricted for many centuries to come. But what makes it so
important is that those few who did have access and who were con-
vinced were also those who set the intellectual and ideological pat-
terns for the civilization that would follow. It was as Plato wanted it
to be-the few made decisions for the many. The "logical" ones led
those who "could not reason well."
According to Havelock, Plato was looking for the "syntax of true
universal definition." Platonic epistemology allowed one to choose
between the "logically and eternally true" and the "logically and eter-
nally false," whereas the poetic mode did not. 60 Plato identifies the
"logical" with the "eternal," while the poetic is seen as being tempo-
rally limited, all illusion. But now some Europeans are discovering
what other cultures have always known: verbal -linear logic is only
one aspect of our consciousness, one part of our cognitive apparatus.
A.s humans we have other tools that are global and intuitive. But
within European culture these have almost been put out of commis-
sion, made inoperable, deformed by a civilization whose epistemol-
ogy ignored them and considered them almost "inhuman," certainly
·•uncivilized." Deficient in the ability to grasp cosmic reality, organic
interrelationship, Europeans were deprived of the source of a differ-
ent kind of power, which comes from joining. They turned, therefore,
to those forms of intellectual manipulation which seemed to yield
power over others; the nature of the asili.
The dominance of written codification is accompanied by other
conceptual habits that support it and that it supports. Epistemology
meets with ontology as concepts of space ancl time begin to adhere
in theories of humanness, knowledge, ancl truth. l .inealily in EuropeM
thought has all of thcst• impllcatiuns. It Is prt>s1•111in tl1t.• nascent
Europl'11111'onr<'ptlons nf p11rpn:wnnd rm1snllty; In tlH' :wnllarlt.a
tl1111nl th111·tl1,1t 11111'.l' 11pll,1:,lnOil 111
1.to,trlty 111lh1• 1·11111111•;111llll'
111111J1111l1·,1I
111111111 nf 1:•,111n111•.111
r.-ll1-1l1111•,,
plill11•,11plik,1I,,111dlcl1·11lt1!1,
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 59
ical thought. These characteristics are all related, but their visibility
as dominant themes emerge at different times in the development of
the culture. They are introduced here briefly, so that we can pick
them up later as recognizable themes contributing to the over-all
configuration of European thought (utamawazo) and behavior.
Dorothy Lee, in Freedom and Culture, tells us that European cul-
ture codifies reality in a lineal manner. She bases her conclusions on
comparisons with specific "non-European" cultures that she finds
have "nonlineal'' codifications of reality. Her work helps to elucidate
the assumption of lineality in the European utamawazo. ln European
culture reality is codified - understood, perceived, organized - in
lineal, sequential relationships. Events are viewed in terms of tem-
porality.61 The line underlies the European aesthetic apprehension of
the given. [ts presence is taken for granted in life, and in all academic
work. Teachers, says Lee, are always drawing them on blackboards.
She goes on to say that "progress" is the "meaningful sequence,"
''where we see a developmental line, the Trobriander sees a point, at
most a swelling in value." Europeans "take pleasure and get satisfac-
tion in moving away from a given point ... the Trobriander finds it in
the repetition of the known, in maintaining the point; that is in what
we call monotony." 62
Lee has hit on the ideological significance of lineality in European
thought. Change or movement away from the point in a lineal direc-
tion toward another imagined point as far as that line can extend (the
future) is "progress" as it is defined in European culture. This con-
ception becomes the basis for willed cultural behavior. "Progress," as
we shall see in Chap. 9, is the idea that initiates change, that gives sup-
posed supremacy to the culture, and that justifies exploitation of oth-
ers. This idea of progress rests on the assumed reality of the line. All
I ltlngs are reduced to sequential relationship on a line: one dimen-
sional and unidirectional. This time line joins the points of "past,"
"present," and "future," where the function of past and present is to
l{lvc value to the future by virtue of inviduous comparison, and then
IIIt' fmure is used as a standard by which to evaluate the value of the
preseut and the past. The future reigns supreme. Any form of cultural
l>t·liavior ls justified in the pursuit of this never attainable future. And
,111y<'1111 ure whose utomawazo d::>esnot allow for the abstract yet
oppt £•ssive fulurc of the progress ideology is thought to be doomed
tu ft1llurc. .Jolin S. Mbiti, writing from a Eurocentric perspective, has
111\l-lto SilY nhout Afrirnn reli!,{lous tho11ght:
with everything else in the Universe have been caused," while for
Africans "everything in the Universe is related, is dependent and is
caused," including themselves; they believe that "things happen
because they do. " 77 In Clark's analysis, the European "why," which is
different from the African "why," issues from a consciousness that
remains locked in to the "lower order" of spatial-temporal dimen-
sions. African consciousness, on the other hand, functions more on
the level of spirituality that becomes the meaningful dimension.
(Leonard Barrett makes a similar point with regard to the African
conception of illness. 78 This different emphasis in the conception of
causality is, in Clark's view, "the manifestation of a totally different
state of consciousness" in which the African is able to move beyond
ordinary time and space to a higher level on which events can
become meaningful in terms of cosmic or universal causation. 79
Yet the idea of cause is problematic even within European logic.
Of Aristotle's four kinds of causes, "material," "formal," "efficient," and
"final," the final cause is crucial for our analysis. According to
Aristotle the final cause of an object, thing, or phenomenon is its pur-
pose, the end for which it exists. In his view determining the final
cause of an object or phenomenon is the most important objective of
science. At the same time this tradition rigidly separates science and
belief. Yet the idea of final cause can only be understood to be a
belief! The belief in the idea of "final cause" gives to European thought
its strong teleological character. It leads to an assumption that every-
thing that exists, exists for a purpose, and that purpose is the most
important thing about it. This idea manifests itself in ideologies as
diverse as Judea-Christian thought and Marxian analysis, and per-
haps finds its ultimate expression in the idea of progress, a critical
component of both of these traditions. European science therefore
states what must be taken as an act of faith (the belief in cause) in an
absolutist and deterministic manner. Clearly, the result is dogma and
its purpose is ideological: "scientism."
What should be method only becomes ideology, which rests on
the following myths, according to Carl Spight: (1) that science is fun-
damentally, culturally independent and universal; (2) that the only
reliable and completely objective language is scientific knowledge; (3)
that science is dispassionate, unemotional, and antireligious: (ti) that
logic is the fundamental tool of science; and (S) I hat th«:: sdentific
method leads systematically and pror.:rcssively towa,d the trut!l. 811
The function of science in _Europ<'unru Ihm· htT1111ws 111at11( pst11h-
llsl1ing a11inv11hwr,1bh· sow r,· of .,11tl1111
IIy II1,111 ,1111101
Iw l'I 111lh•11i-i1•d
ti,,.toll' ol 111,t,ll1ll1,lil11~l•:111np1•1111
ln 11'lallo11 lo olll1•r 1•11ltm1",ll 1111•;
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 67
It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not
to belong to the same thing in the same respect; and whatever other
distinctions you might add to meet dialectical objections, let them be
added. This, then is the most certain of all principles .... 87
..
l-:11111p11.111111rn,1 ofl1111 vl1°W'I c 0111·1 plln1111 ,111 1 ;1111pli•K ol lilt'
1111°11•
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 69
be derived from and supported by it. The special nature of this rela-
tionship in European development will unfold in the chapters that fol-
low. Those colonized by Europe (as well as Europeans themselves)
are taught that Platonic abstraction is abstraction and that because
their thought-systems are not based on such abstractions, they are
incapable of thinking "abstractly." This is merely one aspect of
Europe's assault on the rest of the world.
Certainly abstraction is valuable in specific situations, when rea-
soning about certain kinds of things, e.g., concepts of "opposite,"
"sameness," "difference," etc. But we all know that there are very few
instances in which these abstract categories can be applied accu-
rately and without qualification to concrete realities. Plato knew this
and so therefore called reality as we know it "unreal." He says that it
is only our perception that is contradictory, not "Reality" (with a cap-
ital "R"). Perhaps my major argument with the Platonic argument is
the dictum that the mode of abstraction must be applied to our moral
conceptions and our relationships with each other, or as Kant puts
it, our "judgements." The Kantian imperative is, after all, morally and
existentially irrelevant. To be meaningful it must be applied to con-
crete human situations and be qualified and conditioned by those sit-
uations. The use of abstract "universal" formulations in the European
experience has been to control people, to impress them, and to intim-
idate them. These formulations have political significance not moral
or ethical significance. They do not help people to live better. That is
why Eric Havelock is wrong when he implies that the Greeks were
capable of living more morally after Plato's influence. And that is why,
despite the ascendancy of European scientific thought, European cul-
ture is in many ways less moral than the majority of cultures that
have an authentically moral base.
Abstraction is then a tool that all people use to integrate them-
selves into their environment and to organize their thinking and their
knowledge. Clearly the Platonic emphasis that grew to dominate
European thought, behavior, and social organization did not have
this purpose. Alvin Gouldner's interpretation is closer to mine than
that of most European scholars:
ol 11111v1•1-.11I
cit vi 111111111•111 11111v,
t1,•ll11ll111111, tli, II, 111111J11lyl1,1v1•
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 73
ial control, while the Sophists seem to have had a more pluralistic
view, recognizing the validity in cultural diversity and world-view. In
Gouldner's words, this recognition leads them to:
nothing in this life is real. "The great claim of the philosophy of the
absolute is that the absolute is no hypothesis, but a presupposition
implicated in all thinking, and needing only a little effort of analysis
to be seen as a logical necessity." 100 James' own "pragmatic" con-
ception of truth is as follows:
Plato would not have had any patience for James' "pragmatism"
and neither has the European tradition. It does not "fit" the ideolog-
ical needs of this minority culture. Does not "suit" the other dominant
modes of the culture. It does not satisfy the power needs of the asili.
The synthetic mode yields cosmic conceptions. The European
world-view has succeeded in leaving the culture with no authentic
cosmology, no true metaphysic. Everything is physical, material, and
separate. The ultimate approach to knowledge is objectification and
analysis. Willie Abraham talks about the European "tendency to rip
things apart." 102 There are some things, he says, that cannot be
"divided" without destroying their integrity. It would seem that the
human would be one of these. The European scientific approach tears
human beings to shreads in order to understand them. The essen-
tialist view assumes man/woman to be irreducible. The analytical
mode splits things up. Remote and absolute abstraction is made
applicable to the here and now through an analytical methodology.
What seems to have occurred very early in European development
was a predilection for one of the cognitive methods that we as human
beings were capable of employing. The absolute, the abstract, and the
analytical suit the European utamaroho, an utamaroho that needs the
sensation of control.
Empirical evidence supports this intepretation. As mentioned
previously, early on in the history of European scientific thought, lan-
guage-related skills, and methods of "knowing" were associated with
a portion of the brain that was labelled "major," while the portio11 that
gC'ncrated other types of responses was c(1llccl"minor," nnd as is indl-
catt•cl hv tlw sc-11iat11i<.' rcli\lionsllip of tht•sf' two ll•rrns, tlw "minor"
· w.1'1 tl11111J!hlto lw "lt·ss dt·-wlo1wd" than 1111' "111,1jt11 '' 'l'ltls w;,s 11,li
11,,11111 '', ·1111, ," htlVPI1 t lw p11•dllt•1·t101,of I lit• E111upt•,111111111d
11111 1111t 1111
11111,11 , voh1ll1111,uy 1111111,+ th,11 ,1l111w1111 1111•, 11111p,11l•11111 111
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 77
k,··:.
W,•1111< ilt't'il, Tilt' laltt•r Is thr ''most l11clhqw11sableto normal
,111•1•1·1!
'"1'11ls c·o11pl1•dwltl1 his (1•t•l1111t
lhnl tl1t• tl}\111hrnl11 is "largely
..,. ,,ry," 11:1l1·cllll111lt111111111111,·
1111111•1·, ll1nl tlw tlHl1I lmil11 I:, u "vt'!>II
80 YURUGU
human!)
But there are other views of the modalities of human con-
sciousness. Erich Neumann offers a Jungian-influenced conceptual-
ization, to some degree reminscent of the right-brain/left-brain
distinction. His distinction is between "matriarchal consciousness"
and "patriarchal consciousness." Matriarchal consciousness is prior,
is linked to the "moon spirit" and "moon time," as it is grounded in
natural and cyclical rhythms; it is intuitive and becomes "impreg-
nated" with ideas, rather than "willing" them. Understanding in this
modality is not divorced from feeling. It involves natural processes
of transformation, so that knowing and comprehending affect the
knowing being. Matriarchal consciousness is also associated with the
still darkness of night that is pregnant with growth.
Patriarchal consciousness relates to "daylight and sun." It is
associated with independently willed thought. Neumann says how-
ever, that it is self-deceptive, "interpreting itself as an absolutely free
system." It is "highly practical," efficient, and quick to react. It fol-
lowed matriarchal consciousness in development, detaching itself
from the unconscious.
Desacralization of Nature:
Despiritualization of the Human
From the outset, let me say that, in discussing these European
conceptions we will have a problem with gender terminology. First of
all, it is awkward, but nonetheless important to refrain from the use
of "man" to refer to "human" as the European has done in discourse.
Second, the confusion is further complicated by the fact that when
discussing the European, l will be talking about European men for the
most part, because Plato,and those who followed in his wake, ignored
women and did not include them in their self-concepts of "philoso-
pher," "king," or "the European," and that is why they could refer to
themselves collectively as "European Man." In one sense we are talk-
ing about ideas that effected and were adopted by European women,
children, and men. The issue, then, becomes complicated, and the
reader must indulge me as I attempt to deal with these problems gen-
erated by the European world-view.
The way the European is taught to view nature and his/her
proper relationship to it is particularly important, because it is, in
part, the consequences of this conception that are most distinctive
of European culture. European ontology generates a conception of
nature and the human, and of reality.
What is the implicit idea of nature and its significance that
t·merges from Plato's dialogues? Alvin Gouldner says:
In Plato's view ... ends are not resident in nature but in the uni-
versal Ideas or eternal Forms which transcend nature, in which
nature only imperfectly "participates" and apart from which it is
inl1crently disorderly. From his standpoint, therefore, nature can-
1t0t be controlled by the external influence of some regulating end
or <lesign. 121
Raw nature, "fallen" nature, which for the Greek was disorder, is for
the Christian even worse: it is sin. 124
Nature and spirit both possess resources of vitality and form. The
resources of nature may be more negative. The vitalities of nature
and its forms may be the indispensable presuppositions of human
creativity rather than its active agents; but they cannot be disre-
garded ... the vitalities and unities of nature may play a more neg-
ative part in human destructiveness than those of spirit. The
11atural impulse of sex is, for instance, an inclispensible condition
of all higher forms of family organization as it is the negative force
of destructive sex aberrations. In the same way the natural cohe-
sion of tribe and race is the foundation of higher political creations
ns also the negative determinant of interracial and international
Hlltlr<:hy. 126
objectivity, and you will surely gain power. Then nothing-no sense
of fellowship or personal intimacy or strong belonging-will bar
your access to the delicate mysteries of man and nature. Nothing
will inhibit your ability to manipulate and exploit. This is the same
power we gain over people when we refuse to honor their claim to
respect, to compassion, to love. They become for us mere things on
which we exercise power. Between ourselves and them there is no
commerce of the feelings, no exchange of sentiment or empathy. 129
... 11ol011lyfor the <'xisl<.:11<.:e of this world, but for every one of its
rliar.Kll'rlstlcs, for t•vpry ki11dof lwh1A whklt it co11tai11s-in strict-
t1f11ili, IJ1d1•(•<i, bran ulthnatr
for t•iwl1 p11rlil'1d111lwt11g •lllt•n• 11111i;t
11•n•;r111, ~di 11 xpJ,11111ln1v1111d "•.11ltwlt'11t"
88 YURUGU
And when the "spiritual" entities are removed from the picture-
11•,they usually are once the cosmology is constructed-what is left
I, ;1liltrnrchy with huma11beings at the top looking down over nature
(llll'ir own special ki11gclom). Lovejoy quotes from a textbook of
, hol,,..,tlr philosophy of tlw Mlclclk Ages: "As man is made for the
ti 1 11I<:IHI,na11wly,tl1,1tlit• 111,1y s<.·rv1•him, so is the world made for
1111'•1,1k1· 11f11,,111, ..,,.,v,•lllm.'" 17< >11e1•
ll1;1lII 111,1v "Hnd" i~ postulated
90 YURUGU
is within him that the natural and the pathological are best controlled.
Other people are closer to beasts in the Chain. The European, there-
fore, serves the rational plan of his god by guiding and controlling
other people. American presidents always talk in terms of the
American mission abroad being that of bringing "freedom" to all peo-
ple. Anti-American revolutionaries are always equated with "bar-
barism," while America is seen as defending "civilization." These
terms and arguments are all based on the same mythoform.
We have seen that the European conception is that of human
beings at war with themselves and with their natural surroundings.
This feeling is both reflective and productive of the "will-to-power"
and the desire to control nature and other people and what is natural
( emotional) in themselves. They have no place in a harmonious rela-
tionship to their environment since their conceptions do not allow
them to experience the peace that such a relationship offers. Niebuhr
says that the "essential homelessness of the human spirit is the
ground of all religion." 139 What happens when that religion is inade-
quate? Unable to achieve peace and security from spirituality, the
European seeks fulfillment in the will-to-power, in "mastery over"
rather than "harmony with." Their effect on the world is one of dis-
rnrdance. Imperial ambitions and the structures they dictate are the
syrnptomatic expression of a lack of spiritual peace. A being who is
11ol at peace with itself, not at home in the universe, is compelled to
disrupt that which surrounds it-to refashion and control that uni-
verse. The European seeks peace in human-made, imposed order,
.u1d, of course, does not find it. And so the imperial pursuit contin-
11csinfinitely, as well as the pursuit of "progress." This as a malaise
ll11ds its origins even before its crystallization in Platonic culture,
wl1idi was perhaps a result of a latent "ice-age" utamaroho. While
Pli1lo11ic conceptions facilitated the institutionalization of the
l,111opean utamaroho and European supremacy in the world, there are
111l11•r "pre" and "non" platonic expressions of this same utamaroho
h I t IIPwarrior mythology and behavior of Northern Europe in its "pre"
( Iirlstlan experience. While the devaluation of nature may have been
lllll'llt•1·tualized by Plato, we find its "religious" expression in early
111 1 1>1<•wthought. (See Chap. 2.)
'l'Jw objectification of nature is what allows for its exploitation
1111 I r ,q 11•• In otl ier cultmes nature is experienced subjectively, as are
111I11•1 1111111,.inbeiIJgs. The European seeks the perfectly rational
111 d1•r 1111 order that hrlS no pl act~ for t·hc natural (as irrational) and
Ih,11 h t Iw 1·11ll10<1h1wnt ot ll1t•l111111a1111ightmurc. In majority cultures
tlw11· 11pp1•,11•, to lw .111lt1lltlllw i,.1rnspof tlw lrnpli
,11HI<;11pl11l1tkntt•1I
92 YURUGU
Tl lC p<1rablesof the Sun, the Line and the Cave have been offered
11s paradigms which shall illumi11atethe relationship between ideal
lrnnwlcdge on the one hand a11dempirical experience on the other,
,11111shall suggest to us the ascent of man through education from
I lw IH<•of I he senses towards the reasoned intelligcnce. 144
TIii~ 11111ologk,1I111< 1
1npl11,r ls ~o p11w1·dtd lhal II llas slnmgly
IH'I( l'l)IIOll or llh OWll pl;I('(• Ill llw 11111
l1illllt'll( t•<I lilt• 1-:11mp1•,111's
94 YURUGU
verse. It has enabled him to speak of "high" and "low" cultures. In the
former, people are closer to the "light" of civilization, while those in
the latter wallow in the "darkness" of ignorance, aware only of what
they "feel." Havelock describes the view of humanness offered in the
Republic (compare it with Abraham's earlier description of the Akan
conception of the human being):
Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfish-
ness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and
will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and the better; and
so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him
and the whole city. 146
the history of the idea of the Chain of Being-in so far as that idea
presupposed such a complete rational intelligibility of the world-
is the history of a failure .... The experiment, taken as a whole, con-
stitutes one of the most grandiose enterprises of the human
intellect. .. as the consequences of this most persistent and most com-
prehensive of hypotheses became more and more explieit, rhe more
apparent became its difficulties; and when they are fully drawn out,
they show tile hypothesis of the absolute rationality of the cosmos to
be unbelievable. . . . [ it'allcs add cell It rnnflicl :;, 111 t lir first place,
wll ll rnw lmm(•osc fact, lwsiclus nutny parl k, ,ta, f,wt s, h11111• n,11t1l'11l
ns w1• 1•x1w,lt•111'1'II I• 1(•111pornl.A
ordc•1 lh1• fn1·1 t hal 1•xli-;t(.•11c1•
w11ll!I nt 111111• lil~t111yli,111·ihnw,1
;1t1<Id1,111Ht' tills, 111l1·r1!-it,11111
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 97
Africanized World-view
Human ----- Person (''Thou")
\\'I ti I hi 1·m1 d rt>a::;oning, our science secs in the universe nothing but
, , h,i,,•d drn1it, an al,(!{l<>mcrate and a decomposition of the self
11111 111,ttll'r S11l'11 a vww ls cNlt1i11ly less reaso11able than admis-
I1111 ul 1111111<\l'(l11t•1\ •,011n·1• of !'IH'fl.tY wtill'11 beco111esmatter,
11ilt111(l'l1 lh•• l,1lt1•1°,11l11lln11IH1-;1•11,1 p1111•ly lllt'lapltysiral probl(•m.
JOO YURUGU
lfo• :,pli1of this unity bega11with the Eleatic school, which assumed
1 I llvhH' I'rlntiplc standing above all gods and men. This principle
wo1·,ltt :,I ldC'11\ifif'd with l lie unity of the universe, but was later seen
,,~ 1111l11l1•1llfle11t a nil p<.:rsonnlGod who stands above 1he world and
i1111•1 l•: II, 'l'llus IH'!{HII a l1<md of thought whkh led, 1il1imalcly,to
1111· ,,,•p,11,tll1111 nl -.pit It ,111cl
111all1•r1111d10 11tl11,1lli.1nwhh.:h became
11111 ill t,•t l•,lll' ol w,,r.11,111pltll11Nopl1y,11•11
102 YURUGU
tleliberate desire of the Creator." 164 Both these and a host of other
writers have talked about the European's "alienation from nature" as
opposed to the idea of the "identity and Unity of life" in which sym-
bolism expresses reality. 165
This cursory glance at different thought-systems is necessary,
not only to demonstrate the possibility and existence of alternative
world-views, but also to bring attention to the chauvinism in
l·'.uropean interpretations of these world-views. We have seen repeat-
c•cllythat European epistemological and ontological definitions are
placed, by European theorists, in the context of "advanced" intellec-
111al and cognitive development, as compared with what they call
'".11,cient,""primitive," or "prescientific" thought. What this interpre-
t ,\t ion does is to preclude the viability of alternative definitions of real-
11,v, in so far as these same theorists represent a successfully
,,i.mn·ssive culture that has the means to impose its interpretations
1111 ntliers. Let me bring home the point emphatically that this impo-
. Ul1111 was made by equating "European" with "modern" or "scientific"
1111Iall other cultures with "pre-European" or "primitive." According
1,,I h·nri and H.A. Frankfort:
I IH' ancients, like the modern savages, saw man always as part of
11<"it>ly,
and society as imbedded in nature and dependent upon
, 11:anic forces. For them nature and man did not stand in opposi-
11,1nand did not, therefore, have to be apprehended by different
IIHHl~·s of cognition ... natural phenomenon were regularly con-
' 1•1v,,()in terms of human experience and [that] human experience
w11<, conceived in terms of cosmic events ... the fundamental dif-
1,,,1•11,·,,between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as
els the surrounding world is this: for modern, scientific man
1,•1-1111
1lw I ti ll'nomenal world is primarily an "It"; for ancient-and also for
111111111 lv<>-man it is a "Thou." 166
ltnd pl,111111•1I.
II w.i:, ,1, tli11t1Kl1ltl11li,ttHI11111'1H•d
1 ut
tl11ntt1!l11•1•11tlt1lt"1
Utamawazo: The Cultural Structuring of Thought 105
bility of power and create the illusion of control. The pursuit of power
is the nature of the European asili. The utamawazo is one manifesta-
tion of the asili. It is created to assist in the realization of the asili.
What remains to be demonstrated is the way in which these charac-
teristics encourage the development of a technical order and impe-
rialistic behavior towards other cultures. We must explain how the
utamawazo couples with the utamaroho (energy force) to support
the ideological thrust (asill) of the culture: the quest for dominance.
The asili makes each aspect of the utamawazo political in its use
(application), every action motivated by the utamaroho, both defen-
sive and aggressive: the assumption of a confrontational reality.
We have identified the asili-logos and source of the culture; it is
a seed that once planted dictates the logic of cultural development.
In the chapters to come we will use this concept to explicate the rela-
tionship between the dominant modes of the culture, following the
path along which the logos of the asili leads.
I am the way, the truth, and the light. No one comes
to my Father but through me.
- John 14:6
Chapter 2
"many," what pleases one may not please another. Socrates demon-
strates to Euthyphro that in looking for a proper "first principle" it is
necessary to go beyond the gods to something prior to them as a ref-
erence point. "The gods love what they love because it is holy," and
not the reverse. This priority is, of course, a logical one.
In the Apology, Socrates accounts for his actions by saying that
they were divinely inspired: He was made to act as he does; he was
compelled to "ask questions," an activity that apparently is threat-
ening to the authority of the State. Socrates becomes the nemesis of
the State as he demonstrates to the young Athenians that the politi-
cians are the least wise of its participants. The point that we are con-
cerned with is the way in which Socrates defends his actions. By
identifying his behavior as having been made "necessary" by the
order of the gods, he is, in fact, saying that he cannot help being
Socrates, that he cannot help being as he is. Socrates is being charged
with "impiety," and it is therefore necessary that he brings the gods
to his defense; but more than that, he does so because of the nature
of that which he is defending. 3 Socrates is, after all, defending an entire
"way of life"; not merely one specific or concrete action which, in
Platonic terms, is Euthyphro's mistake. To do this he must appeal to
something that is outside of, greater than, independent of, that life;
something to which it can be referred. The moral principle of justifi-
cation for "all actions" cannot be in terms of anything "human," for
that would be inconsistent, ambiguous, and imperfect, as Euthyphro
was made to see. Socrates' appeal can only be made to the divine; that
which is beyond space and time, that which "created" him.
Now the duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon
me by god; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in
every way in which the will of the divine power was never intimated
to anyone. [Plato, Apology, 33]
Yes.
Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, hav-
lni,: a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war
must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his
troops, and 1he philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the
llcn.of <'l1nngeand lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be
w1 arlll11n~llc:lan.'1
'l'lu• l<1•1111/Jllr·
l'I 1111"ldi·ul" slrllt· lw<·1111st·it Is ht•st a11cl lllC'rdon·
wh,1111-.t.11••-,1i,,11ldlw, 1>111 Ith ,1l:10"ldt•ill" In till' -:1•11,;,,tl1at II d11l's
114 YURUGU
not and cannot concretely exist. The ideal state is itself a "Form" to
be participated in, approximated, imitated, but never consonant with
the becoming, that is, the experienced. The Republic is not in any way
limited by the particular circumstances of human experience. Just as
in the European conception, the philosophic and ethical "progres-
siveness" of the Christ image lies in its presentation of a model of
moral perfection, to be imitated but never reached. So the Republic
represents the perfect order towards which the European state must
continually "advance." As "idea," as "normative model," it is not sim-
ply modeled after the "good," it is the embodiment of the "good." The
problems in the Euthyphro, the Apology, and the Crito are created by
the discrepancy in the world of becoming between the "moral" and
the "natural." This problem is eliminated in the Republic; the State
becomes totally moral because it is totally rational. Virtue is identi-
fied with "objectification"; spirit is reduced to matter and the ability
to manipulate it.
This mode of thought that has worked so well to produce the
kind of technical and social order that Europeans desire has also cre-
ated a moral and spiritual disaster. The formal religious statement
has taken on the form of the rational state and has left Europeans no
access to the necessarily spiritual reservoirs of human morality. This
tendency has intensified over the centuries; until now, when the West
is faced with tremendous self-doubt.
But the point to be made here is that the epistemological model
in which the Platonic abstraction was born (the normative
"absolute") underlies theAexpression of the "monotheistic ideal," the
"rational religion" syndrome, and written codification as values in
the formalized Judeo-Christian religious statement.
Stanley Diamond succ1nctly states the reason for the "monothe-
istic ideal" as well as the reason for its failure as a religious vehicle
in one sentence. "Absolutely pure monotheism exists in the realm of
mathematics, not religion!" Precisely! And that is why it became the
European ideal, since ("logically") pure monotheism can be under-
stood as an attempt to express the Platonic abstraction as the nec-
essary justification of all moral propositions. When European
theologians took up from where Plato left off, they should have real-
ized that they would be forever plagued with the dllemma uf recon-
ciling what should have remained two distinct philosophic-al-
episternological modes; Plato had mistakenly iclc•11titicctllwm as 011e.
l)i,1mn11dsnys lh.i: lltis tc•111IPncytoward Ill<• inl1•~i;11lonof JIIPIJ
11111111d t•11111l1rnutl Ilk ;ind till' d1·Vl'lup11w11Iof tlw "c·xnltc•cl,111clpnsi
llv•• 1•llll1·,1lld!',1°' 1l11rlliu; '.'p101(n 1,•.:• In 1111•1•:1110111•,111111l11d
01111l1a·1
Religion and Ideology Jl5
The classic and the Christian sense of the word strive to order real-
ity within the governance of language. Literature, philosophy, law,
the arts of history, are endeavors to enclose within the bounds of
rational discourse the sum of human experience, its recorded past,
its present condition and future expectations. The code of Justinian,
the Summa [theologica] of Aquinas, the world chronicles and com-
pendia of medieval literature, the Divina Commedia, are attempts
at total containment. They bear solemn witness to the belief that all
truth and realness-with the exception of a small, queer margin at
the very top-can be housed inside the walls of language. 5
If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter,
or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul,
entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other gods, which
thou hast known, thou, nor thy fathers;
Namely, of the gods of the people which are round and about you
nigh unto thee or far off from thee ...
Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor harken unto him; neither
shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou
conceal him:
But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to
put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath
sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God, which brought
I hee out of Egypt, from the house of bondage.
When the Lord thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou
goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations before thee, the
I lit lites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites,
.111(1the Persites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations
v,n'ater and mightier than thou;
And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee; thou
:,ltalt smite them and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make not
1 11vcnant with them, nor show mercy unto them:
Ni•lthcr shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter shalt
1u1I give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto they
•IOI),
V1•sl1t1lldestroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut
dnwn their groves, and burn their graven images with fire.
I rn I I tuu a, I an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God
11,1111 d10s<'t1 thee to be a special people unto himself, above all peo-
pl•• 1lw1""' upvn the face of the earth.
- !1e11teronomy7: l, 7:6
124 YURUGU
For thou an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God
hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all peo-
ple that are upon the face of the earth.
Deuteronomy: 7:6
Even in the first days the question arose which decided the whole
Destiny of the new revelation. Jesus and his friends were Jews by
birth, but they did not belong to the land of Judea. Here in
Jerusalem men looked for the Messiah of their old sacred books, a
Messiah who was to appear for the "Jewish people," in the old tribal
sense, and only for them. But all the rest of the Aramaean world
waited upon the Saviour of the World, the Redeemer and Son of
Man, the figure of all apocalyptic literature, whether written out in
Jewish, Persian, Chaldean, or Mandean terms. In the one view the
death and resurrection of Jesus were merely local events; in the
other they betokened a world-change .... In the Judaic view there
was essentially no need for recruiting-quite the reverse, as it was
a contradiction to the Messiah-idea. The words "tribe" and "mis-
sion" are reciprocally exclusive. The members of the Chosen
People, and in particular the priesthood, had merely to convince
themselves that their longing was now fulfilled. But to the Magian
nation, based on consensus or community of feeling, what the
Resurrection conveyed was a full and definitive truth, and consen-
sus in the matter of this truth gave the principle of the true nation,
which must necessarily expand till it had taken in all older and con-
ceptually incomplete principles. [Spengler's itallics.] 11
TIie freedom of God over the instruments of his will ... is asserted
iwcorcling to insights of prophetic universalism, as against the
lower level of nationalistic Messianism. It is significant, however,
I Ital Christianity does not finally purge itself of the nationalistic
1111rtlt:ularismuntil St. Paul asserts the right to preach the gospel to
lilt• Gentiles, rejects the validity of Jewish law for Christians, and
•.ttl>slitlltcs the church for the nation as the "Israel of God." 12
Christianity was still much too close to the paganism over which it
had scored a technical victory to be happy with a faith in God as
pure spirit. There had never been in the Church a complete con-
version from heathenism. We might be living in the second half of
the twentieth century, but the Gentile need remained for a human
embodiment of deity. God had still to be grasped through a physi-
cal kinship with man and his earthly concerns, and there yet lin-
gered the sense of the efficacy of the substitutionary and
propitiatory sacrifice of a victim.'3
Such a man could have his god-like moments, but could never be
consistently a reflection of the Divine except for those whose no lion
of deity would permit the gods to share our human frailties ...
Far too many Christians do not know God in any other way I han
through Jesus and their faith in God is ilnpcrllPcl or rl1•stroyl'd.Till'
N1·wn•~tanw11tls 11111c>nliH·ly 10 lw hl,1111t•cl 'l'lw m.ijor tmdt
for 111114
11,·-.wltll 1hos1•who lt,1v,• p,11ul1•11·d111l111•li,(11111.uu
1· ,111d :-.11p1•1,t1
ol I Ii.• lll'llpl,• 111Hlvl1111t I 11•111
111111 ,1 ( :rnI 1 11•,111•dl11II II' 1111,11,(1·
111111,111
Religion and Ideology 129
Yet Jesus and his nation, differently taught, could love and wor-
ship God without recourse to incarnation. 14
Christianity offers salvation to all, providing they "come into the fold,"
accepting Jesus as the "Son of God," therefore gaining eternal life; the
Romans offered citizenship to all, providing, as Aristides says, they
possessed "talent," "courage," and "leadership" potential. "Cultural"
boundaries did not matter. Both were offers of "civilization" and a
supposedly evolutionary superior way of life. These formulations
posited a perpetual opposition between those who did not share the
ideologies expressed and those who did. Both statements, impor-
tantly, contained justifications and directives for the "conversion"
and "recruitment" of those outside the cultural group with which
they were identified. Perhaps the single most important ingredient
shared by these "brother" ideologies (actually two arms of the same
ideological weapon) is their vision of the world as the "turf" of a sin-
gle culture. Any and everyone presently under the ideological and
political control of the Christians and Romans was fair game. Never
before had ideologies so explicitly stated this worldwide objective.
This indeed was the "technical victory" to which Schonfield and
Spengler allude. And this unique self-image that projects itself as the
proper model for all, we can identify as European. This self-image
and its projection are part of a centuries-old process through which
Europeans miraculously become the universal paradigm for all
humanity.
While it is clear that both the Christian and the Roman formu-
lations could serve as ideological statements of a world imperialistic
endeavor, it is also clear that the two could not coexist as competing
ideologies. But this did not constitute an irreconcilable opposition.
Their synthesis made much political sense. It was represented in the
cooptation of the Church by and for the purposes of the State, or one
can just as easily reverse this statement. The solution was, indeed,
culturally, as well as historically, compelling. The two ideologies, put
to the service of one cultural group and espousing compatible values
and objectives, worked hand in hand, to command the same alle-
giances, to conquer the same world.
Constantine's conversion is often characterized by European
historians as a "turning point" in European history. Norman Baynes
says that Constantine's conversion is hard to explain based on wl1.1I
came before him and that he "diverted the stream of human !iii.
tory." 17 Ethnologically, it ·was not a "turnlng poiut," hut thc:-con-
cretization of a tendency-a push in a direction alr<>aclyiclentifwhl1•
in the continuum of Western European dcvdopmcnt. Consta11tl11'!I
"co11v •rsion" was do111n11dt•d hy llw l•',urop!':111<l.~tll,I Ii,•<'tllt11rnl 'H't•d
It w11sa 11,•11",.,,1rv•itt·p l11r1l11·f!tpwlll ,1111I1111lldlfi1,1tl11111111,!11
1 Uw11,i11
Religion and Ideology 131
he saw with his own eyes the trophy of a cross of light in the
heavens, above the sun, and bearing the inscription,
"Conquer by This ... "
111his sleep the Christ of God appeared to him with the same sign
which he had seen in the heavens, and commanded him to make a
likeness of that sign which he had seen in the heavens, and to use
II as a safeguard in all engagements with his enemies .... The
,•mperor constantly made use of this sign of salvation as a safe-
g11ardagainst every adverse and hostile power, and commanded
I hat others similar to it should be carried at the head of all his
11rmies.19
This, then, in a very real sense was the first "crusade." In 313
I 'nttslantine and Licinius agreed, in the Edict of Milan, to the official
11•1 ugnition of the Christian religion by the state. The agreement with
before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. But the moment of psycho-
logical conviction may have followed, rather than preceded, his
own avowal: It perhaps occurred during the battle, at the moment
victory became certain. In the ultimate reckoning, however, the
precise details of Constantine's conversion matter little. After 28
October 312 the emperor consistently thought of himself as God's
servant, entrusted with a divine mission to convert the Roman
Empire to Christianity. 21
This same servant of "god" probably later had Licinius, who was
his brother-in-law, killed along with Licinius' nine-year-old son.
Evidently this did not conflict with Constantine's "Christianity."
Barnes says that by 324, Constantine was taking every oppor-
tunity to "stress the truth of Christianity" because of his "religious
sympathies," and he concludes that "an emperor with these convic-
tions could not be expected to tolerate pagan practices which all
Christians found morally offensive." 22 Barnes continues, "He estab-
lished Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire ....
Christians received preference in official appointment. ... Constantine
forbade the erection of cult statues, the consultation of pagan oracles,
divination of any sort, and sacrifice to the gods under any circum-
stances."22 Not only was Constantine concerned with the spread of
Christianity throughout the Empire, but he was equally concerned
with ideological unity among the Christians. If institutionalized
Christianity was to be of political benefit, its lead~rs must speak with
one voice. Theological disputes were of little import in Constantine's
view when the unity of the Church was at stake. His role was there-
fore one of mediation, and he mandated that the bishops settle their
differences, calling the first ecumenical council of the Christian
Church, the Council of Nicaea, in 325.
Arthur E. R. Boak gives his interpretation of Constantine's
actions and convictions:
God sought my service and judged that service fitted to achieve His
purpose. Starting from Britain God had scattered the evil powers
that mankind might be recalled to true religion instructed through
my agency, and that the blessed faith might spread under his guid•
ing hand. And from the West, believing that this gift had been
entrusted to myself, I have come to the East which was in sorer
need of my aid. 28
Licinius, in the East, who did not claim the Christian god, stood
temporarily in the way of Constantine's unified control. Licinius' per
secution of the Christians becomes understandable as u pollt lcul
necessity in his efforts to prevent Constantine's take over. Ry tlw
same token, the rea!lzatio11 of Constantine's arnbl1lo11swen• faclll
tated hy his mission In sprendln~ the rnitl1•
•
Religion and Ideology 135
Dividing into two groups all those in your empire-with this sword
I have indicated the entire civilized world-you have everywhere
appointed to your citizenship, or even to kinship with you, the bet-
ter part of the world's talent, courage, and leadership, while the rest
you recognize as a league under your hegemony .... Neither seas
nor intervening continent are bars to citizenship, nor are Asia and
Europe divided in their treatment here. In your empire all paths are
open to all. No one worthy of rule or trust remains an alien, but a
civil community of the World has been established as a Free
Republic under one, as into a common civic center, in order to
receive each man his due. 33
ply implausible and it does not make sense. It is not contradiction but
consistency that has made for Western European imperial success.
Elaine Pagels, in her interpretation of the significance of the
developments of early Christianity, supports my view in that she
points to the social and political implications of apostolic
Christianism, as opposed to those of the Gnostic tradition that the
orthodox church condemned, and over which it triumphed (although
we must not confuse political triumph with spiritual triumph).
Perhaps it would be more fitting to begin with a discussion of the
African or Kemetic (ancient Egyptian) origins of Christian mythology
and symbolism, though Pagels does not refer to these at all. But since
we cannot take the time here for such a discussion, the reader is
referred to the works of Gerald Massey (1973), John G. Jackson
(1985), Yosef Ben Jochaman (1973), and others. Suffice it to say that
the mythology and symbolism surrounding Usir, also known as Asar,
and Osiris by the Greeks, introduced the concept of a resurrected sav-
ior 3000 years before the advent of Christianity. A study of this tra-
dition also explains why the date of December 25 is used for the
birthdate of Jesus, the symbolism of the stable as a place for his birth,
the three "wisemen," and so forth. 37
Clearly, however, there had to have been something "special,"
something "different" about the formulation of what is now accepted
as biblical Christianity, or it would not have been so well suited to the
archaic European utamaroho as expressed in the Roman State. In
Pagel's book, The Gnostic Gospels, one of the things that we already
know is reaffirmed: Gnosticism was unacceptable to, and considered
heresy by, those who were in the process of establishing the ortho-
dox Christian Church. These gospels were "written out" of the reli-
gion. Pagels offers us a plausible explanation, one that fits with my
understanding of the Western European cultural reality. Gnosticism
was not different enough from the Kemetic and other ancient origins.
Its utamaroho was too close to these. It was neither politically ori-
ented nor materialistic enough. Resurrection was understood sym-
bolically and spiritually-much deeper than unending "physical"
existence. Pagels tells us that the Gnostics believed that resurrec-
tion was to be experienced spiritually, that one experienced Christ on
a spiritual level. "This may occur in dreams, in ecstatic trance, 111
visions, or in moments of spiritual illurnination.": 18 l{cbirth for tlw
ancients was after all a result of illumination and inte11se self-knowl
edge-a heightened splrllua\ level of cl(•velop111 •11LBut contrnry to
tills, orthodoxy that oppost-ct ll1v C,11oslk VIPW, w;1s lud1•1•dll11'!•i1l
(!id, lhnt 11,1<; ('1111.tI (II,(• hndlly hrn1'1
1•1ic•cl hy It, ,II f,ltil11u HS 'l'i JI 11lllta11
Religion and Ideology 13.9
more successful than any other, because it has always been based on
the claim of superior culture. In the budding stages of the quest, as
the European utamaroho took shape, a tightly structured, institu-
tionalized and secularly codified religion was the key to this claim .
god the "demiurge" and said that this "creator" made false claims to
power. In Pagel's explanation of Gnostic thought, achieving gnosis
involved "coming to recognize the true source of divine power-
namely, 'the depth' of all being." But the god of Clement, Irenaeus,
and Tertullian claimed, "I am God, and there is no other .... I am a jeal-
ous God." And to them the concept of a transcendent force reachable
through initiation was "heresy" that "encourage( d) insubordination to
clerical authority." To Irenaeus the meetings of the Gnostics were
"unauthorized." The concept of authority is key. If spiritual growth had
been the focus for Irenaeus and others, the Gnostics would not have
been threatening. The Church represented a structure of authority,
and that structure had to be monolithic. Therefore, in Pagel's words:
"If God is One, then there can only be one true church, and only one
representative of the God in the community-the Bishop." 51 This "One
God" became the basis for the power of "One Emperor" of the "One
Civilization" as well. Belief in him gave the emperor authority to con-
quer all nonbelievers in his name. In a sense Gnosticism was anachro-
nistic, while orthodox Christianity was "right on time." Religious
formulations that were more spiritual and transcendent, less political
and secular in intent, were simply not expedient.
ture just as any religious statement is), and its function in this regard
is to serve the interests of that culture. The docility and lack of aggres-
sion of the conquered peoples serves this interest, and so the
Christian directive is dual in nature; while it provides a justification
for a world-order in the service of a European god, its teachings
encourage others to be nonpolitical and discourages their cultural
nationalism (identification with their national gods and belief sys-
tems).
There is a curious characterization of Jesus as a "revolutionary"
in the literature of Liberation Theology and Black Theology.
Unfortunately, persecution and unpopularity do not necessarily make
ideas revolutionary. The Jewish ideology in its stubborn nationalism
could in this sense be considered more revolutionary in the face of
Roman policy than that of Jesus and his followers. It would be very
difficult to imagine, if we did not consistently put our data into the
context of the European asili, how any historian or social theorist
could identify the so-called "Christian virtues"; i.e., the "Christian
ethic" or mode of behavior as being in any way new or innovative at
the time of Jesus. The mandate to regard and treat one another as
brothers and sisters (i.e., as members of a "family" kin group) had
existed probably since the beginnings of human civilization in Africa.
The African ideological statement, of this mode of behavior as an eth-
ical imperative is much more philosophically profound than the
Christian-European statement of it and, of course, so much more con-
sistent and authentic. It originates in a spiritualistic world-view. 52
What was "new" about the teachings that purported to have
resulted from the activities of Jesus was that they proclaimed that
one was to treat members of other cultural groups in this way, and,
more importantly, one was to treat one's enemies in this (the same)
way-"enemies" being those who were hostile to one's cultural group
or one's "family." This directive is, of course, debilitating and cas-
trating to political cultural nationalism and counter to the demands
of self-determination. This feature, along with that of the direction uf
attention towards "another world" in which justice is sought, may cer-
tainly combine to form a new statement, but it can hardly be called
a politically revolutionary one.
Otto Spengler concerns himself with this political duality uf
Christian doctrine in the Decline of the West. He accuses those i11I lit•
West who would seek to apply the "brotherhood" n11d "lovl'"
cspousccl by Jesus to the "unfortuuate" ~111d "opprtsst(I" h1 the S()<"I
rty of his day of havlni,! 111 fort 1nlsi11l1'rp11•H•df1•srn;'IP11rl1l11gs:
Religion and Ideology 145
"My kingdom is not of this world," and only he who can look into
the depths that this flash illumines can comprehend the voices that
come out of them. It is the Late, city periods that, no longer capa-
ble of seeing into the depths, have turned, the remnants of reli-
giousness upon the external world and replaced religion by
humanities, and metaphysics by moralization and social ethics.
ln Jesus we have the direct opposite. "Give unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's" means: "Fit yourselves to the powers of the fact-
world, be patient, suffer, and ask it not whether they are 'just."'
What alone matters is the salvation of the soul, "consider the lilies"
means: "Give no heed to riches and poverty, for both fetter the soul
lo cares of this world." "Man cannot serve both God and
Mammon"-by Mammon is meant the whole of actuality. It is shal-
low, and it is cowardly, to argue away the grand significance of this
demand. Between working for the increase of one's own riches, and
working for the social ease of everyone, he would have felt no dif-
lerence whatever. 53
the Roman State is argued for by St. Augustine in The City of God. This
was one of the many "apologies" written in defense of Christianity
against its non-Christian critics, as well as the Donatists. Through
Augustine the political compatibility of Roman and Christian ideology
and, therefore, the "counter-revolutionary" role of the followers of
Jesus and Paul are clearly demonstrated. Augustine says that all
earthly authority is "approved'' by and "issues" from God. He quotes
from the scriptures:
These things being so, we do not attribute tlte power of giving king-
dom and empires to any save the true Goel,who gives !ht' lu,pphwss
in tlw kingdom of heaven to the plo11sal0111',1)11!l,{lvrs kl111-(ly pow,·r
In llll' plott:, and 1111•
rn11 ,1tll1 1)11111
1 as II ltlllY plf'IIM' 111111,
l111plo11~.
w110"' 1<11111I pl1•11~m,• ii, 11lw;\y•;J11:;l
Religion and Ideology 147
Let those who say that the doctrine of Christ is incompatible with
the State's wellbeing give us an army such as the doctrine of Christ
requires soldiers to be, let them give us subjects, such as husbands
and wives, such parents and children, such masters and servants,
such Kings, such judges, in fine even such tax-payers and tax-gath-
erers, as the Christian religion has taught that men should be and
then let them dare to say that it is adverse to the State's well-being!
Nay rather let them no longer hesitate to confess that this doctrine,
if it were obeyed, would be the salvation of the State. 57
1'11c•y1111·1-lwd d1•f111ttlo11
tu j-!IVI'1·1-1tly :,1•tr-lm,11.(t'
lo tltt• 1,:,1111p1•u11 anti
11(11111111'1Jh11,,Ill lll/111/t//1)//11 lh,11 d1·111,1111li-d
l111p1·1l11lbtl1
l>t•h,1vlor
152 YURUGU
The role the Church has played has sometimes been that of the
aggressor in a military and political imperialist pursuit. Most often
and most successfully, though, it has been the protagonist in the
drama of European cultural imperialism. The Church has taken a lead-
ing role in cultural aggression, because, of all the facets of European
expansion, it has easiest access to non-European peoples and great-
est potential for their ideological destruction. Only rarely, and never
very effectively nor aggressively, has the Christian Church attempted
to act against what it considered to be the excesses of European
nationalism and even in these instances, by virtue of its conversion-
ism, the Church still occupies a central position in the European offen-
sive, for as has already been pointed out, European imperialist
tendencies may be easily grafted onto Christian ideology.
It remains here to cite only a very few of the instances of the
Church's support of the European imperialist venture. During the
greater part of the Medieval period, Church and State were barely dis-
tinguishable, or more properly speaking, the Church was more pow-
erful than the State, and the term "Christendom" reflected the
intimacy of this relationship. The following statement is a character-
ization of the "Christian holy wars" from a Eurocentric perspective,
one of the more obvious varieties of European nationalism.
During the tenth century, when the Kings of Wessex were winning
back the midlands and Northumbria from the heathen Danes, other
heroic Kings were saving Christendom from its heathen enemies in
the German lands. The Saxon King, Henry the Fowler, drove back
the Danes in the north and the fierce Hungarian archers in the east.
His grandson, Otto the Great, destroyed a great Hungarian army in
955. These men shared with the men of Wessex the honor of sav-
ing Christian Europe. And the defeated heathen were converted to
the Christian faith.65
The most spectacular early step in the expansion of Europe was the
conquest of the eastern Mediterranean coast as a result of the First
Crusade (1096-1099). The Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban
II. ..
And so their lot was now quite contrary of what it had been; since
before they had lived in perdition of soul and body; of their souls,
in that they were pagans, without the clearness and the light of
holy faith; and of their bodies, in that they lived like beasts, with-
out any custom of reasonable beings-for they had no knowledge
of bread or wine, and they were without the covering of clothes, or
the lodgement of houses; and worse than all, through the great
ignorance that was in them, in that they had no understanding of
good, but only knew how to live in a bestial sloth. 71
... the destruction of the Indians was written Into the first rhnplt:1
of tile successful white colonization i11AuH'rlc-,1.Tll'=!plln' l<ll•ttlt1 nl
C'llristianity Wl'rt· easily mnld<·rli1110a r,1<:l:;tl(lc•nlogyLl111t 11111IC'IH'd
1111•1•co11111utc ,111d '>1id:II r11•111b of 1·xp11111l111Hl{<·lll<•r-;11
Religion and Ideology 157
The fact is that almost from its inception the continuous venture
of European expansion ensued not only with the blessings of the
Church but, where necessary, by its decree. In the early fifteenth cen-
tury Pope Edward IV issued a papal bull "granting to the Crown of
Portugal all the countries which the Portuguese should discover from
Cape Non to India," to accommodate the "discoveries" of Prince
Henry the Navigator, on the African Coast. After Columbus' "discov-
ery," according to William Howitt, "His sponsoring Monarchs,
Ferdinand and Isabella, lost no time in applying for a similar grant.
Alexander VI, a Spaniard, was equally generous with his predecessor,
and accordingly divided the world between the Spaniards and
Portuguese." 74 The Pope as earthly representation of Jesus Christ
was supposed to have a right of dominion over the entire earth.
Alexander VI, an infamous pontiff, was determined to stay in
1:erdinand's good graces in order to ensure his own protection and
,1ccumulation of wealth. Anxious, therefore, to gratify Ferdinand and
Isabella, he granted "full rights" to them to all the countries inhabited
l>y"infidels" that they had discovered or would discover.
As the Pope's dominion was held to be worldwide, he had
,1uthority over vast regions he had never even heard of. To prevent
I liis grant to Spain from interfering with lands already "given" to
l'ortugal by a previous bull (issued by Pope Edward IV), he pro-
l'laimed that an invisible line existed from pole to pole, one hundred
lt·agues west of the Azores, separating the two territories. Everything
Io the east of the line of demarcation he bestowed upon the
I1c,rtuguese; all to the west of it went to the Spaniards. His motivation
was supposedly his enthusiasm for the propagation of the Christian
l,11th. In this way the Church divided up the world between two
1:11 ropean powers.
The apologists for the Church cite the public emancipation of
Ill"> slaves by Pope Gregory "the Great" as evidence of the Church's
nlhclal position against slavery. This interpretation is very much out
ul t11newith the historical/political reality. Chapman Cohen, in a work
p11blished in 1931, says:
The English slave trade, like that of other European nations, was
launched with the blessings of the Church. It is ironic but not con-
tradictory that the first English slaver was named "Jesus" and that the
first two rules Captain John Hawkins imposed on his crew were, to
serve God daily, and to love one another. "The piety of the expedi-
tion," says Cohen bitingly, "was beyond reproach." 76
There is no doubt that the Christian community gave its bless-
ings to the slaving venture, participated in it and contributed to its
success by embracing it within Western "morality." W. E. B. DuBois
brings home this point when he says, in reference to West Africa,
"Protestants of England, the Huguenots of France, and the Calvinists
of Holland started mortal struggle for Guinea. "77
Another valuable work, exceptional in European scholarship, is
E. D. Morel's The Black Man's Burden, written in 1920. Here he com-
ments on and offers a first-hand account of a slave raid by Europeans.
The African was a heathen, and as such fair game for the prowess
of the noble Christian Knights who opposed their steel breast-
plates, tempered swords and cross-bows, to his bare chest and
primitive spear. Here is a typical account of one of these predatory
forays:
Then might you see mothers forsaking their children and husbands
their wives, each striving to escape as best he could. Some drowned
themselves in the water, others thought to escape by hiding under
their huts; others stowed their children among the sea-weed, where
our men found them afterwards, hoping they would escape notice .
. . . And at last our Lord God, who giveth a reward for every good
deed, willed that for the toil they had undergone in His service they
should that day obtain victory over their enemies, as well as a guer-
don and a payment for all their labour and expense; for they took
captive of those Moors, what with men, women and children, 165,
besides those that perished and were killed. And when the battle
was over, all praised God for the great mercy He had shown them,
in that He had willed to give them such victory, and with so little
damage to themselves. They were all very joyful, praising loudly the
Lord God for that He deigned to give such help to such a handful of
His Christian people. [According to Morel, this comes from
Portuguese chronicles.]
Thus did Europe first bring the "glad Lidings" to the African. ll did
not take long to ascertain t ilat thE>spiritual ,011snlatlon drrlvc-d
fro111conv0rt ii 1g the J\fric;1n1n C'hrli;lln11ity had Its 111
llll,1111111
('111111
lt•rp,111.1x
Religion and Ideology 159
Almighty God, who art the Author of liberty and the Champion of
the oppressed, hear our prayer-
We, the men of Special Forces, acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee in the preservation of human freedom-
Go with us as we seek to defend the defenseless
and to free the enslaved-
May we ever remember that our nation, whose motto is
"In God We Trust,"
\'Xpects that we shall acquit ourselves with honor,
that we may never
bring shame upon our faith, our families, or our
f1,lJowmen-
( irant us wisdom from Thy mind, courage from
Thine heart, strength from Thine arm, and protection by thine hand
1:, 11c ,pcan. The members of the Special Forces are simply taking direc-
111111 from the Bible.
Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have,
,111<1
spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suck-
ll11g,ox and sheep, camel and ass ...
A11dwhen the Lord thy God hath delivered it [the City] into thine
h1111tl:,, thou shat) s1nite every male thereof with the edge of the
w.ord. nut the women ancl !'he little ones, and the cattle, and all that
l , l11t ht· city, even all the $poll thereof, thou shalt take unto thyself;
t111cl tllc,11::halt t•at till' spoil of l hil,c enC'mics which the Lord thy
1:11d11,1111glw111111•1• .•. of tlw <'ltlt•s of these rwople which the Lord
11,y <lci<Idoth ~IV!' llwc· 101 111 l!llll'rll;1,ic-,·, 1ltn11slwlt •rnv" alivt•
11,111,111~ 111,11l111•,1ll1t•tl1
NII
160 YURUGU
(But) we have another slave system to deal with. This took its rise
in Christian times. It was created by Christians, it was continued by
Christians, it was in some respects more barbarous than anything
the world had yet seen, and its worst features were to be witnessed
in countries that were most ostentatious in their parade of
Christianity. It is this that provides the final and unanswerable
indictment of the Christian Church. 81
War springs from the nobly born; famous pedigrees are the makers
of war. For the perilous deeds which chiefs attempt are not to be
done by the ventures of common men .... No dim and lowly race,
no low-born dead, no base souls are Pluto's prey, but he weaves the
dooms of the mighty, and fills Phlegthon with noble shapes." 89
'l'ltl' violence int his early European religion did not only express
II 1•11111
lt•r111sof w<tr am! lhe killings of enemies but also through the
••11j11 l111<·1II
ol hlonrly ri\11,d 'Hltrifirc to l11e W,HTior god as well.
164 YURUGU
But how then can we account for the supposed hiatus between
Christian Europe and its pagan origins? Only to Christians does the
appearance of "god" in human form explain this evolution. In what
terms do Europeans usually express the difference/relationship?
They do so always in terms of the dichotomy of European national-
ism/chauvinism. Yes, even with regard to their own predecessors/
ancestors. Davidson says: "Northern heathenism, that is, the pre-
Christian beliefs of the Germanic peoples and the Scandinavians,
came to an end in the eleventh century." In the nineth and tenth cen-
turies we know that the Vikings were a great power, but, in Davidson's
words, they were "a menace to Christian civilization." 95
Christianity is associated with "civilization"; non-Christian reli-
gion is called "heathen" or "pagan," but very rarely, even in scholarly
writing, are these latter terms defined. "Pagan" is, in some cases, sim-
ply used to mean "non-Christian," but looking to the dictionary, the
ideological uses of these terms become explicit. The term "heathen"
has the following uses:
'l'lle Latin pagus means village or rural district, and so "pagan" has the
, lcrogatory sense of "peasant" or a person of the countryside. As we,
In contemporary parlance, might say "bumpkin" or "hick," indicating
1111Pwho lacks the "sophistication" of the cities.
"Christian," "heathen," and "pagan," therefore, do not merely
, ,•present religious differentiation. They indicate ideological differ-
1•11<·es,differences in world-view They are culturalist terms defined
It 0111 a Eurocentric or Arab nationalist perspective. European
t 'I 11ll-l inns consider kws to be religious, even though they may dis-
·'U'111• hi! tNly with them asIo the nature of historical truth. (fhere is
cot1c<'rni11gMuslims, who are not considered "hea-
, u1111• ;1111IJiv.tlt·11ct'
1111·11·,,'' IHII wllo 011<'<'wc•11· Tiley pose a cultural embarrassment
lt11·1•II w:1•:M11"il111 tlt;1l 11st 11t·<l''E11ropean civilization
sc·l111l,11~;lllp 11 1
166 YURUGU
from the "dark ages.") Why are the Europeans so hard on their so-
called "pagans" and "polytheistic" forbears?
What, in the European context, represents the proper form of a
religious statement is intimately involved with their concept of "civ-
ilization" or, as Europeans see it, the "civilizing" process. These ideas
cannot be understood without reference to the two basic concepts
of European ideology: evolution and progress.
One of the reasons that the terms "heathen" and "pagan" hold
such reproach and are so derogatory from a Eurocentric perspective
is that initially it was the European "past" to which they referred.
Nothing requires defeat so much as the past in the logic of the
European mythoform. It is the non-European in the contemporary
world who becomes associated with the past in the European mind.
(fhe anthropologists studied the "past," which meant non-Euro-
Caucasians.) But we must remember that Europeans still practiced
what in Christian parlance were "pagan" religions until the eleventh
century. This means that these "backward" peoples were actually
both within and outside the culture simultaneously. "Heretics" were
culturally acceptable (though dangerous). "Pagans" were not. In this
critical period of transition there could be no equivocation concern-
ing the correct path toward progress; the shape of the new national
culture.
This "paganism" did not die easily. Christians have always been
willing to fight bloody battles and wars to "convert" others to their
way of thinking, even their own people. Perhaps the threat of those
who dared to persist in the religions into which they had been born
issued from the fear that Christianity might not triumph as the ideo-
logical champion of the "new" European. Imagine the anxiety that
this caused for those who were convinced of the necessity of
"progress!"
An African-centered perspective forces us to look more closely
at this history, this cultural development. We must make sense of it.
Using the concept of asili, seemingly complex "paranoid" behavior on
the part of the European becomes crystal clear and makes "sense,"
unfolding from the logic of European development. Why should "
people who were non-Christians and who were slaughterin~
Christians become Christians themselves anct begin to slaughter theh
brothers and sisters in order to make them so? What is lhf' ronn0<·
tion between this new religion and the ethos of the religion~ p, acll<.:Pd
by early and "backward'' E11ropca11s?
1'11<'C'Ol\C't'l)I or(/.'1/i tt'll!i II~ to look 1111l'Oll',l:.tc•111•v, lltt· 1•1111·11-l•
lc-11,·v101 whkl1 w,· •w,111'11 lfc•swltlt11111111•,q1l,111,1t111v ,111d 11,•111•r;11IJ1H
Religion and Ideology 167
I 11111111111•
111111•111 y nf 111,r 1·1 ,, St wh ,1111•,ca111pll'111
nlnl't 1•1·111111·1•111111
ll1111111',th ,111cl1·1dl11rnlt·Xp,111slc111 Ii, ollwrwli.1• 10tl11111w11 101
Religion and Ideology 173
the great male-female power;" others said that the divine had no gen-
der; and a third group held that it was either, depending on which
attribute you wished to emphasize. 108 Some Gnostics, she says,
described their god as Mother, Father, and Son. This would resemble
the African conception of Wsir (Osiris), Ast Osis), and Heru (Horus).
Feminine powers, for the Gnostics, were associated with thought,
intelligence, and foresight. 109 Pagels refers to material from the
"secret" gospels, revelations, and mystical teachings that, she says,
are replete with feminine and sexual metaphor, and the valorization
of female aspects of creation and godliness.
But the process of censorship by the self-acclaimed represen-
tatives of Jesus on earth then took place, and
Every one of the secret texts which gnostic groups revered was
omitted from the canonical collection, and branded as heretical by
those who called themselves orthodox Christians. By the time the
process of sorting the various writings ended-probably as late as
the year 200-virtually all the feminine imagery for God had disap-
peared from the orthodox Christian tradition. 110
women." 112In I Corinthians 11:7-9, "a man ... is the image and glory
of God; but woman is the glory of man. For man was not made from
woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for woman,
but woman for man."
Pagels contrasts the position of women in Egypt, Greece, and
Rome, where women enjoyed many rights with men or were in the
process of being given more rights, with "women of the Jewish com-
munities [who] were excluded from actively participating in public
worship, education, in social and political life outside of the fam-
ily."113 (Actually, the position of women in Kernel was far superior
to that of women in either Greece or Rome. So much so that travellers
from these areas were appalled. See B. Lesko, The Remarkable Women
of Ancient Egypt, 1987.) But the scriptures were to say:
I Timothy 2:11-12
The male sex is assimilated to the divine part of the soul; men, like
that divine soul, must be protected from the miasma, the pollution
represented by women. That worse part of the soul, likened to
women, is superior to the worse of the body, which is like an ani-
mal. She says, "women were associated with the body, which was
inferior to the mind; thus they, like the body, served the soul, the
lteacl, the philosopher, the male." 117
t\11rlfrom the Republic, she quotes:" ... all those creatures generated
,rn 111c11 who proved themselves cowardly (deilol) and spent their
IIVl's !11wrnng cluing w0r0 transformed, at their second incarnation,
l11l11w1111wn." 118TllL· fatl1ers nf the Church were merely continuing
tli.1I r •Occ-lNIil particular view of
,111d f11rllH•tl'l,1hot:tllttH 11·tr.1cl1llo11
H ,dl1y, ,1 vh•w tli,11 l1ncl 11l1'1•11dy i,llll:H'Pd 111lt11l0l•:1nnpc1111t·11lture
111111lu. Hh ,11<l11·1•litllo11..:h1
178 YURUGU
Now, since we have proved that God is the source of being to some
things, we must further show that everything besides Himself is
from Him.
It follows from the supreme perfection of God that producing the u11i-
verse He chose the best possible plan, containing the greatest order;
the best arranged situation, place, and time; the greatest effect pro-
duced by the simplest means; the most power, the most k11owlecl~W,
the most happiness and goodness in created things of which the uni-
verse admitted. For as all possible things have a claim to cxiste11<.:<'
in I he undersla11di11g of Goel In proportic111to their 1wrf1•clio11s,I lw
ri•s11lt of all I IH'sr clnlms must lw th<' most 1wrf1•rt act 11,tlworld
wl ill'! 1 ls I 111ssllilt
1
• ( )t I wrwls1· II wtHtl<I 1101 Ill' pos~:lhlt· lo t'1Cpl,tll1wily
1lil111J,'1 l111pp1·1wd ,1stlwy It 1v1· ,,11111·1 tll,111nlll1 1 1wli1t• 11'
Religion and Ideology 181
And further:
If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your
nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your
whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs,
your divinations, have prepared the promises, of which your con-
sciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you
absolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chop-
ping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. This
inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as man-
ifest when rationalism argues for religion as when against it. 124
One mark of the new mindset is the concept of time. For the
African ordinary time is punctuated by sacred time, and time is val-
ued according to what the community experiences. Therefore, we
can speak qualitatively of different "times," because they are experi-
enced differently. Christianization repudiates this concept as it
demeans African culture and substitutes a secularized concept of
uniform lineal time, suiting the more mechanized order, which the
European colonizers and neocolonialists need to establish.
In his book Breast of the Earth, Kofi Awoonor has an excellent dis-
cussion of Christianity's role in this regard and tells us that "The
school was the most important instrument of missionary work in
Africa." 128 It was the key to the process that would strip Africans of
their culture so that they could become part of the technical order;
albeit at the lowest level. The school always took African children
away from their elders and caused them to be ashamed of the very
things that could have been a source of political strength and resis-
tance to colonial rule.
The new technology of exploitation required that the African
become an imitation of the European. 129 It required a total transfor-
mation that embodied new standards of success and social status. 130
Christianity, of course, meant "civilization." To be civilized was to
become as much like the European as possible. Awoonor tells us that,
"The converts were also encouraged to acquire European material
culture .... The superiority of the European way of life was rigorously
inculcated." 129 This included living in the townships that the mis-
sionaries established, in opposition to the very villages in which the
African extended kin lived.
The missionary school discouraged the use of African languages.
"Christian conversion meant cultural change," a change essential to
the donning of the cultural clothing of European technology. "Christ
was a white man; the saints were white; and the missionaries were
white .... Continuously the African was told he was cursed in his
adherence to the ways of his fathers, and because he was black-
skinned, the implications were not lost to him .... The fundamental
erosion of the African's confidence in himself began with the first
Christian convert. "131
One of the most important ways that mi~sionary education pn.>
pared Africans for capitalism and the European techno-social nrck,
was by destroying the integrity of li11eageorganization th al fornwcl
the basi~ of l'hr traditional cornm1111al strurturc. f'hrlstl.i.11ily sln•:::H•ct
n1lt11r1•,"w.
lndlvld11,1I ~alv;1llnn :111dtl1! ".lt1clt•oVllristl,111 111t1l1•rlul
1
ity of the concept. Niebuhr never really repudiates the idea in terms
of its ideological thrust; he merely nibbles a bit at the edges.
As noted in Chap. 1, Lynn White has pointed to specific periods
in European development, and has presented an impressive case for
the supportive relationship between European technology and
European religion. "Modern science," which White identifies with
European culture, is predicated on certain assumptions about the
nature of the human and our relationship to the environment.
Christian ideology supports these assumptions. In White's view, "Our
[European] technological and our scientific movements got their
start, acquired their character, and achieved world dominance in the
Middle Ages. "134The unique style in which these activities have been
carried out in the West required particular ontological conceptions,
conceptions that, White says are "religious" in origin. In his view, the
ideas about nature, our relationship to it, and our destiny, which
crystallized in Medieval Christian theology, were the dominant con-
tributor to the ideological ascendancy of science and technology in
the West, an ascendency that accounts for the present Western
European "ecological crisis," since the technical order is essentially
exploitative of the natural order.
But we can look to an even earlier period for the origins of the
development. Judea-Christian thought in the company of Platonic
epistemology initiated the desacralization of nature that would allow
for a dehumanized techno-social order and the materialist, mecha-
nized conception of the universe on which European scienc.e
depends. This desacralized cosmos was an early conception within
the Hebrew tradition. Mircea Eliade says,
God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item
in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's pur-
poses. And, although man's body is made of clay, he is not simply
part of nature: he is made in God's image .... Christianity is the
most anthropomorphic religion the world has seen .... Man shares
in great measure, God's transcendence of nature. Christianity ... not
only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that
it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends ....
By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to
exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural
objects .... The spirits in natural objects, which formerly had pro-
tected nature from man, evaporated. Man's effective monopoly on
spirit in this world was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the
exploitation of nature crumbled. 143
tism." 147 Imperialists and slavers that they were, Popes Paul III, Paul
IV, Pius V, Gregory, et al., in Niebuhr's view, were only embarrassing
exceptions to the pattern. Certainly from an African-centered per-
spective, we cannot view them as such, for, as Cohen and others have
pointed out, there were far too many of them, and if the "real"
Christians had no part in the creation of the European empire and are
not responsible for the inequities perpetuated by it, then one is forced
to ask, where are they, and where have they been? If in fact they exist
at all, surely they have not been part of the European "experience."
And if the only "real" Christians are outside of Europe, then are they
Christians? In other words, the question is raised as to whether the
non-European values and ideas claimed by Christians like Niebuhr,
who would exonerate Christianity from its militaristic and culturally
aggressive aspects, can be identified with the European tradition at
all!
"Christianity" is a configuration of values, attitudes and behav-
iors that are inseparable from the history of Europe. 148 Unhappily for
non-European people, "real" European Christians do exist and have
existed in large enough numbers to have successfully imposed their
own brand of European cultural nationalism wherever they have ven-
tured, inevitably backed with the armed might of the West.
Niebuhr employs what is perhaps the most ideologically affec-
tive tool and manifestation of European cultural imperialism in his use
of the concept of "universalism." The subtle, but critical, issue raised
by his claims is a philosophical-ideological one. It lies partially in the
implicit value dichotomy he makes between nationalism and univer-
salism. Nationalism in his view is "bad" and represents negative par-
ticularism in which the self (ego) is the source of motivaJ;ion,
sentiment, and behavior; while universalism is its positive opposite
and represents the ability to identify with the universal good of all
people, i.e., takes an abstraction called "humanity" as its inspirational
source.
First, I challenge this formulation on the grounds that it, itself,
is not a "universal" statement, though its value for the European li<'S
in the fact it has all the earmarks of such. It is a moot question as t(i
whether any such "universalism" is desirable even if it were possibk.
Nationalistic, i.e., (self) group identification, is positive because ii Is
humanly feasible and originates in the concrete circumstance of nil
tural definition. Hope for humankind Iles i11tltc possibilities for rash
tuning nationalistic idPologl<>sllrnt arC' not dcfinltiun,\lly prccll1·11t1•d
011tlw cl1•111nwt1011 of otlw, cult11rnl w·rn1ps. 1':111op1•,111 11,1\l011,lll•,111
('lirl•Hllrnl:1111,111• tlu•1P(t111•
,11111,1l,nv1•.di 11<1 ''111•w1tlv1•" thh, vlc•w
f111111
Religion and Ideology 193
111li,•1 <'ull 111·1•:;l111Vt' l1,\d 110 pollt f<';\J11111hll1,,ns t lint rc·quln•d s11ch
194 YURUGU
rhetoric, and when they have, they were certainly not as successful
or as "well-equipped" to carry them out. They therefore speak of "a
god" in necessary relationship to "their nation" or culture. Niebuhr
makes much of this terminological difference in Chap. 8, Vol. I, of The
Nature and Destiny of Man. But to delete the article "a" from its usual
position before "god" and to write it always with a capital "G" merely
gives a quasireligious statement, like that of European Christianism,
greater imperialistic potential. In one case a religious statement is
openly identified with the cultural entity that is its source, and in the
other, it is formulated to be put at the service of a cultural entity in
its world imperialistic pursuits.
Niebuhr cannot avoid the imperialistic uses of Christianity, but
his perspective obliges him to explain European imperialism as ulti-
mately inconsistent with Christian teachings: "prophetic religion, " he
says, "had its very inception in a conflict with national self-deifica-
tion."150 However, it appears that the European Christian definition
("universalistic," absolutist, and monistic) is reinforced by the inter-
national ambitions of the European nation, the cultural supremism of
the European ideology, and the expansionism of the European uta-
maroho. Far from "struggling" against "collective pride," I have argued
that Christianity was ideally fashioned to express European "collec-
tive pride" (nationalism). This explanation, among other ethnologi-
cally satisfying characteristics, has the advantage of being consistent
with the history of the Christian Church, while Niebuhr and other
Christian apologists are hopelessly involved in the impossible task of
explaining away millions of "unreal" Christians and centuries of char-
acteristically "un-Chrisitianlike" behavior of the Christian world.
Chapter 3
Aesthetic:
The Power of Symbols
I he Meaning of "Aesthetic"
There are two uses of the term "aesthetic" that will have rele-
v,111ccIn this discussion corresponding to its usages in European cul-
l 11,1•. First, we want to identify the European conception of beauty, in
I lie•sense of the forms, images, and experiences that evoke positive
, 111ntlo11al responses from those who have been enculturated in the
11.ulltlon. This sense of the European aesthetic is closely related to
v,il11t·;t lint is, its themes are "expressions" of European value. This is
1lw ;1estlwlic that reaches to every layer of the culture. The values
,111el l111<1g<·sinvolved Mc nc,t limited to the ordinary person, although
I 11.-y,11(' n1on• co11srlrn1sly <'Xpressecl in the media that addresses
to tlw popular art forn,s. But thls
II 11•lftn llw "11011l11ll'llt•c·t11al",111cl
l11111ld 1lw 1•;~111·,
nol 1·01tf11:-:c• lwc·.iww (p1•rll.1ps 1111<·rn1sclouslyor n1
I,• t·,I 1,w1v1•1
h11lly)tlih ,II'' ll11•th ,1flc•1·1•,
tlw "1t11c•lli·1·t11nl"
,t!, wt•II.
200 YURUGU
not the intellectually mediated that gives pleasure, that evokes emo-
tional response. The intensification of this tendency leads to the
actual replacement of the authentic emotional sensitivity with an arti-
ficial intellectual aesthetic; and people lose the ability to respond
emotionally and to create that to which others can, indeed, respond.
This is a consequence of the cultural value and utamawazo that splits
human faculties into the "rational" and "emotional," and then dic-
tates that the emotional be controlled, "weeded" out, ignored if pos-
sible-its existence being recognized only because the European
begrudgingly acknowledges that the "human" is afterall part "ani-
mal."
But very different philosophical premises inform the art forms
of other cultures and the ideas about the aesthetics they generate.
The awakening of the human spirit in emotional communion with the
sacred, however that may be defined, is its primary goal. There are
S<'veral authors worth mentioning whose comparisons help to eluci-
( late some of the characteristic features of the European aesthetic
Pxperience.
Willie Abraham says of the Akan art form:
When critics like Gombrich say that the African artists were inca-
pable of realistic presentation, they quite miss the point of African
art. If they seek life-likerepresentation, they should turn to secular
art, the art which was produced for decorative purposes or the
purposes of records, rather than moral art, the art whose inspira-
tion is the intuition of a world force. 4
ascendence of science over its spiritual grounding did not have the
cultural backing to resist the ideological momentum of the European
asili.) European art, already heavily rationalistic, was to become sec-
ular, individualized, and elitist.
The more intellectual, individualized, and individual art became
in the West, the more technical it became. The artist regarded his
work as an object to be made technically perfect. That is, his ideas of
perfection were much more influenced by the concept of technical
and mechanical perfection than in other cultures, and this is primar-
ily the way in which the European artist is presently shaped by his
culture; these are the models with which he is presented and he per-
ceives them "rationalistically."
Sorokin says that as European art searches for diversity and
ever-increasing variety, it loses "all harmony, unity and balance,"
which become "submerged in an ocean of incoherency and chaos."
These trends, he continues, lead to an emphasis on the technical
means of production rather than the art itself. These tools become
increasingly complicated ends in themselves. 7
In his view, European art becomes increasingly "a commodity
manufactured for the market" tending toward the vulgar. We should
point out that the interesting contradiction in European culture is
that its art may be commercially inspired ("the artist must live, after
all"), geared to consumption, inspired by the desire for recognition,
and at the same time remain an elitist form; that is, essentially sepa-
rated from the people, because the art, like the culture, creates (con-
trols) the people, rather than the reverse. According to Sorokin, in the
artist's tendency to disregard religious and moral values, the art itself
Basho was no other than the frog when he heard the sound of the
water caused by its leaping. The leaping, the sound, the frog, and
the pond and Basho were all in one and one in all. There was an
absolute totality; that is, an absolute identity, or to use Buddhist ter-
minology a perfect state of emptiness (i.e. Sunyata) or suchness
(i.e. Tathata). 9
•. do wr- c-all "I h!' old pond" 01 tlit>water's sou11d or I hv lt•;ipli1g frni,:
:t wn1hol lo1 11lth11.1t1• plill11sopl1y 1111•11·
rl'/1llly't l11B111ldlil11t l:1'110111
IH•lll11dtlu• old p1111d,lw1 ,1ww It l111·01qpll'lt· 111ll·wll ,111ddrn•·
1111,{
1111Ip11hl1 In ,111vtltl11).( lt•h·lf l'llt' old
lwlll11tl 01 l11•yo1ul01 1111l<1ld1•
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 207
The habit of analysis does not make room for this kind of appre-
lle11sion, and the predominance of the analytic mode in the European
c·xpcrience has all but eliminated the sensitivity to immediately per-
1t•lvable beauty and its definition. It is the European conviction that
,111 experience of art must be difficult; that profundity is only com-
p, chended through intellectual struggle.
Willie Abraham says,
An Aesthetic of Control
Perhaps there is no better form of artistic expression than that
of music to demonstrate the peculiar dynamics of the European aes-
thetic. The European mind responded to music in precisely the same
way as it responded to every kind of phenomenon with which it was
presented. Music was analyzed, dissected, "studied" and translated
into the language of mathematics. It was written down, and then it
could be "read" as one would read a mathematical equation. And true
to the pattern of European development, the intellectuals who cre-
ated this new music were successful in introducing it into the culture
as a whole because the culture itself was predisposed to value such
an approach. With writing comes control, and with control, for
Europeans, comes power. This is the nature of the utamaroho. This
obviously is far more aesthetically pleasing to them than the cre-
ativity and spontaneity that results from the interaction between
human emotion and the medium of music. In the West, an artist of
African descent who has somehow miraculously inherited the genius
of her culture, via her "ancestral memory," and plays without ever
having studied the tools of the European, is an embarrassment. It is
like European science being confronted by the astronomical knowl-
edge of the Dogon people. It exists, but it shouldn't!
Centuries of tradition of the mathematization and rationalization
of music have caused the European to forget its origin and how it is
produced naturally-as opposed to synthetically (the mere imitation
and description of music). Europeans created neither the first music
nor the first musical instruments; they found them and made them
objects of study. Because there was only one way in which they could
understand this music with which they were confronted, they ana-
lyzed it, looking for "laws" of harmony, and melodic relationships, yet
unable to hear/ feel/ comprehend the cosmic manifestation of sound.
(Even in the Middle Ages, music was the study of harmonics and pro-
portion and, as such, was related to mathematics; (in an academit-
technical, not a cosmic-metaphysical sense); Augustine's De Musico
was the standard textbook.) The Europeans then created a facsclm~
ile and style in which they excelled; i.e., a style that expressed all tlw
power and control of the European aesthetic and value. They en·•
ated the symphony-a technical and organizational masterpicc:l', LI11•
epitome of spcciali7.ation in performance.
Tllrir inventiveness, LhC'ir u11lq11enrss, thl'l1 11tc1111mof111
"cl,\s.:,I<
l'\Prt",S('d ll1wlf prin ,nrlly wit lll11 1111•1r nl" clluwnsloi ,: 11II' ol I w1
lt1 l~111opp,111rttlll r1• ,Ht' p1l111i11llyl11111ow1•d
1 xp1t•i.·.l111rn nl 11111:,h•
o1cl,tpl,1ll11w1,,111rl111111.11101thl'lw
!~11111·., ,11 1 o1 I lw .y111
u111pl11l1111t•11l
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 21l
The order of the auditory world had now been transformed into a
visual, mechanical, and predictive phenomenon. Now all a player
had to do was look at the music and put the finger a certain place
and out would come the sound that had been conceived long before
in somebody's head. 18
While in the West the tendency was for this "written," controlled
music to become elitist and for a passive audience to be "confronted"
with a performance, in Africa the cultural priorities and values
demanded a communal musical form in which there was no real sep-
aration between "performer" and "audience": a participatory experi-
ence for everyone involved. Walton says,
told, the European artist creates "art for art's sake." She is able to
break out of the socio-cultural limitations and definitions of the cre-
ative experience and therefore produces art that has no other pur-
pose than that of expressing the artist's own individual ego. This, we
are told, is "progress," just as Havelock regards the Greek conception
of "knowledge" as a "discovery" leading to intellectual "advance."
But this formulation is both intellectually and emotionally unim-
pressive. It is meaningless, incomprehensible, and confusing. Is it any
wonder that elite art produced under the guidance of such a philos-
ophy fails to reach the major portion of the culture, often has no cul-
tural significance other than material power and tends toward
spiritual demise? The "fine arts" in the West tend to become merely
intellectual exercises. "Art for art's sake" is peculiarly European and
should be rejected as a critical standard in other cultures. Yet this
very peculiar misconception has been one of the main tools used by
Europeans in their criticism of non-European art. Sometimes sur-
rounded by the terminology of a contradictory and superficially
restrictive "universalism," it becomes difficult to realize the severity
of European distortion and self-deception. In regard to "the idea of
art," Rene Wassin·g, in the book African Art says: "Fundamentally it is
a European idea developed in the mental climate of European phi-
losophy and applied to the expression of European culture." 27
Universalism, so called by the European, is actually very par-
ticular, and these statements serve as evidence of the nature of the
peculiar European utamaroho. Evidently, it never occurs to Wassing
that he is talking about the European "idea of art" or that that idea
used in the context of African art might be extremely misleading, to
say the least. What are the indications that an idea of art exists in a
culture? Its verbal documentation; its systematization; its translation
into European philosophical terminology; its "objectification" or the
attempt to isolate it from other aspects of culture, in the Europea11
habit, as with what is regarded by them as "religion?" This is a man-
ifestation of the same ethos, displayed by Placide Tempels, who
wishes to "teach" the Africans their own concept of being. It woulcl
be so much more helpful if "objective," "open-minded" would-be t11l
turalists like Wassing would put more effort into an cxpllcatio11 ot
their own conceptions. (A few years ago I had occasion to att011d 11
Haitian Art exhibit, at which the guest speaker (a European "ex1wrt"
mi Haitian Art] infonnetl us that h<' was delighted to see this dlspl11y,
lwca, Is1·whl'll IH· Hr~,~;artcd going to I lnll I, "llwrc w11sIIn !.1,ell 111ll1i•
,l'I Atl", th.it lit• h,1clIn f;wt hrrn1glit 1111'ldP,t lo 1111•
1111111,111 ll,11ll,III', l
<ll Alric ,111~,111<1ll11•lr.111, W,1:,1,lllg s;1y-;·
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 217
It must ... be remembered that the artist did not consciously set out
to create a work of art. They considered a piece a success if it ful-
filled the task set, a task which was primarily functional. Whatever
function a piece might have-economic, magical or religious-the
aesthetic principle never became an end in itself, in the manner of
"art for art's sake." Aesthetic appreciation and criticism of the mate-
rial culture of Africa is a western invention founded on a discovery
made not long before, the development of which runs parallel with
the developing concept of art in western history. 27
l\ul Grant's view only emphasizes the fact that mythical reality
11'•" ,11uclimore important than secular history, since Jesus would
l111v1·to have been a niula11t to be blond and blue-eyed, given his
(ll,1n of origin.
Tl 1<'l-'.11rn1wan 11wcli;i dcmonst ral<•s th Is aspl'cl of the European
•••KIIH•tk.Wt•ll,11111 It 18 111ll11•ll11•1al11n•of ,ivnwed wlill<·natio11alis111
tit ti 1111',11••.1l11•ttilit hl.1L111lly1·xp1,·v 1•d Wlll1l11lilt• 1:<•og111pht,·11l
220 YURUGU
l l11clcrthe first heading, Helper argues that the color black "has
,1lways been associated with the sinister things such as mourning,
lilt' devil, the darkness of night." Under the second, "White has
.llways been associated with the light of day, divine transfiguration,
llw l>rncficicnt moon and stars ... the fair complexion of romantic
l,1dll•~. the ('OStu111csnf Ro1nans and angels, and the white of the
ling so bc-.111litully<·ombi11edwith blue and red without
l\1111•1·!t·a11
l'Vn ,1 I011('l1of th,• l>l;1<'k lwt'll for lhe flag of pirates.":i:i
tlrnt l111s
The most striking difference between ancient and modern times [is
that] the reality that now begins to attract men's minds, and to
arouse their main interest, is no longer the reality which they find
in the world but that which they create within it. Man begins to feel
a power capable of confronting and opposing nature; his indepen-
dence and creative energy are asserted though not yet proved.
Man's power and virtue are seen as capable of winning over fortune
and all those events on which he has no control and which constl
tute his nature. This human energy is most evident and most slrik
ing in art and literature, in which man fancies an inner world of Ills
own where he can enclose himself ancl reign as absolute rnaslcr_:,i,
Each of them has his life and his world, his ideals and his passions,
but all feel at bottom of their souls one common need which they
cannot satisfy unless they strip off these particular passions and
ideas and lay bare that human soul which is one and the same in
all of them and which perceives and creates beauty. The true
human soul is one, and it is capable of preserving its unity through
different nations, races, and ages, however indelibly every work of
art may bear the imprint of its age and birthplace, that is, the ideas
and passions which contributed to shape the life of its creator. It is
true that, behind all apparent human differences, there lives in each
man that one free soul, by virtue of which all men have, deeply
within themselves, a common humanity. 38
1•11111 c•lc1!11•1
1•i1,1111!e111llon
111 tile l11l<11;wtlo11
lwrc•, WP cnn lakr the
11•1111·1"111rlvc•r•;,1l
1111" ,11111i•proln:it llt1•t,1l1i11•," wlil1'11ari• 11st>d ai-
' pll, It dl'l111ill1111h
l1y tlH' l·'.11111pi•1111
ll11•1,11v , .. ,1.,1tl1•,l111111111
,111d ·"''
226 YURUGU
From such mystical artifacts has the literature and criticism of the
Western world sprung; based upon such narrow prejudices as
those of Defoe, the art of Black people throughout the world has
been described as parochial and inferior. Friday was parochial an<I
inferior until, having denounced his own culture, he assimilated
another. Once this was done, symbolically, Friday underwent a
change. To deal with him after the conversion was to deal with him
in terms of a character who had been civilized and therefore had
moved beyond racial parochialism. 43
I 111 dl•,·adc•s lilt le-African girls have been taught to hate their natural
, I ws .is t lwy st 11CIINI ;1da11n· form created lo Pxpress the European
11t,111111111flo 111111111nl1111tllrf11t•1111slyrllsrrt•tlit tlw t1cstlictic viability of
111111111fv 01111
1
1 111111111·..,11111nl 1111w, l111111,111 trn111s!Str.1igl11t•nyour
11111 'ii> I li,11' II 1·,111 h1• p11~li·d11p ll1t11., 111111 {1•v1•11 II ii ho 11011011).(
230 YURUGU
enough). "Tuck your behind under, so that the profile of your body
is as straight as possible!" Ballet is "universal"; other forms are "eth-
nic" and therefore "culturally based." So continues the myth of the
European aesthetic. The Greek conception of beauty still effects
whites (European Caucasians) and tyrannizes blacks (Africans), who
judge their physical appearance in relation to how closely they
approximate the blond Adonis and Venus. African culture itself (and
this is certainly true of other non-European cultures) offends the
European aesthetic. It is too human.
An aesthetic that strives after a model of perfection; that per-
fection represented by proper proportion to be determined by pre-
cision of measurement and mathematical relationship of line and
space-such is the inherited classical European aesthetic. As an
expression of the European utamawazo this aesthetic became ratio-
nalistic, and controlling, representing a striving toward perfection,
associated with whiteness the lack of color (which is seen as exces-
sive), and it experiences pleasure in power (utamaroho), not "power
to," which is energy; but "power over," which is destruction. So that
even as the European aesthetic relates to other aesthetics, it incor-
porates and reinterprets, and then discards them. But the cultures
that created these ideas can never be totally discarded because they
are a much-needed source of creativity.
The nascent European mentality-a literal, superficial, control-
ling mentality-mistook metaphor for reality, reducing spiritual com-
plexity to technical mathematical formula. And this was the birth of
the "elite" art-art that could be used ideologically to support a per-
fect state order, which would in turn oppress the nonelite and colo-
nize the "cultural other." Elite art in contemporary Europe reinforces
European ontological and epistemological conceptions, which as wt?
have seen, take on ideological significance in the development of the
culture and its stance vis-a-visother cultures. In this way the elite aes-
thetic conception supports European nationalism and European cul
tural imperialism.
This brings us to the forms of popular art. An obvious interpr<•
tation of the function of art on this level would be to give pleasure to
the European (European-American) masses. Such a view misses I lie
mark. That is only a part of the reality, because lt cloesn't employ I I It'
concept of asili. An African-centered perspective allows us to li'111h•1
stand the icleoloi:{ical and pol ii ical uses of this Ml. In Chap. 2 wt• :-.,1w
lltat Eur11rwm1C'liristla111typlay1•d nn cssl'nlllll rnlt' 1111111•
ch•vdop,
1111'111of •l 1-:llroJH'illl 11atl1111.d l'Ol1Sl'IC111Sllt'S!, r,tllll lht• lod
l{m11;111 111•1
1111,111gh .. A1w~ "'111•1111111•
111. M1t1i11 11,1111111,,1<1 11v,•, 111111t1! 11w
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 231
culture is unaware. Often the ikons are camouflaged; in this way they
are better able to effect the individual psyche on a subliminal level.
Presently, it is possible to witness many obvious presentations, such
as eagles, flags, the national colors on cars, Jeans, school uniforms,
boxes of cereal, and toys. And of course there are pronounced ikons
such as the cross (crucifix). These are ikons that promote a Euro-
American national consciousness; there are other, more subtle ones,
that relate to the broader European consciousness. Advertising
media uses these ikons, such as blond-haired women with straight
aquiline noses. There are also verbal ikons that abound in European
and European-American popular culture, so that we continually hear
the juxtaposition of terms like "civilized" and "terrorist," or terms
like "future," "tomorrow," "newest" to indicate value. These are what
Aziza Gibson-Hunter refers to as "literal-ikons." 54 We are usually
unaware of the ways that popular art welds the collective psyche
into a national consciousness of identity.
One of the most prevalent expressions/uses of popular art as it
collectivizes the individual European psyche is in design. If studied
from an African-centered perspective, we see that design is a power-
ful and ubiquitous influence in our lives. The cars we drive; the fur-
niture on which we sit, sleep, or eat; the appliances that we use; even
the colors and fabrics with which we decorate our homes-all employ
the European aesthetic of line, dimension, and space. Oftentimes,
objects themselves become ikons. The television is a Euro-American
ikon. Popular art acts aesthetically; that is, it conditions the cultural
psyche to respond with pleasure to the ikons that represent the
national identity. Aesthetic is above all, in this sense, an emotional
mechanism.
This aesthetic is used ideologically. Ingeniously, it gives differ-
ent signals to different segments of the population. Ikons like the
American flag, for instance, or even a Greek statue, engender feelings
of pride in a person of European descent, as he identifies with what
he understands to be a superior cultural tradition. It is easy (cultural)
for him to feel this because of his ancestral memory and the various
mechanisms, institutions, textbooks, theories, games, movies, videos,
teachers, and forms ad infinitum that surround him, all reinforcing tlw
idea of his cultural superiority, all makiug use of the ikons.
But the very same ikon reaches the individual psyche ol ·n p1·1
son of African descent, creating and rC'inforcing fl'rllngs of l11ft•riorII v,
depeuclcnc-y, ur1dllu111illalion. /\t; I lit' person of J\lrka11 rlL'S<'t·nt lult•r
11,111:,.,,, tlw l1111t~ll'
of IIIP llm11l1110 lier l11dlvldu11I(111% 11-(sl'll, :,lw ,u·t 11
:illy "clt"li11•s" 111•1111 latfo11'-lilp ol 1h•111•111l111wv ~1•t•ld11g lo 1 011•.111111·
Aesthetic: The Power of Symbols 233
IMAGE AND
NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
Here indeed was the white man in action ... the
godlike, the white man descended among the black
people to do magical wonders. The white man was
a god, among mere men, a beloved father, god
among infant-men.
Chapter 4
Self-Image
The bard of a modern Imperialism has sung of the White Man's bur-
den.
The notes strike the granite surface of racial pride and fling back
echoes which reverberate through the corridors of history, exul-
tant, stirring the blood with memories of heroic adventure, deeds
of desperate daring, ploughing of unknown seas, vistas of mysteri-
ous continents, perils affronted and overcome, obstacles tri-
umphantly surmounted.
The sense of self and the sense of identity are reflections of the
synthetic work of the ego. All the elements presented to the indi-
vidual by his drives, his past development and the needs of the
environment in which he finds himself, must be fused together into
a coherent self-image and sense of identity. 3
self-images in the mind of the European. (For "the rest of us," these
terms, defined Eurocentrically, present images of what we think we
should be but cannot become, no matter how hard we strive. And that
can be attributed to the success of European cultural imperialism.)
"Rational Man"
The implications of "rationality" for the European mind are cru-
cial. The essential characteristics associated with this concept, within
the European world-view, are control and consequently power-the
theme that reverberates endlessly in the ethnological unfolding of the
culture, echoed in every statement of value. The "rational man," in
European terms, is above all the person who is in control of his pas-
sions. He makes decisions-choices based on reason-the proper
and invulnerable guide. Being in control of himself puts him in a bet-
ter position to manipulate and control others-those who are irra-
tional or at least less rational. He has power over others by virtue of
his rationalism. Through the institutionalization and abstraction of
this "rational" decision-making process-of which science is consti-
tuted-he believes that he can even control his destiny. He plans, pre-
dicts, and creates his future; activities usually associated with a
"god."
When Plato described "justice" as the triumph of "reason" over
"passion" in human beings, he was laying out a blue print for what he
wanted the "men" of the Republic to become-even in terms of breed-
ing. When the philosophers of the Enlightenment called for the plan-
ning of society according to the "laws of reason," they were
announcing their own entrance onto the stage of "history" as its
ttndisputed vanguard. They were the "rational men" who had been
mandated to determine these laws. They and their progeny would
fashion a social order as only rational men could.
The contemporary "critical" version of this position, which
1111fortunatelymany disenchanted African scholars look to for direc-
t Inn instead of developing their own African-centered analyses, is
t Ital of .Jurgen Habermas. In the 1980s Habermas calls for a "ratio-
11.1lizcdlifeworld"~ that will lead to rationality in the "conduct of life."
Willie he professes to be avoiding the universalization of an "occi-
dental understanding of the world," 5 he claims to have achieved a uni-
wrsally ;:ipplicablc definition of rational behavior, which includes
l1,\Vl11g "goud rt·asom;" fo1 actions; more specifically, reasons that
,111• l 01{11lllv<•ly"c'rn rc•ct" or ":-.lt<'<'t>ssful,"
nnd 111orallyand practically
11
"11•ll;11ll1• ,IIHI "lrH,11(1111111'11 'l'lwrc• I~ nl,vfou,;ly 1u1 t•sc:1pi11gjudge-
voltll', .111dwot Id vl1·w, 1111wli,1I 11111111'
1111•111, ul 11·l1•11•1wt•ls lo lw 11s1•d
• I
240 YURUGU
TIius the autonomous subject who no longer recalls and feels, but
lwows, can now be confronted with a thousand abstracted laws,
principles, topics, and formulas which become the objects of his
l\uowledge.9
commitment) that colors and clouds their vision, Europeans are able
to rise above this attachment (identification). With rationality and
objectivity comes "universality." Europeans are closest to being "uni-
versal" because, by being rational, they are best able to choose and
design the proper social and intellectual forms for all people. They are
what it is hoped others will become, however remote that possibil-
ity may be. By being objective their vision and interpretation can be
international in scope and have universal significance, as opposed to
being parochial and culturally bound. The myth continues.
All of these normative themes affect the European intellectual
aesthetic, just as they affect European behavior. These are the char-
acteristics, the attributes for which a participant in the culture
strives, and, at the same time, they combine to form an important part
of the ontological construct that governs the utamawazo. Criticism
and analysis are considered important parts of the European aes-
thetic experience. In this view, other cultures barely possess "art," in
part because they cannot "critically" assess it.
Plato was very clear on this question, but he was simply devel-
oping the lndo-European asili in its intellectual, ideological form. Not
only were males superior, but they were superior in ways that
demanded their control of women. They were more rational, critical,
and intelligent, more capable of grasping higher truths. Only men
could be philosophers. In fact, women were not even qualified to be
their Iovers. 16 But if we accept for the moment a Jungian analysis, the
characteristics for which the Europeans breed were indeed "male":
coldness, control, oppositional thought. Even females who succeed
in these terms are incomplete, as the culture is in a continual state of
disequilibrium because of "lopsided" development, 17 since its asili is
not based on the principle of complementary or wholeness, but
rather on dominance and destruction.
The European has no choice other than being "male" in terms
of positive self-image. It is not accidental that the term for a male per-
son "man," becomes the term in European languages for all human
beings. This issues from the initial European self/other distinction,
where male is "self" and "female" is other. Michael Bradley says,
"Caucasoid sexes have never really got used to each other, never
really completely trusted each other." 18 This, he says, is because of
the extreme sexual dimorphism necessitated by Neanderthal devel-
opment as an adaptation to the glacial environment. Caucasoids, he
argues, descend from Neanderthals. Bradley assumes that males are
more territorially assertive, and as the category of time was
approached "territorially" by Neanderthals, men feared women as
the bearers of children who would subsequently supplant them. 18
We will return to Bradley's analysis in a later chapter. What is already
apparent, however, is that it has many holes, but it does point to the
recognition that male/female relationships and differences are prob-
lematical for Europeans, and that this is somehow related to the
extreme aggressiveness of the culture.
"Scientific Man"
The European is "scientific man." To them this implies the
essence of universality, objectivity, and the ability to be critical and
rational. "Scientific man" does not connote lo the European mind,
simply the person who is engaged in scientific acllvity. To tliP1_111lw
tC'rm indicates a state of mind a11d of bcil1g: a way of lookinH at the
world. /\s srlc-n,c takc•s OHa m:tglcal quality ht E11rnpt·a11 c11lt11re,so
1lw 11s1•ol Its 111C•tl111clnlnl-(y (';111lr11p;u·1 vnlt1v 111lhP f11dlvld111d
ls "l1.-" wl11,,,pptn,wlw" ti 1· 1111lvP1•11•
~i1lt·11llltc 111,111 wlll1 ., p.1111!111,11
,1111111111
'l'lw tllltll(l1•11l•,,11•1111•h,1vc-lil1l1livwlllllillll'wrnldl•,1011
Self-Image 245
Dr. Jekyll and all the others not sufficiently infamous to be known by
name, but always there. The Deadly Mantis (1957); Dr. Cyclops (1940);
The Island of Dr. Moreau (1977); The Thing (1951); Alien (1979, the
more modern vintage)-the theme does not "go out of style" but con-
tinues to provide material for the European/ American science fiction
"thriller."
An intensive ethnological study of such films alone would no
doubt provide valuable insights into the nature of the European psy-
che. But unfortunately all "mad scientists" are not as bizarre as these
films depict them. There are those who have had deep cultural/philo-
sophical commitments. There is a certain "madness" even in the
fanaticism and unidirection of men like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
and Aquinas. All of the most ideologically influential people in
European development had this fanatical dedication either to total
systematization or to visions of what the world should be and a deter-
mination to make it that way-monolithic and consistently European.
This appears to be the only aspect of the European self-image that
may be perceived as negative-undesirable. They want to be rational,
critical, objective, universal, and scientific; but they are not certain
that they want to be "the scientist." They sense somehow that in this
cold rationalism they will lose control. The nightmare of the self they
envision, therefore, is that they have completely lost their humanity
and have become monstrous (for it is the mad scientist who is the
"monster" in these monster movies). The reality of the nightmare is
that the nature of European culture is such that this monster can and
does gain the power to endanger the lives of those not only in his cul-
ture but throughout the world.
"Civilized Man"
The terms "modern" and "civilized" are also those with which
Europeans describe themselves. They represent the epitome of value
on the scale of "progress"; their own interpretation and description
of value and the abstraction to which the human endeavor is most
properly committed. If this is kept in mind, it becomes easier to rel'.•
ognize instances in which Europeans-are describing themselves, ew, 1
as they struggle, and usually succeed, to make it appear that 1·hcy111,.
doing otherwise. This is the most common manifestation of r::uropt•a11
cultural nationalism/imperialism.
Most <.:0.rtainlyhistorian I larry F.lm<>rBam('S would clalin 1ltnl 111•
is l>el111,t wl11<h follows
"ob)t•cllvt•" 111lhP str111·1111.•nl
Self-Image 247
moral justification for it. This characteristic can be traced from the
early Inda-European heritage of the culture. The conquering uta-
maroho houses the intrinsic aggressive tendencies. The culture itself
redirects these tendencies as "progressive energy." Destructiveness
becomes reconstruction of the world in the conquering self-image.
This characteristic helps to determine the Europeans' behavior
towards other peoples. The quoted passage from Beveridge (written
in the 1890s) expresses the same conviction and self-concept as the
speeches of Ronald Reagan in 1988, those of Richard Nixon in 1974,
those of Bush in 1990, those of the Catholic popes during the
Crusades, and those of the Roman orators in the Archaic "West." The
history of Western Europe abounds with such examples. The con-
sistency and power of this utamaroho is formidable, having been sym-
bolically expressed at least 2500 years ago in the Persian (Iranian)
myth of Yima, reputedly the first leader of the Aryan people, who
was personally appointed by Ahura Mazda, the god of "light" and
"goodness," to "rule the world." 23
The following are excerpts from a speech delivered in Rome in
I he second century. It is praise offered by Aristides, a professional
orator, for Rome, "the eternal city." It is evidence of the Roman uta-
11wroho: of how they saw themselves, and of those characteristics of
which they were most proud. Mikhail Rostovtzeff has said that this
speech is one of the most important sources of information on the
political ideas and mentality of the age of Antonines .
. . . if one looks at the whole empire and reflects how small a frac-
1ion rules the whole world, he may be amazed at the city, but when
Ile has beheld the city herself and the boundaries of the city, he can
110longer be amazed that the entire civilized world is ruled by one
so great. (Section 9)
Your possession is equal to what the sun can pass, and the sun
passes over your land. Neither the Chelidonean nor the Cyanean
pro111ontorieslimit your empire, nor does the distance from which
., l1orseman can reach the sea in one day, nor do you reign within
hxccl boundaries, nor does another dictate to what point your coo-
l I ol reaches; but the sea like a g?rdle lies extended, at once in the
11ildcllrof the civilize(I world and of your hegemony. (Section 10)
and there are no sections which you have omitted, neither city nor
tribe nor harbor nor district, except possibly some that you con-
demned as worthless. The Red Sea and the Cataracts of the Nile and
Lake Maeotis, which formerly were said to lie on the boundaries of
the earth, are like the courtyard walls to the house which is this city
of yours. On the other hand, you have explored the Ocean. Some
flowed around the earth; they thought that poets had invented the
name and had introduced it into literature for the sake of enter-
tainment. But you have explored it so thoroughly that not even the
island therein has escaped you. (Sections 23, 24)24
llcrc was the 11utlcar synthesis of 111anand his worlcl tllal <'011ltl
l>t'C-0111(' cXl(•1\((1•d Int<) inli11ity.
"World Savior"
Only the West developed theistic, providential religion ... the
belief that God works actively in history to perfect the world ...
Westerners were forced to take social change and history seriously,
and they found it natural to envisage themselves as agents of
Providence striving to perfect temporal society. 26
der. On the contrary, you sought its expansion to be the label, not
of membership in a city, but of some common nationality, and this
not just one among all, but one balancing all the rest. For the cate-
gories into which you now divide the world are not Hellenes and
Barbarians, and it is not absurd, the distinction which you made,
because you show them a citizenry more numerous, so to speak,
than the entire Hellenistic race. The division which you substituted
is one into Romans and non-Romans. 31
And so, indeed, the world became divided into "European" and "non-
European," the valued and the nonvalued, the worthy and the unwor-
thy.
Europeans, above all, see themselves as the "grand organizers,"
the forgers of order from chaos. They do not recognize the order that
they find in nature and in other cultures, and so they impose their
own wherever they go. (He is not "religious" man in the phenomeno-
logical sense that Eliade uses this term, and therefore for him the
world does not present itself as "cosmos"-only chaos that he must
reshape into a manmade, desacralized, wholly rational "order." 32
Land and people (and even space) are not conquered until they are
so ordered; Christianity is, above all, an "ordering" of the individual.
And it is the military in European culture that represents the epitome
of this kind of order. Aristides says again,
... before your empire there had been confusion everywhere and
things were taking a random course, but when you assumed the
presidency, confusion and strife ceased, and universal order
entered as a brilliant light over the private and public affairs of
man, laws appeared and altars of gods received man's confidence
... now a clear and universal freedom from all fear has been granted
lwth to the world and to those who live in it.35
more with that of Germany, which saw itself as having been maligned
and neglected in order to facilitate domination by a Latin Church
hierarchy. This reasoning must have had tremendous appeal for the
English, who, under the leadership of Henry VIII, sought religious
independence from Rome. English nationalism created an English
church, and it is interesting that while Henry rejected Latin author-
ity, he did not reject Christianity itself, because of its deep associa-
tion with the definition of "civilization."
Martin Luther said for the Germans what Anglicanism was say-
ing for the English, "I thank God that I am able to hear and find my God
in the German Language, whom [sic] neither I nor you would ever find
in Latin or Greek or Hebrew." 51 The Germanic consciousness of
England was further encouraged by the fact that London became a
place of refuge for German Protestants fleeing persecution. "Out of
the Renaissance and the Reformation a myth developed of an origi-
nal Germanic people with roots reaching back to Adam, possessing
a language and culture richer than and independent from any
other." 52
William Camden (1551-1663) was, according to MacDougall, the
first Englishman to treat the history of the Anglo-Saxons in a serious
and detailed manner. He said that he was motivated by "a common
love for our country and the glory of the English name," and that he
was intent on emphasizing the Germanic origins of "English Saxons. "s:i
According to Camden, England owed its language and greatness to
the historical victories of the Germans. These Germans were the tri-
umphant Franks and Burgundians in France: the Heruli, West Goths,
Vandals, and Lombards in Italy; the Suevians and Vandals in Spain;
a11d the English-Saxons in England. The Greatness of the Saxons was
expressed by Camden as: "This warlike, victorious, stiff, stout, and
vigorous nation." 53 This is further evidence of the function of social
science, in this case history, in the service of the national myth and
illlperial ambition. It is also evidence of the self-image of the European
as warlord.
In order to convincingly argue for Germanic origins of tht>
Euglish people and their culture, Norman influence had to be n1inl-
mized. MacDougall describes Richard Verstegen's Restitution of
Uecayed Intelligence (160S) as a "Panegyric to Germanic dcsc<·nt nl
the English" and says that it was "the first comprchcnsiv{~ pres<•11t:1
lion in English of a tllc•ory of national origin bas<'d 011ii lwlld Iii 1111•
racial ~llpcrinrity of tllr Gl!ri11a1111' 1
1wnpl<.>."!i•
Tllc· ahlllly ol ri 11,1111111ot1111,1111111,dltv
to 111dlilll11• ltst•lf fo1 tPsl•,
tr111l1' ,1f{al11~l11pp11",•,lo11, o, 11111n1p1 11111
,1)H(ll't1•,l011, ,·11111101
11xlt.t h1
Self-Image 261
their rule. This theme was to be echoed again and again throughout
the history of European and Euro-American chauvinism. Ancient
Germany was held to have been inhabited by a people who loved lib-
erty, and the English sought to associate their political and social
institutions with the "freedom" of these forebears. In a speech deliv-
ered in 1832, Baron Henry Bulwer said, "It was in the free forests of
Germany that the light of our purer religion first arose." 55 In his
famous work The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward
Gibbon held that the "puny" Romans had been rescued by the "fierce
giants of the North, their German invaders." 56 The implication is that
these "fierce giants" brought freedom, no matter how violent the
deliverance of the Romans. Even Kant placed the highest value on this
notion of "freedom" and said that in order to be moral one had to be
"free." 57
According to MacDougall, Sharon Turner (History of the Anglo-
Saxon, 1805) wrote that although the Germanic tribes were barbarian,
they had a "love of individual independence and a high sense of polit-
ical liberty" and that these characteristics were "the source of our
[England's] greatest improvements in legislature, society, knowledge
and general comfort." 58 Turner characterized the "nomadic mind" as
being especially well suited to the creation of free social institutions.
It is fascinating how historians are able to take what they usually
judge as a culturally debilitating factor-nomad ism-and turn it into
a strength in order to serve the national myth.
"The nomadic mind is a mind of great energy and sagacity, in the
pursuits and necessities peculiar to that state, and has devised many
principles of laws, governments, customs, and institutions, which
h<1vebeen superior to others that the earlier civilized have estab-
lished. "58 Turner adds that among Germanic tribes the Saxons wer<"
"superior to others in energy, strength, and warlike fortitude," and
that the Anglican Church found its rudimentary beginnings in
Saxony. 59
The French had also used a myth of national origin to suppo, l
the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie against the royal power of th<•
Crown: a struggle that the protagonists viewed in terms of "freedom"
against ''tyranny." Diderot, an encyclopedist, conncctccl this 11eeclfor
"freedom" with the Frankish legacy:
all dedicated to the practice of arms, who were exempt from all
personal servitudes and taxes. For this they were called Franks, as
opposed to the rest of the population which consisted almost
entirely of serfs. This franchise was understood as the hallmark of
nobility itself so that Frank, Freeman or Nobleman were normally
synonymous expressions. 60
consistent. Nothing was better suited to this ideology than the vision
of European progress. Its optimism, arrogance, and freedom from the
fetters of common human morality, which ordinarily prevents other
peoples from wanton theft, rape, and wholesale murder. The nine-
teenth century was "England's century," because there was nothing
that the English would not do-there were no holds barred for the
English nation-no place they would not go in the service of greed
and in fulfillment of this insatiable utamaroho. The ideology of
progress justified every possible act that could be committed in this
service. Progress was a path that had to be followed by "civilizing"
human beings, and the English were the leaders whose destiny it was
to take everyone towards this abstract goal. A powerful self-imaget 63
In MacDougall 's view;
And therein lies the theme of the story, which is that of the continual
regression of the boys in the absence of adult (European) supervision.
The hunters kill Piggy, but before they can get to Ralph the boys are
rescued by adults. In European terms, the boys have culturally moved
"backward" thousands of years in one and a half hours of film time. This
is an expression of one of the European's greatest fears. Perhaps the
worst fate that could befall Europeans is that they lose their "civiliza-
tion" (superiority) and become reduced to what they view the "non-
Europeans" to be. The dichotomies that are presented are not those
that accurately indicate the distinctiveness of European-derived cul-
ture or even the difference between traditional cultures and secular
societies. The images presented are almost the reverse of these dis-
tinctions. African and other primary societies are characterized as
being "disordered," "uncontrolled," and "immoral"; European society
supposedly symbolized the movement away from this into order,
morality, and responsibility-where the individual can feel safe!
The 1954 Hollywood film The Naked Jungle is a prototype of the
media's interpretation of "the saga of Western man," in which he is
depicted as "conquering new lands" and "taming the wilds." Whether
the setting is Africa, India, the Pacific Islands, or South America, the
story is ethnologically the same.
Charleton Heston is a "strong," "rugged," "fearless" Euro-
American plantation owner in South America. He is also very, very
proud. He tells his newly arrived girl friend, "I came here when I was
nineteen and started with just twenty acres. I built all of this with my
own hands, I hewed it out. There was nothing when I came here." But
he warns her, lest she make the mistake of thinking that everything
ls like the paradise he has built. "Civilization is only as far as my land
goes, after that you are in the jungle, where no man has a name. In the
j1rngle man is reduced to an animal and the only law is survival."
At one point they meet a native "friend." The hero explains to the
woman that his friend "is more civilized than the others [because] he
!ins Mayan blood." At another point they view a "cruel" indigenous rit-
ual in which a man is being killed for taking another man's wife. The
while woman is horrified at such "immorality" and protests that it
..,1,ouldbe stopped.
ThE' movie gives the impression of being one long, very author-
11,,t Iv<•command from Charleton Heston, the undisputed "boss" of
1 v1•1 ything and everyone, 11unctuatecl by the sound of gun shots that
h~m• 110111lite pis I ol he carril•s constantly, I llC' <'<>lei
rationality of
whld1 b till' s11p11•rnl' sy111lwl ,d wl,ltP p11wn 111tlw pkt11re.
'l'l11·-pl11111•111ht", II•• lil}llt p11h11wl11·11I l1•};lrn1111111t•s 11p al-{ai11s1
:no YURUGU
tl1e "soldier ants." These are ants that "think" and travel in such
in11nense numbers that they can decimate the side of a mountain.
They hold most of South America in terror. Everyone on the planta-
tion wants to flee, but not Heston, whose image is nothing short of
I hat of a white god. He says that he will stay and fight! His friend, the
South American police officer, thinks he is crazy. He says to Heston,
"If you won't think of yourself at least think of your men [all indige-
11ous]." Whereupon Heston replies (in the voice of Moses handing
clown the Ten Commandments): "lam thinking of them. Fifteen years
ago they were savages. I took them out of the jungle. If I leave they'll
go back, and civilization will go with them."
Next comes the inevitable scene in which he confronts the
''witch doctor" (who also thinks that Heston is crazy). With good rea-
so11,the "witch doctor" is trying to convince the indigenous people
to get out as fast as they can. But Heston, the white god, tells them
to "be brave like his white woman." He is victorious, for the men
decide to stay, and the "witch doctor" slinks away, looking cowardly
a11dweak. Once again non-European cultural tradition is defeated.
The remainder of the film is concerned with Heston's death-
defying, heroic battle with the soldier ants, a battle that he, of course,
wins. And so Europeans are again successful; but then they deserve
tu bi>. Tiley are strong" and "brave," "intelligent" and "good." They are
,,hove all "unselfish" in their efforts to bring "civilization" to an unfor-
1unate "backward" land. The money and power they receive from
I hvir plantations do not contradict the altruism of their motives, for,
Hfl(•r nil, this adventuresome, expansionistic spirit should properly be
11•wardecl.
ht an excellent (and excruciatingly rare) satiric treatment of the
t 1HH1ueringutamaroho of the European, the British comic film Carry
, 11 Cleo lampoons not only the Romans and their incessant military
('Xpeditions, but all the Hollywood films that glorify this age of
Wt--stern imperialism as well. In the film, during one conquering cam-
p.i.lgn, Antony says to Julius Caesar, "You know, Julie, I don't think
these people want to be conquered," and Caesar answers, "I kncJtV
wltat you mean-apathetic! . .. They won't even use the nice new
mads I built them."
Kipling's message to his European brothers is that "Ymm; is the.
Earth and Everything that's in it." There is no doubt that nrnny or 1111'
Hsp1•ds of the European utur11urol10 a11d s<•lf-lmagt•an· ext n·111dy
"positive.'" i11the sense that, In terms of L11elrown intc·rpn·tallo11 of
tl11•it 11o1ll1111,1lbth·l11lt•11•sl, 1111•111111111w111l1t1 ~!IV(", 11H•111llw 1•111111
1•,,111dnptlt11h111111•11•s1,,11y to:-.11pp111I 1111'11
d1•11,,., ,l•lt .1•,s111,1111 01>!1•1
Self-Image 271
l<w;sia ... has carried her arm~ into Finland, Crim, Tartary, The
C'aut·nsus and the Monhammedan, Khanales, extending the White
1•111p1r<·0111lw Caspi.1111'NIthe Euxinc ... Vaster still have been the
111,11ch(•s a1 ,ct 1IH• co11q11csls o( Great Britain ... llardly less strik-
1111(1t1n11111<'prowt>ss of H11ssiaand E11gla11d lms bcl:n that of the
I
272 YURUGU
China has been standing still, while England, Russia and America
have been conquering, planting, and annexing lands ...
We come now to the white peoples. These are gifted with reflective
('11crgy, or rather with an energetic intelligence. They have a feel-
i11gfor utility, but in a sense far wider and higher, more courageous
and ideal, than the yellow races; a perseverance that takes account
of obstacles and ultimately finds a means of overcoming them; a
urcalcr physical power, an extraordinary instinct for order, not
nwrcly as a guarantee of peace and tranquility, but as an indis-
pensable means of self-preservation. At the same time, they have
remarkable, even extreme love of liberty, and are openly hostile to
I he formalism under which the Chinese are glad to vegetate, as well
as the strict despotism which is the only way of governing the
Negro ...
11m-M.11·l.c·rnltlw •111111•1h11
type•:, ol lt•n11w111111Pntlhut will pr11-
d111•,· "p111g1,..,,,1v,••,t,1111L11d1,''1111•,l1,11,ll't1•1l,1•d by "pt•11:;lv1·, 1w1
274 YURUGU
The man who ... opened his atlas to a political map of the world
[in 1914] ... probably got one fundamental impression: the over-
whelming preponderance of the white race in the ordering of the
world's affairs. Judged by accepted canons of statecraft, the white
man towered as the indisputable master of the planet. For from
Europe's teeming motherhive the imperious Sons of Japhet had
swarmed for centuries to plant laws, their customs, and their bat-
tle-flags at the uttermost ends of earth. Two whole continents,
North America and Australia, had been made virtually as white in
blood as the European motherland; two other continents, South
America and Africa, had been extensively colonized by white
stocks; while even huge Asia has seen its empty north marsh,
Siberia, pre-empted for the white man's abode. Even where white
populations had not locked themselves to the soil few regions of the
earth had escaped the white man's imperial sway, and vast areas
i11habited by uncounted myriads of dusky folk obeyed the white
man's will. 77
Fortunately the white man has every reason for keeping a firm hold
on Africa. Not only are its central tropics prime sources of raw
materials and foodstuffs which white direction can alone develop,
but t·o north and south the white man has struck deep roots 111lo tile
soil. Both extremities of the continent are "white man's country,"
where strong white peoples should ultimately arise. Two of tl1c•
\'11icfwhite powers, Britain ancl France, arc pleclgecl Lo lhc hill ht I ltls
racial task and will spare no effort to safcHuard the heritage oft I 11•ir
plom'l'ring ehildn'11 .... 111sl 1<lrt, Lile real danrt<'rIo white- cont rul
of Arrll'n 11,·snot in hHiw11alt ,wk nr lllnck I pvoll, h111111po•,·1lllk
wlilll• wc•11k111•1iH
ll11cu1v.l1
rl11onlr dl•i!'c1td wllltl11 1111•
wl11t,•w111hl
l1-!1•1l
711
Self-Image 275
In 1920, Lothrop Stoddard was calling for the unity of white peo-
ples in the cause of Western European nationalism. Today, the United
States, the European Economic Community, the former Soviet Union
and South Africa are displaying that unity for that cause, in spite of
the fact that they may find it convenient to use slightly different
rhetoric from that of Stoddard.
Stoddard describes what he calls "The White Flood"; i.e., the
worldwide expansion of the white race during the four centuries
between 1500 and 1900, "the most prodigious phenomenon in all
recorded history." 79 (Recorded by the "prodigious phenomenon"
itself!) Since Roman times, he says, the race had been diminishing for
various reasons including the Black Death and reluctance to "multi-
ply."so
And the white proved worthy of his opportunity. His inherent racial
aptitudes had been stimulated by his past. The hard conditions of
Medieval life had disciplined him to adversity and had weeded him
by natural selection ... the northern nations - even more vigor-
ous and audacious (than Portugal and Spain) - instantly sprang to
Lile fore and carried forward the proud oriflame of white expansion
and world domination. 81
Pretoria had been made by the white mind for the white man ....
We are superior people .... The Republic of South Africa ... has not
been created by wishful thinking. We have created it at the expense
of intelligence, sweat and blood ...
Chapter 5
Image of Others
The Complement of the European Self-Image
The persistence of the European utamaroho is inherently depen-
dl'nt on the image that Europeans have created of their "opposites."
'l'hc image of others, the dialectical antithesis of the European self-
l1nagc, helps to define it. The European image of others is a compos-
111•of all those things that represent lack of value; i.e., "negative"
l111111an characteristics, within the dictates of European ideology. It is
11w opposite of this negative image that they "breed for," that their
1·11l1ur<'strives to produce. The European self-image is a "positive"
1111t• In 1,•rms of nor.matlvl' l•:uropNm l)ehavior; it is functional in terms
nf E111 opt•,111 goals. IL cl<H'S Its Joh well. /\ rwgallvr conception of
"11tlw1" l!-1tlw baHIH11po11wllld1 Europc•:111s lrnlld tlwlr l11iag<"'
of other
p1•npl1•1,,I,•, 1111•
c11111·1·ptu,d l<1prnvl,h-d l,y lllf' n,1l11n·ol
1·1111'-lt11Irl
280 YURUGU
their culture, and Europeans create vivid images with which to fill it.
The utamaroho is such that they could not survive (as European)
without this image of an opposite upon whom they can "act out" all
those things that help to maintain their "positive" self-image. This is
important when people talk about "good" and "bad." If, in terms of
their own belief-system, they had to treat everyone as themselves,
they could not survive as "European." This is precisely why a "uni-
versal brotherhood-of-man" philosophy can only be ethnologically
interpreted as having a rhetorical function when it is stated within
European culture, since it is ideologically alien to and incompatible
with the value-thrust and definitions of that culture. It does not fit the
usili. The culture itself needs "nonbrothers"; it needs those who can
be treated totally as objects, as "other."
One of the strongest supportive mechanisms in and influences
on the development of the European image of others-certainly in the
early stages-has been Christian thought. This is a facet that sharply
brings home the hypocrisy of the identification of Christianity with
the ideals of universal "brotherhood." The Christian view of the "non-
European" is generally as "savage" in need of "the word," abandoned
lo the sins and evils of an ungodly existence, ignorant of the true
principles of morality. A missionary, writing in 1838, describes the
1lawaiians this way;
This people have much idle time on their hands, which we feel
anxious to have employed to some valuable end. It is a most diffi-
<'Ull task to teach industry to an idle people. But it is necessary to
the promotion of their Christian character. An idle, improvident
naristian is a contradiction in terms. And such have ever been the
I.tty habits of this people that they cannot improve on themselves
without the influence and example of those who are willing to per-
severe in teaching and encouraging them to work. A little labor will
suffice to provide a supply of food for their own consumption and,
hesides this, the wants of nature's children are few.... Their time
must therefore be spent in indolence or, what is worse, in exposure
to corrupting influences to which their fondness for each 01·her's
society peculiarly leads them. To this influence our churches will
continue to be exposed until some means of employment can b<'
devised which shall tend to raise them from their poverty and
clegradalion. 1
These are the statements in which one finds the European self-
image and their image of others. These images are to be found in
whnt they call "the intellectual histories of Mankind" and the "histo-
1 h's of Western civilization." They need not, and most often will not,
s,w"me" and "him" or "we" and "they" but will use terms far more
d,1111ngi11gto their "objects." We are concerned with the relationship
ht1IWe<>n European descriptions of others and their descriptions of
"1u•II."
The negroid variety is the lowest, and stands at the foot of the lad-
<lcr. The animal character, that appears in the shape of the pcfvis,
is stamped on the Negro from birth, and foreshadows his destir1y.
I lis intellect will always move within a very narrow circle. If his
mental faculties arc dull or even non-existent, he often has an inh·n
:;ity of desire, and so of will, which may be called terrible. Many of
lt1s senses, especially taste• and su1cll, are <levclopccl to an t·xt<·nt
u11k11ownlo the other two raC('S.
The yellow race is the exact opposite of this type. The skull points
forward, not backward. The forehead is wide and bony, often high
and projecting .... There is a further proneness to obesity .... The
yellow man has little physical energy, and is inclined to apathy ....
His desires are feeble, and his will-power rather obstinate than vio-
lent .... He tends to mediocrity in everything .... He does not dream
or theorize; he invents little, but can appreciate and take over what
is useful to him .... The yellow races are thus clearly superior to the
black. Every founder of a civilization would wish the backbone of
society, his middle class, to consist of such men. But no civilized
society could be created by them; they could not supply its nerve
force, or set in motion the springs of beauty and action. 5
... the brown and yellow peoples have contributed greatly to the
civilization of the world and have profoundly influenced human
progress. The negro, on the contrary, has contributed virtually
nothing. Left to himself, he remained a savage, and in the past his
only quickening has been where brown men have imposed their
Ideas and altered his blood. The Originating powers of the
l~uropcan and the Asiatic are not in him. 6
Tlw black race has never shown real constructive power. It has
,wwr built up a native civilization. Such progress as certain negro
groups lwvc>mad<·has l>Cl·ndue to external pressure and has never
long 0111 llv<•d I lint pn•ssun•'s n•111oval,for the negro, when left to
I il1111wll, ,1:, 111
1lall I ,1111IJ.1111•rlH,
1apl11lyrcwrl s to his ancestral ways.
l'lw 111w11 l:111I,wll,·, ,,v.,111•,11t1>1ll111l,1ln1: 1)111 tlu•n· l1r stops. lh•
11111 lw du•"• 110l.,1<l,q1I,
,11,•,ll11ll,1t1•,,111tl~!lvc•lortlt l'l'l'illlvc•ly
284 YURUGU
again .... None of the black races, whether negro or Australian, have
shown within historic times the capacity to develop civilization.
They have never passed the boundaries of their own habitats as
Conquerors, and never exercised the smallest influence over peo-
ples not black. They have never founded as stone city, have never
built a ship, have never produced a literature, have never suggested
a creed .... There seems to be no reason for this except race. 7
wltll1•11t•••••(01 ll1t• Im I<ol I olw ), lllt'll,, mild lw v,lllt<·tl Tlwv 1111 1 11, 11•
Image of Others 285
ated and have sustained a system in which the minority controls the
majority (the "system of white supremacy"). This process, in
Welsing's view, explains the substance of European civilization.
Richard King argues that for the Caucasian (Africans who
became "demelanated" [my term], as a result of their physical sur-
vival during the last glacial period in Eurasia), blackness is traumatic.
It is associated with the loss of their culture and spiritual conscious-
ness caused by a decreased functioning of the pineal gland which
secretes melatonin (a consciousness altering hormone) and by their
isolation from African ancestors. He argues that Caucasians reacted
to this loss with fear of what had become inaccessible (unknown);
then they turned that which they feared into that which they hated.
Blackness became evil in this process, and dialectically, whiteness
(the known) came to represent good or value.
These theories and others of European white racist behavior
will be discussed more fully in Chap. 8. In this instance we are focus-
ing on the significance of blackness in the negative European image
of others. The pivotal dichotomy of blackness and whiteness in
European symbiology are, of course, linked to that development. It is
visible in the mythology, as far as we can tell, from the beginning of
their cultural experience. Merlin Stone in her work on racism, calls
attention to the Zend-Avesta (ca. 600 B.C.E.), the religious literature
of the Aryans that is attributed to Zoroaster. Stone suggests that the
1nythology found therein expresses the beliefs inherited from a much
more archaic oral tradition. It revolves around the great and contin-
11ous battle between two gods and their respective followers.
Ahriman is dark and evil, and those who follow him are a dark "race
of clemons." Ahura Mazda is the god of light and goodness; his fol-
lowers are the foes of evil. 9
Vulindlela Wobogo reminds us that the caste system in India
huds its origins in the Aryan invasion of that civilization in about 1700
U.C.E.Wobogo argues that all racist theory can be traced to European
11rigins.In support of this view he uses Cheikh Anta Diop's Northern
( ·radle theory of lndo-European cultural development. (Diop's theory
I•, discussed in Chaps. 2 and 8 of this study.) Wobogo refers, as well,
tu 11nessay by Mlalaskera and Jagatil\eke entitled "Buddhism and the ,
1<111'<>Question," which discusses the ideas of early Buddhist religious
t1•11rlwrs.According to these ideas the human race is broken down
111111 six sp~t·lcs, lhc' charactc,lstics of which arc immutable, deter-
t11l11l11g ;1hllltics and-status, This is tile>orif{in o[ the caste system.
I ,Ii h "}ijH'C lt•s" Is d( 8IHt•11l1•d hy 1\ l'lllor: '1To tlw Rlack species
0
cutioners and all those who adopt a cruel mode of living." (See
Mlalaskera and Jagatilleke. 1°) They were the lowest caste of darkest
complexion. The caste system that evolved has made those of
Dravidian origins, the earliest rulers of India, the outcasts or
"untouchables," whose shadows must not even touch a person of a
higher caste. The Dravidians are black, indeed as black as any human
beings on earth. Varna, which means "skin color," is the word that
designates "caste."
Here we see the Aryan image of others as black, repulsive, and
lowly. While the "pure white" species, the highest group, according
to the religious teachings of these Aryans, were the perfect saints
(Aryan self-image). 10 The ideas of reincarnation and Karma helped to
explain that this saintly condition was not due to anything that the
members of this group had done or achieved, but rather to their nat-
ural state of birth (ascribed), just as the black group was lowly and
evil by birth and could never hope to change.
The Cress Theory has some more immediately relevant impli-
cations that relate to our survey of white nationalist literature. There
is a theme that continually arises in the theories of white supremism
that seems to support Welsing's observations. Europeans express a
fear of being "outnumbered," and where this circumstance does not
already exist, they appear to anticipate the probability of a change in
the ratio between them and the black people ("nonwhites") who are
proximate to them. As Welsing says, the sheer fact of the composi-
tion of the world's people would be enough to fill Europeans with
this anxiety-given their perception of the world as a basically hos-
tile "other" that must be controlled. But Europeans have themselves
created forced environments in which their minority status is inten-
sified.
The nature of the European utamaroho both defines others as
competitors and enemies, and, at the same time, compels Europeans
to leave "home" (where they are at least surrounded by those who
look and act like them) and to move into alien lands in which they arc·
the "strangers." Colonial situations and slave plantations are cases i11
point. The European's sense of power is exhilarated by the fact llrnt
they are among a very few whites who control many dark-skinned
"natives." Yet imagine, as well, the deep underlying fear-the n·nu
ring nightmare-that some day these "natural underlings" will "~•·t
together" a11clovercome tl1ein by sheer numbers, or kill tht·11l 111t lll'lt
slt>1·p.Consider I li<•nilly prirl !RIiy rcpr<•sst•dt•nH>l lonal dynn111k:, of.,
wllllt• p1•1:-.n11111
"Hl111d1•st.1"wlto llv1•dwith 111<11•111 111,,tany 11101111111
It w1111ldli1•1111111·
i'.ll111},1hw1·1111cltll,11 •;111•wilt lw t1,..,1,11y1•cl111tlw
[mage of Others 287
'l'lw whites are ... the slowest breeders, and they will undoubtedly
lwcome slower still, since section after section of the white race is
, c•vc,ilingthat lowered birthrate which in France has reached the
''1'11p1ne of a stationary population. 12
[He refers to Africans/blacks as] greedy savages who are after our
blood .... We cannot simply stand and watch all the laurels we have
created being plundered by these barbaric and lazy kaffirs...
It is our strong conviction (therefore) that the Black is the raw mate-
rial for the white man. So Brothers and Sisters, let us join hands
together to fight against this Black devil. ..
. . . Our experts should work day and night to set the Black man
against his fellow man. His inferior sense of morals can be exploited
beautifully. And here is a creature that lacks foresight .... The aver-
age Black does not plan his life beyond a year .... 14
it bestow its leadership. The issue is ideological and cultural after all.
Those who threaten the power of "democracy" just happen to be
black.
Wattenberg compares the projected birthrates of the "indus-
trial democracies" with those of the "less developed countries plus
the Soviet bloc" from 1950 to 2100. 22 Lest there be any question as to
who the "industrial democracies" are, they are listed: Canada, U.S.,
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland,
U.K., Italy, Luxemborg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Japan. (In another listing Wattenberg includes
Israel.) With the exception of Japan, all of these nations are white
dominated and/or white majority nations. They may have different
names, but they are merely "provinces" of a single white European
hegemony. Japan sticks in the craw of the European cultural nation-
alist, included in the list because of technological superiority. But
then the Japanese projected fertility rate is also slow, with a median
age for the year 2025 projected to be forty-four. 23 So they are not a
numerical threat.
Wattenberg states his fear, "the Third World will be growing
larger both absolutely and relatively, in decades to come." He then
asks, "Could Third World culture become dominant? Could it erode
our culture?" 24 It makes little difference whether he is considered a
n1lt uralist or a racist. From an African-centered perspective, we are
011rculture. To deprecate one is to demean the other. To fear African
culture is to fear Africans. Wattenberg makes this fear explicit. In
<•He<.:t, he is saying that if there are more of them, their culture will
<·011taminate us. If there are fewer of us, there will be less of our cul-
l urc, and therefore we will have less power. 19 But, says, Wattenberg,
"Tllis view should not be seen simply as Western chauvinism,"
r ,ccause the West has so much to give to the world. 25 Here we see the
cllalectic of self-image and image of other as it functions to fulfill the
cultural asili and to express the utamaroho. The European is the "sav-
ior," the "civilizer"; therefore the "non-European" must be the sinful
''savage." Botha's bigotry is expressed through Wattenberg's blatant
paternalism. For Wattenberg "the West" is the "first world," offcrlni;?
hope of freedom to people in communist countries. 26 Therefore, tll<•
111ostserious world problem is the "decline of the West," becaus~ till'
nilturc bearers, middle and upperclass whitr P.uropN,11s a11d
l~11ropcan descendants have sucl1 a low fcrllllly rnll' ns to <.:mtsP 11
"hlr th d<•arth" ;H11ongtl11•irpop11lation.
Wa11,,,itwrl{ho~ pn•s1•11!1•d tl11•q11lnl<'Sst·111l11l i.tnlt•1111•11t
11111111
1,•111pot,11yIIIH•1,1I
wllllt• nnt1011alls111,l11wlll1•htlw llllil>(t• 1111
:11111111•1111•,
1
Image of Others 291
But did the nature of the European utamaroho and the image of
nt·hers on which it depends change with the demise of slavery? To the
contrary, Europeans/European-Americans continued to consider it
111eirobligation to rationally organize the world, and a white South
African regime represents to them that rational order.
Merlin Stone understands racism as a process that initiates in
illl economic aspect (motivated by greed), then rationalized in cul-
l ural terms ("cultural racism"). This results in what she describes as
"stages" of racism in which land, resources, and labor are stolen from
m,e group by another, and the supportive state of cultural racism in
which beliefs about the racial or ethnic group under attack are pro-
I iaga_ndized by the conquerors. Stone assiduously avoids the obvious
Ill I he presentation of her theory: that this pattern of behavior is char-
,wlcristic of Europeans. Yet the bulk of her "evidence" of racism is
I 11kcnfrom the Aryan experience.
Stone's "cultural racism" clearly involves our "image of others."
SI1 • says that the theft of land is supported by the assertion that the
vlt·l1111sare "innately immoral, even innately evil, e.g., demons, can-
1111,Jls,head hunters, savages, bloodthirsty, merciless, sadistic,
vlllous, child killers, rapists, heathens, in league with the devil, crim-
111;\l,devious, sly, sexually perverse, dishonest, cunning, etc." 32 In this
,l.1H<·,I lie moral inferiority of the "cultural other" (my term) is the
h•,1H·. She (.(<>t'Son 10 say that the purpose of cultural racism is to
llwltt• 1111p1·ovokvd agg1<>sslon;ind the extreme violence characteris-
111·nl 111<• h, st st;i'lt1 of 1•1·01101111<' n1<:fsm. (!1111these Images are not
1111itilw1L, ll11·v r111·p,111uf tfw 1111foldh11-!of tilt• asl/i.) t\c<'ording to
1 11
lllh
i...111111•, 11111(1Ill •11•1illut,1I 1,1( li.111' l,1t1I<;11111111111•111111•11-;"
,II'(' irnl,
294 YURUGU
acteristics of the African physiognomy: the color of the skin, the tex-
ture of the hair, the contours of the lips and the nose. Images brought
attention to features that contrasted most with European features.
The asili of European culture demanded this kind of image-making
and destruction for the enhancement of the European self-image. If
they were to believe themselves physically beautiful, what they con-
sidered to be their opposite must be projected as grotesque. That
which had been positively expressed in the African aesthetic, i.e.,
braided hair, dark skin, and full features, were now made to appear
ridiculous. The intricate African braiding patterns became braids
standing straight up in an artificially stiff manner with ribbons tied
around their ends. Very dark smooth African skin became a shiny
plasticlike black, with accentuated rolling eyes and an enlarged, open
red-lipped mouth. These images, of course, had the double effect of
heightening European self-esteem (which must have been unusually
vulnerable to require such extreme reinforcement), while at the same
time devastating African self-esteem, as Africans replaced an African
ncsthetic with a European aesthetic.
Then Hollywood took over the image-making business, and not
only could black people in America be lampooned in this way but also
Africans on the continent. The result was that both Europeans and
l\fricans rejected what was visually African. Because Hollywood (the
film industry) reigned supreme in the creation and reinforcement of
t I 1cEuropean self-image, it also had to be the most devastating weapon
In the destruction of the self-image of "non-European" peoples, since
t liat is the flip-side of the coin. Seen another way, the films were tools
with which to create a negative image of others. From African safaris
Io Bob Hope comedies, with white Cleopatras and crazed "Indians" in
between, a motley array of blatant stupidity screamed, attacked, gig-
1-(11-<l, and shuffled itself across the screen, representing "non-
l~11ropean" peoples in European consciousness. In fact, the image
n1•at~rl in the Hollywood modality is a cartoonesque exaggeration of
t I1l' characteristics already conjured by the European psyche out of
tlu• depths of its cultural utamawazo (collective cognitive structure)
,111<1 utamaroho ( collective emotional tone). What had been added was
I I11· audio-visual negative image-making: First, the Amoses and Andys
,111cl t I 1e Bc•ulahs;ancl now the Neils (to replace Hattie McDaniel), the
tll'W downs likr George .Jefferson (to replace Steppin' Fetchit), and the
A111oldWilsn11/W1•bstcrpnennial puerility syndrome of anti-African
11.1tlrn111llst ~1:ntiluc11t ,Ill Hlnl<'k t]1eir blows for the European self-
h1rng1·.Musk vldt•o's vlt• with tlwiw otlll'r fnrr1ls 11f111rclir1 In Lht::pm-
d1w1J1111 ,-,11lw 8' nt, ..,q,w llw l•:11rn1w1111 11Iutlwr•,.
iln,111.1·
296 YURUGU
I will say then, that I am not or ever have been in favor of brir11,1ing
about in any way, the social and political equality, of the white and
black races. That I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of 111aki11g
vol ers or jurors of Negroes, not of qualifying I hem to holcl offin·, nor
tn l11l1·n11nrrywltl1 wllltl• 1woplt' and I will sny i11:1dcllllt111 lo 1111:-,,
111111llit•f'l• Is" pl1ysi<·,1ldif11°11•11r1·l>t·lwv1•111111•wlillt• ,11ul hi.wk
, ,11 t''I, wllll'I I wlll 1·v1·r lw I,lei I lw I wo r,w1", IIv111~i •II wr 1111t 1•1111•1
t 111-(1
111·1111 I.II,11111p11ll111·,d v A11tl
1·q11<11ll w,111111Ii,,.,tlll'V • ,1111111I llv1·
•111
Image of Others 2.99
It will be seen that when we classify Mankind by colour, the only one
of the primary races, given by this classification, which has not
m&de a creative contribution to any of our twenty-one civilizations
is the Black Race. (Vol I, p. 233)
... within the first six thousand years, the Black Race has not helped
to create any civilization. (Vol. I, p. 238)
39
Arnold Toynbee
The Negro is a child, and with children nothing can be done with-
out lhe use of authority. We must, therefore, so arrange the cir-
<"11111sta11ces of our daily life that my authority can find expression.
WitI I rcg.::irclto the Negroes, then, I have coined the formula: "I am
yo1ir brother, it is true, but your elder brother."
t\lbrrt Schwritzcr (On the F.dge of Primeval Forest, 1961)
The old antislavery school says that women must stay back, that
they must wait until male Negroes are voters. But we say, if you will
not give the whole loaf of justice to an entire people, give it to the
most intelligent first. If intelligence, justice, and morality are to be
placed in the government, then let the question of "white" women
be brought up first and that of the Negro last.
Susan B. Anthony (Reply to Frederick Douglass, 1869)
Anything they have if it be asked for they never say no, but rather
invite the person to accept it, and show so much lovingness as
though they would give their hearts. 44
l•:11ropeanvalue:
"critical" "noncritical"
"scientific" "superstitious," "magical"
"logical" ''illogical"
"civilized," "advanced" "uncivilized," "primitive"
"modern" "backward"
"lawful," "orderly" "unlawful," "unruly"
"responsible," "adult" "childlike"
"universal" "parochial"
"energetic" "lazy"
"active" "passive"
"enterprising" "apathetic"
"creative" "imitative"
white black, colored
In the case of the Negro ... his shameful history was carried quite
literally, on his brow. Shameful; for he was heathen as well as black
and would never have discovered the healing blood of Christ had
we not braved the jungles to bring him these glad tidings. Shameful;
for, since our role as missionary had not been wholly disinterested,
it was necessary to recall the shame from which we had delivered
him in order more easily to escape our own. As he accepted the
alabaster of Christ and the bloody cross-in the bearing of which
he would find his redemption ... he must, henceforth, accept that
image we then gave him of himself: having no other and standing,
moreover, in danger of death should he fail to accept the dazzling
light thus brought into such darkness. 52
BEHAVIOR
AND ETHICS
In us has been the need to spend life . .. cutting
through deceiving superficialities to reach again the
essential truths the destroyers must hide from spirits
if their white road is to prevail; ...
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 6
Rhetoric and
Behavior
Watergate is no mere accident of history. It is the
natural consequence of a government faced with
the problem of trying to preserve the facade of
democracy before its citizens while waging imperi-
alist war abroad, plundering the public treasury at
home, and supporting reaction wherever it can be
found. To maintain the myth of American righteous-
ness, the government has no other recourse except
to lie. Indeed, lying becomes the central political
behavior of the state. 1
William Strickland
What's in a Lie?
The Iranian Deal: United States sale of arms to Iran in exchange
f01 I Ile r ~lease orAmerican hostages.
They would make slaves of us if they could; but as they cannot, they
kill us. There is no faith to be placed in their words.
They will say to an Indian, "My friend; my brother!" They will take
him by the hand and, at the same moment destroy him ....
Remember that this day I warned you to beware of such friends as
these. I know the Long-Knives. They are not to be trusted. 6
Arrut I wr I I 1111).{
1101 t lll'lll I"p1 ,. Plalonk" fi11•1•ksI in this
ln•1ll1l1·,ll>1111t
1w111utl:.1lwlt 1•11p,11 lly fw cll11•1I itl'IJ1111,11,clsl1wl't1•11<·llo111111dlt11
:i/6 YURUGU
Kovel says that Christianity turned "away form the world" and
111,11It "could only curse from a distance," thereby introducing "a
1
,pllt l1110the cultural universe." This "turning away" can be inter-
11111tl'das being "written in" to the definition of an early adumbration
, 1It I 1(• Iwo-sicted nature of the European ethic. It is not the European's
, 111111rrdu11ivcrse" I hat is split; that remains consistent and intact
pt t'I ls1·ly because of th<' dis1inclion between the standards of intra-
' 1ilt111,\IIH•llnvlw· a11tl tliv standards of huhuvior towards others;
I wl wc•c•11IJi:,;wo11h and I th <l(•t•<b,IH•I w1•1·111lw "rlwtorlnil ethic" ancl
lt1•l111vlot A•, ,1 11'!-illll of IIH'lt
11111 llih 111,111111.1!'1),lllld«", l•,111qpc•1111
320 YURUGU
dealing with the West. Nietzsche says that it tends to "weaken," and
he is right. But it "weakens" other cultures, while strengthening
European power.
But more oft0n in Western social theory, tlte r)l('torical l'I lill
llas hl'<'ll mistakenly usl'<I to cltarnctcrizt· E11rop1•a11lwhnvlor ,111d
v;d1ws. 'l'lw following stHIPllll'lll ls lro111l{ohlt1 Wllll,1111s, wliosP n~1<·11
"lllllc••,1,1111l' I•, (111(' nl IIIIC 11111111lltc-d, llt,11 l'l, "ol)J1•1 tlv•·" ',Ill l11l11u11 ,ii
i\ll,1ly•,1, 1111·111111•11111111
"' y 1\1111·1
!1,111•,tl!'lt'ly
Rhetoric and Behavior 325
//1111wnilarian Mores
Wt• shall 11sethe term "humanitarianism" to refer to another impor-
1,utt value cluster in American society, meaning by it emphasis upon
,111yLype of disinterested concern and helpfulness, including per-
sn1till kindliness, aid and comfort, spontaneous aid in mass disas-
ll'n;, as well as the more important personal patterns of organized
phllnnthrony. Do Hiesc 1hings represent important values in
;\1111•,lccJ'I
The new ethos of the late 1960's sought to restore to their central
place in Western culture the religious, mystical, compassionate,
imaginative, and altruistic ideals that had been tarnished or ignored
by industrialism and secularism, by the mechanism and bureau-
cracy of modern life.22
The new ethos had indigenous roots in some of the central cur-
rents of the Western tradition-in Christian mysticism, in the
Enlightenment's vision of a happy and peaceful world, in
Romanticism's yearning of the union of self and nature and for the
union of all individuals in the Absolute Spirit, in anarchism's faith
in the spontaneous association of men in a harmonious community
when freed from the brutality and oppression of the state, in
Nietzsche's life-affirming ethic and Freud's revelation of the pri-
macy of erotic impulses, and in the existential philosophy of Camus,
Sartre, and Jaspers. 23
The trick is to "claim" ideas that have failed to influence the def-
111ltion of the culture: because they do not fit in with the asili. In this
w:,y, any critique of European ideology informed by a vision of the
l111man that could only have been created either by a rejection of
1·'.uropcan value or in a culture qualitatively different from European
1:!llllurc itself becomes a "Western" product. And this argument (if
",11gut!cl" at all) is made on the basis of values that were, for the
1-'.11n1pcan,never more than rhetoric! "Christian mysticism" becomes
"Wt•slcrn," and the "Enlightenment's vision of a happy world" is not
l,1111l~lwd by 1he fa,ct that this wor'.d was to be defined in terms of and
1 11111 rnllt:d by l·'.uropean "progress.''
( ·antor's characlerinlion of "Western liberalism" is a perfect
or wlin! I h;we t'Hll<'d tlw "rhetorical ethic.'' In the statement
•.1.11c •111t•111
111,11 lnllowl!, lnlw11 lrc11111111' ,01wl11cllng p.tragraphs of his three-vol-
111111•wc,d, 011 1•:111opi 1
ndt111,1I lllslo1y, ('a11tot dalm~. for Ill<• r11I
1111
11111, II•, 11111•,I ,,,·vc·1c• 1 rltk~ Muv1·1111•11I· 111,11 w1111lcl s1·c•k 1111
1
330 YURUGU
opposite.
This kind of cultural confusion can also have another effect. As
l\111us Wilson has rf'worked Pa1tlo Friere's concept of "false con-
,, l1111s11l•ss"(lhlagogy o/ th<' 0,>prr>s.wd).it becomes useful here. The
who 111·l«·s
l·'.11rnpc•:111 till' rlwtt11 lcal ,·thi,· st>rln11sly doHs so out of n
'l,,bw 1 1H1!11 l1111:-1111·s:..-• t 11,d p11·v1•11ts 111111 lrw11 Ills ow11
111·n·1•lvl111,(
i:11111p l11l1•11",l11•; d1•1t111 d l>yhi•,., 1!1111111,'l'lw ,,.·,11ltl~ d,t11g1•1011s lot
332 YURUGU
People of color have not understood where white people were com-
ing from, from day one. Right now Black people keep assuming that
what they feel about other people, white people also feel. Non white
people all over the world are baffled by how easily white people
move into hypocrisy and deceit. We just have not been able to
fathom it. If you are operating on one logic system and you
encounter somebody who is coming from a completely different
logic system, you may not be able to figure it out, especially if they
are really fine in their methodology of deceit. 24
and Cantor have done. Rather, the claim to ideals of "altruism" and
"universal brotherhood of man" must be recognized in terms of their
crucial propagandistic value. There is no more politically cunning
and self-interested being than the European.
It may well be that European culture is the the only culture that
must have a rhetorical ethic in addition to the ethic that actually
influences behavior. Only the European utamaroho seems to require
a vision of itself in opposition to "other"; that is, where this vision
hecomes the fundamental and definitional aspect of utamaroho. This
nwareness of "other" does not originate in an abstract conception of
"humanity," but rather in the European fear of difference and the
need to feel superior. Indeed, the abstraction, if anything, can be
understood as having been conceived to clothe the nakedness of the
European power drive. It is dictated by the asili of European culture
tl1at the European should have "two faces" and a "forked tongue." He
must lie.
In European culture the "moral lie" is epistemologically rein-
forced by the methodology of "objectification" and ontologically by
a conception of the human that seeks always to invalidate emotional
responses. This makes possible, without ideological conflict, the cre-
ation of a rhetorical ethic for purely political purposes. What has
IH!C'll referred to throughout Western European history as the
"C'hristian ethic" has little meaning for the European. It does not rep-
n·scnl conflict in the European commitment but must be explained
Ill t<'nns of the overwhelming consistency and cohesion of the cul-
t 11rc:the as iii. The rhetorical ethic is, therefore, because of the pecu-
liar nature of European culture, in which deceit and hypocrisy
lwcome normal, functional to the European conative striving for
world supremacy.
The concept of asili brings the rhetorical ethic sharply into
focus. As the ideological core of the culture, it provides us with a
frame of reference-an authentic context within which to interpret
the conventional rhetoric used by Europeans to describe their alt i-
t uclcs towards others. Since the asili tells us that each significant
t rnit, each dominant mode of the culture, must fit accordingly to the
"logic" of its germinating template, we understand that the rlietori
< nl ethic could not lw a functioning ideal, a determinant of behavior,
Im that would cause a malfunctioning of the machine. It wo11lctmoll
vatt• inc-nnslstcnt behavim a11dideological conf11slo11011 t h<c'!HU t of
I Ill' HH'lll""' s ,Jf tlw culture. S1wlt l11<·n11slstc~1wy would <·a11sP I ltt• 1·111
t1111• (1111wltl1w) 111111•1·01111·rly•,f1111r·tl11md1111t•l.1t1011sl1lp lo it:{ nlll<•<'
tlv1•(pill po•u•) '1'111•t lll'tflf II-al 1itl1i1111tly111,d1•-; M'll:i< If It I~ l11dc•1•d
Rhetoric and Behavior 335
merely rhetorical; it "fits" the asili. At the same time the asili of the
culture "demands" a rhetorical ethic because of its need for
hypocrisy to render its raw aggression more effective. It is needed
for successful "P.R." The concept of asili, when applied to European
culture, tells us that if the rhetorical ethic were indeed to become an
operative determinant of behavior, the culture in its imperialistic,
mechanistic drive would be destroyed. Ultimately, its nucleic source
would become incoherent. The culture would cease to exist in its
prototypical form. It would die or become something else. But the
reverse has been the case. The European tradition has been over-
whelmingly successful in perpetuating itself. Destruction of its asili
must be effected from without.
The rhetorical ethic plays a crucial role in the maintenance of
the European utamaroho and the support of Western European cul-
tural imperialism. It is the primary factor in a successful proselytiza-
tion of the culture through the creation of a false image of the
European. And yet because of its subtly manipulative methodology
and inherently deceptive technique, it has, for the most part, gone
undetected as an expression of European cultural nationalism. With
a proper understanding of the functioning of the rhetorical ethic in
European culture, it becomes easier to understand the patterns of
European intracultural (Chap. 7) and intercultural behavior (Chap. 8).
... in these surroundings dominated by the walls of
whiteness built . .. to cut faculty from faculty, pull
member from member and drive person against
person ...
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 7
lntracultural
Behavior
The Question of Norms
What are the "values" or standards that guide the behavior of
Europeans within their culture; that is, their behavior towards other
Europeans? "Ethic," here, indicates the beliefs that are implied by (1)
the way in which they treat the other members of their culture, (2)
the goals towards which they strive, and (3) the methods by which
they attempt to reach them. These cultural conceptions of what is
"ethical" are handed to Europeans (European Americans) by the tra-
dition they share with others in their culture, and their acceptance
of these conceptions implies a system of "morality" to which
Europeans adhere. We can, then, look at European culture as a deter-
minant of patterned behavior.
In his study American Society, Robin Williams' characterization
of his own concern coincides with my objective in this chapter. He
says that he is attempting to describe "culture as a normative struc-
l II rc." 1 "Values,'' he says, "concern standards of desirability" (which
, date- the European aesthetic and self-image to the European ethic);
"they are couched in terms of good or bad, beautiful or ugly, pleas-
,1111 or unpleasant, appropriate or inappropriate." Norms "are rules of
c•ondu<'t" that "specify what should and should not be done." The
"11wm.11iv<' aspects of culture" ,omhinc to form a "set of guidelines
l>v wlildt J'('<>pk , q-!ttl,11\- 1hl'lr own l>(•ltavlor <1ml that of their fel-
l11w•,"'.' Sn tli.11 "vnlill's" ;111cl"11011ns" as llwy i\l'l' 11s(·dl1vrc c·;111 only
lw •,11ppu1kcl (IJ po~.111v,•ly"•,.Ill( tl111wd"wllltl11 1111•
('tilltll<' 111s11c11ii
YURUGU
· His discussion is not very helpful since he does not explore the
rnnccpt that he refers to as "the value of the individual,'' but hC'Is
rf!,(ht in sayin~ that the concept comes from "the deepest levels of Its
Ii\111erica11society's] unconscious presuppositions" and tilflt t lw
''val11<:c-0111plcx"associated with ii "is embedder! int he cl'nt ml nfh•<·
llw co!,!11 lliw struct un• oft he rwr~onallt it•s ortlw t·ull 11n·."fiWil h t !tis
lt·t 11:;111111lo II d<•i'J)<'l' 1'iJ1Hil<lt•1,1II011 of 1lH1 ro~11t11vt
1
a11d 1Pl.1111d
lwlt,,vlrn ,d l111plhHI1011:,nl Iltl:, rn11n•pt
1111dltloi1It I•,, 11•,to111,11y
1!111111':1110111•1111 to )1l1111•,
,,,, WlJJl11111•,
Intracultural Behavior 341
Greek were all in terms of the lack or absence of power and control.
"Identification with" indicates "passivity" and "manipulation by" - a
willessness because the self is not separated from the other. The
Homeric man was not a "free agent"; he had no power (knowledge).
It is this all-important need to distinguish self from other (cogni-
tively, emotionally, and politically) and its relationship to the quest
for power on which the European utamaroho depends, that gives
direction to European cultural nationalism (the primary behavioral
manifestation of which is European imperialism.) The dynamics of
this ideology are linked to the separation of self, the related defini-
tion of ego as an isolate, and the resultant desire to control that
which remains (alien) when the ego is abstracted. In this frame of
reference to be "other than" is to be ''opposed to"; and so all "other"
is potential enemy and must be controlled (made powerless). (In
terms of African ontological formulations, on the other hand, the
"person" has her own "power" or "force" by virtue of being a part of
the cosmological whole.)
Dorothy Lee puts it this way: "The definition of the self in our
own cultures rests on our laws of contradiction. The self cannot be
both self and not self, both self and other; the self excludes the
other." 11Norman Brown makes a similar observation when he says
that Freud was "misled by his own metaphysical bias toward dual-
ism"12 and that "one can see Freud's thought inhibited by a concep-
tion of self and other as mutually exclusive alternatives." 13In this
respect, Freud's thought is simply manifesting characteristics of the
European utamawazo, an utamawazo besieged by irreconcilable
dichotomies such as "subject/object," "self/other," which become
the terms of European value distinctions like "knowledge/opinion,"
"reason/emotion," etc.
Paul Goodman has described this tendency in relation to
European psychoanalytic theory as "neurotic dichotomies ... some
of which are prejudices of psychotherapy itself." 14 Goodman dis-
eusses the nature of some of these "splits" that plague European
thou gilt:
The raison d'etre for these "splits" is to be found in the basic goal
of European behavior. The idea of separation is necessary for the
seusation of control, i.e., of European power. It must be experienced
as "control of" and "control over." One part controls the other; "I
control you." Where entities are merged or conceived as unity there
,·an be no question of "control over" or of "power" in the European
sv11se.
This conception of the self and the ontology that generates it do
11otexhaust the possibilites of human meaning or of conceptual mod-
t•lf;.I .cc says that it is possible to have a system that is not based on
,1 lriw orcontradiction. Among the Wintu, she says, "The individual is
p.1ttirularized transiently, but is not set in opposition." 16 Lee prefaces
1111 1 ro111ments on the Wintu conception of self by saying that this
e0111·cption probably no longer exists. But it is possible to find exam-
ph•s frorn cultures that remain dynamic survival systems, and it is
necessary for a viable critique of European culture that we do not
IH•comc locked into a continual comparison of European forms with
lhosf' that it has destroyed (or made obsolete); often such compar-
lso11s encourage the impression of the inevitability of the
Europeanization of the world-no matter how negatively one may
claim to view this process.
Vernon Dixon tells us that the African objective is "the use of
torc<'s in nature to restore a more harmonious relationship between
1111111 and tl1e univcrse." 17 Human beings and tile phenon1c11al wm ld
,ltt' lnterclcpenclr11t. "The phenomenal world l>cc-orncs 1wrso1111I
l11•d " 111111n!xon's ro111Jrnrism1of the- /\frlcan n11clE1tropt'illl world
. vli•w,;, lw dl'i('11%('S tl11•ll'Slll'<'IIVl' ('(1111'1 ('IIL<'lfl(' ft 0111
1 1)1: or h( 111111.11
tl11"H' tw11 pldl11!wpl1k-. 111llw l-:111np1·,111 vt,·w, lw ,1v·,, 1111· · 1•11I:, 111
lntracultural Behavior 347
in his time his fight was all "up hill" and very much in opposition to
the traditional epistemological mode, Plato's successors were ulti-
mately overwhelmingly successful in shaping the Western concept of
self that presupposed its isolation as the prerequisite to objectifica-
tion. In this analysis his success is explainable by the intimate rela-
tionship of his ideas to the ideological principles already present in
the germinating asili of the culture. According to Lee,
Over the years, the English language has followed an analytic and
isolating trend and it is possible that in linguistic reference there
has been an increasing separation of the self from the encompass-
ing situation. 21
Our language implies not only that the self is narrowly delimited,
but that it is also in control. My is the pronoun which we call pos-
sessive; whose distinguishing characteristic, we are told, is that of
possession or ownership; and possession in our culture means con-
trol: mine, to do with as I wish. And My is a word frequently used. 21
The statement is made about the other, the bread, but with the
implication that its validity is limited by the specified experience of
the speaker .... For us, that which we sense or know according to
man-made rules of logic, is; and that which is beyond my appre-
hension, beyond my sensing or cognition, is fiction, that is, it is not.
The sci( is the measure of all things .... Art and metaphysics and
rl'ligio11sexperience are barely tolerated on the fringes of our cul-
tu n• ... Mysticism is defirlf'cl negatively as loss of self; and no one
In <·cstasy is tnkrt1 1H.•rlo11~1y, uulil he comes to his senses. Only
wll1•11 tllt- ~vlf 1,-;lo~lrnlly 1111(ICOl,(t11llvcly in rontrol. is experience
v,,llll, 111ut1•x1·<•1>l ltt lilt• arts ,u1d ri•ll!,llOllonly lhal which is ulti-
1r1,1l1•ty111)1'11In ••II!ll 1''1111'111•111•1•
['. ti 111•
''I
350 YURUGU
Thi:; IJ1sl phrn:,1• lllltls nf tlH• oslfi <'011rt•pt, wlll('II focuses 011
111111•11•111 fd,•ologlr,tl t1·111h•twl1·-. l1,1r:1dmck.1lly,,\s Kovc•l :wr11rnt~ly
II "I I IIt' )I•"I(' 111 I 11C·Y•., .Ji11•11·,1·:hII-(ltt·d III It 11ll hll ,II II I ·,I!ti I' ( ( ,11II C"
ltll'II 111
354 YURUGU
nrlltllt,11 rnd1•1
( 0111plc1fp4,1ck ,1 l(•,1llty And this ls lilt' f111;1l
0\lltOlllt'
111llu "ltl1•11l111!Y
111l111llvl\ltt,llh111,.
356 YURUGU
C.ipltalism was, in fact, the great heresy of the Middle Ages: the
chif'f challenge to the ideal claims of Christianity .... There is no
doubt .... that theological capitalism made its appearance far in
advance of any protestant doctrine in either religion or econom-
icsY
Protestantism may have been sown, nor what form they may have
taken in these early stages, ultimately their development converged
to reinforce one another and to form a culturally and ideologically
congruent system that was to strengthen the tendencies of Western
European development. Both cohere in the European asili. Capitalism
could not have survived without a supportive ethical statement
within the culture; a statement that sanctioned the intracultural
behavior it dictated. Protestantism, and not the so-called "Christian
ethic" (rhetorical), provided that sanction. Mumford himself sees
ultimate correlations.
The Protestant sought to curb the capitalist spirit and in the end he
deepened its channels: he challenged the political rule of the despot
and brought into business enterprise the ruthless ego that has hith-
erto dominated only the machinery of state. 40
Safety and freedom were not to be found only in the inner world:
lint 1hat of the monastery, where authority also threatened, but
within 1he citadel of tile private self, outside the range of tyranni-
t•,11fathers and tQngued lightning.~~
l h•r nualn ht: poll its lo tlw extrC'mr inw;\rdness ;ind sC'\f-relianc.-e
111111
l.1111~1•1
'!1 ld1•,1s t'XPH"ViPd:
362 YURUGU
powers than those this doctrine opposed: the very fact that the
private world of the believer became sacred for him, prevented
him from acknowledging the criterion of sanity-the congruence of
private conviction with the historic experience and the common
sense of other men. 44
Calvinism was a real attempt to render unto God the things which
r1rc Caesar's: a return to that classic republicanism in which civic
virtue counted high in the human scale: a return to Christian prin-
ciples in realms from which it had been progressively banished: a
re-union of eternal doctrine and daily deed. 47
son. This person was suited to the growth of capitalism and the devel-
opment of modern Western society. He was an extreme individualist
(which, of course, had precedents in the earliest traditions of the
European utamawazo (culturally structured thought) only the empha-
sis was new). He was extremely self-reliant. He was the prototype of
the "good" and successful businessman. Mumford says, "the
Protestant personality was businesslike even when there was no busi-
ness in hand." 48 Calvin openly sanctioned the ethics of business; a
sanction that was absolutely necessary. If a modern capitalistic state
was to develop and prosper, a belief in the morality and sacredness
of personal property and the fulfillment of contracts was essential.
(We are only now beginning to witness the implications for the capi-
talist system and the Western empire when such an ethic is not
accepted; not in the advent of Russian socialism, but in the coming
of the "sky-jacker" and other forms of so-called "terrorism." "Terror"
to the West because the West loses control.)
In direct contrast to the Catholic posture, the Protestant attitude
towards adherents to the faith was one of severity and the presenta-
tion of exacting standards and goals of behavior that the individual
was expected to maintain independently; without the aid of a church
which forgave all and possibly served as a crutch for the morally
weak. The Protestant ethic implied a diametrically opposed philoso-
phy from that of the Catholic confessional. In support of this point
Mumford says,
So long as the sinner did not cut himself off from God by Heresy,
the Catholic Church was lenient to him. But Calvin's government
practices no such indulgence: its aim was to reduce temptation and
to root out sin.
The Protestant shut himself off from the sensual expansion and the
<'rotic dilation of the baroque 01 dcr: and the avenues of sense were
now cardully gu~rdccl, sometimes completely shut. Not only did
and fi!.(ures disappear from his architecture, but even fig-
i111a!,{<'S
11rt•d p;1tl1•1ns. wliicl1 1111,silk 111a11t1fac1un•rsof Ill<' period had
'1•,111H•dIn 11rn1111{.irt1111•
lo tli1•lr~:tllll(lt11ous hnwa<IPs, clisappcarNI
It no1 jlt'IP,1111,d,1d11t111111111I
<l111v.-,1tln· 1111dlintnlwt rol11rs b1•r1111w
1111• m,11111nl 1111•
dl•,l111"'1l•,l1,d1l1• 1{1•1111111,lll11111'1
364 YURUGU
Not merely were the images of the Catholic Church rejected: all
images became suspect as superstitious idols, too easily wor-
shfpped for their own sake ... to dance, to attend theaters, to wit-
ness public spectacles, to participate in carnivals, and above all to
gamble at dice or at cards all lay outside the pale of his [the
Protestant's] daily practice; when he was not actively engaged in
business he turned to the sermon, the tract, the newspaper: the
world of black and white. 48
Thus individualism turned into mere atomism. And the final flower
of Protestant teaching was a willful denial of the need for unity:
each man lived in a private world, described by a system of private
science, edified by a private religion, governed by a private code,
subject to no law but his own conscience, obedient to no impulse
but that of his own private will. That was indeed the Utopia of the
irresponsible bourgeousie: it erected specious moral foundations
for the utmost caprice. 50
'1'111•
111a<'hi11t• bc-ca111t'thus n doublc-lwaclccl symbol: it stood for
1111111(lr,i,pollc 1111thorily a11clfor the power that clrnllc11gecl that
.i11llw1lty It slnnd lrn 1111•111 u11d ii 1111il1•d1lw111The• ho11rg1•nisic>
1111·,11111• I; ,111cl1111•p111l1•l111l,1I,
!lit• IIC'W l•,11•1 1·v1•11/lo di',w11 l11 tlw
ltd,1111l1,11rlly11111of 1111•
1111•11• 1·t11tlli·, w1·11· 11l,vl1i11•,lytlioH•' plt•dt•N
3GB YURUGU
of the human spirit was not the source of this morality, rather it was
being destroyed by it. Protestantism with its emphasis on the
Western conceived ego helped to destroy the self. Kovel says,
ized the West more than any other civilization-devolve into anal
fantasies and the resolution of their logical incompatibility is
achieved through an unconscious symbolic root in infantile fan-
tasies about excretion. 57
Under the protestant [sic] passion for individual salvation, the com-
mon man lifted himself up by heroic mental efforts: he read and
mastered the history, the laws, the ethics, and the poetry of one of
the greatest cultures the world has ever known: that of the Jews. 59
Blacks must build a new politics, with a new social vision-a poli-
tics of true revolution, which is always and finally, a politics of self-
reliance. Our future task is self-evident, it is self-development,
building anew like our fallen brother Amilcar Cabral, even as we
fight. Developing in the midst of depression, developing under
siege. Developing without resources, except human resources. 61
Myths allow people to imagine what they cannot do, Sagan con-
tinues. Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother; Zeus over-
throws his father, Uranos. In Sagan's view, these myths have a
healthy, psychocultural function. But Homer's consistent message is
that rebellion against authority leads to disaster. Sagan says that the
Greeks considered offenses against the father as the greatest sin;
hubris. This is clearly a reinforcement of the patriarchal world-view.
For Sagan, Achilles' violent behavior when he fails in his rebellion
against Agamemnon is like the tantrum of a little boy, which threat-
ens to take the culture "back" to a state of barbarism. 68
Finally Sagan attempts to use all of this as a foundation on which
to build an explanation of the "prevalence of graphic sadism" in the
lliud. He asks the same question about contemporary European
American society;
view, indicates that the culture was not at ease with its conscience.
Sagan's explanation is interesting, even helpful, but it is based
on an incorrect assumption. European/European American culture
has no "conscience" in the sense that majority peoples would use that
term. It does have "moral" codes or norms concerning behavior
towards those whom it recognizes as "human," but that is not a "con-
science," it is a "superego" that functions to protect the machine; i.e.,
to protect the culture from itself. Conscience originates in ideas about
what is right and wrong, which in turn are related to the ideological
core of the culture. The ideology of European-derived societies is
that anything goes in the service of power.
Sagan is correct: There is a basic conflict, but the conflict issues
from the extreme individualistic and materialistic world-view of the
culture. These terms are so strong that they act in opposition to the
needs, even of a European social order-of a European conscious-
ness. That is the only conflict within the European asili: Individual
consciousness versus European consciousness. It is difficult for
Europeans to treat other Europeans nonaggressively. That is the
source of "moral," behavioral tension. The superego, to borrow
Freud's term, of the culture then instructs its members to direct unac-
ceptable violent aggression toward "noncultural" beings outside the
culture; "communists," "gooks," "niggers," etc. On this level the con-
flict is resolved. Such violence, like the movies, is not experienced as
violence, nor is the violence that is directed at Africans in America.
Sagan is a victim of the rhetorical ethic. His explanation gives this
''ethic" a function that it does not have. It blurs his vision, so that he
can say of the United States, "we have an ideal of love, a moral
vision." 71 But we, who have been victimized, know that to be a lie.
The Western ethic is the epitome of selfishness. Contrary to the
verbal expression of the rhetorical ethic, it is not considered immoral
in the West to act in one's own interest at the expense of the well-
being of others; rather, selfishness, competitiveness, exploitation of
others are necessary for survival, dictated by the ideology of the cul-
tu re, indicating, therefore, "moral" (acceptable, encouraged) behav-
ior patterns. These characteristics represent moral behavior in the
context of European (Euro-American) culture in that they are sane-
Iioncd by every aspect of the culture, and the individual within it is
ru11rlitionecl to manifest them. The successful "culture-bearers" of
Europe' (,is Weber puts if\ possess these characteristics. The truly
ts llw most <'0111peliliveanrl aggressive person. Wili!P
''W<•i,lt•rn 111:111"
rwrso11111lhc•c·ultmt•,who 111110
llw IPa:-tls11c·,~l'i.sf1il w«y cl<'tc·rn1im~s
h d1,11,11 t•·1lz<•dliy l111111lllty
wli.11 tl1c~Wc•sl IH•1·u111t•::, 1111d11,Vt',l.t·,
380 YURUGU
The original sin to which science was born: hubris-at last becomes
pandemic. "We have now," the head of a prominent think-tank
announces, "or know how to acquire the technical capability to do
very nearly anything we want ... if not now or in five years or ten
years, then certainly in 25 or 50 in 100."
Our presidents still take oaths upon bibles; our astronauts read us
scripture from outer space. But the mark of the beast is upon the
appetites and aspirations that most govern our collective conduct:
demonic imbalance-endless distraction by unholy infinities of
desire: to produce and devour without limit, to build big, kill .big,
control big. Anything goes-but where anything goes, nothing
counts. No natural standard gives discipline. Mephisto's strategy
with Faust: to make absence of restraint matter more than presence
of purpose; to make liberation nihilism's bait. Until at last, even the
man in the street takes the unthinkable in stride, perhaps tries his
c,wn hand at a Faustian turn or two. Was not Buchenwald adminis-
tered by bank clerks-by good bank clerks, responsible employees
with clean fingernails? And My Lai massacred by last year's high
sd 1001basketball stars: nice boys, "not at all like that ... really?" 76
In its most explicit and highly elaborated forms, this theme involves
a sharp separation of man from nature on the one hand, and of the
human from the divine on the other. In this view, however, man is
the child of God, or carries a divine spark or divine mandate. Set
over against the world, he is above all "lesser creatures." He has a
special charter to occupy the earth and to "have dominion over"
both inanimate nature and other living things. Cut off from the
omnipotent and omniscience attributed to the active source of cre-
ation, he strives to attain infinite powers-immortality, perfect
goodness, total control. Actual personal commitment to this
Faustian or Promethean world view would define a doing orienta-
tion to life. And the tangible expression of such a will to do and to
master must be concentratred purposiveness in task-like activity.
Such activity necessarily would tend to have a highly selective "sin-
gle-minded" quality. 77
One overriding quality determines what is good and bad within the
analyzed world: purity. And within the entire spectrum of reality,
one aspect of knowledge fulfills this quality: abstraction. An abstract
idea is a purified idea, freed from annoyingly concrete and sensu-
ous particulars. Words themselves are abstractions. The non-sen-
suous senses, sight and hearing, are the mediators of abstract
activity. Smell, taste and touch are concrete, syncretic, incapable
of making the fine distinctions necessary to sort out what is
abstract from what is sensuous. Abstraction means distance from
immediate experience, the substitution of a relatively remote sym-
bol for a given sensuous reality. Sight and hearing are thus those
senses which best fulfill the possibility of a remote relationship to
the world. Western civilization began its expansion with the dis-
covery of perspective, and the perfection of remote, visually orga-
nized, abstracted activities-whether in navigation or in the
development of firearms that could kill from a distance. 90
being not like a servant in love with beauty of one youth or man or
institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing
towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create
many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wis-
dom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the
vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is science of
beauty everywhere." 97
but in the sense of the "projection" of the self that one does not like
onto another human "object." This syndrome comes about as a result
of an earlier process of "dissociation" in which the person has uncon-
sciously dissociated (but not changed/resolved) behavior from her-
self that her parents or other significant adults find to be
objectionable. Hall outlines Sullivan's psychological conceptualiza-
tion. The "bad'' behavior continues but is dissociated from the self so
that the self can be respected. 98 What happens subsequently is that
the person will "identify" with someone (often her daughter) who
has the traits with which she does not want to identify herself. She
then has negative and problematic feelings about the person, as she
does about the aspects of her own personality that she does not like
and has repressed. 98 Hall takes this concept beyond personal identi-
fication and says that it operates on a cultural level as well. Suppose
Europeans are carrying around the baggage of centuries of antihuman
behavior, of a pathological utamaroho. For Hall this syndrome has a
direct bearing on the ability to love,
tion when the human spirit has become bored with the possibilities
of materialism. Material values can only be temporary; they can never
be "ultimate." Love, spirit, empathy have all but escaped Europeans,
and their behavior is ethnologically explainable in the context of this
cultural "deficiency."
Chapter 8
Behavior Toward
Others
Asili as Matrix
The European conception of and attitude toward those outside
of the culture together comprise one of the most significant and defin-
itive characteristics of European culture. It is the way in which the
European treats those outside of his culture, which is most indicative
of the nature of the culture itself. And to understand the nature of
European imperialism we must understand the cultural conceptions
that provide the ideological support for this kind of behavior; the
belief-system that makes it possible and that reinforces it.
We will not document the horrors that have amassed over
approximately twenty centuries of European imperialism. There are
such works to which the reader will be referred (e.g., the U.S.
Congressional Record contains an impressive listing of acts of "inter-
vcnlio11"by the United States from only 1798 to 1845, which alone are
1•11011gh to stagger the imagination; imagine what could be compiled
sinre the start of the Roman Empire!), and while there is a need for
mc1uy more works of this nature, the number of additional ones
11ppears to grow steadily. for an excellent historical record of
1•:11rnpl!a11aggression, written from the vantage of an African-centered
IH't sp<·,·tive, S<'C'C'hinw<.'izu's7'he Westand the /?est of Us. Chinweizu's
wrn I<rn11 sl1111cl,11,,,was J 11,0:.I dau1agl11g in<lic1 t11(>nlof Europe.mu
lu·ll,1vlo~ tow,11tb 111111·1•, '
lilt• plt1•1111\llf'lltlllo(
II I•, 1101 1•11rn11ll1,lt11w1•v1°1, In dot 111111•111
,J02 YURUGU
What kinds of conceptions of the world are needed for this, and
what styles of actions must be engendered in the inhabitants of the
West to make them so driven and so controlled?
... Let us look at the crucial aspects of our culture for an answer. 2
behavior. If "racial" terms are used, they identify with those who are
"white" (Caucasian). Together, these characteristics form a national
and cultural ethnicity-a concept that combines the cultural-ideo-
logical and physical groupings of people. In the dialectical process of
the European definition of value of individuals, "whiteness" has been
central, overriding even the measure of successful performance
within the Western European value-system. A "white" individual can
be a failure and still be a part of the cultural group-that is, still
"European" and, therefore, treated specially. While a black person or
an individual of color, no matter how successfully acculturated, is still
an outsider. This is the way of the European tribe.
Even so, it is a mistake to focus on the issue of skin-color when
examining European behavior toward others; that is, it is a mistake
to isolate this aspect of European ideology as somehow logically prior
lo its other aspects. It should be viewed as one related theme, among
many expressions of the European utamawazo. Isolation of and undo
emphasis on "color" as an ideological theme in European ideology has
in the past and still continues to invariably lead "liberal" theorists into
I he trap of attempting to argue that physical traits are not related to
cultural-ideological ones and are, therefore, irrelevant. Franz Boas
argued that neither race nor genetics cause cultural "inferiority"
(t:::urocentrically defined). Acceptance of this position encouraged
self-hatred and self-denial among Africans. ("I really am the same as
they are.") That position is politically inept and itself concerned with
the irrelevant. What is pathological, and historically and politically
significant, is the European's treatment of and behavior towards
African/black and other colored peoples, not the fact that they have
linked color with culture. Their very existence argues for this link.
What should be of concern politically to Africans and people of color
is the recognition of European systematic behavior towards them.
The rhetoric or "logic" with which they support this behavior is, in
terms of political strategy, beside the point. We cannot allow their
arguments to distract us from our mission.
It is another testament to the political genius of Europeans (who
lack color) that they have been able for centuries to engage the ener-
gies of First world peoples in polemics that focus on the rhetoric of
their scientism and "logic." The issue is not whether or not majority
peoples arc different. We most certainly arc! And there arc rna11y
· other kinds of differences among the world's peoples ns w<'II.Tlw
n11clal Issue•is what the diffl•rn11cc implies {or bdrnviur wltlll11 n p.ir
11111lo1r ld1•oloHl1al sy:,11•111,
In Et1rnpc•n11 ld1•ol11~{Y,
t\lt 11,111s ,11111ollwt
1111111'
1111'l,11111t1·d
pl'nplt• ,111l11111,1111
,illy lw1111111t 1111111,II
11lltc•1•, '1'111•
Behavior Toward Others 409
How have the meaningful presentation of the world and the mean-
ingful styles of historical action become harmonized with the
themes of white and black in the culture of the West, so as to per-
mit the generation of power by the nations of the West, most par-
ticularly the United States. 8
The authors are speaking for all wars waged by the European
111inorityagainst all majority peoples throughout the history of the
European diaspora.
The statement touches on a recurrent theme in the patterned
behavior of the Europeans toward the cultural other; the usurping of
our land and resources. Among Europeans governed by the capital-
istic ethic, there is nothing that approaches the sacred more than the
rights of property and contract. The successful capitalist can do any-
thing to rob the poor of whatever meagre resources they have, but
as long as what he does is "legal"-as long as 1ie fulfills his contract
with the wage-earner or consumer-his action~ are considered ethi-
tal. Similarly, European social institutions may take from Europeans
their initiative and creativity, their energy and spirit, but the system
will protect their right to their material possessions; for this is their
"property." Whatever they have, in this sense, is theirs to do with as
I hey please. That is the meaning of the right to ownership in the West;
indeed, in capitalist countries that is the meaning of "freedom."
An "ethical" implication of the European concept of the cultural
other is that there are those who have no right to such property;
they especially have no right to own land. A correlative of this is that
t hcsc cultural others are not truly human-not really people; there-
fore, they can no more "own" land than the wild animals that inhabit
it, ancl, therefore, cannot be "stolen" from. To take land from the cul-
tural other Is not to steal. As the authors of the statement quoted
llhovc indicate, a11otltcr by-product o( this contl'()t Is t lw idt·a that
l·'.11rn1wn11s(Eurn1wan A11lcrlc;1ns) ''know how" to ui;P ln11cl1111(1
11•sn1111·1·s. '1'111·111lt111;,I
ollwr Is not n1pallll· nl doit1H s11 ,11111 I,,,._1w
ll11•1f'fn11•,li,,vP tlw 1lgl1t ,111<1
lch•11ot lltC'11 prn1w1 IIKl''l; E11111p1•1111•1, llw
Behavior Toward Others 41]
duty to expropriate the land and resources and to make use of them.
This is, then, the ideological source of the contemporary typology of
nations as either "developed" or "underdeveloped." The natural envi-
ronment is there for "something to be done with it." Europeans know
what to do with it and, therefore, have rights to everything occupied
by people who are not of European descent-for that is the same as
being "unoccupied," and anything "unoccupied" belongs to the
European.
Kenyatta's discussion of land tenure in Facing Mt. Kenya offers
a good comparison of Gikuyu and European attitudes and values. In
their colonial penetration of Kenya, Europeans conveniently mis-
conceived the "big tracts of lands used for other purposes than cul-
tivation and which were equally important to the community" 10 as
being "underdeveloped"-a term that means "that which can and
should be taken over by Europeans" in the language of European ide-
ology. At the same time, the Gikuyu have a category of relationship
to the land termed Mohoi, meaning "one who acquires cultivation
rights on the ng'ondo or lands of another man or family unit, on a
friendly basis without any payment for the use of the land." 11 This
idea would be a violation of the European concept of self, of individ-
ual freedom; and a person who allowed her land to be used in this way
would be considered a fool. Yet the Gikuyu had a concept of them-
selves and of those outside their culture that allowed them to treat
Europeans as Mohoi,· "this generosity of giving temporary cultivation
or building rights to strangers was extended to the Europeans when
I hey arrived in the Gikuyu land. "12 Needless to say, such behavior is
considered evidence of weakness and stupidity by the Europeans
who use it to further their own objectives.
The colonial pattern was repeated again and again wherever
l•:uropeans "discovered" the cultural other. The land was taken, the
people were encarcerated, a colonial "government" was established
to import the morality and institutions of the Western Europeans and
11,regulate Jheir behavior among themselves. The government would
111:skeavailable to Europeans those lands that could best be culti-
vnttd: each "settler" receiving a large track of land, the idea being that
I11• deserved to be "rewarded" f0r his pioneering spirit and his will-
f11r(11cssto "settle'' "untamed" lands (e.g., lands previously inhabited
liy tile C'Ultural other). His "European presence" gave colonial gov-
1·111111culs the cxcusr to "1,rotect'' hhn.
This lwhavloral pattern Is ,011slstc11twith the F.1tropea11's image
", I.e., l ltl' h1ftlalor ol "o, dcr ." Tlw
nl I 1lt11st·II,1:,l I H' wmlcl "oq.:;11111.1·1
c 1111111,II
otlu 1, l111wr•v1•1, wo1tld lw plH1'1'd Iii tt•s1·1v1·d 111l',ll1 w t1·~t•r
412 YURUGU
were the barbarians? Those who defied and ignored the laws-who
lived according to other patterns. Who are the barbarians now? The
skyjackers, kidnappers, and other "terrorists" (revolutionaries). We
are told by the European press that their acts are "uncivilized," and
indeed, their behavior poses a threat to European ideology. By refus-
ing to relate to Western order, these individuals and armies disarm
Europeans. They succeed in robbing them of a potent tool for psy-
chological and ideological enslavement.
To Reagan, Quaddafy is a "mad dog," who supports acts of "ter-
rorism'' against the "free world" (European, Euro-American interests).
Therefore Reagan could intentionally provoke Libya into a defensive
attack by invading the Gulf of Sidra, twelve miles within Libya's coast
line. Then "in retaliation," he could indiscriminately bomb the Libyan
city of Tripoli, perhaps in an effort to assassinate Quaddafy. Reagan's
act is called "defending civilization," while Quaddafy is accused of
supporting acts of "terrorism." But those who are called terrorists by
Europeans are people who have refused to accept the semantics of
European ideology and the rules of European culture. In the view of
these revolutionaries, Europeans are "war criminals," on trial for cen-
turies of systematic exploitation, rape, and murder perpetrated
against various majority peoples. Those whom the Europeans label
"terrorists" understand that we are fools if we accept the war-mon-
gers rules of war. If, indeed, we wish to destroy their power to defeat
us, we must deny them the right to judge us and our behavior. Who
Is Reagan to define moral or even political terms for the world?
It is always a matter of "the entire civilized community being
shocked by these barbaric acts." It is the "barbarian" now, as in
Ancient Rome, who is the true "revolutionary"; if only in the sense
I hat he poses the greatest threat to the European order. Those few
wl10 have come to understand the principles of the European's atti-
1utles and behavior towards the cultural other are considered to be
parnnoid, hateful, extreme, and violent by the rest who still relate to
I lw European fa<;ade. Since European "laws" never work for the cul-
l urn I 01 her anyway, the best thing for non-Europeans to do is to
lg1ion• them. That was one of the lessons of the Mississippi experi-
l'llCl· lha1 black people, learned at the Democratic National
C'o11vcnllon in 1964, much to the embarrassment of the Democratic
I 'Ml y: Lhat its rules for the election of delegates were not meant to
lt11•Judt•Mississippi; 1hal the whites of that state would be upheld In
tlit•lt 1\llnnpl to <•x~·htd~•bl(lcks, because t·o do otht!rwisc would,
I ltt• "01d1•t" of t lit• 1·1111v1
ti1tlc11•cl,11ps1•1 ·111
ton. 'I'll • •wparntIon of t110ral
lly ,1t1d 11l11w,"1111· pl11•11111111·111111ol 111,1ssl1yp1wrlsy; tlw 'if'p111u1l011 of
416 YURUGU
ual) inhibits or limits the violence and brutality with which one
European can treat another. The concept of the cultural other con-
tributes to the survival of European culture, i.e., to its internal cohe-
sion, acting to maintain the integrity of its asili.
The bombing of Japan was culturally supportable because the
Japanese were considered to be cultural others. The massacres in
Vietnam; the torture during the Algerian Revolution; the treatment of
Africans in South Africa; Leopold's mutilations in the Congo; the treat-
ment first of the indigenous population and then of kidnapped
Africans in America-all of these phenomena involved the interaction
of Europeans with the cultural other. The pattern presented by the
history of European behavior towards majority peoples must be eth-
nologically interpreted as evidence of a concept of us as those who
may be treated with any amount of violence and brutality. The pat-
tern indicates that acts of brutality committed against majority peo-
ples are not ethically condemned in European culture--there is no
ideological basis from which to do so. These cultural-historical facts
rnust be taken as evidence of the existence of the European concept
( 11the cultural other; a concept generated by the asili of European cul-
1ure.
The European is capable of decimating whole populations of
niltural others. Actions taken on behalf of the European imperialist
c·nterprise attest to the fact that, according to the "logic" of European
lckology, cultural others can be destroyed with impunity-without
1111iibitiveemotional reaction among those who kill or from within
tlw <"Ulture as a whole. Cohen describes the situation in the Congo
1111derLeopold:
< 111 i\ugust 6, 1945 at 8:15 <'.l.m.,Paul Tippin, acting for the
i\trwrlnm pPnple, dropped a11atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The
I u ,1111,was known tu lw more df'vastating than any previously devel-•
111 u•d i\pproxi1nill ~·ly,rnt· minut·c after dropping it, Tippin could feel
1111• ,•lfpc•ts of lr1·111nr·sill ltls pl;11wflyinF:ahout :rn.ooo
ff•(-''above, .111cl
wlic-11 lw [1111kc·cl tl11w11,1~11or I wlt1lc• lat Pr ,tll I '1;1I llt' t:011lcl sr-1• I ll:1I wa::
It'll 111Iii•• rlty w,1°, ,1 ltl11d ol "t,l,11 k dc·luls." ll1· l1jul l11•c·11 ,111xlt111t- d111
418 YURUGU
ing those first few seconds before the bomb exploded. "Maybe it
won't work," he thought. But with satisfaction and relief he sent a
message back to his superiors in the United States; "Results better
than expected." Back home President Truman and Secretary of State
Byrnes were quite pleased. Tippin reported a "routine" flight back; he
even let his subordinate take the controls and went to the back of the
plane to "get some sleep." On the ground 70,000 people had been
killed; 70,000 more were injured; radiation sickness would kill approx-
imately 1,000 more in the years to come. The President of the United
States called it "the greatest thing in history." 17
German reparations and Jewish statehood, after the atrocities of
World War II, illustrate the difference between the European intracul-
tural ethic and European behavior toward others. German treatment
of the Jews during Hitler's rule was effectively condemned by the
Western world as no other act of mass brutality committed by a
Western European nation has ever been. Yet, it would appear from the
record that it wasn't because this brutality exceeded any other ever
committed against a cultural group. Unfortunately the history of
European imperialism has much worse tales to tell. It was effectively
condemned by the West because of the identity of the victims in terms
of the cultural definitions of the European. The victims, in this case,
were ultimately considered to be Europeans and therefore not cul-
tural others. The Germans had made a mistake. The Boers in South
Africa; the Americans in North America, Japan, Vietnam; etc., the
Spanish in South America, the British in China, India, Africa, the
Caribbean Islands; the Christian Church during the Crusades-the list
could go on and on-but none of these actions by Europeans could
ever be forcefully or seriously condemned by the Western world, for
in each instance the perpetrators had chosen the "ethnically proper"
victims-non-European, nonwhite, nonwestern peoples. Ian Smith was
responsible for the murder of 30,000 Africans in Rhodesia, but he was
never charged with "war crimes." Africans must do that themselves.
On the southern tip of the African continent, a settler population
of 4.5 million Europeans controls a land area of 472,359 square miles,
which they identify as "The Republic of South Africa." This European
minority holds 21 million Africans (and 3 million others of mixed
Indian background) hostage in their indigenous homeland. Tlw
Africans cannot vote, cannot buy or sell land; they cannot live wherl·
they choose, move around at will, nor work when' llwy wlsll. Tlwy
c-a11notlw cl<1 ctC'Clto publlc offlc-e 11qr bi" 11w111ht'r~ of parll111111,nI,
tlwy, t l1t·rl'fon', 11,,vf'110 pollllrnl pow1·1 ,ind 1111 1'1111t10I ov••• 1111'11
llv1•·•·Afrh 1111'; .1r1·7'!.l)l'l<'1•11I of 1111•popul.1!1111101111 ,111· 11·lq{,d1•dt11
Behavior Toward Others 419
The U.S.invasion included the use of fire bombers, gas bombs, and
military might of the type used in Vietnam. Grenadian and interna-
tional solidarity workers defending the island, its homes and work-
sites from the invaders, were brutally murdered, injured, and
imprisoned with no regard for international law.22
fits neatly within the dictates of the asili of the culture. Such is the face
of European political violence against cultural others.
In 1981 Ronald Reagan was faced with the problem of the psy-
chological ill-effects caused by the United State's defeat in Vietnam.
He had to prove to the world and to the American people that the
United States was still more powerful than the Soviet Union. At the
same time the enemy-communism-was not just far away in
Southeast Asia but threatening close at hand, in South and Central
America. The Marxist-Leninists would not rest until all of Central
America was under communist rule. They would eventually get to
the borders of the United States, not satisfied until the entire planet
was under communist control. So goes the line of U.S. militarism, its
own obsession justified by the alleged obsession of others. What is
so bad about communism? The question might be asked in a more
intellectually free environment. The answer predictably is that com-
munism denies people "freedom to choose." It is not usually added
that socialism denies American capitalists access to the material
resources that they need, but do not own; indeed, the spread of
socialism limits capitalist control. The immediate issue is not whether
we agree or disagree with this view, but what kinds of Euro-American
behavior towards others is justified by the so-called communist
threat.
Their villages under attack, the people of Nicaragua are not phe-
notipically European. Their hair is dark and their skins are much
darker than that of European Americans. They look very much like
the original inhabitants of the Americas, from whom many of them are
descended. (Europeans have already decimated such a population.)
They are a poor, humble people. But they have earned the amnity of
a powerful cultural/racial enemy.
The Sandonista government came into power in Nicaragua in
July 1979. It proclaimed revolutionary goals, which automatically
placed it in opposition to the United States. But Nicaragua insisted
that they would relate to the United States on terms of full sover~
eignty and that their right to make their own decisions should be
respected. Yet they had to have known that the United States would
attack the Nicaraguan Revolution.
In 1981 the Nicaraguan government began supporting the revo-
lutionary n,ovcment in El Salvador by se11clingarms. Reagan JH)t111cvrl
on thC' opportunity to begin to reslore America's iniagc as the ovc-r
St'<'r of llw wm lei. On May !), 1981 Ronald Rcuj,{an sli-t111•d ,, $(·t·n 1I
di11·cIlv1·sl.11ll1g Ihill tweausc• Nlrnt ,1g11;1was n' t hrc•,11Io Fl S,llv.u1111,
1111dlt11111'IJ11ll1•dS·t,llc•s, lw w11·1:111tlirnl1l11Hllll' t'1•11l1,d l11t11 llltic't1C
t
Behavior Toward Others 423
said that if the U.S. had sold them, he hadn't known about it, or that
if he had known about it, he couldn't remember! These were the
words of the President of the most powerful nation in the world!
In the hearings Oliver North testified that not only had such a
deal "gone down" in which he had participated, but that he had done
so with the approval of his superiors, and that he had prepared erro-
neous documents to "mislead Congress" so that a hearing would
never take place again. He said that he had also promised three heads
of state in Central America support for their counter-revolutionary
activity, and that the United States Government had promised him
"discretion."
The people of Nicaragua were never the issue in the Contra hear-
ings. Congressmen appeared either to be "hurt" because they had not
been trusted with the secrets of a covert action or appalled that gov-
ernment officials would take it upon themselves to make such impor-
tant policy decisions without consulting the President. Honesty and
integrity were certainly not displayed during the hearings, so that no
one seemed to know who was telling the truth, if it was being told at
all. But no one seemed to question the morality of such "covert
actions." Admiral John Poindexter, who was given credit for having
authorized the deal, said that he purposefully hadn't asked or told the
President in the event that there would be hearings. It was okay
though, because he "knew that the President would have approved."
The entire scenario would have been pitifully comic if it were not
for the fact that while top U.S. Government officials exposed their
lack of integrity to the world, the Nicaraguan people were being
slaughtered by American-paid mercenaries, tortured and denied their
right to self-determination in the process. No one cared, because they
WNe only cultural others .
.lohari Amini demonstrates the way in which the system of
European values operates to define people as "bad" or "subhuman"
,111dis therefore able to absorb any amount of violent acts committed
111,(ainstthem. Her explanation reiterates the behavioral implications
of tile European distinction between themselves and the cultural
1111,er. She correctly assesses the significance of the facts that (1) it
w,1s only tlie Japanese-Amerkans, and not Italian- or German-
J\1111•1lrnns who were "relocated" during World War II;and that (2) the
,11t1111k bon,b was used on the Japanese. Johari Amini says,
111 l!J.l!i, aft1•1 IIH· EtltOIH'illl /\lli<'S had clckatcd the Europt•ans ill
1,1 1111,111v ,1111111,dyth1111tl,(l1uwlltods ol cnirv1·11llo11HIw.irfart·, tlwy
p11111·1·1h•dIll 1h•l1•,111111A•.l,,11'1111.l.1p1111llv d,·~,1,oyl11H
1111• l'llil'~ 111
lllr11•.lil11111,111tlN,111,,,.,tl,Iwttl1 ,1111111111111111111,
11111•1'•,11
WP,1p1111-.
126 YURUGU
which had been developed in time for use on Berlin and Munich, or
on Rome and Naples. But they were not used in Europe. They were
used in Asia instead. And why? Because underneath of all the dis-
cussion and furor about the differences between fascism and
democracy, the European Allies' war against Europeans in Germany
and Italy was, at worst, a tribal warfare and not designed for their
genocide. The situation in Asia was quite different, on the other
hand. The Allies' war against Asians in Japan represented one more
stepping-stone in the decimation of Asiatic populations by
Europeans. By way of rationale, the Asians in Japan did not have
needs, interests, goals, or backgrounds similar to the European
Allies, whereas the Europeans in Germany and Italy did; therefore
it would not have been "right" or "good" or "positive" for Europeans
to use nuclear weapons in fighting their tribal wars in Europe, but
it was indeed "right" and "good" and "positive" and even "just" to
use nuclear weapons to destroy Asians in Japan. The act of the
bombing was legitimized by the European definition of "Japanese"
("Yellow Jap," "Tojo the Jap," slant-eyed, snake-like, vicious in char-
acterization). [Amini's italics.]
That these actions taken against the Asians in Japan were, and
remain, highly consistent with European working definitions of
"right," "good," and "just," as well as European values generally
(particularly religious values), is made obvious upon examination
of the prayer that was offered on behalf of the men who were flying
the bombers. The prayer was, of course, made to God in the hope
that this bombing would cause the war to end soon so there would
be peace on earth, that the bombers would go and return in safety
because they were in His care just as all of them were in His care,
and was prayed "in the name of Jesus Christ" ... [these themes] did
not then, and do not now, contradict each other within the
European framework of values. 24
lly fat the most powerful of European cultural contact and change
111Africa has been the Christia11Church ... missionary work began
li1 Africa as a sporadic attempt ... to extend the gospel to the
heathens [but) the metropolitan political machinery
"1111f11rtt111iltc"
. . lwcnmt' its <'losrst def<>n<ler,
ally, and ultimate beneficiary.
The attack was cultural, aimed at the spirit and self-esteem of the
African, entities that had been held firmly in tact by a cohesive com-
munal organization. Christianity appealed to the outcasts in order to
subvert the solidarity and integrity of the society. It was individual-
istic, not communalistic like African spiritual conceptions. One
sought personal and individual salvation through piety and belief in
Christ. "The school was the most important instrument of Christian
missionary work in Africa." 26 Children entered missionary schools
only to cut ties with their families and with their traditional rituals and
rites of passage; i.e., those institutions that had given Africans such
a deep sense of security and identity. Africans were forced to change
their names in order to become good Christians-docile, humble and
obedient.
Speaking African languages was discouraged, while imitating
Europe was encouraged; including Europe's material culture.
If you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about his
actions. When you determine what a man shall think you do not
have to concern yourself about what he will do. If you make a man
feel that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to accept an
inferior status, for he will seek it himself. If you make a man think
that he is justly an outcast, you do not have to order him to the back
door. He will go without being told; and if there is no back door, his
very nature will demand one. 29
... in its permanence resides its fatal consequences. It kills not the
body merely, but the soul. It breaks the spirit. It attacks the African
at every turn, from every point of vantage. It wrecks his polity,
uproots him from the land, invades his family life, destroys his nat-
ural pursuits and occupations, claims his whole time, enslaves him
in his own home. 30 -
Thf' ltlt:II with Syphilis were chosen becausr- they were in the last
11r"11·(t Iii ry" :-t,1gc, ,f the dis1•;1sc.'l'hr• sf'i~nt ist·s want,•d to karn nbo111
tlw ·,1•1l11w11'1lllll)lk;1tlo111, tlwl lH'( llrYl'<I d1irl11gtill' n,1111 pil,ll!t'. TIit•
,l111ly 1•i.t,1hllslwdth.it 1111' wll Ii Sypl,llli. 1ll1•tl 111011•q11h kly I li:111
1111•11
434 YURUGU
those who did not have it. This conclusion hardly seems worth the
effort. But since the objective was simply to observe the devastating
effects of Syphilis, coldly, "rationally" and "scientifically,"-from the
point of view of the Europeans-the study was deemed a "success."
The physicians involved, in the service of the United States
Government, can be charged with antihuman, genocidal behavior,
behavior that makes hypocritical nonsense of the Hippocratic oath.
James Jones comments: "The Tuskegee Experiment had nothing to do
with treatment." No new drugs were developed or tested! No old
drugs were evaluated! "It was a non-therapeutic experiment." 36 In
other words, diseased patients were diagnosed by physicians and
then not treated so that their condition could deteriorate, leading, in
most cases, to untimely death.
If there is any doubt as to the severe nature of the disease under
discussion, let us take the time to describe it briefly. Syphilis has
been divided into three states of progression: primary, secondary,
and tertiary. The details of these stages were known to European
medical science in 1932. The primary stage lasts from ten to sixty
days and involves a chancre ulcer. The secondary stage begins
within six weeks to six months with a rash and often skin eruptions.
Other complications are the aching of bones and joints, circulatory
disturbances, fever, indigestion, and headaches. Skin lesions may
develop, causing hair to drop from the scalp. "The greatest prolifer-
ation and most widespread distribution of the infectious spirochetes
throughout the body occurs in secondary syphilis." 37 The tertiary or
final stage is the most severe and most significant for an under-
standing of this grotesque human experiment. In the tertiary state a
person develops gummy or rubbery tumors, lesions. and tumors
that coalesce on the skin forming large ulcers covered with a crust
consisting of several layers of dried exuded matter. They produce
deterioration of the bone, sometimes eating away the bone. The liver
may also be affected. Syphilis also attacks the cardiovascular and
central nervous systems, and patients often die of problems related
to this condition.
The tumors may attack the walls of the heart or the blood vessels.
When the aorta is involved, the walls become weakened, scar tis-
sue forms over the lesitrn, the artery dilates, and the valves of the
heart no longer open and dose proµcrly and begin lo h:i\k. The
st rl'lC'hing of th<' vessel walls_111ay procl11C:l' an illl<'ttrysin, n hnl-_
lnonlik(• liul~w in fht• .w,
tc1If the hulV,l'1>11r:1h,
111rn,Ido, 1111'H".itlt h -.11dd1•11
dl',lllt ·111
1111d,;1,111H•1 rn la1t•1
Behavior Toward Others 435
lion! The picture was one of disaster. Why did the future look so bleak
for Africa? The "experts" said because of "cultural differences," "lack
of communication" (lack of television sets), "sexual practices,"
polygamy, and the fact that Africans "like to have children." The
premise was that the spread of AIDS could be controlled by "better
public understanding."
The association was clearly made between AIDS and sexual
promiscuity. The inference was that African culture in general and the
practice of polygamy in particular condoned sexual promiscuity, as
well as undisciplined behavior with regard to sexual relations. It does
not matter that polygamy (polygyny) is not the predominant form of
marriage in Africa, nor that it involves a controlled situation of sexual
relations. It does not matter that the African value system placed on
having children does not raise the degree of sexual promiscuity;
Africans also value stable family situations that provide cultural and
emotional support for children. It does not matter that traditional
African culture is an extremely disciplined ( compared with contem-
porary American society), morally ordered, kin-based and spiritually-
based construct. None of these realities that abound in anthropological
descriptions were made visible. Instead a white woman was shown
teaching a coeducational group of 15-year-old Africans how to use con-
doms. It does not matter that both homosexual and heterosexual pros-
titution were introduced by Europeans into Africa or that moral
discipline breaks down with "Europeanization."
The conclusion reached was that since it would be difficult (for
all of the reasons listed above) for European "experts" to communi-
cate with the afflicted Africans so that their "behavior" could be mod-
ified through an "understanding of the problem," AIDS could be
expected to spread at an alarming rate throughout Africa. AIDSmeans
death. We must remember that as we listen to those arguments.
According to the program, women with AIDSwere not told that they
had AIDS, in this case supposedly for their own protection, which
hardly sounds like a program of "education." The "protection" pro-
gram is another interesting parallel with the Tuskegee Experiment. In
llwlr capacity as "saviors" they are now experimenting with Africans
who are "desperate." Dr. Daniel 7.agury, a French physician, has been
experimenting in Zaire. The program portrayed his experiment as
I wing highly secret but most probably involving the injection of puri-
fi<•cl/\IDS vlrw, iuto ln11mrnbeings in order to stimulate the Immune
~.ysh·111! Could thnt be done to Europeans"? The answ('r ls "no," 011ly
to 1111•"c111t11rnlollw1I"
w,,~;t lit PlllHllll',I: Im Mrl1·:1(wlll1111I11,llly011ly11l1rn1Irl,71il
'1'11111
,f,f() YURUGU
The asili concept tells us to look within the logic of the European
utamawazo and utamaroho in order to understand, predict and inter-
pret European behavior. AIDS is a mystery. That is clear. Let us sup-
pose that it is a human-made virus. Suppose that it is primarily a
product of biochemical warfare, secondarily spread through sexual
and other contact. Dr. Frances Cress Welsing puts forth this hypoth-
esis, which she says is as good as any until it has been proven to be
wrong. ls there any supporting evidence? In Dr. Welsing's view:
Slw continues,
and the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. It was even
then verbalized that allowing the spread of syphilis could be a
method used to destroy the black population.
Thus, aware black people do not find it at all inconceivable that per-
sons with the same mind-set and psychological orientation would
not go further and develop a deadly disease that could be spread
via the venereal route and then introduce this disease into black
and other "undesirable" population groups ... again for the purpose
of a systematic depopulation agenda. 48
• For do,·11nw11111ll1111
ul ,lf'IU,,i 1•xp..•rln1t•111~.~••••( '/p111/,11/.\1•111•1 y, I ,1•rn1111
d A ! 'nlo,
Mel 1.111111,
"i11v111,w i\d,1111H ( l11,ill1vl 111p,•1h,1,k 111
1)!1
Behavior Toward Others 445
wo11ld t 111:,I SH\ Ii ll Pl 01(1'11111'?II /\IDS clot•:; llOl d(•St I oy llS, It ri\11 ('t'r
t.1l11ly 111•11,.;.-d lo 111111111!w, Tlw 11il1• l'1 In 11lw,1ys 11·v••1,1·l•:111111w1111
446 YURUGU
have sought to identify and understand its asili, but not to theorize
as to what could have caused such a strange asili; what could have
caused such an atypical, fanatical "seed" to have been planted in the
first place.
Perhaps that question can never be answered satisfactorily, but
there are those who have tried. And it is a question that begs to be
asked. Why is it that Europeans, who are "white" (a small minority of
the world), should exhibit this inordinate power drive that becomes
the basis of their culture, which they seek to exercise over those who
are not white, or stated positively, those who "have color" (the vast
majority)? Why is it that this culture created by European Caucasians
appears to be singular among the world's cultures? Why is European
culture different in ways that all other cultures are the same? It has
a materialistic world-view, whereas other cultural world-views are
more spiritualistic in nature. It is individualistic, whereas other cul-
tures have communalistic social structures.
Weber implies that the difference is intellectual. The intelligence
of these European Caucasians (whom he calls "western") allowed
them to create more "universal" forms. And of course the entire his-
tory of European civilization (culture in time) is one of such inter-
pretations. When a racial term is used we have called such
interpretations "racist." But this term obfuscates more than it clari-
fies, because of the moralistic undertones that accompany its use. It
never seems to have occurred to any European theorist that the prob-
lem was not association of white skin with greater intelligence, rather
it was with equating European culture with intelligence, value, or
superiority.
We must simply ask the question head on: Can it be an accident
I hat the only people who have built an entire culture based on the
dominance of others are also the only ones who are Caucasian? It
doesn't matter if it is argued that some few Caucasians do not par-
ticipate in this system of world-wide dominance. The generalized
question begs to be asked.
Bobby Wright, an African psychologist, says simply that the col-
l<wlive behavior of Europeans "reflects an underlying biologically
1 ransmitted proclivity with roots deep in evolutionary history." 60 He
s,\ys that the pattern of behavior that we have been describing is
sy111pto111alic of the "psychopathic personality," who, while usually
li11wtiuning well i11(Europenn) society,
• Is of nvt:rng(• or ,1hovl..!avt-ra!-(e"l11tclli!-(c11cc,"ril
• 1111111,llilt• to 1•x1H·1•ft'nrc·
g11llt,
• It.I'. 1111 l1•1•ll11H
nl 111~1•1·111
lty,
450 YURUGU
Whites "then set about the long drawn out task of evolving a social,
political and economic structure with all attendant institutions, to
give Blacks and other "non-whites" the appearance of being inferior
human beings." 66
And further,
We have come all this way and still the question looms: Why
Europeans? Why should they be so power-hungry, aggressive, and
"racist?" What accounts for their difference? Kovel talks around the
issue throughout his book. But his treatment frustrates our desires
to account for the peculiar nature of European culture. After all,
according to Freud and Kovel, we all experience the same phases of
mental/biological development. Is Kovel's argument that the phases
are actually cultural phases as well and that European culture some-
how experienced a distorted or unresolved anal phase of develop-
ment? No, that is not what he says. What follows is the closest he
comes to a causal explanation:
These original titans found that all life came from a black seed, all
life was rooted in blackness, all things possessed a memory of their
collective ancestors. Blackness, the universal solvent of all was
seen as the one reality from which spun the threads of the loom of
life. All colors, all vibratory energies, were but a shade of black;
black was the color of the night sky, primeval ocean of outer space,
birthplace and womb of the planets, stars and galaxies of the uni-
verse; black holes were found at the center of our own galaxy and
countless other galaxies; black was the color of carbon, the key
atom found in all living matter of our world; carbon atoms linked
together to form black melanin, the first chemical that could cap-
ture light and reproduce itself, the chemical key to life; and the
brain itself was found to be centered around black neuromelanin.
Inner vision, intuition, creative genius, and spiritual illumination
were all found to be dependent upon pineal gland blood bourne
chemical messengers that controlled skin color and opened the
hidden door to the darkness of the collective unconscious mind.
allowing the ancient priest-scientist to visualize knowleclgc fro111
the timeless collective unconscious memory banks of t hP millCI.
Indeed, the Black Dot was found to be the hiddc•n cloorw:iy 10 uni
vc>rsalknowledge of the past, present, and futun'. irw,
are afraid; and the "dirt" about which they fantasize as they learn to
control the excretion of their bowels? For King, blackness is life itself
and, as such, is understood as divinity; the sacred force of creation.
But we are taught that it is evil. How did that come to be? And is it
connected, as Welsing would argue, to a reaction on the part of
Europeans to their human condition, their history? Perhaps this leads
to an explanation of Euro-Caucasian behavior.
In explanation, King turns, as Bradley does, to human evolution
and the process through which the earth was populated; in particu-
lar., Northern Europe during the glacial period. The evolutionary par-
ents of all human groups were African with very dark skin
pigmentation. Human life began in the equatorial zones of tropical
Africa. While direct sun seems to have been a creative force, its rays
can also be quite harmful to the skin. In this instance, dark skin is an
advantage. As early hominids became more sapien and less hairy,
their skin became darker as the melanocytes produced extra melanin
that blocked the ultraviolet rays of the sun, protecting these First
People from their harmful effects. But between 50,000 and 30,000
years ago one of several migrations out of Africa into Europe
occurred. 107 In the colder climate, where the sun rays were directed
at an angle and therefore not as intense, dark skin was no longer nec-
essary. It was, in fact, in this situation, a disadvantage. The sun's rays
are needed for the photosynthesis of vitamin D, which allows the cal-
cium in food to be used by the body. In low sunlight highly melanated
skin acted to prevent the body from converting vitamin DI and D2 to
its active form of D3 and D4. 108 As a result these early African immi-
grants into Europe developed soft bones or rickets characterized by
curvature of the bones. The cold climate made it worse, since thick
animal furs had to be worn, which further blocked the sun. As a result
over a period of 20,000 years, the skin color of these "Africans" light-
t•ncd as they became "Caucasians" through selection (of mutants);
more physically adapted/suited to their new environment. Those
with darker skin had less chance for survival. With less melanin
greater amounts of the energy from the scarce sunlight could be
11bsorbed. Later they began to get vitamin D from other sources such
11sfish oils.
Even from the little that we now know about melanin, we can
nss11mcthat there were other side effects as well, for melanin does
1101011lydfr('I lite• ski11. ht King's view, with less melanit1 we could
1·xp1·rt ,u, nyPr-all lnwc•r I 'VC:'Iof 11ervous systl-'lll intc>gration, lt.:ss
,wllvllv ol llw pli1e•1II~11111<1, .ital tlwn•fm<' f.(n•alt•r h1sli\l1('<' of pi1wal
< ,llt 1111 1111
,111011 ' 'l'ltl•,, (11tw11, 111l~lit1111111
.11·1·1•s1, 111 rlf-!ld hrali1 f11111
470 YURUGU
tions associated with the pineal gland (see Chap. l); e.g., the devel-
opment of intuitiveness, holistic, or "global" thinking, the ability to
synthesize mentally, and the ability to comprehend spiritual truths. 110
The comparative lack of melanin in the melanocytes (for all human
beings must produce melanin contrary to Welsing's implications)
would render them less capable of understanding their emotional
life. In King's view, this, in combination with the demands of harsh
environmental conditions caused the intensification of left-brain func-
tions, which are cause and effect oriented, and it cut off the uncon-
scious as a source of knowledge. This would account for a materialist
world-view, the emphasis on technology, and an inability to get
beyond lineal concepts. It would also account for intensely destruc-
tive behaviors on a cultural level stemming from the need for control,
power, and aggressiveness. For King, melanin and the pineal gland are
the keys to a deeper spiritual consciousness on which level human
beings can integrate their understanding/knowledge to reach meta-
physical truths that unlock the doors of the dark unconscious, bring-
ing with it an emotional, and psychological sense of security: a
oneness with self, an inner peace.
These immigrants, whom King comes to regard as "European-
Africans, "* because they were cut off from this inner and deeper real-
ity, developed a fear of it. They had been traumatized by their ice-age
experience. To a severe degree, they developed what King calls "post-
traumatic stress syndrome." 111 The fear of their unconscious, ances-
tral selves manifested as a fear of others (c.f. Diop's xenophobia).
Edward Hall says that others are experienced as the uncontrollable
part of ourselves. 112 This would make sense if we particularize it as
being true of Europeans. The others in this case, were/are more
deeply pigmented, depending on the areas of the world from which
they migrated in Africa. Ultimately for King, Africans-their "moth-
ers," "parents," their source-become the most feared "other." They
feared that which they were incapable of knowing, which came Lo
represent to them the sensation of a loss of control, of chaos, and dis-
order. For spiritual reality becomes overwhelming if one loses on ''s
connection to it. Simultaneously, it could be argued, the need to con-
trol became a pathological need. It gave birth to a cultural style, a ..
world-view, a civilization, and a pattern of bizarre behavior Lowards
others. Once set in motion this pattern of behavior (uto111aro/10)
1•11llrc·l'lvlll1.,1ll!lll ,110111111111(•11pp11•-;1,l0111111«11•xplulli1tlo11
01111;\jlll
Behavior Toward Others 473
ity peoples. One of the most significant facts about these theories is
that they are offered at all. What is in keeping with the European cul-
tural asili is that the ideology of its academia, its political liberals, dic-
tates the terms for such discussion. The issue of the peculiar nature
of European behavior is so threatening to the integrity of the culture,
as it now exists, that they cannot allow this question to be asked; at
least not in the proper form.
If we call European behavior towards others "racism"-and such
behavior appears to be characteristic of a culture created by
Caucasians, who represent a small minority of the world's people,
then obviously our intelligence forces the question-why? What is
the connection? Yet in Euro-American social and academic institu-
tions that question is never addressed in the ways we have seen it
addressed in the above discussion. Rather a new area of discourse is
created called "race relations," which implies first of all that all
"races" are equally involved in the "problem" of conflict. In addition,
the concern is very pragmatic, quite materialistic in fact. "How can
we minimize conflict in the work place or other social situations by
understanding our 'differences' and attitudes towards one another?"
"Differences" apply to all of those groups that may be brought into
contact in an urban situation; Africans, Asians, Latinos, Europeans,
etc. In other words, even the reactions of "non-Europeans" to white
racism become part of the "problem," with the eventual result taking
the focus away from the real problem-the European. Anyone who
euters this discussion with honesty-Le., placing Europeans firmly in
the spotlight where they belong, focusing on their behavior towards
others as the pathology that has set the syndrome in motion-that
person, by some ingenious double-think reversal (the familiar pattern
of European ideology) is called "a racist!" But we know what the real-
11y is and it is not so much a question, in this instance, of which the-
mist is "right," but of their courage and ability to ask the right
question. It matters little, after all, if the discussion is uncomfortable
ft ,r E11ropeans. Certainly we Africans are mandated by ancestral char-
h·r to seek answers to the question of European difference.
Ota Benga, the African pygmy, is to stay at the Zoological Park a few
days longer. This was decided at a conference between Director
Hornaday and the committee of Baptist clergy men appointed by
the Colored Baptist Minister's Conference, to save Benga from
appearing on exhibition in a monkey cage, and if possible, also to
get the custody of him. The length of time he is still to remain an
inmate of the primate house in the park is dependent on Dr.
Verner's return from North Carolina. As soon as he returns he,
Director Hornaday and the Rev. Hames II Gordon, the Chairman of
the Committee, will have another conference. The clergymen will
then try through Mr. Gordon to get possession of Benga, so that
they may send him to Lynchburg, Va. to be educated .... Director
Hornaday ... is not willing to give him into the hands of the clergy
men without an agreement that he will be delivered to Dr. Verner
r1gainwhen he wants him.
New York Age, September 20, 1906
This is the impressive power of the reflective thinker: His act of think-
ing about an object alone gives him the ability to render it motion-
less-powerless. It must "sit still" for his circumspection; i.e., his
theoretical consumption. The cultural other becomes the total
"object" of European thought. She is the most fitting object of study.
She is otherwise meaningless.
The "isms" of European ideology combine into one idea system
that cloaks the sentiments of European cultural imperialism in a syn-
tactical maze of universalistic terminology and logic. Each component
of the system is dependent on a conception of the cultural other as
the embodiment of the negation of value; for each provides the ide-
ological function of supporting the European self-image as the uni-
versal "agent of change," the "doer," the personification of
intelligence, and the "inheritor of the earth."
What follows is an equation of European collective behavior
towards the "Cultural Other":
tion with the cultural other, or a desire to make her into a European.
They all translate into the idea of "control." They symbolize, primar-
ily and essentially, a power relationship in which Europeans are
supreme. Each ideological component contributes to the support of
European imperialism and expansionism, because each ideologically
supports the objective of power over others and attempts to trans-
form European choices into inevitably and humanly desirable uni-
versals. The difference between the militarists and the missionary is
only one of modus operandi; the blows of one are more physically
apparent; those of the other leave battered souls and cultures in their
wake.
Each ideological component contributes to the creation of an
image of those who are different from the Europeans, which generates
a conception that encourages the style of behavior that has charac-
terized the European's relationship to majority peoples. This con-
ception is that of the cultural other; i.e., a being who is justifiably the
object of missionizing, or of scientific consumption and manipula-
tion, or of mass brutality. In either case, the cultural other is "grist for
the mill"; she is material to be used; she is expendable. This web of
interlocking ideological systems is the vehicle by which meaning is
injected into European life. What they accomplish is the devaluation
of people outside the culture. The essential characteristic of the con-
ception of the cultural other, however, is not merely that she is worth
less than a European-but that she is worth nothing. The cultural
other is a being who lacks meaning, whose existence has no human
significance in terms of the European utamawazo. The cultural other
has significance only syntactically as a concept that assures
Europeans of value in their own terms; therefore as a concept on
which the utamaroho thrives and as a concrete object on which
Europeans existentially act out their most destructive instincts.
who sees himself as having a "special charter to occupy the earth." 120
The cultural other is excluded from this category.
Christianism, progressivism and evolutionism, which have ide-
ologically contributed to the dehumanization (devaluation) of the
cultural other, are for the European mind logically supported by an
utamawazo characterized by a lineal conception of time and motion.
It "makes sense" that cultures and peoples must relate "lineally" if
they are conceived to relate at all, and it is a simple conceptual step
to turn the line vertically into the hierarchy of progressivism. The nor-
mative Platonic abstraction provides the epistemological support for
the universalism so essential to the presuppositions of the ideas of
progress and of unilinear evolution. There is no truth but immutable,
nonrelative truth. There is no good but universal good. To be in pos-
session of truth is to know what is universally good for humankind.
Everything must come to be, or at least be judged in terms of, what
"we" are. The European utamawazo provides the conceptual frame-
work in which these "isms" become acceptable.
It is the epistemological tool of "objectification" that perhaps has
Ihe most critical implications for the nature of European culture and
behavior towards others. The mind is trained to objectify. The person
liclieves that by disengaging herself from the phenomenon she wishes
In understand, she comes to "know" it; it becomes an object of her
lwowledge. She therefore attempts fo transform all phenonema into
1•ltlwrtotal "matter" or pure mathematical symbol. She despiritualizes
II. But let us suppose that Plato was essentially mistaken; a good math-
1•111atldanbut a weak humanist (social theorist). If human intelligence
tr-uot limited to rationality as defined in terms of order and control
( power), but rather is revealed in spirituality that may include but
, 1•1tainly transcends rational order, then the European utamawazo
d111•snot equip Europeans to deal successfully with the "human" in
IIH•mselves or with other human beings. Instead, it enables them to
11hj<'clifytheir experiences with and behavior towards, other people.
1'111· more remote such people are from their own culture (from
I 111 oJ>t'), the more they become "objects" only, for the greater is the
l.111111wc.u1's abi.lity to eliminate emotional reaction to his interaction
wll!J tllem. The c11ltural other is at the end of the spectrum; she
I 11•tOllll'S the total object. The outrages of European imperialistic
I 11•1,,,vlor 11r<•tult urally "possible" because their object is the cultural
111 I w, with whom Et1ropca11sfeel no cmotlonal iclE>nlification.
In 1,nv<'l's l111rrrwrtntlon, E111 npenn cull Ufl' is "packaged" or pn•
11•11ltd to Its 1111•1111>1•1 s ,1s ,, st•rlt•s ul ul>strn<'llons, and hl't'I\WH' lllt'y
1 I 1,11,11'111 11-.1Ii ally d11110\ ,tllow 1111•111s1•IVI'~I II clt•ll I wll l 1 1•1)111'11 1!c· pl w
482 YURUGU
IDEOLOGY
"People headed after the setting sun, in that direc-
tion even the possibility of regeneration is dead.
There the devotees of death take life, consume it,
exhaust every living thing. Then they move on, for-
ever seeking new boundaries. "
-Ayi Kwei Armah
Chapter 9
Progress as Ideology
Whose "Progress?"
The "idea of progress" as it is euphemistically referred to by
Europeans provides an essential dynamic of the main thrust of
European ideology. The idea is a fundamental aspect of the European
philosophy of life, providing moral justification for the technical order
and giving supposed direction to the strivings of individuals within
Ihe society. An exploration of the nature of this concept in terms of
its profound cultural/ideological implications reveals that its effects
have been powerful, though most often subtle, and have spread to
other cultures. The idea of progress has been a potent tool in
European hands. It has contributed to the formation of the social
organization by providing the ideological substratum out of which the
oppressive technical order was created. This technical order in which
l 11<'European is imprisoned leads inevitably to the current ecologi-
l'Hl Imbalance, thereby linking the European condition ethnologically
( ideologically) to the "idea of progress."
Approaching this discussion armed with the concept of asili will
,1ll11w us to discover the ideological connections that exist between the
11fofl1r1111azo(thought) and the uniqueness of the European technical
111tier. Even the most critical of contemporary works generally iden-
1lly I hP intensity of the technological mania with something called
"111wl1:rnlty." This merely reveals the progress philosophy to be a part
ol I lwlr pcrspcclivrs. The advantage of the asili concept is that it
In, 1TH uti to he.:spt·\.·lfi1~,I.e., lo den1011stralc the n•lationship bctwee11
l'.111op1•1111ld1•nlo~y 11mltit(' E111t,pt:U11 lt•t·llnt't·nl ortlt'r, lliurc•by pilrtk
11111, IPIIOI I .ItI!>t "~ "111
l I , ,,, ,1 1·11lt 111, ii pl 11•11011
I1111)! nl(ll '"'•" , 111;111al>•,l,:11
490 YURUGU
Plato's sense of drift had expressed itself in his theory that all
change, at least in certain cosmic periods, must be for tile wona·;
all change is degeneration. Aristotle's theory arl111itsof rhnngcs
which arc improyen1ents; this change may b<' progn'ss. Plato IMt~
ta11)1.hlllul all riPvt•lop111t'11I slarls frrnn lllt' ot!i~lilill,llt1• p1·rf1•1l
Fnr111,11 1111•,,,
s11 tll.11 tltt· dl'v1•lopl11v.1111111( lt1sf' 11,,p1•1l1•c1l1111
11111•,I
1t11111' 111wt,tf'I,ti,; ,,11,t1I,1111v
11«'1{11•1• 111111
.
.. ,,rtgl11,IIr1,,,11., ., ... "
Progress as Ideology 493
The trick is that the perfect form exists only as "idea." If one's
interpretation of Plato emphasizes the concrete social and cultural
implications of his theories for human organization, then it becomes
clear that all actual development in the sensate "world of becoming"
may properly start from a conceptualized perfection, but certainly
not with the "perfect state." Actual movement is, therefore, not away
from, but toward the "ideal." If the Ideal could be actualized, then,
once this had occurred, all change would, indeed, be for the worse.
But such, for Plato, is a contradiction in terms.
Joel Kovel says that the "practical genius" of Protestantism and
of the West in general "was to discover that the more remote a
desired goal, the more passionately a man would seek it." 7 I would
insert European before the generic term "man." This is one of the
cultural/behavioral functions of the Christ image, in its European
interpretation, in relation to a diety conceived as "pure spirit." He is
the "human" who is not human. The more than "human being" who
only incidentally, and very briefly, took human form. This image calls
for the emulation of that which is "superhuman" and therefore unre-
alizable by humans. As Kovel says, "All that 'counted' was Movement,
striving for an endless goal that became ever more remote precisely
through the process of striving." 8 One never reaches "progress"; one
makes "progress," and in the European view, there is always more of
it to be made. This supports the ego that must extend its domain
indefinitely; the utamaroho that manifests an insatiable "will-to-
power." It developed out of the asili that demanded it.
We have said that the European self-image requires an "inferior"
to which it relates as "superior." The idea of progress helps to explain
to Europeans in what way they are superior. They believe, and are
able to make others believe, that since they represent the most "pro-
gressive" force at any given moment, they are most human, therefore
best; others in the world represent varying degrees of inferiority.
This characteristic of the European utamaroho is already observable
in archaic Europe. In comparing the Romans with other peoples,
Aristides claimed not only that they are greater than their contem-
poraries but that they are greater than anything which preceded
t IJem. "Hence the inferiority of those who lived in former times
appears because the past is so much surpassed, not only in the ele-
ment at the head of the empire, but also in cases where identical
grnttps have hccn ruled hy others and by you lRome]."!1
Whlll:! a 1rnrtk11lal' kine!of "lmprov<•ment" may be es~ent ial to tl1C'
ol p1ogn•s:1,t•lll11olo~lc·ally,1111,,,
1111·11 IIIs nf tl1<'·l•:ur11pt•a1111/<1111uro/10,
HII c•q1111lly ,14p1•1I 111llw hl1•11I:, 11H',1 ,sw11ptlo11 1l1.111111·
1,lg11'lw,111t
494 YURUGU
present is properly better than and superior to the past. The way the
idea is put firmly into the service of European cultural imperialism is
that the superior "present" becomes something more than merely
what is occurring (or exists) now. What is "progressive" or "modern"
is the proper form or model for what ought to exist in the present.
Therefore, existent forms that do not conform to the "progressive"
(modern or European) model are not part of the "present"-they are
"outdated" and "backward." In this way, the culture, in the vernacu-
lar of European cultural nationalism, is made to be superior not only
to what precedes it-as does its own past-but also to coexistent
"unprogressive" cultures. In other words, the idea of progress pro-
vides a scale on which to weigh and by which to compare people via
their cultures (their group creations).
The European utamaroho requires a self-image of not merely
superiority but supremacy, and the "idea of progress" makes
Europeans supreme among humans. It is superiority placed into the
dimension of lineal time and then the logic of lineal time placed into
a timeless dimension. Without the idea and this conceptual sleight of
hand, cultures would merely be different; European culture would
merely be intensely and obsessively rational; with the assumption of
the idea of progress Europe becomes "better." In the ways indicated,
then, the idea of progress supports the expansionism and supremism
inherent in the European utamaroho.
J. B. Bury's description of this idea firmly supports the point
being made. He discusses the way in which certain ideas prevalent
in and before the Middle Ages set the stage for and were conducive
to the emergence of the idea of progress, even though the ascen-
dency of the idea could not be complete until the "idea of
Providence," which characterized the Middle Ages, lost hold. Bury
demonstrates how the idea of progress supports the European uta-
maroho; the way it functions in a similar manner to the rhetorical
Christian ethic; and its compatibility with European imperialist ide-
ology. Using an interpretation based on the concept of asili, his obser-
vations provide evidence of the meaning and uses of "universalism"
and the objective of a "world order" in the context of European cul-
tural imperialism. (See Chap. 10.) For Bury the conception of tlw .i..
"whole inhabited world as unity and totality,'' like the "imperial t·he•
ory of Rome," are themselves signs of progress and essential lngn·
clients or what later crystallized as tbe "idea of progress." Using I lw
c01wept of osi/i, and an i\frlcnn-c<'nlcred IJ<•rsp1.:ctiv1·,
tlwy ar<· sll{11H
of s11111ctliln~ 1·ls1•.
If Wt' 11',I' 1111•
('l)ll( !'pl qf ""'' Ill lttl1•1 pr-t•IIIH .ti ltl1•,1•·
"l'I 111111•11!1
Progress as Ideology 495
cultures differ from one another .. .in the kind of development they
have realized. This does not mean that any culture .. .is... incapable
of realizing or achieving the same degree of development as any
other culture, but merely that most cultures have not had the same
or similar opportunities to do so, and largely for that reason differ
culturally from one another. 13
acts to encourage the use of the term "modern." "Modern" is, indeed,
so much identified with "Western" that it is difficult to see how it can
be useful as a tool of analysis or description. In so far as it means any-
thing other than "that which presently exists," it has been tied to
European technology and the way of life that accompanies it. Even the
term "contemporary" connotes for Europeans a quality possessed
by the most advanced evolutionary stage and level of progress. The
critique of progress too often identifies "modern man," as the culprit.
The identification of European with "modern," whether "good" or
"bad," leads away from, rather than towards, meaningful alternatives.
Again, it assumes a universal line and the inevitability of European
"progress."
Skolimowski views the momentum of European culture from a
perspective other than that of the "ruling ideology":
(I) We have better medical care. (I) We have destroyed other cultures.
We have eliminated We have either treated
contagious diseases and them as barbarian or savage
altogether cope better with and therefore unimportant, or
illness. we brought them our technology,
thereby disrupting their ways
of life without giving them our
standard of living.
1) We travel faster, we
( 1 (4) We have created unhealthy,
rommunicate faster. if not insane ways of life.
We have more access to We have disengaged the
I hlngs: planes, cars, books, inctlvidual from the variety
t t•c•orcls, reproductions. of interactions with nature and
other people in which he was
ni'lturally engaging in former ways
of 11r.. 20
.502 YURUGU
The confusion between past and present time guarantees that the
past is slowly but continuously contaminated with present as folk-
ways slowly change. The living memory preserves what is neces-
sary for present life. It slowly discards what has become wholly
irrelevant. Yet it prefers to remodel rather than discard. New infor-
mation and new experience are continually grafted on to inherited
models. 27
This idea means that civilization has moved, is moving, and will
move in a desirable direction. But in order to judge that we are
moving in a desirable direction we should have to know precisely
what the destination is. To the minds of most people the desirable
outcome of human development would be a condition of society in
which all the inhabitants would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. 32
By the late nineteenth century, the concept had been largely assim-
ilated to the values of a complex and expanding industrial order.
Progress could now become a slogan to defend the course of tech-
nological innovation and economic rationalization and concentra-
tion.34
An Ideology of Imperialism
It is "progress" in its absolutist definition and ideological func-
tion that explains to Europeans why it is their duty to exploit, con-
quer, and control Africans and others who are different from them.
IL is an ideology of supremacy, a well-constructed mythology of supe-
riority. The point is that the rationale for an oppressive technical
order, the rational ordering of the universe and the endeavor to dom-
l11ate,oppress, and destroy majority peoples, unite in a single ideo-
logical concept, the European ideology of progress.
Long before the idea of progress was part of the language of
l·'.uropean social theory, Christian ideology was providing the justifi-
l'alion for European imperialism and its accompanying white
•aipremism (see Chaps. I and II). Roger Shinn agrees:" ... the idea of
progress is a secularization of the biblical view of history." 36 And
Rltclnhold Niebuhr says of the European Renaissance: "Its concept of
lilslory as a meaningful process, moving towards the realization of
lilglJer and higher possibilities, is derived from Biblical Christian
1 s,·hatology."
37 Christianity and "progress" became bedfellow ide-
Universalism:
The Syntax of Cultural
Imperialism
The Tradition
As Europeans present their culture to the world, they do so con-
sistently in universalistic terms. This representation takes the form
of a relentless command to universalize. It is our purpose to criti-
cally examine the nature of this "universal" that so dominates
European rhetoric, using the concept of asili to demonstrate the way
in which it functions to support and proselytize European ideology.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to call attention to the most
subtle and ideologically effective manifestation of European cultural
Imperialism: the use of the semantics of "universalism" by European
social theorists and "liberal" ideologues. But first let us briefly reca-
pitulate and enumerate some of the ways the "universal" manifests
Itself in those patterns of European culture already discussed.
In terms of the European utamawazo, it is the "Platonic
Abstraction" that represents the universal. It is the nature of the
Platonic "forms" that they represent the "whole" and not the "part."
The struggle towards and search for the universal is, for the
t•:uropeans, a movement towards the ontologically and epistemolog-
Jc;tlly independent. Mircea Eliade has said that it is "sacred space"
I lial becomes the "center of the world" for "religious man" and
llll'rl'l)y orients him in the universe; i.e., creates cosmos from chaos. 2
l·:111opcans, we could say arc essentially "nonreligious." They there-
1011 lwco1nc enn,cshe(I in ..i maze of ontological relativity, lacking a
"1 c•ntn" of snrri,d SfHtl'l' Th· S('rtt('ll for "tile 1inlversal" Is a primary
111111:,1 In IIH'h ,1ttc•111pttut 11•n1·c·
urdt•r, 111l>1•c-rn111•rt·11t1•n•d, and lo
512 YURUGU
t l11·n•1:-011ly 011t• ~!ntl lo olwy h•I It IH' I lw Christ l1111"(;od" of thl' West;
I•·. till• ElllOl)t',\11 lll11lt1t'ILM11i'1ntl1t'ls1111·0111·1•pt11,dly al•u
ro11fo1111:-.
514 YURUGU
Just as pure logical analysis has severed individual thought from its
group situation, so it also separated thought from action. It did this
on the tacit assumption that those inherent connections which
always exist in reality between thought on the one hand, and group
activity on the other, are either insignificant for "correct" thinking
or can be detached from these foundations without any resultant
difficulties. But the fact that one ignores something by no means
puts an end to its existence. Nor can anyone who has not first given
himself wholeheartedly to the exact observation of the wealth of
forms in which men think they decide a priori whether this sever-
ance from the social situation and context of activity is always real-
izable. Nor indeed can it be determined offhand that such a
complete dichotomy is fully desirable precisely in the interest of
objective, factual knowledge. 10
Emile Durkheim
TlH' pmrl·Ss hy wlllrh F,urupNlll mdal sl'lt·11<i' I:, lll,ulc· lo Ill'
tlvt·"·t:. ,1 ptm·•·'-S or st•lf dl'lt1sln11 Its ,Ill l1tt1•1f, 1,l111ply•1p1c-,1tl
"11hj1•1
Universalism: The Syntax of Cultural Imperialism 523
Truth is the property of the national cause .... Truth is that which
hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which
promotes the emergencE' of the nation; it is all that protects the
natives, and ruins the foreigners. 29
Nlnu•r silYfi I lt.ll t I 1c'n11l for African control "can be ... construed
.i:i 11111111d,.. ,trnl>l1•itli'ilni; to j11t;tl1't' nncl thl' i111pla11tatlo11
1Hlvo<·11tll11(
526 YURUGU
Of course, it is, in one sense, the "individual" who fails, but the
µcrspective of the individual is most certainly influenced by her cul-
ture. And while others may come to realize that ideas are culturally
mediated, Nimer must hold fast to the belief that certain epistemo-
logical methodologies ensure "purity" and guarantee that scholar-
ship is not contaminated by group interest. He must similarly avoid
the concrete and stick to the abstractions that merely indicate the
!'>yntax of European argument. His article is a good example of I I
l~uropean cultural imperialism as manifested in the rubric of
European scholarship. The tacit pivotal issues in Nimer's argument
r,111be st·atecl in terms of objectivity (good) vs. subjectivity (bad);
l11<1fviclualism(good) vs. nationalism (bad), where individualism is
lru11lc;:dlylnrnsformcd into universalism. Stanley Diamond, in speak-
Ing ol llw "obJ<>1·tlflrnlion" of n1I1urnl rl'latlvism, hns stnted this
p1m·c•:,:,111tl'v1•1~w: "p.irtklpntlon l11 nll ,·111l111l'~•.•• Is S( lt•11tlfkc1lly
1 d a•: «'lflllVi1h•11I
J11•:tllH to p,11tklp11ll111111111oi1c·
,1.1,iII w1·mov«·Mot111tl
528 YURUGU
Homer said, "Earth common of all," and you have made it come
true. You have measured and recorded the land of the entire civi-
lized world; you have spanned the rivers with all kind of bridges and
hewn highways through the mountains and filled the barren
stretches with posting stations; you have accustomed all areas to
a settled and orderly way of life.35
Aristides does not say it was only through the contact with the
African "Southern Cradle" (Diop) that Rome's nomadic northern
ancestors "settled" and "ordered" themselves. That is partly because
he defines "order" as "Roman control."
It is worthwhile to look at a lengthy passage from J.B. Bury in
which he discusses the idea of the "ecumene" of Alexander and its rela-
tionship to the rationale for the building of the Roman empire. In Bury's
typically Eurocentric description, we see imperial conquest become
"universal brotherhood," imperialists become "saviors," and cultural
aggression become the attempt to unite the human race. But we are in
a position to interpret these behaviors from the vantage point of the
asili concept and therefore to recognize them as expressions of
European universalism: intolerance of difference, the need to control:
In the latter period of Greek history, which began with the con-
quests of Alexander the Great, there had emerged the conception
of the whole inhabited world as a unity and totality, the idea of the
whole human race as one. We may conveniently call it the ecu-
menical idea-the principle of the ecumene or inhabited world, as
opposed to the principle of polis or city. Promoted by the vast
extension of the geographical limits of the Greek world resulting
from Alexander's conquests, and by his policy of breaking down the
barriers between Greek and barbarian, the idea was reflected in
the Stoic doctrine that all men are brothers, and that a man's true
country is not his own particular city but the ecumene. It soon
became familiar, popularised by the most popular of later philoso-
phies of l ~re-ere;a11clj11sl as II hacl been implied in the imperial tlle-
ory nf Rnnw. '1'111•lclt·a nf till' Roman Empire, ilf: theoretical
j11~11fw,,1fo11, Ill' 11co1111n1111
111ff-(l1I Ol'<f•r, llw 1111l1tcatton
of mankind
w111 ld,1•111l11m
111,, ·,111)-!lt· 1111-1
p,1ll11\111oi ~(1111h111 Thi• t1•n11"Worl<I,"
111/m(f,•11,1111111),witl, It 1111111·111111H11•h
ll'lt' ln•,•ly 111•,1w,tlilt11,(
1111111
530 YURUGU
'('I wtt· Is no I uni 1111111 t ltlll fort I wn• I-: nn ",,gnlit;irln11 ldt•nl" h 1 1111•
l·'.llllliH',lll "lltllVl'l'Hlllr,tl, 11111 tw1 "II 11wn·lv l111p11~1•!-l fl Etlt'OIH',lll "Vill'd
532 YURUGU
The ideological rhetoric of the Cold War may continue for some
time; but the main course of world affairs will flow toward urban-
industrial homogeneity, spreading outward from five or six increas-
ingly suave centers of technocratic power .... If things continue on
the course they now follow, it is likely that for those looking back
from a century or so in the future the most prominent feature of our
time will be the global consolidation of the artificial environment,
carrying with it the cultural dominance of western science and the
politics of technocratic elitism. 43
This is no doubt due to the fact that the European, and the
American too, even when he got rid of his superiority complex with
regard to coloured people, cannot abandon his devout attitude to
science, regarded on the one hand as the perogative of his culture
and on the other as an entity outside mankind with a life of its own,
blindly subjecting stars and infusoria alike to its laws, and inevitably
leading to organized happiness. 45
I le•i-..1y1,I 11,11
I Iw ol I1111 1-ildc• ol I!lb I 1•11d1·111 In n•sl:,
y orl){l11111t:s
l11111c• In lt111 , •., : IH Ii 11!1 "dt•1111ll'tll( y ilnd 11•1111111101:ll';tl
p1111(11•:,!,,"
534 YURUGU
which tend to do away with the cultural differences that make human
beings interesting and valuable to one another. 47 Here again we can
use the concept of asili for clarity of analysis and synthesis. The
nature of the European asili is to seek power over other. "Other" is
that which presents itself as threatening because it is not controlled
from the European center. The need to obliterate "difference" issues
from European xenophobia, the same need to maintain difference of
status so that there can be "other" that the self can control. Here we
have the formula for the creation of power. In the European asili, cul-
tural expression and cultural aggression become synonymous.
By focusing on positive or healthy manifestations of the phe-
nomena of culture, alternative possibilities become visible. If the par-
ticular context of the cultural entity is the natural environment in
which human beings learn to value one another, then ultimately tran-
scultural (international) respect can only exist to the extent that par-
ticular cultural philosophies are compatible with the idea of mutual
respect. Nationalism is the love of a people for themselves and their
commitment to their group survival. It is the affirmation of the cul-
tural self. It is what motivates the pockets of resistance to European
oppression. European nationalism, on the other hand, has meant
what Arieli describes as the character of Protestant nationalism; i.e.,
the mandate to universally impose its European ideas. 48 The political
left has traditionally assumed the same invidious distinction between
internationalism and nationalism that is characteristic of European
ideology. This assumption has led to their general distrust of African
nationalism and nationalist ideologies of other majority peoples.
European leftists usually discourage nationalism in these groups
where possible. This stance is itself an expression of the Europca11
utamaroho. Just as it is possible for cultural nationalism to take a
positive form, it is also possible to define internationalism in such n
way that it is not in basic conflict with nationalism. Just as the fani
ily unit is not generally thought of as being opposed to the mainll'
nance of cultural unity, so nationalism and internationalism do n111
have to represent a dichotomy of opposing tendencies. In the Afrlni11
world-view diversity and unity coexist, indeed, are defined in tcnu,
of one another. Diversity is the unfolding of the universal pri11rlpl1•,
while the human intellectual/spiritual mission is the µercepliur1 (JI
the commonness in all things. If the African utamawazo wNc u:wd to
llnderstand the normative relationship of cullural/politlcal l'111111t",,
we wo11lcl r<'a('h very different co11<.:lusio11s
than l·~u101wan tho1wlit
lw~ ltlllgllt us. Tlw followf11g stillt·1111'11l f10111Wflllt• t\l11,tl1,1111pt'H Ip
llv1•ly lcl1•11tlh1"•,011w of 1l11·ltttpllr,1111111~uf 1•:111op1•,1111t1t1•111,1tl1111,d
Universalism: The Syntax of Cultural Imperialism 535
and the free; the gap between the Hellenes and the Barbarians, that
is all other groups; the disparity between a continent rural life and
an expansive mercantile economy tending toward mechanical uni-
formity .... How to turn the new fellowship of the religious mystery
into a fellowship for political mastery: that was the problem of prob-
lems .... Plato never conceived that transformation. 50
Politically the new Roman order accomplished in time what the indi-
vidual polis had never been able to do: it unified the peoples of this
world and brought them the boon of peace and orderly administra-
tion .... But this unification was superimposed and therefore
onesided: not a partnership of equals but a system of patrol. ... With
all Rome's generous show of law, justice, order, the underlying eco-
11orn!cfact was pillage and extortion, and the cornerstone of the
whole system was hurnan slaveryP
l11lll,11t•d
Ji:111opc•;111 1111lv«'11-,11I Tltt• ol>Jc•c
occl1•1wn1ilcl h11•vll,11\ly11tt•1111.
538 YURUGU
... when the protestant sense of duty was wedded to a rational col-
lective aim, the result was the creation of a new kind of martyr and
hero: Cromwell at the head of the Parliamentary armies, Milton sac-
rificing his ambitions as a poet to perform the office of political sec-
retary; Livingston bringing the Gospel to the remotest tribes of the
African jungle; John Brown leading the revolt of slaves at Harpers
Ferry; Abraham Lincoln rising to saintly tenderness and charity in
his high-principled conduct of a stern war. Better than these, what
creed can show? 54
the bottom. It is the same scale as the one that places Christianity at
the top, because it is supposedly monotheistic and universal; the
same scale that is used to denounce religion in favor of the "scien-
tific," the same scale by which European forms become the most uni-
versally valid and therefore "progressive." According to this scale,
this means of valuation, the least European is the "lowest." This is tau-
tological, since it is in fact a European scale.
In terms of European humanism, the higher motives are the
more abstract and belong to higher cultures. The "better" and more
"moral" interests are the more "universal." Self-interested action rep-
resents lower morality. This is the logic of European humanist
rhetoric, it does not matter that this obviously does not describe
European motivation. In these terms, commitment to or sentiment for
one's concrete surroundings represents a low degree of develop-
ment. R. S. Rattray typifies this view in his description of the Asante
of West Africa:
It has been pointed out that the more abstract the conceptual-
ization, the greater the difference between verbalized moral "atti-
tudes" and concrete acts. Stanley Diamond demonstrates this
distinction between verbalized abstraction and concrete behavior as
manifested in the morality of European and majority cultures, respec-
tively, in the following quote:
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet
murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one
of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. For centuries
they have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-
called spiritual experience. Look at them today swaying between
atomic and spiritual disintegration .
111.,t"M,11xl<.111, 1111•
du111h11111Ilw 111tliHt ll1t• < 1lll1p11· ol 1':tpllalls111 li,1:1
550 YURUGU
I
I
It was not always so. The desert was made the
desert, turned barren by a people whose spirit is
itself the seed of death. Each single one of them is a
carrier of destruction. The spirit of their coming
together, the purpose of their existence, is the
spread of death over all the earth. An insatiable
urge drives them.
- Ayi Kwei Armah
Conclusion
Vurugu,
The Incomplete Being
What It All Means
The concept of asili has been used throughout this study in the
search for pattern, consistency, and logos. It is a concept that seeks
to identify the germinating principle of the culture and to explain its
forms in terms of their ideological source. The concept of asili helps
us to understand that the distinctive character of Europeaness lies
precisely in Europe's resistance to exotic ideas or the ability to incor-
porate them in such a way that the asili is reinforced. The scattered
disssonant voices of the European tradition are made ineffective
through the power of the asili, itself power-seeking.
Europe and its diaspora emerges, then, as a monolith; as formi-
dable, persistent, and unidirectional. Its culture has the driving force
of a machine. The cultural scientist must ask: How does this machine
function? Why is it so successful in achieving its objective? Wherein
lies its uniqueness? (Other cultures have at times exhibited aggres-
sion, intense technological orientation, imperialistic behavior, and
other characteristics associated with European development, but
they have_,wvcr lwcn as successful in these pursuits as Europeans
have coll<'rlivt•ly. Tlwsc 1l'ndc>1Kicsnever combined or sustained
1ht•111s<•lvc•s ;\s tl11•yhav<· in llH' Wc•st.)1Tlw a11SWNS
ll101111•11·11111111·s
w,1v111wliti·II 1111•drn11l11,111t1111Hlt•sof till' <·11111111·
1.iywlllll111111' ,·0111
556 YURUGU
bine; the way in which they interrelate with and reinforce one
another. This synogistic effect, in turn, has as its source the ideolog-
ical premise of the culture, i.e., the logos of its asili. Having used this
concept to facilitate our study, we conclude that the success of
European culture depends on the symphonic meshing of its dominant
modalities around the theme of power.
Utamaroho in Disequilibrium
The immortal gods have willed the Roman to rule all nations.
Cicero: Phillipics: 333
Utamaroho (the energy source of the culture) is the force t llnl
determines collective behavior. It manifests as the collective affectlw
being (personality) of the members of the culture, tending to sl;111
dardize their tastes and behaviors. It is the vital quality of the cult 1111•
and is uniquely defined according to the needs or the osi/i, wllh'll II
helps to fulfill. The phenomenon of th<' EurnpeHn 111011,wofw dt•rn,11uI•,
c•tl1110lof(l1·nl nttent1011. OtH'<'its (•ss<'lllid cl1t.r,1( ll'r b 1111cl1·1stn11d,It
ll1•1·11111t"• 1d111lvt•ly1•11-;y to "1n,1lwM'tlst•" of llll• pntt1·111of l-:11111111•,111
Conclusion 561
Power as Logos
This concept of power, then, born out of the nature of the
European utamaroho, becomes the pivotal term in European ethnol-
ogy; i.e., the nature of its center, its asili. The chronic disharmony and
imbalance of the utamaroho perverts spirit into lust. As emotional
security is sought via material control, the need for fulfillment
becomes the ceaseless will-to-power; i.e., the self-realization of the
asili. The nature of the utamaroho is itself the guaranteed source of
continued energy to be put at the service of the European quest for
greater and greater power. And this power-drive becomes the
"premise" of the culture-that fundamental aspect on which all oth-
ers depend. It is the European asili. All European forms cohere in its
dominant ideology. It has been the objective of this entire discussion
to demonstrate the historical and synchronic depth and pervasive-
ness of this iclcolngiral force, which the concept of asili has enabled
us to rcc-og11i1.t·. wit ll the prernise of the need for power as
l\<'~i11ni111,t
It l1Rs IH•1·111h mudc'.sof t•xprcssions orE11rop<'an
1 fi1wct,tilt• t11u11i11i111t
European humanism:
This Is nationalistic insofar as it tends to promote E111op1•,111
forms, I he European utamcrwazo,a scient Ifie-rat lrnrnl vl<•w nf I111
lHllllilH. lht• 111ythology nf F.11ropt·a11 1;11t'\IN'l1mls11111•ilrnlly,H11d
°'''I wrtkl,il l1111'n·1111·111
all:,111.
Conclusion 569
Liberal ideology:
This is characterized by a deemphasis of European limitations
and deficiencies, by the attempt to place them on a nonideological
level, as well as the attempt to co-opt critical thought (that is, to make
it ineffective). This acts to maintain the culture with the same ideo-
logical commitment and in the same power position vis-a-vis other
cultures.
The mind that knows this, the destroyers will set traps for it,
but the destroyers' traps will never hold that mind.
The group that knows this and works knowing this,
that group itself is a work of beauty, creation's work. 13
The image of the West with which the world has been bom-
barded is one that has served the purposes of continued European
political and cultural/ideological domination. European cultural
imperialism has done a formidable job. Since Plato the intellectual
energies of Europeans have been devoted to convincing themselves
and others of their superiority. As a result, the European tradition
is a bastion of propaganda, and those who do not share European
commitments have been forced to occupy themselves with denying
the validity of this portrait; i.e., with refuting its inherent arguments
and with offering a different view of the meaning of European devel-
opment.
But in this endeavor there is a danger of becoming "possessed"
ourselves by the very definitions that we have denied. Now that we
have broken the power of their ideology, we must leave them and
direct our energies toward the recreation of cultural alternatives
informed by ancestral visions of a future that celebrates our
Africaness and encourages the best of the human spirit. Each of the
cultures historically victimized by Europe must reclaim its own
image. As for those of us who are African, our salvation (redemption)
lies in our ancientness and connectedness; not in a romanticized glo
rification of the past, but in a return to the center in which all con-
tradictions are resolved and from which the spiral of development
can continue with clarity. From the center, ikons can be retrieved in
our image that will allow us to tap the energy of the collective con
scious will of our people.
Introduction
1. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, Nok Publishers, Lagos, 1978,p. xiv;
Carter G. Woodson, The Mis-Education of The Negro, AMS Press, New
York, 1977.
2. Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie, and lhechukwu Madubuike, Toward the
Decolonization of African literature, Vol. I, Howard University Press,
Washington, D.C., 1983; Iva Carruthers, "War on African Familyhood," in
Sturdy Black Bridges, Roseann Bell, Betty Parker, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall
(eds.), Anchor Press, Garden City, N.J., 1979.
3. Kathleen Gough, "Anthropology and Imperialism," in Monthly Review, April
1968, pp. 12-23.
4. Dona Marimba Richards, "From Anthropology to African-centered Cultural
Science," unpublished paper. New York, 1984.
5. Wade Nobles, Africanity and the Black Family, Black Family Institute
Publications, Oakland, Ca., 1985, p. 103.
6. Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force: African Heritage in Afro-American Religion,
Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1974, p. 6.
7. Willie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p. 27.
8. Raymond Betts, (ed.) The Ideology of Blackness, D.C. Heath and Company,
Lexington, Mass., 1971, p. v.
9. Barrett, p. 6.
10. Morris Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," in American Joumal
of Sociology, Vol. 51, 1945, p. 98.
11. Robin Williams, American Society, 3rd ed., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970,
p. 22.
12. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, Anchor Press, Garden City, N.J., 1976, p. 42.
13. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York, 1979.
14. Wade Nobles, "Alrican Consciousness and liberation Struggles:
Implications (or the Development and Construction of Scientific
l'aracligms, l'Mt I," Jnumal of /J/ucl<Studies, Vol. I, November 3, 1985,San
Fr.indsco St.11!·IJ111v1•r<illv, Blark Studies Department.
I:>. l lu11lt•r i\cl,1111!., ":-it,,,t,•gh••·'l'nw:irtl the Rl'('OVl'ry ol Meta-Conscious Alriran
1'11111wl1t ill N(•W York. (i .lurw I !)87; Mol<.•lrKt'l('
," (t•t I111,. Ht ( 'It V ( '11lleov,1·
/\•,111t1, \1111,,•11111,1/1• II,,· J/11•111v11/','11,/11/f'l111mw,11·v l'<l,Alrl1·11Wwltl
!'11 11, I 11•1111111 1'1/ll,, "' p11ltlt11h1•tl1!11{11.
572 YURUGU
16. Robert Armstrong, Wellspring: On the Myth and Source of Culture, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 94.
17. Ibid, p. 96.
18. Professor Ibrahim Sherif (African Studies, Rutgers University) and
Professor Jaffer Kassimali (African and Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter
College) have helped me with the construction of these terms.
19. Gregory Bateson, Nauen, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958, p. 25.
20. Ibid, p. 220.
21. Ibid, p. 115.
22. Ibid, p. 311.
23. Ibid, p. 212.
24. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1976, p. 439.
25. Nobles, pp. 104-105.
26. M. Karenga, Kawaida Theory, Kawaida Publications, Inglewood, N.J., 1980,
p. 90.
27. Eli Sagan, The Lust to Annihilate: A Psychoanalytical Study of Violence in
Ancient Greek Culture, Psychohistory Press, New York, 1985; Joel Kovel,
White Racism: A Psychohistory, Vintage, New York, 1971.
28. Norman Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. I, Scott,
Foresman, Atlanta, 1969, p. 3.
29. Ibid, p. 4.
30. Ibid, p. 5.
31. Ibid, p. 8.
32. Quoted in George 0. Adams, "The Idea of Civilization," in Civilization,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 45.
33. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. I, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1928, p. 3.
34. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, rev. ed.,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, p. 13.
35. Stanley Diamond, Search for the Primitive, Transaction Press, New
Brunswick, N.J., 1974, p. 118.
36. Dona Marimba Richards, "Toward the Demystification of Objectivity," in
Imhotep, Journal of Afrocentric Thought, Vol. I, No. 1, Department of
African American Studies, Temple University, 1989.
37. Nobles, p. 104.
38. Asante, Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change, Africa World Press,
Trenton, 1986.
39. Ibid.
Notes 573
Chapter 1 - Utamawazo:
The Cultural Structuring of Thought
1. Plato, Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.I, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Random House, New York, 1937, p. 10; George James, Stolen Legacy,
Julian Richardson, San Franscisco, 1976; Theophile Obenga, "African
Philosophy of the Pharoanic Period," in Egypt Revisited, 2nd ed., Ivan Van
Sertima (ed.), Transaction, New Brunswick, 1989.
2. Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1967, p. 200.
3. Ibid, p. 236.
4. Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics, Bantam Books, New York, 1977, p. 9.
5. Plato, The Republic, Bk. IV:431,The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, trans. Benjamin
Jowett, Random House, New York, 1937.
6. Paul Goodman, "Polarities and Wholeness: Gestalt Critique of 'Mind,' 'Body,'
'External World,"' in Sources, Theodore Roszak (ed.), Harper and Row,
New York, 1972.
7. Iva Carruthers, "Africanity and the Black Woman," in Black Books Bulletin,
1980, Vol. VI, No. 4.
8. Robert Armstrong, Wellspring: On the Myth and Source of Culture, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 115.
9. Ibid, p. 116.
10. Ibid, p. 117.
11. Page duBois, Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-history of the Great
Chain of Being, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1982, p. 16.
12. Vernon Dixon, "World Views and Research Methodolgy," in African
Philosophy, Lewis King, Vernon Dixon, and Wade Nobles (eds.), Fanon
Center Publications, Los Angeles, 1976.
13. duBois, p. 2.
14. Dixon.
15. duBois, p. 5.
16. duBois, p. 9.
17. Stanley Diamond, Search for the Primitive, Transaction Press, New
Brunswick, N.J., 1974, p. 183.
18. Frances Cress Welsing, The Isis Papers: The Keys to the Colors, Third World
Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 1-14.
19.Havelock, Ch. 11.
:W.Dixon, p. 55.
21. Havelock, p. 22:{.
:a. Thcoclorc.l<oszak, Wlw,v Ille• Wastetnnd J:.'nds,Doubleday, New York, 1972,
p, 68,
r1 1'11110,n11•11/1
1
/11.~,11111111 I 1111111111),
I 1.1111111 '1'111• Art!!l1rc•~11,Ni•w Yrnk,
I.IIJ1•111I
Ill ,11,JI. II{I
574 YURUGU
I'1',(,,'p •I
Notes 575
90. Francis Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978.
91. Diamond, p. 193.
92. Ibid, p. 194.
93. Alvin Gouldner, Enter Plato, Basic Books, New York, 1965.
94. Lewis Richards, Ancient Greek Literature in Translation, Vol. II, Chicago,
1986, p. 372.
95. Ibid, p. 64.
96. Gouldner, p. 190.
97. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press.
Cambridge, 1966, p. 12.
98. Ibid, p. 45.
99. Norman Brown, Life Against Death, Wesleyan University Press, Middleton,
Conn., 1959, p. 274.
100. William James, The Writings of William James, John H. McDermott (ed.),
Random House, New York, 1968, pp. 498-500.
101. Ibid, p. 431.
102. Willie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p. 19.
103. B. Edwards, Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain, J.P. Tarcher, Los
Angeles, 1979, p. 29.
104. Hunter Adams, "Strategies. Toward the Recovery of Meta-Conscious
African Thought," lecture at City College of New York, 6 June, 1987.
105. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982, p. 47.
106. Ibid, pp. 59-65.
107. Ibid, p. 66.
108. Ibid, pp. 69, 72, 73.
109. Ibid, pp. 103-104.
110. Ibid p. 93.
111. Ibid, p. 79.
112. Ibid, pp. 104-105.
113. Ibid, pp. 101-103.
114. Ibid p. 221.
115. Ibid, p. 106.
116. Ibid, pp. 439-440.
117. Erich Neumann, "On the Moon and Matriarchal Consciousness," in Fo.tllf'1--.
and Mothers: Five Papers on the Archetypal Background of Family
Psychology, Spring Publications, Zurich, 1973, p. 46.
118. Ibid, p. 48.
119. Hall, p. 191.
120. David Sidney, "The Concept of Meta-Anthropology and its SignIfie amt' 1111
Contemporary Anthropological Science," in Ideological Difference:; (lftr/
World Order, F.S.C.Northrop (ed.), Yale University Pn•ss, Nc·wI h1v1•111
1949, p. 325.
121. Cioulcl11er,p, 191.
1:!2. lhld, p 121
Ii:1 111111,p 'IOh
Notes 577
124. Katherine George, "The Civilized West Looks at Primitive Africa: 140(.)..
1800," in The Concept of the Primitive, Ashley Montagu (ed.), The Free
Press, New York, 1968, pp. 178, 182.
125. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1937, pp. 26-27.
126. Ibid, p. 26.
127. Roszak, Where The Wasteland Ends, p. 164.
128. Ibid, pp. 170, 173.
129. Ibid, p. 168.
130. Ibid, p. 248.
131. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 21.
132. Ibid, p. 327.
133. Ibid, p. 59.
134. Ibid, pp. 183, 63.
135. Ibid, pp. 58-59.
136. Ibid, p. 199.
137. Ibid, p. 187.
138. duBois, p. 13.
139. Niebuhr, p. 14.
140. Abraham, The Mind of Africa, p. 42.
141. Ibid, p. 24.
142. Ibid, pp. 15-16.
143. Ibid, p. 48, pp. 61, 51. •
144. Havelock, Preface to Plato, p. 205.
145. Ibid, p. 197.
146. Plato, Laws, Bk. IX:875C. The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Random House, New York, 1937, p. 620.
147. Lovejoy, p. 324.
148. Ibid, p. 198.
149. Juenger, The Failure of Technology, p. 155.
150. Lovejoy, p. 328.
151. Ibid, p. 329.
152. Ibid, pp. 331-332.
153. Ibid, p. 333.
154. Dixon, "World Views ... " p. 57.
155. Ibid, p. 56.
156. RA. Schwaller De Lubicz, The Sacred Science, Inner Traditions, New York,
1982, p. 9.
157. Ibid, p. 18.
158. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago,
1979, p. 4.
159. Capra, pp. 10-11.
160. lbld, p. 7.
161. lbld, p.9.
162.Ibid, p. H.
10:-1. 1 N,·wYork, 1!!57,p. 102.
Vin~•ll<'lorl,1,(iotl /,, /~1•,/,1)1•lt,1ll11111i
1(1'1lhld, p. 10:1
l(i', lhld, p. I l'i.
578 YURUGU
93. George Dumezil, The Destiny of the Warrior, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1970, pp. 46-47.
94. Ibid, p. 47.
95. Davidson, p. 14.
96. Random House Dictionary, unabridged ed., New York, 1971, p. 655.
97. Ibid, p. 1036.
98. Davidson, p. 14.
99. Mircea Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, Vol. I, trans. Williard R. Trask,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 187.
100. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press.
Chicago, 1979, p. 29.
101. Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, Vol. I, p. 187.
102. Ibid, p. 188.
103. Ibid, pp. 189, 190, 197.
104. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminisl
Theology, Beacon Press, Boston, 1983, p. 53.
105. Ibid, p. 54.
106. Pagels, p. 57.
107. Ibid, p. 59.
108. Ibid, p. 61.
109. Ibid, p. 59.
110. Ibid, p. 68.
lll. lbid, pp. 71-72.
112. Ibid, p. 73.
113. Ibid, p. 75.
114. Ibid, p. 79.
115. Ibid, p. 83.
116. Page duBois, Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-History of the
Great Chain of Being, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1982, p.
136.
117. Ibid, p. 140.
118. Plato, Republic, Bk: 90e-91a, qouted in Page duBois, p. 135.
119. E.I. Allen, Guidebook to Western Thought, English Universities Press,
London, 1957, p. 15.
120. Niebuhr, Vol. I, p. 13.
121. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Chapter XV, London, 1923.
122. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on
Reason, Leibniz: Philosophical Writing, trans. Mary Morris, E.P. Dutton,
New York, 1934, p. 27.
123. Robert Lowie, Primitive Religion, Liveright, New York, 1970. p. xiii.
12'1.William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Longmans, Green and
Company, New York, 1919, p. 4.
125. See Peter Berger, A Rumor of Angels, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1970, p.
:19.
I 2fi Wllll111n.J;1111l1:l,p ti
127 J\r1l1111 "Thi•11C1·t•ptunct<1fChr!i-llaulty was mort> rapid ,111<1
I•:.Jl(JHll•111y•1,
I 0111pll•lf• 11,111"I 111101lh1111thrn11ul11111I tlH· l'(llllltty11t(lr• '1'l11:; 1-(IIVI•rhu• 111
( Ir rn11 t.111l11I '11M11111111,
I h111uu nl ti 11•I 1•111111111e1111 "r 11ml," 1111lw 11e•11~1· 111
582 YURUGU
11. Wade Nobles, "Ancient Egyptian Thought and the Development of African
(Black) Psychology," in Kemet and the African World View, Maulana
Karenga and Jacob Carruthers (eds.), University of Sankore Press, Los
Angeles, 1986, p. 100.
12. Suzuki, p. 40.
13. Abraham, p. 193.
14. Robert Armstrong, Wellspring: On the Myth and Source of Culture, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p. 120.
15. Aziza Gibson-Hunter, personal conversation, 1987.
16. Robert Goldwater, "The Western Experience of Negro Art," in Colloquium
on the Function and Significance of African Negro Art in the Life of African
Culture, Vol 1,Society of African Culture and UNESCO, 1966, p. 342.
17. Ortiz Walton, "A Comparative Analysis of the African and Western
Aesthetic," in The Black Aesthetic, Addison Gayle, Jr. (ed.), Doubleday,
Garden City, N.J., 1972, pp. 154-155.
18. Ibid, p. 156.
19. Weber, pp. 14-15.
20. Walton, "Rationalism and Western Music," in Black World, Vol. XXII,No. 1,
November 1973, p. 55.
21. Walton, "A Comparative Analysis of the African and Western Aesthetic," pp.
159.
22. See Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force, Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1974, p. 83;
Nairn Akbar, "Rhythmic Patterns in African Personality," in African
Philosophy: Paradigms for Research on Black Persons, Lewis King, Vernon
Dixon, and Wade Nobles (eds.), Fanon Center Publications, Los Angeles,
1976; and Kariamu Welsh-Asante, "Rhythm as Text and Structure in
African culture," in The Griot, Fall 1990, on the significance of rhythm in
African cosmology. This point is well made by Joseph Okpaku in New
African Literature, Vol. I, Thomas Crowell, New York, 1970, p. 18.
23. Quoted in Okpaku, p. 18.
24. Carlton Molette, "Afro-American Ritual Drama," in Black World, Vol. XXII,
No. 6,1973, p. 9.
25. Dona Marimba Richards, "The Implications of African American
Spirituality," in African Culture, Molefi Asante and Kariamu Welsh Asante,
(eds.), Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 1985, p. 213.
26. Molette, pp. 10-12; also Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive,
Transaction Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1974, pp. 197-199.
27. Rene Wassing, African Art, Harry N. Abrams, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 5.
28. Armstrong, p. 114.
29. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1921, pp. 229-230.
30. Addison Gayle, Jr., "C11ltural Strangulation: Black Literature and the White
Acsthctir," 111ThP IJ/ocll Aesthetic, Addison Gayle, Jr., (ed.) Doubleday,
Gar<h•11City, NJ, 972. p. 40.
:-11.ll>ld, p. ti I
'.ll. Muafa lriKl'1w,1hlll lcu "1!11•111 I )l•iil'ill'r," This term n•ft-rs lo lhe <•raof llw
1~1110111•1111.. i.,v,•It 1111,111tlIt ,,11;,u 011 i\lrka11 pt•upll·: 11v1•r100 111llll1111
p1•11pl1• 1111,t1111 h llv, 11111111,,11 ,1i..,,.,·,1d11111,Wl'rt• 1111•11
:iy;,lc 111,1111
,illy
584 YURUGU
Supplement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, pp. 18, 19, 23,
24.
25. Kovel, pp. 133, 144, 182.
26. Norman Cantor, Western Civilization: Its Genesis and Destiny, Vol. I, Scott,
Foresman, Atlanta, 1969, p. 4.
27. Philip Curtin, The Image of Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1964, p. 415.
28. Ibid.
29. Kovel, pp. 164-165.
30. Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology,
Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 250-251.
:{I. Aristides, Section 88, pp. 31-32.
32. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1959,
p. 116ff.
33. Aristides pp. 38-39.
34. Curtin, p. 303.
35. Aristides, p. 43.
36. Leon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in
Europe, trans. Edmund Howard, New American Library, New York, 1974,
p. 82.
:H. MacDougall, p. 344.
38. Poliakov, pp. 82-83.
39. Ibid, p. 14.
40. Ibid, p. 15.
41. Ibid, p. 20.
42. Quoted in Poliakov, p. 18.
43. Ibid, p. 18.
44. Quoted in Poliakov, p. 25.
45. Ibid, p. 25.
4G. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press,
Chicago, 1978.
47. MacDougall, p. 11.
48. Ibid, p. 26.
49. Ibid, p. 31.
50. lbld, p. 2.
51. Quoted in MacDougall, p. 44.
52. Ibid, p. 44.
53. Ibid, p. 46.
54. Ibid, p. 49.
55. Ibid, p. 91.
56. Ibid, p. 82.
57. lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Bobbs-Merrill, lndianapol\s,
195G.
58, Quoted in Ma<.:Dougall, p. 92.
S!).!hid, p, 9:t
llO,()11111,•rl
h1 l'ollakov, p 27,
(jJ ()n(lli'tl 111M,ll'lJ011wd1,p, !lH.
I,:.!,ll1ld, p !J!),
Notes 587
6. Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Colour, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1920, pp. 91-92.
7. Ibid, pp. 100-101.
R.Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-History, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 107.
!"J.Merlin Stone, Three Thousand Years of Racism, New Sibylline Books, New
York, 1981, p. 20.
10. Quoted in Vulindlela Wobogo, "Diop's Two Cradle Theory and the Origin of
White Racism," in Black Books Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter, 1976, p. 26.
11. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, Charles Scribner's Sons, New
York, 1921, pp. 53-54.
12. Stoddard, p. 17.
13.Ibid, p. 90.
M. P.W. Botha, "Why We Hate Blacks," in The Shield, the official African
American newspaper of Hunter College. Reprinted from the South
African newspaper, Sunday Times, August 18, 1985, in the by-line of David
G. Maillu, p. 4.
15. Kovel's terms: Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psycho-History, Morningside edi-
tion, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984, p. xi.
16. Ben J. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth, Pharos Books, New York, 1987.
17. Ibid, p. 113.
18. Ibid, p. 115.
19. Ibid, p. 98.
20. Ibid, p. 33.
21. Ibid, p. 89.
22. Ibid, p. 45, Chart 4J.
23. Ibid, p. 67.
24. Ibid, p. 97.
25. Ibid, pp. 97-98.
2G.Ibid, p. 99.
27. Ibid, p. 168.
28. James Pope-Hennesy, Sins of the Father, Capricorn, New York, 1969, p. 47.
29. Quoted in James W. Vander Zanden, "The Ideology of White Supremacy," in
White Racism, Barry N. Schwartz and Robert Disch (ed.), Laurel, New
York, 1970, p. 128.
30. Paul Jacobs,et al., To Serve the Devil, Vol. II, Vintage, New York, 1971, p.176,
footnote.
31. Wayne MacLeod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide Press,
Los Angeles, 1968, p. 73.
32. Ibid, p. 3.
33. Stone, p. 4.
34. Quoted in Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological 11,eory, Thomas Y.
Crowell, New York, 1968, p. 69.
:35. Quot eel in George Stoc-king, Race, Culture and Evolution, The Free Press,
New York, 1968,p. 113.
:1ri C)110Le<I In I larris, p. 87,
:17 llllrl, p. HH
'IH U11t1tt•rl111IM 11.1,"Frnlu•11lui;, St·11l(lt11r1111(1 111Al,h-n," 111,.,,,.,,.\
') lol 11,1,11w
11/ //1w1Hlil,·l{olll11 ,uul Hnth Fhtnt•H•"' (t•dN ), (,',d11•1untl 111h1•1,
!111111111
Notes 58.9
London, 1973, p. 310 from Hegel, Die Philosophie der Gerschichte, Reclam
Vertarg Stuttgart, 1961, p. 155.
39. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Oxford University Press, London,
(1934), 1961.
40. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1966, p. 194.
41. Ibid, p. 88.
42. Ibid, p. 187.
43. Paul Jacobs et al,Yols. I and II.
44. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 13.
45. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 38.
46. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 37.
47. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago, 1979,
p. 3.
48. Cheikh Anta Diop, "Interview," in Black Books Bulletin., Vol. IV, No. 4, 1976,
pp. 30-37.
49. MacLeod, p. 73.
50. Johari Amini, "Re-Definition: Concept as Being," in Black World, 1972,
Vol. XXII,No. 7, p. 6.
51. Ibid, p. 10.
52. James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son, Beacon Paperback, Beacon Hill, 1957,
p. 30.
61. William Strickland, "Watergate: Its Meaning for Black America," in Black
World, Vol. XXlll, No. 2, 1973, p. 9.
62. Eli Sagan, The Lust to Annihilate: A Psychoanalytical Study of Violence in
Ancient Greek Culture, Psychohistory Press, New York, 1979, p. 4.
63. Sagan, p. 3.
64. Ibid, p. 23.
65. Ibid, p. 35.
66. Ibid, p. 36.
67. Ibid, p. 37.
68. lbid, pp. 41-42.
69. Ibid, p. 59.
70. Ibid, p. 60.
71. Ibid, p. 216.
72. Kovel, p. 129.
73. Ibid, p. 167.
74. Alexis Kagame, La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l'Etre, Arsom, Bruxelles,
1956.
75. Williams, p. 493.
76. Theodore Roszak, ed., Introduction to Sources, Harper and Row, Colophon,
New York, 1972, p. xvii.
77. Williams, p. 501.
78. See Kovel, pp. 114-115, for an extended discussion of this point.
79. Ibid p. l 16.
80. Williams, p. 471.
81. Willlie Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p, 34.
82. Ibid, p. 193.
83. Ibid, p. 31.
84. Kovel, p. 158.
85. Williams, p. 465.
86. Ibid, p. 488.
87. Kovel, p. 156.
88. Ibid, pp. 158-159.
89. Ibid, p. 132.
90. Ibid, p. 133.
91. Ibid, p. 130.
92. A.I. Hallowell, "Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View," in PrimiliUP
Views of the World, Stanley Diamond (ed.) Columbia University Press,
New York, 1966, p. 50.
93. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 42.
94. Ibid pp. 45, 48, 52-53.
95. Ibid, p. 54.
96. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner l3ooks, New York, Hl7R,p,
130-131.
~7. Pia tu, Sy111po5iu111 The rnalogues of Plato, Vnl. I, trans., Bc1tjamln .low,·11,
l{a11do111 I louse, N<>wYork, 19~7. p :tM.
~lit 1-:rlw..rll 'I', I ltlll, 11.•yoll(/r11//tll(', i\11rll111'Prc•:,3,u.,,d1•11 ('tty, N I,
1'117 11 1·11
Notes 593
60. Bobby Wright, The Psychopathic Racial Personality and Other Essays, Third
World Press, Chicago, 1985, p. 2.
61. Ibid, p. 7.
62. Ibid, p. 6.
63. Frances Cress Welsing, The Isis Papers: The Keys to the Colors, Third World
Press, Chicago, 1991, p. 4.
64. Ibid, p. 5.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid, p. 6.
67. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
68. Ibid, p. 10.
69. Ibid, p. 12.
70. Ibid.
71. Kovel, p. 49.
72. Ibid, p. 277.
73. Ibid, p. 273.
74. Ibid, p. 284.
75. Ibid, p. 11.
76. Ibid, p. 44.
77. Ibid, p. 47.
78. Ibid, pp. 49-50'.
79. Ibid, p. 9.
80. Ibid, p. 95.
81. Ibid, p. 107.
82. Ibid, p. 108.
83. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey, W. W. Norton,
New York, 1950.
84. Ibid, p. 1.
85. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner Books, New York, 1978,
p. 125.
86. lbld, p. 67.
87. Ibid, p. 122.
88. Ibid, p. 90.
89. Ibid, p. I 09.
90. Cheikh Anta Diop, The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Third World Press,
Chicago, 1978, p. 76.
91. Bradley, p. 123.
92. Ibid, p. 175.
93. Ibid, p. 112.
94. Ibid, p. 14.
95. Ibid, p. 18.
96. Diop quoted in Iva Carruthers, "War on African Familyhood," in Sturdy
Bloch Bridge.~.Roseann Bell, Betty Parker, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall, eds.,
t\11cl1orPress, Garden City, N ..l.,1979, pp. 8-17, see especially p. 10.
97. Diop, p. 167,
DH.lhl<I, p HIS
'.J!IV11ll11dlt•l11
WolH11-to,''I l'wc1 ('111<11'•
'l'hL'()ry nnd I he•Origin nf Wl1ll1•
l<11tl>,111,"111/1/1111, Vril ,1, Nn 11, Wl11ll'r, 1!171i,p ' 11.
/1110/1,/1111/1'///1,
596 YURUGU
Part IV - Ideology
Chapter 9 - Progress as Ideology
l. See Beard's Introduction to J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress. Dover, New York,
1955,p.xxviii.
2. Ibid, p. 11.
3. Theodore Roszak, ed., Sources, Colophon, New York, 1972.
4. E.O. Bassett, "Plato's Theory of Social Progress," in International Journul of
Ethics, xxvm,1927-1928, p. 476.
5. Arthur 0. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in
Antiquity, Octagon Books, New York, 1965, p. 168.
6. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II, 5th ed., Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp. 4-5.
7. Joel Kovel, White Racism: A PsychoHistory, Vintage, New York, 1971, p. 125.
8. Ibid, p. 128.
9. Aristides, "To Rome," in History of Western Civilization: Selected Readings,
Supplement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 40.
10. Charles Beard's Introduction to J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, Dover, New
York, 1955, p. xx.
11. See Wayne Macleod, The Importance of Race in Civilization, Noontide
Press, Los Angeles, 1968.
12. Ashley Montagu, "The Concept of 'Primitive' and Related Anthropological
Terms: A Study in the Systematics of Confusion," in The Concept of the
Primitive, Ashley Montagu (ed.), The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 3-4.
13. Ibid, p. 4.
14. Henryk Skolimowski, "The Scientific World View and the Illusions of
Progress," in Social Research, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1974, p. 53.
15. Skolimowski, pp. 56-57.
16. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
17. Ibid, pp. 70-71.
18. Ibid, p. 72.
19. Ibid, p. 75.
20. Ibid, pp. 77-78.
21. Ibid, p. 82.
22. Michael Bradley, The Iceman Inheritance, Warner Books, New York, 1978,
p. 12.
23. Ibid, p. 18.
24. Ibid, p. 4.
25. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1966, pp. 10-14.
26. William James, The Writings of William James, John J. McDermott. (ed.),
Modern Library, New York, 1968, pp. 498--499.
·n.l".rlc·1lavelock. l'rc,/(lce to Plato, Grossett and Dunlap, New York, 1967, p.
12,
28, 1-'rlPcltle II lt1t•11gi•1, /111h11/11w11/ Ti•cll1wl11w,,I l1•11ryl<(•~11Cry, C'hlcal{o, I 9!'i!i,
PP l'I I()
111 1)(111111,v 1,,,,.,n,,,•t/11111111u//'11/1111, I' 11.,11,
1 , l'11•11lh 1:111t•wrn1d l'IIIIH,NI, 1%'.I,
598 YURUGU
p. 110.
30. Ibid, p. 91.
31. Ibid, p. 94.
32. Bury, p. 2.
33. Ibid, p. 7.
34. Robin Williams, American Society, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 469.
35. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Anti-Christ," The Works of Nietzsche, Vol. XI,
trans. and ed. Alexander Tille, Macmillian, New York, 1924, p. 241.
36. Roger Shinn, "Perilous Progress in Genetics," Social Research, Vol. 41, No. 1,
1974, p. 83.
37. Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, p. 154.
38. For the quintessential critique of Marxist theory and praxis, in relation to
the European and African experiences, see Cedric J. Robinson, Black
Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, Zed Press,
London, 1983.
50. Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1944, p.
31.
51. Ibid, p. 32.
52. Edward Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," in Edward Sapir, Culture,
Language and Personality: Selected Essays, David G. Mandelbaum (ed.),
University of California, Berkeley, 1970, pp. 78-119.
53. Mumford, p. 39.
54. Ibid, p. 200.
55. Ibid, p. 403.
56. Kurt Wolff, "This Is the Time for Radical Anthropology," in Reinventing
Anthropology, Dell Hymes (ed.), Vintage, New York, 1974, p. 101.
57. Ibid, pp. 113-115.
58. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford, London, 1929, p. 291.
59. Mary Kingsley, West African Studies, Barnes and Nobles, New York, 1964, p.
150.
60. Gouldner, p. 47.
61. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, Vintage, New York, n.d., p. 41.
62. Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons, Third World Press, Chicago, 1979,
p. 3.
63. Diamond, p. 163.
64. Fanon, p. 252.
65. Ralph Beats, The Politics of Social Research, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago,
1969, p. 197.
66. Ibid, p. 197.
67. Ibid, p. 5.
68. Ibid, p. 40.
69. Quoted in Roszak (ed.) Sources, pp. x-xi.
70. Ibid, p. xi.
71. Diamond, p. 110.
72. Nobles, p. 109.
73. Roszak, pp. xii-xiv.
74. Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical
Tradition, Zed Press,London, 1983, p. 9.
75. Ibid, p. 19.
76. Ibid, p. 67ff.
77. Merlin Stone, Three Thousand Years of Racism, New Sibylline Books, New
York, 1981, p. 26.
78. This later analysis is a collective product of the participants in a seminar
on "White Racism" held at Hunter College in Spring, 1991.
79. Stone, p. 25.
Notes 601
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1!)7:1,5'1 !i7
608 YURUGU
Welsing, Frances Cress, "To Whom it May Concern," Letter to the African
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491-494, 501,504, 506,556,562- 563; harmony, 32, 35, 42, 85, 91,
563, 566, 568-569; Forms, 13, 16, 95, 100, 105, 118, 189, 205, 210,
18, 22,40,42,47,51, 58,62, 70,81, 212,297,351,395,559,562,564
83, 85, 90, 97, 100, 102, 105, 118, Hawaii, 156
140,162,174,186, 199-201, 203, heathen, 122, 148, 152-153, 155, 158,
206, 209, 212-215, 217-218, 225, 162-163, 165-166, 170, 308, 475,
229-232, 234, 242-243, 273, 295, 478,482,508
325, 346, 353, 363-364, 381, 383- Hebrew, 91, 117, 119-120, 128, 188-
385, 390,397,405,409,419,427, 189,260
434,449,454,456,458,470,483, Hellenistic, 254
485,494,500, 502-503,506, 509, Henry the Navigator, 157
555, 560,563,565-566,568 heresy, 138,143,356,363,366
freedom, 59, 73, 91, 94, 127, 159, 253, heretic, 139
255, 258, 261-264, 289-290, 330, hierarchy, 34-35, 41, 67, 88-90, 116,
338-344, 348, 350, 353-355, 361, 125,142,148,175,260,349,367,
367,374,380-382,385,399,410- 386,481
411, 416, 422, 559-561; individual, historicity, 58, 100, 118, 120, 558
340-343, 355,367,381,385,399, Hollywood, 218, 269-270, 295
411, 560; love of, 342, 561 Holy Roman Empire, 196
Freudian, 16, 243, 284, 377, 392, 452- humanness, 44-45, 47, 50, 58, 94, 121,
453, 456-457, 462; Freudian theory, 293,298,352,364,386,403,427,
243, 377, 456-457 460, 558, 565-566
future, 2-3, 36, 59-60, 63, 68, 97, 116,
140,184,215,232,239,287,289, hypocrisy, 168, 280, 297, 312, 315-
291, 298, 375, 380, 439-440, 460- 317, 321,324,326,328, 333-335,
462, 468, 491-492, 502-503, 569-570 386,410,413-415,430;hypocrlt~
cal, 9, 154, 315-317, 320, 324, 410,
genes, 12, 34, 53,104,277,471; cul- 416,434,436,474,482
tural, 12, 34, 53, 277, 471; genetic,
448,450,459,467 ideal state, 36, 50, 54, 113-114, 227,
genocidal, 2, 433-434, 438, 445-446; 491
genocide,426,436,442,465,477 Ideas, 5, 8-9, 13, 15, 18, 30, 34-35, 39-
gentile, 122, 128, 148, 222, 224 41, 43, 49, 5~ 61, 65, 67, 70-72, 75-
geometrical form, 228 76, 80-81, 83-85, 87-88, 90, 110-111,
germ warfare, 437 124, 144, 166, 172, 188, 192, 20:1,
German heritage, 257, 259 205, 222-224, 227, 230, 249, 2fi~,
germanic, 163-165, 169, 196, 257-262, 283, 285-286, 298, 31s, 325, :mi
264-265, 293 330, 339, 348, 356, 3fi 1, 379, 11I '1,
gnostic, 138-140, 142-143, 174-175; 452,463, 465-466. 1n, 477 17H,
gnosticism, 138, 141-143 481, 491, 497-499, 502-50:3,;,!i!i
Great Chain ol B~ing, 35, 87, 300 ideological matrix, 12, 21:3,:n1, 111' 1,
male, 34-35, 41, 159, 171, 173-174, 177, lithic, 4, 9, 47, 50, 69, 121-122, 134,
242-245, 300,377,397,437,440, 143,148,196,246,256,364,366
443,453,460-461,480,559,561 monotheism, 114-115, 120-122, 142,
Manifest Destiny, 251-252, 266, 421 149, 173-174, 179, 471; monotheis-
masculine, 174-175, 377 tic, 113-114, 120-122, 142, 185
materialism, 99,346,376,381, 386- Moon, the, 81
387,399,451,456,503,557; mate- morality plays, 220
rialistic, 17, 64, 67, 96, 105, 138, Mother Earth, 173
258,369,379,383,449,456,473, Mother Goddess, 171
502, 506; materialization, 30, 96, multidimensional, 30, 60, 62, 98; mul-
139, 181, 500, 509 tidimensionality, 30, 60, 62, 98
mathematics, 50, 78, 81, 114, 210-211, music, 2, 210-213, 229, 295
228,273 mysteries, the, 71, 397
matriarchal, 81-82, 243,471; matriar- mystery, 57, 70, 100-101, 107,119,
chal consciousness, 81-82 139-141, 227,441
matrix, 3, 12, 141, 174, 190, 213, 231, myth, 4, 33-34, 54, 62, 174, 182, 222,
240,258,358, 392-393, 401-402, 226, 230, 233, 242, 249, 255-262,
447-448,459,496,498 264-265, 306, 311, 325
Maxentius, 131-132 mythoform, 10-11, 13, 33, 63, 90-91,
mechanical causation, 67 163-164, 166,197,215,223,227,
mechanization, 500 241,243,258,342
media, 43, 54, 56, 62, 77, 115, 117-119, mythology, 10-11, 36, 63, 67, 91, 117,
199, 214, 218-219, 222, 232-233, 129, 138, 141, 182, 195, 240-241,
241, 265-266, 269,271, 294-295, 255-256, 259, 263, 285, 303, 352,
317,331,376,440,445,509,568 359, 507-509, 556, 568
mediated experience, 207
Medieval, European, 152; Medieval Naked Jungle, the, 269
period, 134, 152, 204 narcissistic, 350, 369, 394, 397
melanin, 284, 444, 450, 452, 458, 465- nascentEurope,52,62;nascent
472 European,35,58, 119,126,170,
melatonin, 285, 466-467 230
messianism, 120, 127 national
metaphysical pathos, 75, 504 consciousness, 5, 137, 169, 196,
metaphysics, 64, 68, 145, 349-350, 501 201, 209, 230-232, 255-256, 258,
Middle Ages, 89,116,147, 188, 196, 261,265,277,294,361; myth,259-
200,210,220,230,356,494 262
minority, 22, 36, 76-77, 80, 82, 99, 125, Nationalism, 9, 19, 22-25, 36, 51, 55,
208, 211, 284-286, 350-352, 374, 103, 124-125, 127-128, 135, 137, 141,
392, 407, 410, 418, 445, 449-451, 144, 148, 150-152, 154-155, 161, 165,
458, 465, 473, 559; minority cul- 170,185, 191-194, 213-214, 219,223,
ture, 76, 352, 392 230-231, 246, 252-253, 258, 260-261,
missionary, 109, 154, 162, 185-187, 265, 268, 271-273, 275-277, 282, 284,
251,255,280,308,327,332,413, 288, 290-291, 305,308,314, 316-318,
427--128,479: schools, 428 :327,330, 335, 3:39,34!'>,374, :{82,
Modnl chnnf,(t•i;,I (18, It)(j 400,402, 405,409,416,423,429-
IIIIHll'llilly, :22,IOI, 110,2'''1.,
48!1•1!)0, 431, 44!), 447, 475-47G,4~Jll-'l!l!i,!i!l7
111)!) 568
11111111111th,;!!1, !:1 1, I /•I, t /1,, h'1h, 111111111 N11tlvi•A111t•1h H:!. 10'', l'l',
1111, 1:o,
628 YURUGU
natural theology, 179, 190 paternalism, 252, 277, 290, 320, 325,
Nazism, 326 360,374,476,566
neanderthal, 244, 459-461,463, 477 patriarchal, 81--82,173-175,177, 242-
Neo-Platonists, 148 243, 378, 454, 464, 471; patriarchy,
Nicaragua, 422-425 171, 174, 185,461
Niger expedition, 154, 254-255 Pax Romanus, 255
nomadic, 172-173,262, 304, 464-465 Phi/ebus, the, 228
Non-Orthodox Christianity, 137 philosopher, 30-31,38, 75, 83, 112-
Norman Conquest, 196, 265 113, 177, 200, 397; philosophy, 13,
Normans, 258 16, 18--19,29, 31, 43, 49, 53, 55, 57,
normative, 46-47, 110, 114, 125, 193, 60, 64, 73, 75-77,86-87,89-90, 95,
197, 208, 223-224,238, 241-242, 99-102, 113, 115-116,119, 177-179,
279, 297,314,323,327,333,337- 182-183,202,206,213,216,223,
338, 351, 357-359,361,366,380, 227,247,280,298,307,322,329,
391, 480-481,499, 565 346,363,419,473,489,495,501,
norms, 117,337-338,379, 381, 452 503,506,568
Northern Cradle, 171-172,285, 305, physical, 1, 16, 33, 62, 64, 76, 82, 100,
448,463,465 109-110,128, 138--140,174, 190,
196,215,219,221,228,230,242,
objectification, 37-39, 56, 68, 70, 76, 272,277,283,285,292, 298,351-
86-88,91, 94-96,99-100, 106-107, 352, 368,371,380,408,416,427,
114-115,200, 216, 307, 315, 334, 429, 431, 435, 448, 459-460,462,
338,344,348, 390-391,396,481, 464,466,471,490,499-500, 556
500,509,557,565 physics, 101-102,300
Odin, 163-164 pineal gland, 285, 466-470
Oedipus Complex, 377, 454 Platonic, 29, 31-33,35, 37, 39, 41, 43-
Old Testament, 143, 151 47, 49, 52-53, 56-58,64, 69-75,81,
n11tological, 8, 62, 70, 82, 88, 90, 93, 91, 93, 104, 111-112,114-116,128,
95, 103, 110, 121, 148, 188, 190, 148, 168, 178--179,181, 183, 188--
230,242,345,350,383,386,389, 189, 202, 205, 220, 228--229,238,
472,480,482,484,490,500,503- 255,287,315,327,341,344,389,
504, 556; ontology, 4, 57-58,83, 88, 458, 480-481,500; epistemology,
%-96, 121. 207, 346, 353-354,480 35, 39, 45, 52-53,56-58, 70, 188,
oriposing, 43, 104, 106, 222, 268, 314 205; thought, 29, 33, 41, 43, 75,
opposition, 6, 32, 34-35, 52, 62, 77, 84, 104,178,181,183,255,458
95, 103, 105-106,129-130,136, 186, political violence, 416, 422-423
193,208, 226, 24:3,296-297,306- Pope, the, 147, 153, 157, 196, 256
~07, 322,334,346,348,352,366, popular art, 199,209, 218, 227, 230-
379,384,386,389,420,422,562 232, 234
oppositional thought, 244 power,
obsession with, 277; to do, I 05;
pngan, 122, 127, 129, 132-133,135- over-other, l 05-107
136, 147 148, 164-167,169-171.190, pra~rnatisrn, 76, 168,388, 419
l!Hi, 277,427, 475-476; f)agnnism, r,reclictabillty, 6'1, I 07
Ill, 128, 1:1:i,1117, 162, 16Gl(i8, prltnll Iv<', 48, 51, 5:i, fi(i,(;;,,82, I 0~!,
1711 1:1.2,127, 141. I W, IS:I, lf11-l,IHI,
p,11,tdlMIII, I, 111,1'10,:'!l7, 'iOl :M7, :mx,~!1!1,~•HIlH'',
lH7, 1,()11,
p111 11111 'IH, 'l'J!,, lf,'.I 111;• •1111;,:m.1,:uJ7,·1r,
1. t~,r,,1'17,1rn.
Index 629
.,,
Index of Non-African Names