3a Lufkin Division Record2

Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 7 Filed 08/07/14 Page 1 of 44 PageID #: 34

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR., §
BRIGHT FUTURE INVESTMENTS, INC, §
IDEAL ABILITIES and §
TYLER COUNTY TAX OFFICE, §
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Court enter a default
judgment against defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities.
In support of the request, the United States avers as follows:
1. The complaint initiating this action was filed on July 7, 2014. (Dkt.
#1.) Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities were named as parties that
may claim an interest in the property at issue. See 26 U.S.C. §7403(b).
2. On July 16, 2014, summons were served on John Parks Trowbridge,
Jr., as President of Bright Futures Investments Inc. and as Trustee of Ideal
Abilities. (Dkts. #4 - 5.)
3. On August 7, 2014, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., filed a, pro-se
purported “Answer” (Dkt. #7) and “Amended Answer.” (Dkt. #10.)

4. No filings have been made on behalf of Bright Futures Investments
Inc. or Ideal Abilities. The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an
individual response and is improper as a response by Bright Future Investments
Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is not an attorney1 and
can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993)
(“[T]he lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow
corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise
than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he rationale for that rule applies equally
to all artificial entities.”). To the extent Mr. Trowbridge was attempting to
respond for Bright Futures Investments Inc. and/or Ideal Abilities those
pleadings are prohibited. Id.
5. The time to file an answer or otherwise respond to the United
States’ complaint expired on August 6, 2014. (See Dkts. #4 - 5.) No response was
filed by Bright Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities claiming any interest in
the property at issue. Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities have
failed to plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the
property at issue as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A) and
12(b). Therefore, entry of default judgment against each of them is appropriate.
1John Parks Trowbridge does not allege he is an attorney, nor does he list any State bar affiliation
in his response. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) Counsel for the United States has searched for “John
Trowbridge” on the website for the Texas State Bar and did not find any listing under that name.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the
Court enter default judgment against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal
Abilities. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it
may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
U.S. Department of Justice
Attorney, Tax Division – CTS-SW
Admitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §517
717 N. Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR UNITED STATES
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.

9816 Memorial Boulevard, No. 205
Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 14-1 Filed 09/16/14 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 149

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Court, having considered the UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR

ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT, and any response or reply thereto, it is
hereby ADJUDGED that:
1. The United States’ motion is GRANTED;
2. Bright Futures Investments Inc. is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to

plead or otherwise defend against the United States Complaint and, having
failed to assert any interest in the property at issue, is adjudged to have no
interest in that property; and
3. Ideal Abilities is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to plead or otherwise

defend against the United States Complaint and, having failed to assert any
interest in the property at issue, is adjudged to have no interest in that property.
SIGNED this ________ day of _____________________________ , 2014.
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§
V § CASE NO. 9:14-CV-138 (RC)
§
ET AL §
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS
This Order shall govern proceedings in this case. The following deadlines are hereby set:
1. Rule 26(f) attorney conference on or before: October 7, 2014.
2. Complete initial mandatory disclosure required by this Order: 28 days after

deadline for Rule 26(f) conference.
3. File joint report of attorney conference: 35 days after deadline for Rule 26(f)
conference. This should follow initial mandatory disclosures, so a realistic
proposal regarding depositions and other discovery can be included.
4. The case is SET for a Rule 16 management conference on November 25, 2014,
at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom #2, Jack Brooks Federal Building, 300 Willow Street,
Beaumont, Texas. Lead counsel for each party, with authority to bind their
respective clients, and all unrepresented parties, shall be present. Continuance of
the management conference will not be allowed absent a showing of good cause1.
1
Before the case management conference, counsel and unrepresented parties should review the most recent
versions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas. The Local
Rules are available on the Eastern District of Texas website (http://www.txed.uscourts.gov).
RULE 26(F) ATTORNEY CONFERENCE
Rule 26(f) requires attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties to confer and attempt
in good faith to agree on a proposed scheduling order (see Appendix 1) and to electronically file
a joint report outlining their proposals. The conference may be by telephone.
Before commencing the Rule 26(f) conference, counsel must discuss settlement options
with their clients, including whether an offer or demand should be made at the Rule 26(f)
attorney conference. Counsel should also inquire whether their clients are amenable to trial
before a United States magistrate judge. Parties willing to consent should file the appropriate
form electronically (see form on Eastern District of Texas website) as soon as possible, so that
the case can be reset for management conference before the magistrate judge to whom the case is
assigned.
The parties must include the following matters in the joint conference report:
1. A brief factual and legal synopsis of the case.
2. The jurisdictional basis for this suit.
3. Confirm that initial mandatory disclosure required by Rule 26(a)(1) and this order
has been completed.
4. Proposed scheduling order deadlines. Appendix 1 has the standard deadlines.

Explain any deviations from standard schedule. Now is the time to inform the
court of any special complexities or need for more time before the trial
setting. The standard schedule is planned so that there is time to rule on
dispositive motions before parties begin final trial preparation.
5. If the parties agree that mediation is appropriate, and the parties can agree upon a
mediator, the name, address, and phone number of that mediator, and a proposed
deadline should be stated. An early date is encouraged to reduce expenses. The
court may appoint a mediator upon request.
6. The identity of persons expected to be deposed.
7. Any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored

information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced.
-2-
8. Any issues relating to preserving discoverable information, including

electronically stored information.
9. Whether any other orders should be entered by the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), (c).
10. Estimated trial time.
11. The names of the attorneys who will appear on behalf of the parties at the
management conference (the appearing attorney must be an attorney of record and
have full authority to bind the client).
12. Any other matters counsel deem appropriate for inclusion in the joint conference
report.
CONTESTED MOTION PRACTICE
Counsel and parties shall comply with Local Rules CV-7, 10, 11, and 56, in addition to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Local Rule CV-7 requires you to attach affidavits and other
supporting documents to the motion or response. Labeled tabs on the attachments to the courtesy
copy will make it easier to find them.
If the motion with attachments exceeds 20 pages, the court requests that you bind (spiral
or otherwise) the courtesy copy at the left to make it easier to read.
Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(b), highlight in the courtesy copy, the portions of the
affidavits or other supporting documents which are cited in your motion or response.
SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL INFORMATION
The Judicial Conference of the United States has implemented policies to protect
sensitive private information about parties, witnesses, and others involved in a civil, criminal, or
bankruptcy case. To that end, all documents filed with the court and made available to the public,
whether electronically or on paper, should limit certain information as follows:
• for Social Security numbers, use only the last four digits;
• for financial account numbers, use only the last four digits;
• for names of minor children, use only their initials;
• for dates of birth, use only the year; and
• (in criminal cases) for home addresses, use only the city and state.
-3-
If such information is elicited during testimony or other court proceedings, it will become
available to the public when the official transcript is filed at the courthouse unless, and until, it is
redacted. The better practice is for you to avoid introducing this information into the record in
the first place. Please take this into account when questioning witnesses or making other
statements in court.
DISCOVERY
Initial mandatory disclosure pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) shall be completed not later than
28 days after the deadline for the Rule 26 attorney conference and shall include the following in
addition to information required by Rule 26(a)(1):
1. The correct names of the parties to the action.
2. The name and, if known, address and telephone number of any potential parties to
the action.
3. The name and, if known, the address and telephone number of persons having
knowledge of facts relevant to the claim or defense of any party, a brief
characterization of their connection to the case and a fair summary of the
substance of the information known by such person. This may be combined with
list of persons required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) so two lists are not needed.
4. The authorizations described in Local Rule CV-34.
5. A copy of all documents, electronically stored information, witness statements,

and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the disclosing party
that are relevant to the claim or defense of any party. This may be combined with
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) so duplication is avoided. In cases
involving a disproportionate burden of disclosure of a large number of documents
on one party, the parties may agree on prior inspection to reduce the need for
copy. Parties are encouraged to agree upon provision of information by electronic
means.
See Local Rule CV-26(d) for meaning of “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”
A party that fails to timely disclose such information will not, unless such failure is
harmless, be permitted to use such evidence at trial, hearing or in support of a motion. A
party is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its
investigation of the case.
-4-
Discovery shall not commence until the deadline set for the attorneys to confer under
Rule 26(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Depositions may be taken, and initial mandatory
disclosure shall occur, before the Rule 16 management conference, so that counsel are in a
position to intelligently discuss additional required discovery, and scheduling of the case.
Following the management conference, the court will enter a scheduling order setting deadlines
controlling disposition of the case. If the court concludes that a management conference is not
necessary after receiving the parties’ 26(f) report, it may enter a scheduling order and cancel the
management conference.
The fact that the scheduling order will have a deadline for completion of discovery is
NOT an invitation, or authorization, to withhold documents or information required to be
disclosed as part of initial mandatory disclosure, under the guise of “supplementation.” Attorneys
are expected to review their client’s files and to conduct at least preliminary interviews of their
clients and potential witnesses under their control, so as to fully comply with the initial
mandatory disclosure requirements by the deadline set in this order. This will allow experts to be
timely identified and prepared to testify, witnesses to be efficiently deposed, and any follow-up
paper discovery to be completed by the deadline to be set for completion of discovery. The court
expects that, in most cases, after reading the pleadings and having a frank discussion of the
issues and discovery during the Rule 26 attorney conference, a review of the opposing party’s
initial disclosures should alert an attorney to any remaining information which should have been
disclosed, so that such information can be provided before the Rule 16 management conference.
A party asserting that any information is confidential should immediately apply to the court for
entry of a protective order. Unless a request is made for modification, the court will use the form
found on the Eastern District website.
DISCOVERY DISPUTES
A magistrate judge is available during business hours to immediately hear discovery

disputes and to enforce provisions of the rules. The hotline is an appropriate means to obtain an
immediate ruling on whether a discovery request is relevant to the claims or defenses and on
disputes which arise during depositions. The hotline number is (903) 590-1198. See Local Rule
CV-26(e).
FAILURE TO SERVE
Any defendant who has not been served with the summons and complaint within 120
days after the filing of the complaint shall be dismissed, without further notice, unless prior to
such time the party on whose behalf such service is required shows good cause why service has
not been made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
FICTITIOUS PARTIES
The name of every party shall be set out in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The
use of fictitious names is disfavored by federal courts. Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 112
F.3d. 869 (7th Cir. 1997). It is hereby ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED as to all
fictitious parties. Dismissal is without prejudice to the right of any party to take advantage of the
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
SETTLEMENT
Plaintiff’s counsel shall immediately notify the court upon settlement.
COMPLIANCE
Attorneys and pro se litigants who appear in this court must comply with the deadlines
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Eastern District of
Texas and this order. A party is not excused from the requirements of a Rule or scheduling
order by virtue of the fact that dispositive motions are pending, the party has not
completed its investigation, the party challenges the sufficiency of the opposing party’s
disclosure, or because another party has failed to comply with this order or the rules.
Failure to comply with relevant provisions of the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or this order may result in the exclusion of evidence at trial, the imposition of
sanctions by the court, or both. Counsel are reminded of Local Rule AT-3, particularly AT-3(I)
& (J).
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17 day of September, 2014.
___________________________________
Ron Clark, United States District Judge
-6-
APPENDIX 1
PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER DEADLINES
The following actions shall be completed by the date indicated.2 The dates indicated are the
standard for most cases. Counsel should be prepared to explain the need for requested changes.
____________________ Deadline for motions to transfer

(1 week after mgmt conf.)
____________________ Deadline to add parties

(6 weeks after mgmt conf.)
____________________ If parties plan to mediate, state date parties propose. This

should be as early as possible, to avoid expense.
____________________ Plaintiff’s disclosure of expert testimony pursuant to Fed.

(10 weeks after mgmt conf.) R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and Local Rule CV-26(b).
____________________ Deadline for Plaintiffs to file amended pleadings. A motion

(12 weeks after mgmt conf.) for leave to amend is not necessary.
____________________ Defendant’s disclosure of expert testimony pursuant to Fed.

(16 weeks after mgmt conf.) R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and Local Rule CV-26(b).
7 weeks after disclosure of an Deadline to object to any other party’s expert witnesses.
of an expert is made Objections shall be made by a motion to strike or limit
expert testimony and shall be accompanied by a copy of the
expert’s report in order to provide the court with all the
information necessary to make a ruling on any objection.
The court will not accept objections to experts filed in any
form—i.e., motions in limine—after this date.3
Expert reports should include the categories of information

set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) and
26(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii). Challenges to expert reports include
those set out in Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)-(d) and 703.
2
If a deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday as defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, the effective date is the
first federal court business day following the deadline imposed.
3
This requirement has two goals: (1) to encourage early disclosure of experts so that if one is struck, the party will
have time to find another; and (2) to avoid the gamesmanship that has become common as parties attempt to
disqualify experts with a motion in limine thus distracting opponents during final trial preparations and perhaps even
blocking testimony required to establish a claim or defense.
-7-
____________________ Deadline for Defendant’s final amended pleadings. A

(14 weeks after mgmt conf.) motion for leave to amend is not necessary.
____________________ Deadline for motions to dismiss, motions for summary

(18 weeks after mgmt conf.) judgment, or other dispositive motions.
____________________ All discovery shall be commenced in time to be completed

(28 weeks after mgmt conf.) by this date.
____________________ Notice of intent to offer certified records

(5 weeks before docket call)
____________________ Counsel and unrepresented parties are each responsible for

(5 weeks before docket call) contacting opposing counsel and unrepresented parties to
determine how they will prepare the Joint Final Pretrial
Order, see Local Rule CV-16(b), and Joint Proposed Jury
Instructions and Verdict Form (or Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in non-jury cases).
____________________ Video Deposition Designations due. Each party who

(4 weeks before docket call) proposes to offer a deposition by video shall serve on all
other parties a disclosure identifying the line and page
numbers to be offered. All other parties will have seven
calendar days to serve a response with any objections and
requesting cross examination line and page numbers to be
included. Counsel must consult on any objections, and only
those which cannot be resolved shall be presented to the
court. The party who filed the initial Video Deposition
Designation is responsible for preparation of the final
edited video in accordance with all parties’ designations,
and the court’s rulings on objections.
____________________ Motions in limine due.

(3 weeks before docket call) File Joint Final Pretrial Order. See Local Rules CV-16
(Obtain form for Exhibit List from Eastern District’s
website).
-8-
_____________________ Response to motions in limine due.4

(2 weeks before docket call) File objections to witnesses, deposition extracts, and
exhibits listed in pretrial order.5 (This does not extend the
deadline to object to expert witnesses. )(Provide the exhibit
objected to in the motion or response). If numerous
objections are filed the court may set a hearing prior to
docket call.
File Proposed Jury Instructions/Form of Verdict (or
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
Date will be set by court. If numerous objections are filed the court may set a
Usually within 10 days prior hearing to consider all pending motions and objections.
to docket call.
August 7, 2015 Docket call and Final Pretrial at 1:30 p.m. in

Lufkin, Texas. Date parties should be prepared to try
case. Provide court with two copies of Exhibit list, using
form from District Clerks Office. Absent agreement of the
parties, this should not have exhibits which were not listed
in the Final Pre-trial Order, but may have some deletions
depending on rulings on objections.
August 11, 2015 10:30 a.m. Jury selection and trial in Lufkin, Texas. Case
will then be tried in order with other cases on the docket.
Depending on disposition of other cases on court’s docket,
jury selection may be the following week. About a month
before docket call, counsel may wish to consult with
counsel for the other cases on the September docket to
determine whether their cases are likely to settle.
4
This is not an invitation or requirement to file written responses. Most motions in limine can be decided without a
written response. But, if there is particularly difficult or novel issue, the court needs some time to review the matter.
To save time and space respond only to items objected to. All others will be considered to be agreed. Opposing
counsel shall confer in an attempt to resolve any dispute over the motions in limine within five calendar days of the
filing of any response. The parties shall notify the court of all the issues which are resolved.
5
Within five calendar days after the filing of any objections, opposing counsel shall confer to determine whether
objections can be resolved without a court ruling. The parties shall notify the court of all issues which are resolved.
The court needs a copy of the exhibit or the pertinent deposition pages to rule on the objection.
-9-

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE,

JR.’S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
The United States filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of nominee liens filed
against property in Tyler County, Texas. (Dkt. #1.) John Parks Trowbridge Jr. filed an
Answer and Amended Answer to the complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) Neither Bright
Future Investments Inc. nor Ideal Abilities have filed an answer or other responsive
pleading and the United States has moved for default. (See Dkt. #14.) The Tyler County
Tax Office has been dismissed as a disinterested party. (Dkt. #17.)
Trowbridge’s Answer and Amended Answer refers to irrelevant law in his quest
to have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America. (See Dkts.
#7, #10, #18, and #19.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject to tax
because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and has been
rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding claims that
they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens of the State
and not the United States).
Trowbridge refused to provide the United States with his availability for the
Court ordered attorney conference. (See Dkt. #15.) Trowbridge’s response, instead,
requested “the constitutional authority that allows the Court to assume the duty of
prosecuting the case or issue orders sua sponte that require the litigaants to perform
specific acts.” A copy of the correspondence between the United States and Trowbridge
is attached as Government Exhibit A. Following the United States’ refusal to justify the
Court’s authority to issue orders in a case it’s assigned, Trowbridge filed his motion for
interlocutory appeal. (See Dkt. #21.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), three criteria must be met before a District Court
may properly certify an interlocutory order for appeal: 1) the order involves a
controlling question of law in the case, 2) as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and 3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); See Aparicio v.
Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, fn. 2 (5th Cir. 1981.) Trowbridge’s request fails all three
criteria.
As stated in the United States’ Complaint (Dkt. #1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…” Further,
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1345, which gives district courts “original
U.S. Opposition to Motion for Interlocutory Appeal

Page 2 of 4
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States…”
Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and enforcement of
liens) is also authorized by statute.1 The only question of law involves the United States
ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr. Trowbridge – NOT the
ability of the Court to issue an order to the parties governing the management of the
litigation.
There is NO ground for a difference of opinion on the Courts ability to manage
its docket by requiring the parties to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pursuant to the Federal rules, the Court has the authority to order “attorneys and any
unrepresented parties” to appear for conferences so that it can meet its obligations to
“issue a scheduling order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. The Seventh Circuit has stated that “the
inherent power of a district judge--derived from the very nature and existence of his
judicial office--is the broad field over which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
applied.” G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).
Finally, an immediate appeal does not materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. Instead, it is a frivolous argument espoused by a taxpayer
to continue his twenty year span of avoiding paying his share of taxes. The motion filed
by Trowbridge is nothing more than a continued attempt to stall collection of his
overdue tax liabilities indefinitely. The arguments made by Trowbridge are patently
frivolous and entitled to no acknowledgement by the Court.
1
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
Page 3 of 4
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the Court
deny the motion for interlocutory appeal and for stay of the proceedings pending
appeal. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it may be
justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing system that
will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via United States Mail,
postage pre-paid, as follows:

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER

Page 4 of 4
Government
Exhibit
_____________
A

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
BRIGHT FUTURE INVESTMENTS, INC, and §
IDEAL ABILITIES, §
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ RULE 26(f) REPORT
Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to the Court’s Order (Dkt.
#15) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), submits the following report.
INTRODUCTION
After years of using frivolous arguments to stall, delay, and evade
collection, John Parks Trowbridge Jr.’s (“Trowbridge”) tax debt has reached
$3,326,015, plus statutory additions. These tax amounts were reduced to
judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., Civil Action H-14-27 (S.D. Tex. –
Houston Division). A copy of the judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas is attached as Government Exhibit A to
the United States’ Complaint. (See Dkt. #1.)
The complaint initiating this action was The United States filed its
complaint on July 7, 2014. (Dkt. #1.) On July 16, 2014, summonses were served
on John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. individually and as President of Bright Futures
Investments Inc. and Trustee of Ideal Abilities. (Dkts. #3 - 5.) On August 7, 2014,
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., filed a, pro-se purported “Answer” (Dkt. #7) and
“Amended Answer.” (Dkt. #10.) No filings have been made on behalf of Bright
Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities.1 The United States requested entry of
default against both Bright Futures Investments and Ideal Abilities for their
failure to respond. (Dkt. #14.)
RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
The United States attempted to contact Trowbridge using the telephone
number on his pleadings – which is an office. Trowbridge refused to come to the
phone at his office, allow his assistant to provide an email address, and insisted
that all communication be via fax or mail. Therefore, the United States mailed a
letter requesting availability to meet for the Court ordered conference.
Trowbridge’s response did not provide availability and, instead, requested “the
constitutional authority that allows the Court to assume the duty of prosecuting
the case or issue orders sua sponte that require the litigants to perform specific
acts.” A copy of the United States letter and the response is attached as Exhibit A.
The United States informed Trowbridge, via letter, that it considered the
response a refusal to comply with the Court’s order and that we would file the
required report on our own. No response to our letter was received. Instead,
1
The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an individual response and is improper as a
response by Bright Future Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
is not an attorney and can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. §
1654; Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993) (“[T]he lower
courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow corporations, partnerships, or
associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he
rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities.”).
2
Trowbridge filed a motion requesting interlocutory appeal of the Court’s
authority to enter its “Order Governing Proceedings.” (See Dkt. #21.) The United
States has responded that the appeal is a frivolous waste of time and resources
only designed to further stall collection of Trowbridge’s outstanding tax
liabilities. (Dkt. #22.)
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO COURT’S ORDER
Since Trowbridge refused to participate in the Court ordered conference,
the United States responds to the Court’s order on its own as follows:
1. A brief factual and legal synopsis of the case. On July 10, 2000,
Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two tracts of contiguous real property and a
private road easement in Tyler County, Texas, (hereinafter, “Tyler County
Property”) to an entity called Ideal Abilities. The deeds and contracts for the
conveyances state that, after recording, the documents were to be returned to
Ideal Abilities, c/o P. O. Box 60899, Houston, Texas 77205. The contracts were
signed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., as Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities.
Because of the lack of adequate consideration, the timing of the sale, the close
relationship between transferor and transferee, and the retention and continued
enjoyment of the property by John Parks Trowbridge Jr., Ideal Abilities holds
title to the Tyler County Property merely as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge
Jr.
On June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Ideal Abilities, as a
nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. The United States
3
has valid and subsisting federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., and John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. for all property and
rights to property in which they have an interest - which includes any interest in
the Tyler County Property. The federal tax liens should be foreclosed upon the
Tyler County Property, the Tyler County Property should be sold free and clear
of all rights, titles, claims, and interests of the parties, and the proceeds of the sale
should be distributed according to law.
2. The jurisdictional basis for this suit. This Court has jurisdiction
over this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7402 and 7403 and 28 U.S.C. 1340 and 1345.
3. Confirm that initial mandatory disclosure required by Rule
26(a)(1) and this order has been completed. The United States served its initial
disclosures on John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. on November 3, 2014 by U.S. Mail. No
initial disclosures have been received by the United States from any of the
defendants as of the date of this filing.
4. Proposed scheduling order deadlines. The United States accepts
the standard deadlines outlined in Appendix 1 of the Court’s Order. (Dkt. #15.)
5. Mediation. The United States does not agree that mediation is
appropriate in this case.
6. The identity of persons expected to be deposed. At this time, the
United States intends to depose defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
representatives of defendants Ideal Abilities and Bright Futures Investments, and
Evelyn Anne Walker.
4
7 & 8. Disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information. The
United States does not believe that there are any issues regarding electronically
stored information.
9. Whether any other orders should be entered by the court
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), (c). At this time, the
United States does not anticipate the need for any orders under the designated
rules.
10. Estimated trial time. The United States anticipates approximately
three days for trial of this matter.
11. Counsel for the United States. The United States will be
represented by undersigned counsel, Joshua D. Smeltzer, at the management
conference who is the attorney of record in this case with authority to bind the
United States in all matters involving scheduling. Mr. Smeltzer does not have
any settlement authority, which is held by officials at the Justice Department and
not trial attorneys assigned to cases. If the Court would like briefing on
settlement authority in this case the United States can provide that briefing upon
request.
12. Jury Trial Designation. This case is listed on PACER as having a
jury demand claimed by the defendant. The only defendant that has filed an
answer is defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) The United
States did not request a jury or notice a jury demand made in either answer filed
by Trowbridge. Regardless, there is no right to a trial by jury in a foreclosure
5
pursuant to a United States tax lien – which is the relief requested by the United
States. See e.g. Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 478-479 (5th Cir. 1968).
Therefore, the United States believes that any jury demand, to the extent it was
made, is improper and that demand should be stricken.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
6
Government
Exhibit
_____________
A
** NOT FOR PRINTED PUBLICATION **
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
§ CIVIL ACTION No. 9-14-CV-138
v. §
§ JUDGE RON CLARK
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al., §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN PARK TROWBRIDGE, JR.’S MOTION FOR

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Before the court is Defendant John Park Trowbridge, Jr.’s motion for an interlocutory
appeal regarding the power of this court to enter an Order Governing Proceedings. [Doc. # 21].
Defendant Trowbridge has argued that this court does not have the authority to sua sponte enter
an Order Governing Proceedings and has asked for an interlocutory appeal on this issue. For the
reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
I. Background
This case arises out of a longstanding disputed between the Internal Revenue Service and
Defendant Trowbridge, regarding unpaid taxes. On May 23, 2014, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas entered a judgment against Defendant Trowbridge for
$3,326,015.01, plus additional statutory interest accruing after April 7, 2014. [Doc. # 1-1]. The
United States then brought suit in the Tyler Division of the Eastern District of Texas, to foreclose
on federal tax liens on property belonging to Defendant Trowbridge, located in Woodville,
Texas. [Doc. # 1]. The presiding judge transferred the case to this division, as Woodville is in
1
Tyler County, which is in the Lufkin Division. [Doc. # 12]. Defendant Trowbridge filed this
motion to seek an interlocutory appeal to this court’s power to enter orders governing scheduling
of this case.
II. Applicable Law
It is within the inherent power of any federal court to control the disposition of matters on
its docket, and the court must exercise its own judgment in doing so, by balancing the competing
interests of the parties. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166 (1936).
Federal district courts are required to enter scheduling orders in civil matters. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(1). In order to assist a court in entering a scheduling order, the court may compel
the parties to appear for one or more pretrial conference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a). Prior to this
conference, counsel and unrepresented parties are required to meet and confer. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(f).
Interlocutory appeals are only permissible when the statutory requirements are met, and
even then, are “granted sparingly, not automatically.” Ala. Labor Council, AFL-CIO, Pub. Emp.
Union, Local No. 1279 v. Alabama, 453 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b), there are three requirements of an interlocutory appeal: 1. the order must involve a
controlling question of law; 2. there must be a substantial ground for a difference of opinion
regarding that question of law; and 3. an immediate appeal from that order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
III. Analysis
This matter meets none of the requirements provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As to
the first prong, this case involves a dispute about unpaid taxes and federal tax liens. The
2
Procedural Orders issued pursuant to the Federal Rules are not the sort of controlling issues
subject to interlocutory appeals. Next, there are no credible grounds for a difference of opinion
on this matter. Defendant Trowbridge tries to obfuscate the issue with arguments regarding
territorial versus constitutional courts. These arguments are unpersuasive and irrelevant.
Finally, an intermediate appeal will not advance this litigation. The requirements for an
interlocutory appeal have not been met.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant Trowbridge has failed to show that any of the requirements for an
interlocutory appeal have been met. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant
Trowbridge’s motion for an interlocutory appeal [Doc. # 21] is DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 18 day of November, 2014.
___________________________________
3

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Clerk enter a default against
defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. In support of the
request, the United States avers as follows:
2. On July 16, 2014, summonses were served on John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr., as President of Bright Futures Investments Inc. and as Trustee of
Ideal Abilities. (Dkts. #4 - 5.)

Clerk of the Court execute and enter on the docket a Clerk’s Entry of Default
against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities. The United States
also requests such further and other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
It appearing from the files and records of this Court as of ___________________,
that Defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities, against whom
judgment for affirmative relief is sought in this action, have failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; now therefore,
I, Dave Maland, Clerk of said Court, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 55(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, do hereby enter default against Defendants
Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities.
Dated this ___________ day of ________________________, 2014.
_____________________________
DAVID MALAND
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Clerk enter a default against
defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. In support of the
request, the United States avers as follows:
2. On July 16, 2014, summonses were served on John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr., as President of Bright Futures Investments Inc. and as Trustee of
Ideal Abilities. (Dkts. #4 - 5.)

Clerk of the Court execute and enter on the docket a Clerk’s Entry of Default
against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities. The United States
also requests such further and other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
United States of America,
9:14-cv-138
v. Civ. No. ________________________
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
I hereby certify that I am the plaintiff or the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the above
Bright Future Investments, Inc.
cause, and that defendant ________________________________ was served by the following
method:
Personally served the President of Bright Future Investments, Inc. - John
Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (See Dkt. #4.)
I further certify that the defendant has failed to serve an answer or other responsive pleading;
no extension has been granted or any extension has expired; the defendant is neither an infant (under
age 21) nor an incompetent person; the defendant is not in the active military service of the United
States of America or its officers or agents or was not six months prior to the filing of the case.
The Clerk is requested to enter a default against said defendant.
/s/ Joshua D. Smeltzer, Attorney

___________________________________________
Date: Plaintiff or Attorney for Plaintiff
11/26/2014 Maryland Bar (no bar number)
___________________ ____________________________________________
Bar No.
U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division
____________________________________________
Address
717 N. Harwood St., Suite 400, Dallas, Texas
_____________________________________________
p:\dflt.aff
9:14-cv-138
v. Civ. No. ________________________
Ideal Abilities.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
I hereby certify that I am the plaintiff or the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the above
Ideal Abilities
cause, and that defendant ________________________________ was served by the following
method:
Personally served the Trustee of Ideal Abilities - John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
(See Dkt. #5.)
I further certify that the defendant has failed to serve an answer or other responsive pleading;
no extension has been granted or any extension has expired; the defendant is neither an infant (under
age 21) nor an incompetent person; the defendant is not in the active military service of the United
States of America or its officers or agents or was not six months prior to the filing of the case.
The Clerk is requested to enter a default against said defendant.
/s/ Joshua D. Smeltzer, Attorney

___________________________________________
Date: Plaintiff or Attorney for Plaintiff
11/26/2014 Maryland Bar (no bar number)
___________________ ____________________________________________
Bar No.
U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division
____________________________________________
Address
717 N. Harwood St., Suite 400, Dallas, Texas
_____________________________________________
p:\dflt.aff
9:14-cv-138
v. Civil No. ______________________
Ideal Abilities.
CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT
On this ________ day of __________________, 20 _____, it appearing from the affidavit(s)
Joshua D. Smeltzer
in support of default of ____________________________, attorney for plaintiff, that each of the
defendants named below has failed to plead or otherwise defend herein as provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure;
Now, therefore, the DEFAULT of each of the following named defendants is hereby entered:
Bright Future Investments Inc., and
Ideal Abilities
DAVID J. MALAND, CLERK
By: _________________________
Deputy Clerk
p:\DFLT.ord

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
§ CIVIL ACTION No. 9-14-CV-138
v. §
§ JUDGE RON CLARK
§
Defendants. §
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court, after considering the joint attorney conference report and after reviewing the
case file, enters this case specific order which controls disposition of this action pending further
order of the Court. The following actions shall be completed by the date indicated.1
DEADLINES
December 2, 2014 Deadline for motions to transfer and to add

parties..
December 15, 2014 Plaintiff’s disclosure of expert testimony

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and Local
Rule CV-26(b).
February 17, 2015 Deadline for Plaintiff to file amended

pleadings. A motion for leave to amend is not
necessary.
1
If a deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday as defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, the
effective date is the first federal court business day following the deadline imposed.
1
March 3, 2015 Deadline for Defendant’s final amended

pleadings. A motion for leave to amend is not
necessary.
December 28, 2014 Defendant’s disclosure of expert testimony

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and Local
Rule CV-26(b).
Seven weeks after disclosure of an expert is Deadline to object to any other party’s expert
made. witnesses. Objections shall be made by a
motion to strike or limit expert testimony and
shall be accompanied by a copy of the expert’s
report in order to provide the court with all the
information necessary to make a ruling on any
objection. The court will not accept objections
to experts filed in any form, including motions
in limine, after this date.2
Expert reports should include the categories of

information set out in Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B) and 26(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii). Challenges
to expert reports should include those set out in
Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)-(d) and 703.
April 30, 2015 Deadline for motions to dismiss, motions for

summary judgment, or other dispositive
motions.
April 20, 2015 All discovery shall be commenced in time to

be completed by this date.
June 18, 2015 Notice of intent to offer certified records.
June 18, 2015 Counsel and unrepresented parties are each

responsible for contacting opposing counsel
and unrepresented parties to determine how
they will prepare the Joint Final Pretrial Order,
see local Rule CV-16(b), and Joint Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law..
2
This requirement has two goals: (1) to encourage early disclosure of experts so that if one is
struck, the party will have time to find another; and (2) to avoid the gamesmanship that has
become common as parties attempt to disqualify experts with a motion in limine thus distracting
opponents during final trial preparations and perhaps even blocking testimony required to
establish a claim or defense.
2
June 25, 2015 Video deposition designations are due. Each

party who proposes to offer a deposition by
video shall serve on all other parties a
disclosure identifying the line and page
numbers to be offered. All other parties will
have seven calendar days to serve a response
with any objections and requesting cross
examination line and page numbers to be
included. Counsel must consult on any
objections, and only those which cannot be
resolved shall be presented to the court. The
party who filed the initial Designation is
responsible for preparation of the final edited
video in accordance with all parties’
designations, and the rulings on objections.
July 2, 2015 Motions in limine are due. File Joint Final

Pretrial Order. The form is available on the
Eastern District of Texas’s website.
July 9, 2015 Responses to motions in limine are due.3
File objections to witnesses, deposition

extracts, and exhibits listed in pretrial order.4
(This does not extend the deadline to object to
expert witnesses.) Provide the exhibit objected
to in the motion or response. If numerous
objections are filed, the court may set a hearing
prior to docket call. File Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
3
To save time and space respond only to items objected to. All others will be considered to be
agreed. Opposing counsel shall confer in an attempt to resolve any dispute over the motions in
limine within five calendar days of the filing of any response. The parties shall notify the court
of all the issues which are resolved.
4
Within five calendar days after the filing of any objections, opposing counsel shall confer to
determine whether objections can be resolved without a court ruling. The parties shall notify the
court of all issues which are resolved. The court needs a copy of the exhibit or the pertinent
deposition pages to rule on the objection.
3
July 23, 2015 Docket call and Final Pre-Trial at 1:30 in

Lufkin, via video. Date the parties should be
prepared to try case.
Provide the court with two copies of Exhibit

List, using form from the District Clerk’s
Office. Absent agreement of the parties, this
should not have exhibits that were not listed in
the Final Pre-Trial Order, but may have some
deletions depending on rulings on objections.
July 27, 2015 Trial in Lufkin at 10:30 am. This case will
then be tried in order with other cases on the
docket. Depending on disposition of other
cases on the court’s docket, trial may be the
following week. About a month before docket
call, counsel may wish to consult with counsel
for the other cases on the July docket to
determine whether their cases are likely to
settle
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
Modification. Taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of
the proposed discovery in resolving the issues, the Court modifies the parameters of discovery in
the following respects. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
Disclosure. The parties are reminded of the requirement, set out in this court’s Initial
Order Governing Proceedings, to have already disclosed, without awaiting a discovery request,
information in addition to that required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, including names of persons likely
to have, and documents containing, information “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”
If there are any questions about whether information is “relevant to the claim or defense of any
party” review Local Rule CV-26(d).
A party that fails to timely disclose any of the information required to be disclosed
by order of this court or by the Federal Rules of Procedure, will not, unless such failure is
harmless, be permitted to use such evidence at trial, hearing or in support of a motion.
Depositions. Plaintiff may depose Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, corporate

representatives of Defendants Bright Future Investments and Ideal Abilities, and Evelyn Anne
Walker. Each party may also depose three additional witnesses as “extra depositions.” The total
time allotted for the “extra depositions” is limited to eight hours for Plaintiffs and eight hours for
Defendants, whether the time is used in direct examination or cross-examination. Absent court
4
order, all depositions shall be taken in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) and Local Rule CV-
30.
The parties are permitted unlimited depositions on written questions of custodians of

business records.
Electronic Discovery. Electronically stored information will be produced in hard copy

form or multi-page TIFF format, unless the parties agree otherwise.
The parties are excused from the pretrial disclosure requirements set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)as such disclosure is cumulative of this court’s pre-trial order
procedures.
DISCOVERY DISPUTES
A magistrate judge is available during business hours to immediately hear discovery

disputes and to enforce provisions of the rules. The hotline number is (903) 590-1198. See
Local Rule CV-26(e).
RESOURCES
The Eastern District of Texas website (http://www.txed.uscourts.gov) contains

information about Electronic filing, which is mandatory, Local Rules, telephone numbers,
general orders, frequently requested cases, the Eastern District fee schedule, and other
information. The electronic filing HelpLine is 1-866-251-7534.
COMPLIANCE
A party is not excused from the requirements of this scheduling order by virtue of the fact
that dispositive motions are pending, the party has not completed its investigation, the party
challenges the sufficiency of the opposing party’s disclosure or because another party has failed
to comply with this order or the rules.
Failure to comply with relevant provisions of the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or this order may result in the exclusion of evidence at trial, the imposition of
sanctions by the Court, or both. If a fellow member of the Bar makes a just request for
cooperation or seeks scheduling accommodation, a lawyer will not arbitrarily or unreasonably
withhold consent. However, the Court is not bound to accept agreements of counsel to extend
deadlines imposed by rule or court order. See Local Rule AT-3(j).
5
TRIAL
The deadlines for pre-trial matters, such as exchanging exhibits, and objections, are
intended to reduce the need for trial objections, side-bar conferences, and repetitive presentation
of evidentiary predicates for clearly admissible evidence. Counsel should be familiar with the
evidence display system available in the courtroom. Copies of exhibits which will be handed to
witnesses should be placed in a three ring binder, with an additional copy for the court. (To
make it easy to direct the witness to the correct exhibit while on the stand, Plaintiff should use a
dark colored binder such as black or dark blue. Defendants should use a light colored binder
such as white, red, or light blue.) Alternatively, if exhibits have been scanned and will be
presented via a computer projection system, be sure there is a way for the court to view or read
them separately so as to be able to understand motions and objections.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 25 day of November, 2014.
___________________________________
6
1
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 LUFKIN DIVISION
3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | DOCKET 9:14CV138

|
4 | NOVEMBER 25, 2014
VS. |
5 | 9:00 A.M.
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, |
6 JR., ET AL | BEAUMONT, TEXAS
7 --------------------------------------------------------
8 VOLUME 1 OF 1, PAGES 1 THROUGH 12
9 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE RON CLARK,

11
--------------------------------------------------------
12
13 APPEARANCES:
14 FOR THE GOVERNMENT: JOSHUA DAVID SMELTZER

(BY TELEPHONE)
15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TAX DIVISION
16 717 N. HARWOOD STREET, SUITE 400
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201
17
18
FOR THE DEFENDANT: NO APPEARANCE
19
20
COURT REPORTER: CHRISTINA L. BICKHAM, CRR, RMR
21 FEDERAL OFFICIAL REPORTER
300 WILLOW, SUITE 221
22 BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701
23
24
PROCEEDINGS RECORDED USING COMPUTERIZED STENOTYPE;
25 TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED VIA COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION.
Christina L. Bickham, RMR, CRR

409/654-2891
2
1 (OPEN COURT, DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT.)
2 THE COURT: This is Judge Clark. I call
3 United States versus John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
4 Number 9:14cv138.
5 Who is here for the United States?
6 MR. SMELTZER: For the United States, it's
7 Joshua Smeltzer.
8 THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Trowbridge, are
9 you there?
10 (No response.)
11 THE COURT: Okay. We have set this scheduling
12 conference. And let me just confirm on the record that
13 notice was sent to Mr. Trowbridge -- I understand by
14 certified mail? We'll check that docket number because I
15 think we've gotten the return receipt card on that.
16 MR. SMELTZER: Your Honor, this is Joshua
17 Smeltzer. And we also sent Mr. Trowbridge a copy of your
18 order in an attempt to meet with him for the 26(f); so,
19 he received a copy from us as well.
20 THE COURT: Okay. And Docket Number 16 in
21 this case is the acknowledgment of the receipt of the
22 certified mail delivery. And as I understand it -- let
23 me ask Ms. Fischer -- and, for the record, she's my law
24 clerk on this particular case.
25 You've noted here that he would not meet and

409/654-2891
3
1 confer, arguing that no one has proven that the court has
2 constitutional authority to enter an order governing
3 proceedings. Is that based on something he put in
4 writing or...
5 LAW CLERK: This was the order we did on his
6 interlocutory appeal, that we did not have the authority
7 to enter --
8 THE COURT: That's right. He filed a motion
9 for interlocutory appeal.
10 LAW CLERK: And that's the -- (indiscernible).
11 THE COURT: Okay.
12 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. What did you say,
13 Ms. Fischer?
14 LAW CLERK: And it's the denial of the
15 interlocutory appeal and the denial of default judgment
16 with --
17 THE COURT: Right.
18 Mr. Trowbridge filed -- and this is Docket
19 Number 21 -- a motion for interlocutory appeal regarding
20 the power of the court to enter an order governing
21 proceedings. I dealt with that; and for the reasons
22 stated in that order, it is beyond question that a
23 federal district court has the power to enter an order
24 governing proceedings and, for that matter, to require
25 the parties and/or their counsel to appear for scheduling

409/654-2891
4
1 conferences, status conferences, and so forth.
2 If this is some variation on one of the groups
3 believing that they are no longer a part of the United
4 States or they are a part of the Republic of Texas or the
5 Republic of Minnesota, I think the Union Army decided
6 that question as far as this particular jurisdiction at
7 the end of the Civil War. There is no question that this
8 court has the power and jurisdiction in this part of
9 Texas and no question that I have the authority to enter
10 orders on scheduling and requiring parties to appear.
11 So, now, the government had moved -- or made a
12 request for entry of default judgment; and I had entered
13 an order, Document 26, on that. So, Mr. Smeltzer, do you
14 understand the procedure? It's not that at some point
15 you're not entitled to it; it's that it's that two-step
16 process. Do you have any questions about that?
17 MR. SMELTZER: We do not, your Honor. I read
18 through your order, and I think that was just a
19 misreading of the rule by my part. We filed -- right
20 after your order, we filed a request for the clerk to
21 enter default; and then we'll proceed to request default
22 judgment from you once that is entered.
23 THE COURT: Okay. And just for record
24 purposes, let me be sure -- I didn't state this before.
25 I'm going to -- the deputy clerk is here.

409/654-2891
5
1 You have received no word or order, have you,
2 from Mr. Trowbridge indicating that, for example, he's
3 not able to be here because he's having a medical
4 problem; or he didn't call in to your office, like
5 sometimes we get, that there is a large traffic accident
6 or traffic problem or anything like that?
7 DEPUTY CLERK: No, sir, I haven't.
8 THE COURT: And, Ms. Fischer, likewise, as the
9 clerk on the case, you haven't received any information
10 like that?
11 LAW CLERK: No, I haven't.
12 THE COURT: All right. And let me, if I
13 could -- I'll ask the court security officer.
14 Will you check downstairs and maybe check
15 outside the door? Let's be sure Mr. Trowbridge is not
16 standing outside in the hall or having some kind of
17 problem downstairs at the front door, at the entrance.
18 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Yes, sir.
19 THE COURT: And let me also ask Brandy, my
20 judicial assistant who mans the front desk, if she would
21 come in and verify whether or not there have been any
22 calls today from -- or e-mails from Mr. Trowbridge
23 indicating some problem in making it here today.
24 JUDICIAL ASSISTANT: No, sir.
25 THE COURT: All right.

409/654-2891
6
1 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: There is no one
2 downstairs, your Honor.
3 THE COURT: Okay.
4 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: He has not come in.
5 THE COURT: All right. So, evidently he's
6 just failed to appear.
7 So, let me ask the government. I guess we
8 have two questions here. One is the issue of the
9 entities, which are only allowed to appear with counsel;
10 and I think you're taking the steps to deal with them.
11 What, if I might ask, on the scheduling order and so
12 forth, are your intentions as far as dealing with him
13 individually since he is allowed to appear pro se and
14 has, in fact, filed an answer and an amended answer? So,
15 he's made his appearance, is not in total default.
16 The full scheduling order that we sent out as
17 a guide to yourself and Mr. Trowbridge, that's basically
18 our plain vanilla form that we send out as a guide; and
19 then normally counsel would confer and determine whether
20 this particular deadline is needed or whether that one
21 can be eliminated because there is no need for it. What
22 are your thoughts on what scheduling should now be
23 entered as far as expeditiously and fairly disposing of
24 the case?
25 MR. SMELTZER: Sure. Your Honor, we had

409/654-2891
7
1 indicated in our 26(f) report -- we filed one
2 individually since he wouldn't meet with us. And we had
3 indicated that the court deadlines that it suggested were
4 fine by us.
5 We do not anticipate a need for any sort of
6 expert witnesses; so, if those deadlines were to be
7 eliminated, that would not be a problem for us.
8 We do intend to try to get third-party
9 information possibly on these entities. Our initial
10 investigation indicates that these entities are not
11 registered with the Secretary of State. We believe them
12 to be fictitious. But to do our due diligence, a short
13 period of time in order for us to follow up on that and
14 get whatever information we can from third parties, I
15 think, would be needed. The deadlines in the court's
16 order are sufficient for that.
17 And then what we intend to do is file a motion
18 for summary judgment outlining to the court the law and
19 the facts as we see them, and we think that the court
20 will be able to dispose of matters after it receives that
21 motion. The answer that Mr. Trowbridge did file, it
22 contains the standard kind of frivolous argument that the
23 court mentioned, about him not being a citizen of the
24 United States because he is a citizen of Texas instead
25 and other things that have been rejected by the courts

409/654-2891
8
1 throughout the country pretty uniformly.
2 THE COURT: Yes. Jefferson Davis and
3 Robert E. Lee made similar arguments at one time, and
4 that issue was decided against them.
5 You indicated no use of expert witnesses. So,
6 you don't think you're going to need an accountant-type
7 to testify as to the amounts and the interest and so
8 forth? I mean, you may not want to foreclose yourself
9 completely. Or perhaps you've presented these before and
10 you're perfectly comfortable. It just occurs to me that
11 given the amount of interest and penalties and so
12 forth --
13 MR. SMELTZER: Sure. The interest is
14 statutory.
15 THE COURT: Okay.
16 MR. SMELTZER: And we have certified
17 transcripts indicating the amounts owed.
18 THE COURT: All right.
19 MR. SMELTZER: And also we just concluded
20 litigation against Mr. Trowbridge in the Southern
21 District where Judge Hughes had entered an order
22 essentially reducing those assessments to a judgment.
23 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
24 MR. SMELTZER: So, a lot of the amounts have
25 been dealt with just in a previous proceeding.

409/654-2891
9
1 THE COURT: I just wanted to be real sure you
2 weren't cutting yourself off and then --
3 MR. SMELTZER: No.
4 THE COURT: -- later would recognize, "Oh, I
5 need to change that."
6 MR. SMELTZER: I appreciate that.
7 THE COURT: All right. About how long do you
8 think -- I guess we don't really need to have a lengthy
9 deadline -- I mean, we could combine the deadline to add
10 parties and motion to transfer. You don't think you're
11 coming up with additional parties, do you? Or do you?
12 MR. SMELTZER: No. I don't believe so. I
13 believe we've found all the parties that may claim an
14 interest in the properties we're seeking; so, I think
15 we're okay.
16 THE COURT: All right. We'll combine those
17 two and make them December 2nd.
18 MR. SMELTZER: Okay.
19 THE COURT: And then I'll leave the disclosure
20 dates for expert witnesses, but I think I'll move them up
21 much closer since you don't think you're going to need
22 any. If he thinks he's going to have any, we might as
23 well flesh that out earlier --
24 MR. SMELTZER: Sure.
25 THE COURT: -- and probably put that, say,

409/654-2891
10
1 December 15th --
3 THE COURT: -- so that we can start, for
4 yourself, and maybe December 28 for him.
6 THE COURT: And March 31st is the deadline for
7 summary judgment motions. Do you think that gives you
8 sufficient time?
9 MR. SMELTZER: I think so. I have a couple of
10 trials in February and March, but I believe that I can
11 still make that deadline. But, I mean, if the court
12 wanted to make it one month earlier and just combine
13 discovery and MSJ as one deadline, that would be okay by
14 me, too -- one month later, I mean.
15 THE COURT: Later.
16 MR. SMELTZER: Yeah, sorry. I realized that
17 after said it. One month later.
18 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. We'll do that, give
19 you the extra month so that way we don't run into the
20 problem of needing extensions on either side.
22 THE COURT: And then we'll leave basically the
23 trial and the pretrial deadlines as they are; although if
24 Mr. Trowbridge continues not to participate, that would
25 cause some problems for a trial unless, of course, the

409/654-2891
11
1 motion for summary judgment disposes of all of the
2 issues.
3 Okay. Any other items that you think would be
4 helpful to be discussed or necessary to be discussed?
5 MR. SMELTZER: Yes, your Honor. We had
6 indicated in our 26(f) -- we noticed on PACER that this
7 is set as a jury trial. The United States didn't make a
8 jury demand. I believe that Mr. Trowbridge -- at least
9 in my reading of his pleadings, I didn't see one there.
10 But, regardless, this type of case is one that isn't
11 entitled to a jury --
12 THE COURT: Okay.
13 MR. SMELTZER: -- a foreclosure on a federal
14 lien. I did a --
15 THE COURT: Hold on --
16 MR. SMELTZER: -- case in the --
17 THE COURT: Yeah. Hold on a second. Hold on
18 a second.
19 MR. SMELTZER: Sure.
20 LAW CLERK: I talked about it with the deputy
21 clerk in Lufkin, and it was a clerical error. So, the
22 jury demand has been pulled from the case.
23 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know if you heard
24 Ms. Fischer, but that was a clerical error.
25 MR. SMELTZER: Oh, okay.

409/654-2891
12
1 THE COURT: The deputy clerk has conferred
2 with my law clerk; and, so, we've pulled that.
3 MR. SMELTZER: Perfect.
4 THE COURT: And, so, we'll revise the schedule
5 to eliminate the items dealing with jury and switch it
6 over to the form we use for bench trials.
7 MR. SMELTZER: All right. Thank you very
8 much.
9 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
10 MR. SMELTZER: No. That is the only thing I
11 have, your Honor.
12 THE COURT: Very good. All right. In that
13 case I appreciate your participating. You're excused.
14 Court is in recess.
15 MR. SMELTZER: Thank you very much.
16 (Proceedings concluded, 9:20 a.m.)
17 COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
18 I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON THIS DATE,
19 DECEMBER 4, 2014, THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT
20 FROM THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS.
21
23
24
25

409/654-2891
Case 9:14-cv-00138-RC Document 34 Filed 12/05/14 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 270

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Court enter a default
judgment against defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities.
In support of the request, the United States avers as follows:
2. On July 16, 2014, summons were served on John Parks Trowbridge,
Jr., as President of Bright Futures Investments Inc. and as Trustee of Ideal
Abilities. (Dkts. #4 - 5.)

the property at issue. On December 5, 2014 the Clerk entered default against both
Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities. (Dkt. #34.)
6. Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities have failed to
plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the property at
issue as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(b).
Therefore, entry of default judgment against each of them is appropriate.
Court enter default judgment against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal
Abilities. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it
may be justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Case 9:14-cv-00138-RC Document 38-1 Filed 12/29/14 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 280

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Court, having considered the UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR

ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT, and any response or reply thereto, it is
hereby ADJUDGED that:
1. The United States’ motion is GRANTED;
2. Bright Futures Investments Inc. is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to

plead or otherwise defend against the United States Complaint and, having
failed to assert any interest in the property at issue, is adjudged to have no
interest in that property; and
3. Ideal Abilities is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to plead or otherwise

defend against the United States Complaint and, having failed to assert any
interest in the property at issue, is adjudged to have no interest in that property.
SIGNED this ________ day of _____________________________ , 20__.
________________________________

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138-MHS
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
NOTICE OF NO OPPOSITION
On December 5, 2014, the Clerk entered default against defendants Bright
Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. (Dkt. #34.) On December 29, 2014,
the United States moved for default judgment against Bright Future Investments,
Inc. and Ideal Abilities. (Dkt. #38.) The time to oppose this motion has expired
and no opposition was filed. (See L.R. 7(e)) Therefore, the motion is ready for
decision as an unopposed motion.
/
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF
filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also
served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
2

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, plaintiff United States of America moves for summary
judgment against defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (“Trowbridge”.)1 Based on the
undisputed material facts, the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
foreclosure of its nominee liens against property subject to the liens.
INTRODUCTION
After years of using frivolous arguments to stall, delay, and evade collection,
Trowbridge’s tax debt was reduced to judgment in the amount of $3,326,015, plus statutory
additions accruing after April 7, 2014.2 In his continued attempt to evade payment of taxes,
Trowbridge used nominee, Ideal Abilities, as a fictitious entity to mask his interest in property
subject to federal tax liens. The time has come for Trowbridge to pay what he owes. The United
States seeks foreclosure of its nominee tax lien against property held by fictitious and defaulted
party, Ideal Abilities, as the nominee of Trowbridge.
1
The Clerk has entered default against the other two defendants, Bright Futures Investments and Ideal Abilities, and
the United States has moved for default judgment to be entered against both entities. (Dkts. #34 and #38.)
2
Further collection activity since entry of judgment has reduced the total amount due, as of April 30, 2015, to
$3,135,328.13. Ashton Decl. ¶3. A copy of the Declaration of James Ashton is attached as Government Exhibit F.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Assessments were made against Trowbridge following adjudication of the tax
deficiencies against Trowbridge by the U.S. Tax Court.3 These assessments were reduced to
judgment against Trowbridge, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, in the amount of $3,326,015, for the 1993 through 1997 income tax years, plus statutory
additions accruing from April 7, 2014 until paid.4 The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the District
Court judgment against Trowbridge and awarded sanctions against Trowbridge for a frivolous
appeal.5 There is no genuine dispute that Trowbridge owes the United States millions of dollars
in unpaid tax liabilities.
The United States filed its complaint to foreclose its nominee tax liens against two tracts
of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County Texas (hereinafter –
“Tyler County Property”). See Dkt. #1 at ¶10. Both tracts of land and the easement were
conveyed by Anne Walker to “Ideal Abilities” with John Parks Trowbridge Jr. signing all the
contracts as “Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities.” Dkt. #1 at ¶¶10, 12. A copy of the deeds and
easement, with accompanying property descriptions, are attached as Government Exhibit D. The
“Real Property Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement” was signed by John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr. as “executive trustee” of Ideal Abilities and are attached as Government Exhibit
E.6
3Copies of the Tax Court Memorandum Opinions finding deficiencies for the tax years 1991 through 1997
are attached as Government Exhibits C-1 and C-2.
4
Government Exhibit A is a copy of the final amended judgment entered by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas against Trowbridge.
5
Government Exhibit B is the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the judgment entered by the
District Court against Trowbridge.
6
See Government Exhibit E at 3, 8, and 12.
U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment
Page 2 of 8
The Texas Secretary of State records do not reflect the existence of “Ideal Abilities” or
any similar sounding entities.7 Further, the Internal Revenue Service records do not indicate that
Ideal Abilities has an Employer Identification Number or any indication that it has ever filed a
tax return.8 In short, there is no evidence that Ideal Abilities actually exists as anything more than
a fictitious entity used as a nominee of its alleged “trustee” John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Moreover, all property tax appraisals were handled by Trowbridge, all property taxes
paid by Trowbridge, and that the request that a double-wide trailer be placed on the property was
also handled by Trowbridge. Dkt. #1 at ¶¶13-15. Therefore, because of a lack of adequate
consideration, the timing of the sale, the close relationship between transferor and transferee, and
the retention of continued enjoyment of the property by John Parks Trowbridge Jr. – Ideal
Abilities holds title to the Tyler County Property merely as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge
Jr. See Dkt. #1 at ¶16.
The clerk has entered default against Ideal Abilities and another entity used
administratively by Trowbridge, Bright Future Investments Inc., for failure to file an answer or
otherwise plead that it has any interest in the Tyler County Property. (Dkt. #34.) The only
“answer” to the United States’ Complaint is by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. and that “answer”
does nothing more than recite frivolous arguments that the federal courts lack jurisdiction
because he is a citizen of Texas and not a citizen of the United States.9 The same arguments were
7
Ashton Declaration at ¶5.
8
Ashton Decl. ¶4. Trowbridge used another entity, Bright Future Investments Inc., to operate a P.O. Box and handle
other administrative matters of Ideal Abilities. Bright Future Investments was included as a party that may assert an
interest in the property; however, default has been entered against Bright Future Investments and the United States’
motion for default judgment is pending against both Ideal Abilities and Bright Future Investments Inc. (Dkts. #34
and #38.)
9
See Dkts. #7 and 10.
Page 3 of 8
rejected by the District Court that entered judgment against him in the Southern District of Texas
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.10 The Fifth Circuit Stated, in the affirmance, that
This court has already rejected as frivolous the argument that

district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions
against residents of state…[and] Trowbridge’s argument that he is
not a citizen of the United States is equally frivolous…[because]
[t]his court has already held that the ‘citizens of Texas are subject
to the Federal Tax Code…[w[e do not address his arguments
further as there is ‘no need to refute these arguments with somber
reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest
these arguments have some colorable merit.’11
Therefore, by default or frivolous response, the United States allegations are undisputed material
facts supporting summary judgment in its favor.
On June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Ideal Abilities, as a nominee of
John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. A copy of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien
against Ideal Abilities as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is attached as Government
Exhibit G. The United States has a valid and subsisting federal tax lien against Ideal Abilities, as
nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., and John Parks Trowbridge Jr. against the Tyler County
Property and it should be foreclosed.12
10
See Dkts. #7 and 10; Gov. Ex. A and B.
11
Gov. Ex. B at 2.
12
See Dkt. #1 at ¶18 and 19.
Page 4 of 8
ARGUMENT
I.
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR. IS CURRENTLY INDEBTED TO THE UNITED STATES
An assessment of tax by the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) is presumptively
correct.13 John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., was assessed for unpaid income tax liabilities for the for
tax years 1993 through 1997 and is indebted to the United States in the amount of $3,135,328.13
plus statutory additions accruing from until paid.14 If tax liabilities are not paid on or before the
statutory date for payment15 then interest accrues on the underpayment from the due date until
paid.16 Similarly, interest accrues with respect to assessed, but unpaid, penalties, additional
amounts, or additions to tax.17
The tax deficiencies were adjudicated by the Tax Court in a prior proceeding. These
decisions also included two $25,000 sanction penalties because the Tax Court found that “[i]t is
clear to us that Dr. Trowbridge took the lead in the sanctionable activity here.”18
The assessments were reduced to judgment by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas19 and the appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was denied as
13 E.g., Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 1998).
14
Ashton Decl. ¶3.
15 Penalties,
additional amounts, or additions to tax are treated as taxes and are, therefore, also entitled to
the presumption of correctness. See 26 U.S.C. §6665(a)(2); Affiliated Foods, 154 F.3d at 530.
1626 U.S.C. §6601(a); See Bob Hamric Chevrolet, Inc. v. USA, Internal Revenue Service, 849 F. Supp. 500, 515
(W.D. Tex. 1994).
17 26 U.S.C. §6601(e)(2).
18 Gov. Ex. C-1 at 27. See also Gov. Ex. C-2 at 3, 15, 27-28.
19
Gov. Ex. A.

Page 5 of 8
“frivolous” and the judgment affirmed.20 There is no genuine dispute that Trowbridge has
millions of unpaid tax liabilities that attach to all his property and rights to property. These tax
liabilities are also due and owing for the federal tax liens filed against his nominee, Ideal
Abilities.21
II.
THE FEDERAL TAX LIENS AGAINST IDEAL ABILITIES, AS NOMINEE OF JOHN PARKS
TROWBRIDGE, JR., SHOULD BE FORECLOSED AGAINST THE TYLER COUNTY PROPERTY
By their default, Ideal Abilities and Bright Future Investments Inc. have admitted the
United States’ well-pled allegations of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); see also, Jackson v. FIE
Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2002); Nishimatsu Cons. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515
F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1975). Therefore, as pled in the complaint, Ideal Abilities holds
title to the Tyler County Property merely as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge Jr. See Dkt. #1 at
¶16.
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “the concepts of ‘nominee,’ ‘transferee,’ and ‘alter-
ego’ are bases for attaching the property of a third-party in satisfaction of a delinquent taxpayer’s
liability.”22 Therefore, “specific property in which a third person [or entity] has legal title may be
levied upon as a nominee of the taxpayer.”23 Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7403, the United States may
enforce its tax liens by foreclosing upon and selling the Tyler County Property and the Court
20
See Government Exhibit A. Government Exhibit B is the Fifth Circuit decision denying the appeal and affirming
the District Court judgment against John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
21
See Gov. Ex. G.
22
Oxford Capital Corp., 211 F.3d at 284.
23
Id.

Page 6 of 8
may order the foreclosure and sale of the property to satisfy the outstanding tax liabilities.24
Therefore, the federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
should be foreclosed against the Tyler County Property and the property should be sold.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and based on the undisputed material facts, the United States is
has valid and subsisting nominee liens against the Tyler County Property, held by Ideal Abilities,
and that property should be foreclosed and sold.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR THE UNITED STATES
24 See 26 U.S.C. §7403.

Page 7 of 8
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, with accompanying proposed order, was filed
with the Court’s ECF filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy
was also served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER

Page 8 of 8
Government
Exhibit
_____________
A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-20333 United States Court of Appeals

Summary Calendar Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 3, 2015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas
No. 4:14-CV-27
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*
John Parks Trowbridge (“Trowbridge”) appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the government, which ordered Trowbridge’s
income tax liabilities for 1993 through 1997 reduced to judgment, the
associated tax liens on the real property foreclosed, and the real property sold.
Trowbridge has not contested the validity of the tax liabilities or his ownership
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 14-20333
of the real property at issue. He has therefore waived those issues. Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, Trowbridge argues that
Harris County is not in the United States and that he is not a citizen of the
United States. He contends that this means the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions against residents of states and that
he is not subject to federal income taxes.
This court has already rejected as frivolous the argument that district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions against residents of
states. United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1991). This court
has also stated that 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602(a) and 7604, which authorize the
issuance and enforcement of IRS summonses, “are federal laws that the district
court has jurisdiction to consider under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” United States v.
Henderson, 209 F. App’x 401, 402 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1340
explicitly grants district courts jurisdiction in internal revenue cases and
28 U.S.C. § 1345 explicitly grants jurisdiction for civil suits commenced by the
United States.
Trowbridge’s argument that he is not a citizen of the United States is
equally frivolous. He presents “shopworn arguments characteristic of tax-
protestor rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this and other courts.”
Stearman v. Commissioner, 436 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2006). This court has
already held that the “citizens of Texas are subject to the Federal Tax Code.”
United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986). We do not address
his arguments further as there is “no need to refute these arguments with
somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest
these arguments have some colorable merit.” Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d
1417 (5th Cir. 1984). They have no merit at all.
This is not the first time Trowbridge has had these frivolous arguments
rejected. In Trowbridge et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-164, 2003 WL
2
No. 14-20333
21278475, Trowbridge made similar arguments in contesting his 1991-1995
tax liabilities. The tax court imposed a $25,000 sanction. In contesting his
1996-1997 tax liabilities, Trowbridge again used similar arguments in the tax
court; he was sanctioned a second time. Trowbridge et al. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-165, 2003 WL 21278414, at *10. Trowbridge appealed to this
court and once again resorted to frivolous arguments. This court upheld the
tax court’s sanctions and imposed additional sanctions.
Given Trowbridge’s history of frivolous appeals, we GRANT Appellee’s
motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 in the amount of $8,000.
We also order that Trowbridge be barred from filing any further appeals in this
court until (1) the sanctions awarded by this court are fully paid; and (2) a
district court certifies his appeal as having some arguable merit. See Smith v.
McCleod, 946 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1991). Trowbridge’s motions are DENIED
as moot.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3
T.C. Memo. 2003-164
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, Petitioner y.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
SABRINA MARTIN, f.k.a. SABRINA L. TROWBRIDGE, Petitioner y.

Docket Nos. 473-01, 474-01. Filed June 4, 2003.
R determined deficiencies in tax with respect to

Ps (H and W) for the years 1991-95, as well as
additions to tax under sees. 6651(a) (1) and 6654,
I.R.C., with respect to various of those years. Ps
filed petitions for redetermination but failed to
appear at trial. R moved for default judgment with
respect to the deficiencies in tax determined against
Ps for all years and the additions to tax determined
against H for the years 1991-93. R proceeded to trial
on the issues of (1) the additions to tax determined
against W for all years, and (2) the additions to tax
determined against H for 1994 and 1995.
Government
Exhibit
_____________
C-1
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1. Held: R's motion for default judgment is granted.
2. further, Forms 1040 and 1040EZ filed by

Ps do not constitute valid Federal income tax returns.
3. Held, further, Ps are liable for the additions

to tax at issue in the amounts determined by R, with
minor adjustments.
4. Held, further, Hand Ware liable for

penalties under sec. 6673, I.R.C., in the amounts of
$25,000 and $15,000, respectively.
John Parks Trowbridge and Sabrina Martin, pro sese.
M. Kathryn Bellis, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: These cases have been consolidated for
purposes of trial, briefing, and opinion. By notices of
deficiency dated October 11, 2000 (the notices of deficiency),
respondent determined deficiencies in, and additions to, each
petitioner's Federal income taxes as follows:
John Parks Trowbridge (Dr. Trowbridge)
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 {a! {12 Sec. 6654
1991 $6,533 $4
1992 9,492 $1,380 222
1993 83,478 20,870 3,498
1994 121,075 30,269 6,283
1995 130,699 32,595 7,068
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Sabrina L. Trowbridge (Ms. Martin 1 )
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 (a) (1) Sec. 6654
1991 $6,197 $105
1992 8,740 1,198 $190
1993 74,612 18,653 3,126
1994 102,588 25,647 5,323
1995 111,266 27,679 6,000
Respondent has moved that petitioners be held in default
with respect to the deficiencies in tax determined against them
for all years and that Dr. Trowbridge be held in default with
respect to the additions to tax determined against him for 1991,
1992, and 1993. In addition, respondent has moved for partial
summary judgment in his favor with respect to the additions to
tax determined against Dr. Trowbridge for 1994 and 1995 and the
additions to tax determined against Ms. Martin for all years.
Respondent has also asked the Court to impose a penalty on each
petitioner under section 6673(a) (1) in the amount of $25,000.
For the reasons that follow, we shall grant respondent's motions
for default judgment, sustain (with minor adjustments) the
additions to tax that are the subject of his motions for partial
summary judgment, and impose penalties under section 6673(a) (1).
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
During the years at issue, Ms. Martin was married to Dr.

Trowbridge and was known as Sabrina L. Trowbridge. She is now
known as Sabrina Martin, and we shall refer to her as Ms. Martin
for all purposes in this report.
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Procedure. For the sake of convenience, all dollar amounts are
rounded to the nearest dollar.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Preliminary Facts
At the time the petitions were filed in these cases, each
petitioner resided in Harris County, Texas.
Petitioners were married to each other during the years at
issue but filed separate returns for those years.
Dr. Trowbridge is a physician, and Ms. Martin is a nurse and
administrative assistant who, during the years at issue, was
sometimes employed by Dr. Trowbridge's professional corporation.
Both petitioners are calendar year taxpayers.
Respondent's examination with respect to Dr. Trowbridge's
1991, 1992, and 1993 taxable years commenced before 1998.
Respondent's examinations with respect to Dr. Trowbridge's 1994
and 1995 taxable years and Ms. Martin's 1991 through 1995 taxable
years commenced after July 1998.
Dr. Trowbridge's 1993, 1994, and 1995 Forms 1040
1993 Form 1040 2
On November 26, 1996, Dr. Trowbridge mailed to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return 1993 (Dr. Trowbridge's 1993 Form 1040), which the IRS
2
As discussed infra, Dr. Trowbridge's 1993 Form 1040 is
relevant to the determination of whether he is liable for the
sec. 6654 addition to tax with respect to his 1994 taxable year.
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received on December 3, 1996. On page 2 of Dr. Trowbridge's 1993
Form 1040, he reported tax of $92,494 but stated: "SEE ATTACHED
DISCLAIMER STATEMENT--ADMITTED TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO". The
attached disclaimer statement (the 1993 disclaimer) reads in part
as follows:
The assessment and payment of income taxes is voluntary

* * * John respectfully declines to volunteer
concerning assessment and payment of any tax balance
due on the return or any redetermination of said tax.
Be it known that we, separately and together,
therefore, deny tax liability and do not admit that the
stated amount of tax on return, as calculated solely by
reference to provided tables, is due and collectible.
The tax return read as a whole shows no amount as being
the tax and shows the tax to be zero and zero is the
starting point in determining a deficiency or any other
action involving this return. * * *
John has provided payment in the amount of $1,000 as a
voluntary contribution.
The 1993 disclaimer is signed by Dr. Trowbridge and "Acknowledged
in full agreement" by Ms. Martin.
Respondent determined a deficiency in Dr. Trowbridge's tax
for 1993 of $83,478.
1994 Form 1040
On January 16, 1997, Dr. Trowbridge mailed to the IRS a Form
1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1994 (Dr. Trowbridge's
1994 Form 1040), which the IRS received on January 21, 1997. On
page 2 of Dr. Trowbridge's 1994 Form 1040, he reported tax of
$170,144 but stated: "SEE ATTACHED DISCLAIMER STATEMENT--ADMITTED

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TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO". In substance, the attached disclaimer is
identical to the 1993 disclaimer.
Dr. Trowbridge submitted to the IRS no other document
purporting to be a return for 1994.
for 1994 of $121,075. The only payment made by Dr. Trowbridge
for 1994 was $1,000 paid on January 21, 1997, with his 1994 Form
1040.
1995 Form 1040
On January 20, 1997, Dr. Trowbridge mailed to the IRS a Form
1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1995 (Dr. Trowbridge's
1995 Form 1040), which the IRS received on January 27, 1997. On
page 2 of Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Form 1040, he reported tax of
$133,977 but stated: "SEE ATTACHED DISCLAIMER STATEMENT--ADMITTED
TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO". In substance, the attached disclaimer is
identical to the 1993 disclaimer.
Dr. Trowbridge submitted to the IRS no other document
purporting to be a return for 1995.
for 1995 of $130,699. The only payment made by Dr. Trowbridge
for 1995 was $1,000 paid on January 27, 1997, with his 1995 Form
1040.
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Ms. Martin's 1991 Through 1995 Income Tax Filings
1991 Form 1040
On or around November 1, 1996, Ms. Martin mailed to the IRS
a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1991 (Ms. Martin's
1991 Form 1040), which the IRS received on November 4, 1996. On
page 2 of Ms. Martin's 1991 Form 1040, she reported tax of $5,203
and withholding of $19,640. She also stated: "SEE ATTACHED
attached disclaimer refers to her but, in substance, is identical
to the 1993 disclaimer.
Ms. Martin submitted to the IRS no other document purporting
to be a return for 1991.
Respondent determined a deficiency in Ms. Martin's tax for
1991 of $6,197. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1991 was
$100 paid on November 4, 1996, with her 1991 Form 1040.
1992 Form 1040
On or around November 1, 1996, Ms. Martin mailed to the IRS
a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1992 (Ms. Martin's
1992 Form 1040), which the IRS received on November 4, 1996. On
page 2 of Ms. Martin's 1992 Form 1040, she reported tax of $1,805
and withholding of $7,944. She also stated: "SEE ATTACHED
attached disclaimer refers to her but, in substance, is identical
to the 1993 disclaimer.

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1992 of $8,740. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1992 was
$100 paid on November 4, 1996, with her 1992 Form 1040.
1993 and 1994 Tax Obligations
Ms. Martin did not file Federal income tax returns for
either 1993 or 1994. She did not make any estimated tax payments
for those years.
Respondent determined deficiencies of $74,612 and $102,588
in Ms. Martin's taxes for 1993 and 1994, respectively.
1995 Form 1040EZ
On or about January 20, 1997, Ms. Martin mailed to the IRS a
Form 1040EZ, Income Tax Return for Singles and Joint Filers With
No Dependents 1995 (Ms. Martin's 1995 Form 1040EZ), which the IRS
received on January 21, 1997. On Ms. Martin's 1995 Form 1040EZ,
she reported tax of $0, an earned income credit of $234, and
withholding of $635. She also stated: "SEE ATTACHED DISCLAIMER
STATEMENT--ADMITTED TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO". The attached
disclaimer refers to her but, in substance, is identical to the
1993 disclaimer.

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1995 of $111,266. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1995
was $100 paid on January 21, 1997, with her 1995 Form 1040EZ.
The Pleadings and Related Matters
The Petitions
In response to the notices of deficiency, both petitioners
filed petitions on January 9, 2001. In many respects, the
petitions are identical. Dr. Trowbridge's petition is 74 pages
long, and Ms. Martin's petition is 75 pages long. Although the
petitions do assign error to respondent's determinations, for the
most part, they make a convoluted argument that subjecting
petitioners to the same rate of tax as Federal employees
constitutes impermissible "disparate treatment". Petitioners
cite a variety of Code sections and regulatory materials to show
that public employees and certain others receive benefits from
the Federal Government that are not available to petitioners as
"private independent contractors" or "private sector workers".
They state:
In direct contrast to the private independent

contractor, or non-government workers whose economic
position, and rate of personal earnings are not fixed
and guaranteed by statute, the rate instead is
controlled by what the market place will bear and
without any position fixed by statute. This gives the
government employees or officers a great personal and
economic advantage over that afforded to the private
independent contractor, or non-government workers, and
as such creates a disparate or unequal treatment under
the law, because the Internal Revenue Service
administratively states that the private independent
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contractors, or private sector workers pay [sic] must

pay the same rate or percentage of tax on net income as
do the government employees under Title 26 USC §§ 1, or
3, without affording these same government privileges,
services, benefits, contributions, or funds.
They argue that either respondent has to afford them a lower,
special tax rate or they must be afforded the same benefits as
Federal Government employees:
it is the position of this petitioner, that there is

within the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), a separate
taxing statute with a reduced or compensatory rate of
tax for the taxpayers who are "private independent
contractors", or "private sector workers". If not,
then this petitioner is entitled to receive the same
compensation in benefits and economic protections as
the federal employee, appointed or elected official, or
corporate or partnership individuals.
Respondent's Motions for a More Definite Statement
In response to the petitions, respondent moved in each case
for a more definite statement or to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Following a hearing on
respondent's motions, we declined to dismiss but concluded that
the petitions contained frivolous and groundless allegations. We
struck from the petitions all such allegations, which constituted
the bulk of the petitions.
The Answers
On May 17, 2001, respondent filed his answers to the
abridged petitions, denying all material allegations of fact made
in support of the lone remaining assignment of error contained
therein.
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Standing Pretrial Order and Notice
On May 29, 2001, the Court issued its Standing Pretrial
Order and Notice in each case, setting the cases for trial at the
trial session of the Court commencing on December 3, 2001, in
Houston, Texas.
Petitioners' Discovery Reguests
On September 20 and 25, 2001, Ms. Martin and Dr. Trowbridge,
respectively, served on respondent a request for admissions.
Each request is over 140 pages in length (without attachments)
and requests over 600 admissions.
On September 27, 2001, each petitioner served on respondent
interrogatories and a request for production of documents. Each
set of interrogatories is over 125 pages in length and contains
over 500 interrogatories.
On October 4, 2001, respondent filed motions for protective
orders with respect to the requests for admissions,
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents served
by petitioners. Respondent argued that such requests were not
timely, addressed improper issues, and were intended to burden
respondent unduly, waste his resources, and divert him from trial
preparation. We asked petitioners to respond and, after
considering their responses, granted respondent relief
"substantially for the reasons stated in respondent's motions."

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Petitioners' Dismissal Efforts
Motions To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
On November 21, 2001, Dr. Trowbridge submitted "for the
petitioners" a motion styled "Petitioner's Verified Challenge to
Jurisdiction of the Court", which we filed in each case as a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion "denies
the existence of any contracts or commercial agreements which
create an attachment of an equity relationship between the
'United States' and/or The State of Texas and Petitioner." The
motion also states: "Petitioner has specifically forfeited,
waived, rejected, declined, and refused to voluntarily accept any
and all benefits, especially admiralty and limited debt liability
benefits, from the 'United States' and its instrumentalities."
Apparently on those bases, the motion then states: "Petitioner
hereby gives formal notice to the Court of Petitioner's status as
a nonjuristic person, a Texas state Citizen, and that, in such
status, Petitioner squarely challenges and voids the jurisdiction
of this Court." Petitioners claimed in the motion that we lack
"in personam" jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. We
denied the motion.
Motions To Dismiss
On November 23, 2001, Dr. Trowbridge submitted (and Ms.
Martin signed "in full agreement") a motion styled "Petitioner's
Notice of Withdrawal of Petition", which we filed in each case as

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a motion to dismiss (the motions to dismiss) and denied. 3 In
those motions, petitioners reiterated their claims that we lack
jurisdiction and stated that they wished to withdraw their
petitions: "Petitioner hereby gives Notice of WITHDRAWAL of the
petition for review by the United States Tax Court. This Notice
of Withdrawal of petition makes moot, voids, and cancels all
proceedings previously scheduled by this Court for action upon
the petition filed in error."
Trial Session
These cases were called from the calendar at the Court's
trial session commencing on Monday, December 3, 2001, in Houston,
Texas. On Friday, November 30, 2001, an employee of the Court
Clerk's Office contacted petitioners and reminded them that they
were expected to appear at the call of the calendar on Monday,
December 3. When, on that date, the cases were called from the
calendar, petitioners failed to appear. Counsel for respondent
appeared and announced ready for trial. The Court set the cases
for trial on Tuesday, December 4, 2001, at 9:00 a.m., and
directed the deputy trial clerk to contact petitioners by
telephone and notify them of the date and time of the trial.
When the cases were recalled from the calendar on December 4, for
3
To the extent petitioners were relying on grounds other
than jurisdiction, a decision dismissing the proceedings would
have been considered a decision sustaining the deficiencies
determined by respondent. See sec. 7459(d). Since we did not
believe that was the result petitioners intended, we denied the
motions to dismiss.
- 14 -
trial, petitioners failed to appear. Counsel for respondent
appeared and announced ready for trial. The deputy trial clerk
reported that he had left messages for both petitioners as to the
date and time of the trial. Respondent moved to dismiss for
default in both cases and the Court set those motions for a
hearing on Friday, December 7, 2001. The Court instructed
respondent's counsel to arrange personal service of the
petitioners, to inform them of the hearing. The Court heard one
witness in support of respondent's case.
On Friday, December 7, 2001, the cases were recalled from
the calendar for a hearing on respondent's motions to dismiss for
default. Petitioners failed to appear. Counsel for respondent
appeared and announced ready for the hearing. Internal Revenue
Agent Marilyn Maciness testified that she had served each
petitioner personally with notice of the hearing. The Court took
respondent's motions to dismiss for default under advisement.
OPINION
I. Motions To Dismiss for Default
Respondent has moved (1) that Dr. Trowbridge be held in
default with respect to, and that a decision be entered in
respondent's favor in the full amount of, the deficiencies in tax
determined by respondent against Dr. Trowbridge for the years
1991 through 1995 and the additions to tax determined by

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respondent against Dr. Trowbridge for the years 1991 through
1993, and (2) that Ms. Martin be held in default with respect to,
and that a decision be entered in respondent's favor in the full
amount of, the deficiencies in tax determined by respondent
against Ms. Martin for the years 1991 through 1995. Petitioners
object, respectively, to those motions (collectively, the default
motions) . 4
In pertinent part, Rule 123(a) provides:
(a) Default: If any party has failed to plead or

otherwise proceed as provided by these Rules or as
required by the Court, then such party may be held in
default by the Court either on motion of another party
or on the initiative of the Court. Thereafter, the
Court may enter a decision against the defaulting
party, upon such terms and conditions as the Court may
deem proper * * *
Respondent argues that petitioners' failures to appear for
the call of these cases on December 3, 2001, and at the trial of
the cases on December 4, 2001, constitute defaults and that it is
appropriate for the Court to enter default judgments against each
with respect to the deficiencies and additions to tax that are
the subject of the default motions.
Although petitioners failed to appear at the hearing on

the default motions, they did submit a document to the Court that
day styled "Mandatory Judicial Notice of Petitioner's Refusal for
Cause of Respondent's Motion for Default Judgment", which we
filed in each case as an objection to the respective default
motions.
- 16 -
Petitioners object to the default motions principally on the
ground that each had withdrawn his or her petition (by the
motions to dismiss, which we had denied).
We have no doubt that petitioners had knowledge of the call
of these cases on December 3, 2001, and the recall of the cases
on December 4 and 7, 2001. We assume that petitioners failed to
answer those calls because they no longer wished to continue
their cases in this Court; that is the position taken by them in
the motions to dismiss (which we denied) . We shall, therefore,
hold each of them in default. We shall enter a decision against
each petitioner that includes the full amount of the deficiencies
in tax and additions to tax that are the subject of the default
motions. That is appropriate since respondent had denied all
material allegations of fact set forth in the petitions in
support of the assignments of error and none of petitioners'
filings has otherwise convinced us that respondent in any way
erred in determining the deficiencies in tax and additions to tax
that are the subject of the default motions.
II. Remaining Additions to Tax
A. Introduction
Respondent proceeded to trial on the issues of the additions
to tax determined against Dr. Trowbridge for the years 1994 and
1995 and the additions to tax determined against Ms. Martin for
the years 1991 through 1995 (collectively, the remaining

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additions to tax) on account of the burden of production imposed
on the Secretary by current section 7491(c) (hereafter section
7491(c) . 5 As will be discussed, respondent has carried that
burden.
B. Summary Adjudication Unnecessary
Respondent has moved for partial summary judgment in his
favor with respect to the remaining additions to tax.
Petitioners object, respectively, to those motions (collectively,
the summary judgment motions) .
A party may move for "summary adjudication in the moving
party's favor upon all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy." Rule 121(a). "Summary judgment is a device used
to expedite litigation and is intended to avoid unnecessary and
expensive trials of 'phantom factual questions.'" Espinoza v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). "The party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact." Id.; see Rule 121(b)
"The opposing party is to be afforded the benefit of all
reasonable doubt, and any inference to be drawn from the
underlying facts contained in the record must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment." Espinoza v. Commissioner, supra at 416.
5
We do not decide whether respondent was reguired to
satisfy sec. 7491(c) in this default setting.
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Respondent has moved for partial summary judgments, but,
since there was a trial in these cases, at which respondent
presented evidence pertaining to the remaining additions to tax,
we need not determine whether the summary judgment motions
satisfy the standards for summary adjudication. We shall,
therefore, deny the summary judgment motions (although we largely
sustain respondent's substantive positions therein, as discussed
below).
C. Substantive Provisions
1. Section 6651 (a) ( 1)
Section 6651(a) (1) provides for an addition to tax in the
event a taxpayer fails to file a timely return (determined
with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is
shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due
to willful neglect. The amount of the addition is equal to
5 percent of the amount required to be shown as tax on such
return foi each month or fraction thereof during which such
failure continues, up to a maximum addition of 25 percent for
returns more than 4 months delinquent. For these purposes, the
amount required to be shown as tax on the return is reduced by
any timely payments of the tax 6 and any credits which may be
claimed on the return. Sec. 6651 (b) (1)
In general, payment of income tax is due on the due date

of the corresponding return, determined without regard to any
filing extensions. Sec. 6151(a).
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2. Section 6654
Section 6654 provides for an addition to tax in the event of
an underpayment of a required installment of individual estimated
tax. As relevant to these cases, each required installment of
estimated tax is equal to 25 percent of the "required annual
payment", which in turn is equal to the lesser of (1) 90 percent
of the tax shown on the individual's return for that year (or, if
no return is filed, 90 percent of his or her tax for such year),
or (2) if the individual filed a return for the immediately
preceding taxable year, 100 percent of the tax shown on that
return. Sec. 6654 (d) (1) (B) (i) and (ii). The due dates of the
required installments for a calendar taxable year are April 15,
June 15, and September 15 of that year and January 15 of the
following year. Sec. 6654 (c) (2). For purposes of section 6654,
an individual's tax consists of income tax and self-employment
tax and is determined before the application of any wage
withholding credit 7 (but after the application of other allowable
credits) . Sec. 6654(f); see sec. 31.
There are two mechanical exceptions to the applicability of
the section 6654 addition to tax. First, as relevant to these
cases, the addition is not applicable if the tax shown on the
individual's return for the year in question (or, if no return is
filed, the individual's tax for that year), reduced for these
Under sec. 6654 (g) (1), wage withholding credits are

treated as payments of estimated tax.
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purposes by any allowable credit for wage withholding, is less
than $500. 8 Sec. 6654 (e) (1). Second, the addition is not
applicable if the individual's tax for the preceding taxable year
was zero. Sec. 6654 (e) (2)
D. Section 7491(c)
Section 7491(c) imposes the burden of production in any
court proceeding (i.e., the burden of moving forward with
evidence) on the Commissioner with respect to the liability of

9
any individual for penalties and additions to tax. In order to
meet the burden of production under section 7491(c), the
Commissioner need only make a prima facie case that imposition of
the penalty or addition to tax is appropriate; he need not negate
the existence of any circumstantial defense such as reasonable
cause. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001); H.
Con£. Rept. 105-599, at 241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 995.
Furthermore, section 7491(c) has no effect on the burden of proof
(i.e., the burden of persuasion), Higbee v. Commissioner, supra
at 446-447, which remains on petitioners in these cases, Rule
Effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31,

1997, the threshold amount is $1,000. Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 1202(a), 111 Stat. 994.
Sec. 7491(c) applies to court proceedings arising in

connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001 (c) (1), 112 Stat. 727. As referenced
in our findings of fact, the additions to tax not included in the
default motions (collectively, the remaining additions to tax)
pertain to examinations commenced after July 1998.
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142 (a); cf. current sec. 7491 (a) (shifting the burden of proof to
the Commissioner in certain circumstances).
E. Discussion
1. Petitioners' Forms 1040 and 1040EZ
Respondent contends that the Forms 1040 and 1040EZ filed by
petitioners with respect to the years at issue do not constitute

10
valid returns. In Williams v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 143
(2000), we held that a disclaimer statement similar to the ones
at issue in these cases rendered the Form 1040 to which it was
attached invalid. We see no reason to depart from the reasoning
of that case here. Accordingly, we conclude that Dr.
Trowbridge's 1993-95 Forms 1040, and Ms. Martin's 1991-92 Forms
1040 and 1995 Form 1040EZ, are not valid returns.
2. Respondent's Section 6651 (a) (1) Determinations
As relevant to his section 6651 (a) (1) determinations,
respondent produced evidence that petitioners did not file valid
Federal income tax returns for any of the years at issue.
Respondent also produced evidence that neither petitioner made
any timely payments of tax with respect to the years at issue.u
10
We address that contention separately because it is
relevant to our analysis of both the sec. 6651(a) (1) and the sec.
6654 additions to tax asserted by respondent.
11
In his sec. 6651 (a) (1) computations, respondent properly
credited each petitioner with one-half of petitioners' aggregate
wage withholding credit where applicable. See sec. 6651(b) (1);
sec. 1. 31-1 (a), Income Tax Regs. (rule for wage withholding
credits of separately filing spouses domiciled in a community
(continued ... )
- 22 -
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that respondent
established a prima facie case that the determination of 25-
percent additions to tax under section 6651(a) (1) with respect to
Dr. Trowbridge for the years 1994 and 1995, and with respect to
Ms. Martin for the years 1991-95, is appropriate, thereby
satisfying section 7491(c). In the absence of any evidence
refuting that prima facie case (such as reasonable cause or lack
of willful neglect on the part of either petitioner), we conclude
that petitioners are liable for such additions to tax. Except as
noted below, 12 we also accept respondent's computation of the
amounts of those additions as set forth in the notices of
deficiency.
3. Respondent's Section 6654 Determinations
As relevant to his section 6654 determinations, respondent
introduced into evidence Dr. Trowbridge's invalid return for 1993
in addition to the evidence of invalid and nonexistent returns
discussed above in the context of his section 6651(a) (1)
determinations. Respondent also produced evidence that, aside
11
continued)
( •••
property State). Respondent also properly credited Ms. Martin
with her earned income credit for 1995. See sec. 6651(b) (1).
12
Respondent inexplicably based his 1992 sec. 6651(a) (1)
computation for Ms. Martin on tax of $8,764 rather than the
$8,740 amount of tax that appears elsewhere in the notice of
deficiency issued to her. The correct amount of such addition
shall be the subject of a Rule 155 computation.
- 23 -
13
from amounts withheld from wages, neither petitioner made any
timely payments of tax that could be applied against his or her
required annual payments for the years at issue.
In the absence of valid returns, the applicability of the
$500 de minimis exception to the section 6654 addition to tax
discussed above is determined on the basis of each petitioner's
tax (within the meaning of section 6654(f)) for the years at
issue. See sec. 6 654 (e) ( 1) . In light of the deficiency
decisions that we shall enter against petitioners pursuant to our
disposition herein of the default motions, neither petitioner
qualifies for the $500 de minimis exception for any of the years
at issue. The impending entry of those deficiency decisions also
precludes the applicability of the section 6654(e) (2) exception
(zero tax for preceding year) with respect to any of the years at
issue.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that respondent
established a prima facie case that the determination of
additions to tax under section 6654 with respect to Dr.
Trowbridge for the years 1994 and 1995, and with respect to Ms.
Martin for the years 1992-95, is appropriate, thereby satisfying
section 7491(c). Absent any evidence refuting that prima facie
13
As is the case with his sec. 6651 (a) (1) computations,
respondent properly credited each petitioner with one-half of
petitioners' aggregate wage withholding credit where applicable.
See sec. 6654(g) (1), supra note 7; sec. 1.31-1(a), Income Tax
Regs., supra note 11.
- 24 -
case, we conclude that petitioners are liable for such additions

14
to tax. Except as noted below, we also accept respondent's
computation of the amounts of those additions as set forth in the
notices of deficiency.
III. Section 6673(a) (1) Penalties
Respondent asks that we impose a penalty against each
petitioner under section 6673 (a) (1) in the amount of $25,000.
In pertinent part, section 6673 (a) (1) provides:
SEC. 6673. SANCTIONS AND COSTS AWARDED BY COURTS.
(a) Tax Court Proceedings.--
(1) Procedures instituted primarily for

delay, etc.--Whenever it appears to the Tax
Court that--
(A) proceedings before it have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer
primarily for delay,
(B) the taxpayer's position in such

proceeding is frivolous or groundless,
or
* * * * * * *
the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000.
14
Respondent inexplicably based his 1992 sec. 6654
computation for Ms. Martin on tax of $8,764 rather than the
$8,740 amount of tax that appears elsewhere in the notice of
deficiency issued to her. In his 1995 sec. 6654 computation for
Ms. Martin, rather than reducing her 1995 tax by the amount of
her 1995 earned income credit, respondent improperly treated that
credit as a payment of estimated tax. See sec. 6654 (f) (3) and
(g) (1) . The correct amounts of those additions to tax shall be
the subject of Rule 155 computations.
- 25 -
The purpose of section 6673 "is to compel taxpayers to think
and to conform their conduct to settled principles before they
file returns and litigate." Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d
68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Grasselli v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-581 (quoting Coleman). A taxpayer's position is
frivolous if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by
a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law. E.g., Nis
Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 544 (2000) We need
not find specific damages to invoke section 6673(a) (1); rather,
that section is a penalty provision, intended to deter and
penalize frivolous claims and positions in deficiency
proceedings. Bagby v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 596, 613-614
(1994).
Petitioners do not here argue for any change in the law, and
there is no plausible argument that, as maintained in the
disclaimers attached to their Forms 1040 and 1040EZ, the payment
of income taxes is voluntary. E.g., Woods v. Commissioner, 91
T.C. 88, 90 (1988). Similarly, there is no plausible argument
that, as maintained in the petitions, subjecting petitioners to
the same rate of tax that applies to Federal employees
constitutes impermissible disparate treatment. See Rogers v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-20, affd. without published opinion
281 F.3d 1278 (5th Cir. 2001). Whatever legitimate arguments may
underlie their assignments of error, petitioners have emphasized

- 26 -
frivolous arguments and, for that reason alone, deserve to have
section 6673(a) (1) penalties imposed against them.
We are also convinced by petitioners' conduct that they both
instituted and maintained these proceedings for delay, which is a
separate basis for imposing a section 6673(a) (1) penalty. We
struck all but minimal portions of their 74- and 75-page
petitions. Their discovery requests ran to hundreds of pages,
and we granted respondent's motions for protective orders with
respect thereto, in part on the ground that we agreed with
respondent that the discovery was intended to burden respondent
unduly, waste his resources, and divert him from trial
preparation. Petitioners actively, indeed, forcefully,
prosecuted these cases until 2 weeks before trial. At that
point, they attempted to withdraw their petitions, asserting a
jurisdictional challenge premised on their disavowal of any
commercial relationship with, and any enjoyment of benefits from,
the United States. They refused to appear for trial or for a
hearing on respondent's motions to dismiss for default, despite
notice thereof in both instances. We interpret petitioners'
actions in prosecuting (and not prosecuting) these cases as
evidence of their intent to delay these proceedings. There are
numerous years and, for some years, large dollar amounts involved
in these cases. There is before us another case, involving Dr.
Trowbridge and his 1996 and 1997 tax years. That case involves
- 27 -
conduct similar to that in this case. See Trowbridge v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-165. We think that both
petitioners deserve large penalties under section 6673(a) (1). It
is clear to us that Dr. Trowbridge took the lead in the
sanctionable activity here. Therefore, we shall impose on him a
penalty of $25,000. We shall impose on Ms. Martin, who filed her
own petition and submitted documents and took actions that
matched those submitted and taken by Dr. Trowbridge, a penalty of
$15,000.
To reflect the foregoing,
Appropriate orders will
be issued, and decisions will
be entered under Rule 155.

T.C. Memo. 2003-165
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE, LIFE CENTER HOUSTON BUSINESS TRUST,

JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE, TRUSTEE, AND LIFE CHOICES BUSINESS TRUST,
JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE, TRUSTEE, Petitioners y.
Docket No. 750-01. Filed June 4, 2003.
R determined deficiencies in, and additions

to, tax with respect to P John P. Trowbridge
(Dr. Trowbridge) for 1996 and 1997. As a protective
measure, R also determined deficiencies in, and
additions to, tax with respect to P Life Center Houston
Business Trust (Life Center) for 1996 and 1997 and P
Life Choices Business Trust (Life Choices) for 1997.
Ps filed a petition for redetermination but failed to
appear at trial. R moved for default judgment against
Dr. Trowbridge with respect to deficiencies in tax for
1996 and 1997 in the amounts of $146,847 and $211,508,
respectively. R proceeded to trial on the issues of
(1) an additional deficiency in tax (first raised in
R's amendment to answer) with respect to Dr. Trowbridge
for 1996 based on additional gross business receipts
for that year, and (2) the additions to tax asserted
against Dr. Trowbridge for 1996 and 1997.
Government
Exhibit
_____________
C-2
- 2 -
1. Held: R's motion for default judgment is

granted.
2. Held, further, R is not barred by the statute

of limitations on assessment with respect to Dr.
Trowbridge's 1996 taxable year.
3. Held, further, there is an additional

deficiency in tax with respect to Dr. Trowbridge for
1996 based on gross business receipts of $1,632,140 for
that year.
4. Held, further, Dr. Trowbridge is liable for

additions to tax under sees. 6 651 (a) ( 1) and 6 654,
I.R.C., with respect to his 1996 and 1997 taxable
years.
5. Held, further, Dr. Trowbridge is liable for a

penalty under sec. 6673, I.R.C., in the amount of
$25,000.
John Parks Trowbridge, pro se.
M. Kathryn Bellis, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: By notice of deficiency dated October 20,
2000 (the notice of deficiency), respondent determined
deficiencies in, and additions to, Federal income tax with
respect to petitioner John P. Trowbridge (Dr. Trowbridge) as

1
follows:
Respondent also asserted additions to tax under sec.

6651 (a) (2) in amounts to be determined. We interpret
respondent's posttrial brief as conceding those additions to tax
in the event we find that the 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040 received
(continued ... )
- 3 -
Additions to
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 (a) (1)
1996 $146,847 $33,041 $7,816
1997 272,771 61,373 14,593
In a statement attached to the notice of deficiency, respondent
explained that business income purportedly earned by petitioner
Life Center Houston Business Trust (Life Center) in 1996 and 1997
and by petitioner Life Choices Business Trust (Life Choices) in
1997 is taxable to Dr. Trowbridge on the alternative grounds that
( 1) Life Center and Life Choices were shams, (2) Life Center and
Life Choices were grantor trusts of which Dr. Trowbridge was the
owner, or (3) Dr. Trowbridge in fact earned such income and,
under the assignment of income doctrine, could not shift the
incidence of taxation with respect to such amounts. Solely as a
protective measure (i.e., as an alternative position in the event
the foregoing arguments proved to be unsuccessful), respondent
also determined deficiencies in, and additions to, tax with
respect to Life Center for 1996 and 1997 and Life Choices for
1997 and issued notices of deficiency (also dated October 20,
2000) to that effect. 2 Petitioners timely filed a petition for
redetermination.
1
( • • • continued)
by respondent from Dr. Trowbridge in October 1997 and October
1998, respectively, are not valid income tax returns (which we so
find).
2
Because we do not reach respondent's alternative
position, we do not set forth the deficiencies and additions to
tax determined against Life Center and Life Choices.
- 4 -
Respondent has moved that Dr. Trowbridge be held in default
and that a decision be entered that there are deficiencies in tax
with respect to him for 1996 and 1997 in the amounts of $146,847
3
and $211,508, respectively, and that decisions be entered that
there are no deficiencies in tax with respect to Life Center and
Life Choices. Respondent has also moved for partial summary
judgment in his favor on the issues of (1) whether respondent is
barred by the statute of limitations on assessment with respect
to Dr. Trowbridge's 19 96 taxable year, ( 2) whether there is an
additional deficiency in tax with respect to Dr. Trowbridge for
1996 based on additional gross business receipts for that year,
and (3) whether Dr. Trowbridge is liable for additions to tax
under sections 6651 (a) ( 1) and 6654. For the reasons that follow,
we shall grant respondent's motion for default judgment and
sustain (with minor modifications as to amounts) the positions he
has taken in his motion for partial summary judgment. We shall
also impose a penalty on Dr. Trowbridge under section 6673(a) (1)
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
3
That amount is less than the deficiency in tax for 1997
determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency. In his
motion for default judgment, respondent attributes such downward
adjustment to the elimination of transfers among petitioners and
other duplicated items.
- 5 -
Procedure. For the sake of convenience, all dollar amounts are
rounded to the nearest dollar.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Dr. Trowbridge and Life Center
Dr. Trowbridge is a physician who has been practicing
medicine since at least 1978. At the time the petition was filed
in this case, Dr. Trowbridge resided in Harris County, Texas.
Dr. Trowbridge is a calendar year taxpayer.
Life Center is a business trust 4 created by Dr. Trowbridge
and a colleague on or around December 6, 1996, pursuant to a
document styled "Contract and Declaration of Trust for Life
Center Houston" (the trust agreement) . The trust agreement
purports to effect the transfer by Dr. Trowbridge of unspecified
property to Life Center in exchange for trust certificates
evidencing beneficial ownership of Life Center. Although the
trust agreement does not identify any trustees by name, Dr.
Trowbridge held himself out as the trustee of Life Center.
Before the close of 1996, Dr. Trowbridge obtained an employer
identification number for Life Center and opened a bank account
in Life Center's name (the Life Center bank account).
For purposes of this report, we assume (without deciding)

that Life Center is a legally recognized entity under Texas law.
- 6 -
The Medical Practice
During the years at issue, Dr. Trowbridge provided medical
services at 9816 Memorial Blvd., Suite 205, Humble, Texas (the
medical practice) . The books and records of the medical practice
were maintained under the cash method of accounting. Prior to
December 1996, the medical practice was referred to as "John
Parks Trowbridge MD", and receipts from the medical practice were
deposited in two bank accounts styled "John Parks Trowbridge MD".
Contemporaneous with the formation of Life Center in December
1996, Dr. Trowbridge began using the name "Life Center Houston"
for the medical practice. On January 8, 1997, cash receipts and
checks from the medical practice for the period December 3
through December 31, 1996, were deposited in the Life Center bank
account.
Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Through 1997 Forms 1040
1995 Form 1040 5
Some time in January 1997, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) received from Dr. Trowbridge a Form 1040, U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return 1995 (1995 Form 1040). Although
Dr. Trowbridge reported tax of $133,977 on that form, he also
inserted the following handwritten notation thereon: "SEE
ATTACHED DISCLAIMER STATEMENT--ADMITTED TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO".
5
As discussed infra, Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Form 1040 is
relevant to the determination of whether he is liable for the
sec. 6654 addition to tax with respect to his 1996 taxable year.
- 7 -
The attached disclaimer statement (the 1995 disclaimer) reads in
part as follows:
The assessment and payment of income taxes is voluntary

* * * I respectfully decline to volunteer concerning
assessment and payment of any tax balance due on the
return or any redetermination of said tax. Be it known
that I, therefore, deny tax liability and do not admit
that the stated amount of tax on return, as calculated
solely by reference to provided tables, is due and
collectible. The tax return read as a whole shows no
amount as being the tax and shows the tax to be zero
and zero is the startinq point in determining a
deficiency or any other action involving me. * * *
Initial 1996 Form 1040
Dr. Trowbridge received extensions of time to file his 1996
Federal income tax return to October 15, 1997. On that date,
Dr. Trowbridge mailed to the IRS a Form 1040, U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return 1996 (initial 1996 Form 1040), which the IRS
received on October 20, 1997. Although Dr. Trowbridge reported
tax of $36,851 on that form, he also attached a disclaimer
statement substantially identical to the 1995 disclaimer.
Dr. Trowbridge also deleted the words "of perjury" from the jurat
of his initial 1996 Form 1040. 6
1996 Form 1040X and Revised 1996 Form 1040
On January 28, 2000, the IRS received from Dr. Trowbridge a
Form 1040X, Amended Individual Income Tax Return, for 1996 (1996
The jurat is the statement above the signature line on

the return which reads in relevant part: "Under penalties of
perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete."
- 8 -
Form 1040X), reporting additional tax of $4,071. Attached as an
exhibit to the 1996 Form 1040X is a Form 1040 for 1996 signed by
Dr. Trowbridge and dated January 26, 2000 (revised 1996 Form
1040). In terms of computations, the revised 1996 Form 1040 is
substantially identical to the initial 1996 Form 1040 (i.e., it
does not reflect the changes contained in the 1996 Form 1040X).
However, Dr. Trowbridge did not attach a disclaimer statement to
the revised 1996 Form 1040, nor did he alter the jurat thereof.
The words "under protest/without prejudice" appear directly
beneath Dr. Trowbridge's signature on both the 1996 Form 1040X
and the revised 1996 Form 1040.
Initial 1997 Form 1040
Dr. Trowbridge received an extension of time to file
his 1997 Federal income tax return to August 15, 1998. On
October 22, 1998, the IRS received from Dr. Trowbridge a Form
1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997 (initial 1997 Form
1040). Although Dr. Trowbridge reported tax of $44,763 on that
form, he also wrote the following on page 2 thereof: "SEE
ATTACHED DISCLAIMER--ADMITTED TAX LIABILITY IS ZERO PER ATTACHED
STATEMENT". In substance, the attached disclaimer statement is
identical to the 1995 disclaimer. Dr. Trowbridge also deleted
the word "perjury" from the jurat of his initial 1997 Form 1040.
- 9 -
1997 Form 1040X and Revised 1997 Form 1040
On January 28, 2000, the IRS received from Dr. Trowbridge a
Form 1040X, Amended Individual Income Tax Return, for 1997 (1997
Form 1040X), reporting additional tax of $32,180. Attached as an
exhibit to the 1997 Form 1040X is a Form 1040 for 1997 signed by
Dr. Trowbridge and dated January 26, 2000 (revised 1997 Form
1040) . In terms of computations, the revised 1997 Form 1040 is
substantially identical to the initial 1997 Form 1040 (i.e., it
does not reflect the changes contained in the 1997 Form 1040X).
However, Dr. Trowbridge did not attach a disclaimer statement to
the revised 1997 Form 1040, nor did he alter the jurat thereof.
The words "under protest/without prejudice" appear directly
beneath Dr. Trowbridge's signature on both the 1997 Form 1040X
and the revised 1997 Form 1040.
Dr. Trowbridge's Payments and Credits
The only payments made by Dr. Trowbridge in respect of his
1996 income tax were $100 payments submitted with his initial
1996 Form 1040 in October 1997 and his 1996 Form 1040X in January
2000, respectively. The only payments made by Dr. Trowbridge in
respect of his 1997 income tax were $100 payments submitted with
his initial 1997 Form 1040 in October 1998 and his 1997 Form
1040X in January 2000, respectively. Dr. Trowbridge did not
claim any wage withholding or other credits on his 1996 and 1997
Forms 1040 and 1040X.

- 10 -
The Pleadings
The Petition
Petitioners filed a petition for redetermination on
January 16, 2001. We have struck from the petition all
assignments of error other than petitioners' assignment relying
on the affirmative defense that the period for assessment of
taxes for 1996 has expired (petitioners' limitations defense)
Answer and Amendment to Answer
Respondent answered petitioners' one remaining assignment of
error by denying that he had erred and averring that, because Dr.
Trowbridge's initial 1996 Form 1040 is not a valid return, the
statute of limitations does not bar the assessment of tax with
respect to Dr. Trowbridge for that year. 7
Subsequently, we granted respondent leave to amend his
answer to allege an increased deficiency in Dr. Trowbridge's 1996
tax attributable to increased gross business receipts for that
year (the portion of Dr. Trowbridge's 1996 deficiency in excess
of $146,847 is hereafter referred to as the additional 1996
deficiency) . Respondent also asserted corresponding increases in
the additions to tax asserted against Dr. Trowbridge under
sections 6651(a) (1) and 6654. Consistent with the protective
notice of deficiency issued to Life Center, respondent asserted
Respondent also alleged that he issued his notice of

deficiency to Life Center within the 3-year period of limitations
on assessment applicable to Life Center's 1996 taxable year.
- 11
in the alternative an increased deficiency in, and increased
additions to, Life Center's 1996 tax. Petitioners did not file a
reply to respondent's amendment to answer.
Petitioners' Discovery Requests
On September 27 and 28, 2001, petitioners served on
respondent a request for admissions, a set of interrogatories,
and two requests for production of documents. The request for
admissions is 134 pages in length (without attachments) and
requests 545 admissions. The set of interrogatories is 124 pages
in length and contains 480 interrogatories.
On October 5, 2001, respondent filed a motion for protective
order with respect to the request for admissions,
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents served
by petitioners. Respondent argued that such requests were not
timely, addressed improper issues, and were intended to burden
respondent unduly, waste his resources, and divert him from trial
preparation. We asked petitioners to respond and, after
considering their response, granted respondent relief
"substantially for the reasons stated in respondent's motion."
Petitioners' Dismissal Efforts
Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
On November 21, 2001, petitioners submitted a motion styled
"Petitioner's Verified Challenge to Jurisdiction of the Court",
which we filed as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

- 12 -
The motion "denies the existence of any contracts or commercial
agreements which create an attachment of an equity relationship
between the 'United States' and/or The State of Texas and
Petitioner." The motion also states: "Petitioner has
specifically forfeited, waived, rejected, declined, and refused
to voluntarily accept any and all benefits, especially admiralty
and limited debt liability benefits, from the 'United States' and
its instrumentalities." Apparently on those bases, the motion
then states: "Petitioner hereby gives formal notice to the Court
of Petitioner's status as a nonjuristic person, a Texas state
Citizen, and that, in such status, Petitioner squarely challenges
and voids the jurisdiction of this Court." Petitioners claimed
in the motion that we lack "in personam" jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction. We denied the motion.
Motion To Dismiss
On November 23, 2001, petitioners submitted a motion styled
"Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal of Petition", which we filed
as a motion to dismiss (the motion to dismiss) and denied. 8 In
that motion, petitioners reiterated their claim that we lack
jurisdiction and stated that they wished to withdraw their
To the extent petitioners were relying on grounds other

than jurisdiction, a decision dismissing the proceedings would
have been considered a decision sustaining the deficiencies
determined by respondent. See sec. 7459(d). Since we did not
believe that was the result petitioners intended, we denied the
motion to dismiss.
- 13 -
petition: "Petitioner hereby gives Notice of WITHDRAWAL of the
petition for review by the United States Tax Court. This Notice
of Withdrawal of petition makes moot, voids, and cancels all
proceedings previously scheduled by this Court for action upon
the petition filed in error."
Trial Session
This case was set for trial at the Court's trial session
commencing December 3, 2001, in Houston, Texas (the trial
session) .
On Friday, November 30, 2001, an employee of the Court
Clerk's Office contacted Dr. Trowbridge and reminded him that
petitioners were expected to appear on the following Monday
at the call of the calendar at the trial session. When, on
December 3, 2001, the case was called from the calendar,
petitioners failed to appear. Counsel for respondent appeared
and announced ready for trial. The Court set the case for trial
on the following day (December 4).
When the case was recalled from the calendar for trial on
December 4, 2001, petitioners failed to appear. Counsel for
respondent appeared and announced ready for trial. The deputy
trial clerk reported that he had left two messages for Dr.
Trowbridge at his office regarding the date and time of the
trial. Counsel for respondent orally moved for default judgment
with respect to the initial deficiencies in tax determined

- 14 -
against Dr. Trowbridge, which we took under advisement pending
respondent's filing of a (subsequently filed) written motion for
default (the default motion). Respondent proceeded to trial on
the remaining amounts at issue (i.e., the additional 1996
deficiency and the additions to tax) . 9
OPINION
I. The Default Motion
By the default motion, respondent moves that Dr. Trowbridge
be held in default and that a decision be entered that there are
deficiencies in tax with respect to him for 1996 and 1997 in the
amounts of $146,847 (the initial 1996 deficiency) and $211,508
(the 1997 deficiency), respectively, and that a decision be
entered that there are no deficiencies in tax with respect to
Life Center and Life Choices. Respondent moves in the
alternative that Life Center be held in default and that a
decision be entered that there are deficiencies in tax with
respect to Life Center for 1996 and 1997 in the amounts of
$23,195 and $476,918, respectively, and that Life Choices be held
Respondent bears the burden of proof (i.e., the ultimate

burden of persuasion) with respect to the additional 1996
deficiency and the portions of the asserted additions to tax
attributable thereto. See Rule 142(a). Respondent bears the
burden of production (i.e., the burden of moving forward with
evidence) with respect to the additions to tax asserted against
Dr. Trowbridge in their entirety. See current sec. 7491(c).
Since respondent decided to proceed to trial on those issues to
satisfy his evidentiary burdens, we need not decide whether he
was required to do so in this default setting.
- 15 -
in default and that a decision be entered that there is a
deficiency in tax with respect to Life Choices for 1997 in the
amount of $500,028. Although the Court ordered petitioners to
file a response to the default motion, Dr. Trowbridge returned to
the Court a copy of that order with the following language
handwritten thereon: "Timely Notice of Non-Acceptance[.] The
Petition was Withdrawn".
In pertinent part, Rule 123(a) provides:
(a) Default: If any party has failed to plead or

otherwise proceed as provided by these Rules or as
required by the Court, then such party may be held in
default by the Court either on motion of another party
or on the initiative of the Court. Thereafter, the
Court may enter a decision against the defaulting
party, upon such terms and conditions as the Court may
deem proper * * *
We have no doubt that petitioners had knowledge of the call of
this case on December 3, 2001, and the recall of the case on the
following day. We assume that petitioners failed to answer those
calls because they no longer wished to continue their case in
this Court; that is the position they took in their motion to
dismiss (which we previously denied) . We therefore grant the
default motion and, in accordance with respondent's primary
position therein, hold Dr. Trowbridge in default. 10
10
As discussed above, we struck from the petition all
assignments of error other than petitioners' limitations defense.
Since respondent addresses petitioners' limitations defense
(among other items) in his motion for partial summary judgment,
the principal consequence of our holding Dr. Trowbridge in
(continued ... )
- 16 -
II. Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Respondent has moved for partial summary judgment in his
favor (the summary judgment motion) with respect to petitioners'
limitations defense, the existence and amount of the additional
1996 deficiency, 11 and the additions to tax asserted against Dr.
Trowbridge. 12 Summary judgment is a device used to expedite
litigation and is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive
trials of "phantom factual questions." Espinoza v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). Since there was a trial in this case,
at which respondent presented evidence pertaining to the issues
addressed in the summary judgment motion, we need not determine
whether summary adjudication is appropriate here. We shall,
therefore, deny the summary judgment motion (although we largely
10
( • • • continued}
default is the ratification of respondent's primary position that
Dr. Trowbridge, rather than Life Center and Life Choices, is
liable for any deficiencies in tax and additions to tax
determined in the notice of deficiency.
In his amendment to answer, respondent alleges an

additional 1996 deficiency of $244,935, based on gross business
receipts of $1,649,376 for that year. In his posttrial brief,
respondent asserts that Dr. Trowbridge had gross business
receipts of $1,632,423 in 1996, thus necessitating a Rule 155
computation with respect to the additional 1996 deficiency.
12
Respondent moved in the alternative for partial summary
judgment against Life Center and Life Choices in the event we
deny his request for default judgment against Dr. Trowbridge.
Our disposition of the default motion renders that alternative
position moot.
- 17 -
sustain respondent's substantive positions therein, as discussed
below).
III. Statute of Limitations
As a general matter, income tax (and related penalties and
additions to tax) must be assessed within 3 years after the later
of (1) the due date (without regard to extensions) of the
corresponding return, or (2) the date on which such return is

13
filed. Sees. 6501(a) and (b) (1), 6665(a) (2); sec. 301.6501(b)-
1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs. However, if the taxpayer fails to
file a return, the Commissioner may assess such amounts at any
time. Sec. 6501 (c) (3).
As relevant to petitioners' limitations defense, respondent
contends that Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1996 Form 1040 does not
constitute a valid return. In Williams v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
136, 143 (2000), we held that a disclaimer statement similar to
the ones at issue in this case rendered the Form 1040 to which it
was attached invalid. We have also held that altering the Form
1040 jurat can destroy that form's validity as a return. E.g.,
Jenkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-617. We shall not
depart from the reasoning of those cases here. Accordingly, we
conclude that Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1996 Form 1040 is not a
13
For these purposes, the date on which a return is mailed
is treated as the filing date if the postmark date falls within
the prescribed period (including extensions) for filing the
return. Sec. 7502 (a) (1) and (a) (2) (A) (i).
- 18 -
valid return. It follows that respondent is not barred by the
statute of limitations on assessment with respect to Dr.
Trowbridge's 1996 taxable year. 14 See, e.g., Jarvis v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 646, 655 (1982)
IV. Additional 1996 Deficiency
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that the
medical practice generated gross receipts of $1,062,676 in 1996.
Respondent based that determination on an analysis of the deposit
activity with respect to the two bank accounts styled "John Parks
Trowbridge MD" and the Life Center bank account (collectively,
the medical practice bank accounts). Respondent subsequently
received daily cash analysis reports and daily practice summaries
with respect to the medical practice for 1996 as the result of
the enforcement of a summons issued to Dr. Trowbridge. Those
reports, introduced into evidence at trial, show that the medical
practice generated gross receipts of $1,632,140 in 1996. 15
14
Even if the revised 1996 Form 1040 that Dr. Trowbridge
submitted in January 2000 constitutes a valid return (an issue
respondent does not explicitly address and we do not decide),
respondent issued the notice of deficiency on Oct. 20, 2000, well
within the 3-year period of limitations on assessment for 1996
that would have commenced on the date of such filing. See sees.
6503 (a), 6213 (a) (issuance of a valid notice of deficiency
suspends the running of the period of limitations on assessment
during the pendency of any ensuing proceedings originating in
this Court) .
15
We have adjusted respondent's computation of 1996
medical practice gross receipts ($1,632,423) downward by $283 to
reflect a patient refund recorded on the cash analysis report for
(continued ... )
- 19 -
Respondent bolstered his documentary evidence with witness
testimony. Kathryn Hill, a former employee of Dr. Trowbridge's,
testified that she had prepared the practice summaries each day
as part of her duties and that she had derived the month-to-date
and year-to-date collections listed thereon from the daily cash
analysis reports prepared by other personnel. Ms. Hill further
testified that, as sometimes reflected in her handwritten
notations on the daily cash analysis reports, she had transferred
cash receipts directly to Dr. Trowbridge and had used patients'
checks to pay third party creditors of the medical practice
whenever Dr. Trowbridge so requested, rather than depositing such
amounts in any of the medical practice bank accounts. Ms. Hill's
testimony is consistent with that of William Williams, an IRS
agent who testified that, in his review of the medical practice
bank account statements, he had been unable to find deposits
corresponding to numerous checks and cash receipts recorded in
the daily cash analysis reports.
Dr. Trowbridge's own daily records establish the gross
receipts of the medical practice in 1996, and the testimony of
Ms. Hill and Mr. Williams satisfactorily explains the large
discrepancy between that amount and the aggregate bank deposits
on which respondent based the initial 1996 deficiency.
15
( • • • continued)
Oct. 28, 1996, that we believe respondent overlooked.
- 20 -
Accordingly, we find that there is an additional deficiency in
tax with respect to Dr. Trowbridge for 1996 based on gross
business receipts of $1,632,140 for that year.
V. Additions to Tax
A. Statutory Provisions
1. Section 6651(a)(l)
Section 6651 (a) (1) provides for an addition to tax in the
event a taxpayer fails to file a timely return (determined with
regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown
that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect. The amount of the addition is equal to 5
percent of the amount required to be shown as tax on the
delinquent return for each month or fraction thereof during
which the return remains delinquent, up to a maximum addition of
25 percent for returns more than 4 months delinquent. For these
purposes, the amount required to be shown as tax on the return is
reduced by any timely payments of the tax 16 and any credits which
may be claimed on the return. Sec. 6651 (b) (1).
2. Section 6654
Section 6654 provides for an addition to tax (in the form of
an interest charge) in the event of an underpayment of a required
installment of individual estimated tax. As relevant to this
16
In general, payment of income tax is due on the due date
of the corresponding return, determined without regard to any
filing extensions. Sec. 6151(a).
- 21 -
case, each required installment of estimated tax is equal to 25
percent of the "required annual payment", which in turn is equal
to the lesser of (1) 90 percent of the tax shown on the
individual's return for that year (or, if no return is filed, 90
percent of his or her tax for such year), or (2) if the
individual filed a return for the immediately preceding taxable
year, 100 percent of the tax shown on that return. Sec.
6654 (d) (1) (B) (i) and (ii). The due dates of the required
installments for a calendar taxable year are April 15, June 15,
and September 15 of that year and January 15 of the following
year. Sec. 6654 (c) (2). For purposes of section 6654, an
individual's tax consists of income tax and self-employment tax
and is determined before the application of any wage withholding
credit 17 (but after the application of other allowable credits).
Sec. 6654(f); see sec. 31.
There are two mechanical exceptions to the applicability of
the section 6654 addition to tax. First, as relevant to this
case, the addition is not applicable if the tax shown on the
individual's return for the year in question (or, if no return is
filed, the individual's tax for that year), reduced for these
purposes by any allowable credit for wage withholding, is less
17
Under sec. 6654 (g) (1), wage withholding credits are
treated as payments of estimated tax.
- 22 -
than $500. 18 Sec. 6654 (e) (1). Second, the addition is not
applicable if the individual's tax for the preceding taxable year
was zero. Sec. 6654 (e) (2)
B. Discussion
1. Respondent's Section 6651 (a) (1) Determinations
We have already concluded, in the context of petitioners'
limitations defense, that the disclaimer statement attached to,
and the alteration of the jurat of, Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1996
Form 1040 rendered that Form 1040 invalid. Since Dr. Trowbridge
attached a substantially identical disclaimer statement to, and
similarly altered the jurat of, his initial 1997 Form 1040, we
conclude as well that Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1997 Form 1040 is
not a valid return.
In addition to introducing at trial Dr. Trowbridge's
(invalid) initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040, respondent produced
evidence that Dr. Trowbridge did not submit to the IRS any other
document purporting to be a return for 1996 or 1997 until January
2000. Respondent therefore produced evidence that Dr. Trowbridge
did not timely file Federal income tax returns for 1996 and 1997
and that each such failure continued for more than 4 months. In
the absence of any conflicting or exculpatory evidence (e.g.,
evidence of reasonable cause or lack of willful neglect on the
18
Effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31,
1997, the threshold amount is $1,000. Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 1202(a), 111 Stat. 994.
- 23 -
part of Dr. Trowbridge), we conclude that Dr. Trowbridge is
liable for 25-percent additions to tax under section 6651(a) (1)
with respect to his 1996 and 1997 taxable years. 19
Respondent also produced evidence that Dr. Trowbridge did
not make any timely payments in respect of his 1996 and 1997
income taxes and did not claim any tax credits for those years.
Accordingly, the 25-percent additions to tax for which Dr.
Trowbridge is liable under section 6651(a) (1) apply to the full
amount of tax required to be shown on his respective 1996 and

20
1997 returns. See sec. 6651 (b) (1).
2. Respondent's Section 6654 Determinations 21
In addition to introducing at trial Dr. Trowbridge's
(invalid) initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040, respondent submitted
19
We note that, in computing the amount of the 1997
addition to tax, respondent incorrectly applied a rate of 22.5
percent rather than 25 percent. See supra note 1.
20
The amount of tax required to be shown on Dr.
Trowbridge's 1996 return is equal to the initial 1996 deficiency
($146,847) plus the additional 1996 deficiency, the latter amount
to be determined under Rule 155 in accordance with part IV of
this report. The amount of tax required to be shown on Dr.
Trowbridge's 1997 return is equal to the 1997 deficiency
($211,508).
21
Respondent applied the provisions of sec. 6654 without
regard to the amounts shown as tax on the revised 1996 and 1997
Forms 1040 attached by Dr. Trowbridge to the 1996 and 1997 Forms
1040X submitted by him to the IRS in January 2000. Petitioners
did not assign error to that aspect of respondent's
determinations. We shall not, therefore, decide whether the
revised 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040 are valid returns or otherwise
take them into account for purposes of determining the
application of sec. 6654.
- 24 -
with the summary judgment motion Dr. Trowbridge's (invalid) 1995
Form 1040, authenticated by affidavit of respondent's counsel. 22
Respondent also produced evidence that Dr. Trowbridge did not
make any timely payments (actual or deemed, see supra note 17) in
respect of his 1996 or 1997 income taxes that could be applied
against his required annual payments.
Given the foregoing evidence regarding invalid returns, the
general applicability of the estimated tax provisions to Dr.
Trowbridge's respective 1996 and 1997 taxable years depends on
whether Dr. Trowbridge's actual (rather than reported) tax for
those years is greater than zero. See sec. 6654 (d) (1) (B).
Similarly, the availability of the $500 de minimis exception with
respect to either such year is determined by reference to Dr.
Trowbridge's actual (rather than reported) tax for each such year
(less any allowable wage withholding credit). See sec.
6654(e) (1). As relevant to the application of section
6654 (d) (1) (B), our disposition herein of the default motion
establishes that Dr. Trowbridge's tax for each of 1996 and 1997
is indeed greater than zero. As relevant to the application of
section 6654(e) (1), such disposition establishes that
22
As referenced in our findings of fact, Dr. Trowbridge's
1995 Form 1040 includes a disclaimer statement that is
substantially identical to the disclaimers attached to his
initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040. On that basis, we conclude
that Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Form 1040 is not a valid return. See
Williams v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 143 (2000).
- 25 -
Dr. Trowbridge's tax (less allowable wage withholding credits)
for each year far exceeds $500.
Our disposition of the default motion also precludes the
applicability of the section 6654(e) (2) exception (zero tax for
preceding year) with respect to Dr. Trowbridge's 1997 taxable
year. In that regard, although the record does not reveal Dr.
Trowbridge's tax for 1995, we deem his 1995 Form 1040 (showing
tax of $133,977 and no tax credits) to be evidence that such tax
was greater than zero, which would render the section 6654(e) (2)
exception inapplicable to his 1996 taxable year as well.
Based on the foregoing, and in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, we conclude that Dr. Trowbridge was subject to
estimated tax with respect to each of his 1996 and 1997 taxable
years and that he made no timely payments in respect of such
liability. Thus, the amount of Dr. Trowbridge's underpayment
with respect to each installment of his required annual payments
for those years is equal to the full amount of such installment. 23
VI. Section 6673 Penalty
In pertinent part, section 6673(a) (1) provides:
SEC. 6673. SANCTIONS AND COSTS AWARDED BY COURTS.
(a) Tax Court Proceedings.--
23
In that regard, we accept respondent's computation of
the 1997 addition to tax ($11,316), and we direct the parties to
determine the amount of the 1996 addition to tax on the basis of
Dr. Trowbridge's 1996 tax (more precisely, 90 percent thereof),
determined in accordance with note 20, supra.
- 26 -
(1) Procedures instituted primarily for

delay, etc.--Whenever it appears to the Tax
Court that--
(A) proceedings before it have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer
primarily for delay,
(B) the taxpayer's position in such

proceeding is frivolous or groundless,
or
* * * * * * *
the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000.
The purpose of section 6673 "is to compel taxpayers to think
and to conform their conduct to settled principles before they
file returns and litigate." Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d
68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Grasselli v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-581 (quoting Coleman). A taxpayer's position is
frivolous if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by
a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law. E.g., Nis
Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 544 (2000) We need
not find specific damages to invoke section 6673(a) (1); rather,
that section is a penalty provision, intended to deter and
penalize frivolous claims and positions in deficiency
proceedings. Bagby v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 596, 613-614
( 1994) .
Dr. Trowbridge does not here argue for any change in the
law, and there is no plausible argument that, as maintained in

27 -
the disclaimers attached to his initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040,
the payment of income taxes is voluntary. E.g., Woods v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 88, 90 (1988). Whatever legitimate
arguments may underlie his assignments of error, Dr. Trowbridge
has emphasized frivolous arguments and, for that reason alone,
deserves to have a section 6673(a) (1) penalty imposed against
him.
We are also convinced by Dr. Trowbridge's conduct that he
both instituted and maintained these proceedings for delay, which
is a separate basis for imposing a section 6673(a) (1) penalty.
We struck substantial portions of the petition. His discovery
requests ran to hundreds of pages, and we granted respondent's
motion for a protective order with respect thereto.
Notwithstanding his active, indeed forceful, prosecution of this
case initially, Dr. Trowbridge abruptly changed course 2 weeks
before trial. At that point, he attempted to withdraw the
petition, asserting a jurisdictional challenge premised on his
disavowal of any commercial relationship with, and any enjoyment
of benefits from, the United States. He refused to appear for
trial, despite notice thereof. We interpret Dr. Trowbridge's
actions in prosecuting (and not prosecuting) this case as
evidence of his intent to delay these proceedings.
There is a contemporaneous case in this Court involving Dr.
Trowbridge and his 1991-95 taxable years which involves conduct

- 28 -
similar to that involved here. See Trowbridge v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-164. We conclude that Dr. Trowbridge deserves a
large penalty under section 6673(a) (1) Therefore, we shall
impose on him a penalty of $25,000.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will
be issued, and decision will
be entered under Rule 155.

••
1
77%..05- 081i]
WARRANTY DEED
TilE GRANTOR .l?vevt,J ANN€7 for and in consideration of (21) Lrberty
u.S.A. Silver Dollars, plus nctes of undetermined value in hand paid, conveys and warrants to
ASIL.I\lf?.S
the following descrihed real estate, situated in the County of :t YI&ICt Thsate
This deec.l is given in fulfillment of Property aatd C01ttract and Ar:reemcnt

.between the parties hereto, dated the _\_O"_"'lday of. • Wt9o, and conditioned for the conveyance of the
above descoibed property, and the covenants of wamnty herein contained shall not apply to any taxes, assessments
or other charges levied. assessed or coming due subsequent of the dale of said contract.
VtJt 679 331
PKIIIT "A"
VOl 669 tiGf 566
DESCRIPTION
of
Fitn.I>IIOTl!:S TO 18.605 ACRES 01' ti1D AS SITUATED Ill THE
CULLEN A!UitT!' ·StlltVEY, A-3 II, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BEING
A OUT 01' AI'D A PM\T OF THAT S1JfE CALLED 75 ACRES, MORE OR
LtsS, DESICKATED AS "TRACT NO. 1" AS -::QNVl'!Yl'!D TO H.\Ril.Y··w.
S'tAI"FORD BY DEE:> Rli'CORDED IN VOI.tJHE 611:1, PACE 4!14 ;ciF .THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS 01" TYLER· COUN'l'Y. SAID 605 ACRES
BEING MORE PM\TICULARLY Dl!:SCRIBEO BY METES AND BOUNDS AS
FOLLOWS: .
BEGINNING AT A PINE KNOT STAKE FOUND ON THE EAST LINE OF

R08ERT LUCAS SURVEY, A-24, AND THE WEST LINE OF SAID
ARNETT _SURVEY FOR THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRES AND OF THIS TRACT AND S1JfE llEING THE NORTHWEST
CORNER 01" THE EARL N. ·HAMILTON 37.55 ACRE TRACT RECORDED
IN VOLUHE 332, PAGE 223 OF THE TYLER COUNTY DEED RECORDS;
THl!:NCt N Ol'l0'.25HW, WITH THE COMMON LIN!': BETWI:I':N SAID
LUCAS AND ARNETT SURVEYS AND WEST LINE Or SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRE TRACT, AT 305.80 FT. PASS THE CENTER OF COUNTY ROAD
NO. J050, IN ALL A TOTAL or FT. TO A l/2" IROM ROD
SET FOR TllE IIORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT AIID BEIIIG THE
SOU'MlWEST CORIIER OF A 17.29 ACRE TRACT SURVEYED THIS DATE
OUT OF SAID STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THEIICE N .87'22'15"E 780.SS FT., WITH THE SOUTtl LINE OF

SAIP 17. 299 ACRE TRACT, TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET fOR THE
SOUTHEAS't CORNER OF SAME AND 'l.'HE NORTit'EAS't CORNER or THIS
TRACT ON THE WEST LINE OF A 1. 1193 ACRE TRACT ALSO SURVEYED
THIS DATE OUT 01' SAID 77 ACRES; '
I
I·
THEHCE S 01'45'40"1!:, WITH THE.WEST LINE OF SAID 1.893 ACRE
TRACT, AT 1031.56 FT. PASS THE CENTER 01' SAID COUNTY ROAD,
IN ALL A OF 106J. 66 FT, 'J'O A IRON ROO Sn" i'OR
THE SOIJTHEAST COIUfER OF THIS TRACT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF
THE SAtD 75 AC:RES AND .ON THE NORTH Lilli! OF THE
ABOVE HENTION!D.KAMILTON 37.55 ACRE TRACT/
THENCE s U8,'J2'W 754.6J.FT., WITH THE SOUTH LINE 01' SAID

75 .ACRES AND THE NQR'tff LINE OF SAID IOJ(ILTOII TRACT, TO THE
PLACE or BEGIJCKIKG AND CONTAIIUMC WITHIN THESE BOUHDS
18 •. 605-ACRESor LAND.
SURVEYED MARCH 2, 1999

I, LYLE RAINEY, REGISTERED. PROFESSIONAL LAND StiRVEYOR NO.
4800, DO HEREBY CERTIFY- THAT THE FIELOKOTE DI!SCRIPTIOK or
THE ABOVE DI!ScRlB.EO TRACT WAS l'RJ!PARED i"RGlK. AN ACTUAL Alii>
ACCURATE ON THE CROWl> SURVEY AltO THAT' SAME IS TRUE AND
CORJ!
. '
. FESSIONAL
HQ. 4800
, . .
;...1..1'
WARRAN1Y DEED
THE GRANTOR JtwN" {i1l19?f. fur and in consideratioo of (21) Liberty
u.S. A. Silver DQ!Iars, ftus - notes of undetermined value in hand paid, conveys and warrants to
.M>u.• r=nes
the fuflowit.l! described real eute, situated in the County of
' . PROPERTY DESCRimON (LEGAL)

off' T"<\..611t.
1'1\e- OF" 1
L.Mn> IrS 186'1:> ,N
(.()M.f'lttSW&- li · 857 ActtGS, IAirTf.f Au..'
1rfG) As uJ f>t.M:£. (t}<lft&!T'A..J
deed is &iveft in fulfillment of that cenaiD Private ExcU. u4 Coatract 8JHI At:reeatetd
bet1l'eetl the Jllll1ies hereto, dlt<:d the .J.Q_ of Jvvt . ..:J::1l!!lL, and oonditioned for !he conveyance of the
1100\oe desc:ribcd property, and the CO\ICDBtS of warranty herein contained shall not apply to any taxes, assessments
or other chur;es leyied, assessed or coming due 5llbseqaeat of !he date of said c:ontract.
(Name) GRANTOR
tty:
-'
11tle
679P!Gf324
'
VOl.
A VOl 669 PAGf 558

. FIELDNOrE DESCRIPTION
(-z.
FIELDNOTES TO J :I. 857 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IM THE
CULLEN ARNETT.SURVEY, A-J9, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BEING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF THAT SAME CALLED 75 ACRES, MORE OH
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1" AS CONVEYED TO HARRY W.
STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED iN VOLUME .610 1 PAGE 494 OF THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER COUNTY. SAID 12.857 ACRES
BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED BY METES AND BOUNDS AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A RAILROAD RAIL FOUND ON THE NORTHEAST SIDE
OF COUNTY ROAD NO. 3050 FOR THE MOST EASTERLY SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF SAID STAFFORD 75 ACRES AND THE SOUTHEAST CORNER
OF THIS TRACT, SAME BEING THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE JIM
NUGENT 5.00 ACRE TRACT AS RECORDED IN VOLUME 465, PAGE 941
OF THE TYLER COUNTY DEED RECORDS AND BEING LOCATED ON THE
WEST LINE O.F THE BAILEY WAYNE BUTL'LR 25.411 ACRE TRACT AS
RECORDED IN VOLUME 548, PAGE 610 OF SAID OFFICIAL PUBLIC
RECORDS;
THENCE S 87.24'W, WITH THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRES AND THE NORTH LINE OF SAID NUGENT 5.00 ACRES TRACT,
AT 26.00 FT. PASS THE CENTER,OF SAID COUNTY ROAD, IN ALL A
TOTAL OF 526.45 FT. TO A 1;-1/2 11 IRON PIPE FOUND FOR THE
NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAME AND THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THIS
TRAC'r AND SAME BEING THE -MOST SOUTHERLY SOUTHEAST CORNER
OF t\ .1. 893 , ACRE TRACT SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID
STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THENCE N 01.45'40"W, WITH THE LOWER EAST LINE OF SAID
3.232 ACRE TRACT, AT 33.40 FT,. AGAIN PASS THE CENTER OF
SAID COUNTY ROAD, IN ALL A TOTAL OF 1034.67 FT .• TO A l/2"
IRON ROD SET FOR AN INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF SAME AND
BEING THE HOST WESTERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT;
THENCE N 48 'E 42.74 FT., WITH THE SOt:mfEAST LINE OF
SAID 1. 893. ACRE. TRACT, TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET FOR ANOTHER
INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF SAME AND REING THE MOST NORTHERLY
NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT;
THENCE H 87<•22,'l5"E 49G.46.FT., WITH A SOUTH LINF Of SAID
1.893 ACRES, TO A 5/8" IRON ROD FOUND FOR THE SOUTHEAST Of
SAME AND THE NORTHEAST CORNER OP' THIS TRACT AN IH'l"ERIOR
ANGLE CORNER OF THE STAFFORD 75 ACRES AKD SAKE BEIMG THE
NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE PREVIOUSLY HEH'l'IOHED BAILEY WAYNE
BUTLER 25.411 ACRE TRACT:
THENCE s 01!45'40 11 E 1064.94 FT., WITH THE WEST LINE OF
SAID BUTLER 25.411 ACRES AND THE I...0WD !AST LINE OF SMD
STAFFORD 75 TO Pl..AcB. 01' BIGDQUIIG AND COM'I'AIMIMG
WITHIN THESE BOUMDS 12.857 ACRES OF LAND.
0
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:0tO
356
6G9raGr559
PACE :1
12.851 AClUS
SURVEYED KARCH 1, 1999-
l, LYLE RAINEY, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR NO.

4800, 00 HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION OF
THE hBOVE DESCRIBED TRACT WAS PREPARED FROM AN ACTUAL AND
ACCUAAT! ON THE GROUND SURVEY AND THAT SAME IS TRUE AND
CORR
..,
I
I
dd-:l't.r VOl 6'19r!nf337

PRIVATE ROADWAY EASEMENT
AND tmU1Y EASEMENT
The State of Texas )

) KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Harris county )
That I, Evelyn Anne Parker (hereinafter referred to as Seller), have SOLD, ASSIGNED, and
CONVEYED to Ideal Abilities (hereinafter referred to as Buyer) a private roadway easement and
right-of-way over, across, through, and under a certain tract of land in the Cullen Arnett Survey,
Abstract No. 39, Tyler county, The State of Texas, (as recorded at vo!ume/69, page 560 of the
records of Tyler county), being 50 feet in width and being 1.893 acres, more or less, more
particularly described by metes and bounds as shown on the Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
made a part hereof for all intents and p1,1rposes, for the purpose cf establishing, constructing,
maintaining, repairing, and reconstructing private roadway and ingress and egress over and
through said private roadway.
And under the same terms Seller does further sell, assign, and convey to Buyer, his
· . successors administrators, heirs, and assigns, a general utility easement along said
private roadway easement for the purposes of installing and maintaining utilities.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said private roadway easement and right-of-way and general
·utility easement and all rights and benefits necessary and convenient for the full use and
enjoyment of the rights hereJn sold to the Buyer, his heirs, administrators, successors, executors,
and assigns forever; provided, however, that the use ofthe easement across the above described
property shall not be exclusive with Buyer but is in common with other original Grantees and the
original Grantor, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, and tenants.
Seller and Buyer agree that, when the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns
include the plural. Seller and Buyer further agree that, where any paragraph or sentence of this
warranty deed might be seve'rable under final rormal order or a court of competent jurisdiction,
the remaining paragraphs and sentences • '' stand intact as the full and final agreement
EXECUTED this to" day or JUty, • ; · UJ.- th----

Evelyn Anne Parker
The State orTt>.xas )
)
Harris county )
This instrument was acknowledged me as a free act and deed on the IO'" day of
July, 2000, by Evelyn Anne '
£\ rX:_
N ARY PUBi/c, STATE OF TE {)
-. I .
vt'll 679'lflE338
.A VOl. 669PAGf5fi2
FIBLDNOTE DESOllPTION
F'IELONOTES '1'0. 1. 893 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IN THE

CULLEN ARNETT SURVEY, A-39, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BEING
A OUT OF AND A PART THAT SJI.Jm CALLED 75 ACRES,· MORE··OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1" AS CONVEYED TO HARRY.W.
STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME .610 1 PAGE 494_1 OF
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER COUNTY.. SAID. L 893 ACRES
BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED BY METES AND'BOUNDS AS
FOLLOWS: · '... ·· · ··.
BEGINNING AT A 1-1/2" IRON PIPE FOUND ON THE SOUTH LINE OF

SAID ·STAFFORD 75 ACRES FOR THE MOST SOUTHERLY SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT AND THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF A 12.857
ACRE TRIICT SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID 7 5 ACRES AND
SAME BEING THE NORTHwEST CORNER OF THE JIM NUGENT 5. 00
ACRE TRACT RECORDED IN VOLUME 465 1 PAGE 941 AND BEING THE
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE EARL N. HAMILTON 37.55 ACRE TRACT
RECORDED IN VOLUME 332, PAGE 223 OF THE DEED RECORDS OF
TYLER COUNTY; ,
f
THENCE N Ol'45'40 11 W,· WITH rHE WEST LINE OF SAID 12.857
ACRE TRACT, AT 33.40 FT. PASS THE CENTER OF COUNTY ROAD
NO. 3050, IN ALL A TOTAL OF 1034.67 FT. TO A 1/2" IRON ROD
SET FOR .THE MOST WESTERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 12.857
ACRES AND AN INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF THIS TRACT;
THENCE N 4 2 • 4 8 1 E 4 2 • 7 4 FT. , WITH THE NORTHWEST LINE OF

SAID 12.857 AC}\ES, TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET FOR THE MOST
NORTHERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAME AND ANOTHER INTERIOR
ANGLE CORNER OF. TRACT; .
1
THENCE N 87'22'15"E 496.46 FT., WITH THE NORTH LINE OF

SAID 12.857 ACRES, TO A !5/8" IRON ROD FOUND FOR THE
NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAME AND THE HOST EASTERL'V SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF THIS TR.lCT AND THE SOU'I'HWEST CORNER OF' A 12.689
ACRE TRACT THIS DATE OUT 01" SAID 75 ACRES;
9
THENCE N 01 45'40"W 50.00 FT., WITH THE WEST LINE SAID
12.689 ACRES, TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET FOR THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF THIS_ TRACT, SAME BEING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER .OF A
11,94 2 ACRE. TJtACT ALSO SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID
STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THENCE S 87.22'15 11 1<1 576 •.46 FT., WITH THE· SOUTH LINE OF
SAID 11.942 ACRE TRACT, TO A 1/2 11 IRON ROD SET FOR THP.
SOUTHWEST CORNER .OF SAME AHD THE NOmmES'I' CORND OF THIS
TRACT ON THE EAST LINE OF A 17. att ACRE 'l'JtACT SURVEYED
THIS DATE OUT OP' SAID STAFFORD 75 "AcRu; _.. ·
D.HIISlT "A"
P•a• 1 of 2
......
VOl
PAGE 2
1.893 ACRES
THENCE S 01'45'40"E, AT 50.00 FT. PASS THE SOUTHEAST

CORNER OF SAID 17.2951 ACRES AND THE NORTHEAST CORNER"OF'AN
11.605 ACRE TRACT ALSO SURVEYED OUT OF SAID 75
COH'l'IHUING WITH THE EAST LIKE 01" SUD 18:605. ACRES,:·, AT
1081.56 FT. AGAIN PASS THE CENTER 01' t.'QUNTY ROAD,NO., 3050,
Ill ALL A:TOTAL OF 1113.66 FT. TO A 1/:l". IllOII.ROD SET FOR
THE SOUTHEAST 01" SAID 18.605 ACRES AJfD THE SOIJTJIW!ST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT ON' THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID 75 ACRES
AND THE NORTH LINE OF THE PREVIOUSLY ltENTIONED HAMILTON
ACRJ TRACT;
THENCE II 88°32'E 50.00 FT., WITH THE NORTH LINE OP SAID

HAMILTON TAA.:T AND THE SOUTH LINE OP SAID STAFFORD 7!5
ACRES, TO THB PLACE OF BEGINNING AND CONTAiliiNG WITHIII
THESE BOUNDS 1.893 ACRES OF LAllO,
SURVEYED HARCH 2, 1999
I, LYLE RAINEY, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR NO.

4800, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE PitLOIIOTE DESCRIPTION OF
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED TR.\CT ,WAS PREPARED PROM AN ACTUAL AND
ACCURATE ON THE GROUND SURVEY AND SAME IS TRUE AND
CORR-CT.
UllliiiT "A"
Pace 2 of 2
llfll STAT! or TUAS

or T1l.M
1 hereby ""rtH1 tllat the foreaoins inat.--nt with lte
tlficet.•
da7 of
au·t-hentlf'etlon we•
2000 at .
for I)t;: ln I8J' off ice on the
o'elqe)t..,.!!...ll. •!!i-'!"'•
t l day dul recorded et 9:00 A.ll., in nt "'I•
OPI'ICIAL PUIILIC UQMDII of aald Coonty.
. '''"""F"'
5 da:r of
OM . . . . ., . , . . . . . .
L@'f
....
---;;-- Clerk.
-· •• Co<oolt7 TeaM
111! STAB or 1'llWI

COOim' or 'l"ri.mt
I hereby eertlb that the foresointt with ih
oHir.e- t'm
....... _..... utke: Wleo1o....,.....,. ............

.;t:p EtrY A-1' '-"'T' i' s
REAL PROPERTY BILL OF EXCHANGE

CONTRACT & AGREEMENT
This contract is d&ted this J.O.i"day of Jut...'<, UOO, and is between,
MwG- ·
hereafter known as PARTY OF mE FIRST PART and,
A'otu=n e=s
hereafter known as PARTY OF mE SECOND PART.
The parties named herein reserve all rights to

the Course of the Common Law, without
prejudice, and come together this date in this two party contractual relationship to transfer
complete and absolute ownership and control over the following described property:
PROf'ERTY DESCRIPTION (LEGAL)

, rtJ
uoN'C'(I <;.,fkC'e
,
fJf=
.
""PeVB\..OPG'D
lN 1 loMPRtSri\JG-
\'2. 951 .k4...
M t'-' f'V'rc.e. (et<tt18l( A-)
Puty of the First Part wilrrarits that he/she has full and absolute ownership rights, and rights
of control of said described J,roperty. That the property is free of liens and
and by this unconditional. Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and Agreement,
Ileal· hate Bill of J:xchuze lcf 3
S7-3
hvl/99
\.
Party of the Second Part offers consideration acceptable to the party ofthe First Part in the
amount of One Thousand Dollars and 110 00/100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in trade for the
above described property, all absolute ownership and control at-law of the above described
property, on the condition that it is free from liens, encumbrances and any trusteeships that
wouk! exercise ownership and control rights that would negate the Party of the Second
Parl's free use of purchased property u an abS?Iute property rigbt.
Party of the First Part accepts the tendered offer at-law of the above trade on the Party of
the Second .Pm's conditions, warranting that liens and/or encumbrances have heen
extinguished and trusteeships have been and rmtde null and void by certified mail
service, or in person. on or about the l 01'\ of Ju:.."(. 2ooo. and conveys abrolute
property ownership to buyer
Party of the Ftnt Par1 now delivers, by this instrumer.t, the above described property to the
Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Dolan aad oo/100 (SI,OOO and no 001100) in considerstion acceptable to the
Party of the FirSt Put in Trade for the absolute ownership and control at-law of the above
described property.
This BiD of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part ind the Party of the FirSt Part are functioning by the course of the
common law by exercising fuU and complete rights of absolute ownership and control over
property traded. All rights are reserved to the Course of the Common Law, none are
waived without prejudice.
I'ROTl'.CTION Of' LAW: Tloellllflorily oftbe plll1ld, l>onlin,lltdor tbe temw lnCI oblitpationt of litis Reall'reperty Bill of
.... C.....,...IIIkiiAcr.-tisprGied.td ........ lheptOYiliouofi:IO:I;4:2:1;6:l;AMENDMENTSI,4,6,7,9,10&14ofthe
US. c.-tit•ica tbe s._ 1..- orttte LIDd, Bib lAw Die l'a. 643, 644, 645, 1602, 1603, 1315. The pertiel........t.....,., as well es
1M T - or
- ' Ob!:lpt.iarle dolo keel Bill of ....t ConlnKt lnCI ill NOT SUBJI'.Cf TO
nMJtAL Oft SfATlt Sl'AT\IT'OitY Oft RWULATORY JUIUSDICilON. SEE: USC 42 1981, 1983; Hale v. Henkle 201 U.S.
0.; K--. "· Jlnalt 102 1'1..1.1'4 66,119A.716; Mc:L)'IMI v. Miller, '21t.l. 374, 16!,a.a Ill, 112; People v. Smidl, 112 Midi. 19270
N.w. 466.67 .......... 1n Ky. 11. :zoo s.w.9,11.; Filbcfl v. Bioi>Gp, 111 old. 212. 274P.Itro. '''':
Treot v. ,........., C.C.A.N. Y lllf'.m, Sl c.C.A. 552; 1teync1c1o. 21 Cat. W:ZSI,ls-4; Taylor v. Porto-, 4 Hill 140, 146(tl4lt. Sute v.
Simon, l s,..n 761(1114); U.S. v...... Kilo Art., 169, IU.Ct.4S6; Reid v. c.,...U65 U.S. l,l.E4.W 114t(l9$7); MinMo v.
314 U.S. 436 Iii 491(1966); ltadlleld "- FWMr, 292 PIIJ.: eq,pa..- v. 236 U.S. I. at 14; Booldwn UHan Co. v. er-.t City Co.;
c""""' v. Aron,Jnu.s. 1.
WARNING: Atty,......., """""'or sua.. •JI"'II(s), 1.- EnJ0mooncr11 Ofl'lccr{a), or Weill Offiar(s). who
by ad. or omiooiool, cw ....... cw ...... cot.pR OF LAW, F.......l cw 11bte STATt.n"E. llEOULATJON, cw OttDINANCE in1>air or
aiJri<fF my or all l h e - or olilipiona oflhis lteel Prq>aty Bill ofEdlenea c-act lnCI or impW lioe ld.ions oflhe above
d
l'altiel . . . .
*•+<loaM- 11p to 10 Y..n ,..- ooOial, ....,._lOr ra 241.242, rool,3$7tlfllll be ...... 2$01(,..._
lire t1.....w _..ad. or GalliooioR ...rt Ia lhe lloolllt oflhe hltioo. AI l""ics
inducliroa eo.tt of ail jaiodktiwo, ..-...m
Bill
m..-ily,lhe IIIII
c-iM:i 1m,'"'· 1-. tm- ...... ,._ or
who by ad. cr......_..,_ ar ...... a.yt.nler ....... oftkil Real
aidit usc 42
4oll lllll Rlilldt .... h fcollonf c-t. SEE: USC 42 2GOOof.7, 20008(1); tWirr "· Moloe. No. 90-411,
"- 4001(1991).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Party of the First Part l8fees to Wamnt and forever
defend the npt of absolute ownership, to the above Aid property unto the Party or the
2cf 3
Second Part, .pnst the claims of aU penons whocmloevtr. The Party of the Second
Part,aecepts absolute ownenhip, as per the tenns coriditions and warranties stated herein
SIGNIDTRIS '241'() SIGmD THIS "'2-@0

!l?..k- A:su. . rnes
wt 679•!c!321
e'}(tttS•-r A VO( 669 P!Gf 558
DESCRIPTION
('!.
TO 12.851 ACRES OF L.\ND AS Sl'tu.\TED IH THE
CUu..mt A.RttE'M" SURVEY, A-39, TYL£R COUNTY, TEX.\S AND BEING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF THAT CALLED 75 ACRES, HORE OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS 10TRACT HO. l,. AS CONVEY EO TO HARR \' W.
BY DEIO RECORDED IN VOLUME 610, PAGE 494 OF THE
OFFICIAL I'U'8LlC r...BCOROS OF TYLER (:()UH'f':t'. s.\10 12.857 ACRES
BEING MORE PARTIC'Ol.ARLY OCSCRIBEO BY METES AND BOUNDS AS
FOL.t.OWS:
BEGllmiMG AT A RI\ILRO.\O RAIL FOUND ON THE NORTHEAST SlOE
OT COUN"l"V ROAO MO. 3050 FOR THE HOST EASTERLY SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF SAID STAFFORD 75 ACRES AND ·ntE SOUTHEAST CORNER
OF TIUS TRACT, SAKE 8EIHC THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE JIM
NOO!HT 5. 00 ACRE 'I'RACT AS RECCRDEO IN VOLUME 4 6 5, PME 9 d 1
OF THE TYLER DEED R!OOROS AHD BEING LOCATED ON THE
WEST OF THE BAILEY WAYNE BUTLER 25.411 ACRE TRACT hS
RECORDED IN VOLUME 548, PAGE 610 OF SAID OFFICiftL PUBLIC
RECORDS;
THENCE S 87.24'W, WITH THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRES AND THE KORTH LIKE OF SAID NUGENT 5.00 ACRES TRACT,
AT 26.00 FT. PASS THE CENTER OF SAID COUNTY ROAD, IN }.LL A
TOTAL OF 526.45 FT. TO A 1-1/2" IRON PIPE FOUND FOR THE
NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAME AND THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THIS
TRACT AND SAME BEING THE -MOST SOUTHERLY SOUTHEAST CORNER
OF 1\ 1. 893 ACRE TRACT SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID
STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THENCE N 01' 4 5' 40"W, WITH THE LOWER EAST LIKE OF SAID
3. 232 ACRE TRACT, AT JJ. 40 FT,. AGAIN PASS THE CENTER OF
SAID COUNTY ROAD, IN ALL A TOTAL OF 1034.67 FT. TO A 1/2"
IRON ROD SET FOR AN INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF SAME AND
BEING THE MOST WESTERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT;
THENCE N 42'48'E 42.74 FT., WITH THE SOUTHEAST LINE OF
SAID 1. 893 ACRE. TRACT 1 TO A 1/2" IRON ROO SET FOR ANOTHER
INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF SAME AND BEING THE MOST NORTHERLY
NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT;
THENCE N 87'22'15 11 E 49G.46 FT., WITH A SOUTH LINE OF SAID
1.893 .1\CRES, TO.\ 5/8" IRON ROD FOUND FOR THE SOUTHEAST OF
SAME AND THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THIS TRACT AN INTERIOR
ANGLE CORNER OF THE STAFFORD 75 ACRES.AND SAME BEING THE
NORTHWBST CORNER OF THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BAILEY WAYNE
BUTLER 25.411 ACRE 'i'RACT; -
THENCE S 01'45'40nE 1064.94 FT., WITH THE WEST LINE OF
SAID BUTLER 25.411 ACRES AND THE LOWER EAST LINE OY SAID
STAFFORD 75 ACRES, TO PLACE OF BEGINNING AND CONTAINING
WITHIN THESE BOUNDS 12.857 ACRES OF LAND.
-···
VOl 679PaCf.322
Vlll .669raGE559.
PAGE l
12 .85'/ ACRES
SURVEYED MARCH 2, 19'::19

I, LYLE.RAINEY, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR NO.
4800, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION OF
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED TRACT WAS PREPARED FROM AN ACTUAL AND
AC:CURATE ON THE GROUND SURVEY AND THAT SAME IS TRUE· AND
CORR
I
I
I
·;
'Oil STATII OF TIIXAS

COUffi'T 01' TYLilft
I. hereby certify that the forf!goins with ito
c;rtlficate o waa filed for record in •Y office on the
da;r of 2000 at Jf.JJL o 'el"f.A_ H. and ua
thle da;r dul record at 9:00 A.H., in Vol. et sf!q.
OPPICIAL RBCO«DS of said County.
official seal at office in Wood¥ille thia
•• beputy
STAnt Of' UXAS

courm' OP mER
I hereby certify that the foresoins inntrumnnt with ita
cl!tt!ficate o£ P,uth!!ntication wee filed for record in IIU' offir.e on the
........ """"" IOOCke: WIIHo ft!llno to:

:f1>Gik.- A-61\...l""n e-s
REAL PROPERTY BILL OF

This contract is dated this lO-ft.day UtJo , and is between,
fve-tXrJ /JtNNE;- _ _ __
hereafter known as PAR1Y OF THE FIRST PART and,
At:,tt...r\\e-5
hereafter known as PAR1Y OF mE SECOND PART.
The parties named herein reserve all rights to the Course of the Common Law, without
prejudice, and come together this date in this two party contractual relationship to transfer
complete and absolute ownership and control over the following described property:
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION (LEGAL)

OFf f<AM=> uJ CcUN'N1
f!.AW As
JtJ "l>c::sa..tp-norJ,
A-)
Party of the First Part warrants that he/she has full and absolute ownership rights, and rights
or control or said described property. That the property is free of liens and encumbrances,
and by this unconditional Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and Agreement,
lof3
Party ol ttle Second Part offen consideration acceptable to the party of the First Part in the
lft'IIC.'lltml olOM T'Hualld &ian and H 001100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in trade for the
abcwe desaibed property, aU absolute ownenhip and control at-law of the above described
property, oo the condition that it is free ftom 1iens, encumbrances and any trusteeships that
wauld exercise ownership and control rir;hts that would negate the Party of the Second
Pari's free use of purchased property Man absolute property right.
Party of the First Part accepts the tendered offer at-!aw of the above trade on the Party of
the Second .Part's conditions, warranting that liens and/or encumbrances have been
extinguished and trusteeships have been revoked and made null and void by certified mail
service, or in person. on or about the · IO ""'. of JvVC. U11o, and conveys absolute
rroperty ownership to buyer
Party of the Fir:!>1 Part now delivers, by this the above described property to the
Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Thousand DoRan and oo/100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in consideration acceptable to the
Party ofthe First Part in Trade for the absolute ownership and control at-law of the above
described property.
This Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part and the Party of the First Part are functioning by the course of the
common law by exercising full and complete rights of ab:rolute ownership and control over
property traded. AJI rights are ·reserved to the Course! of the Common Law, none are
I"ROTF.cTJON OF I.A W: The eudtority of the p8fties, named herein. unc1or the ..,.._ Mel obfiptions of lttil Rail M of
aM Cllllllnct under
U.S. C<lmllituticln the Supreme Law o(lhe Lind, Bib Law Die f'&. 643,644,64$, 1602, 1603, t:JU
lhe Tams ConcliticN IIICI Obltptiom of dUe Roll rrq,.ty Bill of Exdianp 1M CClftlra<t llld
The,..._ .....
ofi;IO:I; 4:2:1;6:2; AMENDMENTS 1,4,6,7,9,10 Al4 ofthe
ltcnin a well as
is P40T ·suan:cr TO
n:DERAL OR STATE STATUTORY OR REGUlATORY JUIUSDICI101'"- SEE: l'SC 42 I HI, 1913; Hole v HellJe 201 US
43.; KaUh. v . .Juralt 102 N.J.Eq 66,1J9A.716; McL)'NII v. Miller, 52 lt.l.l14. t61,e.alll, 112; Peoplev Salilll. 112 Mid.. 19l'7G
N.W. 466.67 Ant.St.Rep.39l.; MulliN v. CatiWIICAIRNJih, 179 Ky. 71, 200 S.\11.9,11.; Fibft v. Bilhclp, IJhU 272, 2741'.1110, 1111.
Treae v. Tofaun, C.C.A.N.Y., lllF.I9J, .5I C.C.A. 552; :11 C.l. W 251, 2S4; T.,U v. l"oMr, 4 Hillll40. be •·
Simcn, 2 9p-. 761(llt4); U.S. v. Wonc KianM., 169, II S.Q.4S6; Reidv. Cow!t:NS U.S. l,l..UW. 11411(19S1);. v. AN..
lt4 U.S. 436 Ill 491(11166); Rdiefd v. FbiMr, 292 1'113.; v. k.-. 2M U.S. 1.111 14; I!Jalldian! Ueia Co. v 0... Oty Co;
Cooper V. Anln, 351 U.S. I.
WARNJNG: My penon, Fodcnl «Stile Admlnillriliw 8(111\C(s). Law il a.-{1). or .Weill 08k.w{s). ..t.o
t.y eel « omlaion , CUllom or 1118&e, cw under COLOR Of LAw , F.._,cw 11b11c STAlVI'E. MOULAT10N. or OIWINANC'E ...... "'
.,,. cw •It tbe 1mn1 or obliptiom of HI Real rrq,.ty Rill Ca1nd M4 eUor ....,..-c
named f'llrtics «lite obfiptions Uledherein,lll'ldcr USC II 241, 242, 1001,3571 .............. &ocrillliliel._ . . . 250k F ClOIIIIt
Mel impfi8ooul&'tl lip to 10 Yean per oouril, . . . . ._.fOr 1ft sltciluW llldt n «--. t - ' ilrl 111e .._. alh ......_
c-u of ell jllrildidiona, Fednt Cf Sl8le Olldals who t.y lld IW lllllliilli<lll ........... ""1 ........... a(feis ....
All,.._
rrq,.ty Bill of EJDdlanp Contract IIICI _... USC 42 1911, 1915, 1916, lfa 8N 1e omt ,.,..ray will 100 fona of
immanity,tbe SEE:USC42 2CON-7,:aooo.(i); fW!wv. ......_No 90-611.
I". 4001(1991).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Party of the First Part agrees to Warranl and forever
defend the right of absolute ownership, to the above said property unto the Party of the
..
ftlrt. . . . dile c:hillls of aal The f"¥ty of the Second
......C OIIIIMI'_, u per llftd 'M:fflm(le$ seated herein
S1CHD nm 1A:Jt;o
k&tL..IT\&S
9Y' B4.&.U
KATHRYN l KRENZKE
Jfj®
(:tO.,
I<ATHRYN L KREN4KE
•• MY CCMMIIIION IXPIRE8
I MY COMMt8slofol El(Pfi'IES
W AAAIL20, 2002
AI'Ril20. 2002
Realltltate 1m1 or 3 of 3
S7-3
Rev 11199
I EXHIBIT "Au
VOl
FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION
\-\W (li'·'30l Ac.i:es) oF 'P€SCRII5€t>:
FIELDNOTES TO 111.605 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IN THE
CULLEN ARNETT-SURVEY, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BEING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF THAT SAME CALLED 75 ACRES, MORE OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1" AS CONVEYED TO HARRY ·w.
· STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 610, PAGE 4 94 , CiF .THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER 'COUNTY. SAID 605 ACRES
FOLLOWS: .
BEGINNING AT A PINE KNOT STAKE FOUND ON THE EAST LINE OF
THE ROBERT LUCAS SURVEY, A-24, AND THE WEST LINE <)F SAID
ARNETT SURVEY FOR THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 75
ACRES AND OF THIS TRACT ANO SAME BEING THE NORTHWEST
CORNER OF THE EARL N. 37.55 ACRE TRACT RECORDED
IN VOLUME 332, PAGE 223 OF THE TYLER COUNTY DEED RECORDS;
THENCE N OJ'l0'25"W, WITH THE LINE BETWEEN SAID

LUCAS AND ARNETT SURVEYS AND WEST LINE OF SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRE TRACT, AT 305.80 FT. rASS THE CENTER OF COUNTY ROAD
NO. 3050, IN ALL A 'fOTAL OF 10'48.27 FT. TO A 1/2u IRON ROO
SET FOR THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS TRACT AND BEING THE
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF A 17.29 ACRE TRACT SURVEYED THIS DATE
OUT OF SAID STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THENCE N 87'22'15"E 780.55 FT., WITH THE SOUTH LINE OF
SAID 17.299 ACRE TRACT, TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET FOR THE
SOUTHEAST OF SANE AND THE NORTHEAST OF THIS
TRACT ON 'l'lfE WEST LINE OF A 1. 893 ACRE TRACT ALSO SURVEYED
THIS DATE OUT or SAID 77 ACRES;
THENCE S 01'45'40"E, WITH 'l'lfE.WEST LINE OF SAID 1.893 ACRF;

TRACT 1 AT 1031.56 FT. PASS TilE CENTER OF SAID COUHTY ROAD,
IN ALL A TOTAL Or 1063.66 FT. TO A 1/2" IRON ROD SET FOR
THE SOUTHEAST CORJfER or 'l'lfiS TRACT ON THE SOUTH LINE Ol'
THE SAID S'I'AFJI'ORD 75 ACRES AND ON 'l'lf! NORTH LINE OF THE
A&OVE KVITIOHED. HAMILTON 37. 55 ACRE TRACT 1
THVICE S 81' 754.63 FT., WITH THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID

75 ACR!:3 AJIO THE NORTH LINE OF SAID HAHILroN TRACT, TO THE
l't..ACE OF IUOIMIIIJIG AND CONTAINING WITHIN THESE BOUNDS
U .605 ACttES OF LAND.
SURVEYED. IUJtCH. 2 1999
I, LYLE RAINEY, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR NO.

4100, DO KERtiY CERTIFY 'mAT THE FIELDHOTE DESCRIPTION OF
THE AeOVE oaatlBED TRACT WAS P'IU!PARED FROM A1f ACTUAL AND
ltCCUIIIATJ ON TlfE GltOUltO StmVEY AND 'mAT. SAKE IS TRUE AND
u.IIO $\MV11YO
......
lfO, UOO
REAL PROPERTY BILL OF EXCHANGE

TllfS COIICRd ts this J<t'day ol ltnJp , and is between.
hemtfter bmw as OF THE FIRST PART and.
.f\?t,*'-.. k lL '-n 6:S

hereafter known as PAR1Y OF THE Sl:COND PART
The parties named herein reserve all rights to the Course of the Common Law, without
prejudice. and come together this date in this two party contractual relationship to t:ansfer
complete and absolute ownership lU1d control over the de!9t'lril9eel
9'f P/n(:r( PA«--r .,.-o:
- PROPERTY DESCRIPTION (LEGAL)
Ko1c"t>WA-y R.\Gtt-T-oF-wk-1 hiD
C.Ot.ltJT''(, \ttt; £"'t?t\E Of

CA>MfKtStut;- I· ect3 Ar$.€5 ,4-s 1N kf""fk"C-t{eD
I
t-\l'>tJ· A+Jt:>
OtJt..'( -ro R,\Gttf'S No-r ·""ti-\& PftoPGeT'(
l't"Sa.fi AS ,,... "Pf;C-t>
Party of the Part ":arrants that he/she has fuU &Rfl rights l>F
ef c;emF&l of wd descnbed property. That the prop&{y ee o iens and encumbrances,
and by this unconditional Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and
Real Estate Bill of Exchange I of 3
S7-3
Revt/99
Vfll
Part} of the Second Part offers oonsideration acceptable to the party of the First Part in the
amount of Doe 11t0 001100 ($1,000 nd no 001100) in trade for the
· and control at-law ofthe above described
condition t m , encumbrances and any trusteeships that
would exercise ownership and ....
Party of the Second
Part's free use of purchased VW
Party of the First Par accepts the tendered offer at -law of the above trade on the Party of
the Second Part's <..OnditionS; wammti'1g that liens and/or encumbrances have been
extinguished and trusteeships have been revoked and made null and void by certified mail
on or about the 'tQoo. and conveys absolute
to buyeJi
Party of the First Part now delivers, by this instrument, the above described propeJ'RWe
Party of the Second Part, and the Pat1y of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Thousand Dollars and oo/100. ($1,000 and no 00/100) in consideration acceptable to the
P11vty of the First Part in Trade for the naehrte ownership and control at-law ofthe above
described property.g\6 tt1:S .
/<..
This Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part an:d the PartY of the First Part are functioning by the course of the
exercising full and complete rights of eeseltik ownership and control over
All rights are reserved to the Course of the Common Law, none are
PROTECTION OF LAW: The authority of the parties, twned herein, 1111<1« the terms lrKf obliplians of this Rul Pro,>my Bill or
Enh110tce- C-..ct 1111111 proldod unci« the provisims of UO:I; 4:2:1; 6:2; AMENDMENTS 1.4,6,7,9.10 ofthe
U.S. CamtiiW<ln lheSuprane Law oflhe Lind, Bib Law Die Pg. 643,644, s-iS, 1602, 1603, U8S. Theplftics DOmed herein as well as
the T<m11 ea.ditions llld OOiptiom of lbla Rod l'rcpaty Bill of Exduonp lrKf C<lDCnld llld is NOT SUBJECT TO
FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTORY OR REGULATORY JURISDICJ'JON.SE£: USC42 1911, 19&3;Halev. Houk.le201 U.S.
43.; KauJbwo v. .JurzU: 102 NJ.Eq. 66,139A.716; Mc:L)'mlll v. Miller, S2lt!. 374, 16l,u Ill, 112; P<q>lev. Smi1b. 112 Midi. tll%70
N.W. 466.67 A.m.SLR"f'.392.; Mullias v. Commonw.,.llh, 179 Ky. 71, 200 S.W.9,11.; Filladt v. BiD>p, Ill clcl. 271. 274P.IIIO, 1111;
T.-...t v. Tom-. 113F.893, Sl C.C.A. 552; RO)'IlOI4o. 21 Cal 2n<l251, 2S<I; Taylor v. l'coW, 4 Hilll40,146(1Ul); SU&ev.
Sim<ln. 2 ap-. 76l(IUI); U.S. v. Wq Kim Alt., 169, II S.Q.4$6; Reid v. Covert l6S U.S. I,I..E4.211clll41(l951); Minallt v.
314 U.S. 436111 491(1966); Recl6eld v. Fisher. 292 Pl13.; Cqlpap V. " " " ' - . 236 u.s. 1.111 14; Dutchen u.;., Co. v. c.- Cily Co.;
Cooperv.Arnl.358U.S.I.
WARNING: /lny p<non. Fedcnl or Slate apil(a). Law W - Olfiom(a).l..qpolll<x(t). or Wcial OfJia:o1s). ..00
by ad « ........... , <WI«a « -. . «....tor COLOR Of LAW, Foclci'al or,._ STAnTre, lt.llOULATlON, «ORDINANCE impair or
obriclso.,y ... •" lbeterms"" oblipicno oflhiil R... Property Bill. .......... .w- or... •"'-
"""""' l'eltial «lh<ol>lipticnt .....,.usc •• 241.242, :oo1. :;s7JilMIIbo:MjasocrioloMol,... .,sol'OIC:r--
llld ...,............ lip lo 10 y.., per ....................._ for lifO lbculd lllldt ad ........................... ollllo ......... All ........
indudina c-. ololljuriadidlono, F-.1
Prapcoty 11111 or Exdoaneo
or....., _...08lc:ielo ..too by eel« .......................... ony- e(-.;.lt-.1
IIIMI
immunity, the lllh Ammclmonl oloeanc,g
P. 4001(1991).
--...-it usc 42 1m, .,.,, JMG, em -llll;acl
F-.. c-t. Sf!!: USC42 :101101-7, 2000e(l); ...- •.
willa ... ,._.,.
......._No 90-611,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Party of the First Part and forever

defend the right of HIINM ownenhip, to the above Aid the Pany of the
14Jt;o
ktt..l-nt?
(Pwty o( 4he finl Pll1) (PNty of 'eccnd Part)
BY
KAn-iRYNTKite,.;z,(E I<ATHRYN L KRENZKE

MY !EXPIRES
IXP'II!II
APRIL 20. 2002
hll
Vtll 679•.1Cf335
VOl 669 i'!Gf 562
A
FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION
('2.
FIELONOTES TO. 1.893 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IN THE
CULLEN ARNETT SURVEY, A-39, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BBING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF· THA'!' SAME CALLED 75 ACRES,- MORE ·OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1 11 AS CONVEYED TO HARRY W.
STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 610, PAGE 4941 OF 'THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER COUNTY. SAID 1:893 ACRES
FOLLOWS: ..
BEGINNING AT A 1-l/2 11 IRON PIPE FOUND ON THE SOUTH LINE 01''

SAID STAFFORD 75 ACRES FOR THE HOST SOUTHERLY SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT AND THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF A 12.857
ACRE TRACT SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID 75 ACRES AND
SAME BEING THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE JIM NUGENT 5. 00
ACRE TRACT RECORDED IN VOLUME 465, PAGE 941 AND BEING THE
NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE EARL N. HAMILTON 37.55 ACRE TRACT
RECORDED IN VOLUME 332, PAGE 223 OF THE DEED RECORDS OF
TYLER COUNTY7
I
THENCE N 01'45'40 11 W, WITH THE WEST LINE OF SAID 12.857
ACRE TRACT, AT 33.40 FT, PASS THE CENTER OF COUNTY ROAD
NO. 3050, IN ALL A TOTAL OF 1034.67 FT. TO A 1/2" IRON ROD
SET FOR THE MOST WESTERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 12.857
ACRES AND AN INTERIOR ANGLE CORNER OF THIS
THENCE N 42'46'E 42.74 FT., WITH THE NORTHWEST LINE OF

SAID 12.857 ACRES, TO A 1/2 11 IRON ROD SET FOR THE HOST
NORTHERLY NORTHWEST CORNER OF ShME AND ANOTHER INTERIOR
ANGLE CORNER OF TRACT;
THENCE N 87"22'15 11 E 496.46 J!T.,

WITH THE NORTH LINE OF
SAID 12.857 ACRES, TO A 5/8 11 IRON ROD f'OUND FOR THE
NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAME hNO THE MOST EASTERLY SOUTHEAST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT'AND THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF A 12.669
ACRE TRACT SURV.EYED THIS DATE OUT OF SAID 75 ACRES:
THENCE N Ol.45'40"W 50.00 FT., WITH THE WEST LINE OF SAID

12.689 ACRES, TO A 1/2 11 . IRON ROD SET FOR THE NORTHEhST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT, SAME BEitiG THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF A
11.942 ACRE TRACT ALSO SURVEYED THIS DATE OUT OF 'SAID
STAFFORD 75 ACRES;
THENCE S 87.22'15 11 W576.46 FT., WITH THE·SOUTH LINE OF

SAID 11.942 ACRE TRACT, TO A 1/2 11 IRON ROO SET FOR THE
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAME AND THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THIS
TRACT ON THE EAST LINE OF A 17. 299 ACRE TRACT SURVEYED
THIS DATE.OUT OF SAID STAFFORD 75.ACRES;
EXHIBIT "A"
Page 1 of 2
,. VOl 679,scE336
VOl
PAGE 2
1.893
THENCE S Ol'45'40ME, AT 50.00 FT. PASS THE SOUTHEAST

CORNER OF SAID 17.299 ACRES AltO THE NORTHEAST CORNER. OF'AN
18.605 ACRE TRACT ALSO SIJ'RVI!!YEO OUT OF SAID 75 AND
COII'l'INUIHG WITH THE EAST LINE OF SAID 18; 605 . ACRES,:·, AT
1081.56 FT. AGAIN. PASS THE CENT.Im OF COUNTY ROAO,NO.• ,J050,
IN ALL A TOTAL OF 1113.66 FT. TO A 1/2". IltOH. ROO .SET FOR
THE SOUTHEAST OF SAID 18.605 ACRES AND THE SOUTHWEST
CORNER OF THIS TRACT OK. Ttl! SOUTtl LINE OF SAID 75 ACRES
AND TH!l IIORTtl LINE OF THE PREVIOUSLY KENTIONI!D HAKILTOH
3?.55 ACRE TRACT;
THENCE If 88'J2'E 50.00 FT., WITH THE I!ORTH LINE OF SAID
HAKILTOK TRACT AltO Ttl! SOUTH LIN! OF SAID STAFFORD 75
ACRBS, TO 'l'K! PLACE OP Bl!GIII'JUHG AND COI!TAIIUHG WITHIN
THESE BOUI!DS 1.893 ACRES OF LAND.
SURVEYED KARCH 2, 1999
l, .LYLE RAINEY, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAUD SURVEYOR NO.

4100, DO HIRlBY CERTIFY THAT THE PI!LDIIOTE DESCRIPTION OF
THE AIIOVIt OBSCRIBIID TRACT WAS PRBPARitO PROM AN ACTUAL AND
ACCUIV.Tit ON THE GROOtfO SIJ'RVU AltO THAT SAKE IS TRUE AND
Ulllllt "A"
Paae 2 of 2
--·
Government
Exhibit
_____________
F
Government
Exhibit
_____________
G

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER
The Court, having considered the UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, and any response or reply thereto,
it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The United States’ Motion is GRANTED; and
2. The United States has valid and subsisting federal tax liens on all property
and rights to property of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., including the Tyler County
Property held by nominee, Ideal Abilities, and more specifically described in Exhibit D
to the United States’ Motion; and
3. The United States may foreclose its liens against the Tyler County
Property, and will submit a proposed order of sale to this Court within 10 days from the
date of this order.
SIGNED this ________ day of _____________________________ , 2015.
________________________________

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO CONTINUE

PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL DEADLINES
The United States of America moves to continue the July 2, 2015
Joint Pre-Trial Order and motion in limine deadline and corresponding
docket call and trial dates until 60 days after a decision on the United States’
Motions for Default Judgement against two of the Defendants and the
United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment against the remaining third
Defendant. In support of this motion the United States affirms as follows:
1. On November 25, 2014, the Court entered a scheduling order.
(Dkt. #32.)1 This Scheduling Order sets July 2, 2015, as the deadline for
submission of a Joint Pre-Trial Order and any motions in limine. Responses
1
The case was originally assigned to Judge Clark and then transferred to Judge Schneider. (Dkt. #39.)
Judge Schneider has referred all pre-trial proceedings to Magistrate Judge Giblin. (Dkt. #40.)
to any motions in limine are to be filed by July 9, 2015. A final pre-trial
conference is set for July 23, 2015, and trial is set to begin on July 27, 2015.
2. On November 26, 2014, the United States’ requested the clerk
enter default against Bright Future Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt.
#30), and the clerk entered default against both defendants on December 5,
2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United States filed its
Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and Ideal
Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). No opposition has been filed to
this Motion for Default Judgment as of the date of this filing. The United
States also filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against the remaining
Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and
Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.)2 The United States’
Motions for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment are briefed and ready
for the Court’s decision.
3. If granted, these pending motions will be dispositive of the
issues in this case. The extension will allow time for the Court to rule on
these motions and save the Court and the parties the time and expense of
further preparation for a trial that may be unnecessary.
2
The response contained frivolous arguments that Trowbridge is a citizen of the State of Texas and not the
United States and other arguments adequately addressed by the United States motion for summary
judgment. Therefore, the United States did not file a reply.
2
4. The District Court may approve or deny extensions of time
based on its discretion, after good cause is shown. Fed. R. Civ. P 16(b)(1)
(“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may,
for good cause, extend the time”).
5. On June 23, 2015, Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. was
contacted regarding this motion and the continuance requested at the only
contact phone number listed in his pleadings. John Parks Trowbridge Jr. has
not responded to the message left with his secretary regarding the
continuance requested.
WHEREFORE, the United States of America moves to continue the
July 2, 2015 Joint Pre-Trial Order and motion in limine deadline and
corresponding docket call and trial dates until 60 days after a decision on the
United States’ Motions for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment.
3
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF
filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also
served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
4

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER
Having considered the UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO CONTINUE PRE-TRIAL
AND TRIAL DEADLINES, and the entire record of this proceeding, it is by the Court
ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further,
ORDERED that the July 2, 2015 Joint Pre-Trial Order and motion in limine
deadline and corresponding docket call and trial dates contained in the Court’s
Scheduling Order (Dkt. #32) are continued until 60 days following a decision on the
motions for default and summary judgment submitted by the United States of America.
SO ORDERED this day of 2015.
_____________________________________
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 45 Filed 07/14/15 Page 1 of
2 PageID #: 406
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § Plaintiff, § § v. § § JOHN PARKS
TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al., § Defendants. §
CIVIL ACTION NO: 9:14-CV-138
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONTINUE AND
TERMINATING DEADLINES
The District Court referred this civil action to the undersigned United
States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for determination of non-
dispositive pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local
Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. This matter was previously assigned to Chief United States
District Judge Ron Clark, who issued a scheduling order setting the
matter for a final pretrial conference on July 23, 2015, along with other
deadlines. See Scheduling Order (doc. #32). On January 13, 2015, the
case was reassigned to the docket of the Honorable Michael H.
Schneider, who in turn referred the matter to the undersigned for pretrial
management. See Referral Order (doc. #40). There are several case-
dispositive motions now pending before the Court which are ripe for
consideration. Accordingly, the United States filed its Motion to
Continue Pre-Trial and Trial Deadlines (doc. #44) requesting that the
current settings and deadline be continued until 60 days after the Court
rules on the case- dispositive motions.
.
The plaintiff has not responded in opposition. After consideration, the
undersigned finds the United States’ motion to continue to be
meritorious, given the pending matters and the fact that the case has
been reassigned to Judge Schneider’s docket, thus mooting the
scheduling order issued by Judge Clark.
It is therefore ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Pre-Trial and
Trial Deadlines (doc. #44) is GRANTED. All deadlines and court
settings in this case are TERMINATED at this time. The undersigned
will reinstate the case for trial and set corresponding pretrial deadlines as
necessary after the Court issues a final ruling on the pending case-
dispositive motions in this matter.
It is so ordered.
SIGNED this the 14th day of July, 2015.
____________________________________ KEITH F.
GIBLIN!UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 45 Filed 07/14/15 Page 2 of
2 PageID #: 407
2

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT

JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. #46)
Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) On November 26,
2014, the United States’ requested the clerk enter default against Bright Future
Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt. #30), and the clerk entered default against both
defendants on December 5, 2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United
States filed its Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and
Ideal Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). The United States also filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment against the remaining Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.)
The Court has continued all pre-trial and trial deadlines until after a final ruling on the
pending case-dispositive motions. (Dkt. #45.)

On July 24, 2015, Trowbridge filed another memorandum, asserting the same
arguments in his previous responses and using the same irrelevant law in his quest to
have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America and that this
Court doesn’t have jurisdiction for the foreclosure action. (See Dkts. #7, #10, #18, #19,
#21, #42, and #46.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject to tax
because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and has been
rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding claims that
they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens of the State
and not the United States).
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…”1
Further, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which gives district courts
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United
States…”2 Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and
enforcement of liens) is also authorized by statute.3 The only question of law involves
the United States ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr.
Trowbridge – NOT some frivolous argument about whether or not Texas is part of the
United States.
1
28 U.S.C. §1340.
2
28 U.S.C. §1345.
3
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
U.S. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Page 2 of 3
deny Trowbridge’s motion to dismiss. The United States also requests such further and
other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
U.S. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

Page 3 of 3

LUFKIN DIVISION

Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO: 9:14-CV-138
§
Defendants. §
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL
The District Court referred this civil action to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for determination of non-dispositive pretrial matters pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. Pending before the Court is the defendant’s Motion for the Court to Recuse Itself for (1)
Incompetence by Reason of Ignorance of Law, (2) Violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers,
and (3) Fraud Under Color of Law, Office and Authority and Memorandum in Support (doc. #31).
I. Background
On July 7, 2014, the United States filed this proceeding against defendants John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr.; Bright Future Investments, Inc.; Ideal Abilities; and the Tyler County Tax Office.1
The United States filed its complaint alleging that defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
1
The Tyler County Tax Office has since been terminated as a party defendant. See Order (doc. #17).
There is also a pending motion for default judgment regarding defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc.
and Ideal Abilities, which the Court will address by separate order. See Motion (doc. #38).
(“Trowbridge”) owes the United States $3,326,015.01 plus statutory additions accruing after April
7, 2014, in unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the 1993 through 1997 tax years.
See Complaint (doc. #1), at p. 2. The Complaint states that these tax amounts were reduced to
judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., case number H-14-27 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. See Exhibit A to Complaint. United States District Judge
Lynn N. Hughes signed that judgment on May 23, 2014. Id.
The Complaint further states that on July 10, 2000, Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two tracts
of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County, Texas, (“the Tyler County
property”) to defendant Ideal Abilities. See Complaint, at p. 2, and Exhibits B-1 through B-3 to
Complaint. On or about July 26, 2000, the deeds and contracts were recorded with the Tyler County
Clerk’s Office. Id. The Complaint avers that the contracts for the deeds and conveyances were
signed by Trowbridge as Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities. Id. at p. 3. The Complaint goes on
to describe the factual background regarding Trowbridge’s requested appraisal of the Tyler County
properties and Ideal Abilities’ holding of the title to the Tyler County Property with Trowbridge as
a nominee. Id.
The Complaint further states that on June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Ideal
Abilities, as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. See id.; see also
Exhibit C to Complaint. The United States therefore contends that it has valid and subsisting federal
tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of Trowbridge, and against Trowbridge for all property
and rights to property in which they have interest, including any interest in the Tyler County
property. See Complaint, at pp. 3-4. The United States further argues that the federal tax liens
should be foreclosed upon the Tyler County property; the Tyler County property should be sold free
and clear of all rights, titles, claims and interests of the parties. Id. at p. 4. Finally, the United States
seeks relief through a finding that it has a perfected tax lien in all property and rights to property
2
belonging to Trowbridge and his nominee, Ideal Abilities. Id. It also seeks foreclosure against the
Tyler County property and a sale of the Tyler County property free and clear of all rights, titles,
claims, and interests of the parties, with the proceeds of the sale to be distributed according to law.
Id.
The docket shows that the case was originally filed in the Tyler Division of the Eastern
District under case number 6:14-CV-595 and assigned to United States District Judge Michael H.
Schneider. On September 11, 2014, Judge Schneider referred the case to United States Magistrate
Judge K. Nicole Mitchell for pretrial proceedings. See Order (doc. #11). On September 15, 2014,
Judge Mitchell ordered that the case be transferred to the Lufkin Division for the Eastern District of
Texas. See Order (doc. #12). In support, she noted that the Tyler County property at issue lies
within the Lufkin Division, citing 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(6). Id. Upon transfer, on September 16, 2014,
the case was reassigned to United States District Judge Ron Clark (now Chief Judge).
On January 13, 2015, the case was again reassigned back to the docket of the Honorable
Michael H. Schneider, who in turn referred the matter to the undersigned for pretrial management
on January 27, 2015. See Referral Order (doc. #40). In the interim, while the case was still before
Judge Clark, defendant Trowbridge filed the instant recusal motion on November 25, 2014.
In the motion and accompanying memorandum, Trowbridge generally argues that he has been
denied due process and that the Court and counsel for the plaintiff are conspiring to defraud him of
his property. See Memorandum (doc. #31), at p. 3. He further contends that the record shows an
ignorance of the law on the part of the Court. Id. at pp. 4-5. Trowbridge also repeatedly argues that
the Court lacks jurisdiction, arguing that an Article III District Court’s limited jurisdiction does not
extend to exercising in personam jurisdiction and the entry of judgments. Id. at pp. 6-8. He relatedly
argues that there is “no evidence that [he] resides within the jurisdiction of a territorial court”,
despite the fact that the “it is indisputable” that he resides in Tyler County, Texas, and the property
3
at issue is in Tyler County. Id. at p. 8. Therefore, Trowbridge’s argues for recusal because the
presiding District Court is merely a territorial court and therefore lacks jurisdiction over Texas,
where Trowbridge resides. He further states that “[Judge] Ron Clark is misrepresenting himself as
the judge of an Article III court of limited jurisdiction; concealing controlling law fatal to the cause
of his employer, the District of Columbia municipal corporation, a.k.a. United States (28 U.S.C. §
3002(2),(3), (8) and (15))”. Id. at p. 10. He argues that the Court is conspiring with the United
States Attorney’s Office to defraud him and that Judge Clark is “feigning ignorance” and that is not
possible for defendant to receive fair treatment in the instant lawsuit. Id. at pp. 11-14.
Discussion
Without even addressing the wholly frivolous nature of Trowbridge’s arguments regarding
the Court and jurisdiction, his motion for recusal fails on its face for several reasons. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (Emphasis
added). Section 455(b) goes on to provide that a judge must also disqualify himself in certain
circumstances enumerated in that provision, including
“(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or
material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case
in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such
a person (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer
in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Trowbridge makes no valid argument in his motion that any of these
provisions apply in this case. There is no specific allegation of personal bias or impartiality on the
4
part of the Court against Trowbridge. Rather, Trowbridge appears to argue that the Court lacks the
authority to adjudicate this case on the merits and that the United States is conspiring against him
as a whole, including the Court. None of these allegations fit within the instances specifically
outlined in Section 455 which would support recusal.
Furthermore, Trowbridge has not presented any credible evidence or affidavit establishing
that the Court before whom his matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in
favor of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; Stringer v. Funchess, 291 F. App’x 617, 619 (5th
Cir. 2008). The unsupported allegations presented by Trowbridge’s motion are legally insufficient
to support recusal under either statute. See Stringer, at 619.
Additionally, to the extent that Trowbridge’s motion names Chief United States District
Judge Ron Clark personally in seeking recusal, the undersigned notes that the case has since been
reassigned to the docket of Judge Schneider and referred to the undersigned for pretrial management.
The recusal motion, filed before the case was transferred, is accordingly moot in that respect.
The Court declines to afford much emphasis to the meritless and misplaced substantive
arguments made by Trowbridge in the recusal motion at this point in the case. This is because many
of the same arguments regarding jurisdiction and court authority have been made throughout the
filings in the case and in Trowbridge’s response to the United States’ dispositive motions, which will
be considered separately. The undersigned would like to emphasize that while the very purpose of
28 U.S.C. § 455 is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety whenever possible2, there is always the concern that certain parties may abuse Section
455 for a dilatory and litigious purpose based on little or no substantiated basis. See Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1401 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994). In this vein, the Court finds
Trowbridge’s motion for recusal and accompanying memorandum to be wholly unsubstantiated and
2
See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988).
5
without merit. The undersigned therefore ORDERS that the motion for recusal (doc. #31) is
DENIED.
SIGNED this the 7th day of August, 2015.
____________________________________
KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CASE NO. 9:14-CV-138
§
et al., §
§
Defendants. §
§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)and the Local Rules for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred the above-captioned civil
action to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration of pretrial motions
and proceedings and entry of findings of fact and recommended disposition on case-dispositive
motions. See Order (doc. #40). Pending before the Court for purposes of this report is the
plaintiff United States’ Request for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. #38).
I. Background
On July 7, 2014, the United States filed this proceeding against defendants John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr.; Bright Future Investments, Inc.; Ideal Abilities; and the Tyler County Tax
1
Office.1 The United States filed its complaint alleging that defendant John Parks Trowbridge,
Jr.,(“Trowbridge”) owes the United States $3,326,015.01 plus statutory additions accruing after
April 7, 2014, in unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the 1993 through 1997
tax years. See Complaint (doc. #1), at p. 2. The Complaint states that these tax amounts were
reduced to judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., case number H-14-27 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See Exhibit A to Complaint. United
States District Judge Lynn N. Hughes signed that judgment on May 23, 2014. Id.
The Complaint further states that on July 10, 2000, Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two
tracts of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County, Texas, (“the
Tyler County property”) to defendant Ideal Abilities. See Complaint, at p. 2, and Exhibits B-1
through B-3 to Complaint. On or about July 26, 2000, the deeds and contracts were recorded
with the Tyler County Clerk’s Office. Id. The Complaint avers that the contracts for the deeds
and conveyances were signed by Trowbridge as Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities. Id. at p. 3.
The Complaint goes on to describe the factual background regarding Trowbridge’s requested
appraisal of the Tyler County properties and Ideal Abilities’ holding of the title to the Tyler
County Property with Trowbridge as a nominee. Id.
The Complaint further states that on June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against
Ideal Abilities, as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. See id.; see
also Exhibit C to Complaint. The United States therefore contends that it has valid and
subsisting federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of Trowbridge, and against
Trowbridge for all property and rights to property in which they have interest, including any
interest in the Tyler County property. See Complaint, at pp. 3-4. The United States further
argues that the federal tax liens should be foreclosed upon the Tyler County property and the
1
The Tyler County Tax Office has since been terminated as a party defendant. See Order (doc. #17).
2
Tyler County property should be sold free and clear of all rights, titles, claims and interests of
the parties. Id. at p. 4. Finally, the United States seeks relief through a finding that it has a
perfected tax lien in all property and rights to property belonging to Trowbridge and his
nominee, Ideal Abilities. Id.
The docket shows that the case was originally filed in the Tyler Division of the Eastern
District under case number 6:14-CV-595 and assigned to United States District Judge Michael
H. Schneider. On September 11, 2014, Judge Schneider referred the case to United States
Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell for pretrial proceedings. See Order (doc. #11). On
September 15, 2014, Judge Mitchell ordered that the case be transferred to the Lufkin Division
for the Eastern District of Texas. See Order (doc. #12). In support, she noted that the Tyler
County property at issue lies within the Lufkin Division, citing 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(6). Id. Upon
transfer, on September 16, 2014, the case was reassigned to United States District Judge Ron
Clark (now Chief Judge). On January 13, 2015, the case was again reassigned back to the docket
of the Honorable Michael H. Schneider, who in turn referred the matter to the undersigned for
pretrial management on January 27, 2015. See Referral Order (doc. #40).
In the interim, the United States properly issued summons and had process served on
defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. See Summons (doc. #4 and doc.
#5). The returned and executed summons show that both of these defendants were served on
July 16, 2014, by executing service on defendant Trowbridge as President of Bright Future
Investments, Inc., and Trustee of Ideal Abilities. See id. To date, neither Bright Future
Investments, Inc., nor Ideal Abilities has appeared in the case by filing an answer or any other
pleading. Accordingly, on November 26, 2014, the United States requested entry of default by
the Clerk of Court. See Request and Accompanying Affidavit (doc. #30). The Clerk entered
3
default against defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities on December 5,
2014 (doc. #34). On December 29, 2014, the United States requested that the Court enter default
judgment in its favor against Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. See Motion
(doc. #38). It also requests that as part of that default judgment, the Court adjudge that those
defendants have no interest in the Tyler County property at issue. See id.; see also proposed
Default Judgment. The two defendants at issue in the motion have neither responded to the
motion for default judgment nor appeared in any other manner.2
II. Discussion
A. Relevant Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and default judgment.
Default under Rule 55 consists of two procedural steps; one for the Clerk and one for the Court.
The first step is the entry of default, followed by the entry of default judgment. See, e.g., New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); Jefferson v. La. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corrs., No. 10-30618, 401 Fed. App’x 927, 929 (5th Cir. 2010). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a) directs the first step requiring the Clerk of court to enter default:
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s
default.
However, an entry of default against the defendant does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to a default judgment. See, e.g., Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Waltner v. Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C., No. 12-50929, 51 F.
App’x 741, 749 (5th Cir. 2013). After the clerk enters default, the clerk may enter a default
2
As the United States correctly points out in its motion, the pro se defendant Trowbridge is
legally precluded from representing the entity defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities as he is not an attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Rowland v. California Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993).
4
judgment only if the claim is “for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
computation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1). When the amount of the claim is not certain and cannot
be made certain,
the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A default
judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person
only if represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like
fiduciary who has appeared. If the party against whom a default
judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative,
that party or its representative must be served with written notice
of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
The court may conduct a hearing if necessary to:
(A) conduct an accounting;

(B) determine the amount of damages;
(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
(D) investigate any other matter.
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Entry of default judgment is within the Court’s discretion. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b); Lindsey, et al. v. Prive Corp., et al., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998); Mason v.
Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1977). Entry of default judgment is not an abuse of discretion
when a defendant fails to answer a complaint. See Bonanza Int’l, Inc. v. Corceller, 480 F.2d
613, 614 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1073 (1973). Prevailing law within the Fifth Circuit
sets forth factors for courts to weigh when determining whether to enter default judgment:
Relevant factors include whether material issues of fact are at

issue, whether there has been substantial prejudice, whether the
grounds for default are clearly established, whether the default was
caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect, the harshness
of a default judgment, and whether the court would think itself
obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.
Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. However, all the above-cited factors need not be addressed.
5
The Fifth Circuit generally disfavors default judgments. Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican
Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Default judgments are a drastic
remedy, not favored by the federal rules and resorted to by the courts only in extreme
situations.”); Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (“...any doubt should, as a
general proposition, be resolved in favor of the movant to the end of securing a trial upon the
merits.”). However, “considerations of social goals, justice, and expediency” offset such
disfavor in evaluating motions for default judgment, with that evaluation lying “largely within
the domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167
F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146
(10th Cir. 1990)).
B. Application
i. Are Issues of Material Fact Present?
Because the defendants have failed to answer the complaint, they admit the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded allegations of fact – apart from any relating to the amount of damages – and “[are]
barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v.
Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 205
(5th Cir. 1992). In the present case, the facts asserted in the complaint are well-pleaded, as the
United States’ factual allegations show a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); United States v. Giles, 538 F.Supp.2d 990, 993 (W.D. Tex
2008). Likewise, due to the defendants’ failure to answer, the entry of default by the Clerk was
appropriate. See id. For these reasons, default judgment may be lawfully entered. See Thomas
v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885) (default judgment may be lawfully entered “according to
what is proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true”).
6
ii. Is There Substantial Prejudice or Harshness in Default Judgment?
The defendants have not answered the complaint or otherwise defended the matter, nor is
there any indication that they intend to appear or otherwise respond. The default judgment
motion has been on file for over eight months with no response. Bright Future Investments, Inc.
and Ideal Abilities have received ample notice of the suit and that there is a pending default.
Defendant Trowbridge was served as the President of Bright Futures and the Trustee of Ideal
Abilities. See Summons. Neither of those parties has properly answered or appeared. Taking
the well-pleaded facts of the original complaint as true, the United States has asserted a valid
cause of action to foreclose on the Tyler County property based on the valid federal tax lien
against Trowbridge. The United States has properly requested entry of judgment in its favor
barring any interest in that property asserted by either Bright Futures Investments, Inc., or Ideal
Abilities. Based on this procedural history and the efforts expended to date by the United States
in acting upon its tax lien, it will be substantially prejudiced if default judgment is denied.
Furthermore, the entity defendants Bright Futures Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities
have wholly failed to respond to the claims asserted in this manner. They have not filed an
answer asserting any interest in the property or disputing the United States’ claims. This silence
and noncompliance establishes that any prejudice to the defendants or harshness through entry of
default is outweighed by the prejudice to the plaintiff if the Court fails to enter judgment in the
plaintiff’s favor.
7
iii. Are the Grounds for Default Clearly Established?
As stated above, the record indicates that the United States successfully perfected service
of process on the entity defendants. Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities wholly
failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The Clerk entered default, and the
United States subsequently filed the motion for default judgment. The procedural requirements
of Rule 55 are satisfied and the court may consider default judgment.
iv. Is Default Due to Excusable Neglect or Good Faith Mistake?
Again, the defendants were properly served notice of the original complaint and they
have entirely failed to respond. There is no dispute that they also received notice of the motion
for default judgment and have not answered the entry of default. Trowbridge, as President of
Bright Futures Investments, Inc. and Trustee of Ideal Abilities is an active party in the case and
thus receives notices of such filings. Those defendants have failed to properly respond to the
motion in any manner. Under these circumstances, there is no evidence of good faith mistake or
excusable neglect on the defendants’ part. Moreover, a finding of willful failure to answer a
complaint is sufficient reason for granting a motion of default judgment. See CJC Holdings v.
Wright & Lato, 979 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 989 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.
1993); Eisenhour v. Stafford, No. 9:12-CV-62, 2013 WL 6212725, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
168905, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) (Clark, J.) (adopting recommendation of Hawthorn, J.).
In the motion, the United States requests entry of judgment in its favor and a finding that
the defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities, Inc., are foreclosed from
asserting any interest in the Tyler County property at issue. The plaintiff does not request
monetary damages in its motion; it only seeks the judgment in its favor. See Motion and
8
Proposed Default Judgment. Therefore, the Court need not conduct a hearing to enter default
judgment and determine the amount of damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
recommends that the District Court grant the United States’ request for entry of default
judgment (doc. #38). The undersigned further recommends that the Court enter judgment in
favor of the plaintiff United States and assess judgment against the defendants Bright Future
Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. The judgment should find that those defendants, having
failed to assert any interest in the Tyler County property at issue, are adjudged to have no
interest in that property.
IV. Objections
.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), all parties are entitled to serve and file written
objections to the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge within fourteen (14) days of
service. Failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions
of law, and recommendations contained within this report shall bar an aggrieved party from de
novo review by the District Judge of the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations,
and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District
Court except on grounds of plain error.
SIGNED this the 18th day of August, 2015.
____________________________________
KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9

LUFKIN DIVISION

§
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§ CIVIL NO. 9:14-cv-138
IDEAL ABILITIES. §
§
Defendants. §
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE,

JR.’S OBJECTION TO PROCEEDINGS (DKT #53) AND OBJECTION TO DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW (DKT #54)
The United States responds to Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., ‘s
Objections (Dkt. # 53 and 54), as follows:
Background
Answer and Amended Answer to the complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) On November 26,
2014, the United States’ requested the clerk enter default against Bright Future
Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt. #30), and the clerk entered default against both
defendants on December 5, 2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United
States filed its Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and
Ideal Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). On August 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge
Keith F. Giblin entered a report and recommendation “that the District Court grant the
United States’ request for entry of default judgment.” (Dkt. # 52 at 9.)

The United States also filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against the
remaining Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and
Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.) The United States’ Motions for
Default Judgment and Summary Judgment are briefed and awaiting decision.
Trowbridge’s Answer and Amended Answer referred to irrelevant law in his
quest to have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America. (See
Dkts. #7, #10, #18, and #19.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject
to tax because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and
has been rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13443, *7 (W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding
claims that they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens
of the State and not the United States). Trowbridge has continually asserted these same
frivolous arguments, and the most recent iteration has taken the form of objections to
the entire proceeding and his alleged denial of due process. (See Dkts. #53-54.)
Argument
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…”1 Further,
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1345, which gives district courts “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States…”2
1
28 U.S.C. §1340.
2
28 U.S.C. §1345.
U.S. Response to Objections
Page 2 of 4
Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and enforcement of
liens) is also authorized by statute.3 The only question of law involves the United States
ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr. Trowbridge. The
objections filed by Trowbridge are nothing more than a continued attempt to distract
the Court from pending motions and stall collection of his overdue tax liabilities
indefinitely. The arguments made by Trowbridge are patently frivolous and entitled to
no acknowledgement by the Court.
Conclusion
disregard the objections, ratify the report and recommendation on default judgment,
and rule on the pending motion for summary judgment. The United States also requests
such further and other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 880 9735
(214) 880 9741 (FAX)
[email protected]
3
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
Page 3 of 4

Humble, Texas 77338
/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

JOSHUA D. SMELTZER

Page 4 of 4
§
§
§
§
. §
§
§
§
§
§
§
On September 1, 2015, defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed
objections ( 53). The Court accordingly conducted a de novo review of the objections,
the pleadings, the record, and the applicable law. See 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
-1-
careful consideration, the Court concludes that the objections are without merit.
First, Trowbridge’s objections are based on the frivolous arguments he has made throughout
this proceeding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the United States’ claims seeking
perfection of its federal tax liens and foreclosure. His objections do not specifically address Judge
Giblin’s finding or conclusions related to the motion for default judgment. In fact, he fails to
address the report and recommendation at all. Rather, he appears to argue that somehow the Court
does not have jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Texas and is geographically excepted
from this Court’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that the United States’ claims are clearly based on
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). His objections
therefore fail to point out any error in the magistrate judge’s report with the specificity required
by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A
judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”) (emphasis added);
72 (requiring specific objections).
Secondly, because he is proceeding pro se and is not an attorney, Trowbridge does not have
the standing to lodge objections on behalf of his co-defendants, against which the default
judgment is sought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Rowland v. Cal Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202
(1993)
-2-
behalf, his objections are precluded.
The Court accordingly OVERRULES defendant Trowbridge’s objections Doc. 53
in their entirety. Having considered the United States’ request for default judgment and Judge
Giblin’s findings and recommendation, the Court ORDERS that the Report and
Recommendation on Motion for Default Judgment Doc. is ADOPTED. Pursuant to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the Court further ORDERS that the motion for default
judgment Doc. 38 is GRANTED.
It is SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 10th day of September, 2015.
____________________________________
MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER
-3-

/l/l"'JJ
SEP1
LUFKIN DIVISION f 2015
Clerk U
' .s D·
i exas· r-- ISfrict C
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO.: 9: 14-CV-138
§
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al, §
§
Defendants. §
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND

DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY THAT
GIVES THE COURT THE CAPACITY TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND ENTER
JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND DECREES IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES
ARISING FROM A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING REGARDING A DEBT, IN
TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS
NOW COMES defendant JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR. (the "Defendant") in the
above-captioned matter, specially and not generally, to Object to denial of due process of law
and Demand disclosure of the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take
jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a
civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas.
This Court is a district court of the United States and federal trial court authorized by
statute to enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil
or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; to wit:
The United States District Courts are trial courts. Trial courts, as opposed to
appellate courts, are courts that hear both civil and criminal cases through
examination and cross-examination by attorneys .... The Oxford Companion to
American Law, Kermit L. Hall, editor in chief (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2002), p. 175 (s.v. "Courts, United States").
The United States district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system.
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have
jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and
criminal matters. USCourts.gov, "District Courts,"
March 18, 2015).
§ 3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
... (2) "Court" means any court created by the Congress of the United
States, excluding the United States Tax Court.
(3) "Debt" means-
... (B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a[ n]
assessment, penalty ... interest, tax ... recovery of a cost incurred by the
United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States ...
. . . (8) "Judgment" means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of
the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt. Title 26 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection
Procedure.
The best-known courts are courts of ... unlimited trial jurisdiction, both civil and
criminal, within their jurisdictional area. At the federal level, these are called
DISTRICT COURTS .... West's Encyclopedia ofAmerican Law, Volume 9 (West
Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1998), p. 316.
The statutory authority for the Court to enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of
the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, is clear; e.g.:
As stated in the United States' Complaint (Dkt. # 1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1340, which gives district courts "original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal
revenue ... " Further, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which
gives district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States ... [Footnotes omitted.] Dkt. #48, p. 2 of 3.
What is not clear, however, is the constitutional authority that gives the Court the
capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United
States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas-
because a lawsuit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not, in and of itself, sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in this Court; to wit:
So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may
sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a
suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself
Defendant's Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 2 of4
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts. Shoshone Mining Co. v.

Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).
Statutory authority for a federal trial court, such as this Court, to enter judgments, orders,
and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a
debt, is irrelevant if the capacity to take jurisdiction is not given by the Constitution; to wit:
It remains rudimentary law that "[a]s regards all courts of the United States
inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether
original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to
take it, and an act o.f Congress must have supplied it . ... To the extent that such
action is not taken, the power lies dormant." The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 24 7,
252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Co., U.S. 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d
811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 S. 368, 379-380, 101
S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260
U.S 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case o_fthe Sewing
Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874);
Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How.
236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); Mcintire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420
(1813). [Underline emphasis added.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989).
Whereas: The Constitution provides more than one fom1 of law in which federal trial
courts are authorized to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the
United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; and
Whereas: It is unknown under which of those forms of law provided in the Constitution
the Court is seated; and
Whereas: The Court has failed for 14 months of pretrial proceedings, to disclose to
Defendant under which particular form of law the Court is seated or the constitutional authority
that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in
favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler
County, Texas-which omission constitutes a denial of due process of law; and
Defendant's Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 3 of 4
Whereas: It is impossible for Defendant to mount a proper defense if Defendant does not
know the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter
judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal
proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas; and
Whereas: If Defendant is foreclosed from mounting a proper defense because the Court
will not disclose the constitutional authority that gives the Court capacity as aforesaid, Defendant
will not be able to have a fair proceeding; and
Whereas : Disclosure by the Court of the constitutional authority that allows the Court to
take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising
from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas, will allow
Defendant to know the particular form of law under which the Court is seated and mount a
proper defense,
Wherefore: Defendant hereby Demands disclosure of the constitutional authority that
gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor
of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler
County, Texas .
DATE: September 14, 2015
Jo m Parks Trowbridge, Jr.

9 16 Memorial Boulevard #205
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
Defendant ' s Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 4 of 4
I, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. , hereby certify that on September 14, 2015, a true,
correct, and complete paper copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY THAT GIVES THE COURT THE CAPACITY TO TAKE
JURISDICTION AND ENTER JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND DECREES IN FAVOR OF
THE UNITED STA TES ARISING FROM A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
REGARDING A DEBT, IN TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS , was served by first class United
States Postal Service delivery upon the counsel of record as indicated below.
Further, two paper copies of DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY THAT GIVES THE COURT THE CAPACITY TO TAKE JURISDICTION
AND ENTER JUDGMENTS , ORDERS, AND DECREES IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED
ST A TES ARISING FROM A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING REGARDING A DEBT,
IN TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS, were filed on September 14, 2015 , by personal hand delivery to
the Clerk of the District Court as indicated below.
Date: September 14, 2015
Joshua David Smeltzer Jerk of the United States District Court

U.S . Department of Justice for the Eastern District of Texas
Tax Division 104 North Third Street
717 N. Harwood Street Lufkin, Texas 75901
Dallas, TX 75201-0000
..
.-
l'
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT .
.... ...
;
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXf,11$. :· {'f

LUFKIN DIVISION [.Ir.·· .. SEP 3 0 2015 '."-
Clerf.c CJ ·- ;;;·/
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § ' .s. Distr; ..
...
-----::::___
Te-.ir.as J::_ ct Court
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO.: 9:14-CV-138
§
§
Defendants. §
DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, WITH PREJUDICE, OF THIS ALLEGED CASE FOR

LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY THAT GIVES THE COURT THE
CAP ACITY TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND ENTER JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND
DECREES IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES ARISING FROM A CIVIL OR
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING REGARDING A DEBT, IN TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS
The Court, having been given reasonable opportunity to produce the constitutional
authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and
decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt,
in Tyler County, Texas, i.e., the geographic area in which the alleged defendant, JOHN PARKS
TROWBRIDGE, JR. ("Trowbridge"), resides and the real property that is the object of the
instant alleged lawsuit is located-which citation of authority would have revealed the particular
and heretofore unknown form of law under which the Court is seated-, but having failed to
produce such constitutional authority, it is reasonable to conclude that no such authority exists
and there is no lawful basis for said lawsuit; to wit:
De non apparentibus et non existntibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same
respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist. John
Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition),
revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2130.
Idem est non probari et non esse ; non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not
proved and what does not exist, are the same ; it is not the defect of the law, but
of proof. Id. at 2136.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Trowbridge hereby Demands the Court:
1. That the Court immediately dismiss with prejudice the instant alleged lawsuit as
unlawful for the Court's lack of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and
enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a
civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas;
2. That the Court award Trowbridge reasonable costs of $22,000 for defending this
unlawful lawsuit over the last 14 months;
3. That the Court award Trowbridge exemplary damages of $22,000 for conducting
and refusing to dismiss the instant unlawful, unconstitutional proceeding against
Trowbridge for the last 14 months despite multiple valid and conclusive motions
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction filed by Trowbridge and no evidence of
jurisdiction in the record of said proceeding;
4. That the Court order vacated as unlawful and void the May 23, 2014, Amended
Final Judgment and Order of Sale and Vacature in the predecessor alleged lawsuit
to the instant alleged lawsuit, i.e., United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action H-14-27 ("Civil Action H-14-
27"), for lack of constitutional authority that gives the district court in Civil
Action H-14-27 the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and
decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt, in Harris County, Texas; and in respect thereof, that the Court
order said district court to pay to Trowbridge costs, restitution, and damages as set
forth herein below-substantiation and proof of which is attached hereto, made
Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Case for the Court's Lack of Constitutional Authority
Page 2 of3
fully part hereof, and incorporated herein by reference in the form of
Trowbridge's September 9, 2015, MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER in Civil Action H-14-27; specifically:
(a) reasonable costs of:
(i) $27,500 in Civil Action H-14-27;
(ii) $42,500 in United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit No.
14-20333, and
(iii) $72,500 ($35,000 for Petition for Writ of Certiorari and $37,500
for Petition for Rehearing) in Supreme Court of the United States
No. 14-1305;
(b) restitution in the amount of $620,600 ($357,000 in real property, $263,600
in personalty) for Trowbridge's loss ofreal property and irreplaceable
personalty as a consequence of the aforesaid unconstitutional May 23,
2014, Amended Final Judgment and Order of Sale and Vacature;
(c) special damages of $11,251.45 (receipts attached);
(d) exemplary damages of $773,100; and
(e) general damages of $250,000; and
5. For such other and further relief that the Court may deem just and fair.
Jo Parks Trowbridge, Jr.

9816 Memorial Boulevard #205
Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Case for the Court's Lack of Constitutional Authority
Page 3 of3
lfL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
-.a--::-.-
. . . ....
SEP Og 2015
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § Civil Action H-14-27
§
§
Defendants. §
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND ORDER
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. ("Trowbridge") hereby appears specially and respectfully
moves the Court to vacate as void the May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment (the "Judgment")
and Order of Sale and Vacature (the "Order") (copy of each attached) in the above-captioned
matter ("Civil Action H-14-27"), for having been entered in a manner inconsistent with due
process oflaw, as provided in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).
Upon Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt.
#18), there being no evidence ofTrowbridge's residence in geographic area in which this Court
of general jurisdiction is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide cases, the Court
showed partiality toward plaintiff United States (the "Plaintiff') and bias against Trowbridge by:
1. Commanding sua sponte, both verbally (Dkt. #30, pp. 16-17 of 19) and in writing
(Dkt. #2 l ), in exercise of general jurisdiction, that Plaintiff must promptly enter in evidence one
ofTrowbridge's Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns, which the Court would use sub
silentio as evidence of a purported contractual I quasi-contractual right to hear and decide Civil
Action H-14-27, which purported right the Court would call "jurisdiction," to justify (a) denying
said motion to dismiss, (b) exercising jurisdiction in geographic area fixed by the Constitution
exclusively for courts of special jurisdiction, and (c) entering the Judgment and Order;
2. Refusing-by way ofdenial of Trowbridge 's express May 8, 2014, Request for an
Explanation of the Reason/or the Court's Denial of Defendant's March 19, 2014, Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. #39)-to disclose that the Fonn 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return that the
Court commanded sua sponte be promptly entered in evidence, was the only evidence the Court
was using, sub silentio, as "proof' that Trowbridge resides in a geographic area in which the
Court is authorized by the Constitution to exercise general jurisdiction;
3. Denigrating Trowbridge and accusing Trowbridge of acting in bad faith (Dkt. #57
p. 3 of 9) for acts amounting to nothing more than exercise of Trowbridge' s legal rights;
4. Entering Judgment (Dkt. #53) sua sponte without regard for Plaintiffs unresolved
April 4, 2014, motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #19); and
5. Rejecting and foreshortening sua sponte by more than 50% the amount of time
Plaintiff stated Plaintiff was prepared to give Trowbridge to gather Trowbridge's belongings
(Dkt, #57 pp. 3-4 of9) and vacate Trowbridge's home in respect of the Order-i.e., from 30 days
to 14 days (Dkt. #54, p. 3 of 4)-an expedited process the omission of which would have worked
no meaningful injury to Plaintiff's interests but which, following the Court's May 27, 2014,
Order Denying Stay (Dkt. #60) ofTrowbridge's Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution of
Order of Sale and Vacature Pending Exhaustion of Remedy (Dkt. #56), resulted in tremendous
personal and professional hardship on Trowbridge and the six people who work for and depend
on Trowbridge for a paycheck (and the patients who receive medical care from Trowbridge), as
well as loss of a substantial portion of Trowbridge' s personalty and irreplaceable items of
sentimental value accumulated over a lifetime, due to a shortage of time to remove them.
The above-cited acts and omissions reveal that ( 1) the Court, not Plaintiff, prosecuted
Civil Action H-14-27, (2) the Court committed fraud upon the court, (3) Trowbridge did not
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order

Page2of19
have a fair proceeding, and (4) the Judgment and Order were entered in a manner inconsistent
with due process oflaw; to wit:
One of the very objects of law is the impartiality of its judges in fact and
appearance .... The relevant consideration under§ 455(a) is the appearance of
partiality ... not where it originated or how it was disclosed. . . . Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994).
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of

course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.... [T]o perform its
high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955).
Fraud on the court {other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to
the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent
documents, false statements or perjury.... It is thus fraud where the court or a
member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge
has not performed his judicial function--thus where the impartial functions of the
court have been directly corrupted. Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121
(10th Cir., 1985).
The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but
on the Due Process Clause.... United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th
Cir., 1976).
The Court is authorized and required to vacate judgments and orders entered in a manner
inconsistent with due process oflaw; to wit:
A judgment is void if the court that rendered it ... acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process. Margo/es v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied,
455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons
Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the
judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661
F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1981 ), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S.
917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 {1982). Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp.
892 (1985).
We believe that a judgment, whether in a civil or criminal case, reached without

due process oflaw is without jurisdiction and void ... because the United States
is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or property without
due process oflaw, and its courts are included in this prohibition. . . . Bass v.
Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 57, 94
L.Ed. 494 (1949).
Page 3of19
[I]f a is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a movant's motion to vacate the judgment." United States v. Indoor
Cultivation Equip.from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55F.3d1311, 1317
(7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4) if"the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process of law." Id at 1316 (citations omitted) ... Price v. Wyeth
Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).
"[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.'' Burrell v.
Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).
BACKGROUND
Civil Action H-14-27 is an alleged Federal debt collection proceeding whose subject
matter is alleged income tax liability, and an action to foreclose on alleged federal tax liens
recorded by claimant United States against real property owned by Trowbridge and arising from
alleged unpaid federal income truces, penalties, and interest assessed against Trowbridge by the
Internal Revenue Service for true years 1993-1997 totaling (as of September I, 2013)
$3,286,335.47 (Dkt. #1, pp. 1-2of3).
The record of Civil Action H-14-27 is devoid of competent proof, i.e. material evidence,
that Trowbridge has actual residence in any geographic area in which a court of general
jurisdiction, such as this Court, is authorized by the Constitution to exercise jurisdiction.
The only material fact in the record of this case relevant to the allegation, "Defendant,
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., resides within the jurisdiction of this Court., (Dkt. #I, p. I of3), is
that Trowbridge resides in Harris County, Texas (Dkt. #19-7, p. 4 of27; Dkt. #19-8, p. 5 of28).
The essence of this case is this Court's (1) dereliction of its duty to know, understand,
and declare the law in respect of the controlling definition and meaning of the term "United
States," as legislated by Congress in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and 28 U.S.C. 3002(15), (2)
denigration of Trowbridge for exclusive reliance on and usage of said controlling definition and
meaning in all ofTrowbridge's filings, and (3) insistence that the Court, a court of general
Page 4of19
jurisdiction, has authority to hear and decide cases in geographic area fixed by the Constitution
exclusively for courts of special jurisdiction; specifically, Harris County, Texas.
The Court states during a hearing on May 21, 2014, "But I conclude as a matter of law
that North [sic 1] Harris County [Texas] is part of the United States" (Dkt. #57, p. 3 of 9),
thereby, evidently, inferring that Trowbridge, who resides in north Harris County, Texas, is a
resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. "United States"-ejfectively the District of Columbia only-and
therefore of the subject, and Trowbridge's property of the object, of Title 26 U.S.C.
The Court on May 23, 2014, in: (1) the Court's Judgment" (Dkt. #53) awards to Plaintiff
$3,326,015.01 ofTrowbridge's property, plus statutory additions accruing after April 7, 2014;
authorizes Plaintiff to foreclose the subject liens; and awards to Plaintiff all right, title, and
interest in, and right to possession of, said real property, and (2) the Court's Order (Dkt. #54),
sets the parameters therefor.
The Court expedites Trowbridge's eviction sua sponte (Dkt, #57 pp. 3-4of9; Dkt. #54, p.
3 of 4) and denies Trowbridge's motion to stay the Order. (Dkt. #60).
ARGUMENT
A. The Court Denied Trowbridge The Constitutional Right or Due Process or Law.
1. The Court denied Trowbridge the constitutional Right to have the instant
controversy beard and decided by a Federal trial court of special jurisdiction.
FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.
Courts that hear both civil and criminal matters are courts of general jurisdiction; to wit:
The United States District Courts are trial courts. Trial courts, as opposed to
appellate courts, are courts that hear both civil and criminal cases through
examination and cross-examination by attorneys.... The Oxford Companion to
American Law, Kermit L. Hall, editor in chief (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2002), p. 175 (s.v. "Courts, United States").
1
Whereas, there is no person by the name "North Harris Cour:ity," "North" appears to be an error on the
part of the Official Court Reporter and should be spelled with a lower-case "n."
Page S of 19
The United States district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system.
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have
jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and
criminal matters. USCourts.gov, "District Courts," http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/U nderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx (accessed
March 18, 2015).
§ 3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
... (2) "Court" means any court created by the Congress of the United
States, excluding the United States Tax Court.
(3) "Debt" means-
... (8) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a[n]
assessment, penalty ... interest, tax ... recovery of a cost incurred by the
United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States ...
. . . (8) "Judgment" means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of
the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt. Title 26 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection
Procedure
On the federal level, the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction....
West's Encyclopedia ofAmerican Law, Volume 6 (West Group: St. Paul, Minn.,
1998), p. 293.
The best-known courts are courts of GENERAL JURISDICTION, which have

unlimited trial jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, within their jurisdictional area.
At the federal level, these are called DISTRICT COURTS •... Id. at Volume 9, p. 316.
FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION.
That certain Constitution ordained, established, and implemented March 4, 1789,
Independence Hall, Philadelphia Pennsylvania (the "Constitution"), creates the federal judicial
power in Article 3 § 1 and defines the maximum extent of that power in Article 3 § 2(1); to wit:
Section. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish....
Section. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to

Page 6of19
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies

between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State,-
between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR EACH SPECIES OF FEDERAL TRIAL COURT.
Courts ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the
Constitution are courts of special (or limited) jurisdiction; e.g.:
The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may
extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. . . . Insurance Corporation ofIreland,
Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701(1982).
The Constitution provides impliedly for Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction at
Article 4 § 3(2); to wit, in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; ...
JURISDICTION IS TERRITORIAL.
The geographic area in which a particular court has authority is a defined territory with
fixed boundaries; to wit:
-Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or

persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The
authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed. . . . Henry
Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St.
Paul, Minn., 1910) (hereinafter "BLACK'S"), p. 673.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise limited legislative power throughout the
Union and exclusive legislative power in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States" (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)); to wit:
It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative

power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the
other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia....
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

Page 7 of19
The species jurisdiction that a Federal trial court is authorized to exercise, i.e., either
special or general, is determined by (1) the particular geographic area Gudicial district) in which
the court is located, and (2) the species of legislative power the Constitution authorizes Congress
to exercise in that particular area; to wit:
Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the
Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold
or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4
Dall. 8, 10; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32; Sheldon v. Sill, 8
How. 441, 448; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165 .... Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 u. s. 226, 234 (1922).
Federal trial courts of special jurisdiction are under the exclusive control of the judicial
branch of the national government and are limited to controversies of the character delineated in
Article 3 § 2(1) arising in geographic area occupied by one of the several commonwealths united
by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction-such as this Court-are under the exclusive
control of the legislative branch of the national government (Congress) and have authority "to
hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and criminal matters"
(USCourts.gov, supra, p. 6), arising in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States" (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), supra, p. 7).
DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FEDERAL TRIAL COURT OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION.
Whereas: It is indisputable that this Court is a Federal trial court of general jurisdiction;
and
Whereas: It is indisputable that Trowbridge is a resident of the geographic area occupied
by that certain commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted
into the Union December 29, 1845, i.e., Texas; and

Page 8 of19
Whereas: It is indisputable that Trowbridge has no physical or economic presence or
residence in fact in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" (id); and
Whereas: It is indisputable that Trowbridge, a resident of Texas, has the constitutional
Right to have a controversy between Trowbridge and the United States heard and decided in a
Federal trial court of special jurisdiction,
Wherefore: It is indisputable that Trowbridge has been denied the Right to a Federal trial
court of special jurisdiction, an aspect of denial of due process of law of constitutional
dimension.
2. The Court heard and decided Civil Action H-14-27 without constitutional
authority.
PLAIN STATEMENT OF FACTS.
When Plaintiff fails for 19 days to enter in evidence proof of jurisdiction following filing
ofTrowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt. #18): At a
hearing held on April 7, 2014, for no apparent reason and without prompt from Plaintiff or
Trowbridge regarding any ofTrowbridge's tax returns, the Court asks Plaintiff, "Do you have a
copy of one of these objectionable tax returns?" (Dkt. #30, p. 15of19).
The transcript of said hearing also attributes the following statements to the Court: "Well,
I would like just to see an exemplar" (id); "And just the 1040, the first couple of pages of it, plus
whatever attachment would affect liability" (id. at 16-17 of 19); "I want you just to file it ... "
(id at 17of19); "Just file one as - -" "- - the attachment the Court ordered" (id.); and "I just
want to see what one looks like" (id).
When Plaintiff comments to the Court, "We didn't include those [Trowbridge's tax
returns] just because we didn't feel we needed to, but I can get a copy" (id. at 16of19), the
Court replies, "Well, just one" (id.).

Page 9 ofl9
Following the Court's instructions to Plaintiff at the aforesaid April 7, 2014, hearing, the
Court, in exercise of general jurisdiction, commands Plaintiff by Management Order (Dkt. #21 ):
"The United States must promptly give the court one of the objectionable tax returns."
Plaintiff, on April 14, 2014, files in the record "United States' Court Ordered
Supplement" (Dkt. #24) and attaches thereto a copy ofTrowbridge's Form 1040 U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return for 1997 (Dkt.#24-1) (the "1997 Fonn 1040").
The Court never reveals why the filing of one of Trowbridge' s tax returns was so urgent I
important. Following filing of the 1997 Fonn I040, the Court never raises the subject again.
After six weeks with no ruling on the motion to dismiss, Trowbridge files on May 1, 2014,
Trowbridge's Request for Ruling on Defendant's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #33).
The next day, May 2, 2014, 44 days after the filing of the March 19, 2014, motion to
dismiss, the Court issues an order (Dkt. #34) denying said motion.
FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
Whereas: Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that that as of April 7,
2014, time is of the essence re the Court's verbal and written order commanding that Plaintiff
must promptly file in the record one ofTrowbridge's tax returns; and
Whereas: "Non refert quid notum sitjudici, si notum non sit informajudici. It matters
not what is known to the judge, ifit is not known to himjudicially"2-and, there being no
evidence that Trowbridge resides in a geographic area in which a court of general jurisdiction,
e.g., the Court, has authority: To be justified in denying Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, motion to
dismiss, the Court needed something that would allow the Court to treat Trowbridge as a resident
of geographic area in which the Constitution authorizes the Court to hear and decide cases; and
2
John Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis
Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914), p. 2150.
Page 10of19
Whereas: On April 7, 2014, the record of Civil Action H-14-27 is devoid of evidence that
Trowbridge has residence in fact in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"
(Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), only geographic area in which a Federal trial court of general
jurisdiction, such as the Court, has authority to hear and decide cases; and
Whereas: As of April 7, 2014, Plaintiff has failed for 19 days since the filing of
Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, to enter in evidence
anything that would suggest or allow the Court to presume that Trowbridge is a resident of
"Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" (id.), and is unaware (Dkt. #30, p. 16
of 19) of the Court's need for such evidence in order to be able to justify denying Trowbridge's
March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; and
Whereas: Standard application of the basic rules of statutory construction to the
controlling 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) definition of the term "United States" reveals that Congress
define said term in a geographical sense to mean the District of Colwnbia, the Conunonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Conunonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands and no other thing-the statutory Statel of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States (Dkt. #28, pp. 34-35 of 42); and
Whereas: Residents of the aforesaid insular Title 26 U.S.C. States of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States are not liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. (Id. at 35 of 42); and
3
In the colloquial expression "SO States," the meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. tenn "State" is the District of
Columbia-the only 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) State whose residents are liable to tax under26 U.S.C.; to wit: "[T]axing
statutes are subject to strict construction ..." (A Dictionary ofLaw, Seventh Edition, Jonathan Law and Elizabeth
Martin, editors (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009). p. 295)-and the 50 States are the purported 50 bodies
politic (political subdivisions) of the District of Columbia residing without the exterior limits of the District of
Columbia in geographic area occupied by one of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under the
authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, such as Texas, each of whose "members" at some point
performed some act or made some statement-such as the signing and making of a Form I 040 U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return-which actors in government regarded, sub silentio and unilaterally, as an "alien [nonresident
ofanv o(the Title 26 U.S.C. States ofthe Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United Statesl showing a definite intention to
acquire residence in the ['flt/e 26 U.S.C. geographicall U.S. [j.e .. tor purposes oftax under Title 26 U.S.C.. the
District ofColumbia onlv]." 26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii).
Page 11of19
Whereas: The only 26 U.S.C. 770l(a)(10) State of the Title 26 U.S.C. 770l(a)(9)
geographical United States whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. is the District
of Columbia; and
Whereas: General legislation at 26 U.S.C. 770l(b)(l)(B) Nonresident alien provides, in
pertinent part, that "An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of
the fijtle 26 U.S.C. geographicall United States nor a resident ofthe fijt/e 26 U.S.C.
geographica/l United States . .. "; and
Whereas: Trowbridge is a 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(l)(B) nonresident alien; and
Whereas: General legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013 provides, in pertinent part:
(g) Election to treat nonresident alien [Trowbridge] individual as resident of the

[Title 26 U.S.C. geographical) United States [i.e., for purposes of tax under Title
26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia only]
(1) In general
A nonresident alien [Trowbridge] individual with respect to whom this
subsection is in effect for the taxable year shall be treated as a resident of the
[Title 26 U.S.C. geographical] United States [i.e., for purposes of tax under
Title 26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia onlyl-
(A) for purposes of chapter I for all of such taxable year, and
(B) for purposes of chapter 24 (relating to wage withholding) for payments
of wages made during such taxable year.
. . . (h) ... year in which nonresident alien [Trowbridge) becomes resident of
[Title 26 U.S.C. geographical] United States [i.e., for purposes of tax under Title
26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia only]
(1) In general
lf--
(A) any individual is a nonresident alien individual at the beginning of any
taxable year but is a resident of the [Title 26 U.S.C. geographical] United
States [i.e., for purposes of tax under Title 26 U.S.C., the District of
Columbia only] at the close of such taxable year,
... then the individual referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as a
resident of the [Title 26 U.S.C. geographical) United States [i.e., for purposes
of tax under Title 26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia only) for purposes of
chapter 1 for all of such taxable year, and for purposes of chapter 24 (relating
to wage withholding) for payments of wages made during such taxable year.
[and]

Page 12of19
Whereas: General legislation at 26 C.F.R. l .871-4(c)(2)(iii) provides, in pertinent part:
§ 1.871-4- Proof of residence of aliens.

(a) Rules ofevidence. The following rules of evidence shall govern in
detennining whether or not an alien within the [Title 26 U.S.C. geographical)
U.S. [i.e., for purposes of tax under Title 26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia
only] has acquired residence therein for purposes of the income tax.
(b) Nonresidence presumed. An alien [Trowbridgel by reason of his alienage,
is presumed to be a nonresident alien.
(c) Presumption rebulted-(1) Departing alien....
(2) Other aliens. In the case of other aliens, the presumption as to the alien's
nonresidence may be overcome by proof.-
... (iii) Of acts and statements [e.g.• a Fonn 1040 tax return] of the alien
[Trowbridge] showing a definite intention to acquire residence in the [Title
26 U.S.C. geographical] U.S. [i.e., for purposes of tax under Title 26 U.S.C.,
the District of Columbia only] ...
Wherefore: In its exercise of general jurisdiction, the Court on April 7, 2014, substantially
asswnes responsibility for prosecution of Civil Action H-14-27 by commanding sua sponte both
verbally and in writing that Plaintiff must promptly enter in the record what the Court needs and
will use against Trowbridge unilaterally and sub silentio as prima facie evidence of an act or
statement purportedly showing a "definite intention to acquire residence" (26 C.F .R. 1.871-
4(c)(2)(iii), supra) in the District of Columbia-Le., "Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States" (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)) and geographic area in which a court of
general jurisdiction, such as the Court, is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide
cases-a fraud upon the court evincing that it was impossible for Trowbridge to have a fair
proceeding, an aspect of denial of due process of law of constitutional dimension.
THE 1997 FORM 1040 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE EVIDENCE OF"A DEFINITE INTENTION TO ACQUIRE
RESIDENCE IN THE (TITLE 26 U.S.C. GEOGRAPHICAL) U.S.".
Whereas: Evidence attached to and part of the 1997 Fonn 1040 in the fonn of
Trowbridge's October 15, 1998-notarized "DISCLAIMER STATEMENT DENYING ANY
TAX LIABILITY" (Dkt. #24-1, pp. 13-15of16) documents that Petitioner's apparent alleged
general election to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States by
Page 13of19
way of the 1997 Form 1040 was made unwittingly by mistake (id), obtained by the Internal
Revenue Service through fraud on the part oflntemal Revenue Agent Roy Fite (id.), and that
Trowbridge never had any such intention (id); and
Whereas: The aforesaid DISCLAIMER STATEMENT DENYING ANY TAX
LIABILITY contradicts, overcomes, and renders immaterial the 1997 Form 1040 as evidence of
any "intention to acquire residence in the [Title 26 U.S.C. geographical] U.S." (26 C.F.R. 1.871-
4(c)(2)(iii)) on the part of Trowbridge,
Wherefore: The Court's use of the 1997 Fonn 1040 as "evidence" ofTrowbridge's
alleged 26 U.S.C. 6013 general election to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States is without merit and a fraud upon the court.
WHY THE PURPORTED 26 U.S.C. 6013 ELECTION FACILITY IS A HOAX AND A NULLITY.
No one has the right to elect (choose) to be treated as a resident of a geographic area in
which he has no residence in fact for the purpose of taxation; to wit:
12. While one's statements may supply evidence of the intention requisite to
establish domicile at a given place of residence, they can not supply the fact of
residence there; and they are of slight weight when they conflict with the fact.
This is the more so where, as here, the statements are shown to have been inspired
by the desire to establish a nominal residence for tax purposes, different from the
residence in fact. P. 425. In such circumstances, the actual fact of the place of
residence and the person's real attitude and intention with respect to it as *400
disclosed by his course of conduct are the controlling factors in ascertaining his
domicile. When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he
must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to
make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general
purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose
of taxation. P. 426.... Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
Whereas: Trowbridge has never had the right to elect to be treated as a resident of the
Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States for the purpose of taxation; and
Whereas: No actor in government has ever had the right to treat Trowbridge as a resident
of the Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States for the purpose of taxation; and
Page 14of19
Whereas: Jurisdiction is "limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined
territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc." (BLACK'S, supra, p. 7) and "The authority of any
court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed" (id.); and
Whereas: The alleged 26 U.S.C. 6013 election facility is discretionary I optional and
therefore an alleged contractual I quasi-contractual-Le., not jurisdictional-matter; and
Whereas: The Court, in the Court's May 13, 2014, Second Order Denying Dismissal
(Dkt. #42) declares, among other things, "This court has jurisdiction" and cites by footnote not
the actual fact of the place of Trowbridge' s residence or the geographic area in which the Court
is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide cases as the reason therefor, but rather a
statute (28 U.S.C. 1340 (2012)), evincing that the Court (1) knows that Trowbridge resides not
within the jurisdiction of the Court as alleged by Plaintiff (Dkt. #1, p. 1 of 3), and (2) asserts
"jurisdiction" but rather is using-sub silentio and fraudulently-an alleged contractual I quasi-
contractual right as the basis of the Court's authority to hear and decide Civil Action H-14·27,
the 1997 Fonn 1040 being "proof' (immaterial prima facie evidence) thereof,
Wherefore: The Court's assertion "This court has jurisdiction," despite no actual
evidence of jurisdiction is willful and perjurious and a fraud upon the court under color of law, a
denial of due process of law of constitutional dimension.
B. Civil Action H-14-27 Was Not A Fair Proceeding.
The transcript of the May 21, 2014, hearing (Dkt. #57, pp. 3-4of9) (the "Transcript")
provides the following exchange between the Court and counsel for the United States:
THE COURT: . . . The United States is free to go by slang nicknames if it

chooses. Whether it goes by the United States of America or the United States or
USA or what as we say in Texas, "Murica," that that's fine. The rules allow
pleading in common names or official names.
The confusion -- and I actually don't think Trowbridge has a clue what all
this means. Frankly, you can't. But he got it from somebody. As I mentioned last

Page IS of 19
time, he lives up there around Dr. Jaikaran. And there are two approaches. He's
using it even though he probably knows it's meaningless because he has no other
way he thinks of avoiding it, so - - or he's delusional and believes it. But by
spending your time being rational with an irrational purpose would be irrational.
So when do you want him evicted?
MR. SMELTZER: I was prepared to give Mr. Trowbridge 30 days if he

needed it to gather his belongings. I don't know if he - - sometimes people are less
than willing to leave and we are required to use the Marshal Service but - -
THE COURT: Well - -

MR. SMELTZER: - - I thought that 30 days was reasonable.
THE COURT: - - the problem is the adverse decision by the Board of Tax
Appeals, which just pretends to be a court, was June 4th, 2003. So he's had 11
years.
MR. SMELTZER: That's true.

THE COURT: So you add up 30 days, plus 11 years that he has known of the
problem, has, as near as I know, done nothing constructive by way of negotiation
or payment or anything else.
MR. SMELTZER: No, he has not.

THE COURT: And he has been obstreperous. Because I don't like calling
people insane, I'll assume he's being dishonest, I think that's a step up, in using all
of this stuff.
Today is the 21st of May. I believe he needs to be out by noon May 30th.
MR. SMELTZER: That is fine by me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There is simply no sense in our allowing him further to do it,
that is, to occupy.
1. The Court denigrated Trowbridge for taking responsibility for knowing and
understanding the law and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights.
When Congress omit to provide a definition for a particular word or legal term in a
particular statute, great care must be taken to ensure proper interpretation thereof; to wit:
Although the District of Columbia Income Tax Act made "domicile" the fulcrum
of the income tax, the first ever imposed in the District, it set forth no definition of
that word. To ascertain its meaning we therefore consider the Congressional
history of the Act, the situation with reference to which it was enacted, and the
existing judicial precedents, with which Congress may be taken to have been
Page 16of19
familiar in at least a general way. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562.
District o/Co/umbia v. Murphy, 314 US 441, 449 (1941)
"lgnorantia excusator, nonjuris sedfacti. Ignorance of fact may excuse, but not
ignorance oflaw" (BOUVIER'S (see fn. 2, p. 10, supra), p. 2136), and "Ignorance of law consists
of the want of knowledge of those laws which it is our duty to understand, and which every man
is presumed to know" (id at 1488).
When Congress do provide a specific definition for a certain tenn in a particular body of
statutory law, everyone has a duty to understand and know the meaning thereof, legal
professionals doubly so, and no one has any discretion to take said term in any other way than
that provided by Congress; to wit:
The words of a statute are to be taken in their ordinary and popular meaning,
unless they are technical terms or words of art, in which case they are to be
understood in their technical sense .... [Underline emphasis added.] Henry
Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation ofthe Laws
(West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1896), Sec. 57, p. 128.
Linguistic inference canons provide guidelines about what the legislature likely
meant, given its choice of some words and not others. The linguistic inference
canons include classic logical canons such as expressio unius, noscitur a sociis,
and ejusdem generis. Other inferential rules encourage interpreters to follow the
ordinary usage of text unless the legislature has itself defined the word or the
phrase has acquired a technical meaning.... [Footnotes omitted; underline
emphasis added.] Jacob Scott, "Codified Canons and the Common Law of
Interpretation," The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98, Issue 2, January 2010, pp.
352-353.
Table I. Linguistic Inference Canons ...

. . . Ordinary usage: Follow ordinary usage of tenns, unless the legislature gives
them a specified or technical meaning....
Dictionary definition: Follow dictionary definitions of terms, unless the
legislature has provided a specific definition. [Underline emphasis added.) Id.
at 357.
"Quijure suo utilur, neminifacit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one"
(BOUVIER'S, p. 2157)-but the Transcript reveals that the Court condemns Trowbridge for

Page 17of19
exercising Trowbridge's legal rights and relying on and referring to the statutes of Congress for
the meaning of the definition of the Title 26 and 28 U.S.C. term "United States"; to wit:
I actually don't think Trowbridge has a clue what all this [United States, United
States of America, USA] means.... And there are two approaches. He's_using it
[controlling definition of"United States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.] even though
he probably knows it's meaningless [insinuation that "United States" has no
special meaning in Title 26 or 28 U.S.C. and Trowbridge is acting in bad faith)
because he has no other way he thinks of avoiding it [inference that Trowbridge is
acting in bad faith or for purposes of delay or both: tacit denigration of
Trowbridge for exercising Trowbridge's legal rights], so - - or he's delusional and
believes it [inference that Trowbridge is delusional for maintaining fidelitv to the
controlling definition of"United States" provided by Congress in Titles 26 and 28
U.S.C. and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights). But by spending your time
being rational with an irrational purpose would be irrational [inference that
Trowbridge is irrational for adhering to the controlling definition of "United
States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.; inference that Trowbridge's exercise of
Trowbridge's legal rights is irrational].
2. The Court prosecuted sua sponte and in exercise of general jurisdiction, Civil
Action H-14-27 with bias against Trowbridge, using pejorative epithets to
characterize Trowbridge for observing controlling law in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.
and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights, citing the amount of time expended
doing so as the reason Trowbridge's eviction should be expedited.
Plaintiff states "I was prepared to give Mr. Trowbridge 30 days if he needed it to gather
his belongings" and "I thought that 30 days was reasonable," to which the Court replies:
"[T]he problem [an alleged debt] is the adverse decision by the Board of Tax
Appeals [United States Tax Court], which just pretends to be a court, was June 4th,
2003. So he's had 11 years [false inference that Trowbridge has neglected a legal
duty for 11 years] .... So you add up 30 days, plus 11 years that he has known of
the problem [an alleged debt], has, as near as I know, done nothing constructive
by way of negotiation or payment or anything else [i.e., has not volunteered to
negotiate or pay the alleged debt] .... And he has been obstreperous [no evidence
of obstreperousness per se; the Court equates Trowbridge's choice to litigate
(rather than negotiate and pay) an alleged debt with obstreperousness]. Because I
don't like calling people insane [denigration of Trowbridge for observing the Title
26 and 28 U.S.C. definition and meaning of "United States" and insinuation that
Trowbridge is insane for doing so], I'll assume he's being dishonest [denigration
of Trowbridge for insisting on the law], I think that's a step up, in using all of this
stuff [controlling definition of"United States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.]. Today
is the 21st of May. I believe [evidence that the Court, not Plaintiff, is prosecuting
Civil Action H-14-27] he needs to be out by noon May 30th [nine days later] ....
There is simply no sense in our allowing him further to do it, that is, to occupy.
Page 18of19
3. The Court entered the Judgment and Order without regard for Plaintiff's
unresolved April 4, 2014, motion for summary judgment, further evincing that
the Court prosecuted this case s11a spo11te, in exercise of general jurisdiction.
Whereas, the record of Civil Action H-14-27 reflects entry of Amended Final Judgment
May 23, 2014 (Dkt. #53), said record is devoid of resolution of Plaintiffs April 4, 2014, United
States' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Dkt. #19), signifying that
said motion was extraneous to final disposition of this case and that the Court prosecuted Civil
Action H-14-27 sua sponle, in exercise of general jurisdiction-against a resident of geographic
area fixed by the Constitution exclusively for courts of special jurisdiction, who has no residence
in fact in any geographic area in which any courts of general jurisdiction is authorized by the
Constitution to hear and decide cases-justified by sub silentio use of immaterial prima facie
evidence (the 1997 Form 1040) as ''proof' of Plaintiffs allegation that "Defendant, John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr., resides within the jurisdiction of this Court" (Dkt. #1, p. 1 of 5).
CONCLUSION
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving

disputes. The power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function rest, in
the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect for
judgments depends in tum upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial
integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest order. Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
In light of the hereinabove-cited evidence and defects in Civil Action H-14-27,
Trowbridge hereby moves the Court to vacate the Court's May 23, 2014, Judgment and Order
and afford Trowbridge such other relief as the Court deems proper.

9816 Memorial Boulevard #205
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
Page 19of19
I certify that on September 9, 2015, two copies of the attached MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER, together with (two) attachments, was delivered by hand to the
Clerk of the United States District Court in Houston, Texas, for filing and one copy was served
via United States Mail, first class postage to counsel as follows:
Joshua Smeltzer
Department of Justice, Tax Division
Dallas, Texas 7520 I
Case 4:14-cv-00027 Document 53 Filed in TXSD on 05/23/14 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
United States of America, §

§
Plaintiff, §
§
versus § Civil Action H-14·27
§
John P. Trowbridge, Jr., ct al., §
§
Defendants. §
Amended FinalJudgment
I. The United States of Ameriea:

A Takes $3,326,015.01, plus statutory additions accruing after April 7, 2014
fromJohn P. Trowbridge ineludinghis assumed name Freedom Ventures, UDO.
B. Has tax liens on Trowbridge's property, including 25XI7 Ram.rock Drive,
Porter, Texas 77365.
C. May foreclose its Uens against 25xx7 Raml'ock Drive,
D. Has all right, title, and interest in the property including the right to possession.
1. The clerk will leave the case open for the court to supervise Trowbridge's eviction.
Signed on May 23, 20I4, at Houston, Texas.
Lynn N. Hughes
United States DistrictJudge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DlSTIUCT OF TEXAS
United States of America, §

§
Plaintiff, §
§
§ Civil Action H-14•27
§
John P. Trowbridge, Jr., ct al., §
§
Defendants. §
Order of Sale and Vacature
x. The United States ofAmerica, having attached its lieos, may foreclose 2.5ll7 Ramrock
Drive, Porter, Texas 77365, also known as:
lot 16, block x, of Bentwood, section r, a subdivision of I 56.8 acres, out of the
William Massey Survey, A·39r, and the Mary Owens survey, A·405, in
Montgomery County, Texas, as imposed by the map and dedication records in
cabinet G, sheets x38A- x4xA.
2. The Internal Revenue Service is directed under 2.8 U.S.C. §§ 2.00I, 2002, and 2004, to
offer the property at a commercially reason.able and public sale.
3. The Service may access the property to preserve it, including retaining someone to
change or install locks or other security on the property until the deed is delivered to
a buyer.
4. The terms and conditions of the sale are:
A. The sale will be free and clear of all liens or other claims inferior to the Service's
lien.
----------·--" ............ _________________

B. The sale is subject to building lines, laws, ordinances, and governmental

regulations affecting the property and easements and restrictions of record.
C. · The sale of the property by public auction must be held on the front steps of
the Montgomery County Courthouse.
D. The date and time for the sale is to be announced by the Service.
E. After the Service has determined the date and time for the sale, it must include
it in the notice of sale and mail the notice, by regular and certified mail, retum
receipt requested, to:
Joshua D. Smeltzer
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
United States Department of]ustice
7r7 North Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 752or
John P. Trowbridge,Jr.
9816 Memorial Boulevard, Suite 205
Humble, Texas 7733 8
F. The date and time of the auction must be announced by the Service by
advertising the sale once each week for four consecutive weeks in at least one
generally circulated newspaper in Montgomery County, Texas, through the
Houston Association of Realtors, and otherwise at the discretion of the Service.
The notice of sale will describe the property and the terms of the sale in this
order in brief, direct, and plain English.
G. The minimum bid will be determined by the Service and must be in the notice
of sale. If the minimum bid is not rnet, the Service may hold a new sale with a
reduced minimum bid.
H. Each successful bidder must deposit at the time of the sale atleast10% of the bid
by a certi.&ed or cashier's check payable to the United States District Court.
Before being allowed to bid, bidders must have shown that they can comply.
I. The buyer must pay the Service within 28 clays after his bid is accepted by
certified or cashier's check payable to the United States District Court. If the
buyer does not comply, his deposit is forfeited and will be used to cover the
expenses of the sale, with residue applied to Trowbridge's tax liabilities. The
clerk will distribute the deposit, by a c:hec:k to the United States Treasury. The
property will again be offered for sale under the terms of this order or sold to
the next highest bidder. The United States may bid as a credit against its
judgment without tender of cash.
]. The sale is confirmed unless someone objects within 35 days. After

confirmation, the Service will execute and deliver a deed conveying the property
to the buyer.
K. The sale is without right of redemption.
5. Until Trowbridge vacates the property, he must preserve it in its current condition and
insure it against fires and casualties. He must do nothing that reduces the value of the
property like vandalism or recording liens.
6. IfTrowbridge interferes with the sale, vandalizes the property, or attempts to re•enter
it. he may be punished with fines, incarceration, or both.
7. By noon onJune 6, 2ox4, Trowbridge must vacate the property. Ifhe does not leave,
the United States Marshal will evict him. The marshal may use reasonable force to
enter the property and arrest people who interfere. Unremoved personal property is
forfeited, and the Service must dispose of it in a commercially reasonable manner.
Proceeds from the sale of his personal property must be applied to his tax liabilities.
8. By June 9, 2or4, Trowbridge must give Smeltzer his new address.
9. After the sale is confirmed, the clerk will distribute the proceeds in this order:
A. First, to the costs or fees of the clerk and marshal.
B. Second, to the Service for the reasonable costs of the sale, which will be
examined by the court at conf'irmation.
C. 1b.ird, to ad 'Valorcm taxes due to Montgomery County.
D. Fourth, to the United. States of America for unpaid taX debts.
xo. All remaining pi:oceeds are to be held by the clerk until this courr orders othenvise.
II. The Unitecl States Marshal will serve Trow bridge with this order.
Signed on May 2..;3. 2014, at Houston, T e.xas.
+ I. ....
-
United States DistrictJudge
ELECTRONIC DATA CARRIERS OF TEXAS UPDATED 10/22/13 PRINTDATE
2228 WIRTCREST LANE, SUITE G !TEXAS MAX-38 0 Form 160 (INS) BOLNUMBER
HOUSTON, TX 77055 EFF 5/01/13 0 Form 162 (VAL) P 0 NUMBER
(713) 680-9600
TXDMV 005344018C USDOT 1811946 0 GP for days 0 NTE 0 Pre-Existing Contract
data nows from the Cube Sheet, You may oveiwrite }11 1
fril!l!!l"l·"fa111 - 0 Rate BOL
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE Conslgnee JOHN TROWBRIDGE
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City PORTER TX Zip 77365 City HOUSTON TX Zip 77055
County MONTGOMERY Phone County _H_A_R_R_IS_ _ _ _ __ Cell
------
XTRA STOP 1 ZIP XTRA STOP 2 ZIP XTRA STOP 3 ZIP
--- ---
DATES PickUp Delivery
Invoice To: Attn: Earliest
--------
Address Latest
------------------,,-,--.---
CI ty _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ State Zip Preferred I06/06/14 l
D Expedited @ 5000 Lbs D Complete Occupancy D Exclusive Use D Space Reservation
D Selected Del @ Lbs Vehicle Cu Ft No Cu Ft Ordered No Cu Ft
WEIGHT ADDITIVES LIN FT Wf ADD TRK G-MJLES © EaseMaker
Airplane, Glider Truck 1 Truck 2
30 '
Camper, Camper Shell, unmounted Gross Weight
Boat, Sailboat <14 Ft Tare Weight
Boat, Sailboat 14 Ft+ NET Weight
_ _ Boat Trailer, any length AUTO Weight
Canoe, Skiff, Dlnghle, Kayak 14 Ft+ Wf Additives
_ _ Travel Camper, Horse Trailer Total Weight
Mini-Mobile Home COMBINED WEIGHT
TRANSPORTATION COSTS BASED ON HOURLY RATES NO GROSS DISCOUNT NET CHG

LOCAL SERVICES: 5 Trucks 5 Men 100.00 /HR 23.8 Hours n 2375.00 2375.00
TRAVEL TIME CHARGES: n
TRANSPORTATION WEIGHT Lbs BILLED WEIGHT Lbs n
FUEL SURCHARGE Make sure your FUEL TABLE is up to date! 14.00%1 n
ATC (Additional Transportation Cost) ORIGIN OPTIONAL 3.45 Cwt n
ATC (Additional Transportation Cost) DEST OPTIONAL 3.45 Cwt n
VALUATION 0 RVP@ /LB 0 DVP @ /LB 0 $0.60/Lb }
COVERAGE _ _ ___ COVERAGE -=--j
0 No Dad @LJ/$100 0 No Dad M _ _ __
0 $250 Dad @ /$100 0 $250 Ded @ /$100
0 $500 Ded @ /$100 0 $500 Dad @ /$100
Sf;R\llC_ES
0 FULL SERVICE PACK 0 OT 66.45 Cwt
- - - Lbs n ----
0 FULL SERVICE UNPACK 0 OT 15.20 Cwt Lbs n ____
D lo -
FOR CRATES, SEE
"OTHER SERVICES"
BELOW
DESCRIP QTY RATE AMOUNT QTY RATE AMOUNT QTY RATE AMOUNT
Dishpack 34 44.95 1528.30 61.60 26.20 L!:=:=======!l
1.5Ctn 16 8.95 143.20 16.50 7.35
3.0 Ctn 1 13.15 13.15 25.45 11.85
4.5 Ctn 4 15.55 62.20 31.40 11.85
6.0 Ctn 18.50 35.60 13.35
6.5 Ctn 19.20 41.40 15,75
Wardrobe 33, 10 19.95 12, 70
Crib Matt 12.20 15.00 3.70
Sgl Matt 21.95 17.75 10,70
Dbl Matt 27.80 17.75 10.70
K/Q Matt 51.25 26,85 17.45
Long Sgl 30.40 18.40 10.70
Mirror Ctn 36 34.40 1238.40 54,30 22.65
TOTALS 91 2985.25
NET CHARGE 2985.25 CUSTOM PACKING n 2985.25 2985.25
NnTI=.• !=OR I r.n TV RnY _c:;,::,:: "OTl-lt=R" r.l l!=:T()M I INPl<IN(.:l l"i
I'
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE
2
n _____
n ----
n
NO DESCRIPTION NO DESCRIPTION NO DESCRIPTION

1 All Terrain Vehicle 13 Gun Safe/Cabinet 25 Pool Table 37 Tractor <25hp
2 Animal Kennel 14 Gym System 26 Riding Mower<25 38 Tractor 25hp+
3 Automobile 15 Harpsichord 27 Rowboat <14 Ft 39 Trailer <14 Ft
4 Big Screen TV (40"+) 16 Hot Tub 28 Safe 500 lbs or less 40 Trailer >14 Ft
5 Canoe <14 Ft 17 Jacuzzi 29 Satellite Dish>30 41 Trampoline
6 Dlnghie <14 Ft 18 Jet Ski 30 Skiff <14 Ft 42 Truck w Camper
7 Doll House 19 Kayak <14 Ft 31 Snow Mobile 43 Van (any size)
8 Dune Buggy 20 Motorcycle 32 Spa 44 Weight Lift Equip
9 Farm Equip >25hp 21 Organ 33 SUV 45 Weight Station
10 Go-Cart 22 Piano 34 SUV Truck 46 Whirlpool
11 Golf Cart 23 PickUp Truck 35 Stretch Limousine 47 Wind Surfer
12 Grand Clock 24 Playhouse 36 Tool Shed 48 Work Bench
SELECTION: NO QTY DESCRIPTION RATE

n ____
n ----
n
n----
n ____
QTY
1ST 44.45 ADDTL 30.10 ORIGIN n ____
1ST 30.10 ADDTL 20.95 DESTINATION n ----
O!D NO FLTS
0 ELEVATOR
- - - Lbs Cwt ELEVATOR n ______
0 ELEVATOR Lbs Cwt ELEVATOR n _____
- - - Lbs
0 STAIRS
--- Cwt r1
n----
0 STAIRS
- - - Lbs Cwt
NO ITEMS NO FLTS
0 PIANO/ORGAN IN 1ST 33.90 ADDTL 16.85 n
0 PIANO/ORGAN OUT 1ST 33.90 ADDTL 19.00 n----
WEIGHT RATE O/D DISTANCE NO CARRIES
0 LONG CARRY
- - - Lbs Cwt
- - - FtFt n ----
0 LONG CARRY
--- Lbs Cwt
--- n
NO MEN
WAITING TIME IF LESS THAN 200 MILES, 1 FREE HR; 200+ MILES= 2 FREE HRS
1STDAYORIG TRUCK MAN _ _ HRS@ /HR n ____
ADDTLDAYS TRUCK MAN HRS @ /HR r1
1ST DAY DEST TRUCK MAN HRS@ /HR n- ---
___ _
ADDTL DAYS TRUCK MAN HRS@ /HR r1 _ _ __
f.'Uliiii! WEIGHT MILES
0 AT ORIGIN --- LBS DOT n
0 AT DESTINATION _ _ _ LBS 0 OT n----
SELF STORAGE PICKUP I DELIVERY
0 AT ORIGIN _ _ _ LBS 0 OT r: - - - -
0 AT DESTINATION
--- LBS 0 OT n ----
l•WisU'Mi!•M•lltilN!•M•* n ____
3
0 AT ORIGIN LBS
--- CWT
0 AT DESTINATION LBS
--- CWT r1 ____
ORIGIN STORAGE D Whole Shipment Partial Weight
- - - Lbs
LOCATION
- - - - DATEIN
1st Day Stg Lbs Cwt
- - - - DATEOUT n ____
Whse Handling _ _ _ Lbs Cwt n
Addtl Stg Lbs Cwt /Day X n ---
Valuation Type RVP 15% of ___ = ___ X _ _ 15-Day Periods n-____
Bulky Items Stored:
n ____
n ----
n ----
n ____
n
@SIT PICKUP Miles n----
ATTEMPT P/U
- - - Lbs Truck Man HRS n
D 01- - - n----
---
0 SIT PICKUP BY CWT
- - - Lbs --- cwt
DESTINATION STORAGE D Whole Shipment Partial Weight Lbs

LOCATION
---
DATEIN
Auth No
----
DATE OUT
1st Day Stg Lbs Cwt
----- n
Whse Handling _ _ _ Lbs Cwt n----
Addtl Stg Lbs Cwt _ _ _ !DayX n ---
Valuation Type RVP 15% of _ _ _ = _ __ _ _ 15-Day Periods n-
____
Bulky Items Stored:
n
n----
n
n----
n
@SIT DELIVERY Lbs CJ
Miles n----
0 ATTEMPTED DEL
--- Lbs Miles ROUNDTRIP n
0 2nd Whse Handling Lbs Cwt NIA if shipment stays on van n----
0 SIT DELIVERY BY CWT - - - L b s n ----
MAILING ADDRESS OF SHIPPER Street
City _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ST Zip
PAPERING I PADDING
- - - CU FT - - - /CU FT n ___
-OIVERSl0N MUST BE >30 MILES, IF <12,000 LBS, $4.50CVVT; IF 12,000 LBS+, $37.45
MILES DIVERTED LBS n ---
TRAVEL TIME - EXTRA DRIVER - -
_ _ _ HRSOTR@ /HR RETURN MILES@ Ml fl ----
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL
MAN
- - - HOURS 0 OT
- - - /HOUR n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
DEST STORAGE HANDLING 4480# (in) 201.60 n 201.60 201.60
DEST STORAGE 1ST MONTH 179.20 n 179.20 179.20
DEST STORAGE HANDLING 4480# (OUT) 201.60 n 201.60 201.60
DEST n
4
OTHER SERVICES
ARMOR PACK LCD TV 30"- 59" NO OF TVS Dor n ____
UNPACK LCD TV 30"- 59" NO OF TVS Dor n
CRATING CRATE n ----
n
UNCRATING CRATE
n ----
n- ---
n ___ _
..........;''';"'"······· .
n ----
TOT AL CHARGES
E.§ © 2012 EaseMaker Software

6/9/2014 Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59Customer
FiledCopy
09/30/15 Page 33 of 37 PageID #: 547
Merchant ID: 720000308348 Term ID: 001
Sale - Approved
Date 06/09/14 Time 08:13:27

Method of Payment MasterCard
Entry Method Manual
Account# XXXXXXXXXXXX1782
Order ID 101697
Approval Code 009798
Amount 5,942.65
Customer Copy
https://secure.paymentech.comlrnanager/receiptAction.do?subaction=generateReceipt&transType=nevi.Order&receiptType=B&org.apache.struts.taglib.html.TOKEN=eda756402e4e4660c8a763b76c55dbdf 1/2
PAGE: 1 EDC MOVING SYSTEMS

2228 WIRTCREST #G
HOUSTON TX
I I THRU
*** HISTORY TROWBRIDGE
*** JOHN P ACCOUNT #: 39396 SLSID: 100
9/29/15
X D - -DATE- - TICKET NO. ----DESCRIPTION--------DEBIT-- --CREDIT--CON. TOT
N D 7/ 1/14 10169775 STG07/01/14-07/31/14 179.20

N D 8/ 1/14 10169776 STG08/01/14-08/31/14 323.20
N D 9/ 1/14 10169777 STG09/01/14-09/30/14 323.20
ND 10/ 1/14 10169778 STGl0/01/14-10/31/14 323.20
ND 11/ 1/14 10169779 STGll/01/14-11/30/14 323.20
ND 12/ 1/14 10169780 STG12/0l/14-12/31/14 323.20
ND 1/ 1/15 10169781 STGOl/01/15-01/31/15 323.20
ND 2/ 1/15 10169782 STG02/01/15-02/28/15 323.20
ND 3/ 1/15 10169783 STG03/01/15-03/31/15 323.20
ND 4/ 1/15 10169784 STG04/0l/15-04/30/15 323.20
ND 5/ 1/15 10169785 STG05/0l/15-05/31/15 323.20
ND 6/ 1/15 10169786 STG06/01/15-06/30/15 323.20
ND 7/ 1/15 10169787 STG07/01/15-07/31/15 323.20
ND 8/ 1/15 10169788 STG08/01/15-08/31/15 323.20
101697 CONTRACT TOTAL 4380.
ND 7/15/14 101697-02 TRANSIT INS 80 1 000 640.00

101697- CONTRACT TOTAL 640.
ND 1/ 7/15 0107150000 CHECK ET0107C04 -323.20

01071500 CONTRACT TOTAL -323.
ND 2/10/15 0210150000 CHECK ET0209C07 -323.20

ND 3/13/15 0313150000 CHECK ET0313C05 -323.20

ND 4/ 9/15 0409150000 CHECK ET0409C05 -323.20

ND 5/ 6/15 0506150000 CHECK ET0506C06 -323.20

ND 6/24/15 0624150000 CHECK ET0624C01 -323.20

ND 7/13/15 0713150000 CHECK ET0713C06 -323.20

ND 7/17/14 0717140000 CHECK ET0716C04 -1107.20

ND 8/11/14 0811140000 CHECK ET0808C12 -323.20

ND 8/15/15 0815150000 CHECK ET0814C03 -323.20

PAGE: 2 EDC MOVING SYSTEMS

2228 WIRTCREST #G
HOUSTON TX
*** HISTORY*** I I THRU --;--;--
9/29/15 TROWBRIDGE JOHN P ACCOUNT #: 39396 SLSID: 100
x D --DATE-- TICKET NO. ----DESCRIPTION--------DEBIT-- --CREDIT--CON. TOT
N D 9/ 4/14 0904140000 CHECK ET0903C03 -323.20

ND 7/15/14 101697-021 2 MTHS VAL JUN-JULY 288.00

101697-0 CONTRACT TOTAL 288.
ND 10/21/14 1021140000 CHECK ET1020C02 -323.20

ND 11/14/14 1114140000 CHECK ET1113C04 -323.20

ND 12/ 4/14 1204140000 CHECK ET1204C03 -323.20

12041400 CONTRACT TOTAL: -323.
BALANCE = $
I certify that on September 29, 2015, the foregoing DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, WITH
PREJUDICE, OF THIS ALLEGED CASE FOR LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
THAT GIVES THE COURT THE CAPACITY TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND ENTER
JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND DECREES IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES ARISING
FROM A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING REGARDING A DEBT, IN TYLER
COUNTY, TEXAS was served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:
Joshua Smeltzer
Department of Justice, Tax Division
Dallas, Texas 75201
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Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 7 Filed 08/07/14 Page 1 of 44 PageID #: 34

Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 7 Filed 08/07/14 Page 2 of 44 PageID #: 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, United States of America, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the

In support of the request, the United States avers as follows:

may claim an interest in the property at issue. See 26 U.S.C. §7403(b).

2. On July 16, 2014, summons were served on John Parks Trowbridge,

Jr., as President of Bright Futures Investments Inc. and as Trustee of Ideal

Abilities. (Dkts. #4 - 5.)

3. On August 7, 2014, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., filed a, pro-se

purported “Answer” (Dkt. #7) and “Amended Answer.” (Dkt. #10.)

4. No filings have been made on behalf of Bright Futures Investments

individual response and is improper as a response by Bright Future Investments

corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise

to all artificial entities.”). To the extent Mr. Trowbridge was attempting to

pleadings are prohibited. Id.

5. The time to file an answer or otherwise respond to the United

property at issue as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A) and

12(b). Therefore, entry of default judgment against each of them is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the

may be justly entitled.

JOHN MALCOLM BALES

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

ATTORNEY FOR UNITED STATES

United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:

John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.

/s/ Joshua Smeltzer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

The Court, having considered the UNITED STATES’ REQUEST FOR

1. The United States’ motion is GRANTED;

2. Bright Futures Investments Inc. is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to

3. Ideal Abilities is HEREBY in DEFAULT for failing to plead or otherwise

SIGNED this ________ day of _____________________________ , 2014.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS

1. Rule 26(f) attorney conference on or before: October 7, 2014.

2. Complete initial mandatory disclosure required by this Order: 28 days after

RULE 26(F) ATTORNEY CONFERENCE

1. A brief factual and legal synopsis of the case.

2. The jurisdictional basis for this suit.

4. Proposed scheduling order deadlines. Appendix 1 has the standard deadlines.

6. The identity of persons expected to be deposed.

7. Any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored

8. Any issues relating to preserving discoverable information, including

10. Estimated trial time.

CONTESTED MOTION PRACTICE

SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. The correct names of the parties to the action.

4. The authorizations described in Local Rule CV-34.

5. A copy of all documents, electronically stored information, witness statements,

A magistrate judge is available during business hours to immediately hear discovery

Plaintiff’s counsel shall immediately notify the court upon settlement.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17 day of September, 2014.

PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER DEADLINES

____________________ Deadline for motions to transfer

____________________ Deadline to add parties

____________________ If parties plan to mediate, state date parties propose. This

____________________ Plaintiff’s disclosure of expert testimony pursuant to Fed.

____________________ Deadline for Plaintiffs to file amended pleadings. A motion

____________________ Defendant’s disclosure of expert testimony pursuant to Fed.

SIGNED this day of _____________________ , 2014.