FILED

Gary Harrison
CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT
5/4/2023 3:45:18 PM
1 Jon M. Sands BY: MARINA L CONTRERAS /s/
Federal Public Defender DEPUTY
2 District of Arizona CR045587
HON. JAMES C. CARRUTH
3 Cary Sandman (AZ Bar No. 004779)
Jessica Salyers (AZ No.032702)
4 Maren Dale (AZ No. 036815)
5 Assistant Federal Public Defenders
407 West Congress, Suite 501
6 Tucson, Arizona 85701
7 [email protected]
[email protected]
8 [email protected]
9 520.879.7614 Telephone
520.622.6844 Facsimile
10
11 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF HON.
THEJAMES
STATE OF ARIZONA
C. CARRUTH
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
12
13 State of Arizona, No. CR 045587
14 Plaintiff,
15 vs.
16 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
17 Barry Lee Jones,
18 Defendant. (Hon. Kyle Bryson)
19
20
21 Defendant/Petitioner, Barry Lee Jones, by and through counsel undersigned
22
hereby petitions this Court for postconviction relief, pursuant to Ariz. Crim. P. Rule
23
24 32. This petition is not opposed by the State. The petition should be granted for the
25 reasons stated below.
26
I. Statement of the Case.
27
28 At 6:16 a.m. on Monday May 2, 1994, four-year-old Rachel Gray was admitted to

1
 1 Kino Community Hospital in Tucson, Arizona. Rachel was pronounced dead on arrival.
2
An autopsy was performed the next day by Dr. John Howard of the Pima County Medical
3
4 Examiner’s Office. Dr. Howard determined that death was a homicide caused by a small
5 bowel laceration due to blunt abdominal trauma. Dr. Howard also found that Rachel had
6
a laceration of the left scalp behind the ear, a very small laceration involving the midline
7
region of the vaginal introitus, as well as multiple internal and external contusions. See
8
9 Jones v. Ryan, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1163 (D. Ariz. 2018); affirmed, Jones v. Shinn, 943
10 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).
11
At the time of her death, Rachel had been living in the small trailer of Barry Lee
12
13 Jones located at 4501 E. Benson Highway in Tucson, Arizona. Living there with Rachel
14 and Jones were Rachel’s mother, Angela Gray (“Angela”), Angela’s other children, 11-
15
year-old Rebecca Lux (“Becky”) and 14-year-old Johnnie Lux (“Johnnie”), and Jones’s
16
17 11-year-old daughter Brandie. Angela and her children had moved into Mr. Jones’s trailer
18 sometime in April 1994 and had been living with Mr. Jones for just a short time before
19
Rachel’s May 2nd death. 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.
20
Within just a few hours from the time law enforcement learned of Rachel’s death,
21
22 Mr. Jones became the leading suspect, and on May 2nd he was arrested and charged with
23 first degree murder and child abuse. Subsequently, attendant to grand jury proceedings,
24
Jones was charged with various offenses in a five-count indictment: (1) Count One –
25
26 intentionally or knowingly engaging in an act of sexual intercourse with Rachel in
27 violation of A.R.S. § 13-1406 (1993); (2) Count Two - intentionally or knowingly causing
28
physical injury to Rachel by striking her abdominal area causing a rupture to her small

2
 1 intestine, under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, in
2
violation of A.R.S. §13-3623 (B)(1) (1994); (3) Count Three – intentionally or knowingly
3
4 causing physical injury to Rachel by bruising her face and ear and causing a laceration to
5 her head, in violation of A.R.S §13-3623 (C)(1) (1994); (4) Count Four – while having
6
care and custody of Rachel, intentionally or knowingly causing Rachel to be placed in a
7
situation where her health was endangered, under circumstances likely to produce death
8
9 or serious physical injury, by failing to take Rachel to the hospital before her death, in
10 violation of A.R.S. §13-3623 (B)(1) (1994); and (5) Count Five – first degree felony
11
murder of Rachel Gray in violation of A.R.S. §13-1105 (1994). (ROA 2.)
12
13 Following a jury trial in April 1995, Mr. Jones was convicted on all charges. (ROA

14 139.) His convictions under Counts One, Two, and Four served as the predicate felonies
15
supporting the conviction of felony murder under Count Five. (ROA 135 at 14). See A.R.S
16
17 § 13-1105 (1994) (predicate felonies sustaining felony murder include offenses under
18 A.R.S. §13-3623 (B)(1) (1994) and A.R.S. § 13-1406 (1993). Jones was sentenced to
19
lengthy prison sentences and sentenced to death on Count Five. (ROA 159).
20
The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jones, 188 Ariz.
21
22 388 (1997). Mr. Jones’s state postconviction petition counsel, who received an
23 appointment, notwithstanding his explicit experiential ineligibility under extant rules,
24
conducted no investigation, and after presenting several specious claims not germane to
25
26 this proceeding, the petition was dismissed. Jones, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1177–78, 1214–
27 1217.
28
Mr. Jones has always maintained his innocence. In 2001 he instituted a federal

3
 1 habeas corpus proceeding. Id., at 1162. Following a seven day evidentiary hearing in 2017,
2
the federal district court granted a writ of habeas corpus, overturned all Mr. Jones’s
3
4 convictions, and ordered the State to release or retry him. Id., at 1218. This relief was
5 granted on grounds that Mr. Jones’s had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to
6
effective-assistance of counsel. The court also determined that Mr. Jones’s failure to
7
present his claim in his state postconviction proceeding should be excused, because state
8
9 postconviction counsel was ineffective for not raising this Sixth Amendment claim in the
10 first instance.
11
The district court’s decision was affirmed on appeal, subject to a minor caveat.
12
13 With respect to Count Four, which charged Mr. Jones with intentional or knowing child
14 abuse for failing to take Rachel to the hospital after she became ill, the court of appeals
15
held that there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Jones would still have been convicted
16
17 of reckless child abuse (a lesser-included offense not a predicate offense to felony
18 murder). Jones v. Shinn, 943 F.3d at 1235–36.1
19
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court did not consider or refute
20
the finding that Mr. Jones’s conviction was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
21
22
23 1
Rachel’s mother Angela Gray was charged along with Mr. Jones under Counts Four and
24 Five of the indictment. (ROA 2.) She was separately tried by a jury and was found guilty
of a lesser-included offense under Count Four. Angela was determined to have acted
25 recklessly, rather than intentionally or knowingly. The jury’s finding of a reckless mental
26 state made her ineligible for conviction of felony murder. The felony murder statute
required a jury finding that Angela acted with an intentional or knowing mental state in
27 violation of the child abuse statute. See A.R.S. §13-1105 (1994) and A.R.S. § 13-3623
28 (B)(1) (1994). As noted Mr. Jones’s jury found the intentional or knowing mental state
rendering his child abuse conviction a predicate to felony murder.

4
 1 Nor did the Court disturb the lower court’s finding that Mr. Jones lost the lawyer
2
appointment lottery twice, when he was appointed both incompetent state trial counsel
3
4 and postconviction counsel. To the contrary, notwithstanding evidence that Mr. Jones was
5 denied his fundamental Sixth Amendment rights, the judgment was reversed because, in
6
the majority’s view, federal habeas courts were statutorily prohibited from considering
7
Mr. Jones’s evidence, because his negligent state postconviction counsel failed to
8
9 investigate and present the evidence to the state postconviction court in the first instance.
10 Shinn v. Ramirez and Jones, 142 S. Ct. at 1735–1740.
11
Mr. Jones contends that the Supreme Court reached the Shinn decision in disregard
12
13 of its own precedent. Just a decade earlier, the Court held that if a prisoner failed to raise
14 his trial counsel ineffectiveness claim in an initial state post-conviction proceeding—as
15
Jones’s postconviction lawyer did here—then a federal habeas court could excuse that
16
17 failure, if the failure to raise the claim in state court was the result of negligent state post-
18 conviction counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
19
Not surprisingly, the Shinn decision drew a strong rebuke from the dissent, for all
20
but overrul[ing] [Martinez],” and “reduc[ing] to rubble many habeas petitioner’s Sixth
21
22 Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel.” Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1740, 1750
23 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The Court’s decision would leave “many people who were
24
convicted in violation of the Sixth Amendment to face incarceration or even execution
25
26 without any meaningful chance to vindicate their right to counsel.” Id., at 1740. The
27 implications of the decision are dire.
28
To put it bluntly: Two men [including Mr. Jones] whose trial attorneys did

5
 1 not provide even the bare minimum level of representation required by the
2 Constitution may be executed because forces outside of their control
prevented them from vindicating their constitutional right to counsel. It is
3 hard to imagine a more extreme malfunction than the prejudicial deprivation
4 of a right [to effective assistance of counsel] that constitutes the foundation
for our adversary system.
5
142 S. Ct. at 1749–50 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
6
7 Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Mr. Jones’s case was returned to the
8 federal district court for further proceedings. Other avenues for relief remained open to
9
Jones, but the parties ventured on a different course. During the preceding several months,
10
11 the parties engaged in serious discussions, with the assistance of a mediator, Magistrate
12 Judge Deborah Smith, in an effort to achieve a settled resolution. This renewed petition
13
for postconviction relief (which the State does not oppose) culminates from those
14
15 successful efforts. Should this Court grant the petition, Mr. Jones and the State have
16 agreed that the State will lodge an amended indictment, Mr. Jones will plead guilty, and
17
then be sentenced under terms which will result in his release from prison for time-served.
18
II. Facts
19
20 Mr. Jones’s case is a child abuse timeline case, grounded, like all such cases, in a
21 pivotal circumstantial premise: that injuries endured by a child occurred when that child
22
was in the accused’s care. And so it was in the Jones case. The “gravamen of the
23
24 prosecution’s case against Mr. Jones was that Rachel was solely in his care on the
25 afternoon of May 1, 1994 when her injuries, including her fatal abdominal injury, were
26
inflicted.” Jones, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. The prosecution’s case homed in on a very
27
28 specific and narrow timeline, charging that Mr. Jones assaulted Rachel, when he was alone

6
 1 with her on Sunday afternoon, May 1, 1994, just hours before her death at 3:00-4:00 a.m.
2
on May 2. Id., at 1169–70.
3
4 The prosecutor summarized the State’s theory in closing: “‘Who is her rapist? Who

5 is her murderer? The answer to that question is simple. Who was with her all day on
6
Sunday, May 1st.’” Id., at 1168–69 (quoting RT 4/13/95 at 92.) In order to support the
7
intentional or knowing infliction of the child abuse charge alleged in Count Four, (for
8
9 failing to take Rachel to the hospital after she became ill) the prosecutor argued that Mr.
10 Jones’s guilt for the assaults, provided the motive for his denial of medical care. The
11
prosecutor told the jury that [Mr. Jones] “beat Rachel in order to rape her, and when [Mr.
12
13 Jones] failed to take her to the hospital, ‘[s]he died as a result of that beating because only
14 the defendant knew how badly she was hurt.”’ Id. (quoting RT 4/13/95 at 92).
15
Thus, the foundation of the prosecution’s case was framed around a circumstantial
16
17 assumption: that Rachel suffered her injuries while in Mr. Jones’s care just hours before
18 her death. Trial counsel knew this to be the case; indeed, he acknowledged in his opening
19
statement to the jury that ‘“[e]verything in this case is going to center around what
20
happened on Sunday, May 1st. Specifically, a couple of disputed hours ....” 327 F. Supp.
21
22 3d at 1169 (quoting RT 4/6/95 at 60) (emphasis added).
23 It was self-evident that the State would present forensic evidence to prove the
24
injuries could be dated to the narrow timeline. Trial counsel admitted he anticipated that
25
26 “the State would present [forensic] medical evidence tying Rachel’s injuries to a couple
27 of disputed hours” on May 1. Id., at 1199. And the State did present such evidence from
28
Dr. John Howard, a medical examiner with the Pima County Medical Examiner’s Office,

7
 1 who testified at Jones’s trial that all of Rachel’s injuries were consistent with infliction on
2
the afternoon of May 1. Id., at 1206–07. Nevertheless, trial counsel never investigated the
3
4 reliability of the State’s theory of the case. Id., at 1198–1202, 1206. Instead, despite Mr.
5 Jones’s pleas of innocence, id., at 1200, trial counsel demurred from his role as Sixth
6
Amendment advocate. He later explained that the failure to investigate followed from his
7
assumption that Mr. Jones “was guilty based on the State’s version of the case.” Id., at
8
9 1205. Adding insult to injury, during closing argument, trial counsel told the jury that
10 “maybe [Mr. Jones] did take [Rachel] out and murder her. . .” Id., at 1207.
11
Trial counsel’s actions here made a mockery of his duties under the Sixth
12
13 Amendment. Especially, where “there were several significant red flags that should have
14 alerted counsel to the need to investigate the medical evidence regarding the timing of
15
Rachel’s injuries.” Id., at 1199.
16
17 Red flag number one. Counsel had credible evidence, demonstrating that Rachel

18 was not harmed during the brief time when she was in Mr. Jones’s care on May 1. Pivotal
19
to this conclusion were the repeated statements and sworn testimony given by Rachel’s
20
older sister Becky. She asserted time and again that Mr. Jones and Rachel went on two
21
22 trips in his van on that Sunday afternoon, and each time Rachel returned home unharmed
23 and happy. Id., at 1181–82, 1200.
24
Becky was first interviewed on May 2nd at 10:00 a.m. by Detective Ferrier. She
25
26 stated that Rachel went with Mr. Jones on just two trips—to the store and to a friend’s
27 house—and Rachel looked “ok” and was “smiling” when she returned home. Id. Becky
28
was next interviewed by Detective Downing on May 4th. Becky stated Mr. Jones awoke

8
 1 around 2:30 p.m. on May 1 when Jones’s friend came over to visit. She said that around
2
4:00 p.m. Mr. Jones took Rachel to a friend’s house. She told Detective Downing that
3
4 Rachel did not have a “hurt,” and then Jones took Rachel with him to the store. Id., at
5 1181. Becky said that when they returned from the store, Rachel was standing on the porch
6
waving to her. Id. The essence of Becky’s statements to Detectives Downing and Ferrier
7
is that Rachel looked unharmed after returning from just two trips in the van.
8
9 Becky testified at Angela’s trial on March 24, 1995, just 2 ½ weeks before she
10 testified at Mr. Jones’s trial on April 11, 1995. In her opening statement at Angela’s trial,
11
the prosecutor told the jury that Becky would testify that Jones and Rachel took only two
12
13 trips together in Jones’s yellow van on Sunday, May 1, 1994. Mr. Jones’s trial counsel
14 was present during Becky’s testimony and obtained a transcript of Becky’s testimony at
15
Angela’s trial. (ROA 123.) Becky repeated her prior statements, testifying at Angela’s
16
17 trial that Mr. Jones took only two trips with Rachel in his van, and Rachel returned from
18 each trip unharmed. Becky was specifically asked at Angela’s trial if she was “sure [Jones
19
and Rachel] left and came back two separate times,” and she answered unequivocally,
20
“yes.” Id., at 1182.
21
22 But in an about face from her testimony at Angela’s trial, during her direct
23 examination at Mr. Jones’s trial, Becky testified that she saw Jones and Rachel leave in
24
the van three times and she did not see Rachel at the time she returned from this third trip.
25
26 Id., at 1174. Inexplicably, Mr. Jones’s counsel failed to impeach Becky with her prior
27 inconsistent statements at Angela’s trial or with the statements made in her pre-trial police
28
interviews. See Id., at 1206 (finding “Bruner [] failed to cross-examine Becky with her

9
 1 four prior statements after she offered testimony at trial, for the first time, that [Mr. Jones]
2
took Rachel on a third trip in the van, affording the prosecution an opportunity to argue
3
2
4 that [Mr. Jones]committed the offenses during this third trip in the van”). (emphasis
5 added).
6
Given Becky’s unequivocal and repeated insistence that Rachel returned unharmed
7
from a total of just two trips with Mr. Jones, trial counsel should have understood, “that
8
9 Rachel showed no signs of a physical beating and rape during the afternoon of May 1.
10 This evidence should have suggested to counsel that perhaps Rachel had not been beaten
11
or assaulted by [Jones] that afternoon,” and that a forensic investigation should ensue to
12
13 determine the time between the injuries and death. Id., at 1200.
14 Red flag number two. Counsel had evidence that Rachel already appeared ill on
15
Saturday April 30. One of Mr. Jones’s neighbors, Isobel Tafe, was interviewed by lead
16
17 detective Pesqueira. In the interview disclosed to trial counsel, Ms. Tafe related that on
18 Saturday April 30 four-year-old Rachel was wandering around the trailer park without
19
adult supervision and she looked “sick” and had a pale grayish pallor. Id., at 1200.
20
“Counsel knew that Rachel was observed to have a similar pallor on Sunday afternoon
21
22 after she was discovered sick at [another neighbor’s] camper. This evidence points to the
23 possibility that Rachel was already suffering from peritonitis on April 30, suggesting the
24
25
26 2
The lead detective Pesqueira’s own investigation led her to conclude that Rachel had
27 taken just two trips in the van with Mr. Jones and that a third trip did not occur until after
Rachel was already discovered vomiting and sick at a neighbor’s house. Id., at 1181–82.
28

10
 1 need [for counsel] to investigate the timing of Rachel’s injuries more closely.” Id. Had
2
counsel bothered to investigate he would have learned that the symptoms described by
3
4 Ms. Tafe, were symptoms “specific to this sort of [disease] process,” related to Rachel’s
5 fatal peritonitis. Id., at 1190. Even the State’s expert Dr. Howard eventually conceded this
6
point, agreeing that “Rachel looking sick and gray in color on April 30 was consistent
7
with the injury occurring before that date.” Id., at 1191.
8
9 Red flag number three. Mr. Jones had evidence derived from Dr. Howard’s pre-
10 trial interview and earlier testimony at Angela’s trial, which suggested “Rachel’s injuries
11
were most consistent with infliction prior to May 1.” Id., at 1206. “This evidence from the
12
13 State’s expert significantly bolstered the need for a defense investigation of the medical
14 timeline between injuries and death.” Id., at 1200. And making matters worse, even though
15
trial counsel could have “impeach[ed] Dr. Howard with his earlier statements and
16
17 testimony finding Rachel’s injuries ‘most consistent’ with infliction prior to May 1,” he
18 inexplicably failed to do so. Id., at 1206.
19
Red flag number four. Mr. Jones’s counsel had evidence that others had harmed
20
Rachel. “Evidence that others may have caused Rachel’s injuries further substantiated the
21
22 need to investigate the medical evidence and its association with the timing of Rachel’s
23 injuries.” Id., at 1200–01.
24
“For example, trial counsel had evidence suggesting [Rachel’s teenage brother]
25
26 Jonathon may have been molesting other children, and Rachel was afraid of him [when
27 he came into the children’s bedroom]” Id., at 1201. Counsel also had evidence that
28
“Jonathon had to be moved out of the girls’ bedroom into separate sleeping quarters due

11
 1 to sexual behavior directed toward [Mr. Jones’s daughter] Brandie.” Id., at 1189. Trial
2
counsel also made file notations, that Angela’s former boyfriend “Zoly” may have had
3
4 problems with Rachel sexually in the past. All this evidence heightened the plausibility
5 that Rachel might have experienced sexual trauma before living with [Mr. Jones], or at
6
least before May 1, and, therefore, that the medical timeline between the vaginal injury
7
and death needed to be fully investigated.” Id., at 1201.
8
9 Also, Mr. Jones’s counsel had evidence that Rachel’s mother Angela may have
10 inflicted the blows that led to Rachel’s small bowel injury and her death. She excessively
11
punished her children, including Rachel. Id., at 1176, 1188. Counsel had evidence that
12
13 after moving into Jones’s trailer, “Angela had struck Rachel so hard that the next day a
14 handprint was seen on Rachel’s body.” Id., at 1188, 1201. She was also observed
15
“smack[ing] Rachel in the face, striking Rachel in the head, and kicking Becky. Id.
16
17 Counsel also had CPS records reporting Angela inflicted blows on her daughter Becky’s
18 stomach (the site of Rachel’s fatal injury) and she had thrown her children downstairs and
19
slammed them against walls during physical altercations. Id., at 1188, 1201. In addition,
20
Mr. Jones’s neighbors, reported that Angela screamed at the children, threatening them
21
22 with physical harm while Mr. Jones acted appropriately around children. Id., at 1188. All
23 of this evidence “strongly suggested that Angela could have caused one or more of
24
Rachel’s injuries, including her small bowel injury and therefore an investigation was
25
26 needed in order to determine if Rachel’s injuries could be dated to sometime prior to that
27 Sunday afternoon.” Id., at 1201.
28
Counsel also had evidence that other children in Mr. Jones’s trailer park may have

12
 1 harmed Rachel. Becky reported to Detective Ferrier on May 2, that she heard Rachel say
2
that a neighborhood boy hit her with a metal bar in the stomach. Id., at 1188. Two other
3
4 witnesses reported to lead detective Pesqueira that they heard that a neighbor’s son hit
5 Rachel in the stomach. Id., at 1188–89. When Mr. Jones’s daughter Brandie was
6
interviewed on May 2 she also reported that a boy had hit Rachel in the stomach with a
7
metal bar. Id., at 1189. Finally, “Angela reported that Becky could be overly rough with
8
9 Rachel, saying once she pushed her in front of a moving car, and another time Angela was
10 told that Rachel had fallen from a clothesline after Becky had put her up there.” Id.
11
Red flag number five. Trial counsel had reason to know that “the police
12
13 investigation was colored by a rush to judgment and a lack of due diligence and thorough
14 professional investigation.” Id., at 1208–09. The obvious defects in the law enforcement
15
investigation pointed to the necessity for Mr. Jones’s counsel to thoroughly examine the
16
17 reliability of the State’s accusations. And “effective counsel would have brought [the
18 defects in the law enforcement investigation] to the jury’s attention, casting further doubt
19
on the strength of the State’s case.” Id. In Mr. Jones’s case, the police investigation was
20
problematic.
21
22 First, the law enforcement investigators failed to document any effort to locate the
23 clothing worn by Rachel or Jones on the day of the alleged assault, obliging the lead
24
detective to admit that this investigatory failure was unheard of in a case charging sexual
25
26 assault. Consequently, she acknowledged that evidence possibly exculpating Jones (for
27 instance, the absence of blood, or other bodily fluids on Jones’s and Rachel’s clothing)
28
was lost. 89.) Id., at 1180–81.

13
 1 Second, the State’s theory of the case was settled before any forensic investigation
2
into the timing of the injuries. Sergeant Pesqueira, the lead detective, decided that Rachel’s
3
4 injuries must have been inflicted on May 1, without investigating whether there was
5 medical evidence supporting her assumption. Id., at 1178–79. For example, if Pesqueira
6
had informed Dr. Howard of evidence she had obtained from one of Jones’s neighbors,
7
Isobel Tafe, who reported that Rachel appeared ill on April 30, Dr. Howard would have
8
9 explained “that a description of Rachel looking sick and gray in color prior to May 1 could
10 be compatible with the injury occurring before that date.” Id., at 1192. Pesqueira now
11
concedes, that if she had known the injury to Rachel may have occurred before May 1,
12
13 she would have “expanded her investigation” into an earlier timeframe. Id., at 1178–79.
14 But of course that was never done.
15
Third, the lead detective admitted she had neglected investigation into whether
16
17 there were others living in Jones’s trailer who may have sexually abused Rachel, when
18 minimal inquiry would have revealed that Rachel’s older brother was reported to have
19
molested other children and he had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with
20
Jones’s daughter Brandie. Id., at 1189. Pesqueira “admitted that there was no reason she
21
22 could think of why she would have ruled out such an investigation. Id. But she did anyway.
23 Fourth, the lead detective never investigated whether Angela had inflicted the fatal
24
blow to Rachel’s abdomen. Had she done so she would have discovered that the evidence
25
26 “strongly suggested that Angela could have caused one or more of Rachel’s injuries,
27 including her small bowel injury.” Id., at 1201.
28
Fifth, Mr. Jones told detectives that he had taken Rachel to the Choice Market in

14
 1 the late afternoon of May 1, the same location where the two children said they thought
2
they had seen a man in a yellow van striking a child while entering the market parking
3
3
4 lot. Mr. Jones also told the detectives Rachel had gone into the market with him and she
5 helped carry the milk. Id., at 1182. Despite verifying the other locations Mr. Jones reported
6
visiting on May 1, Detective Pesqueira “acknowledge[s] . . . there is no ‘indication
7
anywhere in the sheriff’s department record’ that anyone attempted to verify and
8
9 document that [Mr. Jones] went into the Choice Market around 4:00 or 4:30 in the
10 afternoon and that Rachel was fine at the time.” Id., at 1183 (quoting EH RT 11/6/17 at
11
99–101). This means one of two things. The police failed to verify Mr. Jones’s report, or
12
13 they did verify that Rachel was fine during her visit to the market and then failed to
14 document the same.
15
Altogether, the evidence known to trial counsel suggested that an investigation of
16
17 the medical timeline from injury to death was crucial and needed to be done. Had they
18
19
20 3
The State has previously agreed that the children’s testimony was “impeached
extensively at trial.” (See Ninth Cir. 08-99033 ECF No. 63 at 14-15.) It is no wonder such
21 an admission was made. See 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1175–76, 1185–87. The children described
the van they saw as lacking windows along the sides. Id., at 1175, 1187. But Jones van
22 did have windows on the sides, and the van the children saw without windows can be seen
in a sheriff’s department aerial photo, which was admitted as an exhibit at trial. Id., at
23 1187. Moreover, the claim that Rachel was being beaten in the Choice Market parking lot
is belied by Becky’s repeated consistent reports that Rachel returned from the market
24 unharmed. Other witnesses who saw Rachel later that evening of May 1 described her as
showing no visible injuries to her face, where the children claimed to have seen the man
25 hit a child. Id., at 1176,1182. Experts who testified during the federal hearing, testified the
children’s statements were tainted by leading questioning; that reconstruction of the scene
26 demonstrated the children would not have been able to see a driver striking the face of the
four-year-old child; that Rachel did not suffer any injuries consistent with the described
27 actions of the driver; and that Mr. Jones could not physically reach across the wide van to
strike Rachel while driving the vehicle. Id., at 1196–98. Beyond the foregoing, as
28 explained further below, none of the injuries seen at the time of Rachel’s death were
inflicted on May 1.

15
 1 done so, they would have discovered evidence showing that it was not possible for
2
Rachel’s injuries to have been inflicted on May 1.
3
4 Fatal Small Bowel Injury.

5 Four medical experts provided testimony during Mr. Jones’s federal evidentiary
6
hearing regarding the nature and timing of the injury to Rachel’s small bowel.. Three of
7
them, Dr. Janice Ophoven, Dr. Mary Pat McKay, and Dr. Philip Keen “all agree that it is
8
9 not possible that the injury to Rachel’s small bowel occurred on the afternoon of May 1.”
10 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1189–90. The fourth expert, Dr. Howard has now admitted that, if he
11
had testified truthfully at Mr. Jones’s trial, he would have admitted that all Rachel’s
12
13 injuries probably occurred before May 1. Id., at 1207.
14 “Dr. Ophoven explained that the fatal injury to Rachel’s duodenum occurred in the
15
retroperitoneal space, which is just behind, but separated from, the abdominal cavity or
16
17 peritoneum. The inflammatory response to an injury in this area is initially restricted to
18 the tissue area of the retroperitoneum. Retroperitoneal injuries do not manifest in the same
19
kind of symptoms as an injury inside the peritoneum, such as appendicitis, where the
20
inflammation spreads quite rapidly and symptoms develop quickly. Individuals may
21
22 experience discomfort—a bellyache, nausea, or a change in appetite—but would not
23 necessarily look like they were suffering from an impending catastrophe. As a result, the
24
delay between injury and the time of onset of symptoms—let alone diagnosis of injury—
25
26 in injuries to the duodenum like Rachel’s is often three or four or more days. Individuals
27 commonly do not know they have a serious injury for several days until there is a
28
catastrophic decompensation with the onset of peritonitis and, simultaneously, shock.”

16
 1 Id., at 1190.
2
“Dr. Ophoven testified that based on her review of the physical evidence, including
3
4 samples of tissue and chemical analysis from Rachel taken at the time of autopsy, ‘the key
5 findings in this case of abdominal trauma of many days duration were not made clear’
6
during [Mr. Jones’s] trial. The evidence demonstrates that ‘the fatal injuries to Rachel
7
Gray could not possibly have been inflicted on the day prior to her death as suggested by
8
9 the state at [Mr. Jones’s] trial.’ Dr. Ophoven concluded that the ‘veracity of this evidence
10 is as scientifically precise as any forensic determination available in medical science.”’
11
Id. (quoting from (EH RT 11/1/17 at 37–38; EH Ex. 106 at 4276)) (emphasis added).
12
13 “Dr. Mary Pat McKay, a board-certified emergency medicine practitioner

14 specializing in trauma care with additional experience teaching and researching in the
15
field of injury care and trauma, testified regarding her personal experience treating
16
17 duodenal injuries like Rachel’s as well as an extensive literature review she undertook
18 focused on pediatric injuries involving duodenal rupture, perforation, laceration,
19
treatment. Id., at 1191. In her review, Dr. McKay identified ‘more than 200 cases of
20
intestinal injury in children over many decades, including at least 160 cases of duodenal
21
22 perforation with the timeline described from injury through diagnosis to treatment and
23 outcome.’ In her review of the literature, Dr. McKay did not find a single reported case in
24
which a duodenal injury resulted in death within 48 hours after the known time of injury.”
25
26 Id., at 1191 (quoting from EH RT 11/2/17 (a.m.) at 5–6, 9, 15; EH Ex. 113 at 6634–27.)
27 “Dr. McKay suspected Rachel’s injury was non-accidental due to the delay in
28
seeking treatment but could not rule out an accidental injury based on the evidence. In her

17
 1 experience, she has seen duodenal injuries caused by bicycle handlebars and even rough
2
play such as wrestling.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
3
4 Dr. McKay further explained “that the inflammatory response in these types of

5 injuries is a smoldering process. The correct diagnosis and medical treatment are often not
6
undertaken for several days. Dr. McKay’s literature review uncovered cases where the
7
correct diagnosis was not reached for up to seven days. Dr. McKay explained that the
8
9 laceration to Rachel’s duodenum would initially cause inflammation within the
10 retroperitoneal space, but not infection. Eventually, if left untreated the inflammation
11
spreads and infection sets in, resulting in overwhelming sepsis and death. The progression
12
13 from the initial injury to increased inflammation and infection, and eventually death, takes
14 a ‘very long period of time.’ In her literature review, Dr. McKay found cases in which
15
individuals suffered duodenal lacerations like Rachel’s and survived, even though they
16
17 did not receive treatment for four to seven days. Dr. McKay concluded that “Rachel’s
18 duodenal injury occurred no sooner than 36 hours prior to death and likely occurred
19
much earlier. There is absolutely zero evidence to suggest it could have occurred in less
20
than 24 hours.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
21
22 Dr. Keen agreed that “Rachel’s abdominal injury occurred approximately two days
23 prior to her death.” Id. On the other hand, after Dr. Howard provided widely divergent
24
and inconsistent opinions regarding the dating of the fatal injury, he eventually
25
26 acknowledged: “that if he had been asked the right questions at [Mr. Jones’s] trial, he
27 would have testified truthfully that in his judgment the injury was most consistent with
28
having occurred prior to May 1, but admitted that he did not make this finding clear to

18
 1 [Mr. Jones’s] jury.” Id., at 1192.
2
Vaginal Injury
3
4 “Dr. Ophoven conducted a microscopic examination of the physical evidence of

5 Rachel’s vaginal injury obtained during autopsy. Prior to her 2010 report, she requested a
6
special ‘trichrome’ stain be applied to the anogenital tissues which revealed evidence of
7
‘a mature vital reaction’ indicated by low cell content material as a result of the body
8
9 making new tissue to heal; ‘regeneration’ or the replacement of surface epithelial cells;
10 and ‘neovascularization’ or new blood vessel growth that occurs when tissue is healing
11
and growing. Based upon her review of these slides, Dr. Ophoven concluded that Rachel
12
13 had a vaginal injury that was weeks old, and possibly predated the time period in which
14 Rachel lived with [Mr. Jones].” Id., at 1192 (quoting EH RT 11/1/17 at 41–43).
15
Dr. Keen looked at the same evidence and concluded that “the vaginal injury was
16
17 multiple days, possibly weeks, old, and was older than the abdominal injury.” Id. Dr.
18 Howard once again provided widely divergent estimates of the time of the injury. Id. He
19
eventually admitted: “his testimony at [Mr. Jones’s] trial could have left the jury with the
20
misimpression that the vaginal injury was most consistent with infliction between 2:00
21
22 and 5:00 on the afternoon of Sunday, May 1, while his findings were that the injury was
23 most consistent with infliction on Saturday, April 30.” Id., at 1193.
24
Both Dr. Keen and Dr. Ophoven concluded that the hemorrhaging of this older
25
26 wound seen at the time of death was consistent with and symptomatic of shock and sepsis.
27 Id., at 1192–93. This sepsis related hemorrhaging process is known as disseminated
28
intravascular coagulation (“DIC”). DIC “renders the body unable to clot and destabilizes

19
 1 the clots that have already formed, potentially causing bleeding from all orifices—from
2
old wounds, the mouth and nose, the GI tract, and urinary tract—and also can cause
3
4 [bruising-like] marks to appear on the exterior of the body.” Id., at 1193. In Rachel’s case,
5 DIC was determined to have an explanatory nexus to her vaginal bleeding, her scalp
6
wound, and the subcutaneous hemorrhaging (bruising-like blotches) seen on portions of
7
her torso. Id. These findings are not unique to Mr. Jones’s case. See e.g., In re Figueroa,
8
9 4 Cal. 5th 576, 582–83 (2018) (attributing genital bleeding observed at time of death to
10 DIC rather than recent sexual trauma).
11
12 Bruising

13 “Dr. Howard agreed, that, had the attorneys asked him at [Mr. Jones’s] trial he
14
would have told them that you cannot really distinguish or date bruises to a specific day.
15
16 He further agreed that he could not distinguish between a bruise inflicted on April 29 from
17 a bruise inflicted on May 1.” Id., at 1193. Dr. Ophoven agreed that it was not possible to
18
date Rachel’s bruising to May 1. Dr. Ophoven and Dr. McKay also concluded that many
19
of the “blotchy discolorations” on Rachel’s torso were associated with sepsis and shock;
20
21 i.e., DIC. Id.
22 Scalp Injury
23
“Both Rachel and Mr. Jones had independently reported to witnesses that Rachel
24
25 had fallen from [Mr. Jones’s] van on the afternoon of Sunday, May 1.” Id., at 1194.
26 Although Dr. Howard had testified at Mr. Jones’s trial that the scalp wound was consistent
27
with an injury caused by a prybar in Mr. Jones’s van, id., at 1170–71, at the federal
28

20
 1 hearing, Dr. Howard, Dr. Ophoven and a biomechanics expert, Dr. Hannon, all concurred
2
that the wound was consistent with a fall onto a flat surface. Id., at 1194. Dr. Ophoven and
3
4 Dr. Hannon also explained in more detail why the scalp wound could not have resulted
5 from a blow from a prybar, and neither could the prybar have caused the fatal injury to
6
Rachel’s small bowel. Id.4
7
In terms of the timing of the scalp injury, during the federal hearing Dr. Howard
8
9 said the wound “occurred hours or a day prior to death.” Id. Known for his varying
10 opinions, Dr. Howard also acknowledged that in his pre-trial interview, he stated that his
11
examination of the tissues led him to conclude that the injury was “probably two days
12
13 old.” Id. In a 2017 deposition, “after reviewing the tissue slides twice before the
14 deposition, he testified that the scalp injury was, more probably than not, at least two days
15
old.” Dr. Ophoven came to the same conclusion after reviewing the microscopic
16
17 evidence–that the injury occurred prior to the pivotal afternoon of May 1. Id.
18 Dr. Ophoven also concluded that the hemorrhaging of the scalp wound seen during
19
the evening of May 1, just hours before Rachel’s death was caused by DIC and the
20
irreversible shock, when the body loses its ability to clot, and an old wound could begin
21
22 oozing or bleeding again. Id. On this score, as late as 5:00 p.m. on May 1, when Rachel
23 was seen dry-heaving at neighbor Stephanie Fleming’s residence—and after Jones’s
24
errands with Rachel—Rachel’s head was not yet bleeding. Id., at 1182. It was only later
25
26 that evening that this old wound began to hemorrhage. Id., at 1183.
27
28 4
There was no blood or other biological evidence on the prybar. Id., at 1173.

21
 1 Only after her head began to bleed, did Mr. Jones take Rachel with him in the van
2
to get ice for her head. Id. This was the third trip in the van; the one which occurred after
3
4 Rachel was visibly sick and suddenly seeping blood from her scalp wound. Id., at 1182.
5 And the following morning of May 2, when Rachel was taken to the hospital, her scalp
6
wound continued to ooze blood. At trial, the State suggested that the trace stains of blood
7
in the van and on Mr. Jones’s clothing, worn on Monday May 2,5 suggested Mr. Jones had
8
9 assaulted Rachel in the van on the day prior. Id., at 1203. However, expert evidence
10 presented at the federal hearing, clarified that the trace amounts of blood had innocent
11
explanations, discussed further below. Id., at 1203–04.
12
13 III. Legal Analysis

14 “The right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our
15
justice system” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
16
17 governed by the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). The
18 duty of effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment “is to make the adversarial testing
19
process work in the particular case.” Id., at 690. “In every case the court should be
20
concerned with whether . . . the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because
21
22 of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
23 results.” Id., at 696.
24
To demonstrate ineffective assistance under Strickland, Mr. Jones must show that
25
26
27
5
28 Recall that law enforcement did not conduct a search for the clothing Mr. Jones wore on
May 1.

22
 1 counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
2
deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687–88.
3
4 A. Deficient Performance

5 When measuring the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, it is

6
axiomatic that to make the adversarial process work in any particular case, “counsel has a
7
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
8
9 particular investigations unnecessary.” Id., at 690–91. Competent counsel are expected to
10 undertake a “thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options” for the
11
defense, id., at 690, and any limitation on counsel’s investigation must be supported by a
12
13 “reasonable professional judgment.” Id. Mr. Jones’s trial counsel failed this test.
14 Here, it was vital for Mr. Jones’s trial counsel to investigate the critical evidence
15
central to proof of Mr. Jones’s guilt: the timeline from Rachel’s injuries to death. See
16
th
17 Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 863–64 (4 Cir. 2011). “[Defendant’s] lawyer
18 disregarded [his] professional obligation to investigate critical prosecution evidence,
19
thereby engendering ‘a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to
20
produce just results.’” Id., at 861 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696); Duncan v.
21
22 Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding deficient performance where “the
23 central role that the potentially exculpatory evidence could have played in Duncan’s
24
defense). In Mr. Jones’s case, “under prevailing professional norms, the central focus of
25
26 the defense should have been an investigation into when Rachel suffered her injuries.”
27 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1199.
28
As already summarized above, there were numerous red flags pointing to the

23
 1 reasonable necessity of investigating the medical evidence relevant to determining the
2
date of injury timeline. Counsel knew the State would present medical evidence
3
4 “suggesting all of Rachel’s injuries were consistent with being inflicted on the afternoon
5 of Sunday, May 1, when Rachel was alone with [Mr. Jones]in his van.” Id., at 1199–1200.
6
They knew Rachel had already looked ill on April 30; that Dr. Howard had made
7
statements and given testimony suggesting that the injuries occurred before May 1; that
8
9 others may have been responsible for Rachel’s injuries; that Becky had consistently said
10 Rachel was not injured after her two trips with Mr. Jones; and that the police investigation
11
was replete with omissions and uninvestigated assumptions. Id., at 1200–01. “All of these
12
13 circumstances would have indicated to any reasonable attorney that a medical
14 investigation into the timing of Rachel’s injuries was necessary, but counsel in this case
15
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation.” Id., at 1201.
16
17 Even trial counsel “agreed . . . that he missed an important issue with respect to the

18 timing of Rachel’s injuries and should have done more to determine the time of injuries.”
19
Id., at 1205. “Judging the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct on the facts of this case,
20
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct . . .counsel’s decision to forego inquiry into
21
22 the medical evidence regarding the time of injury was objectively unreasonable in light of
23 the vast body of evidence pointing to the need to investigate the medical timeline between
24
Rachel’s injuries and her death.” Id., at 1206.
25
26 Counsel also acted unreasonably in failing to investigate potential innocent

27 explanations for the bloodstain evidence. “Because the evidence known to trial counsel
28
rendered it plausible, as discussed above, that Rachel was not assaulted and raped by [Mr.

24
 1 Jones] on May 1 during the alleged third trip in the van, it was reasonably necessary to
2
investigate the implications of the blood evidence presented at [Mr. Jones’s] trial
3
4 suggesting the rape and assault of Rachel took place in the van.” Id., at 1202–03.
5 “Counsel knew before trial that there was going to be evidence presented with
6
respect to the interpretation of blood evidence but failed to consult with any bloodstain
7
interpretation expert. Becky had reported that [Mr. Jones] and Angela took Rachel into
8
9 the bathroom to do CPR, and then they rushed Rachel to the hospital on the morning of
10 May 2. Thus, there was reason to believe that the trace amounts of blood on [Mr. Jones’s]
11
clothing might have been simply transferred from Rachel’s bleeding head while [Mr.
12
13 Jones] was attempting to administer aid or transport Rachel to the hospital. Similarly,
14 counsel were on notice that the small stain of blood on the carpet of the van was located
15
adjacent to the passenger seat, where Rachel was being held in her mother’s arms on the
16
17 way to the hospital on May 2. There was reason to expect that the carpet stain might be
18 the result of blood dripping from Rachel’s head during the trip to the hospital on May 2,
19
and not a stain left from Rachel’s head lying in the back of the van after her head was
20
bleeding as a result of being beaten and hit during the sexual assault, as the prosecution
21
22 argued at trial. Moreover, trial counsel were on notice that that there was no attempt to
23 either identify or recover the clothing worn by [Mr. Jones] or Rachel on Sunday, May 1.
24
The State argued, based on the evidence of spatter stains found on the passenger seat, floor
25
26 of the van, and the right sleeve of [Mr. Jones’s] shirt, that after the assault, [Mr. Jones]
27 put her in the passenger seat of the car and kept hitting her “trying to make her shut up.”
28
Id., at 1203. “Based on all of the foregoing that trial counsel’s failure to investigate the

25
 1 blood evidence was objectively unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms.”
2
Id.
3
4 B. Prejudice

5 Prejudice is shown by evidence of a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

6
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
7
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
8
9 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here, the jury was required to reach a unanimous verdict on
10 each count. Therefore, the outcome would have differed if only “one juror would have
11
struck a different balance.” Weeden v. Johnson, 854 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2017)
12
13 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003)). In this case, the demonstration of
14 prejudice far exceeds the proof required.
15
“Contrasting the evidence presented at trial with the evidence that could have been
16
17 presented at trial by reasonably effective counsel. . . [here] counsel’s failure to conduct
18 his own investigation with respect to the dating of the injuries and to challenge any of the
19
State’s evidence which suggested that all of Rachel’s injuries were consistent with
20
infliction on the afternoon of Sunday, May 1—when Rachel was alone with [Mr. Jones]
21
22 in his van—resulted in prejudice. . . The new evidence presented in these proceedings
23 undermines considerably the confidence in the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Had
24
counsel conducted an adequate investigation of the medical, physical, and eyewitness
25
26 testimony, he could have presented an extremely different evidentiary picture than that
27 shown to the jury at [Mr. Jones’s] trial. Namely, trial counsel could have cast doubt on
28
whether Rachel’s injuries were actually inflicted on the afternoon of May 1, when she was

26
 1 in [Mr. Jones’s] care. Instead, counsel admitted to the jury during closing argument that
2
‘maybe [Mr. Jones] did take her out and murder her . . .”’ Id., at 1206–07.
3
4 Viewing the evidence as a whole, there is not credible or reliable evidence to

5 suggest that Mr. Jones assaulted Rachel on May 1, 1994, or at any other time. Apart from
6
the testimony of Dr. Ophoven, Dr. McKay and Dr. Keen, “Dr. Howard’s ‘truthful’ opinion
7
was that Rachel’s small bowel, scalp and vaginal injuries were ‘most consistent’ or
8
9 ‘typical’ with having occurred prior to May 1.” Id., at 1207. Thus, Mr. Jones has
10 “negat[ed] the very grounds on which the State relied to prove that he inflicted” Rachel’s
11
injuries. Id., at 1208.6 This satisfies the showing that Mr. Jones’s was prejudiced regarding
12
13 the accusations that he assaulted Rachel.
14 The same evidence of prejudice applies to negate the grounds for Mr. Jones’s
15
conviction on Count Four, for failing to take Rachel to the hospital after it became
16
17 apparent she was ill on Sunday evening of May 1. “[Mr. Jones’s] conviction on Count
18 Four, for failure to take Rachel to the hospital, was intertwined with the allegations that
19
Petitioner had inflicted the injuries to Rachel . . .” Id., at 1212.
20
“At trial the State argued explicitly that the conviction on Count Four depended on
21
22 the timing of the fatal injury and the identity of the assailant by asserting that Rachel was
23 the victim of a crime of sexual assault, and that ‘when that sexual assault was committed’
24
25
26 6
Added to this, the evidence also “demonstrate[s] that the police investigation was colored
by a rush to judgment and a lack of due diligence and thorough professional investigation;
27 effective counsel would have brought this to the jury’s attention, casting further doubt on
the strength of the State’s case.” Id., at 1208–09.
28

27
 1 she became the victim of other crimes, including Count Four. (RT 4/13/95 at 82). The
2
State explained at trial that ‘Rachel died because she was beaten in order to be raped. She
3
4 died as a result of that beating both because the internal injuries killed her and because
5 only the [Petitioner] knew how badly she was hurt, only the [Petitioner] had the means of
6
taking that baby to the hospital, but for obvious reasons he could not, and so he let her
7
die.’” (RT 4/13/95 at 104–05)(emphasis added). Id., at 1213. “The State acknowledged in
8
9 closing argument during trial that, of all the other witnesses who testified at trial that they
10 saw Rachel sick in the late afternoon or evening of May 1, only [Mr. Jones] knew why
11
and how badly she was hurt, and to cover his own responsibility for what he had done
12
13 failed to take her to the hospital. If [Mr. Jones] was not responsible for the assault, under
14 the State’s own theory he would be less likely to have had reason to prevent Rachel from
15
being taken to the hospital.” Id.
16
17 The foregoing demonstrates that if “counsel had not performed deficiently, [Mr.

18 Jones’s] jury would not have convicted him of any of the predicate felonies and thus he
19
has also demonstrated prejudice with respect to the capital [eligible] charge” of felony
20
murder. Id., at 1214.7
21
22 IV. Conclusion
23 For all the above reasons, including the State’s concurrence that relief be awarded, it
24
is respectfully requested that the petition for postconviction relief be granted.
25
26
27 7
As noted, the court of appeals found that there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Jones
28 would still have been convicted of reckless child abuse (a lesser-included offense not a
predicate offense to felony murder). Jones, 943 F.3d at 1235–36.

28
1 Dated this 4th day of May, 2023.
2
Jon M. Sands
3 Federal Public Defender
4 District of Arizona
5
Cary Sandman
6 Jessica Salyers
7 Maren Dale

8 s/Cary Sandman
9 Counsel for Petitioner
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 1 ORIGINAL of the foregoing
e-filed/delivered this 4th day of May, 2023, to:
2
3 Clerk of the Pima County Superior Court
Tucson, Arizona 85701
4
COPIES e-mailed/mailed to:
5
6 Jeffrey Sparks
Deputy Solicitor General
7 Arizona Attorney General’s Office
2005 N. Central Ave.
8 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-1592
9 Jim Nielsen
10 Office of the Attorney General
2005 N. Central Ave.
11 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-1592
12 Brad Roach
13 Pima County Attorney’s Office
32 N. Stone Ave.
14 Tucson, Arizona 85701
15 Hon. Kyle Bryson
16 Div. 5 Pima County Superior Court
17 s/Teresa Ardrey
Assistant Paralegal
18 Capital Habeas Unit
19
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