16 COUET OF COMMON PLEAS. rL. E.

1873 THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. WITH AM.

Nov. G.
Contract—Consideration—Acceptance of Tender.
The plaintiffs advertised for tenders for the supply of stores for a period of
twelve months. The defendant sent in a tender to supply the stores require^
for the period named, at certain fixed prices, “ in such quantities as the company’s
store-keeper might order from time to timeand the plaintiffs accepted his
tender:—
Held, that there was a sufficient consideration for the defendant’s promise to
supply the goods, although there was no binding contract on the part of the com­
pany to order any.

The first count of the declaration stated that it was agreed by

and between the plaintiffs and the defendant that the defendant
should supply and sell and deliver to the plaintiffs at Doncaster
station, and that the plaintiffs should buy and accept of him, any
quantity they might require and order of him during a period
ending on the 31st of October, 1872, of certain descriptions of
iron, at certain prices agreed on between them; that all things
were done and happened and existed, and times had elapsed, to
entitle the plaintiffs to a performance by the defendant of his
agreement and to maintain the action for the breach by him of
the same as thereinafter alleged; yet that the defendant did not
nor would supply and sell and deliver to the plaintiffs at Doncas­
ter station or elsewhere divers quantities of the said descriptions of
iron, which the plaintiffs required and ordered of him during the
said period, whereby the plaintiffs were obliged to procure quan­
tities of iron from other persons at higher prices than those to be
paid by them as aforesaid, and were otherwise injured.
Second count, that it was agreed by and between the plaintiffs
and the defendant that the defendant should supply and sell and
deliver to the plaintiffs at Doncaster station, and that the plaintiffs
should buy and accept of him, any quantity they might order of
him for half the requirements of the plaintiffs during the said
period ending on the 31st of October, 1872, of certain descriptions
of iron,'at certain prices agreed on between them ; that all things
were done, &c., yet the defendant did not nor would supply and
sell and deliver to the plaintiffs, as agreed on as aforesaid, divers
quantities of the said descriptions of iron, which the plaintiffs
YOL. IX.] MICH. TEEM, XXXVII YICT. 17

ordered of him for half the requirements of the plaintiffs during 1873
the said period ending the 31st of October, 1872, whereby the Great
Northern
plaintiffs were obliged to procure quantities of iron from other Railway Co.
persons at higher prices than those to be paid as aforesaid, and v.
Witham.
were otherwise injured. Claim, 2000Z.
Pleas: 1. That it was not agreed by and between the plaintiffs
and the defendant, as alleged ; 2. That the plaintiffs did not
require or order iron as in the declaration alleged.
There was also a demurrer to each count of the declaration, on
the ground that it disclosed no consideration for the defendant’s
promise to supply the iron therein mentioned. Issue, and joinder
in demurrer.
The cause was tried before Brett, J., at the sittings at Westmin­
ster after the last term. The facts were as follows:—In October,
1871, the plaintiffs advertised for tenders for the supply of goods
(amongst other things iron) to be delivered at their station at
Doncaster, according to a certain specification. The defendant
sent in a tender, as follows :—
“I, the undersigned, hereby undertake to supply the Great
Northern Railway Company, for twelve months from the 1st of
November, 1871, to 31st of October, 1872, with such quantities
of each or any of the several articles named in the attached specifi­
cation as the company’s store-keeper may order from time to time,
at the price set opposite each article respectively, and agree to
abide by the conditions stated on the other side.
(Signed) “ Samuel Witham.”
The company’s officer wrote in reply, as follows:—
“ Mr. S. Witham.
“ Sir,—I am instructed to inform you that my directors have
accepted your tender, dated, &c., to supply this company at Don­
caster station any quantity they may order during the period
ending 31st of October, 1872, of the descriptions of iron men­
tioned on the inclosed list, at the prices specified therein. The
terms of the contract must be strictly adhered to. Requesting
an acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter,
(Signed) “ S. Fitch, Assistant Secretary.”
To this the defendant replied,—“ I beg to own receipt of your
18 COURT OP COMMON PLEAS. [L. R.

1873 favor of 20th instant, accepting my tender for bars, for which
Great I am obliged. Your specifications shall receive my best attention.
Northern
Railway Co.
S. Witham.”
v. Several orders for iron were given by the company, which were
Witham.
from time to time duly executed by the defendant; but ultimately
the defendant refused to supply any more, whereupon this action
was brought.
A verdict having been found for the plaintiffs,

Nov. 5. Digby Seymour, Q C., moved to enter a nonsuit, on the

ground that the contract was void for want of mutuality. He
contended that, as the company did not bind themselves to take
any iron whatever from the defendant, his promise to supply them
with iron was a promise without consideration. He cited Lees v.
Whitcomb (1) ; Burton v. Great Northern Bailway Co. (2); Sykes
v. Dixon (3) ; and Bealey v. Stuart. (4)
Cur. adv. vult.

Nov. 6. Keating, J. In this case Mr. Digby Seymour moved

to enter a nonsuit. The circumstances were these:—The Great
Northern Railway Company advertised for tenders for the supply
of stores. The defendant made a tender in these words,—“ I
hereby undertake to supply the Great Northern Railway Company,
for twelve months, from &c. to &c., with such quantities of each or
any of the several articles named in the attached specifications as
the company’s store-keeper may order from time to time, at the
price set opposite each article respectively,” &c. Some orders
were given by the company, which were duly executed. But the
order now in question was not executed; the defendant seeking to
excuse himself from the performance of his agreement, because it
was unilateral, the company not being bound to give the order.
The ground upon which it was put by Mr. Seymour was, that there
was no consideration for the defendant’s promise to supply the
goods ; in other words, that, inasmuch as there was no obligation
on the company to give an order, there was no consideration moving
from the company, and therefore no obligation on the defendant to
(1) 5 Bing. 34. (4) 7 H. & N. 753; 31 L. J. (Ex.)
(2) 9 Ex. 507 ; 23 L. J. (Ex.) 1£4. 281.
(3) 9 Ad. & E. 693.
YOL. IX.] MICH. TEEM, XXXYII YICT. 19

supply the goods. The case mainly relied on in support of that 1873
contention was Burton v. Great Northern Bailway Co. (1) But that Great
is not an authority in the defendant’s favor. It was the converse R^^yf^Co.
case. The Court there
. .
held that no action would lie against
° .
the W
_ itham
v­ .
company for not giving an order. If before the order was given
the defendant had given notice to the company that he would not
perform the agreement, it might be that he would have been justi­
fied in so doing. But here the company had given the order, and
had consequently done something which amounted to a considera­
tion for the defendant’s promise. I see no ground for doubting
that the verdict for the plaintiffs ought to stand.

Brett, J. The company advertised for tenders for the supply

of stores, such as they might think fit to order, for one year. The
defendant made a tender offering to supply them for that period at
certain fixed prices; and the company accepted his tender. If
there were no other objection, the contract between the parties
would be found in the tender and the letter accepting it. This
action is brought for the defendants refusal to deliver goods ordered
by the company; and the objection to the plaintiffs’ right to
recover is, that the contract is unilateral. I do not, however,
understand what objection that is to a contract. Many contracts
are obnoxious to the same complaint. If I say to another, “ If
you will go to York, I will give you 100Z.,” that is in a certain
sense a unilateral contract. He has not promised to go to York.
But, if he goes, it cannot be doubted that he will be entitled to
receive the 1007. His going to York at my request is a sufficient
consideration for my promise. So, if one says to another, “ If you
will give me an order for iron, or other goods, I will supply it at a
given priceif the order is given, there is a complete contract
which the seller is bound to perform. There is in such a case
ample consideration for the promise. So, here, the company
having given the defendant an order at his request, his acceptance
of the order would bind them. If any authority could have been
found to sustain Mr. Seymour’s contention, I should have con­
sidered that a rule ought to be granted. But none has been cited.
Burton v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1) is not at all to the pur-
(1) 9 Ex. 507 ; 23 L. J. (Ex.) 184. ,
B
20 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. [L.. R.

1873 pose. This is matter of every days practice ; and I think it

Great would be wrong to countenance the notion that a man who tenders
Northern
Railway Co.
for the supply of goods in this way is not bound to deliver them
v. when an order is given. I agree that this judgment does not
Witham.
decide the question whether the defendant might have absolved
himself from the further performance of the contract by giving
notice.

Grove, J. I am of the same opinion, and have nothing to add.

Rule refused.

Attorneys for defendant: Jacobs, North, & Vincent, for North &
Sons, Leeds.

Nov. 6. ASHFORTH v. REDFORD and Another.

Construction of Mercantile Contract—Credit of “from six to eight Weeks!'

On a sale of goods, the invoice expressed that they should be paid for in “ from
six to eight weeks.” The sale took place on the 1st of May, and the action for the
price was commenced on the 18th of June. At the trial the judge left it to the
jury to say what was the mercantile meaning of the expression “ from six to eight
weeks; ” and they found that the action had not been brought prematurely.
The judge, being of the same opinion, directed a verdict for the plaintiff:—
Held,—upon the authority of Alexander v. Vanderzee (Law Rep. 7 C. P. 530),
—that the question was properly left to the jury, and the verdict right.

Action by the plaintiff, a commission-merchant at Manchester,

to recover the price of certain cotton-wefts sold by him to the
defendants, to be paid for in “from six to eight weeks.,, The
sale took place on the 1st of May last, and the action was com­
menced on the 18th of June.
At the trial before Brett, J., at the last assizes at Manchester, it
was objected on the part of the defendants that the action had
been brought before the expiration of the agreed period of credit.
The learned judge left it to the jury to say what was the mercan­
tile meaning of the expression “ from six to eight weeks.” The
jury found that the action had not been brought too soon; and
the learned judge, being of the same opinion, directed a verdict
for the plaintiff for 28£. 14s. 2d.