Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sycamore
Sycamore
PATRICK SCHOEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 23-1218 (TJK)
JAMIE SYCAMORE,
in his individual and official capacities,
Defendant.
The Parties have reached a full and final settlement of this matter, as reflected
that this Court approve the terms of the Agreement, incorporate the terms of the
Agreement into an order dismissing this case, and retain jurisdiction to enforce the
Agreement.
This Court has the authority, but not the obligation, to accept continuing
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), the Supreme Court explained that district
courts lack jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a private settlement that resolved a
federal case that had been dismissed without a specific request for the federal court
to retain jurisdiction to enforce it. Id. at 380. Thus, to achieve a settlement agreement
that is enforceable in federal court, parties must submit that agreement to the court
before the case is dismissed, and the court must incorporate the agreement into its
order of dismissal. Id. The Supreme Court held that district courts have the power to
Case 1:23-cv-01218-TJK Document 14 Filed 08/21/23 Page 2 of 5
do this. Id. (explaining that federal jurisdiction will lie to enforce a settlement
agreement where “the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement
agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order” (emphasis added));
Dismissal, 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2366 (4th ed. 2021) (“The Supreme Court has
held that a district court also may condition dismissal on the parties’ agreement to
the Court’s discretion, Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that approval of consent decrees is within sound discretion of district court),
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, courts consider whether the agreement is “fair
and reasonable.” Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1983). That, in turn, is driven by whether the agreement “‘spring[s] from
and serve[s] to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, . . .
comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings [,] . . . [and whether]
the relief embodied. . . conflicts with or violates the statute upon which the complaint
was based.” Sierra Club v. Browner, No. 93-125, 1994 WL 750290, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
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Case 1:23-cv-01218-TJK Document 14 Filed 08/21/23 Page 3 of 5
This case meets those criteria. The parties’ settlement agreement is fair and
not block any users from his @SycamoreANC Twitter account or from any other
account that he uses for official purposes, thus ensuring that he will not block users
from any account on which he conducts official business on the basis of the users’
protected speech. Three published circuit court opinions, and more than a dozen
district court opinions, have concluded that public officials violate the First
Amendment if they block users from an account used to discuss public business on
the basis of users’ protected speech. See, e.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated
as moot sub nom. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., No. 20-197,
2021 WL 1240931 (Apr. 5, 2021); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir.
2019); and compare Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2021); see also
Officials and Their Authority to Create Public Forums on Social Media, 69 DUKE L.J.
701, 705 n.24 (2019) (collecting district court cases). Although Commissioner
Sycamore does not acknowledge that his decision to block users from his account
violated the Constitution, the Agreement ensures that Commissioner Sycamore will
follow the Constitution as interpreted by other courts facing similar issues, and the
Agreement therefore (a) resolves a matter within the scope of this case, (b) embodies
relief consistent with the legal basis of the case, and (c) violates no other law. See
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Case 1:23-cv-01218-TJK Document 14 Filed 08/21/23 Page 4 of 5
In addition, this issue has already been litigated in this district against
another ANC member in Hecker v. Krepp, No. 21-CV-839 (2021). In that case, the
defendant settled the case by agreeing to terms substantively identical to the terms
in this Agreement. On motion from the parties, the court in Hecker used its discretion
Plaintiff’s counsel then learned that the defendant in Hecker violated the Agreement
counsel wrote that “a user with the handle @nevertweety, who identifies himself as
‘Jeff,’ posted a screenshot showing that you have blocked him from your official D.C.-
government account, @ANC6B10. I can’t see the messages that lead to the blocking,
but, according to Jeff, they were related to redistricting and by no means unprotected
by the First Amendment. You violated Jeff’s constitutional rights quite clearly.” But
because the court retained jurisdiction over enforcement of the agreement only
insofar as it applied to the plaintiff, the defendant was, as a practical matter, able to
identical agreement. In addition, Plaintiff has evidence that on May 2, 2023, the day
after the complaint in this case was filed, Defendant Commissioner Sycamore blocked
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(m), undersigned counsel discussed this matter
with counsel for Commissioner Sycamore and for the District of Columbia. Both
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Case 1:23-cv-01218-TJK Document 14 Filed 08/21/23 Page 5 of 5
Commissioner Sycamore and the District of Columbia stated they would not oppose
Plaintiff’s motion.
For Plaintiff:
CHARLES GERSTEIN
(D.C. Bar No. 1033346)
GERSTEIN HARROW, LLP
810 7th Ste NE, Ste. 301,
No. 317
Washington, DC 20002
[email protected]
202-670-4809
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