Professional Documents
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Doctrine in Civpro Cases
Doctrine in Civpro Cases
HEVA MANAGEMENT
Doctrine: Payment of docket fees is an indispensable requirement for the perfection of an
appeal and before the court acquires jurisdiction over the same.
Fresh Period Rule- an adverse party appealing an adverse judgment/ final order is allowed a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal from receipt of the order denying a motion
for reconsideration/ new trial.
Final vs Interlocutory Order: 1 st- disposes of the subject matter in its entirety leaving nothing
more to be done by the court.
Remedy: appeal under Rule 41
2nd- does not completely dispose the case but leaves something to be done
Remedy: special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
In this case, the property involved has no assessed value but the property was only valued at P2, 826.
Applying the exception above, the MTC therefore has jurisdiction in the case and not the RTC.
Remedy: RTC must immediately dismiss the case for having no jurisdiction, without prejudice to the
parties’ filing of a new one before the MTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
ORBETA vs ORBETA
Doctrine: An action for cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a personal action since it is not
expressly included in the enumeration under Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the ROC. Similarly, an action to annul a
contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. Hence, where respondent
resides is the proper venue for the complaint to be filed.
TENORIO vs PANO
Doctrine: Where it is alleged that the contract has been breached, reason for which the other
party demands its resolution and the return of the property subject thereof, the action is an action for
the recovery of the possession of land and in accordance with Section 1, Rule 4,ROC, the action should
be filed where the property is situated.
ARUEGO vs. CA
Doctrine: The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings/ events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case.
The action brought by Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the
Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested
right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was
vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from
this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it
was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a
minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the RTC, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.
ENERIO vs ALAMPAY
Doctrine: The totality rule will apply.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same parties constitutes
the basis of jurisdiction and for determining the jurisdictional amount. The claim for P978.00 actual
damages, P10,000 moral damages, P15,000 exemplary damages, and P3,000 AF fall within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
FLORES vs MALLARE-PHILIPPS
Doctrine: In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject
to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and
neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
TIJAM vs SIBONGHANOY
Doctrine: In Tijam, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed by the Surety almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At
several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety
invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Tijam applies only to exceptional circumstances. The general rule remains: a court’s lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case.
REPUBLIC vs BANTIGUE
Doctrine: petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal.
Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records
were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of
the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to
the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal,
petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of
estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal. In this case, petitioner Republic has not
displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket fees. After resolving thrice
the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found that these had been paid one (1)
year and 11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision.
Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but
failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that they paid these only on July 8, 1999, 23
or after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for payment, which was December 11,
1998. Clearly, the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to appeal, had long
become final and executory.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level
rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
NG SOON vs ALDAY
Doctrine: While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the
exact amount of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount
of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to
compute the docket fees payable. Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing
money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not fatal not
only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly
implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.
Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The sums
claimed were ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141, section 5(a).
PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER vs JUDGE ALAMEDA
Doctrine: In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test is as
follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer?
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP vs CA
Doctrine: By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent
was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it
had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the fact remains that it
precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second case. This is a compelling reason to
dismiss the second case.
JUAN BAYANG vs CA
Doctrine: A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the
former judgment must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between
the first case and the second case identity of parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of
action.
Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being
so, it should follow that the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case
by summary judgment.
VIDAL vs ESCUETA
Doctrine: the time line in Section 417 should be construed to mean that if the obligation in the
settlement to be enforced is due and demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period
should be counted from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due
and demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be
counted from the date the obligation becomes due and demandable.
By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of the settlement
should be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is regardless of the nature of the
complaint before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for therein. The venue for such actions is governed by
Rule 4, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for the enforcement of a
settlement is not one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civil cases; 30 hence, the
rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
ARCELONA vs CA
Doctrine: it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all
the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the action. In other
words, a tenant who fails to implead all the coowners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the
entire co-owned land.
Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of
indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.
It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies
available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court 25 on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time
petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six (6) months from the entry thereof; second, a
direct action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for
certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own
recitals.
DAVID LU vs LU YM et al
Doctrine: In the current controversy, the main purpose of the complaint filed before the RTC
was the annulment of the issuance of the 600,000 LLDC shares of stocks because they had been
allegedly issued for less than their par value. Thus, David sought the dissolution of the corporation and
the appointment of receivers/management committee. To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the
dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions
which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or real property
would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action. Therefore, the case
before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Even assuming that the subject in the instant case is capable of pecuniary estimation, still, the
case should not be dismissed because the insufficiency of the fees actually paid was belatedly raised;
David relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and if there is a deficiency, it may instead be
considered a lien on the judgment that may hereafter be rendered.