Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167246               July 20, 2011

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner,

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by George Leonard S. Umale (petitioner),

ANTECEDENTS

On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease 5 whereby the petitioner agreed to
lease, for a period of two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000, an eight hundred sixty (860)-
square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent. The
respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership through a Deed of Absolute
Sale, subject to the following conditions: (1) that no shopping arcades or retail stores, restaurants,
etc. shall be allowed to be established on the property, except with the prior written consent from
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership and (2) that the respondent and/or its successors-in-interest shall
become member/s of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (Association), and shall abide by its rules
and regulations.6

On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer
case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8084.7 The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner’s
violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. Under this contract,
the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small
drivers’ canteen,8 and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the
respondent’s prior written consent.9 The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and
other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from
the respondent, and the necessary permits from the Association and the Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
Partnership. The petitioner also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of
the lease contract.

The MTC-Branch 68 decided the ejectment case in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-
Branch 155, Pasig City affirmed in toto the MTC-Branch 68 decision.10 The case, however, was re-
raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, Pasig City because the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Branch 155,
upon motion, inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 11 The RTC-
Branch 267 granted the petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Branch 68
decision. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being prematurely filed. 12 Thus, the
respondent filed a petition for review with the CA on April 10, 2002. 13

During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for
unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9210.14 This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the
expiration of the parties’ lease contract.

On December 4, 2002, the MTC-Branch 71 rendered a decision 15 in favor of the respondent, the
dispositive portion of which read, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [referring to the respondent] and
against the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him, as follows:

1. Defendant and all persons claiming rights under him are ordered to peacefully vacate the
premises located at Lot 9, Block 5, San Miguel Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 488797 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City and to
surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2. Defendant is ordered to pay unto plaintiff the following:

a. Damages for the use of the property after the expiration of the lease contract
therefor in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00) a
month, beginning 16 January 2002 until he and all those claiming rights under him
have vacated and peacefully turned over the subject premises to the plaintiff; and

b. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees together
with costs of suit.

3. With respect to the commercial units built by [the] defendant on the subject land, he is
hereby ordered to remove the same from the subject land and to restore the subject land in
the same condition as it was received unto the plaintiff, at his exclusive account, failing which
the same shall be removed by the plaintiff, with expenses therefor chargeable to the
defendant.

On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and
dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia.16 The petitioner, however, was still
ordered to pay rent in the amount of seventy-one thousand five hundred pesos (₱71,500.00) per
month beginning January 16, 2002, which amount is the monthly rent stipulated in the lease
contract.

Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. The respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between Civil Case
Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment, i.e., the first
case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the
expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based
on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. 17 The lease
contract expired on January 15, 2002, 18 while the first case was filed on October 10, 2000.
On August 20, 2004, the CA nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and
ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of
action. The decision of the MTC- Branch 71 was ordered reinstated. Subsequently, the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the filing of the present petition for review
on certiorari.

In presenting his case before this Court, the petitioner insists that litis pendentia exists between the
two ejectment cases filed against him because of their identity with one another and that any
judgment on the first case will amount to res judicata on the other. The petitioner argues that the
respondent reiterated the ground of violations of the lease contract, with the additional ground of the
expiration of the lease contract in the second ejectment case. Also, the petitioner alleges that all of
the elements of litis pendentia are present in this case, thus, he prays for the reversal and setting
aside of the assailed CA decision and resolution, and for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia and/or forum shopping.

THE COURT’S RULING

We disagree with the petitioner and find that there is no litis pendentia.

As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions
are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious.19

Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two
actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the
identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.20

In the present case, the parties’ bone of contention is whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210
involve the same cause of action. The petitioner argues that the causes of action are similar, while
the respondent argues otherwise. If an identity, or substantial identity, of the causes of action in both
cases exist, then the second complaint for unlawful detainer may be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia.

We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.

Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. 21 If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in
any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.22

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such
as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of
action23 (also known as the "same evidence" test),24 or whether the defenses in one case may be
used to substantiate the complaint in the other. 25 Also fundamental is the test of
determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of
the first complaint.26

Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint – and to
which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was
grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the
second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the
first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in
effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence
of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was
only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint
accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the
cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment
case.

In response to the petitioner’s contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests
on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the
restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent
alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main
basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for
this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful
detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the
cause of action,27 which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract. 1awphi1

Also, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there can be no conflict between the decisions rendered in
Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 because the MTC-Branch 71 decided the latter case on the sole
issue of whether the lease contract between the parties had expired. Although alleged by the
respondent in its complaint, the MTC-Branch 71 did not rule on the alleged violations of the lease
contract committed by the petitioner. We note that the damages awarded by the MTC-Branch 71 in
Civil Case No. 9210 were for those incurred after the expiration of the lease contract, 28 not for those
incurred prior thereto.

Similarly, we do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case No. 9210, the
second civil case. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test
applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.29 Considering our pronouncement that not all the
requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the
respondent committed no forum shopping. Also, a close reading of the Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping30 (attached to the second ejectment complaint) shows that the respondent
did disclose that it had filed a former complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. Thus, the
respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 20, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 78836 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1006 dated
June 10, 2011.

* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1040 dated
July 6, 2011.

1
 Rollo, pp. 24-60.

2
 Id. at 9-19.

3
 Id. at 21.

4
 Id. at 332-336.

5
 Id. at 133-138.

6
 Id. at 10.

7
 Id. at 127-131.

8
 Id. at 135-136.
9
 Id. at 136.

10
 Id. at 196-199.

11
 Dated September 19, 2001.

12
 Rollo, pp. 222-227.

13
 Id. at 12.

14
 Id. at 337-342.

15
 Id. at 345-353.

16
 Supra note 4.

17
 Rollo, p. 323.

18
 Id. at 649.

 Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 165027, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA
19

528, 545; and Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, 489 Phil. 702, 707 (2005).

20
 Dotmatrix Trading v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009, 604 SCRA 431.
See Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 159323, July
31, 2008, 560 SCRA 719, 736; Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No.
156542, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 535, 545-546; and Abines v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, G.R. No. 167900, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 421, 429.

21
 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 3, Rule 2.

22
 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 4, Rule 2.

 Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 322 (1912); Pagsisihan v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil.

469, 479 (1980); and Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 499, 506-507 (1998).

24
 See Agustin v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 168139, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 576.

 Victronics Computers, Inc. v. RTC, Branch 63, Makati, G.R. No. 104019, January 25, 1993,
25

217 SCRA 517, 530.

 Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No.

185159, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 470.

27
 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 1, Rule 70.

28
 Rollo, p. 352.

29
 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 605, 615 (1997).
30
 Rollo, pp. 343-344.