Professional Documents
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3a Lufkin Division Record2
3a Lufkin Division Record2
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Court enter a default
judgment against defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities.
1. The complaint initiating this action was filed on July 7, 2014. (Dkt.
#1.) Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities were named as parties that
Inc. or Ideal Abilities. The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an
Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is not an attorney1 and
can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993)
(“[T]he lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow
than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he rationale for that rule applies equally
respond for Bright Futures Investments Inc. and/or Ideal Abilities those
States’ complaint expired on August 6, 2014. (See Dkts. #4 - 5.) No response was
filed by Bright Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities claiming any interest in
the property at issue. Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities have
failed to plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the
1John Parks Trowbridge does not allege he is an attorney, nor does he list any State bar affiliation
in his response. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) Counsel for the United States has searched for “John
Trowbridge” on the website for the Texas State Bar and did not find any listing under that name.
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Court enter default judgment against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal
Abilities. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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This Order shall govern proceedings in this case. The following deadlines are hereby set:
3. File joint report of attorney conference: 35 days after deadline for Rule 26(f)
conference. This should follow initial mandatory disclosures, so a realistic
proposal regarding depositions and other discovery can be included.
4. The case is SET for a Rule 16 management conference on November 25, 2014,
at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom #2, Jack Brooks Federal Building, 300 Willow Street,
Beaumont, Texas. Lead counsel for each party, with authority to bind their
respective clients, and all unrepresented parties, shall be present. Continuance of
the management conference will not be allowed absent a showing of good cause1.
1
Before the case management conference, counsel and unrepresented parties should review the most recent
versions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas. The Local
Rules are available on the Eastern District of Texas website (http://www.txed.uscourts.gov).
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Rule 26(f) requires attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties to confer and attempt
in good faith to agree on a proposed scheduling order (see Appendix 1) and to electronically file
a joint report outlining their proposals. The conference may be by telephone.
Before commencing the Rule 26(f) conference, counsel must discuss settlement options
with their clients, including whether an offer or demand should be made at the Rule 26(f)
attorney conference. Counsel should also inquire whether their clients are amenable to trial
before a United States magistrate judge. Parties willing to consent should file the appropriate
form electronically (see form on Eastern District of Texas website) as soon as possible, so that
the case can be reset for management conference before the magistrate judge to whom the case is
assigned.
The parties must include the following matters in the joint conference report:
3. Confirm that initial mandatory disclosure required by Rule 26(a)(1) and this order
has been completed.
5. If the parties agree that mediation is appropriate, and the parties can agree upon a
mediator, the name, address, and phone number of that mediator, and a proposed
deadline should be stated. An early date is encouraged to reduce expenses. The
court may appoint a mediator upon request.
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11. The names of the attorneys who will appear on behalf of the parties at the
management conference (the appearing attorney must be an attorney of record and
have full authority to bind the client).
12. Any other matters counsel deem appropriate for inclusion in the joint conference
report.
Counsel and parties shall comply with Local Rules CV-7, 10, 11, and 56, in addition to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Local Rule CV-7 requires you to attach affidavits and other
supporting documents to the motion or response. Labeled tabs on the attachments to the courtesy
copy will make it easier to find them.
If the motion with attachments exceeds 20 pages, the court requests that you bind (spiral
or otherwise) the courtesy copy at the left to make it easier to read.
Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(b), highlight in the courtesy copy, the portions of the
affidavits or other supporting documents which are cited in your motion or response.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has implemented policies to protect
sensitive private information about parties, witnesses, and others involved in a civil, criminal, or
bankruptcy case. To that end, all documents filed with the court and made available to the public,
whether electronically or on paper, should limit certain information as follows:
• for Social Security numbers, use only the last four digits;
• for financial account numbers, use only the last four digits;
• for names of minor children, use only their initials;
• for dates of birth, use only the year; and
• (in criminal cases) for home addresses, use only the city and state.
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If such information is elicited during testimony or other court proceedings, it will become
available to the public when the official transcript is filed at the courthouse unless, and until, it is
redacted. The better practice is for you to avoid introducing this information into the record in
the first place. Please take this into account when questioning witnesses or making other
statements in court.
DISCOVERY
Initial mandatory disclosure pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) shall be completed not later than
28 days after the deadline for the Rule 26 attorney conference and shall include the following in
addition to information required by Rule 26(a)(1):
2. The name and, if known, address and telephone number of any potential parties to
the action.
3. The name and, if known, the address and telephone number of persons having
knowledge of facts relevant to the claim or defense of any party, a brief
characterization of their connection to the case and a fair summary of the
substance of the information known by such person. This may be combined with
list of persons required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) so two lists are not needed.
See Local Rule CV-26(d) for meaning of “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”
A party that fails to timely disclose such information will not, unless such failure is
harmless, be permitted to use such evidence at trial, hearing or in support of a motion. A
party is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its
investigation of the case.
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Discovery shall not commence until the deadline set for the attorneys to confer under
Rule 26(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Depositions may be taken, and initial mandatory
disclosure shall occur, before the Rule 16 management conference, so that counsel are in a
position to intelligently discuss additional required discovery, and scheduling of the case.
Following the management conference, the court will enter a scheduling order setting deadlines
controlling disposition of the case. If the court concludes that a management conference is not
necessary after receiving the parties’ 26(f) report, it may enter a scheduling order and cancel the
management conference.
The fact that the scheduling order will have a deadline for completion of discovery is
NOT an invitation, or authorization, to withhold documents or information required to be
disclosed as part of initial mandatory disclosure, under the guise of “supplementation.” Attorneys
are expected to review their client’s files and to conduct at least preliminary interviews of their
clients and potential witnesses under their control, so as to fully comply with the initial
mandatory disclosure requirements by the deadline set in this order. This will allow experts to be
timely identified and prepared to testify, witnesses to be efficiently deposed, and any follow-up
paper discovery to be completed by the deadline to be set for completion of discovery. The court
expects that, in most cases, after reading the pleadings and having a frank discussion of the
issues and discovery during the Rule 26 attorney conference, a review of the opposing party’s
initial disclosures should alert an attorney to any remaining information which should have been
disclosed, so that such information can be provided before the Rule 16 management conference.
A party asserting that any information is confidential should immediately apply to the court for
entry of a protective order. Unless a request is made for modification, the court will use the form
found on the Eastern District website.
DISCOVERY DISPUTES
FAILURE TO SERVE
Any defendant who has not been served with the summons and complaint within 120
days after the filing of the complaint shall be dismissed, without further notice, unless prior to
such time the party on whose behalf such service is required shows good cause why service has
not been made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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FICTITIOUS PARTIES
The name of every party shall be set out in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The
use of fictitious names is disfavored by federal courts. Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 112
F.3d. 869 (7th Cir. 1997). It is hereby ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED as to all
fictitious parties. Dismissal is without prejudice to the right of any party to take advantage of the
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
SETTLEMENT
COMPLIANCE
Attorneys and pro se litigants who appear in this court must comply with the deadlines
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Eastern District of
Texas and this order. A party is not excused from the requirements of a Rule or scheduling
order by virtue of the fact that dispositive motions are pending, the party has not
completed its investigation, the party challenges the sufficiency of the opposing party’s
disclosure, or because another party has failed to comply with this order or the rules.
Failure to comply with relevant provisions of the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or this order may result in the exclusion of evidence at trial, the imposition of
sanctions by the court, or both. Counsel are reminded of Local Rule AT-3, particularly AT-3(I)
& (J).
___________________________________
Ron Clark, United States District Judge
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APPENDIX 1
The following actions shall be completed by the date indicated.2 The dates indicated are the
standard for most cases. Counsel should be prepared to explain the need for requested changes.
7 weeks after disclosure of an Deadline to object to any other party’s expert witnesses.
of an expert is made Objections shall be made by a motion to strike or limit
expert testimony and shall be accompanied by a copy of the
expert’s report in order to provide the court with all the
information necessary to make a ruling on any objection.
The court will not accept objections to experts filed in any
form—i.e., motions in limine—after this date.3
2
If a deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday as defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, the effective date is the
first federal court business day following the deadline imposed.
3
This requirement has two goals: (1) to encourage early disclosure of experts so that if one is struck, the party will
have time to find another; and (2) to avoid the gamesmanship that has become common as parties attempt to
disqualify experts with a motion in limine thus distracting opponents during final trial preparations and perhaps even
blocking testimony required to establish a claim or defense.
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Date will be set by court. If numerous objections are filed the court may set a
Usually within 10 days prior hearing to consider all pending motions and objections.
to docket call.
August 11, 2015 10:30 a.m. Jury selection and trial in Lufkin, Texas. Case
will then be tried in order with other cases on the docket.
Depending on disposition of other cases on court’s docket,
jury selection may be the following week. About a month
before docket call, counsel may wish to consult with
counsel for the other cases on the September docket to
determine whether their cases are likely to settle.
4
This is not an invitation or requirement to file written responses. Most motions in limine can be decided without a
written response. But, if there is particularly difficult or novel issue, the court needs some time to review the matter.
To save time and space respond only to items objected to. All others will be considered to be agreed. Opposing
counsel shall confer in an attempt to resolve any dispute over the motions in limine within five calendar days of the
filing of any response. The parties shall notify the court of all the issues which are resolved.
5
Within five calendar days after the filing of any objections, opposing counsel shall confer to determine whether
objections can be resolved without a court ruling. The parties shall notify the court of all issues which are resolved.
The court needs a copy of the exhibit or the pertinent deposition pages to rule on the objection.
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The United States filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of nominee liens filed
against property in Tyler County, Texas. (Dkt. #1.) John Parks Trowbridge Jr. filed an
Answer and Amended Answer to the complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) Neither Bright
Future Investments Inc. nor Ideal Abilities have filed an answer or other responsive
pleading and the United States has moved for default. (See Dkt. #14.) The Tyler County
Trowbridge’s Answer and Amended Answer refers to irrelevant law in his quest
to have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America. (See Dkts.
#7, #10, #18, and #19.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject to tax
because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and has been
rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding claims that
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they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens of the State
Trowbridge refused to provide the United States with his availability for the
Court ordered attorney conference. (See Dkt. #15.) Trowbridge’s response, instead,
requested “the constitutional authority that allows the Court to assume the duty of
prosecuting the case or issue orders sua sponte that require the litigaants to perform
specific acts.” A copy of the correspondence between the United States and Trowbridge
is attached as Government Exhibit A. Following the United States’ refusal to justify the
Court’s authority to issue orders in a case it’s assigned, Trowbridge filed his motion for
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), three criteria must be met before a District Court
may properly certify an interlocutory order for appeal: 1) the order involves a
controlling question of law in the case, 2) as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and 3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); See Aparicio v.
Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, fn. 2 (5th Cir. 1981.) Trowbridge’s request fails all three
criteria.
As stated in the United States’ Complaint (Dkt. #1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…” Further,
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1345, which gives district courts “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States…”
Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and enforcement of
liens) is also authorized by statute.1 The only question of law involves the United States
ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr. Trowbridge – NOT the
ability of the Court to issue an order to the parties governing the management of the
litigation.
its docket by requiring the parties to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pursuant to the Federal rules, the Court has the authority to order “attorneys and any
unrepresented parties” to appear for conferences so that it can meet its obligations to
“issue a scheduling order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. The Seventh Circuit has stated that “the
inherent power of a district judge--derived from the very nature and existence of his
judicial office--is the broad field over which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
applied.” G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).
to continue his twenty year span of avoiding paying his share of taxes. The motion filed
overdue tax liabilities indefinitely. The arguments made by Trowbridge are patently
1
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
U.S. Opposition to Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the Court
deny the motion for interlocutory appeal and for stay of the proceedings pending
appeal. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it may be
justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing system that
will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via United States Mail,
Government
Exhibit
_____________
A
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INTRODUCTION
collection, John Parks Trowbridge Jr.’s (“Trowbridge”) tax debt has reached
judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., Civil Action H-14-27 (S.D. Tex. –
Houston Division). A copy of the judgment entered by the United States District
The complaint initiating this action was The United States filed its
complaint on July 7, 2014. (Dkt. #1.) On July 16, 2014, summonses were served
Investments Inc. and Trustee of Ideal Abilities. (Dkts. #3 - 5.) On August 7, 2014,
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John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., filed a, pro-se purported “Answer” (Dkt. #7) and
“Amended Answer.” (Dkt. #10.) No filings have been made on behalf of Bright
Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities.1 The United States requested entry of
default against both Bright Futures Investments and Ideal Abilities for their
phone at his office, allow his assistant to provide an email address, and insisted
that all communication be via fax or mail. Therefore, the United States mailed a
Trowbridge’s response did not provide availability and, instead, requested “the
constitutional authority that allows the Court to assume the duty of prosecuting
the case or issue orders sua sponte that require the litigants to perform specific
acts.” A copy of the United States letter and the response is attached as Exhibit A.
The United States informed Trowbridge, via letter, that it considered the
response a refusal to comply with the Court’s order and that we would file the
required report on our own. No response to our letter was received. Instead,
1
The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an individual response and is improper as a
response by Bright Future Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
is not an attorney and can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. §
1654; Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993) (“[T]he lower
courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow corporations, partnerships, or
associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he
rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities.”).
2
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authority to enter its “Order Governing Proceedings.” (See Dkt. #21.) The United
States has responded that the appeal is a frivolous waste of time and resources
the United States responds to the Court’s order on its own as follows:
1. A brief factual and legal synopsis of the case. On July 10, 2000,
Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two tracts of contiguous real property and a
Property”) to an entity called Ideal Abilities. The deeds and contracts for the
Ideal Abilities, c/o P. O. Box 60899, Houston, Texas 77205. The contracts were
Because of the lack of adequate consideration, the timing of the sale, the close
relationship between transferor and transferee, and the retention and continued
enjoyment of the property by John Parks Trowbridge Jr., Ideal Abilities holds
title to the Tyler County Property merely as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge
Jr.
nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. The United States
3
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has valid and subsisting federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., and John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. for all property and
rights to property in which they have an interest - which includes any interest in
the Tyler County Property. The federal tax liens should be foreclosed upon the
Tyler County Property, the Tyler County Property should be sold free and clear
of all rights, titles, claims, and interests of the parties, and the proceeds of the sale
2. The jurisdictional basis for this suit. This Court has jurisdiction
over this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7402 and 7403 and 28 U.S.C. 1340 and 1345.
26(a)(1) and this order has been completed. The United States served its initial
initial disclosures have been received by the United States from any of the
the standard deadlines outlined in Appendix 1 of the Court’s Order. (Dkt. #15.)
4
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United States does not believe that there are any issues regarding electronically
stored information.
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), (c). At this time, the
United States does not anticipate the need for any orders under the designated
rules.
11. Counsel for the United States. The United States will be
conference who is the attorney of record in this case with authority to bind the
United States in all matters involving scheduling. Mr. Smeltzer does not have
any settlement authority, which is held by officials at the Justice Department and
not trial attorneys assigned to cases. If the Court would like briefing on
settlement authority in this case the United States can provide that briefing upon
request.
jury demand claimed by the defendant. The only defendant that has filed an
answer is defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) The United
States did not request a jury or notice a jury demand made in either answer filed
5
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pursuant to a United States tax lien – which is the relief requested by the United
States. See e.g. Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 478-479 (5th Cir. 1968).
Therefore, the United States believes that any jury demand, to the extent it was
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
6
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Government
Exhibit
_____________
A
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Before the court is Defendant John Park Trowbridge, Jr.’s motion for an interlocutory
appeal regarding the power of this court to enter an Order Governing Proceedings. [Doc. # 21].
Defendant Trowbridge has argued that this court does not have the authority to sua sponte enter
an Order Governing Proceedings and has asked for an interlocutory appeal on this issue. For the
I. Background
This case arises out of a longstanding disputed between the Internal Revenue Service and
Defendant Trowbridge, regarding unpaid taxes. On May 23, 2014, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas entered a judgment against Defendant Trowbridge for
$3,326,015.01, plus additional statutory interest accruing after April 7, 2014. [Doc. # 1-1]. The
United States then brought suit in the Tyler Division of the Eastern District of Texas, to foreclose
Texas. [Doc. # 1]. The presiding judge transferred the case to this division, as Woodville is in
1
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Tyler County, which is in the Lufkin Division. [Doc. # 12]. Defendant Trowbridge filed this
motion to seek an interlocutory appeal to this court’s power to enter orders governing scheduling
of this case.
It is within the inherent power of any federal court to control the disposition of matters on
its docket, and the court must exercise its own judgment in doing so, by balancing the competing
interests of the parties. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166 (1936).
Federal district courts are required to enter scheduling orders in civil matters. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(1). In order to assist a court in entering a scheduling order, the court may compel
the parties to appear for one or more pretrial conference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a). Prior to this
conference, counsel and unrepresented parties are required to meet and confer. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(f).
Interlocutory appeals are only permissible when the statutory requirements are met, and
even then, are “granted sparingly, not automatically.” Ala. Labor Council, AFL-CIO, Pub. Emp.
Union, Local No. 1279 v. Alabama, 453 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b), there are three requirements of an interlocutory appeal: 1. the order must involve a
controlling question of law; 2. there must be a substantial ground for a difference of opinion
regarding that question of law; and 3. an immediate appeal from that order may materially
III. Analysis
This matter meets none of the requirements provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As to
the first prong, this case involves a dispute about unpaid taxes and federal tax liens. The
2
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Procedural Orders issued pursuant to the Federal Rules are not the sort of controlling issues
subject to interlocutory appeals. Next, there are no credible grounds for a difference of opinion
on this matter. Defendant Trowbridge tries to obfuscate the issue with arguments regarding
territorial versus constitutional courts. These arguments are unpersuasive and irrelevant.
Finally, an intermediate appeal will not advance this litigation. The requirements for an
IV. Conclusion
Defendant Trowbridge has failed to show that any of the requirements for an
___________________________________
Ron Clark, United States District Judge
3
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Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Clerk enter a default against
defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. In support of the
1. The complaint initiating this action was filed on July 7, 2014. (Dkt.
#1.) Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities were named as parties that
Inc. or Ideal Abilities. The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an
Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is not an attorney1 and
can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993)
(“[T]he lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow
than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he rationale for that rule applies equally
respond for Bright Futures Investments Inc. and/or Ideal Abilities those
States’ complaint expired on August 6, 2014. (See Dkts. #4 - 5.) No response was
filed by Bright Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities claiming any interest in
the property at issue. Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities have
failed to plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the
1John Parks Trowbridge does not allege he is an attorney, nor does he list any State bar affiliation
in his response. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) Counsel for the United States has searched for “John
Trowbridge” on the website for the Texas State Bar and did not find any listing under that name.
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Clerk of the Court execute and enter on the docket a Clerk’s Entry of Default
against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities. The United States
also requests such further and other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
that Defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities, against whom
judgment for affirmative relief is sought in this action, have failed to plead or otherwise
I, Dave Maland, Clerk of said Court, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 55(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, do hereby enter default against Defendants
_____________________________
DAVID MALAND
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
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Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Clerk enter a default against
defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. In support of the
1. The complaint initiating this action was filed on July 7, 2014. (Dkt.
#1.) Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities were named as parties that
Inc. or Ideal Abilities. The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an
Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is not an attorney1 and
can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993)
(“[T]he lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow
than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he rationale for that rule applies equally
respond for Bright Futures Investments Inc. and/or Ideal Abilities those
States’ complaint expired on August 6, 2014. (See Dkts. #4 - 5.) No response was
filed by Bright Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities claiming any interest in
the property at issue. Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities have
failed to plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the
1John Parks Trowbridge does not allege he is an attorney, nor does he list any State bar affiliation
in his response. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) Counsel for the United States has searched for “John
Trowbridge” on the website for the Texas State Bar and did not find any listing under that name.
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Clerk of the Court execute and enter on the docket a Clerk’s Entry of Default
against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities. The United States
also requests such further and other relief to which it may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
9:14-cv-138
v. Civ. No. ________________________
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities.
I hereby certify that I am the plaintiff or the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the above
Bright Future Investments, Inc.
cause, and that defendant ________________________________ was served by the following
method:
Personally served the President of Bright Future Investments, Inc. - John
Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (See Dkt. #4.)
I further certify that the defendant has failed to serve an answer or other responsive pleading;
no extension has been granted or any extension has expired; the defendant is neither an infant (under
age 21) nor an incompetent person; the defendant is not in the active military service of the United
States of America or its officers or agents or was not six months prior to the filing of the case.
p:\dflt.aff
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
United States of America,
9:14-cv-138
v. Civ. No. ________________________
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities.
I hereby certify that I am the plaintiff or the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the above
Ideal Abilities
cause, and that defendant ________________________________ was served by the following
method:
Personally served the Trustee of Ideal Abilities - John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
(See Dkt. #5.)
I further certify that the defendant has failed to serve an answer or other responsive pleading;
no extension has been granted or any extension has expired; the defendant is neither an infant (under
age 21) nor an incompetent person; the defendant is not in the active military service of the United
States of America or its officers or agents or was not six months prior to the filing of the case.
p:\dflt.aff
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
9:14-cv-138
v. Civil No. ______________________
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities.
Joshua D. Smeltzer
in support of default of ____________________________, attorney for plaintiff, that each of the
defendants named below has failed to plead or otherwise defend herein as provided by the Federal
Now, therefore, the DEFAULT of each of the following named defendants is hereby entered:
Bright Future Investments Inc., and
Ideal Abilities
By: _________________________
Deputy Clerk
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SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court, after considering the joint attorney conference report and after reviewing the
case file, enters this case specific order which controls disposition of this action pending further
order of the Court. The following actions shall be completed by the date indicated.1
DEADLINES
1
If a deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday as defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, the
effective date is the first federal court business day following the deadline imposed.
1
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Seven weeks after disclosure of an expert is Deadline to object to any other party’s expert
made. witnesses. Objections shall be made by a
motion to strike or limit expert testimony and
shall be accompanied by a copy of the expert’s
report in order to provide the court with all the
information necessary to make a ruling on any
objection. The court will not accept objections
to experts filed in any form, including motions
in limine, after this date.2
2
This requirement has two goals: (1) to encourage early disclosure of experts so that if one is
struck, the party will have time to find another; and (2) to avoid the gamesmanship that has
become common as parties attempt to disqualify experts with a motion in limine thus distracting
opponents during final trial preparations and perhaps even blocking testimony required to
establish a claim or defense.
2
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3
To save time and space respond only to items objected to. All others will be considered to be
agreed. Opposing counsel shall confer in an attempt to resolve any dispute over the motions in
limine within five calendar days of the filing of any response. The parties shall notify the court
of all the issues which are resolved.
4
Within five calendar days after the filing of any objections, opposing counsel shall confer to
determine whether objections can be resolved without a court ruling. The parties shall notify the
court of all issues which are resolved. The court needs a copy of the exhibit or the pertinent
deposition pages to rule on the objection.
3
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July 27, 2015 Trial in Lufkin at 10:30 am. This case will
then be tried in order with other cases on the
docket. Depending on disposition of other
cases on the court’s docket, trial may be the
following week. About a month before docket
call, counsel may wish to consult with counsel
for the other cases on the July docket to
determine whether their cases are likely to
settle
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
Modification. Taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of
the proposed discovery in resolving the issues, the Court modifies the parameters of discovery in
the following respects. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
Disclosure. The parties are reminded of the requirement, set out in this court’s Initial
Order Governing Proceedings, to have already disclosed, without awaiting a discovery request,
information in addition to that required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, including names of persons likely
to have, and documents containing, information “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”
If there are any questions about whether information is “relevant to the claim or defense of any
party” review Local Rule CV-26(d).
A party that fails to timely disclose any of the information required to be disclosed
by order of this court or by the Federal Rules of Procedure, will not, unless such failure is
harmless, be permitted to use such evidence at trial, hearing or in support of a motion.
4
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order, all depositions shall be taken in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) and Local Rule CV-
30.
The parties are excused from the pretrial disclosure requirements set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)as such disclosure is cumulative of this court’s pre-trial order
procedures.
DISCOVERY DISPUTES
RESOURCES
COMPLIANCE
A party is not excused from the requirements of this scheduling order by virtue of the fact
that dispositive motions are pending, the party has not completed its investigation, the party
challenges the sufficiency of the opposing party’s disclosure or because another party has failed
to comply with this order or the rules.
Failure to comply with relevant provisions of the Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or this order may result in the exclusion of evidence at trial, the imposition of
sanctions by the Court, or both. If a fellow member of the Bar makes a just request for
cooperation or seeks scheduling accommodation, a lawyer will not arbitrarily or unreasonably
withhold consent. However, the Court is not bound to accept agreements of counsel to extend
deadlines imposed by rule or court order. See Local Rule AT-3(j).
5
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TRIAL
The deadlines for pre-trial matters, such as exchanging exhibits, and objections, are
intended to reduce the need for trial objections, side-bar conferences, and repetitive presentation
of evidentiary predicates for clearly admissible evidence. Counsel should be familiar with the
evidence display system available in the courtroom. Copies of exhibits which will be handed to
witnesses should be placed in a three ring binder, with an additional copy for the court. (To
make it easy to direct the witness to the correct exhibit while on the stand, Plaintiff should use a
dark colored binder such as black or dark blue. Defendants should use a light colored binder
such as white, red, or light blue.) Alternatively, if exhibits have been scanned and will be
presented via a computer projection system, be sure there is a way for the court to view or read
them separately so as to be able to understand motions and objections.
___________________________________
Ron Clark, United States District Judge
6
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1
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
2 LUFKIN DIVISION
7 --------------------------------------------------------
13 APPEARANCES:
18
FOR THE DEFENDANT: NO APPEARANCE
19
20
COURT REPORTER: CHRISTINA L. BICKHAM, CRR, RMR
21 FEDERAL OFFICIAL REPORTER
300 WILLOW, SUITE 221
22 BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701
23
24
PROCEEDINGS RECORDED USING COMPUTERIZED STENOTYPE;
25 TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED VIA COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION.
2
1 (OPEN COURT, DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT.)
4 Number 9:14cv138.
7 Joshua Smeltzer.
9 you there?
10 (No response.)
3
1 confer, arguing that no one has proven that the court has
4 writing or...
7 to enter --
13 Ms. Fischer?
16 with --
4
1 conferences, status conferences, and so forth.
5
1 You have received no word or order, have you,
10 like that?
6
1 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: There is no one
24 the case?
7
1 indicated in our 26(f) report -- we filed one
4 fine by us.
8
1 throughout the country pretty uniformly.
12 forth --
14 statutory.
9
1 THE COURT: I just wanted to be real sure you
15 we're okay.
10
1 December 15th --
8 sufficient time?
19 you the extra month so that way we don't run into the
11
1 motion for summary judgment disposes of all of the
2 issues.
11 entitled to a jury --
14 lien. I did a --
18 a second.
12
1 THE COURT: The deputy clerk has conferred
8 much.
14 Court is in recess.
21
23
24
25
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the Court enter a default
judgment against defendants, Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities.
1. The complaint initiating this action was filed on July 7, 2014. (Dkt.
#1.) Bright Future Investments Inc. and Ideal Abilities were named as parties that
Inc. or Ideal Abilities. The response filed by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., is an
Inc. or Ideal Abilities because John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is not an attorney1 and
can represent himself pro-se, but cannot represent an entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202, 113 S.Ct. 716, 721 (1993)
(“[T]he lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 … does not allow
than through a licensed attorney.” “[T]he rationale for that rule applies equally
respond for Bright Futures Investments Inc. and/or Ideal Abilities those
States’ complaint expired on August 6, 2014. (See Dkts. #4 - 5.) No response was
filed by Bright Futures Investments Inc. or Ideal Abilities claiming any interest in
the property at issue. On December 5, 2014 the Clerk entered default against both
plead or otherwise defend any claim or interest they may have in the property at
1John Parks Trowbridge does not allege he is an attorney, nor does he list any State bar affiliation
in his response. (See Dkts. #7, #10.) Counsel for the United States has searched for “John
Trowbridge” on the website for the Texas State Bar and did not find any listing under that name.
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Court enter default judgment against Bright Futures Investments Inc. and Ideal
Abilities. The United States also requests such further and other relief to which it
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing
system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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NOTICE OF NO OPPOSITION
Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities. (Dkt. #34.) On December 29, 2014,
the United States moved for default judgment against Bright Future Investments,
Inc. and Ideal Abilities. (Dkt. #38.) The time to oppose this motion has expired
and no opposition was filed. (See L.R. 7(e)) Therefore, the motion is ready for
/
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Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF
filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also
2
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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, plaintiff United States of America moves for summary
judgment against defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (“Trowbridge”.)1 Based on the
undisputed material facts, the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
INTRODUCTION
After years of using frivolous arguments to stall, delay, and evade collection,
Trowbridge’s tax debt was reduced to judgment in the amount of $3,326,015, plus statutory
additions accruing after April 7, 2014.2 In his continued attempt to evade payment of taxes,
Trowbridge used nominee, Ideal Abilities, as a fictitious entity to mask his interest in property
subject to federal tax liens. The time has come for Trowbridge to pay what he owes. The United
States seeks foreclosure of its nominee tax lien against property held by fictitious and defaulted
1
The Clerk has entered default against the other two defendants, Bright Futures Investments and Ideal Abilities, and
the United States has moved for default judgment to be entered against both entities. (Dkts. #34 and #38.)
2
Further collection activity since entry of judgment has reduced the total amount due, as of April 30, 2015, to
$3,135,328.13. Ashton Decl. ¶3. A copy of the Declaration of James Ashton is attached as Government Exhibit F.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 286
deficiencies against Trowbridge by the U.S. Tax Court.3 These assessments were reduced to
judgment against Trowbridge, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, in the amount of $3,326,015, for the 1993 through 1997 income tax years, plus statutory
additions accruing from April 7, 2014 until paid.4 The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the District
Court judgment against Trowbridge and awarded sanctions against Trowbridge for a frivolous
appeal.5 There is no genuine dispute that Trowbridge owes the United States millions of dollars
The United States filed its complaint to foreclose its nominee tax liens against two tracts
of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County Texas (hereinafter –
“Tyler County Property”). See Dkt. #1 at ¶10. Both tracts of land and the easement were
conveyed by Anne Walker to “Ideal Abilities” with John Parks Trowbridge Jr. signing all the
contracts as “Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities.” Dkt. #1 at ¶¶10, 12. A copy of the deeds and
easement, with accompanying property descriptions, are attached as Government Exhibit D. The
“Real Property Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement” was signed by John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr. as “executive trustee” of Ideal Abilities and are attached as Government Exhibit
E.6
3Copies of the Tax Court Memorandum Opinions finding deficiencies for the tax years 1991 through 1997
are attached as Government Exhibits C-1 and C-2.
4
Government Exhibit A is a copy of the final amended judgment entered by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas against Trowbridge.
5
Government Exhibit B is the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the judgment entered by the
District Court against Trowbridge.
6
See Government Exhibit E at 3, 8, and 12.
U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment
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The Texas Secretary of State records do not reflect the existence of “Ideal Abilities” or
any similar sounding entities.7 Further, the Internal Revenue Service records do not indicate that
Ideal Abilities has an Employer Identification Number or any indication that it has ever filed a
tax return.8 In short, there is no evidence that Ideal Abilities actually exists as anything more than
a fictitious entity used as a nominee of its alleged “trustee” John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Moreover, all property tax appraisals were handled by Trowbridge, all property taxes
paid by Trowbridge, and that the request that a double-wide trailer be placed on the property was
consideration, the timing of the sale, the close relationship between transferor and transferee, and
the retention of continued enjoyment of the property by John Parks Trowbridge Jr. – Ideal
Abilities holds title to the Tyler County Property merely as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge
The clerk has entered default against Ideal Abilities and another entity used
administratively by Trowbridge, Bright Future Investments Inc., for failure to file an answer or
otherwise plead that it has any interest in the Tyler County Property. (Dkt. #34.) The only
“answer” to the United States’ Complaint is by John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. and that “answer”
does nothing more than recite frivolous arguments that the federal courts lack jurisdiction
because he is a citizen of Texas and not a citizen of the United States.9 The same arguments were
7
Ashton Declaration at ¶5.
8
Ashton Decl. ¶4. Trowbridge used another entity, Bright Future Investments Inc., to operate a P.O. Box and handle
other administrative matters of Ideal Abilities. Bright Future Investments was included as a party that may assert an
interest in the property; however, default has been entered against Bright Future Investments and the United States’
motion for default judgment is pending against both Ideal Abilities and Bright Future Investments Inc. (Dkts. #34
and #38.)
9
See Dkts. #7 and 10.
U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment
Page 3 of 8
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42 Filed 04/24/15 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 288
rejected by the District Court that entered judgment against him in the Southern District of Texas
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.10 The Fifth Circuit Stated, in the affirmance, that
Therefore, by default or frivolous response, the United States allegations are undisputed material
On June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Ideal Abilities, as a nominee of
John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. A copy of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien
against Ideal Abilities as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is attached as Government
Exhibit G. The United States has a valid and subsisting federal tax lien against Ideal Abilities, as
nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., and John Parks Trowbridge Jr. against the Tyler County
10
See Dkts. #7 and 10; Gov. Ex. A and B.
11
Gov. Ex. B at 2.
12
See Dkt. #1 at ¶18 and 19.
U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment
Page 4 of 8
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42 Filed 04/24/15 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 289
ARGUMENT
I.
correct.13 John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., was assessed for unpaid income tax liabilities for the for
tax years 1993 through 1997 and is indebted to the United States in the amount of $3,135,328.13
plus statutory additions accruing from until paid.14 If tax liabilities are not paid on or before the
statutory date for payment15 then interest accrues on the underpayment from the due date until
paid.16 Similarly, interest accrues with respect to assessed, but unpaid, penalties, additional
The tax deficiencies were adjudicated by the Tax Court in a prior proceeding. These
decisions also included two $25,000 sanction penalties because the Tax Court found that “[i]t is
clear to us that Dr. Trowbridge took the lead in the sanctionable activity here.”18
The assessments were reduced to judgment by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas19 and the appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was denied as
13 E.g., Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 1998).
14
Ashton Decl. ¶3.
15 Penalties,
additional amounts, or additions to tax are treated as taxes and are, therefore, also entitled to
the presumption of correctness. See 26 U.S.C. §6665(a)(2); Affiliated Foods, 154 F.3d at 530.
1626 U.S.C. §6601(a); See Bob Hamric Chevrolet, Inc. v. USA, Internal Revenue Service, 849 F. Supp. 500, 515
(W.D. Tex. 1994).
17 26 U.S.C. §6601(e)(2).
18 Gov. Ex. C-1 at 27. See also Gov. Ex. C-2 at 3, 15, 27-28.
19
Gov. Ex. A.
“frivolous” and the judgment affirmed.20 There is no genuine dispute that Trowbridge has
millions of unpaid tax liabilities that attach to all his property and rights to property. These tax
liabilities are also due and owing for the federal tax liens filed against his nominee, Ideal
Abilities.21
II.
THE FEDERAL TAX LIENS AGAINST IDEAL ABILITIES, AS NOMINEE OF JOHN PARKS
TROWBRIDGE, JR., SHOULD BE FORECLOSED AGAINST THE TYLER COUNTY PROPERTY
By their default, Ideal Abilities and Bright Future Investments Inc. have admitted the
United States’ well-pled allegations of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); see also, Jackson v. FIE
Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2002); Nishimatsu Cons. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515
F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1975). Therefore, as pled in the complaint, Ideal Abilities holds
title to the Tyler County Property merely as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge Jr. See Dkt. #1 at
¶16.
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “the concepts of ‘nominee,’ ‘transferee,’ and ‘alter-
ego’ are bases for attaching the property of a third-party in satisfaction of a delinquent taxpayer’s
liability.”22 Therefore, “specific property in which a third person [or entity] has legal title may be
levied upon as a nominee of the taxpayer.”23 Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7403, the United States may
enforce its tax liens by foreclosing upon and selling the Tyler County Property and the Court
20
See Government Exhibit A. Government Exhibit B is the Fifth Circuit decision denying the appeal and affirming
the District Court judgment against John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
21
See Gov. Ex. G.
22
Oxford Capital Corp., 211 F.3d at 284.
23
Id.
may order the foreclosure and sale of the property to satisfy the outstanding tax liabilities.24
Therefore, the federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
should be foreclosed against the Tyler County Property and the property should be sold.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and based on the undisputed material facts, the United States is
has valid and subsisting nominee liens against the Tyler County Property, held by Ideal Abilities,
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, with accompanying proposed order, was filed
with the Court’s ECF filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy
was also served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:
Government
Exhibit
_____________
A
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-2 Filed 04/24/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 294
FILED
February 3, 2015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Defendant - Appellant
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-2 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 295
No. 14-20333
of the real property at issue. He has therefore waived those issues. Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, Trowbridge argues that
Harris County is not in the United States and that he is not a citizen of the
United States. He contends that this means the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions against residents of states and that
he is not subject to federal income taxes.
This court has already rejected as frivolous the argument that district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions against residents of
states. United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1991). This court
has also stated that 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602(a) and 7604, which authorize the
issuance and enforcement of IRS summonses, “are federal laws that the district
court has jurisdiction to consider under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” United States v.
Henderson, 209 F. App’x 401, 402 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1340
explicitly grants district courts jurisdiction in internal revenue cases and
28 U.S.C. § 1345 explicitly grants jurisdiction for civil suits commenced by the
United States.
Trowbridge’s argument that he is not a citizen of the United States is
equally frivolous. He presents “shopworn arguments characteristic of tax-
protestor rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this and other courts.”
Stearman v. Commissioner, 436 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2006). This court has
already held that the “citizens of Texas are subject to the Federal Tax Code.”
United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986). We do not address
his arguments further as there is “no need to refute these arguments with
somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest
these arguments have some colorable merit.” Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d
1417 (5th Cir. 1984). They have no merit at all.
This is not the first time Trowbridge has had these frivolous arguments
rejected. In Trowbridge et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-164, 2003 WL
2
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-2 Filed 04/24/15 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 296
No. 14-20333
21278475, Trowbridge made similar arguments in contesting his 1991-1995
tax liabilities. The tax court imposed a $25,000 sanction. In contesting his
1996-1997 tax liabilities, Trowbridge again used similar arguments in the tax
court; he was sanctioned a second time. Trowbridge et al. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-165, 2003 WL 21278414, at *10. Trowbridge appealed to this
court and once again resorted to frivolous arguments. This court upheld the
tax court’s sanctions and imposed additional sanctions.
Given Trowbridge’s history of frivolous appeals, we GRANT Appellee’s
motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 in the amount of $8,000.
We also order that Trowbridge be barred from filing any further appeals in this
court until (1) the sanctions awarded by this court are fully paid; and (2) a
district court certifies his appeal as having some arguable merit. See Smith v.
McCleod, 946 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1991). Trowbridge’s motions are DENIED
as moot.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 297
Government
Exhibit
_____________
C-1
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 27 PageID #: 298
- 2 -
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 {a! {12 Sec. 6654
1991 $6,533 $4
1992 9,492 $1,380 222
1993 83,478 20,870 3,498
1994 121,075 30,269 6,283
1995 130,699 32,595 7,068
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 3 of 27 PageID #: 299
- 3 -
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 (a) (1) Sec. 6654
1991 $6,197 $105
1992 8,740 1,198 $190
1993 74,612 18,653 3,126
1994 102,588 25,647 5,323
1995 111,266 27,679 6,000
for all years and that Dr. Trowbridge be held in default with
tax determined against Dr. Trowbridge for 1994 and 1995 and the
additions to tax that are the subject of his motions for partial
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
- 4 -
FINDINGS OF FACT
Preliminary Facts
and 1995 taxable years and Ms. Martin's 1991 through 1995 taxable
Return 1993 (Dr. Trowbridge's 1993 Form 1040), which the IRS
2
As discussed infra, Dr. Trowbridge's 1993 Form 1040 is
relevant to the determination of whether he is liable for the
sec. 6654 addition to tax with respect to his 1994 taxable year.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 5 of 27 PageID #: 301
- 5 -
as follows:
1994 Form 1040), which the IRS received on January 21, 1997. On
- 6 -
for 1994 was $1,000 paid on January 21, 1997, with his 1994 Form
1040.
1995 Form 1040), which the IRS received on January 27, 1997. On
for 1995 was $1,000 paid on January 27, 1997, with his 1995 Form
1040.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 7 of 27 PageID #: 303
- 7 -
a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1991 (Ms. Martin's
page 2 of Ms. Martin's 1991 Form 1040, she reported tax of $5,203
1991 of $6,197. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1991 was
a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1992 (Ms. Martin's
page 2 of Ms. Martin's 1992 Form 1040, she reported tax of $1,805
- 8 -
1992 of $8,740. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1992 was
Ms. Martin did not file Federal income tax returns for
either 1993 or 1994. She did not make any estimated tax payments
Form 1040EZ, Income Tax Return for Singles and Joint Filers With
No Dependents 1995 (Ms. Martin's 1995 Form 1040EZ), which the IRS
1993 disclaimer.
- 9 -
1995 of $111,266. The only payment made by Ms. Martin for 1995
was $100 paid on January 21, 1997, with her 1995 Form 1040EZ.
The Petitions
They state:
- 10 -
The Answers
therein.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 11 of 27 PageID #: 307
- 11 -
Order and Notice in each case, setting the cases for trial at the
Houston, Texas.
respondent unduly, waste his resources, and divert him from trial
- 12 -
Motions To Dismiss
- 13 -
petition for review by the United States Tax Court. This Notice
Trial Session
December 3. When, on that date, the cases were called from the
appeared and announced ready for trial. The Court set the cases
telephone and notify them of the date and time of the trial.
When the cases were recalled from the calendar on December 4, for
3
To the extent petitioners were relying on grounds other
than jurisdiction, a decision dismissing the proceedings would
have been considered a decision sustaining the deficiencies
determined by respondent. See sec. 7459(d). Since we did not
believe that was the result petitioners intended, we denied the
motions to dismiss.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 14 of 27 PageID #: 310
- 14 -
appeared and announced ready for trial. The deputy trial clerk
default in both cases and the Court set those motions for a
OPINION
- 15 -
1993, and (2) that Ms. Martin be held in default with respect to,
against Ms. Martin for the years 1991 through 1995. Petitioners
motions) . 4
- 16 -
ground that each had withdrawn his or her petition (by the
in tax and additions to tax that are the subject of the default
A. Introduction
to tax determined against Dr. Trowbridge for the years 1994 and
1995 and the additions to tax determined against Ms. Martin for
- 17 -
burden.
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
5
We do not decide whether respondent was reguired to
satisfy sec. 7491(c) in this default setting.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 18 of 27 PageID #: 314
- 18 -
below).
C. Substantive Provisions
shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due
any timely payments of the tax 6 and any credits which may be
- 19 -
2. Section 6654
of the tax shown on the individual's return for that year (or, if
return. Sec. 6654 (d) (1) (B) (i) and (ii). The due dates of the
following year. Sec. 6654 (c) (2). For purposes of section 6654,
filed, the individual's tax for that year), reduced for these
- 20 -
than $500. 8 Sec. 6654 (e) (1). Second, the addition is not
D. Section 7491(c)
- 21 -
142 (a); cf. current sec. 7491 (a) (shifting the burden of proof to
E. Discussion
10
We address that contention separately because it is
relevant to our analysis of both the sec. 6651(a) (1) and the sec.
6654 additions to tax asserted by respondent.
11
In his sec. 6651 (a) (1) computations, respondent properly
credited each petitioner with one-half of petitioners' aggregate
wage withholding credit where applicable. See sec. 6651(b) (1);
sec. 1. 31-1 (a), Income Tax Regs. (rule for wage withholding
credits of separately filing spouses domiciled in a community
(continued ... )
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 22 of 27 PageID #: 318
- 22 -
Dr. Trowbridge for the years 1994 and 1995, and with respect to
deficiency.
11
continued)
( •••
property State). Respondent also properly credited Ms. Martin
with her earned income credit for 1995. See sec. 6651(b) (1).
12
Respondent inexplicably based his 1992 sec. 6651(a) (1)
computation for Ms. Martin on tax of $8,764 rather than the
$8,740 amount of tax that appears elsewhere in the notice of
deficiency issued to her. The correct amount of such addition
shall be the subject of a Rule 155 computation.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 23 of 27 PageID #: 319
- 23 -
13
from amounts withheld from wages, neither petitioner made any
qualifies for the $500 de minimis exception for any of the years
(zero tax for preceding year) with respect to any of the years at
issue.
Trowbridge for the years 1994 and 1995, and with respect to Ms.
13
As is the case with his sec. 6651 (a) (1) computations,
respondent properly credited each petitioner with one-half of
petitioners' aggregate wage withholding credit where applicable.
See sec. 6654(g) (1), supra note 7; sec. 1.31-1(a), Income Tax
Regs., supra note 11.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 24 of 27 PageID #: 320
- 24 -
notices of deficiency.
* * * * * * *
the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000.
14
Respondent inexplicably based his 1992 sec. 6654
computation for Ms. Martin on tax of $8,764 rather than the
$8,740 amount of tax that appears elsewhere in the notice of
deficiency issued to her. In his 1995 sec. 6654 computation for
Ms. Martin, rather than reducing her 1995 tax by the amount of
her 1995 earned income credit, respondent improperly treated that
credit as a payment of estimated tax. See sec. 6654 (f) (3) and
(g) (1) . The correct amounts of those additions to tax shall be
the subject of Rule 155 computations.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 25 of 27 PageID #: 321
- 25 -
(1994).
Petitioners do not here argue for any change in the law, and
281 F.3d 1278 (5th Cir. 2001). Whatever legitimate arguments may
- 26 -
numerous years and, for some years, large dollar amounts involved
Trowbridge and his 1996 and 1997 tax years. That case involves
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-3 Filed 04/24/15 Page 27 of 27 PageID #: 323
- 27 -
$15,000.
Government
Exhibit
_____________
C-2
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 28 PageID #: 325
- 2 -
- 3 -
Additions to
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651 (a) (1)
1996 $146,847 $33,041 $7,816
1997 272,771 61,373 14,593
Life Center Houston Business Trust (Life Center) in 1996 and 1997
( 1) Life Center and Life Choices were shams, (2) Life Center and
Life Choices were grantor trusts of which Dr. Trowbridge was the
respect to Life Center for 1996 and 1997 and Life Choices for
redetermination.
1
( • • • continued)
by respondent from Dr. Trowbridge in October 1997 and October
1998, respectively, are not valid income tax returns (which we so
find).
2
Because we do not reach respondent's alternative
position, we do not set forth the deficiencies and additions to
tax determined against Life Center and Life Choices.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 4 of 28 PageID #: 327
- 4 -
with respect to him for 1996 and 1997 in the amounts of $146,847
3
and $211,508, respectively, and that decisions be entered that
under sections 6651 (a) ( 1) and 6654. For the reasons that follow,
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
3
That amount is less than the deficiency in tax for 1997
determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency. In his
motion for default judgment, respondent attributes such downward
adjustment to the elimination of transfers among petitioners and
other duplicated items.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 5 of 28 PageID #: 328
- 5 -
FINDINGS OF FACT
medicine since at least 1978. At the time the petition was filed
- 6 -
Parks Trowbridge MD", and receipts from the medical practice were
1996, Dr. Trowbridge began using the name "Life Center Houston"
through December 31, 1996, were deposited in the Life Center bank
account.
5
As discussed infra, Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Form 1040 is
relevant to the determination of whether he is liable for the
sec. 6654 addition to tax with respect to his 1996 taxable year.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 7 of 28 PageID #: 330
- 7 -
part as follows:
Income Tax Return 1996 (initial 1996 Form 1040), which the IRS
Dr. Trowbridge also deleted the words "of perjury" from the jurat
Form 1040X, Amended Individual Income Tax Return, for 1996 (1996
- 8 -
exhibit to the 1996 Form 1040X is a Form 1040 for 1996 signed by
Dr. Trowbridge and dated January 26, 2000 (revised 1996 Form
does not reflect the changes contained in the 1996 Form 1040X).
the revised 1996 Form 1040, nor did he alter the jurat thereof.
October 22, 1998, the IRS received from Dr. Trowbridge a Form
1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997 (initial 1997 Form
the word "perjury" from the jurat of his initial 1997 Form 1040.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 9 of 28 PageID #: 332
- 9 -
Form 1040X, Amended Individual Income Tax Return, for 1997 (1997
exhibit to the 1997 Form 1040X is a Form 1040 for 1997 signed by
Dr. Trowbridge and dated January 26, 2000 (revised 1997 Form
does not reflect the changes contained in the 1997 Form 1040X).
the revised 1997 Form 1040, nor did he alter the jurat thereof.
1996 income tax were $100 payments submitted with his initial
1996 Form 1040 in October 1997 and his 1996 Form 1040X in January
respect of his 1997 income tax were $100 payments submitted with
his initial 1997 Form 1040 in October 1998 and his 1997 Form
claim any wage withholding or other credits on his 1996 and 1997
- 10 -
The Pleadings
The Petition
error by denying that he had erred and averring that, because Dr.
- 11
additions to, Life Center's 1996 tax. Petitioners did not file a
respondent unduly, waste his resources, and divert him from trial
- 12 -
and limited debt liability benefits, from the 'United States' and
Motion To Dismiss
- 13 -
petition for review by the United States Tax Court. This Notice
Trial Session
This case was set for trial at the Court's trial session
session) .
and announced ready for trial. The Court set the case for trial
When the case was recalled from the calendar for trial on
trial clerk reported that he had left two messages for Dr.
- 14 -
OPINION
deficiencies in tax with respect to him for 1996 and 1997 in the
- 15 -
this case on December 3, 2001, and the recall of the case on the
10
As discussed above, we struck from the petition all
assignments of error other than petitioners' limitations defense.
Since respondent addresses petitioners' limitations defense
(among other items) in his motion for partial summary judgment,
the principal consequence of our holding Dr. Trowbridge in
(continued ... )
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 16 of 28 PageID #: 339
- 16 -
78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). Since there was a trial in this case,
10
( • • • continued}
default is the ratification of respondent's primary position that
Dr. Trowbridge, rather than Life Center and Life Choices, is
liable for any deficiencies in tax and additions to tax
determined in the notice of deficiency.
- 17 -
below).
contends that Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1996 Form 1040 does not
the ones at issue in this case rendered the Form 1040 to which it
was attached invalid. We have also held that altering the Form
13
For these purposes, the date on which a return is mailed
is treated as the filing date if the postmark date falls within
the prescribed period (including extensions) for filing the
return. Sec. 7502 (a) (1) and (a) (2) (A) (i).
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 18 of 28 PageID #: 341
- 18 -
activity with respect to the two bank accounts styled "John Parks
14
Even if the revised 1996 Form 1040 that Dr. Trowbridge
submitted in January 2000 constitutes a valid return (an issue
respondent does not explicitly address and we do not decide),
respondent issued the notice of deficiency on Oct. 20, 2000, well
within the 3-year period of limitations on assessment for 1996
that would have commenced on the date of such filing. See sees.
6503 (a), 6213 (a) (issuance of a valid notice of deficiency
suspends the running of the period of limitations on assessment
during the pendency of any ensuing proceedings originating in
this Court) .
15
We have adjusted respondent's computation of 1996
medical practice gross receipts ($1,632,423) downward by $283 to
reflect a patient refund recorded on the cash analysis report for
(continued ... )
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 19 of 28 PageID #: 342
- 19 -
testified that she had prepared the practice summaries each day
as part of her duties and that she had derived the month-to-date
15
( • • • continued)
Oct. 28, 1996, that we believe respondent overlooked.
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- 20 -
V. Additions to Tax
A. Statutory Provisions
1. Section 6651(a)(l)
reduced by any timely payments of the tax 16 and any credits which
2. Section 6654
16
In general, payment of income tax is due on the due date
of the corresponding return, determined without regard to any
filing extensions. Sec. 6151(a).
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- 21 -
6654 (d) (1) (B) (i) and (ii). The due dates of the required
installments for a calendar taxable year are April 15, June 15,
filed, the individual's tax for that year), reduced for these
17
Under sec. 6654 (g) (1), wage withholding credits are
treated as payments of estimated tax.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 22 of 28 PageID #: 345
- 22 -
than $500. 18 Sec. 6654 (e) (1). Second, the addition is not
B. Discussion
and the alteration of the jurat of, Dr. Trowbridge's initial 1996
Form 1040 rendered that Form 1040 invalid. Since Dr. Trowbridge
similarly altered the jurat of, his initial 1997 Form 1040, we
evidence that Dr. Trowbridge did not submit to the IRS any other
did not timely file Federal income tax returns for 1996 and 1997
and that each such failure continued for more than 4 months. In
18
Effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31,
1997, the threshold amount is $1,000. Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 1202(a), 111 Stat. 994.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 23 of 28 PageID #: 346
- 23 -
not make any timely payments in respect of his 1996 and 1997
income taxes and did not claim any tax credits for those years.
19
We note that, in computing the amount of the 1997
addition to tax, respondent incorrectly applied a rate of 22.5
percent rather than 25 percent. See supra note 1.
20
The amount of tax required to be shown on Dr.
Trowbridge's 1996 return is equal to the initial 1996 deficiency
($146,847) plus the additional 1996 deficiency, the latter amount
to be determined under Rule 155 in accordance with part IV of
this report. The amount of tax required to be shown on Dr.
Trowbridge's 1997 return is equal to the 1997 deficiency
($211,508).
21
Respondent applied the provisions of sec. 6654 without
regard to the amounts shown as tax on the revised 1996 and 1997
Forms 1040 attached by Dr. Trowbridge to the 1996 and 1997 Forms
1040X submitted by him to the IRS in January 2000. Petitioners
did not assign error to that aspect of respondent's
determinations. We shall not, therefore, decide whether the
revised 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040 are valid returns or otherwise
take them into account for purposes of determining the
application of sec. 6654.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 24 of 28 PageID #: 347
- 24 -
make any timely payments (actual or deemed, see supra note 17) in
those years is greater than zero. See sec. 6654 (d) (1) (B).
Trowbridge's actual (rather than reported) tax for each such year
6654 (d) (1) (B), our disposition herein of the default motion
establishes that Dr. Trowbridge's tax for each of 1996 and 1997
22
As referenced in our findings of fact, Dr. Trowbridge's
1995 Form 1040 includes a disclaimer statement that is
substantially identical to the disclaimers attached to his
initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040. On that basis, we conclude
that Dr. Trowbridge's 1995 Form 1040 is not a valid return. See
Williams v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 143 (2000).
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 25 of 28 PageID #: 348
- 25 -
year. In that regard, although the record does not reveal Dr.
Trowbridge's tax for 1995, we deem his 1995 Form 1040 (showing
was greater than zero, which would render the section 6654(e) (2)
estimated tax with respect to each of his 1996 and 1997 taxable
23
In that regard, we accept respondent's computation of
the 1997 addition to tax ($11,316), and we direct the parties to
determine the amount of the 1996 addition to tax on the basis of
Dr. Trowbridge's 1996 tax (more precisely, 90 percent thereof),
determined in accordance with note 20, supra.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-4 Filed 04/24/15 Page 26 of 28 PageID #: 349
- 26 -
* * * * * * *
the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the
taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000.
( 1994) .
Dr. Trowbridge does not here argue for any change in the
27 -
the disclaimers attached to his initial 1996 and 1997 Forms 1040,
him.
- 28 -
••
1
77%..05- 081i]
WARRANTY DEED
TilE GRANTOR .l?vevt,J ANN€7 for and in consideration of (21) Lrberty
u.S.A. Silver Dollars, plus nctes of undetermined value in hand paid, conveys and warrants to
ASIL.I\lf?.S
the following descrihed real estate, situated in the County of :t YI&ICt Thsate
I
I·
THEHCE S 01'45'40"1!:, WITH THE.WEST LINE OF SAID 1.893 ACRE
TRACT, AT 1031.56 FT. PASS THE CENTER 01' SAID COUNTY ROAD,
IN ALL A OF 106J. 66 FT, 'J'O A IRON ROO Sn" i'OR
THE SOIJTHEAST COIUfER OF THIS TRACT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF
THE SAtD 75 AC:RES AND .ON THE NORTH Lilli! OF THE
ABOVE HENTION!D.KAMILTON 37.55 ACRE TRACT/
. '
. FESSIONAL
HQ. 4800
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 354
, . .
;...1..1'
WARRAN1Y DEED
THE GRANTOR JtwN" {i1l19?f. fur and in consideratioo of (21) Liberty
u.S. A. Silver DQ!Iars, ftus - notes of undetermined value in hand paid, conveys and warrants to
.M>u.• r=nes
the fuflowit.l! described real eute, situated in the County of
(Name) GRANTOR
tty:
-'
11tle
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 355
679P!Gf324
'
VOl.
6G9raGr559
PACE :1
12.851 AClUS
..,
I
I
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 357
That I, Evelyn Anne Parker (hereinafter referred to as Seller), have SOLD, ASSIGNED, and
CONVEYED to Ideal Abilities (hereinafter referred to as Buyer) a private roadway easement and
right-of-way over, across, through, and under a certain tract of land in the Cullen Arnett Survey,
Abstract No. 39, Tyler county, The State of Texas, (as recorded at vo!ume/69, page 560 of the
records of Tyler county), being 50 feet in width and being 1.893 acres, more or less, more
particularly described by metes and bounds as shown on the Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
made a part hereof for all intents and p1,1rposes, for the purpose cf establishing, constructing,
maintaining, repairing, and reconstructing private roadway and ingress and egress over and
through said private roadway.
And under the same terms Seller does further sell, assign, and convey to Buyer, his
· . successors administrators, heirs, and assigns, a general utility easement along said
private roadway easement for the purposes of installing and maintaining utilities.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said private roadway easement and right-of-way and general
·utility easement and all rights and benefits necessary and convenient for the full use and
enjoyment of the rights hereJn sold to the Buyer, his heirs, administrators, successors, executors,
and assigns forever; provided, however, that the use ofthe easement across the above described
property shall not be exclusive with Buyer but is in common with other original Grantees and the
original Grantor, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, and tenants.
Seller and Buyer agree that, when the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns
include the plural. Seller and Buyer further agree that, where any paragraph or sentence of this
warranty deed might be seve'rable under final rormal order or a court of competent jurisdiction,
the remaining paragraphs and sentences • '' stand intact as the full and final agreement
This instrument was acknowledged me as a free act and deed on the IO'" day of
July, 2000, by Evelyn Anne '
£\ rX:_
N ARY PUBi/c, STATE OF TE {)
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 358
-. I .
vt'll 679'lflE338
.A VOl. 669PAGf5fi2
FIBLDNOTE DESOllPTION
THENCE S 87.22'15 11 1<1 576 •.46 FT., WITH THE· SOUTH LINE OF
SAID 11.942 ACRE TRACT, TO A 1/2 11 IRON ROD SET FOR THP.
SOUTHWEST CORNER .OF SAME AHD THE NOmmES'I' CORND OF THIS
TRACT ON THE EAST LINE OF A 17. att ACRE 'l'JtACT SURVEYED
THIS DATE OUT OP' SAID STAFFORD 75 "AcRu; _.. ·
D.HIISlT "A"
P•a• 1 of 2
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 359
......
VOl
PAGE 2
1.893 ACRES
UllliiiT "A"
Pace 2 of 2
. '''"""F"'
5 da:r of
OM . . . . ., . , . . . . . .
L@'f
....
---;;-- Clerk.
-· •• Co<oolt7 TeaM
MwG- ·
hereafter known as PARTY OF mE FIRST PART and,
A'otu=n e=s
hereafter known as PARTY OF mE SECOND PART.
Puty of the First Part wilrrarits that he/she has full and absolute ownership rights, and rights
of control of said described J,roperty. That the property is free of liens and
and by this unconditional. Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and Agreement,
Ileal· hate Bill of J:xchuze lcf 3
S7-3
hvl/99
\.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 361
Party of the Second Part offers consideration acceptable to the party ofthe First Part in the
amount of One Thousand Dollars and 110 00/100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in trade for the
above described property, all absolute ownership and control at-law of the above described
property, on the condition that it is free from liens, encumbrances and any trusteeships that
wouk! exercise ownership and control rights that would negate the Party of the Second
Parl's free use of purchased property u an abS?Iute property rigbt.
Party of the First Part accepts the tendered offer at-law of the above trade on the Party of
the Second .Pm's conditions, warranting that liens and/or encumbrances have heen
extinguished and trusteeships have been and rmtde null and void by certified mail
service, or in person. on or about the l 01'\ of Ju:.."(. 2ooo. and conveys abrolute
property ownership to buyer
Party of the Ftnt Par1 now delivers, by this instrumer.t, the above described property to the
Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Dolan aad oo/100 (SI,OOO and no 001100) in considerstion acceptable to the
Party of the FirSt Put in Trade for the absolute ownership and control at-law of the above
described property.
This BiD of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part ind the Party of the FirSt Part are functioning by the course of the
common law by exercising fuU and complete rights of absolute ownership and control over
property traded. All rights are reserved to the Course of the Common Law, none are
waived without prejudice.
I'ROTl'.CTION Of' LAW: Tloellllflorily oftbe plll1ld, l>onlin,lltdor tbe temw lnCI oblitpationt of litis Reall'reperty Bill of
.... C.....,...IIIkiiAcr.-tisprGied.td ........ lheptOYiliouofi:IO:I;4:2:1;6:l;AMENDMENTSI,4,6,7,9,10&14ofthe
US. c.-tit•ica tbe s._ 1..- orttte LIDd, Bib lAw Die l'a. 643, 644, 645, 1602, 1603, 1315. The pertiel........t.....,., as well es
1M T - or
- ' Ob!:lpt.iarle dolo keel Bill of ....t ConlnKt lnCI ill NOT SUBJI'.Cf TO
nMJtAL Oft SfATlt Sl'AT\IT'OitY Oft RWULATORY JUIUSDICilON. SEE: USC 42 1981, 1983; Hale v. Henkle 201 U.S.
0.; K--. "· Jlnalt 102 1'1..1.1'4 66,119A.716; Mc:L)'IMI v. Miller, '21t.l. 374, 16!,a.a Ill, 112; People v. Smidl, 112 Midi. 19270
N.w. 466.67 .......... 1n Ky. 11. :zoo s.w.9,11.; Filbcfl v. Bioi>Gp, 111 old. 212. 274P.Itro. '''':
Treot v. ,........., C.C.A.N. Y lllf'.m, Sl c.C.A. 552; 1teync1c1o. 21 Cat. W:ZSI,ls-4; Taylor v. Porto-, 4 Hill 140, 146(tl4lt. Sute v.
Simon, l s,..n 761(1114); U.S. v...... Kilo Art., 169, IU.Ct.4S6; Reid v. c.,...U65 U.S. l,l.E4.W 114t(l9$7); MinMo v.
314 U.S. 436 Iii 491(1966); ltadlleld "- FWMr, 292 PIIJ.: eq,pa..- v. 236 U.S. I. at 14; Booldwn UHan Co. v. er-.t City Co.;
c""""' v. Aron,Jnu.s. 1.
WARNING: Atty,......., """""'or sua.. •JI"'II(s), 1.- EnJ0mooncr11 Ofl'lccr{a), or Weill Offiar(s). who
by ad. or omiooiool, cw ....... cw ...... cot.pR OF LAW, F.......l cw 11bte STATt.n"E. llEOULATJON, cw OttDINANCE in1>air or
aiJri<fF my or all l h e - or olilipiona oflhis lteel Prq>aty Bill ofEdlenea c-act lnCI or impW lioe ld.ions oflhe above
d
l'altiel . . . .
*•+<loaM- 11p to 10 Y..n ,..- ooOial, ....,._lOr ra 241.242, rool,3$7tlfllll be ...... 2$01(,..._
lire t1.....w _..ad. or GalliooioR ...rt Ia lhe lloolllt oflhe hltioo. AI l""ics
inducliroa eo.tt of ail jaiodktiwo, ..-...m
Bill
m..-ily,lhe IIIII
c-iM:i 1m,'"'· 1-. tm- ...... ,._ or
who by ad. cr......_..,_ ar ...... a.yt.nler ....... oftkil Real
aidit usc 42
4oll lllll Rlilldt .... h fcollonf c-t. SEE: USC 42 2GOOof.7, 20008(1); tWirr "· Moloe. No. 90-411,
"- 4001(1991).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Party of the First Part l8fees to Wamnt and forever
defend the npt of absolute ownership, to the above Aid property unto the Party or the
2cf 3
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 362
Second Part, .pnst the claims of aU penons whocmloevtr. The Party of the Second
Part,aecepts absolute ownenhip, as per the tenns coriditions and warranties stated herein
-···
VOl 679PaCf.322
Vlll .669raGE559.
PAGE l
12 .85'/ ACRES
I
I
I
·;
•• beputy
At:,tt...r\\e-5
hereafter known as PAR1Y OF mE SECOND PART.
The parties named herein reserve all rights to the Course of the Common Law, without
prejudice, and come together this date in this two party contractual relationship to transfer
complete and absolute ownership and control over the following described property:
Party of the First Part warrants that he/she has full and absolute ownership rights, and rights
or control or said described property. That the property is free of liens and encumbrances,
and by this unconditional Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and Agreement,
lof3
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 366
Party ol ttle Second Part offen consideration acceptable to the party of the First Part in the
lft'IIC.'lltml olOM T'Hualld &ian and H 001100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in trade for the
abcwe desaibed property, aU absolute ownenhip and control at-law of the above described
property, oo the condition that it is free ftom 1iens, encumbrances and any trusteeships that
wauld exercise ownership and control rir;hts that would negate the Party of the Second
Pari's free use of purchased property Man absolute property right.
Party of the First Part accepts the tendered offer at-!aw of the above trade on the Party of
the Second .Part's conditions, warranting that liens and/or encumbrances have been
extinguished and trusteeships have been revoked and made null and void by certified mail
service, or in person. on or about the · IO ""'. of JvVC. U11o, and conveys absolute
rroperty ownership to buyer
Party of the Fir:!>1 Part now delivers, by this the above described property to the
Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Thousand DoRan and oo/100 ($1,000 and no 00/100) in consideration acceptable to the
Party ofthe First Part in Trade for the absolute ownership and control at-law of the above
described property.
This Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part and the Party of the First Part are functioning by the course of the
common law by exercising full and complete rights of ab:rolute ownership and control over
property traded. AJI rights are ·reserved to the Course! of the Common Law, none are
waived without prejudice.
I"ROTF.cTJON OF I.A W: The eudtority of the p8fties, named herein. unc1or the ..,.._ Mel obfiptions of lttil Rail M of
aM Cllllllnct under
U.S. C<lmllituticln the Supreme Law o(lhe Lind, Bib Law Die f'&. 643,644,64$, 1602, 1603, t:JU
lhe Tams ConcliticN IIICI Obltptiom of dUe Roll rrq,.ty Bill of Exdianp 1M CClftlra<t llld
The,..._ .....
ofi;IO:I; 4:2:1;6:2; AMENDMENTS 1,4,6,7,9,10 Al4 ofthe
ltcnin a well as
is P40T ·suan:cr TO
n:DERAL OR STATE STATUTORY OR REGUlATORY JUIUSDICI101'"- SEE: l'SC 42 I HI, 1913; Hole v HellJe 201 US
43.; KaUh. v . .Juralt 102 N.J.Eq 66,1J9A.716; McL)'NII v. Miller, 52 lt.l.l14. t61,e.alll, 112; Peoplev Salilll. 112 Mid.. 19l'7G
N.W. 466.67 Ant.St.Rep.39l.; MulliN v. CatiWIICAIRNJih, 179 Ky. 71, 200 S.\11.9,11.; Fibft v. Bilhclp, IJhU 272, 2741'.1110, 1111.
Treae v. Tofaun, C.C.A.N.Y., lllF.I9J, .5I C.C.A. 552; :11 C.l. W 251, 2S4; T.,U v. l"oMr, 4 Hillll40. be •·
Simcn, 2 9p-. 761(llt4); U.S. v. Wonc KianM., 169, II S.Q.4S6; Reidv. Cow!t:NS U.S. l,l..UW. 11411(19S1);. v. AN..
lt4 U.S. 436 Ill 491(11166); Rdiefd v. FbiMr, 292 1'113.; v. k.-. 2M U.S. 1.111 14; I!Jalldian! Ueia Co. v 0... Oty Co;
Cooper V. Anln, 351 U.S. I.
WARNJNG: My penon, Fodcnl «Stile Admlnillriliw 8(111\C(s). Law il a.-{1). or .Weill 08k.w{s). ..t.o
t.y eel « omlaion , CUllom or 1118&e, cw under COLOR Of LAw , F.._,cw 11b11c STAlVI'E. MOULAT10N. or OIWINANC'E ...... "'
.,,. cw •It tbe 1mn1 or obliptiom of HI Real rrq,.ty Rill Ca1nd M4 eUor ....,..-c
named f'llrtics «lite obfiptions Uledherein,lll'ldcr USC II 241, 242, 1001,3571 .............. &ocrillliliel._ . . . 250k F ClOIIIIt
Mel impfi8ooul&'tl lip to 10 Yean per oouril, . . . . ._.fOr 1ft sltciluW llldt n «--. t - ' ilrl 111e .._. alh ......_
c-u of ell jllrildidiona, Fednt Cf Sl8le Olldals who t.y lld IW lllllliilli<lll ........... ""1 ........... a(feis ....
All,.._
rrq,.ty Bill of EJDdlanp Contract IIICI _... USC 42 1911, 1915, 1916, lfa 8N 1e omt ,.,..ray will 100 fona of
immanity,tbe SEE:USC42 2CON-7,:aooo.(i); fW!wv. ......_No 90-611.
I". 4001(1991).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Party of the First Part agrees to Warranl and forever
defend the right of absolute ownership, to the above said property unto the Party of the
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 367
..
ftlrt. . . . dile c:hillls of aal The f"¥ty of the Second
......C OIIIIMI'_, u per llftd 'M:fflm(le$ seated herein
S1CHD nm 1A:Jt;o
k&tL..IT\&S
9Y' B4.&.U
KATHRYN l KRENZKE
Jfj®
(:tO.,
I<ATHRYN L KREN4KE
•• MY CCMMIIIION IXPIRE8
I MY COMMt8slofol El(Pfi'IES
W AAAIL20, 2002
AI'Ril20. 2002
Realltltate 1m1 or 3 of 3
S7-3
Rev 11199
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 368
I EXHIBIT "Au
VOl
FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION
\-\W (li'·'30l Ac.i:es) oF 'P€SCRII5€t>:
FIELDNOTES TO 111.605 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IN THE
CULLEN ARNETT-SURVEY, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BEING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF THAT SAME CALLED 75 ACRES, MORE OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1" AS CONVEYED TO HARRY ·w.
· STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 610, PAGE 4 94 , CiF .THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER 'COUNTY. SAID 605 ACRES
BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED BY METES AND BOUNDS AS
FOLLOWS: .
BEGINNING AT A PINE KNOT STAKE FOUND ON THE EAST LINE OF
THE ROBERT LUCAS SURVEY, A-24, AND THE WEST LINE <)F SAID
ARNETT SURVEY FOR THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 75
ACRES AND OF THIS TRACT ANO SAME BEING THE NORTHWEST
CORNER OF THE EARL N. 37.55 ACRE TRACT RECORDED
IN VOLUME 332, PAGE 223 OF THE TYLER COUNTY DEED RECORDS;
u.IIO $\MV11YO
......
lfO, UOO
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 369
The parties named herein reserve all rights to the Course of the Common Law, without
prejudice. and come together this date in this two party contractual relationship to t:ansfer
complete and absolute ownership lU1d control over the de!9t'lril9eel
9'f P/n(:r( PA«--r .,.-o:
- PROPERTY DESCRIPTION (LEGAL)
Party of the Part ":arrants that he/she has fuU &Rfl rights l>F
ef c;emF&l of wd descnbed property. That the prop&{y ee o iens and encumbrances,
and by this unconditional Real Property Bill of Exchange- Contract and
Real Estate Bill of Exchange I of 3
S7-3
Revt/99
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 370
Vfll
Part} of the Second Part offers oonsideration acceptable to the party of the First Part in the
amount of Doe 11t0 001100 ($1,000 nd no 001100) in trade for the
· and control at-law ofthe above described
condition t m , encumbrances and any trusteeships that
would exercise ownership and ....
Party of the Second
Part's free use of purchased VW
Party of the First Par accepts the tendered offer at -law of the above trade on the Party of
the Second Part's <..OnditionS; wammti'1g that liens and/or encumbrances have been
extinguished and trusteeships have been revoked and made null and void by certified mail
on or about the 'tQoo. and conveys absolute
to buyeJi
Party of the First Part now delivers, by this instrument, the above described propeJ'RWe
Party of the Second Part, and the Pat1y of the First Part acknowledges receipt of One
Thousand Dollars and oo/100. ($1,000 and no 00/100) in consideration acceptable to the
P11vty of the First Part in Trade for the naehrte ownership and control at-law ofthe above
described property.g\6 tt1:S .
/<..
This Bill of Exchange Contract and Agreement serves as a public notice to all that the Party
of the Second Part an:d the PartY of the First Part are functioning by the course of the
exercising full and complete rights of eeseltik ownership and control over
All rights are reserved to the Course of the Common Law, none are
waived without prejudice.
PROTECTION OF LAW: The authority of the parties, twned herein, 1111<1« the terms lrKf obliplians of this Rul Pro,>my Bill or
Enh110tce- C-..ct 1111111 proldod unci« the provisims of UO:I; 4:2:1; 6:2; AMENDMENTS 1.4,6,7,9.10 ofthe
U.S. CamtiiW<ln lheSuprane Law oflhe Lind, Bib Law Die Pg. 643,644, s-iS, 1602, 1603, U8S. Theplftics DOmed herein as well as
the T<m11 ea.ditions llld OOiptiom of lbla Rod l'rcpaty Bill of Exduonp lrKf C<lDCnld llld is NOT SUBJECT TO
FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTORY OR REGULATORY JURISDICJ'JON.SE£: USC42 1911, 19&3;Halev. Houk.le201 U.S.
43.; KauJbwo v. .JurzU: 102 NJ.Eq. 66,139A.716; Mc:L)'mlll v. Miller, S2lt!. 374, 16l,u Ill, 112; P<q>lev. Smi1b. 112 Midi. tll%70
N.W. 466.67 A.m.SLR"f'.392.; Mullias v. Commonw.,.llh, 179 Ky. 71, 200 S.W.9,11.; Filladt v. BiD>p, Ill clcl. 271. 274P.IIIO, 1111;
T.-...t v. Tom-. 113F.893, Sl C.C.A. 552; RO)'IlOI4o. 21 Cal 2n<l251, 2S<I; Taylor v. l'coW, 4 Hilll40,146(1Ul); SU&ev.
Sim<ln. 2 ap-. 76l(IUI); U.S. v. Wq Kim Alt., 169, II S.Q.4$6; Reid v. Covert l6S U.S. I,I..E4.211clll41(l951); Minallt v.
314 U.S. 436111 491(1966); Recl6eld v. Fisher. 292 Pl13.; Cqlpap V. " " " ' - . 236 u.s. 1.111 14; Dutchen u.;., Co. v. c.- Cily Co.;
Cooperv.Arnl.358U.S.I.
WARNING: /lny p<non. Fedcnl or Slate apil(a). Law W - Olfiom(a).l..qpolll<x(t). or Wcial OfJia:o1s). ..00
by ad « ........... , <WI«a « -. . «....tor COLOR Of LAW, Foclci'al or,._ STAnTre, lt.llOULATlON, «ORDINANCE impair or
obriclso.,y ... •" lbeterms"" oblipicno oflhiil R... Property Bill. .......... .w- or... •"'-
"""""' l'eltial «lh<ol>lipticnt .....,.usc •• 241.242, :oo1. :;s7JilMIIbo:MjasocrioloMol,... .,sol'OIC:r--
llld ...,............ lip lo 10 y.., per ....................._ for lifO lbculd lllldt ad ........................... ollllo ......... All ........
indudina c-. ololljuriadidlono, F-.1
Prapcoty 11111 or Exdoaneo
or....., _...08lc:ielo ..too by eel« .......................... ony- e(-.;.lt-.1
IIIMI
immunity, the lllh Ammclmonl oloeanc,g
P. 4001(1991).
--...-it usc 42 1m, .,.,, JMG, em -llll;acl
F-.. c-t. Sf!!: USC42 :101101-7, 2000e(l); ...- •.
willa ... ,._.,.
......._No 90-611,
14Jt;o
ktt..l-nt?
(Pwty o( 4he finl Pll1) (PNty of 'eccnd Part)
BY
hll
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 42-6 Filed 04/24/15 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 372
Vtll 679•.1Cf335
VOl 669 i'!Gf 562
A
FIELDNOTE DESCRIPTION
('2.
FIELONOTES TO. 1.893 ACRES OF LAND AS SITUATED IN THE
CULLEN ARNETT SURVEY, A-39, TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS AND BBING
A OUT OF AND A PART OF· THA'!' SAME CALLED 75 ACRES,- MORE ·OR
LESS, DESIGNATED AS "TRACT NO. 1 11 AS CONVEYED TO HARRY W.
STAFFORD BY DEED RECORDED IN VOLUME 610, PAGE 4941 OF 'THE
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS OF TYLER COUNTY. SAID 1:893 ACRES
BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED BY METES AND BOUNDS AS
FOLLOWS: ..
EXHIBIT "A"
Page 1 of 2
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Government
Exhibit
_____________
F
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Government
Exhibit
_____________
G
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ORDER
The Court, having considered the UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, and any response or reply thereto,
it is hereby ORDERED that:
2. The United States has valid and subsisting federal tax liens on all property
and rights to property of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., including the Tyler County
Property held by nominee, Ideal Abilities, and more specifically described in Exhibit D
to the United States’ Motion; and
3. The United States may foreclose its liens against the Tyler County
Property, and will submit a proposed order of sale to this Court within 10 days from the
date of this order.
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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docket call and trial dates until 60 days after a decision on the United States’
Motions for Default Judgement against two of the Defendants and the
United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment against the remaining third
(Dkt. #32.)1 This Scheduling Order sets July 2, 2015, as the deadline for
1
The case was originally assigned to Judge Clark and then transferred to Judge Schneider. (Dkt. #39.)
Judge Schneider has referred all pre-trial proceedings to Magistrate Judge Giblin. (Dkt. #40.)
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conference is set for July 23, 2015, and trial is set to begin on July 27, 2015.
enter default against Bright Future Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt.
#30), and the clerk entered default against both defendants on December 5,
2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United States filed its
Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and Ideal
Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). No opposition has been filed to
this Motion for Default Judgment as of the date of this filing. The United
States also filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against the remaining
Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and
Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.)2 The United States’
Motions for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment are briefed and ready
issues in this case. The extension will allow time for the Court to rule on
these motions and save the Court and the parties the time and expense of
2
The response contained frivolous arguments that Trowbridge is a citizen of the State of Texas and not the
United States and other arguments adequately addressed by the United States motion for summary
judgment. Therefore, the United States did not file a reply.
2
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based on its discretion, after good cause is shown. Fed. R. Civ. P 16(b)(1)
(“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may,
contacted regarding this motion and the continuance requested at the only
contact phone number listed in his pleadings. John Parks Trowbridge Jr. has
not responded to the message left with his secretary regarding the
continuance requested.
July 2, 2015 Joint Pre-Trial Order and motion in limine deadline and
corresponding docket call and trial dates until 60 days after a decision on the
3
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Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF
filing system that will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also
4
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ORDER
AND TRIAL DEADLINES, and the entire record of this proceeding, it is by the Court
ORDERED that the July 2, 2015 Joint Pre-Trial Order and motion in limine
deadline and corresponding docket call and trial dates contained in the Court’s
Scheduling Order (Dkt. #32) are continued until 60 days following a decision on the
motions for default and summary judgment submitted by the United States of America.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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The United States filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of nominee liens filed
against property in Tyler County, Texas. (Dkt. #1.) John Parks Trowbridge Jr. filed an
Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) On November 26,
2014, the United States’ requested the clerk enter default against Bright Future
Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt. #30), and the clerk entered default against both
defendants on December 5, 2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United
States filed its Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and
Ideal Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). The United States also filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment against the remaining Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.)
The Court has continued all pre-trial and trial deadlines until after a final ruling on the
On July 24, 2015, Trowbridge filed another memorandum, asserting the same
arguments in his previous responses and using the same irrelevant law in his quest to
have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America and that this
Court doesn’t have jurisdiction for the foreclosure action. (See Dkts. #7, #10, #18, #19,
#21, #42, and #46.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject to tax
because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and has been
rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding claims that
they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens of the State
As stated in the United States’ Complaint (Dkt. #1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…”1
Further, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which gives district courts
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United
States…”2 Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and
enforcement of liens) is also authorized by statute.3 The only question of law involves
the United States ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr.
Trowbridge – NOT some frivolous argument about whether or not Texas is part of the
United States.
1
28 U.S.C. §1340.
2
28 U.S.C. §1345.
3
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
U.S. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the Court
deny Trowbridge’s motion to dismiss. The United States also requests such further and
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing system that
will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via United States Mail,
The District Court referred this civil action to the undersigned United States Magistrate
U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. Pending before the Court is the defendant’s Motion for the Court to Recuse Itself for (1)
Incompetence by Reason of Ignorance of Law, (2) Violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers,
and (3) Fraud Under Color of Law, Office and Authority and Memorandum in Support (doc. #31).
I. Background
On July 7, 2014, the United States filed this proceeding against defendants John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr.; Bright Future Investments, Inc.; Ideal Abilities; and the Tyler County Tax Office.1
The United States filed its complaint alleging that defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
1
The Tyler County Tax Office has since been terminated as a party defendant. See Order (doc. #17).
There is also a pending motion for default judgment regarding defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc.
and Ideal Abilities, which the Court will address by separate order. See Motion (doc. #38).
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(“Trowbridge”) owes the United States $3,326,015.01 plus statutory additions accruing after April
7, 2014, in unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the 1993 through 1997 tax years.
See Complaint (doc. #1), at p. 2. The Complaint states that these tax amounts were reduced to
judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., case number H-14-27 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. See Exhibit A to Complaint. United States District Judge
The Complaint further states that on July 10, 2000, Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two tracts
of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County, Texas, (“the Tyler County
property”) to defendant Ideal Abilities. See Complaint, at p. 2, and Exhibits B-1 through B-3 to
Complaint. On or about July 26, 2000, the deeds and contracts were recorded with the Tyler County
Clerk’s Office. Id. The Complaint avers that the contracts for the deeds and conveyances were
signed by Trowbridge as Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities. Id. at p. 3. The Complaint goes on
to describe the factual background regarding Trowbridge’s requested appraisal of the Tyler County
properties and Ideal Abilities’ holding of the title to the Tyler County Property with Trowbridge as
a nominee. Id.
The Complaint further states that on June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Ideal
Abilities, as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. See id.; see also
Exhibit C to Complaint. The United States therefore contends that it has valid and subsisting federal
tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of Trowbridge, and against Trowbridge for all property
and rights to property in which they have interest, including any interest in the Tyler County
property. See Complaint, at pp. 3-4. The United States further argues that the federal tax liens
should be foreclosed upon the Tyler County property; the Tyler County property should be sold free
and clear of all rights, titles, claims and interests of the parties. Id. at p. 4. Finally, the United States
seeks relief through a finding that it has a perfected tax lien in all property and rights to property
2
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belonging to Trowbridge and his nominee, Ideal Abilities. Id. It also seeks foreclosure against the
Tyler County property and a sale of the Tyler County property free and clear of all rights, titles,
claims, and interests of the parties, with the proceeds of the sale to be distributed according to law.
Id.
The docket shows that the case was originally filed in the Tyler Division of the Eastern
District under case number 6:14-CV-595 and assigned to United States District Judge Michael H.
Schneider. On September 11, 2014, Judge Schneider referred the case to United States Magistrate
Judge K. Nicole Mitchell for pretrial proceedings. See Order (doc. #11). On September 15, 2014,
Judge Mitchell ordered that the case be transferred to the Lufkin Division for the Eastern District of
Texas. See Order (doc. #12). In support, she noted that the Tyler County property at issue lies
within the Lufkin Division, citing 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(6). Id. Upon transfer, on September 16, 2014,
the case was reassigned to United States District Judge Ron Clark (now Chief Judge).
On January 13, 2015, the case was again reassigned back to the docket of the Honorable
Michael H. Schneider, who in turn referred the matter to the undersigned for pretrial management
on January 27, 2015. See Referral Order (doc. #40). In the interim, while the case was still before
Judge Clark, defendant Trowbridge filed the instant recusal motion on November 25, 2014.
In the motion and accompanying memorandum, Trowbridge generally argues that he has been
denied due process and that the Court and counsel for the plaintiff are conspiring to defraud him of
his property. See Memorandum (doc. #31), at p. 3. He further contends that the record shows an
ignorance of the law on the part of the Court. Id. at pp. 4-5. Trowbridge also repeatedly argues that
the Court lacks jurisdiction, arguing that an Article III District Court’s limited jurisdiction does not
extend to exercising in personam jurisdiction and the entry of judgments. Id. at pp. 6-8. He relatedly
argues that there is “no evidence that [he] resides within the jurisdiction of a territorial court”,
despite the fact that the “it is indisputable” that he resides in Tyler County, Texas, and the property
3
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at issue is in Tyler County. Id. at p. 8. Therefore, Trowbridge’s argues for recusal because the
presiding District Court is merely a territorial court and therefore lacks jurisdiction over Texas,
where Trowbridge resides. He further states that “[Judge] Ron Clark is misrepresenting himself as
the judge of an Article III court of limited jurisdiction; concealing controlling law fatal to the cause
of his employer, the District of Columbia municipal corporation, a.k.a. United States (28 U.S.C. §
3002(2),(3), (8) and (15))”. Id. at p. 10. He argues that the Court is conspiring with the United
States Attorney’s Office to defraud him and that Judge Clark is “feigning ignorance” and that is not
possible for defendant to receive fair treatment in the instant lawsuit. Id. at pp. 11-14.
Discussion
Without even addressing the wholly frivolous nature of Trowbridge’s arguments regarding
the Court and jurisdiction, his motion for recusal fails on its face for several reasons. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (Emphasis
added). Section 455(b) goes on to provide that a judge must also disqualify himself in certain
“(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or
material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case
in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such
a person (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer
in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Trowbridge makes no valid argument in his motion that any of these
provisions apply in this case. There is no specific allegation of personal bias or impartiality on the
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part of the Court against Trowbridge. Rather, Trowbridge appears to argue that the Court lacks the
authority to adjudicate this case on the merits and that the United States is conspiring against him
as a whole, including the Court. None of these allegations fit within the instances specifically
Furthermore, Trowbridge has not presented any credible evidence or affidavit establishing
that the Court before whom his matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in
favor of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; Stringer v. Funchess, 291 F. App’x 617, 619 (5th
Cir. 2008). The unsupported allegations presented by Trowbridge’s motion are legally insufficient
Additionally, to the extent that Trowbridge’s motion names Chief United States District
Judge Ron Clark personally in seeking recusal, the undersigned notes that the case has since been
reassigned to the docket of Judge Schneider and referred to the undersigned for pretrial management.
The recusal motion, filed before the case was transferred, is accordingly moot in that respect.
The Court declines to afford much emphasis to the meritless and misplaced substantive
arguments made by Trowbridge in the recusal motion at this point in the case. This is because many
of the same arguments regarding jurisdiction and court authority have been made throughout the
filings in the case and in Trowbridge’s response to the United States’ dispositive motions, which will
be considered separately. The undersigned would like to emphasize that while the very purpose of
28 U.S.C. § 455 is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of
impropriety whenever possible2, there is always the concern that certain parties may abuse Section
455 for a dilatory and litigious purpose based on little or no substantiated basis. See Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1401 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994). In this vein, the Court finds
Trowbridge’s motion for recusal and accompanying memorandum to be wholly unsubstantiated and
2
See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988).
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without merit. The undersigned therefore ORDERS that the motion for recusal (doc. #31) is
DENIED.
____________________________________
KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)and the Local Rules for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred the above-captioned civil
action to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration of pretrial motions
and proceedings and entry of findings of fact and recommended disposition on case-dispositive
motions. See Order (doc. #40). Pending before the Court for purposes of this report is the
plaintiff United States’ Request for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. #38).
I. Background
On July 7, 2014, the United States filed this proceeding against defendants John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr.; Bright Future Investments, Inc.; Ideal Abilities; and the Tyler County Tax
1
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Office.1 The United States filed its complaint alleging that defendant John Parks Trowbridge,
Jr.,(“Trowbridge”) owes the United States $3,326,015.01 plus statutory additions accruing after
April 7, 2014, in unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the 1993 through 1997
tax years. See Complaint (doc. #1), at p. 2. The Complaint states that these tax amounts were
reduced to judgment in United States v. Trowbridge, et al., case number H-14-27 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See Exhibit A to Complaint. United
States District Judge Lynn N. Hughes signed that judgment on May 23, 2014. Id.
The Complaint further states that on July 10, 2000, Evelyn Anne Walker conveyed two
tracts of contiguous real property and a private road easement in Tyler County, Texas, (“the
Tyler County property”) to defendant Ideal Abilities. See Complaint, at p. 2, and Exhibits B-1
through B-3 to Complaint. On or about July 26, 2000, the deeds and contracts were recorded
with the Tyler County Clerk’s Office. Id. The Complaint avers that the contracts for the deeds
and conveyances were signed by Trowbridge as Executive Trustee of Ideal Abilities. Id. at p. 3.
The Complaint goes on to describe the factual background regarding Trowbridge’s requested
appraisal of the Tyler County properties and Ideal Abilities’ holding of the title to the Tyler
The Complaint further states that on June 4, 2013, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against
Ideal Abilities, as a nominee of John Parks Trowbridge, was filed in Tyler County. See id.; see
also Exhibit C to Complaint. The United States therefore contends that it has valid and
subsisting federal tax liens against Ideal Abilities, as nominee of Trowbridge, and against
Trowbridge for all property and rights to property in which they have interest, including any
interest in the Tyler County property. See Complaint, at pp. 3-4. The United States further
argues that the federal tax liens should be foreclosed upon the Tyler County property and the
1
The Tyler County Tax Office has since been terminated as a party defendant. See Order (doc. #17).
2
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Tyler County property should be sold free and clear of all rights, titles, claims and interests of
the parties. Id. at p. 4. Finally, the United States seeks relief through a finding that it has a
perfected tax lien in all property and rights to property belonging to Trowbridge and his
The docket shows that the case was originally filed in the Tyler Division of the Eastern
District under case number 6:14-CV-595 and assigned to United States District Judge Michael
H. Schneider. On September 11, 2014, Judge Schneider referred the case to United States
Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell for pretrial proceedings. See Order (doc. #11). On
September 15, 2014, Judge Mitchell ordered that the case be transferred to the Lufkin Division
for the Eastern District of Texas. See Order (doc. #12). In support, she noted that the Tyler
County property at issue lies within the Lufkin Division, citing 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(6). Id. Upon
transfer, on September 16, 2014, the case was reassigned to United States District Judge Ron
Clark (now Chief Judge). On January 13, 2015, the case was again reassigned back to the docket
of the Honorable Michael H. Schneider, who in turn referred the matter to the undersigned for
pretrial management on January 27, 2015. See Referral Order (doc. #40).
In the interim, the United States properly issued summons and had process served on
defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. See Summons (doc. #4 and doc.
#5). The returned and executed summons show that both of these defendants were served on
July 16, 2014, by executing service on defendant Trowbridge as President of Bright Future
Investments, Inc., and Trustee of Ideal Abilities. See id. To date, neither Bright Future
Investments, Inc., nor Ideal Abilities has appeared in the case by filing an answer or any other
pleading. Accordingly, on November 26, 2014, the United States requested entry of default by
the Clerk of Court. See Request and Accompanying Affidavit (doc. #30). The Clerk entered
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default against defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities on December 5,
2014 (doc. #34). On December 29, 2014, the United States requested that the Court enter default
judgment in its favor against Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. See Motion
(doc. #38). It also requests that as part of that default judgment, the Court adjudge that those
defendants have no interest in the Tyler County property at issue. See id.; see also proposed
Default Judgment. The two defendants at issue in the motion have neither responded to the
II. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and default judgment.
Default under Rule 55 consists of two procedural steps; one for the Clerk and one for the Court.
The first step is the entry of default, followed by the entry of default judgment. See, e.g., New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); Jefferson v. La. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corrs., No. 10-30618, 401 Fed. App’x 927, 929 (5th Cir. 2010). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a) directs the first step requiring the Clerk of court to enter default:
However, an entry of default against the defendant does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to a default judgment. See, e.g., Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Waltner v. Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C., No. 12-50929, 51 F.
App’x 741, 749 (5th Cir. 2013). After the clerk enters default, the clerk may enter a default
2
As the United States correctly points out in its motion, the pro se defendant Trowbridge is
legally precluded from representing the entity defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc., and
Ideal Abilities as he is not an attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Rowland v. California Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993).
4
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judgment only if the claim is “for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
computation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1). When the amount of the claim is not certain and cannot
be made certain,
the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A default
judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person
only if represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like
fiduciary who has appeared. If the party against whom a default
judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative,
that party or its representative must be served with written notice
of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Entry of default judgment is within the Court’s discretion. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b); Lindsey, et al. v. Prive Corp., et al., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998); Mason v.
Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1977). Entry of default judgment is not an abuse of discretion
when a defendant fails to answer a complaint. See Bonanza Int’l, Inc. v. Corceller, 480 F.2d
613, 614 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1073 (1973). Prevailing law within the Fifth Circuit
sets forth factors for courts to weigh when determining whether to enter default judgment:
Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. However, all the above-cited factors need not be addressed.
5
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The Fifth Circuit generally disfavors default judgments. Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican
Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Default judgments are a drastic
remedy, not favored by the federal rules and resorted to by the courts only in extreme
situations.”); Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (“...any doubt should, as a
general proposition, be resolved in favor of the movant to the end of securing a trial upon the
merits.”). However, “considerations of social goals, justice, and expediency” offset such
disfavor in evaluating motions for default judgment, with that evaluation lying “largely within
the domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167
F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146
B. Application
Because the defendants have failed to answer the complaint, they admit the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded allegations of fact – apart from any relating to the amount of damages – and “[are]
barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v.
Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 205
(5th Cir. 1992). In the present case, the facts asserted in the complaint are well-pleaded, as the
United States’ factual allegations show a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); United States v. Giles, 538 F.Supp.2d 990, 993 (W.D. Tex
2008). Likewise, due to the defendants’ failure to answer, the entry of default by the Clerk was
appropriate. See id. For these reasons, default judgment may be lawfully entered. See Thomas
v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885) (default judgment may be lawfully entered “according to
what is proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true”).
6
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The defendants have not answered the complaint or otherwise defended the matter, nor is
there any indication that they intend to appear or otherwise respond. The default judgment
motion has been on file for over eight months with no response. Bright Future Investments, Inc.
and Ideal Abilities have received ample notice of the suit and that there is a pending default.
Defendant Trowbridge was served as the President of Bright Futures and the Trustee of Ideal
Abilities. See Summons. Neither of those parties has properly answered or appeared. Taking
the well-pleaded facts of the original complaint as true, the United States has asserted a valid
cause of action to foreclose on the Tyler County property based on the valid federal tax lien
against Trowbridge. The United States has properly requested entry of judgment in its favor
barring any interest in that property asserted by either Bright Futures Investments, Inc., or Ideal
Abilities. Based on this procedural history and the efforts expended to date by the United States
in acting upon its tax lien, it will be substantially prejudiced if default judgment is denied.
Furthermore, the entity defendants Bright Futures Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities
have wholly failed to respond to the claims asserted in this manner. They have not filed an
answer asserting any interest in the property or disputing the United States’ claims. This silence
and noncompliance establishes that any prejudice to the defendants or harshness through entry of
default is outweighed by the prejudice to the plaintiff if the Court fails to enter judgment in the
plaintiff’s favor.
7
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As stated above, the record indicates that the United States successfully perfected service
of process on the entity defendants. Bright Future Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities wholly
failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The Clerk entered default, and the
United States subsequently filed the motion for default judgment. The procedural requirements
of Rule 55 are satisfied and the court may consider default judgment.
Again, the defendants were properly served notice of the original complaint and they
have entirely failed to respond. There is no dispute that they also received notice of the motion
for default judgment and have not answered the entry of default. Trowbridge, as President of
Bright Futures Investments, Inc. and Trustee of Ideal Abilities is an active party in the case and
thus receives notices of such filings. Those defendants have failed to properly respond to the
motion in any manner. Under these circumstances, there is no evidence of good faith mistake or
excusable neglect on the defendants’ part. Moreover, a finding of willful failure to answer a
complaint is sufficient reason for granting a motion of default judgment. See CJC Holdings v.
Wright & Lato, 979 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 989 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.
1993); Eisenhour v. Stafford, No. 9:12-CV-62, 2013 WL 6212725, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
168905, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) (Clark, J.) (adopting recommendation of Hawthorn, J.).
In the motion, the United States requests entry of judgment in its favor and a finding that
the defendants Bright Future Investments, Inc. and Ideal Abilities, Inc., are foreclosed from
asserting any interest in the Tyler County property at issue. The plaintiff does not request
monetary damages in its motion; it only seeks the judgment in its favor. See Motion and
8
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Proposed Default Judgment. Therefore, the Court need not conduct a hearing to enter default
judgment and determine the amount of damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
recommends that the District Court grant the United States’ request for entry of default
judgment (doc. #38). The undersigned further recommends that the Court enter judgment in
favor of the plaintiff United States and assess judgment against the defendants Bright Future
Investments, Inc., and Ideal Abilities. The judgment should find that those defendants, having
failed to assert any interest in the Tyler County property at issue, are adjudged to have no
IV. Objections
.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), all parties are entitled to serve and file written
objections to the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge within fourteen (14) days of
service. Failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions
of law, and recommendations contained within this report shall bar an aggrieved party from de
novo review by the District Judge of the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations,
and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District
____________________________________
KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9
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Background
The United States filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of nominee liens filed
against property in Tyler County, Texas. (Dkt. #1.) John Parks Trowbridge Jr. filed an
Answer and Amended Answer to the complaint. (Dkts. #7 and #10.) On November 26,
2014, the United States’ requested the clerk enter default against Bright Future
Investments and Ideal Abilities (Dkt. #30), and the clerk entered default against both
defendants on December 5, 2014. (Dkt. #34.) Following entry of default, the United
States filed its Motion for Default Judgment against Bright Future Investments and
Ideal Abilities on December 29, 2014 (Dkt. #38). On August 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge
Keith F. Giblin entered a report and recommendation “that the District Court grant the
The United States also filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against the
remaining Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., on April 24, 2015 (Dkt. #42), and
Trowbridge responded on May 11, 2015 (Dkt. #43.) The United States’ Motions for
Default Judgment and Summary Judgment are briefed and awaiting decision.
quest to have the Court rule that Texas is not part of the United States of America. (See
Dkts. #7, #10, #18, and #19.) The crux of Trowbridge’s argument is that he is not subject
to tax because he is not a citizen of the United States, which is patently frivolous and
has been rejected by the courts. See e.g. United States v. Long, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13443, *7 (W.D. Tex. 2005)(citing cases rejecting frivolous arguments made regarding
claims that they are not U.S. citizens but “natural persons”, “legal entities”, or citizens
of the State and not the United States). Trowbridge has continually asserted these same
frivolous arguments, and the most recent iteration has taken the form of objections to
the entire proceeding and his alleged denial of due process. (See Dkts. #53-54.)
Argument
As stated in the United States’ Complaint (Dkt. #1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1340, which gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue…”1 Further,
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1345, which gives district courts “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States…”2
1
28 U.S.C. §1340.
2
28 U.S.C. §1345.
U.S. Response to Objections
Page 2 of 4
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 55 Filed 09/02/15 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 504
Finally, the relief sought by the United States (i.e. entry of judgment and enforcement of
liens) is also authorized by statute.3 The only question of law involves the United States
ability to foreclose its liens to pay the long overdue taxes of Mr. Trowbridge. The
objections filed by Trowbridge are nothing more than a continued attempt to distract
the Court from pending motions and stall collection of his overdue tax liabilities
indefinitely. The arguments made by Trowbridge are patently frivolous and entitled to
Conclusion
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the United States of America, requests that the Court
disregard the objections, ratify the report and recommendation on default judgment,
and rule on the pending motion for summary judgment. The United States also requests
Respectfully submitted,
3
26 U.S.C. §7401, 7402(a), (f), 7403.
U.S. Response to Objections
Page 3 of 4
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 55 Filed 09/02/15 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 505
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s ECF filing system that
will send notification to all counsel of record. A copy was also served via United States Mail,
§
§
§
§
. §
§
§
§
§
§
§
On September 1, 2015, defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed
objections ( 53). The Court accordingly conducted a de novo review of the objections,
the pleadings, the record, and the applicable law. See 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
-1-
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 57 Filed 09/10/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 508
careful consideration, the Court concludes that the objections are without merit.
First, Trowbridge’s objections are based on the frivolous arguments he has made throughout
this proceeding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the United States’ claims seeking
perfection of its federal tax liens and foreclosure. His objections do not specifically address Judge
Giblin’s finding or conclusions related to the motion for default judgment. In fact, he fails to
address the report and recommendation at all. Rather, he appears to argue that somehow the Court
does not have jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Texas and is geographically excepted
from this Court’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that the United States’ claims are clearly based on
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). His objections
therefore fail to point out any error in the magistrate judge’s report with the specificity required
by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A
judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
Secondly, because he is proceeding pro se and is not an attorney, Trowbridge does not have
the standing to lodge objections on behalf of his co-defendants, against which the default
judgment is sought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Rowland v. Cal Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202
(1993)
-2-
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in their entirety. Having considered the United States’ request for default judgment and Judge
Giblin’s findings and recommendation, the Court ORDERS that the Report and
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the Court further ORDERS that the motion for default
It is SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-3-
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 58 Filed 09/14/15 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 510
NOW COMES defendant JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR. (the "Defendant") in the
above-captioned matter, specially and not generally, to Object to denial of due process of law
and Demand disclosure of the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take
jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a
This Court is a district court of the United States and federal trial court authorized by
statute to enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil
The United States District Courts are trial courts. Trial courts, as opposed to
appellate courts, are courts that hear both civil and criminal cases through
examination and cross-examination by attorneys .... The Oxford Companion to
American Law, Kermit L. Hall, editor in chief (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2002), p. 175 (s.v. "Courts, United States").
The United States district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system.
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have
jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and
criminal matters. USCourts.gov, "District Courts,"
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 58 Filed 09/14/15 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 511
§ 3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
... (2) "Court" means any court created by the Congress of the United
States, excluding the United States Tax Court.
(3) "Debt" means-
... (B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a[ n]
assessment, penalty ... interest, tax ... recovery of a cost incurred by the
United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States ...
. . . (8) "Judgment" means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of
the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt. Title 26 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection
Procedure.
The best-known courts are courts of ... unlimited trial jurisdiction, both civil and
criminal, within their jurisdictional area. At the federal level, these are called
DISTRICT COURTS .... West's Encyclopedia ofAmerican Law, Volume 9 (West
Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1998), p. 316.
The statutory authority for the Court to enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of
the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, is clear; e.g.:
As stated in the United States' Complaint (Dkt. # 1), this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1340, which gives district courts "original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal
revenue ... " Further, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which
gives district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States ... [Footnotes omitted.] Dkt. #48, p. 2 of 3.
What is not clear, however, is the constitutional authority that gives the Court the
capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United
States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas-
because a lawsuit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not, in and of itself, sufficient to vest
So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may
sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a
suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself
Defendant's Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 2 of4
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 58 Filed 09/14/15 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 512
Statutory authority for a federal trial court, such as this Court, to enter judgments, orders,
and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a
debt, is irrelevant if the capacity to take jurisdiction is not given by the Constitution; to wit:
It remains rudimentary law that "[a]s regards all courts of the United States
inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether
original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to
take it, and an act o.f Congress must have supplied it . ... To the extent that such
action is not taken, the power lies dormant." The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 24 7,
252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Co., U.S. 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d
811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 S. 368, 379-380, 101
S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260
U.S 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case o_fthe Sewing
Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874);
Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How.
236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); Mcintire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420
(1813). [Underline emphasis added.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989).
Whereas: The Constitution provides more than one fom1 of law in which federal trial
courts are authorized to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the
United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; and
Whereas: It is unknown under which of those forms of law provided in the Constitution
Whereas: The Court has failed for 14 months of pretrial proceedings, to disclose to
Defendant under which particular form of law the Court is seated or the constitutional authority
that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in
favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler
Defendant's Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 3 of 4
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Whereas: It is impossible for Defendant to mount a proper defense if Defendant does not
know the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter
judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal
Whereas: If Defendant is foreclosed from mounting a proper defense because the Court
will not disclose the constitutional authority that gives the Court capacity as aforesaid, Defendant
Whereas : Disclosure by the Court of the constitutional authority that allows the Court to
take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising
from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas, will allow
Defendant to know the particular form of law under which the Court is seated and mount a
proper defense,
gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor
of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler
County, Texas .
Defendant ' s Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure
Page 4 of 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. , hereby certify that on September 14, 2015, a true,
REGARDING A DEBT, IN TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS , was served by first class United
States Postal Service delivery upon the counsel of record as indicated below.
IN TYLER COUNTY, TEXAS, were filed on September 14, 2015 , by personal hand delivery to
..
.-
l'
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT .
.... ...
;
Clerf.c CJ ·- ;;;·/
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § ' .s. Distr; ..
...
-----::::___
Te-.ir.as J::_ ct Court
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO.: 9:14-CV-138
§
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al, §
§
Defendants. §
The Court, having been given reasonable opportunity to produce the constitutional
authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and
decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt,
in Tyler County, Texas, i.e., the geographic area in which the alleged defendant, JOHN PARKS
TROWBRIDGE, JR. ("Trowbridge"), resides and the real property that is the object of the
instant alleged lawsuit is located-which citation of authority would have revealed the particular
and heretofore unknown form of law under which the Court is seated-, but having failed to
produce such constitutional authority, it is reasonable to conclude that no such authority exists
De non apparentibus et non existntibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same
respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist. John
Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition),
revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2130.
Idem est non probari et non esse ; non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not
proved and what does not exist, are the same ; it is not the defect of the law, but
of proof. Id. at 2136.
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1. That the Court immediately dismiss with prejudice the instant alleged lawsuit as
unlawful for the Court's lack of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and
enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a
2. That the Court award Trowbridge reasonable costs of $22,000 for defending this
3. That the Court award Trowbridge exemplary damages of $22,000 for conducting
Trowbridge for the last 14 months despite multiple valid and conclusive motions
4. That the Court order vacated as unlawful and void the May 23, 2014, Amended
Final Judgment and Order of Sale and Vacature in the predecessor alleged lawsuit
to the instant alleged lawsuit, i.e., United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action H-14-27 ("Civil Action H-14-
27"), for lack of constitutional authority that gives the district court in Civil
Action H-14-27 the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and
decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt, in Harris County, Texas; and in respect thereof, that the Court
order said district court to pay to Trowbridge costs, restitution, and damages as set
Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Case for the Court's Lack of Constitutional Authority
Page 2 of3
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(ii) $42,500 in United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit No.
14-20333, and
(iii) $72,500 ($35,000 for Petition for Writ of Certiorari and $37,500
No. 14-1305;
5. For such other and further relief that the Court may deem just and fair.
Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Case for the Court's Lack of Constitutional Authority
Page 3 of3
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lfL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
§
-.a--::-.-
. . . ....
SEP Og 2015
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § Civil Action H-14-27
§
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al, §
§
Defendants. §
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. ("Trowbridge") hereby appears specially and respectfully
moves the Court to vacate as void the May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment (the "Judgment")
and Order of Sale and Vacature (the "Order") (copy of each attached) in the above-captioned
matter ("Civil Action H-14-27"), for having been entered in a manner inconsistent with due
Upon Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt.
#18), there being no evidence ofTrowbridge's residence in geographic area in which this Court
of general jurisdiction is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide cases, the Court
showed partiality toward plaintiff United States (the "Plaintiff') and bias against Trowbridge by:
1. Commanding sua sponte, both verbally (Dkt. #30, pp. 16-17 of 19) and in writing
(Dkt. #2 l ), in exercise of general jurisdiction, that Plaintiff must promptly enter in evidence one
ofTrowbridge's Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns, which the Court would use sub
silentio as evidence of a purported contractual I quasi-contractual right to hear and decide Civil
Action H-14-27, which purported right the Court would call "jurisdiction," to justify (a) denying
said motion to dismiss, (b) exercising jurisdiction in geographic area fixed by the Constitution
exclusively for courts of special jurisdiction, and (c) entering the Judgment and Order;
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2. Refusing-by way ofdenial of Trowbridge 's express May 8, 2014, Request for an
Explanation of the Reason/or the Court's Denial of Defendant's March 19, 2014, Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. #39)-to disclose that the Fonn 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return that the
Court commanded sua sponte be promptly entered in evidence, was the only evidence the Court
was using, sub silentio, as "proof' that Trowbridge resides in a geographic area in which the
3. Denigrating Trowbridge and accusing Trowbridge of acting in bad faith (Dkt. #57
p. 3 of 9) for acts amounting to nothing more than exercise of Trowbridge' s legal rights;
4. Entering Judgment (Dkt. #53) sua sponte without regard for Plaintiffs unresolved
5. Rejecting and foreshortening sua sponte by more than 50% the amount of time
Plaintiff stated Plaintiff was prepared to give Trowbridge to gather Trowbridge's belongings
(Dkt, #57 pp. 3-4 of9) and vacate Trowbridge's home in respect of the Order-i.e., from 30 days
to 14 days (Dkt. #54, p. 3 of 4)-an expedited process the omission of which would have worked
no meaningful injury to Plaintiff's interests but which, following the Court's May 27, 2014,
Order Denying Stay (Dkt. #60) ofTrowbridge's Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution of
Order of Sale and Vacature Pending Exhaustion of Remedy (Dkt. #56), resulted in tremendous
personal and professional hardship on Trowbridge and the six people who work for and depend
on Trowbridge for a paycheck (and the patients who receive medical care from Trowbridge), as
sentimental value accumulated over a lifetime, due to a shortage of time to remove them.
The above-cited acts and omissions reveal that ( 1) the Court, not Plaintiff, prosecuted
Civil Action H-14-27, (2) the Court committed fraud upon the court, (3) Trowbridge did not
have a fair proceeding, and (4) the Judgment and Order were entered in a manner inconsistent
One of the very objects of law is the impartiality of its judges in fact and
appearance .... The relevant consideration under§ 455(a) is the appearance of
partiality ... not where it originated or how it was disclosed. . . . Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994).
Fraud on the court {other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to
the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent
documents, false statements or perjury.... It is thus fraud where the court or a
member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge
has not performed his judicial function--thus where the impartial functions of the
court have been directly corrupted. Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121
(10th Cir., 1985).
The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but
on the Due Process Clause.... United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th
Cir., 1976).
The Court is authorized and required to vacate judgments and orders entered in a manner
A judgment is void if the court that rendered it ... acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process. Margo/es v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied,
455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons
Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the
judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661
F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1981 ), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S.
917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 {1982). Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp.
892 (1985).
BACKGROUND
Civil Action H-14-27 is an alleged Federal debt collection proceeding whose subject
matter is alleged income tax liability, and an action to foreclose on alleged federal tax liens
recorded by claimant United States against real property owned by Trowbridge and arising from
alleged unpaid federal income truces, penalties, and interest assessed against Trowbridge by the
Internal Revenue Service for true years 1993-1997 totaling (as of September I, 2013)
The record of Civil Action H-14-27 is devoid of competent proof, i.e. material evidence,
that Trowbridge has actual residence in any geographic area in which a court of general
The only material fact in the record of this case relevant to the allegation, "Defendant,
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., resides within the jurisdiction of this Court., (Dkt. #I, p. I of3), is
that Trowbridge resides in Harris County, Texas (Dkt. #19-7, p. 4 of27; Dkt. #19-8, p. 5 of28).
The essence of this case is this Court's (1) dereliction of its duty to know, understand,
and declare the law in respect of the controlling definition and meaning of the term "United
denigration of Trowbridge for exclusive reliance on and usage of said controlling definition and
meaning in all ofTrowbridge's filings, and (3) insistence that the Court, a court of general
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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jurisdiction, has authority to hear and decide cases in geographic area fixed by the Constitution
The Court states during a hearing on May 21, 2014, "But I conclude as a matter of law
that North [sic 1] Harris County [Texas] is part of the United States" (Dkt. #57, p. 3 of 9),
thereby, evidently, inferring that Trowbridge, who resides in north Harris County, Texas, is a
resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. "United States"-ejfectively the District of Columbia only-and
therefore of the subject, and Trowbridge's property of the object, of Title 26 U.S.C.
The Court on May 23, 2014, in: (1) the Court's Judgment" (Dkt. #53) awards to Plaintiff
$3,326,015.01 ofTrowbridge's property, plus statutory additions accruing after April 7, 2014;
authorizes Plaintiff to foreclose the subject liens; and awards to Plaintiff all right, title, and
interest in, and right to possession of, said real property, and (2) the Court's Order (Dkt. #54),
The Court expedites Trowbridge's eviction sua sponte (Dkt, #57 pp. 3-4of9; Dkt. #54, p.
ARGUMENT
A. The Court Denied Trowbridge The Constitutional Right or Due Process or Law.
1. The Court denied Trowbridge the constitutional Right to have the instant
controversy beard and decided by a Federal trial court of special jurisdiction.
Courts that hear both civil and criminal matters are courts of general jurisdiction; to wit:
The United States District Courts are trial courts. Trial courts, as opposed to
appellate courts, are courts that hear both civil and criminal cases through
examination and cross-examination by attorneys.... The Oxford Companion to
American Law, Kermit L. Hall, editor in chief (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2002), p. 175 (s.v. "Courts, United States").
1
Whereas, there is no person by the name "North Harris Cour:ity," "North" appears to be an error on the
part of the Official Court Reporter and should be spelled with a lower-case "n."
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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The United States district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system.
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have
jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and
criminal matters. USCourts.gov, "District Courts," http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/U nderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx (accessed
March 18, 2015).
§ 3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
... (2) "Court" means any court created by the Congress of the United
States, excluding the United States Tax Court.
(3) "Debt" means-
... (8) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a[n]
assessment, penalty ... interest, tax ... recovery of a cost incurred by the
United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States ...
. . . (8) "Judgment" means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of
the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt. Title 26 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection
Procedure
On the federal level, the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction....
West's Encyclopedia ofAmerican Law, Volume 6 (West Group: St. Paul, Minn.,
1998), p. 293.
Independence Hall, Philadelphia Pennsylvania (the "Constitution"), creates the federal judicial
power in Article 3 § 1 and defines the maximum extent of that power in Article 3 § 2(1); to wit:
Section. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish....
Section. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Courts ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the
The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may
extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. . . . Insurance Corporation ofIreland,
Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701(1982).
The Constitution provides impliedly for Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction at
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; ...
JURISDICTION IS TERRITORIAL.
The geographic area in which a particular court has authority is a defined territory with
The Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise limited legislative power throughout the
Union and exclusive legislative power in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United
The species jurisdiction that a Federal trial court is authorized to exercise, i.e., either
special or general, is determined by (1) the particular geographic area Gudicial district) in which
the court is located, and (2) the species of legislative power the Constitution authorizes Congress
Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the
Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold
or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4
Dall. 8, 10; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32; Sheldon v. Sill, 8
How. 441, 448; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165 .... Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 u. s. 226, 234 (1922).
Federal trial courts of special jurisdiction are under the exclusive control of the judicial
branch of the national government and are limited to controversies of the character delineated in
Article 3 § 2(1) arising in geographic area occupied by one of the several commonwealths united
by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction-such as this Court-are under the exclusive
control of the legislative branch of the national government (Congress) and have authority "to
hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both civil and criminal matters"
(USCourts.gov, supra, p. 6), arising in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United
Whereas: It is indisputable that this Court is a Federal trial court of general jurisdiction;
and
by that certain commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted
residence in fact in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" (id); and
Right to have a controversy between Trowbridge and the United States heard and decided in a
Wherefore: It is indisputable that Trowbridge has been denied the Right to a Federal trial
dimension.
2. The Court heard and decided Civil Action H-14-27 without constitutional
authority.
When Plaintiff fails for 19 days to enter in evidence proof of jurisdiction following filing
ofTrowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt. #18): At a
hearing held on April 7, 2014, for no apparent reason and without prompt from Plaintiff or
Trowbridge regarding any ofTrowbridge's tax returns, the Court asks Plaintiff, "Do you have a
The transcript of said hearing also attributes the following statements to the Court: "Well,
I would like just to see an exemplar" (id); "And just the 1040, the first couple of pages of it, plus
whatever attachment would affect liability" (id. at 16-17 of 19); "I want you just to file it ... "
(id at 17of19); "Just file one as - -" "- - the attachment the Court ordered" (id.); and "I just
When Plaintiff comments to the Court, "We didn't include those [Trowbridge's tax
returns] just because we didn't feel we needed to, but I can get a copy" (id. at 16of19), the
Following the Court's instructions to Plaintiff at the aforesaid April 7, 2014, hearing, the
Court, in exercise of general jurisdiction, commands Plaintiff by Management Order (Dkt. #21 ):
"The United States must promptly give the court one of the objectionable tax returns."
Plaintiff, on April 14, 2014, files in the record "United States' Court Ordered
Supplement" (Dkt. #24) and attaches thereto a copy ofTrowbridge's Form 1040 U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return for 1997 (Dkt.#24-1) (the "1997 Fonn 1040").
The Court never reveals why the filing of one of Trowbridge' s tax returns was so urgent I
important. Following filing of the 1997 Fonn I040, the Court never raises the subject again.
After six weeks with no ruling on the motion to dismiss, Trowbridge files on May 1, 2014,
Trowbridge's Request for Ruling on Defendant's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #33).
The next day, May 2, 2014, 44 days after the filing of the March 19, 2014, motion to
dismiss, the Court issues an order (Dkt. #34) denying said motion.
2014, time is of the essence re the Court's verbal and written order commanding that Plaintiff
must promptly file in the record one ofTrowbridge's tax returns; and
Whereas: "Non refert quid notum sitjudici, si notum non sit informajudici. It matters
not what is known to the judge, ifit is not known to himjudicially"2-and, there being no
evidence that Trowbridge resides in a geographic area in which a court of general jurisdiction,
e.g., the Court, has authority: To be justified in denying Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, motion to
dismiss, the Court needed something that would allow the Court to treat Trowbridge as a resident
of geographic area in which the Constitution authorizes the Court to hear and decide cases; and
2
John Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis
Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914), p. 2150.
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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Whereas: On April 7, 2014, the record of Civil Action H-14-27 is devoid of evidence that
Trowbridge has residence in fact in "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"
(Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), only geographic area in which a Federal trial court of general
jurisdiction, such as the Court, has authority to hear and decide cases; and
Whereas: As of April 7, 2014, Plaintiff has failed for 19 days since the filing of
Trowbridge's March 19, 2014, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, to enter in evidence
anything that would suggest or allow the Court to presume that Trowbridge is a resident of
"Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" (id.), and is unaware (Dkt. #30, p. 16
of 19) of the Court's need for such evidence in order to be able to justify denying Trowbridge's
controlling 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) definition of the term "United States" reveals that Congress
define said term in a geographical sense to mean the District of Colwnbia, the Conunonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Conunonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands and no other thing-the statutory Statel of the Title 26 U.S.C.
Whereas: Residents of the aforesaid insular Title 26 U.S.C. States of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States are not liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. (Id. at 35 of 42); and
3
In the colloquial expression "SO States," the meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. tenn "State" is the District of
Columbia-the only 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) State whose residents are liable to tax under26 U.S.C.; to wit: "[T]axing
statutes are subject to strict construction ..." (A Dictionary ofLaw, Seventh Edition, Jonathan Law and Elizabeth
Martin, editors (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009). p. 295)-and the 50 States are the purported 50 bodies
politic (political subdivisions) of the District of Columbia residing without the exterior limits of the District of
Columbia in geographic area occupied by one of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under the
authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, such as Texas, each of whose "members" at some point
performed some act or made some statement-such as the signing and making of a Form I 040 U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return-which actors in government regarded, sub silentio and unilaterally, as an "alien [nonresident
ofanv o(the Title 26 U.S.C. States ofthe Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United Statesl showing a definite intention to
acquire residence in the ['flt/e 26 U.S.C. geographicall U.S. [j.e .. tor purposes oftax under Title 26 U.S.C.. the
District ofColumbia onlv]." 26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii).
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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Whereas: The only 26 U.S.C. 770l(a)(10) State of the Title 26 U.S.C. 770l(a)(9)
geographical United States whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. is the District
of Columbia; and
pertinent part, that "An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of
the fijtle 26 U.S.C. geographicall United States nor a resident ofthe fijt/e 26 U.S.C.
Wherefore: In its exercise of general jurisdiction, the Court on April 7, 2014, substantially
asswnes responsibility for prosecution of Civil Action H-14-27 by commanding sua sponte both
verbally and in writing that Plaintiff must promptly enter in the record what the Court needs and
will use against Trowbridge unilaterally and sub silentio as prima facie evidence of an act or
statement purportedly showing a "definite intention to acquire residence" (26 C.F .R. 1.871-
the United States" (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)) and geographic area in which a court of
general jurisdiction, such as the Court, is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide
cases-a fraud upon the court evincing that it was impossible for Trowbridge to have a fair
THE 1997 FORM 1040 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE EVIDENCE OF"A DEFINITE INTENTION TO ACQUIRE
RESIDENCE IN THE (TITLE 26 U.S.C. GEOGRAPHICAL) U.S.".
Whereas: Evidence attached to and part of the 1997 Fonn 1040 in the fonn of
TAX LIABILITY" (Dkt. #24-1, pp. 13-15of16) documents that Petitioner's apparent alleged
general election to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States by
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
Page 13of19
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way of the 1997 Form 1040 was made unwittingly by mistake (id), obtained by the Internal
Revenue Service through fraud on the part oflntemal Revenue Agent Roy Fite (id.), and that
LIABILITY contradicts, overcomes, and renders immaterial the 1997 Form 1040 as evidence of
any "intention to acquire residence in the [Title 26 U.S.C. geographical] U.S." (26 C.F.R. 1.871-
Wherefore: The Court's use of the 1997 Fonn 1040 as "evidence" ofTrowbridge's
alleged 26 U.S.C. 6013 general election to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States is without merit and a fraud upon the court.
WHY THE PURPORTED 26 U.S.C. 6013 ELECTION FACILITY IS A HOAX AND A NULLITY.
No one has the right to elect (choose) to be treated as a resident of a geographic area in
12. While one's statements may supply evidence of the intention requisite to
establish domicile at a given place of residence, they can not supply the fact of
residence there; and they are of slight weight when they conflict with the fact.
This is the more so where, as here, the statements are shown to have been inspired
by the desire to establish a nominal residence for tax purposes, different from the
residence in fact. P. 425. In such circumstances, the actual fact of the place of
residence and the person's real attitude and intention with respect to it as *400
disclosed by his course of conduct are the controlling factors in ascertaining his
domicile. When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he
must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to
make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general
purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose
of taxation. P. 426.... Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
Whereas: Trowbridge has never had the right to elect to be treated as a resident of the
Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States for the purpose of taxation; and
Whereas: No actor in government has ever had the right to treat Trowbridge as a resident
of the Title 26 U.S.C. geographical United States for the purpose of taxation; and
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
Page 14of19
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territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc." (BLACK'S, supra, p. 7) and "The authority of any
Whereas: The alleged 26 U.S.C. 6013 election facility is discretionary I optional and
Whereas: The Court, in the Court's May 13, 2014, Second Order Denying Dismissal
(Dkt. #42) declares, among other things, "This court has jurisdiction" and cites by footnote not
the actual fact of the place of Trowbridge' s residence or the geographic area in which the Court
is authorized by the Constitution to hear and decide cases as the reason therefor, but rather a
statute (28 U.S.C. 1340 (2012)), evincing that the Court (1) knows that Trowbridge resides not
within the jurisdiction of the Court as alleged by Plaintiff (Dkt. #1, p. 1 of 3), and (2) asserts
"jurisdiction" but rather is using-sub silentio and fraudulently-an alleged contractual I quasi-
contractual right as the basis of the Court's authority to hear and decide Civil Action H-14·27,
the 1997 Fonn 1040 being "proof' (immaterial prima facie evidence) thereof,
Wherefore: The Court's assertion "This court has jurisdiction," despite no actual
evidence of jurisdiction is willful and perjurious and a fraud upon the court under color of law, a
The transcript of the May 21, 2014, hearing (Dkt. #57, pp. 3-4of9) (the "Transcript")
provides the following exchange between the Court and counsel for the United States:
time, he lives up there around Dr. Jaikaran. And there are two approaches. He's
using it even though he probably knows it's meaningless because he has no other
way he thinks of avoiding it, so - - or he's delusional and believes it. But by
spending your time being rational with an irrational purpose would be irrational.
So when do you want him evicted?
1. The Court denigrated Trowbridge for taking responsibility for knowing and
understanding the law and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights.
When Congress omit to provide a definition for a particular word or legal term in a
particular statute, great care must be taken to ensure proper interpretation thereof; to wit:
Although the District of Columbia Income Tax Act made "domicile" the fulcrum
of the income tax, the first ever imposed in the District, it set forth no definition of
that word. To ascertain its meaning we therefore consider the Congressional
history of the Act, the situation with reference to which it was enacted, and the
existing judicial precedents, with which Congress may be taken to have been
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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familiar in at least a general way. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562.
District o/Co/umbia v. Murphy, 314 US 441, 449 (1941)
"lgnorantia excusator, nonjuris sedfacti. Ignorance of fact may excuse, but not
ignorance oflaw" (BOUVIER'S (see fn. 2, p. 10, supra), p. 2136), and "Ignorance of law consists
of the want of knowledge of those laws which it is our duty to understand, and which every man
When Congress do provide a specific definition for a certain tenn in a particular body of
statutory law, everyone has a duty to understand and know the meaning thereof, legal
professionals doubly so, and no one has any discretion to take said term in any other way than
The words of a statute are to be taken in their ordinary and popular meaning,
unless they are technical terms or words of art, in which case they are to be
understood in their technical sense .... [Underline emphasis added.] Henry
Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation ofthe Laws
(West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1896), Sec. 57, p. 128.
Linguistic inference canons provide guidelines about what the legislature likely
meant, given its choice of some words and not others. The linguistic inference
canons include classic logical canons such as expressio unius, noscitur a sociis,
and ejusdem generis. Other inferential rules encourage interpreters to follow the
ordinary usage of text unless the legislature has itself defined the word or the
phrase has acquired a technical meaning.... [Footnotes omitted; underline
emphasis added.] Jacob Scott, "Codified Canons and the Common Law of
Interpretation," The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98, Issue 2, January 2010, pp.
352-353.
"Quijure suo utilur, neminifacit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one"
(BOUVIER'S, p. 2157)-but the Transcript reveals that the Court condemns Trowbridge for
exercising Trowbridge's legal rights and relying on and referring to the statutes of Congress for
the meaning of the definition of the Title 26 and 28 U.S.C. term "United States"; to wit:
I actually don't think Trowbridge has a clue what all this [United States, United
States of America, USA] means.... And there are two approaches. He's_using it
[controlling definition of"United States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.] even though
he probably knows it's meaningless [insinuation that "United States" has no
special meaning in Title 26 or 28 U.S.C. and Trowbridge is acting in bad faith)
because he has no other way he thinks of avoiding it [inference that Trowbridge is
acting in bad faith or for purposes of delay or both: tacit denigration of
Trowbridge for exercising Trowbridge's legal rights], so - - or he's delusional and
believes it [inference that Trowbridge is delusional for maintaining fidelitv to the
controlling definition of"United States" provided by Congress in Titles 26 and 28
U.S.C. and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights). But by spending your time
being rational with an irrational purpose would be irrational [inference that
Trowbridge is irrational for adhering to the controlling definition of "United
States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.; inference that Trowbridge's exercise of
Trowbridge's legal rights is irrational].
2. The Court prosecuted sua sponte and in exercise of general jurisdiction, Civil
Action H-14-27 with bias against Trowbridge, using pejorative epithets to
characterize Trowbridge for observing controlling law in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.
and exercising Trowbridge's legal rights, citing the amount of time expended
doing so as the reason Trowbridge's eviction should be expedited.
Plaintiff states "I was prepared to give Mr. Trowbridge 30 days if he needed it to gather
his belongings" and "I thought that 30 days was reasonable," to which the Court replies:
"[T]he problem [an alleged debt] is the adverse decision by the Board of Tax
Appeals [United States Tax Court], which just pretends to be a court, was June 4th,
2003. So he's had 11 years [false inference that Trowbridge has neglected a legal
duty for 11 years] .... So you add up 30 days, plus 11 years that he has known of
the problem [an alleged debt], has, as near as I know, done nothing constructive
by way of negotiation or payment or anything else [i.e., has not volunteered to
negotiate or pay the alleged debt] .... And he has been obstreperous [no evidence
of obstreperousness per se; the Court equates Trowbridge's choice to litigate
(rather than negotiate and pay) an alleged debt with obstreperousness]. Because I
don't like calling people insane [denigration of Trowbridge for observing the Title
26 and 28 U.S.C. definition and meaning of "United States" and insinuation that
Trowbridge is insane for doing so], I'll assume he's being dishonest [denigration
of Trowbridge for insisting on the law], I think that's a step up, in using all of this
stuff [controlling definition of"United States" in Titles 26 and 28 U.S.C.]. Today
is the 21st of May. I believe [evidence that the Court, not Plaintiff, is prosecuting
Civil Action H-14-27] he needs to be out by noon May 30th [nine days later] ....
There is simply no sense in our allowing him further to do it, that is, to occupy.
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order
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3. The Court entered the Judgment and Order without regard for Plaintiff's
unresolved April 4, 2014, motion for summary judgment, further evincing that
the Court prosecuted this case s11a spo11te, in exercise of general jurisdiction.
Whereas, the record of Civil Action H-14-27 reflects entry of Amended Final Judgment
May 23, 2014 (Dkt. #53), said record is devoid of resolution of Plaintiffs April 4, 2014, United
States' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Dkt. #19), signifying that
said motion was extraneous to final disposition of this case and that the Court prosecuted Civil
area fixed by the Constitution exclusively for courts of special jurisdiction, who has no residence
in fact in any geographic area in which any courts of general jurisdiction is authorized by the
Constitution to hear and decide cases-justified by sub silentio use of immaterial prima facie
evidence (the 1997 Form 1040) as ''proof' of Plaintiffs allegation that "Defendant, John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr., resides within the jurisdiction of this Court" (Dkt. #1, p. 1 of 5).
CONCLUSION
Trowbridge hereby moves the Court to vacate the Court's May 23, 2014, Judgment and Order
and afford Trowbridge such other relief as the Court deems proper.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 9, 2015, two copies of the attached MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER, together with (two) attachments, was delivered by hand to the
Clerk of the United States District Court in Houston, Texas, for filing and one copy was served
Joshua Smeltzer
Department of Justice, Tax Division
717 N. Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 7520 I
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 24 of 37 PageID #: 538
Amended FinalJudgment
1. The clerk will leave the case open for the court to supervise Trowbridge's eviction.
Lynn N. Hughes
United States DistrictJudge
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 25 of 37 PageID #: 539
x. The United States ofAmerica, having attached its lieos, may foreclose 2.5ll7 Ramrock
Drive, Porter, Texas 77365, also known as:
lot 16, block x, of Bentwood, section r, a subdivision of I 56.8 acres, out of the
William Massey Survey, A·39r, and the Mary Owens survey, A·405, in
Montgomery County, Texas, as imposed by the map and dedication records in
cabinet G, sheets x38A- x4xA.
2. The Internal Revenue Service is directed under 2.8 U.S.C. §§ 2.00I, 2002, and 2004, to
offer the property at a commercially reason.able and public sale.
3. The Service may access the property to preserve it, including retaining someone to
change or install locks or other security on the property until the deed is delivered to
a buyer.
A. The sale will be free and clear of all liens or other claims inferior to the Service's
lien.
C. · The sale of the property by public auction must be held on the front steps of
the Montgomery County Courthouse.
D. The date and time for the sale is to be announced by the Service.
E. After the Service has determined the date and time for the sale, it must include
it in the notice of sale and mail the notice, by regular and certified mail, retum
receipt requested, to:
Joshua D. Smeltzer
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
United States Department of]ustice
7r7 North Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 752or
John P. Trowbridge,Jr.
9816 Memorial Boulevard, Suite 205
Humble, Texas 7733 8
F. The date and time of the auction must be announced by the Service by
advertising the sale once each week for four consecutive weeks in at least one
generally circulated newspaper in Montgomery County, Texas, through the
Houston Association of Realtors, and otherwise at the discretion of the Service.
The notice of sale will describe the property and the terms of the sale in this
order in brief, direct, and plain English.
G. The minimum bid will be determined by the Service and must be in the notice
of sale. If the minimum bid is not rnet, the Service may hold a new sale with a
reduced minimum bid.
H. Each successful bidder must deposit at the time of the sale atleast10% of the bid
by a certi.&ed or cashier's check payable to the United States District Court.
Before being allowed to bid, bidders must have shown that they can comply.
I. The buyer must pay the Service within 28 clays after his bid is accepted by
certified or cashier's check payable to the United States District Court. If the
buyer does not comply, his deposit is forfeited and will be used to cover the
expenses of the sale, with residue applied to Trowbridge's tax liabilities. The
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 27 of 37 PageID #: 541
clerk will distribute the deposit, by a c:hec:k to the United States Treasury. The
property will again be offered for sale under the terms of this order or sold to
the next highest bidder. The United States may bid as a credit against its
judgment without tender of cash.
5. Until Trowbridge vacates the property, he must preserve it in its current condition and
insure it against fires and casualties. He must do nothing that reduces the value of the
property like vandalism or recording liens.
6. IfTrowbridge interferes with the sale, vandalizes the property, or attempts to re•enter
it. he may be punished with fines, incarceration, or both.
7. By noon onJune 6, 2ox4, Trowbridge must vacate the property. Ifhe does not leave,
the United States Marshal will evict him. The marshal may use reasonable force to
enter the property and arrest people who interfere. Unremoved personal property is
forfeited, and the Service must dispose of it in a commercially reasonable manner.
Proceeds from the sale of his personal property must be applied to his tax liabilities.
9. After the sale is confirmed, the clerk will distribute the proceeds in this order:
B. Second, to the Service for the reasonable costs of the sale, which will be
examined by the court at conf'irmation.
xo. All remaining pi:oceeds are to be held by the clerk until this courr orders othenvise.
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 28 of 37 PageID #: 542
II. The Unitecl States Marshal will serve Trow bridge with this order.
+ I. ....
-
United States DistrictJudge
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 29 of 37 PageID #: 543
ELECTRONIC DATA CARRIERS OF TEXAS UPDATED 10/22/13 PRINTDATE
2228 WIRTCREST LANE, SUITE G !TEXAS MAX-38 0 Form 160 (INS) BOLNUMBER
HOUSTON, TX 77055 EFF 5/01/13 0 Form 162 (VAL) P 0 NUMBER
(713) 680-9600
TXDMV 005344018C USDOT 1811946 0 GP for days 0 NTE 0 Pre-Existing Contract
data nows from the Cube Sheet, You may oveiwrite }11 1
fril!l!!l"l·"fa111 - 0 Rate BOL
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE Conslgnee JOHN TROWBRIDGE
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City PORTER TX Zip 77365 City HOUSTON TX Zip 77055
County MONTGOMERY Phone County _H_A_R_R_IS_ _ _ _ __ Cell
------
XTRA STOP 1 ZIP XTRA STOP 2 ZIP XTRA STOP 3 ZIP
--- ---
DATES PickUp Delivery
Invoice To: Attn: Earliest
--------
Address Latest
------------------,,-,--.---
CI ty _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ State Zip Preferred I06/06/14 l
D Expedited @ 5000 Lbs D Complete Occupancy D Exclusive Use D Space Reservation
D Selected Del @ Lbs Vehicle Cu Ft No Cu Ft Ordered No Cu Ft
WEIGHT ADDITIVES LIN FT Wf ADD TRK G-MJLES © EaseMaker
Airplane, Glider Truck 1 Truck 2
30 '
Camper, Camper Shell, unmounted Gross Weight
Boat, Sailboat <14 Ft Tare Weight
Boat, Sailboat 14 Ft+ NET Weight
_ _ Boat Trailer, any length AUTO Weight
Canoe, Skiff, Dlnghle, Kayak 14 Ft+ Wf Additives
_ _ Travel Camper, Horse Trailer Total Weight
Mini-Mobile Home COMBINED WEIGHT
Sf;R\llC_ES
0 FULL SERVICE PACK 0 OT 66.45 Cwt
- - - Lbs n ----
0 FULL SERVICE UNPACK 0 OT 15.20 Cwt Lbs n ____
D lo -
FOR CRATES, SEE
"OTHER SERVICES"
BELOW
DESCRIP QTY RATE AMOUNT QTY RATE AMOUNT QTY RATE AMOUNT
Dishpack 34 44.95 1528.30 61.60 26.20 L!:=:=======!l
1.5Ctn 16 8.95 143.20 16.50 7.35
3.0 Ctn 1 13.15 13.15 25.45 11.85
4.5 Ctn 4 15.55 62.20 31.40 11.85
6.0 Ctn 18.50 35.60 13.35
6.5 Ctn 19.20 41.40 15,75
Wardrobe 33, 10 19.95 12, 70
Crib Matt 12.20 15.00 3.70
Sgl Matt 21.95 17.75 10,70
Dbl Matt 27.80 17.75 10.70
K/Q Matt 51.25 26,85 17.45
Long Sgl 30.40 18.40 10.70
Mirror Ctn 36 34.40 1238.40 54,30 22.65
TOTALS 91 2985.25
NET CHARGE 2985.25 CUSTOM PACKING n 2985.25 2985.25
NnTI=.• !=OR I r.n TV RnY _c:;,::,:: "OTl-lt=R" r.l l!=:T()M I INPl<IN(.:l l"i
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 30 of 37 PageID #: 544
I'
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE
2
n _____
n ----
n
WAITING TIME IF LESS THAN 200 MILES, 1 FREE HR; 200+ MILES= 2 FREE HRS
1STDAYORIG TRUCK MAN _ _ HRS@ /HR n ____
ADDTLDAYS TRUCK MAN HRS @ /HR r1
1ST DAY DEST TRUCK MAN HRS@ /HR n- ---
___ _
ADDTL DAYS TRUCK MAN HRS@ /HR r1 _ _ __
f.'Uliiii! WEIGHT MILES
0 AT ORIGIN --- LBS DOT n
0 AT DESTINATION _ _ _ LBS 0 OT n----
SELF STORAGE PICKUP I DELIVERY
0 AT ORIGIN _ _ _ LBS 0 OT r: - - - -
0 AT DESTINATION
--- LBS 0 OT n ----
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 31 of 37 PageID #: 545
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE
l•WisU'Mi!•M•lltilN!•M•* n ____
3
0 AT ORIGIN LBS
--- CWT
0 AT DESTINATION LBS
--- CWT r1 ____
ORIGIN STORAGE D Whole Shipment Partial Weight
- - - Lbs
LOCATION
- - - - DATEIN
1st Day Stg Lbs Cwt
- - - - DATEOUT n ____
Whse Handling _ _ _ Lbs Cwt n
Addtl Stg Lbs Cwt /Day X n ---
Valuation Type RVP 15% of ___ = ___ X _ _ 15-Day Periods n-____
Bulky Items Stored:
n ____
n ----
n ----
n ____
n
@SIT PICKUP Miles n----
ATTEMPT P/U
- - - Lbs Truck Man HRS n
D 01- - - n----
---
0 SIT PICKUP BY CWT
- - - Lbs --- cwt
PAPERING I PADDING
- - - CU FT - - - /CU FT n ___
-OIVERSl0N MUST BE >30 MILES, IF <12,000 LBS, $4.50CVVT; IF 12,000 LBS+, $37.45
MILES DIVERTED LBS n ---
TRAVEL TIME - EXTRA DRIVER - -
_ _ _ HRSOTR@ /HR RETURN MILES@ Ml fl ----
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL
MAN
- - - HOURS 0 OT
- - - /HOUR n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
ORIGIN n
DEST STORAGE HANDLING 4480# (in) 201.60 n 201.60 201.60
DEST STORAGE 1ST MONTH 179.20 n 179.20 179.20
DEST STORAGE HANDLING 4480# (OUT) 201.60 n 201.60 201.60
DEST n
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 32 of 37 PageID #: 546
Customer JOHN TROWBRIDGE
4
OTHER SERVICES
ARMOR PACK LCD TV 30"- 59" NO OF TVS Dor n ____
UNPACK LCD TV 30"- 59" NO OF TVS Dor n
CRATING CRATE n ----
n
UNCRATING CRATE
n ----
n- ---
n ___ _
..........;''';"'"······· .
n ----
TOT AL CHARGES
Sale - Approved
Order ID 101697
Approval Code 009798
Amount 5,942.65
Customer Copy
https://secure.paymentech.comlrnanager/receiptAction.do?subaction=generateReceipt&transType=nevi.Order&receiptType=B&org.apache.struts.taglib.html.TOKEN=eda756402e4e4660c8a763b76c55dbdf 1/2
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 34 of 37 PageID #: 548
BALANCE = $
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 36 of 37 PageID #: 550
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 29, 2015, the foregoing DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL, WITH
THAT GIVES THE COURT THE CAPACITY TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND ENTER
COUNTY, TEXAS was served via United States Mail, postage pre-paid, as follows:
Joshua Smeltzer
Department of Justice, Tax Division
717 N. Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75201
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 59 Filed 09/30/15 Page 37 of 37 PageID #: 551
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