Internal Memos Regarding Blizzard Redacted
Internal Memos Regarding Blizzard Redacted
2. What didn't:
• Need County texting tree - staff don't check work emails after hours
• Link MH Dept or government websites to Facebook Buffalo Blizzard 2022 page or whatever
the next iteration will be
• Need a Mental Health Disaster Coordinator position to be part of the emergency operations
team and to pre-plan and coordinate with behavioral health providers
• Safety line to notify Department that staff are ok
• Review the Buffalo Blizzard 2022 Facebook Page for lessons learned
• In September, start an emergency preparedness campaign
• Need a master resource list of open pharmacies for medications
• Better coordination for early evacuation of staff
• Review and clarify who is essential personnel (MH Dept)
• Better clarity for ECDMH role in crisis and disaster planning
• Coordinated advance planning for similar disasters
• Have a stock of emergency supplies and food if staff get stuck at work
• Need SOPs for disasters (by type) and training
• Physical and Emotional survival guides for publication and distribution to the public
• Better disaster preparedness for underserved or locations
• Need campaign for people in domestic violence situations during disasters
• Provisions for pets during emergencies
• Analyze area / circumstances of fatalities occurred to see what can be avoided for next time
• Master plan for plowing critical facilities
• Utilize emergency broadcasting procedures on television / radio & social media
1
Community Provider Feedback on Blizzard Preparation / Response
• We had no overnight accommodations for staff that were at our 24-hour facilities for
multiple days
• We need a policy like the hospitals that calls for volunteers to stay for the duration of the
storm and has prepared accommodations for staff
• Staff unable to travel due to limited snow clearing on side streets even after the
storm. Suggest that 24/7 facilities are registered with County emergency operations are able
to be transported via snowmobile or other safe vehicle to provide relief coverage.
• Difficulty in getting medication deliveries from pharmacies. Emergency medications need to
be delivered because we are not a hospital or pharmacy.
• During “Driving Bans,” Horizon was directed to seek the necessary approvals and coordinate
transportation activity through Emergency Support Functions at 716-207-1098 for health care
workers. The phone number is not accepting calls at this time. As of today, we get the same
message.
• Critical venders restricted to provide deliveries in Buffalo during a driving ban, (especially
food service, milk, bread, and produce venders) to maintain 24-hour residential operations.
• Formally remove travel restrictions on Health Care Workers and critical venders during a
driving ban
• Transportation of critical medication
• A better snow emergency clearing plan with key pick up points in the aftermath of the storm
when people cannot get out of their own streets
• United Way sent out resources, but a more organized way to get those resources to patients
in the system would be helpful
• Assistance with getting programs like Terrace House plowed as a priority (while we have
private contracts, in blizzards like this, it didn’t matter)
• Emergency funding quickly allocated to pay for things such as overtime pay and loss revenue
as staff couldn’t work because they didn’t have power
2
From BestSelf Behavioral Health:
• There was an online community where individuals where able to communicate their needs
and people were able to provide support and help
• Some groups had snowmobiles that turned out to be very useful in getting support to people
• City of Good Neighbors - people helping those near them, local Facebook and social media
groups helping each other, local places that could offer food and resources doing so like the
community fridges and buffalo resilience
2. What didn't:
• Giving tickets to those providing support when first responders were unable to do so. Many
lives were saved by community people able to get medicine, food, etc. to folks
• Travel ban should have been implemented sooner to decrease people getting stuck trying to
get home once it was put in place
• Aftermath clean up not well coordinated and took longer. Maybe working more together
with those offering to come in to help would have sped things up
• The inequity of how the city was assisted and cleaned up after the blizzard, comments by
leaders that do not take into consideration that not everyone has a surplus of food, water,
and resources
• Lack of preparation by the County and City to have supports spread out and resources pre-
staged
• Formal coordination with local community members who are prepared and willing to offer
door to door support if able (there are people willing / able to do this whether asked or not
• Invest in snowmobile equipment and identify teams that are trained and being able to
provide support / rescue in this way
• Have external snow cleanup crews from across New York State prepared to come in and
assist with clean up so that it can happen as quickly and efficiently as possible
• Coordination with some key local church leaders to see if some sanctuaries could plan to be
open to provide shelter if needed. Ensure those places are well stocked with food, blankets,
etc. A "safety zone" should be identified in each neighborhood
• Offering emergency boxes when we know storms are coming with the ability to have them
shipped or picked up from local community centers with MRE or other shelf-stable options
• A better plan for locations with generators that will not lose power for emergency centers
3
From WNY Independent Living Center (WNYIL):
• The Blizzard 2022 Facebook page connected individuals in need of shelter, food, or stranded
to the resources and help they needed
• National Grid did their best to restore power quickly
• The people of the City came together
• People opened their homes to strangers, donated to others, etc.
• The community was informed in the correct amount of time
• The community came together to assist with saving lives and providing needs of others
• Having the National Guard come in with snow skies to assess the situation and to
communicate to snowplows
• Kind hearts helping others out of the cold - the death toll would have been much higher
otherwise
• The forecasters and weather people gave us ample warning to prepare
2. What didn’t:
4
3. What you would recommend or what is needed: When we are alerted to a storm of this
intensity:
• Make sure salt trucks are out before the storm hits until driving becomes a hazard
• Have a map of warming places so people can locate them as soon as they need them, maybe
a website or something, allow people to add their own home when it is at the extent of a
blizzard
• Ask more places to be willing to run and operate warming stations and have them stocked
• The City AND Police should have emergency vehicles that can operate in the snow…
snowmobiles or something, they can retrieve people who are stranded or stuck or deliver
food and essentials
• Share emergency preparedness plans to the community, i.e.: how to stay warm if your power
goes out, what is safe and not safe as far as running a gas stove for heat, etc.
• Businesses should have been closed, just as schools were, in advance
• Emergency medical stations that can assist with medical situations triggered by situational
impact
• Emergency food packages to be provided based on household to assure the basic needs are
available. They can be priced but low so they’re affordable. No restrictions on income or age
either.
• Going back to utilizing emergency broadcasting procedures so no one thinks or believes that
it’s a joke.
• Implementing evacuation services for those who are homebased but living with life
threatening situations
• More independent contractors to plow on stand by
• Smaller plows, the ones attached to ATV’s, worked well for the city
• We needed a response in preparation FOR the storm; it would have saved lives. This should
include Federal, State AND community leadership
• Faster (earlier) implementation of blizzard procedures
• More emergency shelters available
• A survival-skills (prep training beforehand) class would really be beneficial
• Create a strong evacuation strategy for natural disasters, like those in Florida for hurricanes
• Close non-essential businesses 24 hours ahead of time and stores offering food and other
essential needs 8-12 hours ahead of time to allow people to prepare for an emergency and
for staff to get to safety
• Open shelters along main routes ahead of time for vulnerable populations. These should be
stocked with emergency food and generators. Priority for cleanup should be on these routes
• Open public lots for free parking before the storm to ensure cars are off the road, especially
for those who have street-only parking
• Provide emergency food and supply allowances to low-income individuals to use during
natural disaster seasons
• Allow flexibility with prescription refills in the time of a natural disaster to ensure that
medication is not lapsed
• Solidify a strong snow removal and cleanup plan on both the State and local level
• Increase cohesive communication amongst public officials at all levels
5
From Spectrum Health & Human Services:
1. Because behavioral health had adapted policies and procedures to work remotely and virtually
during the pandemic, it was easy to transition services. We went remote for 12/23/22 on
12/22/22
2. Consider a system similar to Amber Alerts that would alert everyone about the dangers and
potential difficulties related to natural disasters would be very helpful for people that don't listen
to the news or follow social media etc.
3. A better, comprehensive, pre-prepared disaster plan that would allow for outreach to individuals
in need would have been helpful and saved lives. For example, snowmobiles and community
helpers should be part of a plan
4. Travel ban and closings should happen sooner when serious warnings exist
1. I called for 2 critical staff (as few as possible to prevent county overload) to be picked up by
emergency services and transported to work. They waited 3 1/2 hours then called me to ask to
be taken off the list as they were getting tired. Ben was very nice when I spoke with and wanted
to help but cited the reason was that the drivers were not reporting in. I would propose
developing an app like Uber has so the command center has knowledge of who / what / where /
when at all times.
2. I do not live in Buffalo and was not here during the storm but was told the city streets for
hospital access were not cleared well. Maybe they were by the larger hospital systems with
emergency departments. However, we did provide food and shelter to a family that needed it.
3. Which brings me to- was there a number we could have called to notify the public in our area we
could provide emergency shelter?
6
MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
CENTRAL POLICE SERVICES
During December 23-26, 2022, Erie County was subjected to a major winter storm which
challenged all levels of government services. This memorandum outlines the major department
challenges and provides recommendations to senior county leadership to evaluate future responses to
major storms and similar emergency situations.
The Department of Central Police Services (CPS) is responsible for providing support services
to public safety and criminal justice agencies on a countywide basis. These services include 911
communications, forensic laboratory, information systems, Statewide Automated Biometric
Identification System, Stop DWI Program, and law enforcement training. For purposes of this storm
the vast majority of challenges were centered around the 911 Communications Center.
By way of background, the 911 Communications Center operates with 39 staff members on
a 24/7 basis to address law enforcement, fire and medical emergencies. Between January 1, 2022 to
December 31, 2022, the 911 Communications Center handled 773,326 calls and 6,279 text
messages. During the Christmas Storm, the 911 Communications Center handled approximately
29,000 calls/texts over four days. In order to ensure proper emergency communication services,
call-takers and the department leadership was required to work three straight days during the winter
storm.
RECOMMENDATION: Prior to the storm, the department coordinated with the B&G
Department to ensure 24-hour coverage with an experienced building engineer. This was critical to
ensuring uninterrupted 911 service to the public. During the early-morning hours of December 25,
2022, a sprinkler water line burst on the third floor which houses the 911 Communication Center.
Without the knowledge of the location of the shut-off valve the building would have had to be
evacuated and potential catastrophic damage to the 911 servers located on the second floor. Other
Department After-Action Report
Page 2 of 3
major issues during the storm included the primary and back-up cooling units for the 911 server
room malfunctioned which could have been catastrophic to 911 service. In addition, significant
wind damage to the roof of the building occurred during the storm which was evaluated in real-time
by the building engineer and department leadership. All future major storms must include pre-
planning with the B&G Department to ensure 24-hour experienced building engineer coverage.
RECOMMENDATION: During this storm, as well as during less severe storms, CPS assigned a
dedicated department representative to the EOC for coordination with the 911 team. In addition,
close coordination between the commissioners of the Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services and CPS was critical for the proper distribution of internal and external
information. The process of assigning CPS staff and close coordination among department
commissioners both prior and during the event should continue during future emergency situations.
ISSUE: Authorizing CPS call-takers to work at non-CPS facilities to answer 911 calls.
RECOMMENDATION: Due to roads being unpassable, CPS staff were extremely challenged to
report to work even with the assistance of law enforcement. On a case by case basis, CPS call-
takers were authorized to work at non-CPS facilities such as the EOC and the Hamburg Police
Department to answer 911 calls on a county-wide basis. This process allowed call-takers to have to
travel less distance thereby lessoning the likelihood of getting stuck on a roadway. This process
will be reviewed to evaluate other remote PSAPs which may be appropriate to use during future
emergency situations.
RECOMMENDATION: Prior to the storm, as well as during other storms, the Erie County
Sheriffs Office (ECSO) would transport call-takers, on an as-needed basis, to and from the Public
Safety Campus (PSC). During this storm, the ECSO, NYSP, BPD, Emergency Services and the
CPS Commissioner transported call-takers to and from the PSC. This required specific
coordination with each employee and each agency to arrange transports. This was a time-
consuming process and unable to be accomplished for all call-takers due to extreme weather
conditions. Consideration should be given to a single point of contact to assist with call-taker
transportation with direct access to all appropriate law enforcement agencies.
RECOMMENDATION: In some cases, during the storm emergency services were suspended
without notification to CPS. Call-takers had the ability to review the computer aided dispatch
system which captures all calls for services. The review allowed for an informal understanding that
911 response was either very slow or suspended. No formal notification was made to CPS
indicating suspension of emergency services. Consideration should be given during future storms
that senior leadership from public safety agencies notify CPS of any emergency service suspension.
Department After-Action Report
Page 3 of 3
RECOMMENDATION: Prior to the storm the county established the 716-858-SNOW line for the
public to contact to address non-emergency matters. This strongly benefitted the 911
Communications Center to lesson the extreme number of calls for service which were not of an
emergency nature. Consideration should be given to expand the use of the SNOW line to alleviate
the non-emergency calls to the 911 Communications Center. Leveraging the SNOW line is
beneficial to both delivering emergency and non-emergency services to the public.
RECOMMENDATION: CPS had an adequate number of cots but were not the most comfortable
to utilize for three consecutive days. The department will consider purchasing a small number of
more comfortable cots which can be used during future long-term emergencies.
ISSUE: The use of the Western New York First Responder Mental Helpline.
RECOMMENDATION: Subsequent to the ending of the winter storm, CPS contacted the
Western New York First Responder Mental Helpline to provide services to all the call-takers and
dispatchers located in the PSC (ECSO, BPD, MERS, CPS) which worked during the storm.
Helpline staff were at the PSC on two days after the storm and provided 24-hour contact numbers to
effected staff members. In addition, the week following the storm the Helpline organized two
formal debriefings at the EOC for any interested staff. Consideration should be given to expanding
this service to effected staff members subsequent to future emergencies. In addition, consideration
should include limited funding for this non-profit organization to better address first responder
mental health matters after critical incidents.
This document does not capture every issue addressed by the department during the storm
but serves to respectfully recommend significant areas of consideration to improve the response to
future major county-wide emergencies.
As part of our departmental after action we focused on the key issues to hopefully advance new ideas so
as to better address the challenges of the future. As is often the case with first responders, after actions
pay less attention to the overwhelming positives and heroic efforts because as professionals it’s about
what can be done better, faster and more efficient the next time. As such it should be understood that
a critical assessment should be rewarded with a reciprocal commitment to address the areas of need.
Activation:
The activation of the EOC requires the skill and forethought to know who needs to be on location and
most importantly, when. Maintaining fidelity to the ICS model of initially staffing critical Command Staff
positions is essential for rapid situational awareness which in turn drives objectives by identifying that
the various needs of the operation are met.
Future Response: Ensuring from incident onset that in addition to Incident Command being
clearly designated, at a minimum key ICS Command Staff positions are activated and staffed
including, Operations, Planning, Logistics, Public Information, Finance and a food service section
are activated. This will require specific personnel trained in those disciplines are identified and
tasked. The department has also taken immediate action to better utilize Iamresponding as a
means to accurately activate critical staff based on credentials.
Ask: future budget should include a planning specialist for DHSES with a specific focus on
incident/event response, recovery and mitigation.
Staffing:
Initial staffing of the EOC was limited by the ability to get people to the location however once
supported by improving weather conditions it was quickly identified that having the right staff on site is
key. Historically there has been a layered approached to EOC staffing and was expanded as needed.
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services staff where quickly overwhelmed with tasks
normally associated with other departments or jurisdictions. The cascading effect fragmented the
limited staff beyond sustainment.
Future Response: Incorporating DISS staff members that match the level of service that is
needed at the EOC (I.e., phone and laptop set up support 858-SNOW – training for those that
will be answering the calls on how to take calls and triage appropriately.
Success-Bringing in the dispatch/MERS and 911 call takers inside of the EOC was a strength in that it was
a large force multiplier for the staff working at 45 Elm. It also allowed for these call takers to assist in
triaging duplicate DLAN tickets.
Future Response: Continue to bring in dispatchers and call takers from a level two activation
With consideration given to the time of the storm aligning with Christmas operational shifts where
broken into 8-hour periods.
Future Response: Using an internal after action it was identified that 12-hour operational shifts
would be most beneficial and will likely be implemented moving forward.
Future Response: DHSES will move to activate the cadre of part time instructors as part of the
initial operational periods. Additionally, future hires will be required to demonstrate a working
knowledge of the Incident Command System and positional proficiencies.
Response:
The equipment for use inside of the EOC needs to be addressed from several perspectives. Laptops and
phones need to be updated in addition to the networks that support them. Quotes have been prepared
for upgrades, but it is important to recognize that appropriate levels of technological support will be
needed.
DSHES department staff maintained the status of being the nexus of communication for the local
emergency managers in order to maintain effective communication across a variety of disciplines. This
proved instrumental in the coordinated response efforts. As the needs of the response grew to
unimaginable demands staff identified other community stakeholders who may be a powerful asset
moving forward.
Future Response: Key stakeholders not traditionally considered first responders MUST be
identified, encouraged and empowered take an active role during disasters. This is including but not
limited to county departments with routine non for profit or non-government organization connectivity.
Future Response: DHSES following the November snowstorm identified the need for a more
robust response capability utilizing the local snowmobile federation assets. Unfortunately, the length of
time between events didn’t allow time for full development of the mutual aid resource. Whereas the ad
hoc activation during the Blizzard of 2022 allowed for deployment of essential tracked vehicles a formal
mutual aid memorandum of understanding inclusive of liability protections MUST be formally
documented. The county attorney’s office will play a critical role in expediting this process.
Future Response: DHSES acknowledges that a tremendous amount of departmental equipment
can and should be deployed during incidents and events. There is also a realization that the department
is limited in full time deployable staff during major incidents. We have taken immediate steps to cross
train part time instructors on all departmental resources. Our goal is also to facilitate a train the trainer
ATV/UTV course as soon as possible. Currently our staff has two qualified train the trainers and
numerous courses have been offered to municipal partners but with the anticipated surge in tracked
equipment the anticipated demand for training should be led by the department.
Training:
DLAN is the hub of information for the county’s emergency response operations. This product allows for
the active collaboration and resource coordination between state, county and local agencies. As
previously mentioned, one of the needs identified early includes ensuring that specific stakeholders are
proficient in the utilization of this platform including the creation of DLAN tickets. Whereas outreach
has been offered on a routine basis by DHSES municipal compliance has been driven almost exclusively
by post event urgency not best practices or preparedness.
Future Response: Training for DLAN will need to occur on a regular basis and elected officials
strongly encouraged to provide staffing and allowances for participation in this process. Internal
credentialing especially staff from DSS, Senior Service and other identified individuals should
also be addressed as a force multiplier and requirement of each departments and county
governments continuity of operations.
The topics discussed in this document are a broad stroke view attempt to capture comments
and concerns of DHSES staff.
I would add that having been involved in numerous incidents and planned events our steps
forward should focus on, sustainable resilience. The tendency post event is to throw money at
immediate solutions without careful consideration of consistency. We should look beyond the
illumination of the event and strive for practical applications that can be transformed into
lifesaving resources if needed not purchased for a singular purpose.
MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENT AND
PLANNING
TO: Benjamin Swanekamp, Chief of Staff
Per the request of the County Executive, the following is a summary memorandum regarding the
Department of Environment and Planning’s (DEP’s) December 2022 blizzard preparations, response,
and lessons learned. Due to the varied services provided by the DEP, this report has been organized
by the specific duties and responsibilities of the three (3) Divisions within the Department.
• Division of Planning/Office of GIS
• Division of Sewerage Management
• Environmental Compliance Services (ECS)
Environmental Compliance
• ECS has no formal role or responsibilities during an Emergency, unless called upon as
subject matter experts or to provide back-up staffing.
• Based on weather predictions and discussion during the 12/21/22 Commissioners meeting,
ECS prepared all staff to work from home on 12/23/22. This included staff emailing
needed documents to themselves in case the virtual desktop was not able to keep up with
demand.
• After the storm, multiple ECS staff assisted with the storm hotline. Assisting with the
hotline resulted in several suggestions and lessons learned, such as:
o Use of a cell phone Emergency Broadcast warning system for shelter in place,
driving bans and weather warnings (like are used for tornados or Amber Alerts
would be helpful);
o Clarity about when essential employees should or should not drive is needed
perhaps through coordination with those employers (hospitals, sewer treatment
plants, etc). Also, consideration of exemption for heating contractors might be
needed;
o Staff on the hotline understood that dialysis patients who were given a ride to
treatment, but were not transported home, which was problematic;
o More support and education about preparing for storms is needed – what to have on
hand at home and in your car.
o Extreme Heat and Cold events are being addressed in ongoing internal and
Community Climate Action initiatives.
• As a Lesson Learned, ECS Staff could have been made available to staff the Storm Hotline
earlier in the event, rather than waiting for a call for supplemental staffing. For the next
event, a pool of those available to support the Hotline could have some level of training
before an event to avoid the need to train new people in the middle of the emergency.
MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
DIVISION OF INFORMATION AND
SUPPORT SERIVCES
FROM: William Geary Jr, Karen Hoak, Tracy Cichocki, Catherine Walsh
Public Works played a vital role in all phase of the emergency response to the Christmas Blizzard 2022. This memo
will illustrate the planning process, supply of critical services during the response and recovery operations, and ideas to
help mitigate gaps in future in the future.
Planning
Interagency coordination, communications, and collaboration are critical to an effective and efficient response. The
planning for this event started in DPW, on the 19th of December; with NWS, Labor Relations, Emergency Services and
contract forces.
The timing of the event, near Christmas holiday, made this even more challenging. Communications from DPW,
Personnel and Labor Relations mitigated any employee no shows with an MOU allowing for additional pay on
Christmas Day to ensure we had adequate coverage. The MOU incentivized and rewarded the employees to be
available and on the job since the contract would have only rewarded employees who came into work on December
26th.
DPW reached out to EC DHSES on the 19th to prepare all the Highway districts with cots and blankets. Unfortunately,
the supplies did not make it to all the districts in time for the storm. EMS required a ticket be created in DLAN for the
supplies and they would then deliver. One of the gaps was no having overtime pre-storm for EMS employees to make
the deliveries or allowing the Highway staff to pick up the supplies.
Food was procured for all the Highway districts, which needs to be a priority in future response. This has been a
challenge getting approval. All the Highways facilities are equipped with food preparation facilities, to include the new
facility when it is constructed. The Highway facilities tend to feed not just its employees, but all the ECSO road
deputies and in some cases, first responders for the duration of the event.
• Lesson learned, we need to procure food for a minimum of 72 hours. The supplies we purchased only
lasted about 48 hours.
Buildings and Grounds staff, faced similar issues as the districts, being stuck in some cases for days due to road
conditions in the City. We did not procure any food for them, but it is something, along with cots and blankets that
needs to be addressed in the future. B&G does have limited access to food from the Holding Center in the event they
can not obtain food, but this should not be a normal procedure.
Equipment, has been an area in both Highway and B&G to increase. Highways has a need for specialized snow
blowers, albeit, at a cost of $1 million. The districts will be adjusting the base line for high lifts from the 2 they have
now to 4 as a minimum. The need and use of a high lift were priceless in the past two events of 2022. B&G has to
increase the plowing equipment as well; Bobcats with snow blowers, plow trucks and even small high lifts need to be
acquired.
• Rath Bldg., Public Safety, Fire Training and Holding Center have to have high lifts and personnel to
operate them during snow events.
The pre-event planning conversation with the contractors is very helpful and proved to be successful. The conversation
started about 72 hours before the storm and possible pre-employment of equipment. The contractors can not be engaged
until a State of Emergency is declared; in the future an early SOE would be helpful. In the future, DPW will be looking
into ways to have visibility of the pieces of equipment, using technology for the dashboard viewer in the EOC, such as
using Air Tags or AVLs. This will allow for real time information in the EOC and mapping capabilities.
DPW, planning for future events, staffing in the EOC need to be addressed. The limited activation was problematic for
DPW. Staff needed were stuck in the City of Buffalo for days, DPW has to have more representation, in person, like
B&G and DLAN ticket reviewers. Using staff in charge of Operations or Logistics from EMS (or other departments)
did not work well. Roles within ICS really need to be filled by DPW personnel, there were multiple gaps with
answering tickets or developing Task Forces.
• We need to offer additional DLAN training for employees and consider providing ICS training upon
hiring for all DPW employees.
Operational/Recovery
DPW was able to coordinate efforts in the field opening roads, securing utilities and lifelines, managing environmental
and safety hazards, assessing damages, and securing facilities. The top priority of DPW was preservation of life and
public health, followed by public services.
23 December at 0730 hrs. rain changed to snow and driving ban was in place at 0930 hrs. Blizzard conditions in the
effected arears began at 0840 hrs. on the 23rd and ended at 0105 hrs. on 25th, over 40 hours. DPW-Highways had 40
plows and 5 high lifts on the road. Equipment was reduced for 12-hour period due to zero visibility in the Harlem and
Clarence Highway districts.
DPW had 30 contractor high lifts working in Harlem and Clarence Districts starting at 2200 hrs. on 23rd along with
DPW-HWYS crews. At the same time, Task Forces were set up with a loader assigned to Buffalo Fire and a loader
with BPD. By noon on the 24th; contractors had 40 high lifts; 18 loaders County line in Clarence to Clinton Street, 15
loaders in Amherst/Clarence Center area, and 7 in Cheektowaga and areas west of Transit Rd. 1445 hrs. on the 24th a
Task Force was set up with Utility Crews and high lifts to open sub stations for power in the City of Buffalo, (the first
time I talked with City of Buffalo DPW Commissioner).
EC DPW created its own task force at 2030 hrs. on 24 Dec to keep Mercy Hospital, Abbott Rd, and Seneca Street open.
This task force included assistance from the City of Buffalo Police Department as well as the Buffalo Fire Department.
The goal was to make one lane plus open for emergency service vehicles to gain access to the Holding Center and
Buffalo Niagara corridor, including Elm and Oak Street to North Street. This objective was accomplished by 0800 hrs.
on 25 Dec. Another mission within this task force was to hire and dispatch mechanics to repair 12 abandoned fire trucks
in the City of Buffalo (due to the cold weather the diesel in the trucks had gelled after they had to be abandoned in the
blizzard).
NYS DOT and NYS Police coordinated another Task Force at 2100 hrs., 24 Dec, in a coordinated call with EC DPW
and EC DESHS, to assist the City of Buffalo with search and rescue efforts.
EC DPW – HWYS, along with contract forces, had all County roads open and 497 vehicles towed by 1900 hrs. on 25
Dec 2022. Of those 497 vehicles, 306 cars were towed in the portion of the City of Buffalo that the County took over
responsibility for clearing out (namely the Southeast portion of the City described below). Simultaneously, DPW
assisted with efforts to open roads and escort ECSO to get dialysis patients to their appointments. The City of Buffalo
called in their contractor, Veracelli, who would have 30 pieces of equipment operating by 26th. 27 Dec the City of
Buffalo set a goal of having one lane open all streets with in 48 hrs. on all City streets. NYSDOT Albany called in
additional resources and set up a staging area at Buffalo State College. This was a huge logistical issue for DPW; there
was no coordination with DPW on needs from NYS DOT. In the end, EC DPW had to provide to fuel to all the contract
ambulances that came to the City as well as all public and private equipment that was staged at Buffalo State, without
any coordination with DPW.
This Buffalo State Task force and county contractor working the entire area of the City from Broadway south to the
Lake, took till 30 December. DPW could not demobilize any of the contractors or crews until Buffalo State was fully
demobilized on 31 December. The final count on County directed assets was 139 trucks, 74 loaders and over 50,000
gallons of fuel.
Mitigation
The mission is to reduce the potential impact on the community from future disasters, to life and property. The
mitigation plans should be a continual planning process and overlap of other emergency management missions. NIMS
has a component of Command Management, Multiagency Coordination System (MACS). MACS, allows all levels of
government and all disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively.
DPW continues to assess damages in the buildings, equipment and document invoices. The Budget department has set
up accounts and funds approved by the Legislature, so we can start paying invoices. Contractors are gathering their
documentation and it is expected, those bills will be paid within the month.
DPW, will continue to invest in technology, building management systems, to have real time information for buildings,
similar to Highways dashboard. There are positions needed within DPW; most importantly at the ME’s Office a
Stationary Engineer. DPW could benefit by having an Emergency Manager position full time, similar to NYS DOT
has. DPW will develop training plans and update those on yearly basis for DLAN.
Before, during and after an emergency, Public Works is the lifeline of the community.
Erie County Department of Health
After Action Review – December 2022 Blizzard
Strengths .................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Strengths .................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Communications .......................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Strengths .................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................................. 10
Strengths ................................................................................................................................................................................ 11
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Miscellaneous ............................................................................................................................................................................ 12
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
This document was written at the request of County Executive Mark Poloncarz. This report collects information and data
from Erie County Department of Health (ECDOH) divisions and staff who participated in Erie County’s response to the
December 2022 Blizzard (December 23-24, 2022). It may also include observations from and lessons learned from a
previous winter storm, around November 17, 2022.
These observations were compiled with a strong willingness to contribute to improvements in departmental operations and
the county’s emergency response.
Recommendations from this report center on life safety issues, Medical Examiner’s Office operations, SNOW line calls,
approaches to improve communications and the department’s efforts for planning, preparation, response, recovery for
future severe winter weather events.
One fundamental question that arose from this storm: how can Erie County encourage a culture of resilience among
residents and healthcare facilities? The answer will require involvement from community groups, other departments and
healthcare administration, and sustained efforts to address with messaging, education and physical resources.
Localized community mutual aid responses to meet basic needs were strong and organically managed. For example, a “Bills
Mafia” initiative to bring snowblowers and shovelers to clear driveways and sidewalks in Buffalo’s hardest-hit areas was a
very visible volunteer-organized response. Erie County was able to support this effort with the National Guard for safety
operations. Direct efforts to collaborate with informal community groups, self-identified mutual aid leaders and other
spontaneous volunteer efforts are warranted.
Another pressing question: how can we strengthen EOC operations and make them conform to ICS/FEMA standards?
Staff identified a lack of preparation, structure and organization at the EOC. This calls for further education for all potential
EOC staff in the Incident Command System, perhaps with an outside facilitator, to get Erie County “back to basics” on the
foundations of this FEMA-recommended framework. And, it calls for drills and table-top exercises to keep this top of mind
for key staff.
Incident Overview
Erie County experienced 36 hours of sustained blizzard conditions from December 23-24, 2022. This storm surpassed the
famed Blizzard of ’77 in duration and loss of life. These extreme winter weather conditions of sub-zero windchills,
hurricane-force winds and relentless lake effect snow impacted travel, utilities (power, heat), public works (snow removal)
and – critically – emergency response (fire, police, ambulance).
This weather event occurred over the Christmas holiday weekend, disrupting activities for nearly all residents. Road
conditions and holiday plans affected both EOC healthcare facility staffing. Drivers took to the roads during a driving
advisory and a driving ban to go to or return home from work, shop, or for holiday travel. Hundreds of abandoned vehicles
caused havoc on highways, arterial roads and side streets once plows were able to resume operations. Those trapped
drivers faced awful decisions about staying in a freezing vehicle or attempting to reach shelter in deadly blizzard conditions.
Thousands of residents were stranded away from their homes or workplaces, and tens of thousands of residents
experienced power and heat loss that caused uncomfortable, uncertain, and in some cases, life-threatening circumstances.
At least 43 storm-related deaths have been confirmed by the Erie County Medical Examiner’s Office as of this writing.
Multiple mutual aid teams from NYS and other municipalities supported EMS and first responders.
Task Forces came together to coordinate response and transport. A snow plow would be paired with fire and ambulance
equipment to respond to calls. Creative solutions were developed quickly and in the field to facilitate transport and
maximize efficiency. Some patients were transported to hospitals by fly cars or via UTV to an ambulance on a relatively
cleared street.
Therapy dogs from were brought in for dispatchers’ mental health support. PSAPs from other jurisdictions were available to
manage phone work. Dispatchers worked out of the PSC (Public Safety Campus) and from a room at the EOC. At EOC they
worked next to Buffalo Fire Department, which worked out well for real-time coordination.
NYS Fire and EMS were brought in for additional and welcomed support.
Nurse Navigator
EMS used a Nurse Navigator resource through AMR ambulance service. This out-of-state resource triaged low-priority calls
that could be handled with at-home management, with an expectation that transport to a hospital, urgent care or private
physician would be available within 48 hours. An example would be for a 9-1-1 caller who had pain from a twisted ankle
and no other apparent injuries (uncontrolled bleeding, head injury). The nurse could explain how to alleviate pain and avoid
further injury until they could access medical treatment. The nurse navigators addressed about 20% of calls that would
usually have prompted an ambulance response.
Hospitals
Relatively quickly, the process fell into place for hospitals to communicate their essential employee lists to the EOC for
transport.
When able to travel, ambulances transported patients to the nearest hospital - not necessarily their preferred hospital.
Kenmore Mercy Hospital and DeGraff Memorial, north of the city, experienced increased ambulance volume.
Though some disruption to life-sustaining treatments like dialysis was expected, actual conditions were worse. 9-1-1/858-
SNOW were able to prioritize dialysis transport requests based on severity (time since last treatment) and location
(individuals stuck in vehicles on the road were high priority; individuals at a hospital had access to care and were not
scheduled for transport). EOC provided a one-way ride to a treatment center - not a round-trip service. This maximized our
transport capacity, and we were not endangering patients by returning them to homes over treacherous roads or to a
home without power.
Some patients had to stay overnight at some dialysis centers. Dispatchers explained to patients and centers that they would
not return patients to their homes after their dialysis sessions. Administrators at these sites were not pleased and often not
prepared with food or cots/blankets.
The Christmas holiday contributed to some staff not wanting to be scheduled or insisting on working from home when they
could not perform their duties at home. Road and weather conditions and power outages prevented others from fully
participating in EOC operations and the response.
There is no replacement for face-to-face interaction at the EOC and ESF desks. Remote resources may not be considered or
considered too late. Checking in mutual aid ambulances, for example, should require an in-person interaction and live
inspection of the vehicle, equipment, radios and a thorough briefing and mission assignment. That didn’t happen with all
shifts for mutual aid. EMS mutual aid ambulances were checked in in-person. Fire resources were told to go to scene. AMR
told EMS to send mutual aid ambulances to AMR which caused EMS to looe visibility of mutual aid ambulances.; that’s
where the breakdown happened.
Mutual aid resources were overutilized compared to local resources, and local resources were underutilized. It varied in
some cases; the mutual aid ambulance took 22 calls in a shift, and AMR took three. Other times, mutual aid ambulances
just sat at a fire station and were never given a call. Ways to improve coordination should be examined and adopted in the
future.
Hospitals
Hospitals, in general, had unrealistic expectations about patient discharge during a driving ban. Some hospital staff also
had unrealistic expectations about the ability of emergency resources to transport them to or from their workplace.
Response
For approximately 18 hours, EMS response were suspended. This was an unexpected circumstance that took a tremendous
toll on ambulance crews and dispatchers who have a culture of responding regardless of the conditions. The weather and
road conditions were just too dangerous for travel.
Operational Periods
The 8-hour operational period was not ideal. Though it was a good attempt to accommodate individual holiday plans, travel
to-and-from most homes was not feasible or safe for many at the EOC. Transport required using resources that might have
otherwise been deployed in other ways. A 16- or 24-hour operational period would have been a better choice.
Demobilization
The demobilization announcement came as a surprise to EMS staff, as their operations were ongoing with mutual aid teams
still in the field. This decision was communicated without this divisions’ input.
Erie County employees assigned to the EOC should be fully briefed on how long they should expect to be on-call/on duty.
EOC staffing should start with the level of on-site staff that the planning and conditions called for - not basing shift times on
holiday plans.
Develop EMS/PHEP staff as resources for operations and logistics. For example, with the ME’s Office instead of calling in
outside contractors.
Transport
Consider options to put Senior Services/municipal ride service vans into use. For example, these vehicles could be used to
transport dialysis patients home from centers once roads are clear and safe for travel.
DHSES maintains a Functional Needs Registry for self-identified individuals with conditions, disabilities or specific needs.
Emergencies and disasters may put these individuals at additional risk because of power outages, lack of transportation
options (e.g., dialysis patients, individuals who depend on oxygen tanks). Consider how this registry is incorporated into
emergency response, how that registry is communicated to municipal emergency managers, and how the public is informed
about this registry.
EMS should communicate the need for hospitals and healthcare centers to review and revise their emergency plans and
how they interact with staffing, supplies and shelter for patients, staff and families. In a snow emergency with the potential
for driving bans and dangerous road conditions, employees should have a “go bag” of at least 4 days of clothes, snacks and
personal items. Hospitals should stock an emergency supply of nonperishable and frozen foods for future similar emergency
situations.
Hospital EMs should advise staff that once on site, travel home may not be possible. In extreme weather situations,
hospitals should have contingency plans to house/maintain discharged patients and their visitors, stranded staff and walk-
ins from the community.
In blizzard conditions, dialysis patients should be advised to bring a “go bag” to the dialysis center that should include
clothes, personal items, blankets and snacks. This advisement should be given in November before snowfall begins and
reinforced with dangerous weather condition predictions.
Decedents were identified in a reasonable amount of time, especially given the circumstances.
EMS securing resources, such as assisting with making DLAN and NYS Response requests, lodging for out-of-town staff, and
food for MEO, was very helpful. This process should be started at storm onset if it is identified as a potential need through
the planning process.
Administrative staff were available and receiving calls off-site. Staff worked non-stop for a week with recovery,
investigations, examinations and notifications.
While managing the caseload of mass fatalities from the storm event, the ME’s Office handled five cases of children who
perished in a house fire, overdoses, traffic fatalities, and any other cases falling under ME jurisdiction.
ME’s Office benefited from mutual aid response from Rensselaer and Onondaga counties. These were trained staff who
were able to assimilate into office operations with ease.
Buffalo Police were very helpful in terms of recovering decedents and supporting scene investigators. Future mass fatality
plans need to include all agencies involved.
Area hospitals accepted decedents found by police to store in their morgues until they filled with patients who died in the
hospital.
Staff relied on the NWS forecast to decide to close the office in advance of the storm. With the possibility of power and
phone outages, working off-site/at home would preserve staff safety and continued operations. The ME’s Office is not set
up for a shelter-in-place situation. Although the office is on the ECMC campus, ECMC typically does not address building
access (snow clearance), security (unsecured doors) and maintenance in a timely fashion, if at all.
The ME’s Office needs better physical barriers to control access. In the recent past, families looking for personal property
have attempted to access the ME’s Office. This facet of the response could have been addressed by a Safety Office under
ICS. This was also an issue during the mass shooting response.
Transport
Hospitals were inflexible and complained that their morgues were out of space and they were overwhelmed. This was
because of the inability of funeral homes to claim bodies during the storm, not necessarily because of storm-related deaths.
Appeals to hospitals to hold decedents until the weather cleared were not considered once their morgues filled. Hospitals
need a backup plan to store their bodies.
Some decedents were brought to the ME’s Office in private vehicles. Some decedents were in private homes for several
days before transport could be arranged. These were highly unusual and unprecedented circumstances.
Police attempted to deviate from normal practice by dropping off bodies at ME’s Office or the refrigerated trailer at the
EOC without clearing with the MEO and obtaining a tracking number for the body.
Data reporting for storm-related deaths was cumbersome. MEO should explore acquiring analytics software.
Storm-related death data was shared with the media too freely throughout storm event. More secure consistent system
should be developed to share mass fatality death data.
Storage
Because of construction, the ME’s Office had a second body storage refrigerator available for storage with 18 spaces. If this
storm had occurred one week later, that refrigerator would not have been available. State resources take two days or more
to secure. The ME’s Office needs its own trailer on ECMC property. Discussions need to occur as soon as possible.
Vendors
Contracted staff assigned to the ME’s Office did not understand or respect existing procedures and alienated ME’s Office
and mutual aid staff. This resulted in confusion, deviation from normal procedures and extra work for the ME’s Office.
Coordination
IAPs and organizational charts were not drafted or disseminated, which led to confusion at the ME’s Office about
contracted staff duties and the appropriate chain of command to reach the IC. This was an issue for staff involved with the
whole operation. There were no briefings before or at the end of operational periods.
Demobilization
The demobilization announcement came as a surprise to ME staff as their operations were ongoing with non-storm-related
cases. This decision should have been made in consultation with the ME’s Office and communicated better to this office.
Recommendations
Security and Operations
Evaluate and address day-to-day safety and site security at the ME’s Office. Consider security concerns during planning
phase of any emergency response.
Coordinate snow clearance and other facility needs with ECMC campus.
Review, revise and rehearse mass fatality plan. Erie County needs an updated mass fatality plan with input from relevant
Erie County departments and offices, hospitals, funeral directors, and NSYDOH. Because it is a complicated plan and
involves so many different agencies, we believe the best approach is to hire a consultant to write a comprehensive plan
involving all parties. ME’s Office heard comments about DMORT. DMORT require state approval and cost sharing, and is not
a realistic expectation or option for disasters on the scale of this blizzard. DMORT response takes roughly two weeks to
implement.
Work with ECMC on an MOU for trailer storage in a mutually acceptable and accessible ECMC campus location. Build in
maintenance costs in the ME’s budget. Consider purchasing a refrigerator trailer equipped to store bodies for future
emergencies.
Hospital system needs a plan to handle body overflow that doesn’t rely on the ME.
Task Delegation
For future events, requests for resources, personnel, coordination of family reunification or family support sites, or
accommodation for mutual aid staff should be directed through the EOC/ICS and result communicated back to ME’s Office.
Staffing
Develop relationships with EMS/PHEP staff to support emergency response. EMS/PHEP staff or MRC (SMART) volunteers
could assist with scribing for ME’s office. People in this role should not be expected to assist with direct contact with
decedents.
Include division and department leadership in discussions on bringing in outside vendors/contractors to assist.
Other
During our internal review, the ME’s Office identified that when organizations conduct active shooter drills, their office
should be incorporated into those events.
More secure consistent data analytics system should be developed to share mass fatality death data.
Communications
Strengths
Timing
CE Poloncarz and senior administration officials (Health, DPW, DHSES) held a press briefing on Thursday afternoon to
communicate anticipated storm severity per the NWS Buffalo forecast, school closures, preparation recommendations and
safety messages. CE staff and designated PIOs outlined communication roles for duration of storm response with some
working from home or off-site and some scheduled for EOC.
Subsequent press briefings were well-timed (morning and afternoon; daily). Timely responses made for media inquiries and
local, national and international media requests.
Messages
National Weather Service bulletins were dire, descriptive and adequately timed. Their message did not reach all Erie County
population.
EOC team monitored social media and media. Media monitoring uncovered misinformation about National Guard resources
that was able to be addressed quickly through a response on social media.
ReadyErie: The ReadyErie app was updated regularly with driving ban information, safety messages and video content from
press briefings.
Access
With ASL interpreters unable to travel to the EOC, the PIO team adjusted by directing interpreters to upload video
recordings of the press conference interpretations soon after each briefing. These were then uploaded to YouTube and
ReadyErie (video section). The flexibility of WNY Deaf Access Services and their ASL interpreters on this point was greatly
appreciated.
Advance notice was given to Niagara Radio Reading Service of 858-SNOW availability for blind/low-vision residents.
Staff
PIOs worked on-site and off-site. Social media content managers included people at the EOC and individuals off-site and, in
one case, out of town (and thus not impacted by storm/power outage conditions).
EOC did not follow the ICS structure and operations as recommended by FEMA. Face-to-face interaction at the EOC is a
crucial element for effective coordination. It is easier to scale back operations and staffing if conditions warrant.
ICS recommends regular briefing at shift changes or other clearly noted intervals. ICS also recommends IAPs at the
beginning of operational periods. ICs did not hold briefings. Even if EOC is hybrid/virtual, briefings or daily calls for EOC
operations would improve situational awareness and facilitate coordination.
IAPs were not written or distributed. This hindered situational awareness, caused confusion and may have led to EOC staff
acting outside their defined roles to ensure that tasks were completed.
Coordination
All county social media channels could have helped in sharing and amplifying key county safety messages.
Individual or group outreach to community leaders could have emphasized the potential severity of this storm.
Messages
ReadyErie: One person updated content (no planned redundancy). Push notifications not necessarily enabled on all end
users phones. ReadyErie has a limited reach. If ReadyErie is to be used in future emergencies, there should be a
comprehensive county-wide campaign to educate residents on when and how this resource is used, how to turn on
Residents who lost power had difficulty in accessing County messages through social media, television and radio.
Aside from American Sign Language, Erie County did not provide safety messages in languages other than English.
Erie County warnings that communicated the storm magnitude and severity and how to prepare did not reach many Erie
County residents through their normal communication channels. Though not used, the Emergency Broadcast System or a
county-wide text to all active cell phones could have signaled the severity and timing of storm conditions, life hazards if
going outdoors, and a direct appeal to shelter in place.
Access
Niagara Frontier Radio Reading Service and other opportunities for outreach to vulnerable communities and individuals
with disabilities should be considered.
Consider live “hits” or pre-recorded messages with safety messages and updates for radio stations to play – especially if a
significant number of people are without power, stranded in vehicles or at places other than their homes.
Staff
Key social media personnel lost power, which impacted their ability to participate in the communications response. Note:
these individuals went above and beyond in making every effort to access power and internet while dealing with very
challenging home circumstances. This highlights the need for redundancy and cross-training for personnel, and multiple
means of accessing social media channels.
Recommendations
Truckers and travelers from out of the area may not access the local and traditional media channels that Erie County use to
communicate driving bans, storm conditions and risk.
As resources allow, assign a staff/PIO resource to monitor social media (Reddit, Discord, Facebook, Twitter) for real-time
reporting from residents. Their focus should be identifying misinformation for correction, needed and priority safety
messages, and intelligence that informs DPW, EMS and fire/police response.
In order to better use ReadyErie in future weather emergencies, Erie County should develop and communicate a
comprehensive county-wide campaign to educate residents on when and how ReadyErie is used, how to turn on
notifications, and how to access the app’s information. Content should be templated to make updating faster and easier.
Develop a for content review before posting to make sure messages are consistent, accurate and timely.
Explore using the Emergency Broadcast System or a county-wide text to all active cell phones could have signaled the
severity and timing of storm conditions, life hazards if going outdoors, and a direct appeal to shelter in place.
Explore using the Niagara Frontier Radio Reading Service and other opportunities for outreach to vulnerable communities
and individuals with disabilities.
Consider establishing and promoting the Winter Weather Safety page earlier (October) and promoting it heavily to
community groups. This would include practical tips on building emergency kits or home, vehicles and work; how to shelter-
in-place; home safety (carbon monoxide, dangers of heating with gas stoves, fire safety).
Add streaming capability at EOC to allow for ASL interpreter, visual aids to be presented on-screen during press briefings.
As overflow for 9-1-1 callers who could not get through or who were unsatisfied with the 9-1-1 response, this SNOW line
was responsible for many DLAN tickets; some were duplicates of 9-1-1 calls.
Some call input from SNOW line call takers had incomplete/missing information that was key to coordinating a response
(e.g., call back phone number, name, address).
An algorithm for triaging calls and coordinated response was needed. Need to continue discussions with 2-1-1 to coordinate
responses and with Erie County DISS on technical options for text messaging, onboarding call takers, and adding SNOW
phone lines on site at the EOC.
A backlog of DLAN tickets grew; the EOC manager handling DLAN tickets did not always have a place to send those tickets.
There is a need for regular, ongoing DLAN training and clearly established EOC managers and ESF desks responsibilities.
Before each storm there is a rush of people who forgot their passwords, log on and need refreshers on use and updates.
Training is a key part of planning and preparation, and this needs to be a priority.
Recommendations
Communicate types of calls that are appropriate for SNOW.
Identify and train call takers; determine their willingness and availability prior to an anticipated weather event or check in
on a regular basis.
Train any call takers related to a response in protocols/process, and importance of collecting complete information on the
call. Call takers/dispatchers should also communicate to dialysis patients that transport to a facility is one-way, and they
should be prepared with food/medicines to stay at that facility until road conditions improve.
Prepare to provide mental health resources for call takers during and after their response.
Consider earlier and more frequent coordination with 2-1-1 and 3-1-1.
Develop algorithms for triaging calls and coordinated response. Continue discussions with 2-1-1 to coordinate responses
and with Erie County DISS on technical options for text messaging, onboarding call takers, and adding SNOW phone lines
virtually or on site at the EOC.
Conduct regular, ongoing, DLAN training to prevent people from forgetting their passwords, how to log on and how to use,
and updates. Clearly establish EOC managers and ESF desk responsibilities with regular shift changeovers. EOC manager is
the most important role at the EOC. The person or persons assigned to that role should have one function: triaging DLAN
tickets so they are pushed to appropriate EOC functional area/ESF desk. Without an IAP, no one knew which roles were
filled and which roles were not.
Miscellaneous
The Buffalo News suspended print delivery during the storm; television and radio reporters were limited in their ability to
travel and report on location. The video updates provided through the Erie County YouTube channel were highly viewed in
comparison to other county broadcasts and in some cases were streamed on local TV stations.
Some social media posts included comments that the Cattaraugus Territory should be noted on the GIS maps that were
produced. Recommendation: Label Cattaraugus Territory and Seneca Territory with their preferred labels.
Dozens of ad hoc warming shelters were established and used in the city of Buffalo during and after the storm. Not all
official city of Buffalo warming shelters had power. Balancing the messages of “if you are outside, get inside” with “here are
the warming shelter sites” was a challenge, as people who were relatively safe in an unheated home might have attempted
to reach a shelter – whether by road or on foot, both would put their lives at risk.
This is the second weather related incident response I’ve participated in during my time with
Erie County. Both extreme weather events occurred within 5 weeks of each other giving me
an opportunity to reflect on how we manage operations in Erie County and specifically within
the Department of Public Works Highway Division.
Preparedness
Our leadership in the maintenance districts does a great job of coordinating staffing, readying
equipment and all tasks necessary to manage snowfall in WNY. When it comes to planning for
what is likely a new norm of extreme weather events we could improve upon our practices by
coordinating with Emergency services to equip each districts with the items necessary to
continue working in critical situations. The department could establish a check list for the
District Engineers to ensure each facility has what they need in the event there are several
employees sleeping and working out of one location for days at a time. Some of the cots that
were acquired in 2014 have been damaged do to being stored in inadequate spaces. Having a
one stop shop or one stop drop off for these essential items would help eliminate any scramble.
As we begin to improve an replace Highway Facilities we need to incorporate an extreme
weather event lens to design. Additionally, within our department we could improve planning
for food in these circumstances. We were able to stock each district up with a couple days of
groceries ahead of time but could do better back up planning in the future.
It would be beneficial to create a tangible document titled “DPW Operating Procedures for
Extreme Weather Response”. This could be a resource for training and tailgate talks ahead of
extreme weather events.
Communication
We excelled at communication during both storms. I attribute this to the accountability and
situational awareness that is promoted by using WeatherEvents. Our District Engineers are
experienced in managing operations and using WeatherEvents as a communication tool and
the Dashboard as visual support is key to our success. For the most part the DE’s know what
warrants a phone call and most stay in touch as needed via text or call to keep me informed of
operations.
Collaboration
At the EOC, collaboration is key and seems to be a successful element of our response in many
ways. Collaboration between County departments and many agencies is well established but
with other agencies we need better in roads. It was good to have a City of Buffalo
representative on site after the Blizzard but would have been far more beneficial to have them
in place ahead of time given their lack of emergency command structure.
Equipment
After the last two weather events it is clear we are leagues ahead of most municipalities with
our fleet. We are in great shape thanks to the investment and support over the past 10+ years.
We have started to discuss and need to plan for continuing to invest and acquire specialized
equipment for these weather events.
I’ve participated in three ICS emergency responses this year, Jefferson Massacre, November
Storm and Christmas Blizzard. It’s an honor to be entrusted as part of the team and each
incident has been transformative for me, professionally and personally. Each incident has also
served as a clear reminder on the importance of solid leadership and I am very proud to have
witnessed remarkable leadership by this administration. We are better because we know we
can always do better and that leads me to share a few ideas and observations.
More training.
Trauma Informed Care training for those who work in an emergency response. Many may
not be seen as front line but are often tasked with responding to crisis, in person or on the
phone.
Mental Health First Aid Training is an excellent training to provide for anyone who is public
facing at any time and could be an excellent training to have in the toolbox during times of
crisis.
Empathy/Equity
There is a need for those responding to have a better understanding of the communities we
are responding to. Erie County is a geographically, and culturally diverse region and remains
very segregated. Community comprehension would provide a better understanding of those
you are trying to help. Understanding socio-economic challenges and language barriers
specific to certain areas across the region would eliminate challenges that arise in our
response. Although it is unrelated to my department, I am compelled to provide feedback
because I observed dialogue and in one instance language that was not appropriate given how
grave the situation was.
**Thank you for providing this opportunity for feedback. I am proud to be part of a team
that continues to do incredible work. Happy New Year!**
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MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
TO: Mark C. Poloncarz, Erie County Executive
Benjamin Swanekamp, Chief of Staff
PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to memorialize the next actions of the Department of Social Services in the
area of winter storm emergency response plans after reflection on the Blizzard of 2022.
⊕ Youth Detention
◊ Meet with Department of Health to develop policy and procedure to ensure mandated 24-hour
nursing coverage under 9 NYCRR 180-1.9(b)(6)(iii) for the Youth Detention facility. During the
blizzard Youth Detention was without coverage for almost three days. DSS met with DOH this
past week and DOH is developing a policy for their staff by next week.
⊕ Establish emergency procedure for ECDSS to request mass authorizations when possible, from OTDA
during an emergency to allow for approval times to go through Federal authorities.
Use of Resources
⊕ Homeless Services
◊ 20 cots provided by emergency response to DSS to cover emergency shelters were a
necessary backup, but were not needed.
⊕ Transport to Youth Detention
◊ ECSO were able to assist many Youth Detention workers in getting to the facility to provide
coverage. This worked well and may be required in the future during a similar situation.
⊕ Welfare Checks on Children by ECSO
◊ Child Welfare coordinated with the ECSO to conduct welfare checks on children as required.
This worked well and will be used in future responses.
MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
DEPT. OF MEDICAID INSPECTOR GENERAL
Memo on “What went well and what did not” from my point of view during the
Holiday Storm 2022.
During the storm, I answered the 858-SNOW helpline. I was the only person from
my department to perform this task. All my staff did get an email inviting them to
participate. They all declined.
I was asked if I could work the 858-SNOW helpline on 12/23/2022 at 8:45 PM.
Training for the helpline was scheduled for 8 AM on 12/24. I accepted and attended
the training. The necessary software was installed on my phone, and I began to take
calls later that day. I logged 48 hours either answering or performing follow-up calls
for the 858-SNOW line.
1) Call Operators. We should have a “core” group of trained people who can be
set up to take calls during an emergency. We have that now by default, but
we should formalize it.
a. This should include setting up software on computers and phones;
b. Operator training;
c. Establishing supervisors;
d. Scheduling. Some people worked overnight, and some put in twelve -
Page 1 of 2
hour shifts. If we had an emergency plan in place, this could be
established in advance. At one point, only two people were on the
phones after midnight. That was probably enough, but we should have
had a more formal schedule. I was asked twice if I could start work at
4 AM. (That’s not a typo). We need to plan better for a 24 hour
response.
2) Language. I and others did get calls to the 858-SNOW line from persons who
had limited or non-existent English skills. In two cases I know of, people
called in and no one knew what language was being spoken. We did get very
few non-English calls, but I felt we didn’t do enough to prepare for this.
3) Call Forms. When a call came in, the operators completed an electronic form.
This was a great idea. It clearly listed out what information was needed, there
was an option to list calls as High, Medium or Low priority and a comments
section for information not otherwise required.
a. One problem was if multiple calls came in for the same issue. There
was no way to “recall” a submitted form, add new data or remove a
submitted form altogether. Those options should be available going
forward.
b. Operators had no idea what was happening after a form was submitted.
It would be good to know, for example, that a task was being addressed.
4) The System Worked. The fast-moving nature of the storm required a quick
solution. The 858-SNOW line worked. I am convinced the operators saved
lives.
5) Closing the Rath Building on Friday the 23rd probably saved lives. It
prevented people from being stuck in cars on the way to / from work, or being
stuck in the Rath Building. It was a good decision.
6) If given a choice, I would rather take calls at the Emergency Operations Center
then from my home. There is better access to tech support and better access
to information at the EOC.
7) Some groups/persons referred callers to the 858-SNOW line rather than 911.
Some calls were far too serious for the 858-SNOW line.
8) I was told at several points that “911 was overwhelmed”. I do not know if
that was true. If it was, do we need “backup 911 operators”?
9) I had two vendors reach out to me during the storm. They had vehicles (dump
trucks / bucket loaders) that were needed, but no one reached out to them. We
need to develop a listing of vendors with these kinds of vehicles now, so we
have someone to call in a crisis. (Confidentially, I emailed their numbers to
Pat Lucy (Amherst Highway Supervisor) but I know for a fact he never called
them.)
10) This will happen again.
Page 2 of 2
MEMORANDUM
COUNTY OF ERIE
DEPT. OF PERSONNEL
The Personnel Department did not have any significant issues during the blizzard. The storm in
November provided training to Commissioners and supervisors on the work-from-home rules
during a storm. In addition, the storm policy was re-written after the November storm, which
provided clearer guidance than the previous iteration.
As the Erie County Probation Department is not 24-hour operations, our feedback will be limited
however, we believe it valuable to your integrated after-action report.
In response to your request for feedback, supervisors within the Erie County Probation Department were
tasked with consulting with their respective teams for feedback on the recent “blizzard” event to assist
in determining concerns, reflect on current procedures and address any outstanding questions. The
general feedback received was extremely positive.
The probation department staff expressed appreciation of the County Executive Office’s decision and
notification on Thursday, 12/22/22 of the closure of county operations for Friday, 12/23/22 which
allowed staff ample time to prepare for “work from home” and address personal matters related to the
impending storm. The department presently has a phone tree notification system in place which was
utilized twice during this event to ensure all department staff were notified of the county operations
closure and staff commented that this system worked well.
Approximately two-thirds (106) of our department staff have “Work from Home” agreements and
because of this “blizzard” event, were able to address work related matters despite the closure of non-
emergency county operations. Although some internal rumbling followed November’s snow event
regarding the mandate for staff to work from home if signed agreements were on record, no such issues
arose during the December event. However, the fact that the December “blizzard” closure lasted three
business days did raise some internal issues with staff having available at home the volume of work
necessary. To address this concern, department wide emails were issued regarding the availability of
recommended on-line training curriculums. This issue will be addressed more thoroughly later this
month in our department Operations meeting and suggestions will be solicited for future such
circumstances.
In light of the county wide driving ban issued and closure of other significant partnering entities such as
the criminal and family courts, and local treatment agencies, the department did not need to coordinate
or communicate with these entities to reschedule appearances, meetings, etc. However, when driving
bans were lifted in certain parts of Erie County on Tuesday, 12/27/22 and not in others, department staff
did need to notify a small number of entities/agencies of our department’s expected absence on
12/28/22. The Erie County Probation Department partners with several area treatment agencies and
local jurisdictions for use of their facilities to enable us to meet with individuals on probation supervision
in locations within the probationer’s neighborhood. The department did reached out to these
entitles/agencies on 12/27/22 and 12/28/22 to communicate this anticipated absence.
On 12/28/22 the county’s Personnel Department issued information to county department heads
regarding the ability to be flexible with leave requests and the “Work from Home” policy for Thursday,
12/29/22 in light of the significant personal circumstances some of our staff might be experiencing. This
intervention was viewed by staff as sensitive, supportive, and was very much appreciated. Thank you!
Lastly, please note that despite resumed county operations on 12/29/22 and the absence of a driving
ban, the Erie County Probation Department did issue directive to its staff based on the volume of residual
snow, to limit all “field” work which necessitated travel into the communities to only essential matters.
This directive was effective for both 12/29 and 12/30/22 and had no significant effect on department
operations.
It is my hope that the above noted information is beneficial to your objective and as always, please do
not hesitate to contact me should you need any additional information.
Pursuant to the County Executive’s e-mail of January 5, 2023, please accept this memo as the
“Blizzard After Action Report” for the Department of Real Property Tax Services (RPTS). The
format is two areas RPTS can improve upon and two areas RPTS should “sustain” or do more of:
I. Two Improves
1. Communication regarding closings. There was some confusion given the City of
Buffalo’s driving ban and whether the Rath Building was open (on the last day of the
driving ban). Guidance was first given that the Rath Bulding would be open, but
then the City announced the ban was still in effect. Communicated with Personnel
Commission Brian Bray along with the TV news link provided to my by RPTS staff
regarding the City and we held tight until we could hear more.
2. Tax bills and sewers. We needed the sign-offs from Sewers regarding the sewer tax
bill amounts. Sewers could not access the sign off forms / information remotely, so
RPTS’s Tax Prep & Admin section continued processing as much as they could from
home until Sewers could provide the signed-off upon information.
I. NUTRITION
• PREP:
o Congregate dining closed for Friday, 12/23 (announced on Thursday, 12/22); Monday
was the pre-scheduled holiday.
o Home-Delivered Meal clients (Meals on Wheels) received “Blizzard Boxes” of shelf-
stable meals to cover Friday – Monday.
• DURING:
o Kept in regular contact with FeedMore, KenTon, and Amherst beginning on Sunday
for a planned Tuesday reopening.
o Initial issues with FeedMore once again needing to be plowed out (like November
Storm), and then volunteer / driver delays and inability to traverse Buffalo roads.
o Only KenTon (Town of Tonawanda) was able to open for congregate as scheduled on
Tuesday. KenTon also completed normal Home-Delivered Meals.
o FeedMore and Amherst closed congregate sites for Tuesday, but called clients and
utilized Amherst and Red Cross services to get to clients in dire need.
• PREP:
o Worked with clients to get their dialysis appointments rescheduled for Friday,
12/23/2022. Two clients insisted that they had to go to dialysis on that day, so we left
them as scheduled with our third-party transportation vendor.
I worked with Jason and Jonathan Shaw on potential driving of these clients,
in case our third party vendor was unable to assist. EOC could not commit
to transporting them, but was aware.
o Deemed our transportation team non-essential because we had rescheduled rides, so as
to have no onsite workers for Friday, 12/23/2022.
• DURING:
o I made personal follow up calls to both still scheduled clients on Friday, 12/23: both
rescheduled their dialysis for Saturday.
o Dialysis transport, especially for our City providers and transportation providers
whose shelters had been used as warming sites (ie. Cheektowaga), was still uncertain
for Tuesday, 12/27 and Wednesday, 12/28 – it was nearly normal by Thursday.
o Other transportation rides resumed by Thursday, 12/29.
o Able to coordinate with EMS / Darien to get Senior Services wheelchair-capable van
for dialysis transport from EOC.
• PREP:
o Pre-emptively called all vulnerable clients to evaluate their preparedness.
o Worked with EMS to get an extra oxygen tank to one client concerned they would run
out during the storm; also with vendors to get food boxes out as needed.
• DURING:
o On Friday, 12/23, our team completed calls that were not connected on Thursday and
our phone line remained operational.
o On Tuesday, 12/26 – Wednesday, 12/27, I created a Google Form and had entire staff
perform well-checks for all City of Buffalo based clients. We also returned low
priority SNOW line calls from older adults as well-checks.
• NSYOFA COORDINATION:
o I received an initial call from NYS on Saturday am, 12/24 saying that the Governor
wished for the State employees to perform well-checks on older adults. I pushed back