VOL.

171, MARCH 21, 1989

Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80194. March 21, 1989.*

EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING,
respondents.

Civil Procedure; Law of the case doctrine; No law of the case may be said to have been laid
down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court’s refusal to consider petitioner’s claim
that his former acquittal barred the separate action.—The “doctrine of the law of the case” has
no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the two resolutions were
handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the
issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the
proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an
interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendant’s motion
to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and
factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil
action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution was premised on
the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not
consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. To
repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no
law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the
respondent court’s refusal to consider petitioner’s claim that his former acquittal barred the
separate action.

Same; Same; Definition of.—“ ‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330).”
(Italics supplied). “It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is
the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case. x x x” (Emphasis supplied). “It is a rule of
general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the
points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the
appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be
considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues
are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and, according to some
authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.’ ”

Civil Law; Torts and Damages; The rule is settled that the same negligent act can create two
kinds of liability on the part of the offender but offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability.—Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act
or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds

1
of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi
delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-
delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine is well-settled that a person while not criminally liable may still be
civilly liable.—Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action after such
acquittal.

This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of
Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. that: “In view of the fact that the defendant-
appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to
recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.
‘The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist’. (Padilla vs. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July
29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988).
The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides: ‘When the accused in a
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.’ x x x”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine that failure of the court to make pronouncement favorable
or unfavorable as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have
the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action favors the private respondent.—
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to
make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused
amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a
separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it
becomes no longer enforceable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 29 enunciates the rule that a civil action for damages
is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.—
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application
of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proven by
mere preponderance of evidence. Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on
reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

2
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of respondent to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such
separate civil action for damages.—Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the
respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. The Court has also
heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that—“x x x a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover
damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. x x x”

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.

     Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was “sideswiped by a vehicle in the
evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo City”. The respondent Court of Appeals concurred
in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen
(Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the
direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a
consequence.

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. Private respondent, as
the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and
he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Petitioner
was acquitted in said criminal case “on reasonable doubt”.

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which
civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027.
In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative defenses that the
private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter’s cause of action, if
any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said
criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff
failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case.

3
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3,
1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that “(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested
that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate
remedy, to review the ruling of the court”.

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the aforesaid order of the trial
court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court’s resolution of July 23, 1975, and
a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October
28, 1975.

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private
respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P6,920.00 for
hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for
moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and costs.

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A
motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987.

The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private
respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the
civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for
civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted
in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the
judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for
refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding
that the main issue had been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore
mentioned. It is petitioner’s position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case,
the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do not
constitute the “law of the case” which would control the subsequent proceedings in this
controversy.

1. We incline favorably to petitioner’s submission on this score.

The “doctrine of the law of the case” has no application at the aforesaid posture of the
proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-
40992 may have involved some of the issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on
the merits by the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its
order denying therein defendant’s motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific
opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were
predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very

4
well be that such resolution was pemised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the
basis of the facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a quo was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been
expounded on the merits of that action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down
in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court’s refusal to consider petitioner’s claim that
his former acquittal barred the separate action.

“ ‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule
of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330).” (Italics
supplied).

“It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of
all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes
the law of that particular case. x x x” (Emphasis supplied).

“It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of
the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both
the trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that
appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the
facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and,
according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.’ x x x”

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of
petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the
negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same
negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability.

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., it was held that where
the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal
case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein
constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet,
however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33
of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal offense and cannot otherwise be considered as a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while
petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of
Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., this time involving damage to property through negligence as to

5
make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary
reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action
against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore,
clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, changes on
the matter of civil actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our
discussion on the statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will
consider the doctrinal developments on this issue.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the
prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu,
where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a
pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal.

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is
allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc
vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. that:

“In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that ‘his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a
separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs.
Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may
still be civilly liable. ‘The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist’.
(Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al.,
G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

‘When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.’ x x x”

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court
to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the
accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine
the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application
of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasidelict, hence only a civil

6
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by
mere preponderance of evidence. Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on
reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a
case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:

“3. That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about 7:00 o’clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street
from his restaurant situated at 220 Iznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of
the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing on the middle of
the street as there were vehicles coming from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay,
Iloilo City, he was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-25-08 W which
was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was
being driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed
and in violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and
by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due negligence and by
failing to take into cinsideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of Iznart Street;”

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, did not bar him from filing such separate
civil the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his
intervention in the criminal case action for damages. The Court has also heretofore ruled in
Elcano vs. Hill that—

“x x x a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of
Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. x x x”

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same
factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly
declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is
not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil
action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two
different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that
in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and

7
resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil
Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold
that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

     Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Petition denied; decision affirmed.

Notes.—Civil liability is not extinguished where acquittal is based on reasonable doubt that
accused is guilty of the crime charged. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558.)

While civil damages may be awarded in the criminal case despite aquittal, this rule does not
preclude the filing of a separate civil action under certain circumstances. (Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 129, SCRA 558.)

——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals,
171 SCRA 429, G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

Case Digest:

8
Failure of the trial court to make any pronouncement as to civil liability amounts to
reservation.  Hence, party may still appeal for the civil aspect of the case.

FACTS: Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar Jarantilla in
the evening of July7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City. Jarantilla was accordingly charged before
the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal
Case No. 47207.

Sing, as the complaining witness, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and
he intervened in the prosecution of the criminal case through a private prosecutor.

Jarantilla was acquitted on reasonable doubt. On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a civil case
against Jarantilla in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action
involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the dismissed criminal case.

The petitioner in his motion to dismiss alleged that the private respondent had no cause of
action, that the latter’s cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in the same
criminal case .

RTC denies motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, granted damages to Sing, and proposed
that the case be elevated to the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action without
reserving the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission?
 
HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.

Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part
of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto  and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same
negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the
criminal case through intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein
constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.

The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'

Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to
a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action.
The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes
no longer enforceable.
 
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application
of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil

9
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasidelict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by
mere preponderance of evidence. Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on
reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

10