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REMEDIAL LAW

General Principles; Liberal Construction of the Rules of Court

Question: Deceased Francisco owned the subject property and sold the same
to Esperanza. MFC purchased the subject property from Esperanza by virtue
of a Kasulatan. In 1989, during the lifetime of Francisco, his last will and
testament was submitted to probate before the RTC. The estate of Francisco
(respondent) filed a case against Esperanza seeking to annul the title of MFC.
The RTC ruled in respondent’s favor. On appeal before the CA, the latter
court required MFC to file its appellant brief on August 15, 2013. On
December 20, 2013, MFC filed a motion to be given the opportunity to file it
appeal brief. It alleged that it received the notice dated August 15, 2013
sometime in September and had until October 15, 2013 within which to file its
brief. However, MFC only discovered the said notice which was apparently
filed in another case folder during their year-end inventory in December 2013.
Thus, MFC asked for an additional period of 30 days from December 19, 2013,
or until January 19, 2014, within which to file its brief, which the CA later
granted.
On February 6, 2014, MFC filed its motion to admit appellant’s brief, but the
CA denied, holding that MFC failed to file its brief within the reglementary
period. It noted that despite the grant of an extension of time to file, it only
filed its brief on February 6, 2014 or 18 days after the last day of extension
granted by the CA.
Was the CA’s denial of the motion justified?
Answer: No. Generally, the rules of procedure must be strictly followed because "the
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with
the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost."
Acting on such appeals, the CA has the authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file
the appellant's brief in the exercise of its judicial discretion. However, the CA must
still adhere to the fundamentals of justice and fairness, bearing in mind the
peculiar circumstances and deciding matters on a case-by-case basis.
We find that MFC should be afforded the amplest opportunity for its case to be decided
on the merits and not on mere technicalities. When MFC filed its motion with the
attached appellant's brief, it was a clear indication that it did not abandon its appeal.
We have previously allowed the relaxation of these rigid rules of procedure in order to
serve substantial justice in considering (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of
the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought
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is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. 
This Court notes that MFC stands to lose its property rights due to a technicality for
the belated filing of its appellant's brief attributed to its former counsel's negligence.
We are of the view that the belated filing of its brief was an honest mistake and not an
attempt to delay the proceedings of the case. Considering the foregoing, We find that
the disposition of this case on the merits will best serve the ends of justice. Thus, this
Court deems it appropriate to remand the case to the CA for further proceedings.
(Mega Fishing Corporation v. Estate of Gonzales, G.R. No. 214781, March 9,
2022, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Liberal Construction of the Rules of Court
Question: The Republic opposed the application for registration filed by the
heirs of Sta. Ana on the ground that the property was previously subject of
another registration and that a prior decree of registration had already been
issued as reported by the LRA. There were no available records of the
supposed prior cadastral proceedings and no other party has come forward to
challenge the heirs’ ownership. Should the registration of the property be
allowed?
Answer: Yes. We agree that indeed, there are no available records bearing the
so-called Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984 or the decision or decree of
registration or title issued therein. The only single entry in the records is found on
page 80 of the LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots: "a portion of said lot is already
covered by a certificate of title pursuant to the decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 10."
But no matter how we look at it, we cannot deduce therefrom the actual text of the
decision, the exact portion of Lot 459 affected, or the parties in whose favor the
supposed title was issued, including the details of this supposed title. For sure, it
would be the height of injustice for respondents to be held hostage or
punished by reason of the plain scarcity of the records on file with the
government agencies concerned. It is certainly illegal, immoral, and against
public policy and order for respondents who have been vested with a legal
right to be precluded from exercising it, sans any real remedy under the law.
Although we recognize that a final and executory decision in a land registration case
does not ever become extinct, here, again, the records are simply too scarce for
any court of law or the LRA itself to ascertain what exactly should be executed
in terms of the text of the decision.
We therefore fully concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
only right and logical thing to do under the circumstances is to allow the
execution of the final and executory Decision dated October 26, 1967 for
registration of the entire Lot 459 filed by the same Julian Sta. Ana and
Mercedes Sta. Ana who are respondents' predecessors-in-interest thereto.
Remarkably, no private party has ever come forward to oppose the claim of
ownership invariably asserted by respondents' predecessors-in-interest over
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the entire Lot 459 or a portion thereof. In any event, whatever decision, if any, may
have been issued over a portion of Lot 459 in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record
No. 984, there is no existing title found in the records pertaining to that portion.
Consequently, there can be no double titling to speak of resulting from the order of
execution in LRC Case No. N-5999 (in relation to the Decision dated October 26, 1967),
as affirmed in CA-G.R. SP No. 139385. (Republic v. Tapay, G.R. No. 157719, March
2, 2022, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
Question: Sen. Angara filed a complaint for damages against Palafox, Jr. who
authored the unsigned letter containing defamatory statements against him.
In the complaint, it indicates that Sen. Angara is holding office in Pasay City.
Thus, it was filed in the said city. Palafox, Jr. moved for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of improper venue because as both their residence is
in Makati City, the complaint must be filed there and not in Pasay City. Sen.
Angara countered that it is allowed under Article 360 of the RPC. The RTC
denied the motion of Palafox, Jr. and his subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Aggrieved, Palafox, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari directly
with the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the RTC. Will the petition
prosper? 
Answer: The petition will not prosper. In Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, We summarized such
rule and the exceptions thereto: Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has
been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (I) when dictated by the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the
broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. We have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of strictly respecting this rule. In Pemberton v.
De Lima, We said that the Court may only act when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception. Further, We
have held that such serious and important reasons must be "clearly stated in
the petition."
Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the concurrent
jurisdiction of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not bother to provide any
reason or explanation to justify his noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of
courts. Further, when he was required to reply to Sen. Angara's Comment containing
the latter's argument on the violation of hierarchy of courts, he simply manifested his
adoption of his previous arguments in the Petition. This constitutes a clear disregard of
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the hierarchy of courts and merits the dismissal of the Petition. (Palafox, Jr. v. Hon.
Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
Question: What is the sequence of hierarchy of courts? 
Answer: The hierarchy begins from the trial courts, then the Court of Appeals and
other intermediate courts, then finally, the Supreme Court. This sequence recognizes;
(1) the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under the
Constitution and by law; (2) their ranking and effect of their ruling in relation with one
another; and (3) how they interact with one another. (Palafox, Jr. v. Hon. Mendiola,
G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Administrative Remedies
Question: Give the general rule and the exceptions to the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
Answer: In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, the general rule is that before a party
may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded
him by administrative processes, specially where the issue demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include
situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated, to wit: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (t) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; j) where there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is
involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. (Professional Regulation
Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, February 14, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Administrative Remedies
Question: AAA was found guilty of unprofessional conduct and/or
dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional Teachers (Board),
which operates under the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), for
using fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and
professional license.
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AAA filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Board.
Without elevating the case to the PRC, AAA directly filed a petition for review
with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA granted AAA’s
petition for review and reversed the ruling of the Board. 
The PRC argues that the petition should have been dismissed for AAA’s
failure to avail administrative reliefs. Is the PRC correct?
Answer: Yes, PRC is correct. Under the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence;
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action.
Here, AAA denied the PRC of its opportunity to review the Board's decision and if
necessary, correct or modify the same, without resorting to the judiciary and
unnecessarily adding to the courts' already clogged dockets. This is contrary to the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action. (Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo,
G.R. No. 214435, February 14, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Administrative Remedies
Question: Under their Contract for the Supply of Electricity (CSE), National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) obliged itself to supply power to
Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC) through the 138kV Aplaya-PSC line.
Cagayan Electric Power Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO) expressed interest in
acquiring the 138kV Aplaya-PSC line on the ground that said line is a
sub-transmission asset which can be sold by TRANSCO to a qualified
distribution facility or consortium under R.A. No. 9136, otherwise known as
the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2000 (EPIRA). However, TRANSCO
classified the 138kV Aplaya-PSC line as a transmission asset, and therefore
cannot be sold or disposed of or even offered for sale to CEPALCO.
Disagreeing with the foregoing classification by TRANSCO, CEPALCO brought
the matter for dispute resolution before the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC). The ERC granted CEPALCO's petition and classified the 138kV
Aplaya-PSC line as a sub-transmission asset. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the ERC. Did the CA erred in affirming the decision of
the ERC?
Answer: No. Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies, such
as the ERC in the instant case, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the
reviewing authority. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law, none of which obtains in this case.  As properly held by the CA,
the ERC has the sole authority to set the standards of the transmission voltages and
other factors that shall distinguish transmission assets from sub-transmission assets,
pursuant to the provisions of the EPIRA and its IRR. Section 4(b) and (c) of Rule of the
EPIRA’s IRR proves that the 138kV Aplaya-PSC Line is a sub-transmission asset which is
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subject to divestment by TRANSCO. (Philippine Sinter Corp. v. National

Transmission Corp., G.R. No. 192578, September 16, 2020, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Administrative Remedies; Public Interest
Question: May a trial court dismiss outright a case due to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies on the ground of strong public interest?
Answer: No. The "public interest" angle would only excuse the failure to avail of
administrative remedies which would in turn merit the trial court's review of its case, so
as not to dismiss it outright due to procedural infirmities or lack of jurisdiction.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, G.R. No.
214485, January 11, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Dismissal of Criminal Case effect on Administrative
Aspect
Question: Will the dismissal of the criminal case amount to the dismissal of
the administrative case involving the same set of facts?
Answer: No. The dismissal of the criminal case has no bearing on the administrative
aspect of the instant case. 
The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 18879 and 18880 of the RTC does not have any
bearing on the administrative case against petitioner as different degrees of evidence
are required in these actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
needed whereas only substantial evidence will suffice in administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, petitioner's acquittal in the criminal aspect of this case does not affect the
decision reached in the instant administrative case nor carry with it relief from
administrative liability. (Miñao v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No.
231042, February 23, 2022, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Dismissal of Criminal Case effect on Administrative
Aspect
Question: An administrative complaint was filed by Conag in 2011 against the
Vice Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Esperanza,
Masbate (local government officials). On February 22, 2013 (assailed
Decision), the Ombudsman found merit in the complaint and held that the
local government officials were indeed remiss in their duties, imposing upon
them suspension for 6 months. Aggrieved, the local government officials,
including petitioners, filed two separate motions for reconsideration, arguing
in common that the assailed Decision has no basis in fact and law, and that
the suspension was too harsh a penalty. The Ombudsman partially granted
the motions in its May 1, 2013 Order, and reduced the penalty to a fine
equivalent to three-months' salary.
In the meantime, petitioners were re-elected during the May 13, 2013
elections. Unsatisfied with the reduction of the penalty, Conag moved to
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reconsider the Ombudsman's May 1, 2013 Order. However, this was denied by
the Ombudsman for lack of merit in its June 19, 2013 Order.
Thereafter, the local government officials filed a Motion to Stay Execution of
the Ombudsman's assailed Decision as modified by its May 1, 2013 Order
(modified assailed Decision), grounded, among others, on the application of
the condonation doctrine.
Acting on such motion, the Ombudsman rendered its March 24, 2014 Order 22
(second assailed Order), holding that the condonation doctrine does not apply
in petitioners' case because the decision that found them guilty of the offense
had already become executory even before their re-election.
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing that the assailed
Decision and the assailed Orders should be nullified for being rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners insist that they can no longer be
administratively disciplined following their re-election.
Did the Ombudsman act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed Decision and the assailed
Orders?
Answer: No. It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43. In view thereof, and insofar as it seeks to nullify the assailed
Decision and the first assailed Order which are both final issuances, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
As to the second assailed Order, which is an interlocutory order, even though the
special civil action of certiorari may be the proper remedy, petitioners still violated the
hierarchy of courts when they filed the petition directly to this Court without citing any
exception to the rule. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground.
Besides, even if we consider petitioners' arguments on the merits, the Court still finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman when it refused to
implement the modified assailed Decision. Significantly, decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases are required to be executed as a matter of
course.
In fact, not even the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review can
stay the immediate implementation of Ombudsman decisions, resolutions, or orders in
administrative disciplinary cases. Only a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, can
produce such effect as stated in Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01,
Series of 2006. (Monterde v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022,
Hernando, J.)

General Principles; Question of Law and of Fact

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Question: What is the distinction between a question of law and of fact?

Answer: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants, but must solely rely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the
facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question
posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to the question by
the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without
examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise,
it is a question of fact.
Stated differently, "there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts." (East West
Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, July 12, 2021, Hernando, J.)
General Principles; Question of Law and of Fact
Question: Are there any exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass
upon and review the findings of fact by the CA?
Answer: Yes. Jurisprudence held, quoting the case of Medina v. Asistio, Jr., there are
exceptions to the rule wherein the Court may pass upon and review the findings of fact
by the CA, to wit: 
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.
The instant case falls under the exceptions since the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the RTC, and is based on the supposed absence of evidence,
i.e., the Franchise Verifications, but is contracted by the evidence on record. True, the
issues of whether the Franchise Verifications were indeed attached to the
Reply-Affidavit filed by SSS so as to prove that JMA Transport was still in operation after
1999, and whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in directing the prosecution
to conduct reinvestigation for the purpose of admitting respondents' controverting
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evidence against the same are both factual in nature. The Court observes that the
findings of the CA were premised mainly on the Franchise Verifications which were
allegedly not found in the records. However, upon our review of the records, We find
that the said Franchise Verifications were actually appended to the Reply of SSS
contrary to the observation of the appellate court. Hence, it is only proper to give due
course to the instant petition. (Social Security System v. Seno, Jr., G.R. No.
183478, February 10, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; Agrarian Disputes
Question: AAA was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in
Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. In 1993, the parcels of land were
placed under the coverage of the CARP. Hence, AAA’s titles to the parcels of
land were cancelled, and new titles were issued in favor of BBB a Farmer, as a
CARP beneficiary.
AAA filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB. She
also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR. While the
appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB, AAA claimed
that BBB surreptitiously entered the property and refused to vacate despite
repeated demands.  This prompted AAA to file the instant complaint for
forcible entry before the MCTC.
Does the MCTC have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Answer: No, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisprudence dictates
that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts. Those involving
agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts.
In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, the Court held that under Section 19
of R.A. No. 9700, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases
pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present: 
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in
nature; and 
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
In this case, the two requisites were met as AAA sufficiently alleged that the land in
dispute were awarded to BBB as a CARP beneficiary, thus, the issue of possession was
linked to an agrarian dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to BBB. As stated by RA
9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. The status of
BBB as a farmer was also not disputed by AAA. 
In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC
should dismiss the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear that the DAR,
through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries. CLOAs were issued to BBB being a beneficiary of CARP. Recipients of
CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded. As BBB entered the subject parcel of
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lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by AAA as forcible
entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Thus, the DAR, through the
DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian
dispute. (Dayrit v. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631, December 7, 2021, Hernando,
J.)
Jurisdiction; Summons; Personal Service
Question: Jay was out of the country due to his overseas employment from
August 7, 2012 to January 5, 2013. A temporary restraining order, petition
and summons regarding his VAWC case were issued to him in which the
sheriff attempted to personally serve it in his house and in his employment
office, but to no avail. Atty. Palmero, his counsel in a separate criminal case,
in lieu of Jay, received the documents. Is there a valid service of summon?
Answer: No. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons should
be served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in
accordance with Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies
at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. - When any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who
is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against him, unless he was validly served with
summons. Thus, serving the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a
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valid service of summons. (Sabado v. Sabado, G.R. No. 214270, May 12, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; MCTC
Question: AAA filed a petition for partition before the MCTC. Although the
complaint was captioned as a petition for partition, there was nothing to
partition about the parcel of land subject of the petition. As stated, the
disputed portions of subject land had already been long segregated and
conveyed to BBB who further sold them to CCC. However, the allegations of
the petition raised the issue of whether the late AAA owned the surveyed and
segregated 15,000-square-meter portion of the land with a total value of
P19,100.00. Does the MCTC have jurisdiction over the petition?
Answer: Yes, the MCTC has jurisdiction. As a rule, what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Here, the ultimate issue is whether
the late AAA owned the subject land covered with a total value of P19,100.00. Under
the law, the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions involving title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00, thus, the MCTC may act
on the complaint filed and render the appropriate judgment. (Willy v. Julian, G.R. No.
207051, December 1, 2021, Hernando, J.)
NOTE: Under R.A. No. 11576, Sec. 2 which amended Sec. 33 of B.P. 129, MTC
has “exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or any interest therein does not exceed Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) exclusive on interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.”
Jurisdiction; DARAB; Agrarian Dispute
Question: Jose, a farmer-beneficiary under PD 27 was awarded a parcel of
land (subject land). A TCT was then transferred in Jose’s name by DAR. Jose
obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc. (respondent bank) secured by a
mortgage over the subject land. But he failed to pay the obligation so the
mortgage was foreclosed in favor of the respondent bank. A certificate of sale
was then registered in the latter’s favor.
A year passed but neither Jose nor his heirs redeemed the subject land. Thus,
ownership was consolidated in the bank’s favor.  Respondent bank filed a
verified petition for cancellation of the TCT issued in favor of Jose covering
the subject land before the PARAD. Petitioner filed an Answer arguing that the
PARAD had no jurisdiction. The PARAD granted the bank’s petition. The
DARAB reversed the PARAD. The CA, in turn, reversed the DARAB and
reinstated the PARAD Decision.
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Does DARAB have jurisdiction?

Answer: None. DARAB has no jurisdiction as there is no agrarian dispute
between the parties. The Court, in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, held that the
jurisdiction of the DAR concerns the (1) determination and adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform; (2) resolution of agrarian conflicts and
land-tenure related problems; and (3) approval or disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring, or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. The DAR, in turn, exercises this jurisdiction
through its adjudicating arm, the DARAB.
Even if the case involves cancellation of an EP, an agrarian dispute between the parties
should first exist for the then DARAB or DAR Secretary to acquire jurisdiction.
Tenancy relationship between the parties must exist for the DARAB to acquire
jurisdiction. The following indispensable elements should therefore first be
established: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. These elements have not
been satisfied in the present case.
There was no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent bank over the
subject land. Neither did they have any leasehold or agrarian relations when the
respondent bank filed its petition with the DARAB. In fact, the respondent bank did not
allege in its petition that such kind of relationship exists between them. What is crystal
clear in the instant case is that respondent bank's petition for cancellation of certificate
of title stemmed from the subject land's foreclosure. There was therefore no agrarian
dispute notwithstanding the fact that the land involved is an agricultural land. Thus,
respondent's petition should have been dismissed by the DARAB for lack of
jurisdiction.
Admittedly, petitioners did not question the DARAB's jurisdiction or the lack thereof.
However, the Court could not simply ignore this especially since it is apparent from the
face of the petition that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, a
material allegation which would confer jurisdiction to the DARAB.
Respondent bank’s recourse should have been with the Register of Deeds, not
DARAB. Respondent bank, being the purchaser in the foreclosure sale of the subject
land and after Jose's failure to redeem the same, should have at least first brought its
cause before the appropriate Register of Deeds, not before the DAR. The CA thus erred
in reversing the Decision of the DARAB since the petition to cancel TCT No. EP-86727 is
beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR. (Heirs of De Lara, Sr. v. Rural Bank of Jaen,
Inc., G.R. No. 212012, March 28, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; Grave Abuse of Discretion
 13

Question: Sumni filed a complaint against her former employer, Hyorin

Studios, in which she won because the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the NLRC. Consequently, Hyorin Studios filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion
when it didn’t deny the petition filed by Sumni, that the said decision should
only be left on the discretion of the NLRC.  Is Hyorin Studios’ contention with
merit?
Answer: No. Grave abuse of discretion is defined in jurisprudence as such capricious
and arbitrary exercise of judgment as equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of
jurisdiction. Factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect, but the appellate
court is not precluded from reviewing evidence alleged to be arbitrarily considered or
otherwise disregarded by the former. The CA's power of judicial review under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court empowers it "to examine the records and evaluate the pieces of
evidence in. order to confirm their materiality and significance, and to disregard the
labor tribunal's factual findings whenever its conclusions were not substantiated by the
evidence on record” (G & S Transport Corporation v. Medina, G.R. No. 243768,
September 05, 2022, Hernando, J.)

Jurisdiction; DAR; Tenancy Relationship

Question: Buncio filed an illegal possession case against respondents who
alleged that their forebears have leasehold agreement with the parents of
Buncio before the RTC. Respondents opposed the complaint arguing that DAR
is the one that has jurisdiction since there is a tenancy relationship. The RTC
referred the case to DAR. Is the RTC correct?
Answer: Yes. We note that the core issue herein is which between the RTC and the
DAR has jurisdiction over the case. An accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership over real property, the jurisdiction of which is within the proper RTC. On the
other hand, Section 50 of RA 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order No. (EO)
229 vested upon the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. Subsequently, EO 129-A was issued wherein the
power to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and
jurisdiction over the implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR
regional offices. 
We underscore that even prior to RA 9700 and DAR AO 04, Series of 2009 which
Buncio argues should not have been given retroactive effect as to set aside the RTC's
January 30, 2008 Order, the following similar provisions of RA 6657 and the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure were already in place upon the filing of her January 8, 2007
Complaint, the provisions of which indicate that it is the DARAB that has jurisdiction to
adjudicate an agrarian dispute.
 14

An agrarian dispute includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands

acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. 
In Velasquez v. Spouses Cruz, We defined tenancy relationship as "a juridical tie which
arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of
which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating
the land."
As a rule, the existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and
allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.  Thus, in order for tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, viz.:

1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and
6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. 
All the foregoing requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.
In Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, We emphasized that "crucial for the creation of tenancy
relations would be the existence of two of the essential elements, namely, consent and
sharing and/or payment of lease rentals. 
In the instant case, respondents substantially alleged that there existed a tenancy
relationship among the parties, in particular among the parents of Buncio and Hilario
in view of their leasehold agreement. Furthermore, respondents' claim that pursuant to
said agreement, she and her husband, Hilario, have been paying the agreed rentals of
the landholdings, to the lessors or Buncio's parents. These allegations suffice for the
referral of the dispute to the DAR. "As stated by law, mere allegation of an
agrarian dispute is enough." (Dy Buncio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206120, March 23,
2022, Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; Petition for Declaratory Relief
 15

Question: CIR issued tax assessments to Standard Insurance Co., a non-life

insurance company, for deficiency of documentary stamp taxes. The latter
filed for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, it filed with the RTC the
Petition for Declaratory Relief with a prayer for issuance of a TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the implementation of Sections 108 and 184
of the NIRC. It contended that the facts of the case must be appreciated
considering the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10001 (RA 10001) entitled An
Act Reducing the Taxes on Life Insurance Policies, the tax rate for life
insurance premiums which reduced from 5% to 2%. Is the corporation correct?
Answer: No, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Petition for
Declaratory Relief and issuing an injunction against the collection of taxes. CA 55
provides that petitions for declaratory relief do not apply to cases where a taxpayer
questions his liability for the payment of any tax under any law administered by the
BIR.
SECTION 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in a
Court of First Instance to determine any question of construction or validity arising
under such deed, contract, instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder: Provided, however, That the provisions of this Act shall not apply to
cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or
charge collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief against the
imposition of tax liability or validity of tax assessments. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Standard Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 219340 (Resolution), April
28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; Barangay Conciliation
Question: Where are the venues to conduct barangay conciliation proceedings
as a pre-condition in filing a complaint in court?
Answer: Under Sec. 409 of RA 7160, the following are the venues of barangay
conciliation proceedings:
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
 16

where such workplace or institution is located. (Ngo v. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707,
August 24, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Jurisdiction; Barangay Conciliation
Question: What cases are not covered by the mandatory barangay
conciliation?
Answer: According to Admin. Circular No. 14-9330, the following cases are not
covered by the mandatory barangay conciliation:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
3. Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and
municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable
settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
4. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnership or juridical entities, since only
individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants
or respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
5. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
Lupon;
6. Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
7. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
8. Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being
committed or further continued, specifically the following:
a. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (see Sec. 412 (b)
(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law);
b. Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over
another or a person illegally deprived or on acting in his behalf;
c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the
action; and
d. Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations. (Ngo v. Gabelo et al.,
G.R. No. 207707, August 24, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Cause of Action
Question: Define what is a cause of action.
 17

Answer: Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another''. (Purificacion v. Gobing, G.R.
No. 191359, November 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Cause of Action
Question: A parcel of land located in Cavite was formerly owned by AA and
BB. CC and DD, spouses, were tenants in the foregoing subject lot. Atty. V,
representing the former landowners of the subject lot, sold it to EE. Atty. V
paid the CC and DD a disturbance compensation amounting to P1,046,460.00.
However, CC claimed that in addition to the foregoing amount, she and her
late husband had a mutual agreement with Atty. V and EE that they will
relinquish their tenancy rights over the subject lot, except the 1,000 square
meter portion where their house is located, as part of the disturbance
compensation.
To support her claim, CC presented the an unnotarized Malayang Salaysay
dated July 1, 1993 as an evidence which stated that “Na isinasagawa namin
ang lahat na ito kapalit ng Disturbance Compensation na halagang ISANG
MILYON APATNAPU'T ANIM NA LIBO AT APAT NA RAAN ANIM NA PUNG PISO
(P1,046,460.00) at ISANG LIBONG METRO CUADRADONG (1,000 SQM) LUPA at
kusang loob at walang sinumang tumakot o pumilit o nangako ng anuman pa
sa amin.”
However, CC claimed that respondents did not fulfill their promise to give
them 1,000 square meters of the subject lot. Instead, EE demanded CC to
vacate the land.
Allegedly, CC filed a Complaint for Disturbance Compensation on January 3,
2000, but it has already prescribed.
Will CC’s complaint prosper? Explain.
Answer: No. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another". In the instant case, CC’s cause
of action arose when they executed the notarized Malayang Salaysay dated July 1,
1993. In the said document, the Purificacion spouses relinquished their tenancy rights
in favor of the former landowners in exchange for P1,046,460.00, representing their
disturbance compensation. On January 3, 2000, or more than six years from the time
they acknowledged having received the foregoing amount as their disturbance
compensation, CC filed the instant complaint and claimed that the payment of the said
disturbance compensation was incomplete since Atty. V allegedly promised them a
1,000 square meter portion of the subject lot as an additional disturbance
compensation. However, in view of the period prescribed under Section 38 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, an action to enforce any cause of action under the
Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action
accrued.
 18

Therefore, CC’s present action is barred by prescription. (Purificacion v. Gobing,

G.R. No. 191359, November 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Splitting of Cause of Action
Question: BM Merchandising is a sole proprietorship owned by BM. It entered
into a loan agreement with FEBTC in the amount of P5,000,000 and secured by
a real estate mortgage as well as a chattel mortgage. FEBTC also granted BM
Merchandising a discounting line facility in the amount of P 15,000,000. It
was partially secured by the same collateral. In both the Loan Agreement and
the Discounting Line Facility there is an acceleration clause which makes all
the obligations of BM Merchandising due and demandable upon default or
non-payment of any of its obligations with FEBTC. BM Merchandising
defaulted and despite demand from FEBTC, it failed to pay all its obligations.
Thus, Bank A proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage
for the discounting line facility and filed a collection suit for the loan
agreement.
HW moved for the dismissal of the collection suit on the ground that Bank A
simultaneously avail the remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and the
collection suit which are alternative remedies. Is HW correct?
Answer: HW is wrong. To put everything in its proper perspective, it must be stressed
that the parties executed two loan agreements, namely: the Loan Agreement, and the
Discounting Line Facility. These two loan facilities granted to HW are separate and
distinct from each other. 
Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action and if, two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as ground for the dismissal
of the others. Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they
give rise to separate causes of action for which separate actions may be
instituted and presented. When money is payable by installments, a distinct cause
of action assails upon the following due by each installment and they may be recovered
in successive action. On the other hand, where several claims payable at different times
arise out of the same transactions, separate actions may be brought as each liability
accounts. But where no action is brought until more than one is due, all that are due
must be included in one action; and that if an action is brought to recover upon one or
more that are due but not upon all that are due, a recovery in such action will be a bar
to a several or other actions brought to recover one or more claims of the other claims
that were due at the time the first action was brought.
In sum, petitioner may institute two alternative remedies against the spouses Berris:
either a personal action for the collection of the promissory notes issued under the
Discounting Line or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both,
simultaneously or successively. Although we recognize the right of the mortgage
creditor to recover the deficiency when the mortgaged properties are not enough to
 19

satisfy the entire obligation, the action is only instituted after the termination of the
foreclosure proceedings and not during its pendency, so as not to violate the
prohibition against splitting of cause of action. 
However, the foregoing rule against splitting of cause of action is not applicable to the
herein collection suit which was drawn against the Loan Agreement. As earlier
discussed, the Loan Agreement is separate and distinct from the Discounting Line.
Thus, there could be no violation of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action
when FEBTC instituted a foreclosure of a mortgage drawn against the Discounting Line
and successively filed a collection suit to recover the debt due against the Loan
Agreement. (Asset Pool A (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Spouses Berris, G.R. No. 203194,
April 26, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Res Judicata

Question: What is res judicata? 

Answer: Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; or a thing or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters determined
in the former suit."
The doctrine of res judicata embodied in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. —
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been [missed] in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
The above-quoted provision embraces two concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
prior judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment, viz.:
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition
of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
 20

between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be
shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment"
would apply. If as between the two cases, only the identity of parties can be shown, but
not identical causes of action, then res judicata as 'conclusiveness of judgment.
(Villaroman v. Estate of Arciaga, G.R. No. 210822, June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Summons
Question: Through an Accion Reivindicatoria, Mikana sought the amendment
of the technical descriptions of the TCTs of the parties involved, which
include Levi. However, Levi was only served with summons through
substituted service, which the court found was not properly justified. Was the
court correct?
Answer:  Yes. Before a substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties
must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable
time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant. If the substituted service will be effected at the defendant's house or
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full
legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. Thus, the person must have the relation of
confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends
the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to
the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution), April
18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Res Judicata

Question: Spouses Husband and Wife obtained a loan from ABC Bank secured
by a real estate mortgage. Spouses failed to pay and even redeem the
property within the prescribed redemption period, subsequently the Transfer
Certificates of Title were transferred to ABC Bank, the highest bidder.
Husband filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and
foreclosure proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and damages before
the RTC but was dismissed. The CA and subsequently the SC affirmed the RTC
decision. Then, Husband executed a document where he relinquished his
rights to the property to his son, Son. Son filed a complaint for quieting of
title alleging that he is the true, lawful, and absolute owner of the property. In
 21

response ABC Bank filed an answer arguing that Son’s complaint is already
barred by res judicata.

Answer: Yes. It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far
as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot
be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held
that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter
in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue
be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit. In this case, identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of
issues.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the validity of the real estate mortgage and
the subsequent foreclosure sale can no longer be attacked in a new complaint for
quieting of title, more so because the decision has become final and an entry of
judgment has already been entered in our books. To put it simply, we have already
ruled, in effect, that ABC Bank is the owner of the subject property as it was acquired
by it through a valid foreclosure sale. Granting the reliefs sought by Son and his heirs
would be inconsistent with the ruling of the court and will disturb the final and
executory Decision in the said case. (Heirs of Casiño, Sr. v. Development Bank of
the Philippines, Malaybalay Branch, Bukidnon, G.R. No. 204052-53, March 11,
2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Government Instrumentalities are Exempt from paying
Docket Fees
Question: Is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority exempt from
payment of docket fees?
Answer: Yes. Under Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended:
Section 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in the rule. Local
governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
BCDA is a government instrumentality because it falls under the definition of an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., "any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with
 22

special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter." It is vested with corporate powers under Section 3 of RA No. 7227. Despite
having such powers, however, the BCDA is considered neither a stock corporation
because its capital is not divided into shares of stocks, nor a non-stock corporation
because it is not organized for any of the purposes mentioned under Section 88 of the
Corporation Code. Instead, the BCDA is a government instrumentality organized for the
specific purpose of owning, holding and/or administering the military reservations in
the country and implementing their conversion to other productive uses. Being a
government instrumentality, the BCDA is exempt from payment of legal fees including
docket fees pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
(Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 205466, January 11, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Venue of Courts
Question: Woo filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of his late father, Wee, with the RTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The said
petition stated that Wee died in Mindoro but his Death Certificate indicates
that his residence at the time of his death was at Tondo, Manila. 
The RTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan motu proprio dismissed the Petition filed
by Woo by reason of improper venue, the court opined that Rule 73, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, as amended, fixes jurisdiction for purposes of special
proceedings for the settlement of estate so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate; thus, it is the RTC
of the province or city where the decedent resided at the time of her death
that has exclusive jurisdiction over decedent's estate. 
Was the trial court correct in dismissing Woo’s petition? 
Answer: No. The RTC committed grave abuse when it motu proprio dismissed Woo’s
petition because of improper venue. The court a quo confused the concepts of
jurisdiction and venue when it asserted that the residence of the decedent is a
foundational fact relating to jurisdiction, and it motu proprio dismissed the petition for
probate on the ground of improper venue under Rule 73, Section 1. Jurisdiction treats
of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the
locality, the place where the suit may be had. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional; a
party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived. It
is settled that courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue. (Gacad, Jr. v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 216107, August 3, 2022,
Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping
Question: What are the elements of forum shopping?
Answer: The Court likewise reminds us that the elements of forum shopping are:
 23

(i) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interest;
(ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the same
facts; and
(iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to Res Judicata in the other
action. (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, G.R.
No. 211563, September 29, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping
Question: PTT Philippine Trading Corp. (PTTPTC) received a demand letter
from the Commissioner of Customs for customs duties, value-added tax and
penalties for its imported fuels. PTTPTC paid it under protest. Then, it filed a
petition for review before the CTA assailing the legality of the demand letter.
Subsequently, it filed 2 more petitions for the refund on the money it paid
under protest. The Commissioner moved for the dismissal of the subsequent
petitions on the ground of forum shopping. Rule on the motion.
Answer: Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, all of which
are substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court. Hence, to constitute forum
shopping, the following elements must be present: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amounts to Res Judicata in the action under consideration.

In finding that there was no forum shopping, the CTA-EB held that the causes of action
of the three petitions differ. In CTA Case No. 7707, PTTPTC questioned the legality of
the November 7, 2007 demand letter and prayed that it be nullified. CTA Case Nos.
8002 and 8023 have similar causes of action as both pray for the refund of the amount
that PTTPTC paid representing erroneously paid taxes and custom duties. However,
CTA Case Nos. 8002 and 8023 are mere supplemental petitions to CTA Case No. 7707.
We agree. 
CTA Case No. 7707 is a protest to an alleged erroneous customs duties assessment. In
this case, PTTPTC prayed for the nullification of the assessment as well as the
November 7, 2007 demand letter ordering PTTPTC to settle the obligation. On the
other hand, CTA Case Nos. 8002 and 8023 are claims for refund of the amount that
respondent paid under protest to the BoC representing its assessment balance
pursuant to the November 7, 2007 demand letter it was contesting in CTA Case No.
7707. Taking into consideration the prayer of PTTPTC in CTA Case No. 8002, on one
hand, and CTA Case No. 8023, on the other hand, the logical conclusion is to regard
both petitions as supplements to CTA Case No. 7707 despite being filed and docketed
 24

as separate petitions. (Commissioner of Customs v. PTT Philippines Trading

Corp., G.R. No. 203138-40, February 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping
Question: SVHFI claimed that it is the registered and absolute owner of a
parcel of land in Pampanga issued in its name as Mabalacat Institute, Inc.
(MII), now known as Don Teodoro V. Santos Institute. DTVSI occupies said lot
without paying rent and only through its tolerance since the year 1983 until
March 14, 2002.
SVHFI informed MII that it will now be charged a rental fee payable every 5th of
the month, otherwise it should vacate the subject lot. Despite such notice, MII
failed to comply. This prompted SVHFI to file a complaint for collection of a
sum of money, with which MII filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of an answer.
This motion was denied, even after submitting it for reconsideration.
MII sought to nullify the court order but was denied. The Petition for Review
on Certiorari was dismissed on the following grounds: (i) the petition was
considered as unsigned pleading for failure to verify the same in accordance
with Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
and (ii) the petition lacks sufficient showing that the assailed judgment was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
MII filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim with the court a quo in the
Collection Case which was admitted in the Order dated June 27, 2007. This
was set for pre-trial. A Motion to Dismiss the collection case was filed on the
ground of forum shopping.
It argued that the failure of SVHFI to report to the court a quo that it filed the
Ejectment Case despite the explicit requirement of Section. 5(c), Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court was a willful and deliberate act of forum shopping on account
of which its complaint should be dismissed. MII likewise charged SVHFI with
violating the rule on splitting of a single cause of action as set forth in
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the same Rules.
Was there forum-shopping in this case?
Answer: No, there is none. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court prohibits forum
shopping by requiring the plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath that he or
she has not commenced any- action involving the same issues in any court.
The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such parties
representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
latter founded, on the same facts; and (iii) any judgment rendered in one action will
amount to Res Judicata in the other action.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the second and third elements of forum
shopping and litis pendentia are lacking. Thus, it is of the firm view that there is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between a suit for collection of sura of
 25

money and an unlawful detainer case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these
actions would not amount to Res Judicata in the other action. (Santos Ventura
Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, G.R. No. 211563, September
29, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Attorney’s Fees
Question: May a party who prayed for an attorney’s fees of only P100,000 in a
Complaint-in-Intervention before the Regional Trial Court, where they paid a
filing fee of a very minimal amount, now claim and be awarded the amount of
P38,521,350.00 by way of attorney’s fees?
Answer: No, a party is precluded from propounding a claim of attorney's fees beyond
that what they prayed for, and that awarded by the RTC. Article 2208 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: 
1. When exemplary damages are awarded;
2. When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
6. In actions for legal support;
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
10. When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (Jacinto
v. Litonjua, G.R. No. 207675, January 20, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Attorney’s Fees
Question: Are trial courts precluded from adjudicating matters
involving attorney's fees?
 26

Answer: No. The trial court may rule on money judgments such as attorney's fees and
record and. enforce attorney's lien in a. petition for cancellation of adverse claim or in
a separate action., at the option of the counsel, claiming the same.
To distinguish, registration or recording of an attorney's lien merely recognizes the
right of the lawyer to claim from the judgment of the suit, whereas the lien can only be
enforced when the money judgment in favor of the counsel's client becomes final and
executory. It is to be noted that among the prayers of Atty. Dominguez in his Motion to
Fix Attorney's Fees is to register a statement of his lien before the rendition of
judgment.
If a lien may be enforced in said petition when the money judgment has become final,
then the registration of the lien may be granted even prior to the judgment in order to
establish the lawyer's claim. The determination and the fixing of attorney's fees may be
deferred until the resolution of the case and the finality of the money judgment in
favor of the lawyer's client. (Dominguez v. Bank of Commerce, G.R. No. 225207,
September 29, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Manner of Taking Deposition
Question: Kushina was going to Cambodia to work in a textile company. At the
airport, she was apprehended for allegedly carrying 3 kg of heroin in her bag.
She was convicted and sentenced to death for Drug Trafficking. Meanwhile in
the Philippines, Orochimaru and Madara, the recruiters of Kushina, were
charged for violations of Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995, Illegal recruitment and
Estafa. Since the testimony of Kushina was considered as vital to the case
filed in the Philippines, the President of Cambodia granted an indefinite
suspension of her execution. The prosecution filed a “Motion for Leave of
Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Chantal by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories.” Orochimaru and Madara objected asserting that the
deposition should be made before and not during the trial; that the
depositions under Rules 23 and 25 are not designed to replace the actual
testimony of the witness in open court and the use thereof is confined only in
civil cases; and that such method will violate their right to confront the
witness or to meet her face to face as provided for under the Constitution.
Were the contentions of Orochimaru and Madara meritorious?
Answer: No. Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave
offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to
perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how
to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is
imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
 27

Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so
long as there is compelling reason.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by applying
suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal proceedings.
For one, in Caños v. Peralta the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge did not
abuse his discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of the criminal
cases that were filed against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned, among others, that
consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.
The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Cojuangco.
Jr. v. Court of Appeals wherein the Supreme Court upheld the consolidation of the
criminal case and civil case that were respectively filed against the petitioners therein.
On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally
construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.
The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that were laid
down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written interrogatories
under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject
of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.   
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — In a
foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in section 14
hereof. 
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of
interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written
interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name
and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days
thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing
to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3) days
 28

after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve

recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of
reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the
victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against
Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the Indonesian President,
His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to afford Mary Jane the
opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines.
Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the
aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters
among signatory states including the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is enforced
precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the
significance of cooperation and coordination among the states to prevent, investigate
and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just
like in the case of drug and human trafficking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges
that were filed against respondents. 
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
(People v. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, September 9, 2019,
Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Indispensable Parties
Question: Abragar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and
non-payment of salaries before the Labor Arbiter against Marble Training
Center which is a training facility of TESDA in cooperation with DTI and the
Provincial Government of Bulacan. All the assets of Marble Training Center
are contributed by TESDA, DTI and the Provincial Government of Bulacan.
Notice was served to the training center but they failed to file an answer
within the reglementary period, thus they were declared in default and
judgment was rendered in favor of Abragar. When no appeal was taken,
Abragar moved for execution which was opposed by TESDA maintaining that
Marble Training Center has no juridical personality and the complaint fails to
implead indispensable parties. Is TESDA correct?
Answer: No. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandate that only natural
or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action and
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
parties-in-interest. In connection thereto, in Litonjua Group of Companies v. Vigan, this
Court found that the Litonjua Group of Companies, which therein respondent sought to
hold solidarity liable for illegal dismissal, was not a legal entity with juridical
personality and hence could not be held a party to the suit. Similarly, the Center which
respondent seeks to hold liable has no juridical personality nor is it an entity
 29

authorized by law to be a party to any action; it has no legal capacity to sue or be sued
and should not have been impleaded as defendant in the instant case. 
Given the foregoing, the proper remedy in this case is the joinder of the proper parties.
In connection thereto, the mandatory rule on joinder of indispensable parties is set
forth in Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This Court has previously laid down the
test to determine if a party is an indispensable party, thus: An indispensable party
is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot
be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party
is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may
properly go forward.
Applying the foregoing test, the Court finds that the MOA Parties are indispensable
parties as their interest in the controversy is such that a final adjudication cannot be
made in their absence, without injuring or affecting their interest. As alleged by
respondent himself, his claims are anchored in his employer-employee relationship
with the Center. In view of the lack of juridical personality of the Center, any judgment
in favor of respondent against the Center would have to be enforced against the
properties contributed by the MOA Parties. Verily, the interest of the MOA Parties in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined such
that their legal presence as a party to the proceedings is an absolute necessity. While
we wish to abide by the mandate on speedy disposition of cases, more so considering
that what is involved here is the welfare of a worker, we cannot allow a judgment that
would ultimately be enforced against one or more of the MOA Parties without giving
them their day in court. To do so will result in a possible violation of due process.
Their inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in
order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair play. (Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority v. Abragar, G.R. No. 201022,
March 17, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Indispensable Parties
Question: PNTC Colleges, Inc. (PNTC) and Time Realty, Inc. (Time Realty)
entered into a Contract of Lease which will run from 2005 to 2007. After the
lease term has ended, the contract was impliedly renewed on a monthly basis
after said date. With the acquiescence of Time Realty, PNTC continued to
occupy the premises for an increased rental rate.
Eventually, Time Realty notified PNTC of its intent not to extend the lease on
the fourth floor anymore and had two options: (1) to extend the lease on the
 30

fourth floor but only until April 2007; or (2) to transfer to the second floor of
the same building. PNTC decided to terminate the lease in April 2007.
PNTC transferred to its new site, but Time Realty now alleges that PNTC did
not settle its outstanding rentals and service (electricity and water) charges,
plus interest/surcharges. Time Realty ordered PNTC to cease its moving out
operations, then retained the remaining properties of PNTC in the premises.
Due to this, PNTC filed a Complaint for Delivery of Personal Properties with
Damages alleging that it suffered serious losses due to Time Realty's
unjustified withholding of its properties.
Time Realty filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that PNTC started
vacating the leased premises absent a formal notice and without paying its
remaining obligations and that remaining properties could not be removed
without damaging the property. It also asserted that NTC left without
restoring the premises in the same condition it was found at the beginning of
the lease. Hence, Time Realty engaged the services of a general contractor in
order to restore the premises to a tenantable condition.
These were denied by PNTC in its reply, stating that the lease contract was
still in effect when the properties were confiscated. Moreover, PNTC insists
that unjust enrichment would result if Time Realty's counterclaims would be
granted, especially when proper accounting and valuation of the properties
have not been made.
Should the compulsory counterclaim of PNTC be granted?
Answer: No. A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant's claim for money or other
relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the
complaint.
To expound, PNTC incurred the obligations mainly because of Paragraph 23 of the
Contract of Lease which states that Time Realty can retain PNTC's properties as
security for unpaid rentals and other charges. Even while Time Realty exercised its
right under the contract, PNTC still filed a Complaint to recover its properties. By doing
so and yet still refusing to pay, PNTC somehow preempted Time Realty's option to file
its own case in order to collect from the former.
Hence, Time Realty filed an Answer with Counterclaim instead. Nonetheless, as Time
Realty was forced to resort to the measures specified in the contract to protect its
interests, its counterclaims should be granted. This is because these counterclaims are
intimately related to the subject matter of the Complaint, particularly the personal
properties of PNTC, which have been withheld and stored by Time Realty. (PNTC
Colleges, Inc. v. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Absence of Counsel during Pre-trial
 31

Question: If the part-defendant is present and the counsel is absent during

pre-trial, will it result ipso facto to an ex parte presentation of evidence of the
plaintiff?
Answer: No. When read plainly, the then Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court gives
the impression that only the failure of the plaintiff or the defendant (and not their
counsels) to appear in pre-trial would bring about the dismissal of the action or the
eventual ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, respectively. 

With the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said Section 5 has been clarified by already
including the word counsel and putting the conjunctive word and, to the effect that it is
only when both the party-litigant (plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear
in pre-trial that there be the concomitant consequence of either a dismissal (plaintiff
and counsel were absent), or presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and counsel
were absent). (Gemina v. Heirs of Espejo, Jr., G.R. No. 232682, September 13,
2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Notice to Counsel is Notice to Parties
Question: Decision of the Court of Appeals was sent to the office address on
the record, which was also the home address of Atty. H. The registry return
card shows that it was received by Mrs. W, wife of Atty. Is there a valid notice
to the parties?
Answer: Yes. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon said attorney. Notice sent to counsel of record binds the
client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment
resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment,
valid and regular on its face.
Verily, Mrs. W is presumed authorized to receive the CA Decision on behalf of Atty. H
that was sent to the office address on record. It necessarily follows that parties,
through Atty. H, duly received the said decision in the ordinary course of business.
(Taningco v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 215615, December 9, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Summary Judgment
Question: Lorde is the owner of a parcel of land who mortgaged the same as a
security for a loan to Leo. Lorde failed to pay the loan which led to the
foreclosure of the mortgage. She did not bother to redeem the property within
the reglementary period, as a result, the title to the property was
consolidated in Leo’s name. When Leo was about to take possession of the
property, Lorde offered to repurchase the property by entering in a Contract
to Sell, which she failed to comply with the terms that resulted into the
cancellation thereof. 
Leo then filed a motion for summary judgment against Lorde. Will the motion
prosper? 
 32

Answer: No. Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid
long litigation and delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues
of fact to be tried. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are still genuine issues
of fact that need to be resolved in the trial. Hence, the Court should hold that the
denial of Leo’s Motion for Summary Judgment is proper. (Aljem's Credit Investors
Corp. v. Spouses Bautista, G.R. No. 215175, April 25, 2022, Hernando, J.) 
Civil Procedure; Appeal
Question: On October 12, 2011, the CA rendered a decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC in favor of Filomino Elomina and against Leticia Ramirez.
The decision was received by Ramirez on October 17, 2011 and she filed her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision on November 3, 2011. The CA on
December 21, 2011 denied the motion on the ground of late filing. Petitioner
Ramirez now comes to the SC and asks for the relaxation of the rules on the
ground that the inadvertent late filing was due to her forgetfulness as a
result of old age and frail condition. Should the petition be granted?
Answer: We resolve to dismiss the instant Petition.  Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court provides for the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration:  Section 1. Period of
filing. - A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the
adverse party.  In the instant case, the following are the relevant dates: (i) On October
12, 2011 the appellate court issued its Decision; (ii) Ramirez received a copy of the
appellate court's Decision on October 17, 2011;  (iii) After 17 days from receipt
thereof, or on November 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration;  (iv) On
December 21, 2011, the appellate court issued its Resolution denying the Motion since
it was belatedly filed. The 15th day of the allowable period for Ramirez to file her
Motion for Reconsideration fell on a holiday, November 1, 2011. Thus, Ramirez had
until November 2, 2011 to file the same, reckoned from the date of her receipt of the
appellate court's Decision. However, she filed the Motion the following day, or
November 3, 2011. 
Time and again, the Court has declared that "the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so .... leads to the loss of the right to
appeal", such as the instant case. This Court finds no compelling reason to justify
the relaxation of the rules. Settled is the rule that "[a]nyone seeking exemption from
the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of
proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such
deviation". However, this Court finds that Ramirez failed to discharge the same, thus
warranting the appellate court's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration. 

We are not unaware that the technical rules of procedure should be used to promote,
not frustrate, the cause of justice.  However, this liberality in the relaxation of the
rules should be carefully weighed against the orderly administration of
 33

justice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because

their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. (Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Modes to Appeal a Decision or Final Judgment of the RTC
Question: What are the three modes to appeal a decision or final judgment of
the RTC?
Answer: Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes to appeal a decision or final
judgment of the RTC, viz:
The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is
brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the
RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only
questions of law. (East West Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, July 12,
2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Appeal
Question: When a record on appeal is required, is the appellant required to
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal?
Answer: Yes. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or
final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final
order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of
appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with
notice to the adverse party, to wit:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final order. However,
an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Thus, the rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and
a record on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the
 34

notice of appeal and record of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice
of the judgment or final order.
Here, considering that the respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial
of their motion for intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed
both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within the period prescribed by the
rules.
The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of
the final order dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the
date respondents' counsel received the order of denial. Respondents had until
December 15, 2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal.
Since they filed their motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2010, the period for
filing of the appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final
order denying their motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2011, the period to
appeal, applying the fresh period rule, resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or
until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules. Verily,
respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without a record on
appeal. Thus, on April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its
non-perfection and failure to file the required record on appeal. It was only on June 27,
2011 that respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to
admit record on appeal while claiming inadvertence and lack of knowledge on the
timing of the filing of the record on appeal. (Brual v. Contreras, G.R. No. 205451,
March 7, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Filing of Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court
Question: May a question of facts be raised during a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court?

Answer: No. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law, thus a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
However, the rule admits of exceptions, which includes, but not limited to: (1) where
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and
conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record. (Prieto v. Cajimat, G.R. No. 214898, June 8,
2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Filing of Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court
 35

Question: Can a province file a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and

Mandamus before our courts?
Answer: No. A province is not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of the
Rules which can properly avail of the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, as it was not a party in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. Even if a
Province had the standing to file a petition, it is settled that "as a quasi-judicial agency,
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only
be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition" in order to respect the
hierarchy of courts. (Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 &
201347, April 18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Certiorari Not a Remedy for Lost Appeal

Question: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) a criminal complaint for violations of Sections 254 (Attempt to
Evade or Defeat Tax) of the National Internal Revenue Code against AAA.
AAA moved to dismiss on the ground that she was immune from criminal
liability in view of her availment of the tax amnesty under Republic Act No.
(RA) 9480, but the CTA 2nd division denied AAA’s motion to dismiss. AAA
sought reconsideration, and the CTA 3rd division ruled in favor of AAA and
dismissed the case.
The BIR appealed the case to CTA En Banc via a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.  But because BIR was represented by the BIR Special
Prosecutors, and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CTA En
Banc resolved to dismiss the Petition. BIR moved for reconsideration, but it
was denied.
Thus, BIR filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, interposing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA. Was the filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 proper?

Answer: No. A special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will lie only in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, if the remedy of an appeal is available, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not prosper as it is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.
In this case, the remedy of an appeal was available. Section 1, Rule 16 of the 2005
Revised Rules of the CTA provides:
SECTION 1. Appeal to Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari. - A party
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Court en banc may appeal therefrom
by filing with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within
fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. If such party has filed a motion for reconsideration or for new
 36

trial, the period herein fixed shall run from party's receipt of a copy of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration or for new trial.
Based on the foregoing, BIR availed availed of the wrong remedy because instead of
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43, BIR filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. (People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206579, December 1,
2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment
Question: On what grounds can the annulment of judgment be invoked?
Answer:  The annulment of judgment can be invoked only on two grounds, namely,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. (Calubad v. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029,
September 02, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment
Question: Is a party who previously filed a Petition for Relief of Judgment,
when erroneously availed of, barred from filing a subsequent Petition for
Annulment of Judgment?
Answer: No. When a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the judgment sought to be annulled are no longer available through
no fault of her own. This is because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is
fundamentally void. 
Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of a judgment, and one which
may negate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction, including defective service of
summons, it is a well-founded cause for an action for annulment of a judgment.
(Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment
Question: During his lifetime, Woozi claimed ownership of a certain lot by
filing a Petition for Reconstitution before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
their province with a prayer for the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in
his name. This was granted by the CFI which ordered the reconstitution of
said OCT and thereafter cancelled it for the issuance of a TCT in the name of
Woozi. 
Thirty years later, when Woozi was already dead, his heirs claimed ownership
of said Lot. This was contested by the siblings of Woozi who filed an action
for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which declared TCT
as null and void. The heirs of Woozi thus filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA) questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in declaring the TCT as
null and void, contending that the RTC cannot pass upon the validity of said
TCT in an action for quieting of title. The CA ruled that while a TCT should not
have been issued to Woozi in an action for reconstitution, the declaration of
 37

its nullity can only be made in an action for annulment of judgment before the
CA or in an action for reconveyance before the RTC. Was the CA correct?
Answer: Yes. The CA was correct in ruling that the proper remedy of the heirs of
Protacio is an action for reconveyance and not for annulment of the judgment
reconstituting then cancelling it and in lieu thereof to issue a new TCT in the name of
the heirs of Woozi. The proper recourse should have been to file an action for
reconveyance. This is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of
land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for
the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. (Heirs of
Borras v. Heirs of Borras, G.R. No. 213888, April 24, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgment
Question: May the court who rendered judgment alter or amend a final and
executory decision?
Answer: No, it cannot but there are exceptions. It is settled that the court which
rendered the judgment has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment. It
does not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a final and executory
decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely: (a) if there is a need to
correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments, and;
(c) if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable.
Corollary, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available remedies and guidelines
for the satisfaction of a judgment, including enforcement of a writ of execution, which
the winning party may avail of before the judgment court. Among the remedies
available to such party to fully enforce the writ of execution is the examination of a
judgment obligor. (Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R.
No. 211969, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgment
Question: London Bridge, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against Mary
Jane Far East Properties, Inc. This was due to the discovery of a concrete
retaining wall of an adjacent building owned by Mary Jan which encroached
on its property line.
London Bridge informed Mary Jan of such encroachment, to which they
instructed that it be removed. The workers were unable to finish it and a
substantial part still needed to be removed. London Bridge was consequently
compelled to hire a contractor to complete the demolition. It then demanded
payment of the cost of the additional works it conducted in the amount of
P3,980,468.50, but respondent refused, which led to the filing of the
complaint.
The RTC adjudged Mary Jan liable for the cost of the demolition, actual and
compensatory damages, and attorney's fees, which was affirmed by CA but
modified the decision by deleting the actual and compensatory damages. A
 38

writ of execution was granted but remained unserved as the office in the said
address that it was Mary Jen Development Group’s and not Mary Jan’s.
London Bridge observed that Mary Jan and Mary Jen’s stated officers are the
same, and that they were shareholders of both corporations. This prompted
them to file an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment Obligor before the same
court which rendered the final judgment. Should the motion prosper?
Answer: Yes. Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court has
the inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice". The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus
issue "auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect" and
to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding "which appears conformable to
the spirit of the said law or rules''.
In the case at bench, the writ of execution was returned unserved. It was therefore
imperative for the judgment court to issue an order for examination of respondent
after the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. Such order would have ensured
the satisfaction of its judgment, all the more so if it has already attained finality. In
other words, the RTC, pursuant to its residual authority, should have issued auxiliary
writs and employed processes and other means necessary to execute its final
judgment.
Moreover, the RTC disregarded the general prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable"
by the petitioner in its motion. The general prayer appearing on the motion enables the
court to award reliefs supported by the same or other pleadings, by the facts admitted
at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not
specifically prayed for in the same. (Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East
Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration
Question: In a criminal case involving deficiency of tax payments, the Court of
Tax Appeals issued a resolution on December 14, 2009, which was served to
and received by the BIR Main Office and the Prosecutor assigned thereto on
December 17, 2009, and December 21, 2009, respectively. Thereafter, the
Prosecutor filed its motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2010. The
Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the motion, which the Prosecutor
consequently appealed. Will the appeal prosper?
Answer: No, the appeal will not prosper. For purposes of determining its timeliness, a
motion for reconsideration may properly be treated as an appeal. As a step to allow an
inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal, which is fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the resolution. When filed beyond the appeal, the motion for
reconsideration ipso facto forecloses the right to appeal.

In this case, the Prosecutor filed the motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2010,
which is beyond the reglementary period to file for the same. Hence, the appeal will
 39

not prosper. (People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 4, 2019, Hernando,
J.)
Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction
Question: What is the purpose of the preliminary injunction?
Answer: A preliminary injunction is an order grunted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency,
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of
the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of the court to render a
meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will
hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits.
Another essential role is preventive of the threats to cause irreparable harm or injury to
a party before the litigation could be resolved.
It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The
application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special
reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard. (Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 221133, June 28, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction
Question: Reta is the owner and operator of Acquarius Container Yard (AYC).
Sometime in 2009, Reta entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) for the free use of his container yard located in
Davao City as a designated examination area for the container vans in the
Port of Davao for 25 years. The MOA also provides that the parties may
revoke it anytime for cause. BOC claimed that sometime in 2010, Reta closed
the container yard and barred customs examiners from entering, thus, BOC
through Atty. Castigador sent a letter to Reta terminating their MOA. This
prompted Reta to file a complaint for Preliminary Injunction alleging that
after the BOC agreed to use ACY as the designated examination area, he
invested in various machineries and equipment for the examination and
inspection of container vans. Will the writ of preliminary injunction prosper?
Answer: Jurisprudence laid down the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as follows: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial
invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant; and, (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists
to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential
that the party seeking its issuance be able to establish the existence of a right
to be protected. It must be a right that is actual, clear, and existing; not a
mere contingent, abstract, or future right. Further, the invasion of that clear
 40

and unmistakable right must be material and substantial. There must also be
a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part of the party
seeking injunction. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which
its amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. To satisfy the
requisites for the issuance of the writ, mere prima facie evidence is needed to
establish the clear and unmistakable right, and the substantial and material
invasion thereof; complete and conclusive proof is not needed.
In the instant case, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, as
laid down, were not met. First, Reta has no clear and unmistakable right on the
conduct of examination in ACY. The conduct of examinations in ACY premises is
governed by the MOA between Reta and the BOC. It is undisputed that the parties
consented to the MOA which stipulated that any of the parties may revoke it for cause
at any time before the end of its term. On March 5, 2010, BOC has already revoked the
MOA on the ground of strained relations due to Reta's closure of the ACY premises.
The revocation was made before the issuance of the assailed RTC Order. Second, it
follows that there is no substantial or material invasion of Reta's right. As the right
does not exist, there can be no substantial or material invasion thereof. Third, the
damage or injury allegedly sustained by Reta is not irreparable. As set out, the
damages or injury suffered by the party applying for injunction must be unquantifiable.
The Petition correctly pointed out that Reta was able to state in his Complaint an
amount (i.e., P100,000.00) pertaining to the loss of earnings he suffers for each day
the BOC is not conducting examinations in ACY. Therefore, the requisite of irreparable
injury is not met. (Bureau of Customs v. Court of Appeals – Cagayan de Oro
Station, G.R. No. 192809, April 26, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: May the Office of the Solicitor General file a Petition for Certiorari
beyond the 60-day period on the ground that its Legal Division is
understaffed?
Answer: No. It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition for
certiorari should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases.
The recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the aforementioned rule are
encapsulated in the case of Labao v. Flores, viz,:

x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice
not commensurate with [their] failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3)
good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the
merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake[,] or excusable negligence without
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
 41

involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.
Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for [their] failure to comply with the rules.
The Court finds the OSG’s explanation of being understaffed office to justify the
extension of the 60-day period not falling under any of the exceptions to warrant a
relaxation of the rule. (Republic v. Heirs of Borja, G.R. No. 207647, January 11,
2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: What is the proper remedy to question a court’s order dismissing a

replevin case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
Answer: Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.
An order granting a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is without prejudice to the refiling of the same action
or claim.
In connection thereto, Section 1, Rule 41 clearly provides that an order dismissing an
action without prejudice may not be appealed via a Rule 41 petition, and must instead
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65:

SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
(Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: AAA was awarded by the Municipality of Bacnotan of her claim for
backwages. Days later, AAA learned that she was dropped from the payrolls
of the Municipality of Bacnotan. She was also told to stop reporting for work.
She wrote to the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Bacnotan to verify if she had
been unilaterally dropped from the payrolls.
The Office of the Municipal Mayor of Bacnotan replied that she was dropped
pursuant to a previous compromise agreement executed by AAA and the
 42

Municipality of Bacnotan wherein it was agreed that AAA shall retire herself
upon payment of her monetary claims.
The Mayor of Bacnotan filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution of the
compromise agreement, which was granted by the RTC. AAA then moved to
quash the writ, claiming that the compromise judgment was null and void for
being contrary to public policy, and the writ for its execution was against
property and rights exempted from execution. 
The RTC denied AAA’s motion to quash. Aggrieved by the RTC’s ruling, AAA
sought recourse directly to the Supreme Court via the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Was the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme
Court proper?
Answer: No, the direct recourse to the Supreme Court was not proper. From the
regional trial court, AAA skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded straight to this
Court for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts. In the case of
Candelaria v. RTC, the Court ruled that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts and with the Court of Appeals. 
A direct resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify
the same,  to wit: (1) When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy; (2) When demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) When the
challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) When analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of
the case. 
AAA’s cause against the jurisdiction of the RTC is far too generic, personal, and
non-transcendental to fall under any of these four exceptions. Thus, there is no valid
reason for her to directly invoke the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction. (Leones v. Corpuz,
G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: Can a certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lie as a

substitute for an appeal? Is there an exception?
Answer: The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for
relief through a special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy
by appeal lies. The exception to this rule is conceded only "where public welfare and
the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so
require, or where the orders complained of were found to be completely null and void,
or that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from
orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver.” For example, certiorari
may be available where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. (Metro Rail Transit
 43

Development Corp. v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and

Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 204452, June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: Does certiorari correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of

judgment?
Answer: Yes. The Court shall not tire in calling out the usual propensity of some
litigants in confounding errors of judgment for errors of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is an error committed by a court within its jurisdiction that is reviewable by
appeal. Mere allegations of wrongful conclusions based on the facts and the law or
supposed misappreciation of evidence do not, by themselves, rise to the level of grave
abuse of discretion against the trial court.
The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.
On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those done outside and in excess of a trial
court's jurisdiction and committed in grave abuse of discretion that are properly
reversible by certiorari. The abuse of discretion should clearly be grave, following the
definition long-formulated by jurisprudence:
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross
as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary
cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the
foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the
petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. (Radaza v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380, August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: Mauricio Laoyan and Magdalena Quilit filed before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) a petition for annulment of sale of an
agricultural land and redemption thereof over two parcels of land. After trial,
the RARAD ruled in favor of the petitioner. Then Landbank filed a notice of
appeal but it was denied for being filed out of time. Landbank sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in accordance with
Section 3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Will the
petition prosper?
 44

Answer: No, the petition will not prosper. The jurisprudential pronouncement
in Lubrica remains to be good law, and is doctrinal and controlling. Lubrica, which
likewise involved herein LBP, has settled that the DARAB is devoid of power to issue
writs of certiorari. This Court calibrates the pronouncements made in Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica. It is true that the lack of an express
constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction disables DARAB from
exercising certiorari powers. Apart from this, however, is a more fundamental reason
for DARAB's disability. As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not
consummate judicial power, DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs
of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of statutorily stipulated competence but a
question that hearkens to the separation of government's tripartite powers: executive,
legislative, and judicial. In other words, the DARAB's lack of authority over special civil
actions for certiorari is not merely attributed to the absence of a statutory grant
thereof. Zoleta, in consonance with Lubrica, clarified further that the power to issue
writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. DARAB, not being a court of law
exercising judicial power, is, therefore, inherently powerless and incapable by
constitutional fiat of acquiring jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, and
issuing writs of certiorari to annul acts of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) or RARAD even when it exercises supervisory powers over them. (Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Certiorari

Question: YG Ent. filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
However, the appellate court dismissed the decision due to its failure to
attach the required pleadings for a Petition for Certiorari and that the said
petition was with no merit. YG Ent. alleges that their counsel committed gross
negligence in handling the case which is a result of their denial of due
process. Is the contention of YG Ent with merit? 
Answer: No. The alleged negligent acts of PNB' s counsel did not deprive it of due
process or the opportunity to be heard excusable negligence was characterized as "so
gross 'that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it.' This
excusable negligence must also be imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or her
counsel whose negligence binds his or her client”. The essence of due process is to
afford parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard in order to defend and support
their case, and the prohibition points to the total and absolute absence of such
opportunity to be heard. (Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Victor, G.R. No.
207377, July 27, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Expropriation
Question: Expedite Escaro is one of the heirs of the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Calabanga, Camarines Sur consisting of more or less
24 hectares. In 1994, DAR placed this parcel of land under the Compulsory
Acquisition Scheme pursuant to RA 6657. Thus, Landbank of the Philippines
(LBP) made an initial valuation of the property. Unsatisfied with the valuation,
Escaro referred the matter to the PARAD. After the valuation was made by
 45

PARAD, LBP elevated it to DARAB who reinstated the initial valuation of the
property. Escaro then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Thus, Escaro filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with
the RTC pursuant to RA 6657. LBP moved for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of res judicata for failure of Escaro to appeal the decision of the
DARAB. Will the petition prosper?
Answer: It is well-settled that the "valuation of property or determination of
just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies." Accordingly, RA 6657 vests the RTCs, acting as SACs, original and
exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just compensation. Notably,
considering that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function,
this Court, in Dalauta abandoned its ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank and
in Limkaichong, and definitively struck down as void the 15-day prescriptive
period under the DARAB Rules on the finding that it unduly undermined and
impeded the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to
determine just compensation in accordance with Section 57 of RA 6657.
Indeed, it was emphasized in Dalauta that the jurisdiction of the RTCSAC in actions for
determination of just compensation is original and exclusive, and not merely appellate.
It is for this reason that the Court cannot recognize a procedural rule of the DARAB
that requires the court to adjudge as dismissible an action (which is otherwise by law
properly brought within its judicial cognizance) for having been filed beyond the
15-day period provided in the DARAB Rules. To sanction such rule will effectively
reduce the RTC-SAC to act merely as an appellate review of the administrative decisions
of the DAR through its adjudicators. This clearly runs counter to Section 57 of RA 6657
and, therefore, should be considered as void and ineffectual.
Moreover, this Court held in Dalauta that considering that payment of just
compensation is an obligation created by law, the proper prescriptive period to file a
complaint for judicial determination of just compensation under RA 6657 is 10 years
pursuant to Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code. In this regard, the period to file an
original action for just compensation with the RTC-SAC should be reckoned "from the
time the landowner received the notice of coverage." (Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Escaro, G.R. No. 204526, February 10, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Ejectment Suits; Differences thereof
Question: On February 25, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible
entry against defendant Palajos before the MeTC. They claim that they are the
owners of the subject property which they acquired from their parents in
1999. Sometime in September or October 2001, they took actual possession
of the subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it.
Further, plaintiffs claimed that in the third week of January 2006, they
discovered that defendants, by means of force upon things, strategy and
stealth and without their knowledge and consent, destroyed portions of the
 46

perimeter fence, entered the subject property and constructed their houses
thereon, depriving plaintiffs of their possession. Upon discovery, plaintiffs
made demands for defendants to vacate but the latter failed and refused to
remove their houses and structures. As a result, plaintiffs filed a complaint
before the proper barangay authorities, but defendants still failed to comply
with their demand.
The MeTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs finding that they had prior physical
possession of the subject property since they constructed a concrete
perimeter fence thereon in 2001. The RTC reversed the MeTC ruling, finding
out that plaintiffs failed to prove prior physical possession. The CA, in turn,
reversed the RTC, ruling that Manolo sufficiently proved such possession.
1. Distinguish forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
2. Did Manolo proved his prior physical possession of the subject property?
Answer:
1. There are two (2) kinds of ejectment suits, namely: (1) forcible entry; and (2)
unlawful detainer, the differences of which may be summarized as follows: 

Particulars Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

Possession The possession of the defendant or The possession is previously

the intruder is illegal from the legal but eventually becomes
beginning because his/her unlawful upon the expiration of
possession of the property is one's right to possess the
against the will or without the property after, for instance, the
consent of the plaintiff or the termination or violation of a
former possessor. lease contract.
Thus, the plaintiff must allege in Thus, the plaintiff need not
the complaint and prove that have prior physical possession
he/she was in prior physical of the property.
possession of the property in
litigation until he/she was deprived
thereof by the defendant.

Demand to No previous demand to vacate is Prior to the filing of the action,

Vacate required before the filing of the the plaintiff must issue a
action. demand to vacate the
defendant, which the latter fails
to comply with.
 47

Particulars Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

Prescriptiv In general, the one-year The one-year period in unlawful

e Period prescriptive period is reckoned detainer is counted from the
from the date of actual entry on the date of the last demand to
property. However, if forcible entry vacate.
is done through stealth, the period
is counted from the time the
plaintiff discovered the entry.

2. Yes. The three elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to
prosper are the following:
(a) plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the defendant
encroached on the property;
(b) plaintiff was deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth by defendant; and
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his
deprivation of the physical possession of the property, except that when the entry is
through stealth, the one (1) year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or
legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property. 
In this case, Palajos contends that two elements of forcible entry are absent: first,
Manolo had no prior physical possession of the property; and second, the action was
filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
We disagree. As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or that
arising from ownership. Title is not an issue. As an exception, Section 16, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding
the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. Thus, based on the foregoing, the issue of ownership of the property in
forcible entry cases may be provisionally determined — to determine the issue of
possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership.
In addition, We have likewise consistently held that "possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right."
This Court finds that it is necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject
property for purposes of determining prior possession. In the instant case, both the
MeTC and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his siblings were able to establish
that they are the registered owners of the subject property which they acquired from
their parents in 1999. Although they did not immediately put the same to active use,
but viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, Manolo had been occupying the
 48

land since 1999. On the other hand, Palajos claims that his right to enter Lot No. 5 of
the subject property was by virtue of a May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute Sale which B.C.
Regalado & Co. executed in his favor. However, We find that Palajos failed to
substantially prove the same.
With regard to the issue of prior physical possession, sometime in September
or October 2001, Manolo and his siblings took actual possession of the
subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it.
Anent the claim of prescriptive period, We find that the same was filed within one year
from the time Manolo and his sibling discovered the clandestine entry of the
defendants on the third week of January while the complaint was filed on February 23,
2006. Entry in the premises of the subject property without the consent and knowledge
of the registered owner, clearly falls under stealth, which is defined as "any secret, sly
or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within
[the] residence of another without permission." (Palajos v. Abad, G.R. No. 205832,
March 7, 2022, Hernando, J.)

Special Civil Actions; Indirect Contempt

Question: On November 19, 2004, HCPTI, the operator of the Manila Harbour
Centre, on one hand, and La Filipina Uygongco Corp. (LFUC), an enterprise
engaged in the importation and trading of fertilizers, milk and dairy
products, soybean meal and sugar, together with its sister company
Philippine Foremost Milling Corp. (PFMC), an entity primarily organized to
import and mill wheat, flour and animal foods, on the other hand, entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)6 which provided, among others, priority
berthing rights to the domestic and foreign vessels of respondents LFUC and
PFMC.
Years later, the parties’ relationship turned sour. HCPTI then send a letter to
LFUC and PFMC of their accountabilities. As a response, both alleged that
HCPTI failed to provide priority berthing to their vessels and to conduct
dredging to maintain the depth of the navigational access channel and
berthing area. Consequently, respondents LFUC and PFMC filed a Complaint
for Compliance with Maritime Law, Regulation and Contract, Breach of
Contract, Specific Performance and Damages. A TRO was also granted, which
enjoined HCPTI from preventing respondents LFUC and PFMC access to its rail
lines and unloaders, and from using the port facilities of HCPTI, among
others.
During the said periods, respondents' barges were not permitted to berth in
their assigned berthing area despite the fact that they were ready for
berthing and notwithstanding that the proper documentations were already
submitted by respondents to HCPTI such as the PPA Application for
Berth/Anchorage, an HCPTI Commitment Sheet and Request for Berth
 49

Application. They were allowed at some point but would then be ordered to
vacate, constraining them to rent said barges incurring additional expenses.
LFUC and PFMC filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against HCPTI averring
that there was willful violation on the part of the HCPTI officers, and that the
provisions of the MOA were violated.
This was denied by HCPTI, claiming that respondents either failed to apply
for berthing for any or all of the vessels allegedly denied priority berthing, or
some of the said vessels were never serviced at all by HCPTI during the
period given to them which was March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009. They also
argued that a charge for Indirect Contempt is criminal in nature and thus, the
rules of evidence in contempt proceedings should be applied as far as
practicable.
1. Should the charge be a criminal contempt or civil contempt?
2. Was there indirect contempt in this case?
Answer:
1. The nature of the case is more civil than criminal. Civil contempt is committed when
a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other
party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's
authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or
judge.
To recall, it was alleged that during the period given, thirty-nine (39) of its vessels and
barges were denied access to HCPTI's rail lines and unloaders and the use of its port
facilities in violation of the WPI and the November 19, 2004 MOA.
Clearly, the purpose of the contempt petition was for the enforcement of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. It is a remedy resorted to preserve and enforce the rights of
respondents and to compel obedience to the injunctive writ which was issued for their
benefit.
Hence, the petition for contempt is civil in nature. Accordingly, an appeal from the
decision dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy. The appellate court
was therefore correct in holding that the petition, for indirect contempt instituted by
the respondents herein, is civil in nature.
2. No. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard
or disobedience of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner,
to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or
dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during
litigation.
 50

In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels
during the period material to the case was not intended to undermine the authority of
the court or an act of disobedience to the WPI.
To reiterate, respondents' priority berthing right is subject to the condition that the
berthing area is vacant. Thus, even if respondents' vessels are already near the vicinity
of petitioners' terminals, if the berthing area is occupied by a third party vessel,
respondents' barges could not be immediately accommodated. It must wait until after
the unloading of the third party vessel has been completed or it has transferred to
another berthing area. It is only when no other vessel is available for berthing at the
time the berth application is filed that the vessel with no ETA would be provisionally
scheduled for berthing. (Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. v. La Filipina
Uygongco Corp., G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120, September 27, 2021, Hernando,
J.)
Special Civil Actions; Writ of Possession
Question: Alma obtained a loan from PNB. To secure the loan, she mortgaged
a parcel of land. She failed to pay the loan and then PNB foreclosed the
property. On January 8, 2002, as the sole bidder in the public auction, PNB
acquired the lot. PNB registered the sale on January 28, 2002. However, Alma
failed to redeem the property.
More than nine years later, on July 18, 2011, PNB filed an ex-parte petition for
issuance of writ of possession before the RTC. The RTC granted PNB’s
petition and said court’s resolution became final. 
More than two months later, on November 25, 2011, Alma filed an opposition
to recall writ of possession, claiming that the RTC should not have granted
the petition since she is a third party who possesses the subject property.
The RTC granted Alma’s petition. The CA sustained the RTC. Is Alma correct?
Answer: No. Generally, "once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer's
name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the
buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at any time. Its
right of possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and
the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the
exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance,
should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay."
In this case, the records showed no proof that PNB has formally consolidated the title
of the property in its name. Additionally, it took the bank more than nine years before
it petitioned for the issuance of a writ of possession. Nevertheless, the bank registered
itself as the purchaser following the foreclosure sale, through a Certificate of Sale
recorded in the Registry of Deeds on January 28, 2002. Moreover, Alma failed to
redeem the property during the one-year redemption period. Thus, she ceased to have
rights over the subject lot either as a mortgagor or redemptioner. These circumstances
suggest that PNB, although it did not consolidate the title in its name yet, is entitled to
 51

possess the property as the registered purchaser after the foreclosure sale, and
because of Alma's failure to redeem it even if she is in actual possession of the lot.
However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to issue the writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. In Nagtalon v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, the Court enumerated the following jurisprudential exceptions: 
(a) gross inadequacy of the purchase price; 
(b) third party claiming right adverse to the mortgagor/debtor, and; 
(c) failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor. 
The first and third exceptions cannot apply to this case since there are no allegations
referring to either the purchase price or surplus proceeds of the sale, if any.
To emphasize, a third party should hold possession of the subject property adversely
to the judgment debtor or mortgagor. Here, Alma cannot be considered as a third
party since she herself was the mortgagor who failed to redeem the property
during the foreclosure proceeding and the redemption period. In other words,
she had full knowledge that PNB was the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and that she
did not redeem the property during the one-year period for redemption. Alma can
hardly be considered as a third party holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor or mortgagor precisely because she herself was the mortgagor. At least with
respect to the foreclosure itself, she already surrendered any right (as a mortgagor or
redemptioner) she had over the property after she failed to redeem it. (Philippine
National Bank v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Special Civil Actions; Petition for Declaratory Relief
Question: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief against Shell,
Caltex, and Petron for increasing the prices of their petroleum products
whenever the price of crude oil increases in the world market despite that fact
that they had purchased their inventories at a much lower price long before
the increase. Petitioner argued that such practice constitutes monopoly and
combination in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 1867 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and a violation against RA No. 8479 (Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act). The petition for declaratory relief was then
denied by Court of Appeals for lack of cause of action as there is no factual
allegation in the Petition that their rights are being threatened or that there is
an imminent violation thereof that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought. Is the petition for declaratory relief the proper remedy?
Answer: An action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. Case law provides
that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
as such action is filed only for the purpose of securing an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a contract, deed or statute. It cannot be
availed of if the statute, deed or contract has been breached or violated because, in
such a case, the remedy is for the aggrieved party to file the appropriate ordinary civil
 52

action in court. (Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060
& 189333, June 30, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Special Proceedings; Determination of Heirship
Question: AAA was the registered owner of a lot located in Cotabato covered
by OCT No. P-46116. On August 17, 1995, BBB and CCC, claiming to be the
surviving heirs of the spouses XXX, filed before the RTC a complaint for
quieting of OCT No. P-46116 and recovery of possession thereof. They
claimed that AAA gradually took possession of portions of the subject
property by taking advantage of the ignorance and illiteracy of spouses XXX.
On the other hand, AAA argues that BBB and CCC’s allegation that they are the
rightful heirs of spouses XXX to the exclusion AAA, calls for a separate
determination of heirship in a special proceeding which is a precondition to
an action for recovery of property and/or quieting of title. Is AAA correct?
Answer: No. In Treyes v. Larlar, the Court held that a prior determination of heirship in
a special proceeding is not prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to
enforce ownership rights by virtue of succession. 
Accordingly, when two or more heirs rightfully assert ownership over another in an
ordinary civil action to recover the property of the estate against third persons, the trial
court may determine their status or right as legal heirs to protect their legitimate
interests in the estate, since successional rights is transmitted by operation of law
from the moment of death of the decedent. Thus, it is only proper to allow the BBB and
CCC to institute the present civil action or to intervene in the recovery of the property
of the estate without a prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding.
Apropos, the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the determination of heirship
between parties. (Ende v. Roman Catholic Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of
Cotabato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867, December 6, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Special Writs; Writ of Amparo

Question: Morada received a text message that her son, Johnson, was
arrested and detained by barangay tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for
alleged theft. Morada then went to the barangay hall and respondent Rolly
informed her that Johnson was already released from the custody of
barangay as evidenced by the entry in the barangay blotter, signed by
Johnson himself. Morada still cannot find him. Morada went to the NPD to
report that her son is missing. An investigation was conducted, but to no
avail. 
In the meantime, rumors circulated within Barangay 176 that Johnson had
been extrajudicially killed and that his body was mixed in cement in order to
conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to institute a petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC to determine whether
respondents had violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to life,
liberty and security, and to compel respondents to determine the
 53

whereabouts of Johnson, and the person/s responsible for his disappearance

or possible death, among others.
Should the RTC deny the petition for writ of amparo?

Answer: Yes. The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under

Republic Act No. 9851 are as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
There is no question that the first and second elements are attendant in this case.
However, We agree with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely lacking.
While it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he committed
in the house of Randy, it was sufficiently established by the respondents that
he was already released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as evidenced
by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself. In fact, Morada neither
denied nor refuted the said document of release. As opposed to the unsubstantiated
allegations of Morada that it is respondents who are responsible for Johnson's
disappearance, We accord greater weight to the documentary evidence presented by
the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was no longer in the custody of the
respondents when he disappeared. Such evidence strongly militates against Morada's
claim of enforced disappearance. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14,
2022, Hernando, J.)
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause
Question: What is the proper mode of assailing the OMB's finding of probable
cause in criminal cases?
Answer: The proper mode would be by filing a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not with the CA. This has always been and is still the prevailing
rule. To repeat, Carpio-Morales did not invalidate this remedy as it covers
administrative cases only. The CA has no jurisdiction over findings of probable cause
in criminal cases.
In Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court examined previous case law and
clarified that the Carpio-Morales ruling has limited application to administrative cases
before the OMB. The appellate court, in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
opined that Carpio- Morales "should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that what
 54

was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an
administrative case filed against a public official." (Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R.
No. 230171, September 27, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Criminal Procedure; Qualifying Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information
Question: What is the effect if the qualifying circumstance is not alleged in
the information even if proved during trial?
Answer: According to People v. Begino, the "qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall
be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if
not pleaded. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant
circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned." Since the qualifying
circumstance of relationship was not properly pleaded and proved in the case at bench,
De Guzman should only be convicted of Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC. 
The minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender should both be
alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to
qualify the rape charge as these circumstances have the effect of altering the nature of
the rape and its corresponding penalty. Otherwise, the death penalty cannot be
imposed upon the offender. (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 224212, November
27, 2019, Hernando, J.)
Criminal Procedure; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
Question: Mr. X’s Complaint-Affidavit  was  filed before the OPP-Antique on
May 17, 2006 against Mr. M for Unlawful Appointment.  On September 21,
2006, petitioner Mr. M filed her counter-affidavit  dated   September 20, 2006. 
On September 28, 2006, Mr. X filed his Reply-Affidavit.  After finding probable
cause, the OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution dated August 6, 2009
recommending that a criminal complaint for Unlawful Appointment be filed
against petitioner Mr. M.  On  October 12, 2009, the August 6, 2009
Resolution was forwarded and received by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas for review.   The initial indorsement of the Review Resolution of the
August 6, 2009 Resolution was made on March 3, 2011 to Ombudsman W.   As
there was a change of leadership in the OMB, a Review dated September 8,
2011 of the August 6, 2009 Resolution  was again indorsed on September 26,
2011 to the newly-appointed Ombudsman  F  who  approved  the  said  Review
Resolution on April 24, 2012. On May 24, 2012 an Information indicting
petitioner Mr. M for Violation of Article 244 of the RPC (Unlawful
Appointments) was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Was there a violation of Mr. M’s right to speedy disposition of cases?
 55

Answer:  Yes. From the foregoing facts, approximately six years had elapsed from
May 17, 2006, the time when the complaint-affidavit was filed before the OPP-Antique,
until May 24, 2012, when the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan.  
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.  Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, the period to conduct and complete the preliminary investigation is
already excessive.  Such a long delay was unreasonable and inordinate so as to
constitute an outright violation of the speedy disposition of petitioner Mr. M’s case.
There is no doubt that petitioner Mr. M was prejudiced by the inordinate delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation.   The lapse of six years before the filing of the
Information with the Sandiganbayan placed him in a situation of uncertainty.  This
protracted period of uncertainty over his case caused her anxiety, suspicion and even
hostility. The inordinate delay defeats the salutary objective of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, which is "to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within
the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and   consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose." To perpetuate a violation of this
right by the lengthy and unreasonable delay would result to petitioner Mr. M’s
inability to adequately prepare for his case and would create a situation where the
defense witnesses were unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past,
leading to the impairment of petitioner Mr. M's possible defenses. Thus, we cannot
countenance without running afoul to the Constitution. (Zaldivar-Perez v. First
Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 204739, November 13, 2019,
Hernando, J.) 
Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash
Question: Are denials of a motion to quash improper subjects of a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court?
Answer: Yes. Foremost in our rules of criminal procedure is that motions to quash are
interlocutory orders that are generally unreviewable by appeal or by certiorari. If the
motion to quash is denied, it means that the criminal Information remains pending
with the court, which then must proceed with the trial to determine whether the
accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged against him. Only when the court
promulgates a final judgment of conviction can the accused question the deficiencies
of the Information by raising them as errors by the trial court and as an additional
ground for his exoneration in his appeal.
More importantly, certiorari is a remedy of last resort. The special civil action of
certiorari will not lie unless its petitioner has no other plain, speedy, or adequate
 56

remedy in the ordinary course of law. The fact that another remedy – to proceed to trial
– is ready, available, and at the full disposal of the accused herein post-denial of his
motion to quash already bars his remedial refuge in certiorari. (Radaza v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380, August 04, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Criminal Procedure; Variance Doctrine
Question: 11-year old AAA was playing in the street when she was informed
by her sister that she was being summoned by Eulalio who was waiting at
AAA’s house. AAA did as instructed, went home and sat on a papag. Eulalio
then made AAA lie on the bed and kissed her. Eulalio and AAA were in this
compromising position when AAA’s parents arrived. They then went to
barangay to report the incident. An Information was filed charging Eulalio
with rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The RTC convicted Eulalio of
acts of lasciviousness. Is the RTC correct?
Answer: Yes, the RTC is correct. Eulalio can only be held guilty of acts of
lasciviousness although charged with rape following the variance doctrine enunciated
under Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that
“[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or Information
and that proved, and the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved”. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense
charged. (People v. Eulalio y Alejo, G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019,
Hernando, J.)

Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence

Question: What is preponderance of evidence?
Answer: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish its cause of
action by a preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. Preponderance of evidence does
not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side
than on the other. (Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. v. Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317, June
28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Constructive Possession of Illegal Drugs
Question: AA and BB are live-in partners. Illegal drugs were seized in the room
of the house of AA. AA contends that she had no knowledge of the existence
of the illegal drug and denied any involvement in the criminal activities of BB.
Rule on the contention.
Answer: AA’s contention has no merit. It is well established that the defense of alibi or
denial, in the absence of convincing evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor by the
 57

courts for it can easily be concocted, especially in cases involving the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
When a prohibited drug is found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in
possession of such drugs in violation of law. The fact of finding the said illegal drug is
sufficient to convict. AA’s claim that she was unaware that illegal drugs were in her
room fails to convince. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. It is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. (Estores y Pecardal v. People, G.R. No. 192332,
January 11, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Discrepancies and Inconsistencies in the Testimonies of Witnesses
Question: Can minor discrepancies discredit the testimony of a witness?
Answer: In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not
detract from the substance of her testimony. This Court has time and again said that a
few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact
of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening
their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony. (People v. Moreno y
Tazon, G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Genuineness of Handwriting
Question: What are the manners in proving the genuineness of handwriting
under the Rules of Court?
Answer:  Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of
handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it
to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged;
(2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that
the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and
fraud.
In Lamsen v. People, We decreed that "[a]s against direct evidence consisting of the
testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract, and
who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes
indirect or circumstantial evidence at best."
As can be gleaned from the above-cited rule and jurisprudence, it is clear that the
testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the questioned
document prevails over the comparison made by a witness or the court of the alleged
forged handwriting or signature against the writings admitted to be genuine.
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Here, Fidela testified affirmatively that she personally witnessed Jerico, Norman,
Derrick, Sergio, and Chona sign their contracts of services, DTRs and ARs. Fidela
categorically declared under oath that the signatures thereon were not forgeries as she
was physically present at the time of signing thereof. Juxtaposed with the comparison
made by the Sandiganbayan of the subject signatures, which is considered only as
circumstantial evidence, Fidela's testimony constitutes direct evidence as to the
genuineness of the subject signatures on the subject documents. Accordingly, the
plain comparison of the questioned signatures made by the Sandiganbayan cannot
prevail over the direct evidence of Fidela, accused-appellants' witness, who testified
affirmatively that she was physically present during the signing of the subject
documents and thus, has personal knowledge thereof. (People v. Palma Gil-Roflo,
G.R. Nos. 249564 & 249568-76, March 21, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence
Question: Mae Al-Saad arrived at their house in Lennox Anne Black Street, BF
Village, Talon Dos, Las Piñas City at 1:20 in the morning. She instructed Grace
to get her child, Leila, from the room of Ameerah and Sarah. Then Mae bought
four (4) liters of gasoline from Optimus Shell Gasoline Station, at around 2:59
in the morning of 14 September 2010. Then, Mae and her child rode a tricycle
going home to Lennox Street. The tricycle driver noticed a liquid substance on
the floor of his tricycle and when he wiped it, it smelled of gas. Their house
was burned resulting in the death of 2 of its occupants. Mae was charged with
the crime of arson with homicide and was subsequently convicted for the
crime on circumstantial evidence. Is the evidence enough to convict Mae
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Answer: Yes. The Court concedes that there is no direct evidence to link
accused-appellant to the alleged act, there being no eyewitness as to how the fire
started. However, jurisprudence holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of
establishing guilt. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean
that the accused-appellant's guilt cannot be proved. Circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence and therefore, also prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Soria, a similar arson case wherein circumstantial
evidence was proven to be sufficient to identify and convict the accused, further
elaborated on this kind of evidence, to wit: [F]or circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Thus, the circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person. Moreover, it must be remembered
that the probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than
nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish
between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a fact may be inferred."
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We agree with the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the
following combination of circumstances pointed to the logical conclusion that
accused-appellant commenced and caused the fire as to support a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt against her. The testimonies of the other credible
witnesses, all of whom were assessed and observed firsthand by the trial court,
corroborated the above findings. They all point to the fact that the accused-appellant
was the one who started the fire which gutted the Al-Saads' house, resulting in the
deaths of Ameerah and Ibrahim and causing serious physical injuries to Sarah, all of
whom are accused-appellant's stepchildren. The gasoline attendant of Optimus Shell
Gasoline Station, Talon Dos Branch, positively identified the accused-appellant as
having purchased gasoline from their store. The lead Fire Investigator also testified
that the dirty kitchen area where the accused-appellant reported to have seen a spark
and smelled something burnt was not even damaged by the fire. Thus, absent any
circumstance which could affect the outcome of the case, the findings of the lower
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, remain binding on the Court. In fine, the
accused-appellant's guilt for the offense of Arson with Homicide has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court and the appellate court thus correctly
convicted her of the offense and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua.  (People v.
Al-Saad y Bagkat, G.R. No. 242414, March 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Testimonial Evidence
Question: BBB and CCC claim that they are the legitimate children of the
spouses XXX However, BBB and CCC’s records of birth were not recorded in
the Civil Register or their legitimate filiation embodied in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the spouses XXX. Instead, BBB
and CCC offered testimonies of their relatives' collateral relatives to prove
that they are legitimate children of the spouses XXX.
How can BBB and CCC establish their status as heirs of spouses XXX? 
Answer: Under Art 172. of the Family Code, Filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
However, both the Civil Code and Family Code recognize such other means allowed by
the Rules of Court to prove filiation or the legitimacy status of a person, that includes
testimonies of witnesses. Although no documentary evidence was offered by
petitioners to prove their legitimacy, the testimonies of the witnesses presented
preponderantly tipped the scales in their favor. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the rules." Clearly, a testimony based on personal knowledge,
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such as that of an eyewitness, may prove the fact that BBB and CCC were the legitimate
children of the spouses XXX. (Ende v. Roman Catholic Prelate of the Prelature
Nullius of Cotabato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867, December 06, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Credibility of Testimony of Rape Victim
Question: AAA was instructed by BBB to fetch water from the house of XXX.
When AAA went home, BBB noticed that AAA's shorts were worn backwards
with bloodstains on it. BBB asked AAA what happened, and AAA narrated that
XXX took off her shorts and panty, touched her vagina, and raped her. Thus,
BBB and AAA immediately sought assistance from barangay authorities. On
the same day of the rape and report, AAA was subjected to physical
examination by Dr. Yap who found hymenal bleeding and laceration indicative
of a recent penetration of the victim 's vaginal canal. XXX was found guilty of
rape by the RTC.
On appeal, XXX now raises that the prosecution failed to duly prove how the
alleged rape was committed as AAA merely made a general reference to rape
during her testimony. Did the prosecution sufficiently establish the
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged?
Answer: Yes. XXX argues about the credibility of AAA as a witness. The trial court has
the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness so as to determine if
there is indeed truth to his or her testimony in the witness stand. And it must be given
high respect to its evaluation of the testimony of a witness.
AAA attested without any inkling of hesitation that she felt pain in her vagina when she
was being raped by appellant. In cases where penetration was not fully established, the
Court had consistently enunciated that rape was nevertheless consummated on the
victim's testimony that she felt pain. The pain could be nothing but the result of penile
penetration, sufficient to constitute rape.
The presence of a hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock position due to penetration further
strengthens AAA's testimony that she was raped. It is worthy to note that the results of
AAA's physical examination which was conducted on the very same day that the rape
incident happened corroborates her testimony that she was sexually molested by the
appellant. Dr. Yap even categorically stated that AAA's vagina was still bleeding when
she was brought to him for personal examination, thus proving that the act of rape
was consummated.
XXX miserably failed to impeach AAA's credibility. If indeed AAA fabricated her story, it
would have been easy for the defense to destroy her credibility, "for the ability to
sustain such fiction would require a quick and insidious mind, and her mental
condition certainly precluded such possibility.”
Therefore, AAA's competency gives full weight and credence to her testimony. AAA’s
credibility as a witness coupled with her positive identification that it was XXX who
raped her has greater weight than XXX's mere defenses of denial and alibi. The Court
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frowns upon these weak defenses as these are easily fabricated and highly unreliable.
(People v. Catig y Genteroni, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
Evidence; Affidavit of Desistance
Question: Give the rationale with regard to the rule in a recantation or an
affidavit of desistance.
Answer: A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and
reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously
given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious, affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always a
possibility that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances
in the case, which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the
testimony or statements given, can retractions be considered and upheld. (People v.
XXX, G.R. No. 225288, June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)