Former Director of Seattle Startup Accused of Embezzling $2M in Company Funds

Case 2:23-mj-00378-SKV Document 1 Filed 07/27/23 Page 1 of 15
The Hon. S. Kate Vaughan

1
2
3
4
5
6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
8 AT SEATTLE
9
10
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. MJ23-378
11
Plaintiff
12
v. COMPLAINT for VIOLATIONS
13
JOHN M. WHISENANT, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
14
Defendant.
15
16
17 BEFORE, S. Kate Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge, United States
18 Courthouse, Seattle, Washington.
19 The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states:
20 COUNTS 1 – 5
(Wire Fraud)
21
Introduction
22
1. The conduct charged in this Complaint victimized a private company
23
headquartered in Seattle, Washington that operated a car trade platform which allows
24
customers to purchase, sell, and trade pre-qualified used vehicles (Company-1).1 Users
25
26
1
Company - 1 has been purchased by a larger corporation and no longer operates as an independent company and
27 the Company – 1 name.
Complaint - 1 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
United States v. John Michael Whisenant 700 STEWART STREET, SUITE 5220
USAO #2022R00301 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
(206) 553-7970
1 accessed Company-1’s services through their official website or through a mobile

2 application. Company-1 was founded in 2011 and, during the time of the scheme detailed
3 below, was staffed by fewer than 100 employees. Company-1 maintained company bank
4 accounts at Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), based in the State of California, for its financial
5 transactions, including sales-related payments and employee payroll, and used
6 QuickBooks accounting software for bookkeeping.
7 2. In October 2018, Company-1 hired JOHN M. WHISENANT as a
8 Transaction Manager. His initial duties consisted of processing the paperwork required to
9 verify vehicle ownership and to assist customers with financing. A few months later,
10 WHISENANT was promoted to Director of Marketplace Operations, a managerial role
11 on the “public-facing” side of Company-1.
12 3. Approximately one year later Company-1 reduced the size of its workforce,
13 and in so doing expanded WHISENANT’s responsibilities to include managing payroll
14 and customer sales transactions. To fulfill these tasks, Company-1 entrusted
15 WHISENANT with unrestricted access to its payment systems. This access afforded
16 WHISENANT the ability to send ACH (Automated Clearing House) payments from
17 Company-1’s SVB bank accounts, access to all customer transaction records, and access
18 to its accounting records kept using QuickBooks software. WHISENANT’s QuickBooks
19 access also provided him with the QuickBooks login credentials assigned to Company-
20 1’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO). As detailed below, WHISENANT took advantage of
21 this access to covertly steal over two million dollars from Company-1.
22 4. WHISENANT’s employment with Company-1 ended when he abruptly
23 resigned on February 21, 2022.
24 Scheme to Defraud
25 5. Introductory paragraphs 1 through 4 are realleged and incorporated herein
26 as though fully set forth in this Count.
27
(206) 553-7970
1 6. Beginning in or about June of 2019 and continuing through at least

2 November 2021, in King County, within the Western District of Washington and
3 elsewhere, MICHAEL M. WHISENANT, with intent to defraud, knowingly devised a
4 scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of materially
5 false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, as further described below.
6 7. The essence of this scheme and artifice to defraud was for WHISENANT to
7 initiate numerous, unauthorized ACH transfers from Company-1’s SVB bank account to
8 one of several, unique personal bank accounts belonging to him under his name, JOHN
9 M. WHISENANT. It was also a part of the scheme for WHISENANT to conceal the
10 nature of these ACH transfers by describing in their corresponding ACH bank
11 descriptions as fictitious customer transactions or company expenses. Furthermore,
12 unauthorized changes made by WHISENANT in Company-1’s QuickBooks records that
13 recorded these ACH transfers reflect an additional layer of concealment as part of the
14 underlying scheme.
15 Manner and Means
16 8. It was part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that, while working as the
17 Director of Marketplace Operations at Company-1, WHISENANT used his access to
18 Company-1’s SVB bank account ending in 4943 to successfully initiate, via interstate
19 wire, at least 57 separate ACH transfers, totaling over $2 million, from Company-1’s
20 SVB account ending in 4943 to one of 14 unique, personal bank accounts held by
21 WHISENANT. None of the transactions were authorized.
22 9. It was further part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that the
23 corresponding ACH descriptions for many of these transfers contained the identities of
24 customers, many of whom had previously conducted legitimate transactions with
25 Company-1. Other, generic ACH descriptions such as “ACH PREFUNDING” were used
26 for the remainder of the 57 ACH transfers. These actions reflected WHISENANT’s
27 efforts to label the transactions in a way that would make them appear to be legitimate.
(206) 553-7970
1 10. It was further part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that WHISENANT
2 falsified entries in Company-1’s QuickBooks records, often in conjunction with the
3 approximate date of the fraudulent ACH transfers, to disguise these transfers as
4 legitimate business items. Examples include receivables due from customers for made-up
5 vehicle transactions, made-up operational expenses for purchase of vehicles from
6 wholesalers, “TRED Wholesale Purchases” and reductions to payables such as sales tax
7 payable.
8 Execution of the Scheme and Artifice to Defraud
9 11. On or about the dates set forth in the table below, in King County, within
10 the Western District of Washington, and elsewhere, WHISENANT, for the purpose of
11 executing this scheme and artifice to defraud, did knowingly cause to be transmitted by
12 wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures,
13 and sounds, each transmission of which constitutes a separate count of this Complaint:
COUNT DATE WIRE TRANSMISSION
14
1 06/18/2019 An ACH transfer in the amount of $8,950.96 initiated from
15
Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank account ending in 4943,
16 which transmitted a wire and signal from outside the State of
Washington to WHISENANT’s Sound Credit Union account
17 ending in 1214-10, whose servers are located in the State of
18 Washington.
2 06/19/2019 An ACH transfer in the amount of $13,300 initiated from
19 Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank account ending in 4943,
which transmitted a wire and signal from outside the State of
20
Washington.
22 3 07/15/2019 An ACH transfer in the amount of $10,001 initiated from
24 Washington to WHISENANT’s Sound Credit Union account
ending in 1214-10, whose servers are located in the State of
25
Washington.
26 4 09/04/2019 An ACH transfer in the amount of $20,372 initiated from
Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank account ending in 4943,
27
(206) 553-7970

1
Washington.
3 5 01/16/2020 An ACH transfer in the amount of $11,539.47 initiated from
5 Washington to WHISENANT’s Sound Credit Union account
ending in 8959, whose servers are located in the State of
6
Washington.
7
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 1343.
8
And the complainant states that this Complaint is based on the following
9
information:
10
I, JACOBUS W. BAIK, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
11
Training and Experience
12
12. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
13
have been since June 2012. I am currently assigned to the Seattle Field Office. I have
14
received basic federal law enforcement training, including the training at the FBI
15
Academy, as well as other specialized federal law enforcement training. My primary
16
duties include investigation violations of federal law related to complex financial crimes,
17
including corporate fraud, securities fraud, government program fraud, and healthcare
18
fraud. My duties also include investigating instances of wire fraud committed for
19
financial gain at the expense of others.
20
13. Based on my training and experience, I am familiar with the ways in which
21
individuals involved in fraud schemes may use computer systems, bank accounts, and
22
their own employee access and credentials to facilitate fraudulent activity. I have learned
23
that individuals perpetrating embezzlement-related fraud schemes employ a number of
24
techniques, either alone or in combination, to further their illegal activities and to avoid
25
detection by their employers and/or law enforcement. These techniques may include
26
unauthorized use of their employee credentials, exploiting vulnerabilities in their
27
(206) 553-7970
1 employer’s systems, and making fraudulent transactions appear legitimate by using pre-
2 existing account information, transaction descriptions that are common for the business,
3 and/or transaction amounts that are typical for the business.
4 14. The facts set forth in this Affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge,
5 my training and experience, and information I have gathered from other law enforcement
6 personnel, witnesses, and documents obtained during the course of the investigation. This
7 Affidavit does not set forth each and every fact that I or others have learned during the
8 course of this investigation. I have set forth only the facts that I believe are necessary to
9 establish probable cause that JOHN MICHAEL WHISENANT has committed the
10 offense of Wire Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, as set
11 forth above.
12 Company-1 Discovers Evidence of Fraud
13 15. In or about November 2021, Company-1 announced a Series B funding
14 round from new and existing investors, placing heightened scrutiny on its finances.
15 Company-1 had previously employed a part-time bookkeeper since approximately 2016,
16 who performed bookkeeping services for Company-1 on an as-needed basis. In or about
17 January 2022, the bookkeeper became a full-time employee at Company-1. Before then,
18 Company-1 had not performed a full reconciliation of its accounts for approximately two
19 years. In or about January 2022, Company 1’s bookkeeper began performing account
20 reconciliations dating back to 2019.
21 ACH Transfers
22 16. During the reconciliation process, Company-1’s bookkeeper discovered
23 that, between approximately May 2019 and November 2021, ACH payments totaling
24 approximately $2 million had been transferred from one of Company-1’s SVB accounts
25 to numerous unknown bank accounts. The bookkeeper also discovered Company-1’s
26 SVB account had made multiple transactions to these unknown bank accounts, which she
27 flagged as unusual, since Company-1 rarely transacts with the same customer more than
(206) 553-7970
1 once. Some of these ACH transfers contained possible customer names in the transfer
2 description, while others contained language related to ACH prefunding in the transfer
3 description. Company-1’s bookkeeper reviewed various company records to investigate
4 these transactions, including an Excel file titled “SYC Historicals” and QuickBooks.
5 SYC Historicals and QuickBooks
6 17. “SYC Historicals” is an internal Excel file Company-1 maintained to record
7 details of all customer purchase and sale transactions. For the ACH transfers mentioned
8 in the preceding paragraph that appeared to contain a customer name, Company-1
9 attempted to match the information contained in the ACH description with the customer
10 names and amounts listed in “SYC Historicals.” Company-1 was able to match payments
11 and names to corresponding transactions in “SYC Historicals.” However, by comparing
12 “SYC Historicals” to other company records, Company-1 discovered that some of the
13 information in “SYC Historicals” file was inaccurate and possibly fraudulent. For
14 example, after reviewing customer account records, Company-1 identified that many of
15 the transactions listed in “SYC Historicals” never occurred, or that payments referencing
16 the transactions did not involve Company-1's SVB account. Company-1 advised
17 investigators that any employee would have been able to make edits in “SYC Historicals”
18 and that the document and was not subject to routine audits or controls.
19 18. Included in “SYC Historicals” was the following transfer information,
20 which correspond to the individual counts previously identified:
ID UNEXPLAINED ACH CORRESPONDING ACTUAL
21
TRANSFER DESCRIPTION TRANSACTION CORRESPONDING
22 LISTED IN “SYC TRANSACTION OR
23 HISTORICALS” RECORD
24 1 $8,950.96 posted on 6/18/2019 On 4/15/2019, customer No records of a successful

from Company-1’s Silicon “A.C.” sold a 2016 transaction for customer
25 Valley Bank account ending in Honda Civic to “A.C.” The customer had
26 4943 to Sound Credit Union Company-1. The Seller posted a 2016 Honda Civic
account ending in 1214-10. sedan for sale in March
27
(206) 553-7970
Transaction description per the Payoff amount was 2019, but according to the
1
Silicon Valley Bank statement: $8,950.96. customer’s profile, no sale
2 “Tred.com AB CH ACH was ever made.
Offset”.
3 2 $13,300 posted on 6/19/2019 On 6/10/2019, customer No records found for any
4 from Company-1’s Silicon “E.R.” sold a 2016 customer named “E.R.”
Valley Bank account ending in Chevrolet Equinox to
5 4943 to Sound Credit Union Company-1. The Seller
account ending in 1214-10. Payoff amount was
6
Transaction description per the $13,300.
7 Silicon Valley Bank statement:
“Tred.com Reyes ACH Offset”.
8 3 $10,001 posted on 07/15/2019 On 7/8/2019, customer No records for any
9 from Company-1’s Silicon “Y.T.” sold a 2013 Mini customer named “Y.T.”
Valley Bank account ending in Cooper to customer Customer “P.C.” had
10 4943 to Sound Credit Union “P.C.” The Seller successfully sold a vehicle
account ending in 1214-10. Payoff amount was through Company-1's
11
Transaction description per the $10,001. platform, but payment was
12 Silicon Valley Bank statement: conducted through a third-
“Tred.com YIFEI ACH Offset”. party payment processor,
13 and not as an ACH from
14 Silicon Valley Bank.
15 4 $20,372 posted on 09/04/2019 On 7/17/2019, customer No records of a successful

from Company-1’s Silicon “A.C.” sold a 2015 transaction for customer
16 Valley Bank account ending in BMW 3 Series to “A.C.” The customer
17 4943 to Sound Credit Union customer “P.N.” The posted a 2015 BMW 3
account ending in 1214-10. Seller Payoff amount Series sedan for sale, but
18 Transaction description per the was $20,372. according to the customer’s
Silicon Valley Bank statement: profile, no sale occurred,
19 “Tred.com A.Coyle ACH instead the vehicle was
20 Offset”. traded in.
21 5 $11,539.47 posted on On 12/16/2019, Records reflected the

01/16/2020 from Company-1’s customer “A.E.” sold a successful sale of a 2012
22 Silicon Valley Bank account 2012 Land Rover to Land Rover by customer
23 ending in 4943 to Sound Credit customer “A.W.” The “L.E.”, the spouse of
Union account ending in 8959. Seller Payoff amount “A.E.” in December 2019.
24 Transaction description per was $14,901.
Silicon Valley Bank statement:
25
“Tred.com Elixson ACH
26 Offset”.
27
(206) 553-7970
1 19. Company-1’s bookkeeper also discovered that for many of these

2 unexplained transfers, a journal entry had been created in Company-1’s QuickBooks
3 records reflecting a reduction in the balance of its cash account. These entries were then
4 variously represented to be increased in “Accounts Receivable” in the name of a
5 customer, reductions to “Sales Tax Payable,” or charges to an expense account, such as
6 “Title and Reg Fees Expense.” Company-1 confirmed that these entries were made using
7 the QuickBooks login credentials belonging to Company-1’s CEO. The CEO denies
8 making any of entries suspected as fraudulent. In addition to the CEO, only
9 WHISENANT had access to the CEO’s login credentials.
10 20. Throughout January and February 2022, Company-1’s bookkeeper
11 questioned WHISENANT several times about the suspicious ACH transfers. In response
12 to these inquiries, WHISENANT stated that he “would look into it” or did not respond to
13 the bookkeeper. Company-1’s bookkeeper also questioned WHISENANT about entries
14 that had been deleted in their QuickBooks records using Company-1’s CEO’s
15 QuickBooks credentials, to which WHISENANT replied “I am not sure how I deleted it,”
16 but then subsequently apologized. These conversations occurred using “Slack,” an
17 electronic messaging system, and are preserved.
18 21. After being confronted by Company-1's bookkeeper regarding the
19 inconsistencies between the ACH transfers and the corresponding QuickBooks entries,
20 WHISENANT continued to make fraudulent edits in Company-1’s QuickBooks ledgers
21 by falsely corresponding transactions with other customers or non-existent expenses.
22 22. On February 21, 2022, WHISENANT abruptly resigned from Company-1,
23 citing “health reasons” without further explanation. Several of Company-1’s employees,
24 including the CEO, attempted to contact WHISENANT but were unable to reach him.
25 WHISENANT never provided an explanation for the suspicious transfers out of
26 Company-1’s SVB account.
27
(206) 553-7970
1 23. Subsequent investigation revealed that WHISENANT sought to limit

2 access by other Company-1 employees to Company-1’s own accounts and records.
3 Several Company-1 employees advised that WHISENANT refused to grant other
4 Company-1 employees access to the SVB bank accounts and QuickBooks accounting
5 software, even when that access was warranted by their official duties.
6 24. As a result of this information, investigators believed that WHISENANT,
7 secretly and without authorization, transferred money owned by Company -1 to his
8 personal bank accounts, and then attempted to conceal these acts by disguising the
9 transfers as legitimate Company business.
10 FBI Investigation Confirms the Fraudulent Transfers Were Deposited into
11 Accounts Held by WHISENANT
12 25. FBI investigators, including your affiant, obtained and reviewed records for
13 Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank account ending in 4943 and the 14 other accounts that
14 received ACH transfers from that account. Based on the review, and after conferring with
15 Company-1, I was able to confirm that between May 2019 and November 2021 at least
16 57 illegitimate transfers totaling over $2 million from Company-1’s SVB account ending
17 in 4943 were deposited into 14 unique bank accounts, all held in the name of JOHN
18 MICHAEL WHISENANT. These accounts are associated with multiple institutions such
19 as Sound Credit Union, Boeing Employees Credit Union, Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of
20 America, Citibank, Ally Bank, and Capital One Bank. Five of these illegitimate transfers,
21 with accompanying descriptions, are identified in the table below. These five transfers
22 correspond to the transfers identified in Paragraph 16:
ID TRANSFER AMOUNTS AND DESCRIPTIONS
23
1 On 6/18/2019, a withdrawal for $8,950.96 was made from Company-1’s Silicon
24 Valley Bank account ending 4943 with the description “Tred.com AB CH ACH
Offset.” On 6/19/2019, Sound Credit Union account ending 1214-10, held by
25
WHISENANT, received a deposit for $8,950.96 with the description “Deposit
26 ACH Tred.com TYPE: AB CH ID: 7274424378 CO: Tred.com Entry Class Code:
PPD.”
27
(206) 553-7970
2 On 6/19/2019, a withdrawal for $13,300 was made from Company-1’s Silicon

1
Valley Bank account ending 4943 with the description “Tred.com Reyes ACH
2 Offset.” On 6/20/2019, Sound Credit Union account ending 1214-10, held by
WHISENANT, received a deposit for $13,300 with the description “Deposit ACH
3 Tred.com TYPE: Reyes ID: 7274424378 CO: Tred.com Entry Class Code: PPD.”
4 3 On 7/15/2019, a withdrawal for $10,001 was made from Company-1’s Silicon
Valley Bank account ending 4943 with the description “Tred.com YIFEI ACH
5 Offset.” On 6/16/2019, Sound Credit Union account ending 1214-10, held by
WHISENANT, received a deposit for $10,001 with the description “Deposit ACH
6
Tred.com TYPE: YIFEI ID: 7274424378 CO: Tred.com Entry Class Code: PPD.”
7 4 On 9/4/2019, a withdrawal for $20,372 was made from Company-1’s Silicon
Valley Bank account ending 4943 with the description “Tred.com A.COYLE
8 ACH Offset.” On 9/5/2019, Sound Credit Union account ending 1214-10, held by
9 WHISENANT, received a deposit for $20,372 with the description “Deposit ACH
Tred.com TYPE: A COYLE ID: 7274424378 CO: Tred.com Entry Class Code:
10 PPD.”
11 5 On 1/16/2020, a withdrawal for $11,539.47 was made from Company-1’s Silicon
Valley Bank account ending 4943 with the description “Tred.com Elixson ACH
12 Offset.” On 1/17/2020, Sound Credit Union account ending 8959, held by
WHISENANT, received a deposit for $11,539.47 with the description “Deposit
13 ACH Tred.com TYPE: Elixson ID: 7274424378 CO: Tred.com Entry Class Code:
14 PPD.”
15 26. I also reviewed SVB login records for the users that accessed the above
16 account. WHISENANT’s Company-1 email, [email protected] was previously confirmed

17 by Company-1 and through legal process to Google, who maintained Company-1’s email
18 servers. Within these records, I confirmed that the following users, and the following
19 users alone, logged into Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank account ending in 4943 on the
20 dates corresponding with the above transactions as well as the dates corresponding with
21 the rest of the fifty-seven illegitimate ACH transfers:
DATE LOGIN NAME FIRST AND LAST EMAIL
22 NAME
23
06/18/2019 JWHISENANT John Whisenant [email protected]
24
25
26
27
(206) 553-7970

1
2 01/16/2020 JWHISENANT John Whisenant [email protected]
3
Bank Records Confirm WHISENANT Received and Spent the Fraudulent
4
Wire Transfers
5
27. Between June 2019 and February 2022, WHISENANT was an account
6
holder on at least 25 deposit accounts. Among these are 14 accounts which received 57
7
ACH transfers directly from Company-1. My review of the records for these deposit
8
accounts revealed significant spending on personal items such as credit card bills, rent,
9
and cars, in excess of WHISENANT’s earned income and capital gains.
10
28. Between June 2019 and February 2022, WHISENANT received an
11
estimated $225,000 of compensation and expense reimbursement deposits from
12
Company-1. WHISENANT was furloughed in or about March 2020 until approximately
13
August 2020, during which time he collected unemployment income totaling
14
approximately $26,000. During 2021, WHISENANT also sold a home, from which he
15
derived proceeds of approximately $153,000. Aside from Company-1 payroll and home
16
sale proceeds, the majority of the funds received into accounts held by WHISENANT are
17
attributable to the 57 ACH transfers received from Company-1.
18
29. Spending activity from WHISENANT’s deposit accounts during the time
19
of his employment by Company-1 is summarized as follows:
20
x Between June 2020 and February 2022, WHISENANT made credit card payments
21 to American Express in excess of $940,000. A review of the American Express
credit card statements revealed that credit card spending included significant
22
purchases related to travel, cars, and lifestyle expenditures (such as shopping,
23 dining, and entertainment), among other spending. For example:
o In April 2021, WHISENANT spent a total of $48,405 at Porsche Ontario,
24
in connection with the purchase of a 2021 Porsche Taycan.
25 o On December 13, 2021, WHISENANT purchased two airline tickets, one
for himself and one for his significant other, to fly from Los Angeles to
26
Paris on Air France La Premiere. The tickets cost $22,549.97 each.
27
(206) 553-7970
o On February 11, 2022, WHISENANT spent $69,581.80 at Fletcher Jones

1
Motor Cars to purchase a 2021 Mercedes GLS 580.
2 x Between June 2019 and February 2022, WHISENANT made credit card payments
3 to Capital One in excess of $150,000 combined.
x Between August 2020 and July 2021, WHISENANT made rent payments for two
4 different residences in southern California totaling nearly $150,000.
5 x WHISENANT made various additional car purchases, including:
o A 2019 Chrysler 300 purchased, in whole or in part, with a cashier’s check
6 for $21,768 in July 2020.
7 o A Telsa purchased, in whole or in part, for $98,100.48 in October 2020.
o A 2018 Toyota Tacoma purchased, in whole or in part, via a wire for
8 $33,000 in June 2021.
9 o A 2022 Audi E-Tron purchased, in whole or in part, via a wire for $123,096
in August 2021.
10 o A 2021 Volkswagen ID.4 purchased, in whole or in part, via a wire for
11 $46,000 in September 2021.
x In January 2021, WHISENANT made a payment with a cashier’s check for
12 $8,482.47 to the King County Court Clerk in connection with three previous cases
13 in which WHISENANT pled guilty (case reference numbers 04-1-00271-7, 03-1-
01371-1, 02-1-04753-6).
14
15 QuickBooks Entries Were Falsified to Further Conceal the Fraudulent
16 Transfers
17 30. During the investigation, I also obtained and reviewed records for
18 Company-1’s QuickBooks records. Based on my review, and after conferring with
19 Company-1, I was able to confirm particular QuickBooks changes, which correspond
20 with the previously referenced ACH transfers, were made by WHISENANT using the
21 credentials of Company-1’s CEO. The CEO confirmed that he did not make he these
22 transfers himself and, as detailed above, that he provided his QuickBooks credentials to
23 WHISENANT. The following constitute the falsified changes in QuickBooks:
24 ID UNEXPLAINED CORRESPONDING QUICKBOOKS
TRANSFER/DESCRIPTION ENTRY
25 1 An ACH transfer in the amount of On 07/07/2019, WHISENANT added a
26 $8,950.96 posted on 6/18/2019 from QuickBooks entry reflecting a reduction to
Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank cash and a creation of a receivable
27
(206) 553-7970
account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “A.C.”

1
Credit Union account ending in 1214- WHISENANT edited this entry on
2 10. Provided ACH description: “AB 12/05/2020 to reflect a change in the
CH.” receivable to “Company-1 Wholesale
3 Purchases.”
$13,300 posted on 6/19/2019 from QuickBooks entry reflecting a reduction to
5 Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank cash and a creation of a receivable
account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “E.R.”
6
Credit Union account ending in 1214- WHISENANT deleted this entry
7 10. Provided ACH description: 12/11/2020.
“Reyes.”
9 $10,001 posted on 07/15/2019 from QuickBooks entry reflecting a reduction to
Company-1’s Silicon Valley Bank cash and a creation of a receivable
10 account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “P.C.”
Credit Union account ending in 1214- WHISENANT deleted this entry on
11
10. Provided ACH description: 12/14/20. Company-1’s bookkeeper added
12 “YIFEI.” back the entry on 1/27/22, which
WHISENANT subsequently changed the
13 receivable to “Core Program Purchases.”
$20,372 posted on 09/04/2019 from QuickBooks entry reflecting a reduction to
16 account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “A.C.” This entry
Credit Union account ending in 1214- was subsequently deleted on 12/11/2020.
17 10. Provided ACH description: Company-1’s bookkeeper added back the
“A.Coyle.” entry on 1/27/22, and WHISENANT
18 subsequently changed the customer name
19 from “A.C.” to “N.A.”
5 An ACH transfer in the amount of On 02/05/2020, WHISENANT added a
20 $11,539.47 posted on 01/16/2020 from QuickBooks entry reflecting a reduction to
account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “A.W.”
22 Credit Union account ending in 8959. WHISENANT edited the entry on
Provided ACH description: “Elixson.” 12/05/2020 to reflect a change in the
23 receivable to “Company-1 Wholesale
24 Purchases.”
25 The Fraudulent Claims Involved Interstate Wire Transmissions
26 31. In the course of the investigation, I confirmed that SVB’s servers are
27 located outside of the State of Washington. I also confirmed that Sound Credit Union’s
(206) 553-7970
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Former Director of Seattle Startup Accused of Embezzling $2M in Company Funds

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Case 2:23-mj-00378-SKV Document 1 Filed 07/27/23 Page 1 of 15

The Hon. S. Kate Vaughan

1 accessed Company-1’s services through their official website or through a mobile

1 6. Beginning in or about June of 2019 and continuing through at least

which transmitted a wire and signal from outside the State of

24 1 $8,950.96 posted on 6/18/2019 On 4/15/2019, customer No records of a successful

15 4 $20,372 posted on 09/04/2019 On 7/17/2019, customer No records of a successful

21 5 $11,539.47 posted on On 12/16/2019, Records reflected the

1 19. Company-1’s bookkeeper also discovered that for many of these

1 23. Subsequent investigation revealed that WHISENANT sought to limit

2 On 6/19/2019, a withdrawal for $13,300 was made from Company-1’s Silicon

16 account. WHISENANT’s Company-1 email, [email protected] was previously confirmed

09/04/2019 JWHISENANT John Whisenant [email protected]

o On February 11, 2022, WHISENANT spent $69,581.80 at Fletcher Jones

account ending in 4943 to Sound associated with customer “A.C.”

25 The Fraudulent Claims Involved Interstate Wire Transmissions

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