Manotok IV V Barque
Manotok IV V Barque
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J : p
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168
D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division
LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots
situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question.
Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief
Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly
supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-
23-96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty.
Bustos . . . confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter
dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence
and authenticity of said plan. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office
has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified
copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating
therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of
Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79,
Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said
computer print-out is duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . .
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The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does
from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The
documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply
brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions
made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . . .
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently
reconstituted, the LRA noted that only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could
cancel the Manotok title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled, 11 that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be
given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of
Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by
the Barques with a prayer that the reconstitution be ordered immediately.
The LRA denied 12 the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration and the
Barques' prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review 13 was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review 14 was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be
directed to immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected
to the condition that the Manotok title should first be cancelled by a court of
competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks argued in their own
petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok title was spurious
and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion
for leave to intervene. 15 She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject
property. CTacSE
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the
intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these
petitions are attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for
example, the Court en banc's move on the Special First Division's referral for
re-evaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been
made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court
en banc was to proceed with the re-evaluation of these cases on a pro hac
vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner
in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by
the First Division and the Special First Division warranted either affirmation
or modification by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc". It has been argued
that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of
the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the
Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with
lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of
the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative
reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied
by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which
implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court
before had sanctioned the recall entries of judgment. 36 The power to
suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final. 37 The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these
cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the
Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the
field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en
banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been
reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as
well as the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same
Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As earlier stated, we
have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed
jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
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In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before
the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel
the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title.
The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was
spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial
proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals
initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately, upon motion for
reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the
reconstitution of the Barque title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the
cancellation of Torrens titles in the Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals
notably directed the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated
the reconstitution of the Barque title. The obvious question is whether the
Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok
title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks.
It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack [. . . and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law". 38 Clearly, the
cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the
administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the
evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could
it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's
administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over
ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by
law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil
actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court.
39 Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the
power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis
in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which
authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact,
as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for
administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had
jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether
the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the
administrative reconstitution of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
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administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of
titles have been lost due to "flood, fire and other force majeure". The
petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit, containing the
following averments: AEIHaS
Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
further provides:
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or
destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name
of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title
has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should
bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court,
which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the
reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the
memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such
judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That
if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of
any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an
order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the
procedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new
liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title,
after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new
certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as
may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof. 42
Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud,
deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party
obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other
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machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to
criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a
period of not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a
fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in
securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled
thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be
liable for imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or
payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One
hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. 43
These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative
reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or
especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in
favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant
with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for
confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a
previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may
be reissued to its owner. 44
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development
Corporation v. Valenzuela, 45 which we held that "[t]he courts simply have
no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners". 46 That
such doctrine was established for cases of judicial reconstitution does not
bar its application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None of the
provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or
6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a
petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a
Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous
title or to diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued
title is obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be
countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the
courts, and not with the LRA.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it
appears from the official records that the subject property is already covered
by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing
further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such
petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such
appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a previously existing title
covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that
point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over
the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the
cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by
the OSG on behalf of the Republic. cSTDIC
III
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The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company
Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 47 where in the course of reviewing an action
for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the
reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit
the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been
improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal
infirmities" of Molina's cause of action, the Court itself nullified the
reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the
Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques'
petition.
The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary
because in that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of
appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order
for reconstitution of Molina's titles. Had these notices of appeal been
allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial court's
decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution which was the
annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these
alternative results — the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to
act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of
Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process
and the Court itself by directly annulling Molina's titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of
the Manotok title with that undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike
in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate
jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA
had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief,
even while reviewing the LRA's ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as
a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional defects
that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have
effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.
IV
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of
Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its
cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had been initiated
before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a
necessary consequence following our earlier explanation of why the mere
existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into
the validity of that title. ASIDTa
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of
Appeals to have ruled definitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to
title. After all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the
cancellation of the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim was
valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to effectively review and
reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this Court to test the
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premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had
concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available
record before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in
that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert
title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT
No. 13900. 48 The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from
a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have
been registered under the name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No.
13900 was registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. 49 This
detracts from the Barques' claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the
property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title registered
under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the
anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-
3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears
that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the
government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between the
LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP
listing, 50 nor did the LMB have a record of the plan. 51 However, a microfilm
copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital
Region (DENR-NCR). 52 The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical
Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having
emanated from its office. 53
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the
copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the
copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National
Capital Region Lands Management Sector. 54 The LMB, however, denied
issuing such letter and stated that it was a forged document. 55 To amplify
the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to
prove that it did not come from its office. 56 In a letter to the administrator of
the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that "it is evident that there is an
attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents,
hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for
investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this
office under your administration". 57 IEaCDH
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title
by clear and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is
essential for both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become
private property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners
have not succeeded to prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.
Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
legally belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due
process of law insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a
Friar Land and both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the
patrimonial property of the State or that it had become private property. 73
The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case,
the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands
Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that
law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its
proper transmission to private hands, if at all.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any
sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All
that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and
convincing proof that the Manotoks' claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an
ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This
Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive
and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently
able to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for
reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken
before — in Republic v. Court of Appeals 74 and more recently in our 2007
Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals. 75 Our following explanation in
Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for
certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate
the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an
appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need not be the body that
rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact.
Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this
Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending
before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court
commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and
receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual
area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the
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Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or 'areas reserved for
certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and
the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals
therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's
Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant
procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant
of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case.
Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct
a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the
pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying
a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively
to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule
upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to
submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the
order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the
final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.
76
The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in
receiving and evaluating evidence should be whether the Manotoks can
trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No.
823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this
Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is
warranted, similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in Alonso.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims to title by
other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they
may submit on their behalf, may have an impact on the correct
determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus be prudent, in
assuring the accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along
with the OSG, to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the proper claimant to the
subject property, the Court would take such fact into consideration as it
adjudicates final relief.
For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear
and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months
from notice of this Resolution.
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record,
the Office of the Solicitor General is directed to secure all the pertinent
relevant records from the Land Management Bureau and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions
dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET
ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The
Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12
March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the Resolutions of the Land
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Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin.
Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TcSICH
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals
is directed to raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., joins in the dissent of J. Santiago.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Corona, J., please see Separate Opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., also concurs with J. Carpio's Separate Opinion.
Azcuna, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Chico-Nazario, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Santiago in
addition to her dissenting opinion.
Nachura, J., related to one of the counsel. Took no part.
Reyes, J., joins the dissent of J. Santiago.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the dissent of Justice Santiago.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., concurring:
The Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by
Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution
of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon
City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted
the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax
Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and
Chief of the Reconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote
a letter dated 29 October 1996, 1 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire
(Engineer Dalire), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty. Bustos requested Engineer
Dalire to furnish him with a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-
3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the
Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region
(LMS-DENR-NCR). 2
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In his reply dated 7 November 1996, 3 Engineer Dalire informed Atty.
Bustos that the Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a
letter dated 28 November 1996, 4 Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive),
Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos
that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and
Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm
copy of Fls-3168-D conflicted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office
has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2
December 1996 5 to Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter
dated 5 December 1996, 6 Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical
Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engineer
Dalire wrote:
In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the
Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the
certified reproduction plan FLS-3168-D (microfilm) issued by the Chief, Technical
Records & Statistical Section on September 23, 1996 and our letter dated
November 7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic),
please forward to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the
Chief of Technical Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he issued to
LRA for our evaluation. In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us
by LRA) from the copy of that office issued to LRA, the said copy on file
in your office did not emanate from this Office. The stamp, particularly,
bearing the name of this office and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not
the same stamp we are using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.
A letter dated 2 January 1997, 7 purportedly from Engineer Dalire,
addressed to the LRA Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the
LRA General Records Section on 7 January 1997. The letter states: TcDAHS
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Sir:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J. G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
Engineer Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 9 to the LRA
Administrator. The letter states:
31 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative
Reconstitution of the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr.,
Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested
us to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of
plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does not have a record of the same. In
that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
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1. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by
the TRSS, NCR;
2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
The Administrator
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received
today, please be informed that as per the inventory of approved
surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the
microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions,
that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among
the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our
file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital
Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November
1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox
copy attached to your letter, this letter definitely did not come
from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that
the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical
Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until
now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in
compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996
and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06
February 1997 (copies attached).
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With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy
attached to your letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed findings
tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been discussed in our
letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR
for investigation and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order
No. 40, s. 1991. HCISED
19 February 1997
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Bustos:
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the
certification and another for the signing official. We use
one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words
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of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this
spurious plan;
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D
and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious
documents.
The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-
22481 [372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis.
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Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in question indeed consists of two [2]
lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same is being buttressed and corroborated by
the certified copy of the tax map over the property in question issued by the
Quezon City Assessor's Office [annex "H" of Petitioners Position Paper]. Said tax
map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in
question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot
823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the
date of original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] would have Lot 822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as
boundaries when at the time of the original survey, there were no such Psd's yet.
Examination of the technical description and boundaries appearing in TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform
to the certified technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate [property in question] which are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form
No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners'
Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor Tuazon
Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all
adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per
certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners' Position Paper].
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the
boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated
whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate. 17
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted
after a court of competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of the LRA
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be
given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of
the Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14
June 2001, 19 the LRA denied the motion.
The Manotoks filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66642 before the Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution
and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 praying for the modification of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June
2001 Order of the LRA. The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution
of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302)
by a court of competent jurisdiction. aHTcDA
The Manotoks came to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 162335.
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 25 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Barques' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of
24 June 1998. The Barques moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, 26 the
Court of Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby
directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is
hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing
Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 27
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court
overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this Court, such as the decision
i n Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon. 31
Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because
of the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can
only be cancelled if a direct proceeding assailing its validity is filed before
the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques submitted patently
forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their title, and
even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four
"firsts". First, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an
administrative reconstitution of title resulted in the cancellation of the
Torrens title of another person without a direct attack of the cancelled title
in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence
authorizing the LRA to reconstitute administratively a Torrens title despite
the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the same property in
the name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine
jurisprudence where the issue of ownership of land is decided with finality in
a petition for administrative reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first
decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the petitioner in an administrative
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petition praying for a simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected
and undeserved windfall — the declaration of validity of his reconstituted
title and the cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name of
another person over the same property.
LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines firmly
established in numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division,
many of them landmark rulings. To name a few of these decisions starting
in the year 1915: Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 32 Magay, etc. v.
Estiandan, 33 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 34 Alabang Development
Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al., 35 MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et
al., 36 Liwag v. Court of Appeals, 37 Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
38 Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 39 Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership
v. Ve lasco, 40 Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 41 and Alonso v. Cebu
Country Club, Inc. 42
The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First
Division has overturned are:
Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section
Researched by:
(Sgd)
TEODORO A. DE CASTRO
. . . How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in
their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is
mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the
subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January
1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). . . . . 74 (Emphasis
supplied)
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certified
by Engineer Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared from a tracing
cloth plan on file in the NCR" for validation. We returned the white print
plan prepared by Engineer Pangyarihan because we should examine
the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the tracing cloth plan, white prints and
photographic copies sent by the Central Records Division to be
returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated 27 November 1992, Engineer Pangyarihan explained
that he prepared the copy which he certified from a white print plan on
file in the region as the applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth.
While the explanation may be considered, yet the preparation of the
plan is not yet in accordance with Sections 1.3 and 4.3 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 49, s-1991 which requires that the
white prints or photographic print of the plan other than the
original plan which have been decentralized must first be
authenticated by this Bureau before a certified true copy is
issued by the region. It is evident therefore that the issuance
of a certified true copy of Psu-201 from a white print is
premature, and considered void ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print
copy is subjected to field ocular inspection of the land and on the basis
of the findings, the region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as
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usual. Certified copies may now be issued based on the reconstructed
and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201 should therefore be
subjected to ocular inspection.
Clearly, in the present cases the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D
issued by the NCR Regional Office is likewise void unless validated by the
Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No.
49, series of 1991, as amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92. Up
to this time, the Barques have failed to submit a copy of their plan
Fls-3168-D as certified by the Geodetic Surveys Division. The
inescapable conclusion is that the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D is void
ab initio.
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted
to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D, certified by the NCR Regional
Office, to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques
had earlier submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (microfilm) duly certified by
Carmelito A. Soriano for the Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR,
Annex "H" hereof. This microfilm copy is exactly the same as the
Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.
First, there does not appear in Annex "H" a signature over the printed
name Carmelito A. Soriano, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National
Office.
Second, Annex "H" is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys
Division, Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as required
by Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
T h i r d , Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that
purportedly originated from the office of Engineer Privadi Dalire,
Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management
Bureau. Annex "H" is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for
the Barques showed to the Court during the oral argument. Engineer
Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy of Fls-3168-D as
"spurious" in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus: HETDAC
The Barques have the temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan
Fls-3168-D which has been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by
Engineer Dalire, the very person whom the Barques claim certified
their copy of Fls-3168-D. Engineer Dalire is the best person to determine
the authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because he allegedly signed it as
claimed by the Barques, but also because he is the Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, the office
that has the "inventory of approved plans . . . (and) Microfilm Computer list
of plans available for decentralization". aESIDH
The LRA reconstituting officer ended his Comment by urging the LRA
Administrator that "this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Commission for investigation".
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques explained
the circumstances of the order of reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in
this manner:
The said resolution was issued on January 27, 1997 when there
was, as yet, no opposition from anyone to the Barques' petition for
reconstitution and after the Barque had already submitted their
Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 210177 which entitled them, like
the several other petitioners listed in Mr. Bustos' aforesaid Resolution,
to a reconstitution thereof under R.A. 6732.
In his letter, Atty. Turgano surmised that:
"The animosity and bias of Mr. Bustos against petitioners
may be explained by the fact that he was responsible in giving
due course and approving with dispatch the administrative
reconstitution of the Manotok title which is TCT No. RT-22481
(372302).
Mr. Bustos' bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of the
Barques' Petition for Reconstitution which prompted them to file their opposition
to the Barques' petition on April 14, 1997. He, therefore, apparently had the
motive to delete the title and name of the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the LRA
proceedings since it is his Order denying Barques' petition for reconstitution that
was raised on appeal before the LRA Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177 in
the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. as one of the titles approved for
reconstitution by Atty. Bustos, is authentic, genuine and untampered. This is
contrary to the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos that the copy of
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) submitted by the Barques is a
"tampered document", and that the original Administrative
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Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself signed,
which original is on file in his office in the LRA, does not include TCT
No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing)
the title and name of the Barques from the resolution". The Barques
are now accusing Atty. Bustos of falsification by deleting the Barques' name
and title in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such
deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96)
included the Barques' name and title, which is the copy that the Barques
submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to
include the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-
535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27 January 1997, he was
still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery found in the Barques’
plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31
January 1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos even wrote the LRA
Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us (LRA) into favorable action
by submitting forged documents". Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have
included the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-
535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the
lame excuse that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now
"completely irrelevant" because what was raised on appeal to the LRA was
the order of Atty. Bustos denying the Barques' petition for reconstitution. If
their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly
authentic and untampered, the Barques should insist that their petition for
administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by the reconstituting
officer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not claim or even mention this now,
instead they agree that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their
claim that Atty. Bustos granted their petition by including the Barques' title
and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered
or forged documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render the
Barques' reconstituted title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No.
6732 (RA 6732), 87 the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles,
provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud,
deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party
obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court would never countenance these blatant and glaring forgeries. The
present cases involve 34 hectares of prime land located beside the Ayala
Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Its value is estimated
conservatively at P1.7 billion. CIcTAE
Fifth: The Barques’ Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
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The Barques filed their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22
October 1996, eight years after the original of their Torrens title was
allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed the records of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. In contrast, the Manotoks administratively
reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February 1991, three years after the
fire and just one year after the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732
allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles under certain
circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax
Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in
the tax declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer:
"Memo: This property appear (sic) to duplicate the property of
Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under TD No. B-067-02136 with area
of 343,945 sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202." 88 In their Petition For Review dated
30 March 2004, the Manotoks submitted certified true copies of the Barques'
Tax Declarations 06892 89 and 06895 90 containing this notation. In their
Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted copies of
the Barques' tax declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure
of the notation on the Barques' tax declarations. However, counsel for the
Barques admitted that he has not seen the original tax declarations on file
with the Assessor's Office, thus:
Justice Carpio:
. . . The Manotoks are claiming that the Barques erased, removed
annotation in the tax declaration of the Barques that in the tax
declaration on file with the Assessor's Office the tax declaration
of the Barques is supposed to contain annotation that this
property appears to be registered in the name of Manotok Realty
Inc., is that correct?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Atty. Flaminiano:
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen the
pictures of the various houses, buildings and concrete perimeter fence that
the Manotoks constructed on the property since 1960.
Ninth: LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In calling the Manotoks' title "sham and spurious", the LRA
Administrator cited the non-existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The
LRA Administrator stated: "The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of
Petitioners' Position paper] would show that there is no such barrio
as Payong". 95 This is a finding of fact that is based not only on self-serving
and suspect evidence, but also on a patently erroneous claim.
The LRA Administrator relied on Annex "N" of "Petitioners", that is,
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the map of the Barques who were the petitioners before the LRA
Administrator assailing the LRA reconstituting officer's denial of their
reconstitution on the ground of pre-existence of the Manotoks' title and the
submission of a spurious document by the Barques. Obviously, this Court
should not rely on the LRA Administrator's findings which were admittedly
based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted forged
documents to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been
judicially acknowledged almost three decades ago in the Decision of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et
al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya, 96 involving the same property under
dispute in these cases. In Spouses Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations
made an ocular inspection of Barrio Payong in Quezon City, thus: CADacT
On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk
of Court to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question,
which is as follows:
"Conformably with 'Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection'
filed with this Court on even date and as stated in paragraph 2
thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to conduct an
ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at
Payong, Quezon City, which as agreed upon between them is
set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock A.M. (sic), wherein the
parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to
determine:
(a) Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the
plaintiff and/or his children;
(b) Portions of the property where the rice paddies are
located;
(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and
vegetables;
(d) Portions of the property where the houses of the
plaintiff and/or his children are built and located;
The one who bought the property was the father of Barques now.
Justice Velasco:
Would you know if the father of respondent visit and inspect and
investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I was told that he visited the property because the father of the
Barques used to work for Mr. Antonio Florendo. I think he was the
manager of one of the businesses of Mr. Florendo in Davao City
having to do with accessory parts of cars and trucks and he was
at one time also the operator of a public transportation company.
Justice Velasco:
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Okay. Did the father of Mr. Barque find any building or structures
on the land now subject of this dispute?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Atty. Flaminiano:
The reason why they could not take really possession of the
property because they were trying to get some papers from an
Aunt of Mr. Barque to whom the property was mortgaged before
he died. I understand that the property was mortgaged for
something like One Million to Two Million Pesos.
Justice Carpio:
So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of
the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Justice Carpio:
Went around the property (interrupted)
Atty. Flaminiano:
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after
that they left for the United States and for one reason or another
they have not been able to take the proper steps (interrupted)
Justice Carpio:
Clearly, the Barques have never set foot on the property from 1975 up
to the present. The Barques merely "went around" the fully fenced
property. The Barques never sent a demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate
the property. The Barques never filed an ejectment or any action to recover
possession of the property.
Eleventh: The Barques' Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace their Torrens title to the purchase by
their predecessors-in-interest of the property from the Government
in 1919. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks state:
9.5 The Manotok chain of titles began with the purchase by
Zacarias Modesto, Regina Geronimo and Feliciano Villanueva of Lot
823 from the Philippine government on March 10, 1919. Attached
hereto as Annex E is a Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copy
of Sale Certificate No. 1054 issued by the Friar Lands Division, Bureau
of Lands, to Modesto, Geronimo and Villanueva. Ownership over Lot
823 was later consolidated in Modesto, who in 1920 assigned his
interests thereon to M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok. Attached
hereto as Annexes F and G are Land Management Bureau-certified
xerox copies of Assignments of Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated
March 11, 1919 and June 7, 1920.
9.8 Fire gutted the Quezon City ROD on June 11, 1988, and
shortly thereafter (i.e., on August 31, 1988) the Manotoks filed
reconstitution proceedings before the LRA, and were issued a
reconstituted certificate of title, TCT No. RT-22841 (372302), by the
ROD of Quezon city in 1991. A xerox copy of the petition for
reconstitution filed by the Manotoks with the ROD, with attachments, is
attached hereto as Annex J, while a certified true copy of TCT No.
372302 (the title sought to be reconstituted in this petition) is attached
hereto as Annex J-1.
On the other hand, the Barques can trace their chain of title only up to
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1975 when Homer Barque, Sr. purchased the property from Emiliano
Setosta, who the Barques claim bought the property directly from the
Government in the 1940s. The Barques have not presented the deed of
conveyance by the Government to Setosta. The claim of the Barques
that Setosta purchased the property directly from the Government in the
1940s is belied by the 1927 Annual Report of the Director of Lands, stating
that:
With the exception of the estates of Calamba, Imus, Isabela,
Lolomboy, Naic, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon,
Santa Maria de Pandi, and Talisay-Minglanilla, where there are still
some vacant lands, all the others of the 23 Friar land estates had
already been entirely disposed of. . . . 100 (Emphasis supplied)
At the end of 1927, the Government had already sold all of the Piedad
Estate, a Friar land. Thus, the Government could not have sold directly to
Setosta the disputed property in the 1940s.
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey Shows Barques'
Property Located 5.6 Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have
submitted a relocation survey made by the Lands Management Bureau
NCR Regional Office of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D showing that the
Barques' property is located "some 5.6 kilometers away from Lot No.
823 of the Piedad Estate, outside of Quezon City". 101 The relocation
survey plan is signed by Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the Technical Services
Division, and Engineer III Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum dated 22
August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex "M" a copy of the Lands
Management Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D. SHaIDE
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even
judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership
over a property. 105 Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of
title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more.
If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as
when the land covered is part of the public forest, 106 the reconstituted title
does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands v. Gan Tan:
107
The LRA never had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of
the Manotoks. Jurisdiction, as ruled in People v. Casiano, "must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties
or by estoppel". It is axiomatic that only the law can confer jurisdiction. No
amount of estoppel can vest jurisdiction on an officer or court that the law
has not conferred jurisdiction.
The LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper
Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the
Manotoks. Only the Barques insist that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel a
Torrens title of a third party in an administrative reconstitution proceedings
filed by another party, a contention that is patently baseless. SaIHDA
Hence, no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the
law has expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the
Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also
allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or
before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property
Registration D e c r e e expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on
Torrens titles.
This rule has special application to Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree, enacted specifically to foreclose any possible
collateral attack on a Torrens title, as well as any possible
cancellation or modification of a Torrens title without a proceeding
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in the Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the title.
Strict compliance with Section 48 is what gives Torrens titles enduring
stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land ownership. To extend equity
jurisdiction to LRA officers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks on a
Torrens title is a gross and blatant violation of the clear and express
command of a positive law. Any extension of equity jurisdiction that
operates to negate Section 48 will destroy the most basic safeguard in the
Property Registration Decree. Certainly, equity jurisdiction cannot be used
for this purpose.
WHETHER ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR NOT, A TORRENS
TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48
OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE
In cancelling the Manotoks' Torrens title without any trial before any
court, the First Division of this Court completely disregarded Section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act. Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a Torrens title "cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law".
That law is Section 19 of the Judiciary Act which states that the
"Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . .
. in all civil actions, which involve the title to . . . real property".
These two provisions mandate that no Torrens title can be cancelled unless
there is a proceeding in the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the
validity of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it
ordered the cancellation of the Torrens title of the Manotoks without a prior
proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the
validity of the Manotoks' title. Likewise, the First Division of this Court
committed the same violation — totally disregarding Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act, and in the
process overturning well-entrenched doctrines of this Court.
The validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not,
can be assailed only in a direct proceeding before the proper Regional Trial
Court in accordance with Section 48. In Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, 124 the
Court declared:
What is worse, in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 383675, respondent Court of Appeals acted without
jurisdiction. After all, it is hornbook law that a torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title,
whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an
action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and
cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, that a certificate of title can
never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in
accordance with law. . . . 125 (Emphasis supplied)
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The LRA Administrator has admitted that the Torrens title of the
Manotoks "is thus presumed valid". 126 The law recognizes that the
Manotoks' Torrens title is "evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein". 127 Even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the prior title of the Manotoks is spurious, still
under Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, 128 such title can only cancelled by the
proper Regional Trial Court in a direct proceeding assailing its validity.
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. 129 as authority that the Court of Appeals and this Court "have
jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not
originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title" under
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. The ponente has obviously
misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon Realty was a petition filed with the Court of
Appeals for annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost
owner's duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David. Rexlon Realty proved
that the titles were not lost but were in its possession as the first buyer of
the properties from Alex David who had later sold again the properties to
Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon Realty also proved that Alex
David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the sale. ECTSDa
Rexlon Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same
property, which is the situation in the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the
opposing parties agreed that there was only one set of titles covering the
same properties. The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were
lost, and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of
the titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court had no
jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David,
which covered properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David.
Rexlon Realty's obvious interest was to maintain the validity of the
titles to the properties it had purchased, the titles to which were in
Rexlon Realty's possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree, the law requiring a direct proceeding
in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the validity of a
Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at
issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and
distinct issue from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in
issuing replacement titles to the properties in the name of Alex David who
claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial court's judgment,
Rexlon Realty invoked, as stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure", which provides "the grounds to annul
a judgment of a lower court . . . [based on] fraud and lack of jurisdiction".
Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
. . . In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,
also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if
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an owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be
attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness
of the owner's duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the
possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its
favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual
loss of the said owner's duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in
replacement thereof are void.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case at bar, we simply annulled the decision of the RTC,
acting as a land registration court in L.R.C. Record No. 8843, to issue
new owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for
lack of jurisdiction. The dispute between petitioner Rexlon and
respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of land
will have to be threshed out or determined in a more
appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one
allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court,
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual
ownership of the land covered by the lost owner’s duplicate
copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owner’s
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily
equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The
certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is
merely an evidence of title over a particular property. 130
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has reiterated the doctrine in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,
now embodied in Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, in
innumerable decisions. In the 2003 case of Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of
Santiago, 134 a decision penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
this Court declared: DcCITS
The Decision of the First Division cancels a Torrens title without any
proceeding in a trial court directly attacking the title as required by law.
What this Court warned against in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby is now
before us — a situation where "all security in registered titles [is] lost".
Every landowner holding a Torrens title will now have to camp in the
corridors of the courts, or constantly watch in the balcony of his house, just
to avoid losing his titled land. The Decision of the First Division, by
destroying the stability of land titles, will usher in an era of land disputes,
which before the advent of the Torrens system were often violent and
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bloody.
The Decision of the First Division denies to the Manotoks a basic
guarantee under the Constitution — that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. 136 The Decision deprives the Manotoks
of their P1.7 billion property without any trial in any court contrary to the
clear and express mandate of Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree. This Court should never allow such blatant, gross and
shocking violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
A FINAL WORD ON RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
This Court has often warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles,
which have resulted in innocent landowners losing their titled lands to crime
syndicates specializing in forged titles and documents. The patently forged
documents presented in these cases remind us of what this Court stated in
Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay: 137
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with
extreme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land
under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has many
times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the
title to his property. Through fraudulent reconstitution
proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that his
certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a
reconstituted title in someone else's name. 138 (Emphasis
supplied)
CORONA, J : p
Title is the "union of all the elements (as ownership, possession and
custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property". 15 It
is the "legal link between a person who owns property and the property
itself". 16
Though employed in various ways, title is generally used to describe
either the manner in which a right to real property is acquired, or the
right itself. In the first sense, it refers to the conditions necessary to
acquire a valid claim to land; in the second, it refers to the legal
consequences of such conditions. These two senses are not only
interrelated, but inseparable: given the requisite conditions, the legal
consequences or rights follow as of course; given the rights, conditions
necessary for the creation of those rights must have been satisfied.
Thus, when the word 'title' is used in one sense, the other sense is
necessarily implied. 17
Since any declaration of fraud or deceit on the part of one party will
expose that party to criminal prosecution, this Court should refrain from
making any such declaration until and unless the complicated and
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contentious maze of factual matters is clearly resolved. While these matters
have been brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
Nos. 66642 and 66700, the Court of Appeals at that time was not able to
exhaustively evaluate and analyze them.
The controversial factual matters were, however, brought to light
extensively and in great detail during the oral arguments of these cases as
well as in the respective memoranda submitted by the parties and by Office
of the Solicitor General after the oral arguments.
To reiterate, what is crucial and critical in these cases is the complete
determination of contentious factual issues.
However, the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the
province of this Court as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to
appreciate evidence at the first instance. 23 On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals has the competence to perform that task. Indeed, we stated in
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation: 24
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases
for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual
issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of
its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate
need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision. DcCIAa
There are indeed many factual questions looming over the respective
certificates of title of the contending parties. These can only be threshed out
in a remand to the Court of Appeals. Hence, I respectfully submit that the
proper and prudent course now is for the Court to constitute a special
division of the Court of Appeals to be composed of three associate justices to
be designated by us for the purpose of hearing these cases on remand. The
special division will hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings
and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three months from finality of the Court’s resolution in this
case.
Accordingly, I vote that these cases be REMANDED to a special division
of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
The computer print-outs show that Plan Fls-3168-D is the second plan
in said list, followed by Fls-3169-D of Chua, then Fls-3170-D of Loyola.
Said official list is a credible piece of evidence proving the existence of
Stetson's Plan Fls-3168-D.
Respondents also furnished the Court photo copies of Plan Fls-3168-D
issued by the Land Management Bureau-National Capital Region (LMB-NCR)
and certified by different officials:
1. A photo copy of Plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued on September
23, 1996 and duly certified by Carmelito A. Soriano for Ernesto S.
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Erive, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR. 11
In his letter dated January 31, 1997, Dalire alleged that plan Fls-3168-D
was not included in the inventory of approved plans enrolled in their file.
However, this allegation was belied upon presentation of a photocopy of the
tracing cloth plan of Fls-3168-D duly certified by Teofilo R. Laguardia, Chief
of the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the LMB-NCR.
Dalire next claimed that plan Fls-3168-D was not included in their
computer list of plans available for decentralization. However, this claim was
categorically debunked by the LRA, thus:
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997
that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is
belied by a certified copy of the computer print-out issued by
the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly
entered in the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and
has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on
Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and
Box Number 0400 . . . .
That's 1933. The 1940. 1941 is okay. What is the barrio there?
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Barrio Culiat.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, it started as Barrio Payong became Barrio Culiat later on it
became Matandang Balara the present name.
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Yes, Sir.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
I do not agree with the claim that Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals
23which mentioned the Agrarian Court's order to its clerk of court to conduct
an ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong,
Quezon City, constitutes credible evidence as to the location of the property.
There was no mention at all as to how the said court made the
determination of the location of the property. Moreover, there was nothing in
the Agrarian Court’s Order stating exactly where, in Quezon City, Barrio
Payong was located, which indicates that petitioners themselves may have
brought the inspecting parties to the property they were occupying.
Similarly, the Court in the case of People v. Siguin, 24 did not make a
finding as to the existence and location of Sitio Payong but merely referred
to the Information filed which alleged that the crime was committed in Sitio
Payong, Matandang Balara. SaTAED
Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of
petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of
the LRA that petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab initio.
Having also affirmed the LRA finding that respondents' title, TCT No. 210177,
is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority
to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative
reconstitution process.
It must be noted that Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
(or The Property Registration Decree) does not expressly provide for the
specific court that can order the cancellation of a certificate of title. On the
other hand, Section 108 thereof clearly provides that only the Court of First
Instance (now RTC) can order an erasure, alteration or amendment in a
certificate of title. AECcTS
The claim that the LRA has no authority to pass upon the genuineness
of a certificate of title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding is an
absurdity. Will the LRA just accept any title and order its reconstitution
although it is facially void? Such an absurd interpretation would necessarily
result in the reconstitution of a patently fake and spurious title and the
consequent proliferation of fake titles, a situation that the legislature could
not have contemplated when it enacted R.A. No. 6732 authorizing the
administrative reconstitution of titles.
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It is, therefore, misleading and baseless for petitioners to assert that
their previously reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covers the
same property as that identified and described in respondents' TCT No.
210177 so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for
reconstitution.
However, even assuming that both petitioners' and respondents' titles
cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over
respondents' petition for reconstitution.
As petitioners themselves admit, they caused the administrative
reconstitution of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the
other hand, respondents' TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on
September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence
was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24, 1998 based
on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost
during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988.
Respondents' TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time
petitioners filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of
Appeals, 36 the Court ruled that:
[I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early
as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted
original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO
12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners'
parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally
doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void.
Since the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as
well as petitioners' opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title
of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for
reconstitution should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the
petitioners. Thus:
[W]hen an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-
judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject
matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be
included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency
or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. 43
Again, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court should have had a
first chance at resolving the issue of validity of the title, nonetheless, under
the circumstances, this Court, upon elevation of the issue before it, had the
unquestionable jurisdiction to declare petitioners' reconstituted title void and
order its cancellation, under the same rationale relied upon by this Court in
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. dela Rosa: 46
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional
Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous
pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence
presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right
at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent
for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will
be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to
have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from
there to this Court . . . .
In short, since petitioners themselves laid before the LRA and the Court
of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted
title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had
the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.
In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 48 the Court ruled, thus:
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition
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for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting
the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, that they were
given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and
evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient
and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the
adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding. It being a valid
judgment, res judicata applies.
Indeed, petitioners are barred from thereafter impugning the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule on these issues. In the leading
case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 49 it was stressed that:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the
same jurisdiction . . . .
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the
power of the court. . . . [I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
Considering all the foregoing and the fact that these cases do not
involve an issue of transcendental importance, such as life, liberty or the
security of the state, no compelling reason exists to depart from this well-
settled doctrine, nor to ignore the fundamental public policy behind it.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that these cases be referred back to the Court's
Special First Division for final disposition in accordance with its Decision of
December 12, 2005.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., dissenting:
This is to express my dissent in the majority opinion which set aside
the final and executory Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First
Division of this Court, recalled the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May
2006 in the present cases, and remanded the same to the Court of Appeals
for reception of further evidence.
I emphatically call attention to the fact that the Decision, dated 12
December 2005, the fallo of which reads —
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended
Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration
Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-210177 and the March
12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED[,] AIcECS
had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY. The two Motions for Reconsideration of
the petitioners were both denied in Resolutions dated 19 April 2006 and 19
June 2006. The Entry of Judgment was already made on 2 May 2006.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
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rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in
time. 1
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of
occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the
fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of
courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality. 2
Apparent from the foregoing are the two-fold purposes for the doctrine
of the immutability and inalterability of a final judgment: first, to avoid delay
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and, second, to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Obviously, the first purpose is in line with the dictum that justice
delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the court
properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a judicious
decision. The end should always be the meting out of justice. As to the
second purpose, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time. It must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better
serve the ends of justice and to place everything in proper perspective. In
the process, the possibility that errors may be committed in the rendition of
a decision cannot be discounted. 3
The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the
corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is
void. 4 Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by
a court without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion.
5 Petitioners assert, and the majority opinion effectively sustains, that the
From the said LRA Decision, the parties filed separate appeals with the
Court of Appeals.
Respondents' petition for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, which the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division of
the Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2003,
resolved as follows —
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of [herein petitioners] and
the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith [herein
respondents'] valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-
210177.
Petitioners' petition for review, on the other hand, was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642, disposed by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in
its Amended Decision, dated 24 February 2004, in the following manner —
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED
and a new one entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel [herein petitioners'] TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA
to reconstitute forthwith [herein respondents'] TCT No. T-210177. ICESTA
It was not the LRA which ordered the cancellation of petitioners' title
but the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals which separately decided CA-
G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. Petitioners contend, however,
that even the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of
their title. They maintain that their title can only be attacked in a direct
action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Decision, dated 12
December 2005, of the First Division of the Court already addressed the said
arguments, thus —
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to
the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious
and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals.
After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have
already declared that petitioners' title is forged. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is time that the Court finally put an end to the controversies between
petitioners and respondents in these cases, and thwart further attempts by
any party to still prolong the same. Unfortunately, the Resolution of the
majority opinion has the contrary effect. It not only protracts the litigation,
but also complicates the same by giving undue consideration to the
evidence and points raised by Felicitas and Resendo Manahan (Manahans) in
their much delayed petition-in-intervention.
When the Court en banc reopened the present cases, it expressly
delineated the four issues to be resolved and upon which the parties were to
be heard in the oral arguments. These issues were:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners'
TCT No. RT-22481 without a trial before the proper Regional Trial
Court in the proceeding directly assailing the validity of
petitioners' title?
2. Does the Land Registration Authority [LRA] have jurisdiction to
administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in
the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted
TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of
petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative
reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?
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4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide
the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative
reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
Even just a cursory reading of the foregoing issues would readily reveal
that these are mainly legal and jurisdictional issues. The parties, namely, the
petitioners and the respondents, have the right to rely on the adherence by
the Court en banc to the said issues in its determination of whether or not to
still subject the said parties to more litigation proceedings. For the Court en
banc to consider and rule upon issues which are outside of the four afore-
stated and on which the parties were heard during the oral arguments is a
denial of due process.
The matter of whether or not the factual issues in the instant cases
should again be relitigated cannot be anchored on the factual allegations of
the parties, moreso, when such allegations were made by the Manahans.
The Manahans were not even allowed to intervene in the oral arguments nor
submit issues for the oral arguments. Thus, the majority opinion palpably
erred in remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals for further reception of
evidence on the basis of the assertions of the Manahans, which contradict
the claims of both the petitioners and the respondents, the original parties in
the cases at bar. The courts are bound to look no further than the record and
cannot even consider contrary evidence to determine where the
preponderance thereof lies. 11 These cases must be resolved upon the
evidence submitted to the LRA, since a judicial review of executive decisions
does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the
executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws, and
are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support
in the evidence. 12 Further proceedings before the Court of Appeals following
the remand of the instant cases thereto, would undoubtedly be tantamount
to a new trial and investigation.
Wherefore, I vote to DENY all motions and prayers of the petitioners for
the setting aside of the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First
Division of this Court and the remand of the present cases to the Court of
Appeals for the reception of further evidence, in my firm belief that the said
Decision must stand and be honored for already being final and executory. I
also vote to GRANT the motions for execution and possession filed by the
respondents pursuant to the same Decision.
Footnotes
1. F. Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System: A Textbook on Land Titles, Deeds,
Liens, Descent and Mortgage at 120.
2. Id. at 121.
3. Id. at 125.
4. G.R. No. 162605, rollo, pp. 666-732. See also 477 SCRA 339.
5. Id. at
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6. Id. at 969-A.
7. See, e.g., Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107595, 2 February 1994, 229
SCRA 601; Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July
1994, 234 SCRA 455; In Re: Azucena Garcia, 393 Phil. 718 (2000); University
of the Philippines v. Rosario, 407 Phil. 924 (2001); Republic v. Holazo, G.R.
No. 146846, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 345; Cañero v. University of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 156380, 8 September 2004, 437 SCRA 630; Encinas v.
National Bookstore, G.R. No. 162704, 28 July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572;
Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 128122, 128184
& 128229, 18 March 2005, 485 SCRA 234; Subido v. Republic, G.R. No.
152149, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 178: Heirs of Nicolas v. Development Bank,
G.R. No. 137548, 3 September 2007, 532 SCRA 38.
8. Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 74.
9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. at 87.
11. Id. at 95.
12. Id. at 96.
13. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 2-23.
14. CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, rollo, p.7-45.
15. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, pp. 172-201.
16. Id. at 244-248.
17. Id. at 256-275.
18. Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Justices
Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Justice Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. dissented.
19. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 432. aEHTSc
59. Id.
60. Annex "G", Respondents' Memorandum.
61. Rollo, p. 210.
62. Id. at 949.
63. See id. at 1107.
64. Id. at 1075
65. Id. at 1077.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1320.
69. See id. at 1321-1322.
70. Id.
71. 426 Phil. 61 (2002).
72. See 462 Phil. 546 (2003) .
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 96-97. Penned by Administrator Senecio O.
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Ortile.
20. CA rollo, pp. 78-79.
Sir:
Re: Administrative Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City
We write in behalf of our clients, the Heirs of the late Homer L. Barque, Sr.,
the registered owner of the properties covered by TCT No. 210177.
We are constrained to bring to your immediate attention a pattern of effort to
delay the administrative reconstitution of the above title in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 6732 and LRA Circular No. 13 dated July 26, 1989
SR [sic] notwithstanding the recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, DENR, Manila,
to give due course to the said reconstitution.
We respectfully request that this matter be looked into in order to expedite
the long overdue reconstitution of the title to the said properties.
With our highest esteem.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN D. TURGANO
Counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Lot 9, Blk 11, Don Jose Avenue
Don Jose Heights, Fairview, Quezon City
82. Supra note 10.
83. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 143. The 14 February 1997 letter of the LRA
reconstituting officer states in full:
February 14, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
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In connection with the letter dated February 7, 1997, of Benjamin D. Turgano,
counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque, petitioners in the Administrative
Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, please be informed of the following:
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the
aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of
the submitted documents; EHCaDS
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of
Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document.
For your comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of
reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached
for your reference is a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together
with its enclosures, directly received by the undersigned from Engineer
Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, marked as
annex "B";
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171,
472 Sq. m., respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to
duplicate Lot 823, Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m.
covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok,
et al., copy of which is hereto attached as annex "C".
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into
favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended
that this case be referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges
against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
84. LRA Records, p. 204.
85. Id. at 357-360.
86. Id. at 253. The LRA reconstituting officer's Comment reads in full:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
QUEZON CITY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL
COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 210177 OF THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy
of Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)? (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Oppositor's Motion for Reconsideration be
given due course; the challenged Resolution be set aside; and the Order
dated June 30, 1997 be upheld.
It is further prayed that this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Commission for investigation.
Quezon City, Philippines, August 13, 1998.
(SGD.) BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS Reconstituting Officer & Chief, Reconstitution
Division
Enclosure:
Xerox Copy of tampered Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
87. An Act Allowing the Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of
Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and other Force
Majeure, Amending for the Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential
Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine and Section Five of Republic Act
Numbered Twenty-Six.
88. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 438.
89. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 213. Annex "BB", Manotoks' Petition for Review
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dated 30 March 2004.
90. Id. at 214. Annex "BB-1", Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March
2004.
91. TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 353-355.
92. Supra note 86.
93. Annex "M-21", Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
94. LRA Records, p. 412, Opposition dated 8 April 1997.
95. Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 99.
96. 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
103. Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 94. LRA Resolution dated 24 June 1998.
104. Supra note 35 at 744.
105. Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
106. Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680 (1987).
107. 89 Phil. 184 (1951).
108. Id. at 186-187.
109. Supra note 42.
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110. Id. at 565.
111. Catingub v. Court of Appeals, et al., 206 Phil. 83 (1983); Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 175 Phil. 476 (1978).
112. 216 Phil. 533 (1984).
113. Id. at 535.
114. The dissenting opinion cited Tijam v. Sibonghanay, et al., 131 Phil. 556
(1968).
115. Supra, note 94.
116. LRA Records, pp. 254-277.
117. Id. at 273.
118. 111 Phil. 73 (1961).
119. Id. at 93-94.
120. Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
121. Arsenal v. IAC, 227 Phil. 36 (1986).
122. Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January
1990, 181 SCRA 252.
123. Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991,
200 SCRA 178, 184 citing Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
124. 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).
CORONA, J.:
1. Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Renato C. Corona in Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 123346,
134385 and 148767, 14 December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
2. Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona, G.R. No. 141375, 30 April 2005, 402
SCRA 330.
3. Republic v. Estipular, 391 Phil. 211 (2000).
4. Presidential Decree.
5. Property Registration Decree.
6. SEC. 9. The Land Registration Authority Administrator may review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or Register
of Deeds. Any appeal shall be filed within fifteen days from the receipt of the
judgment or order by the aggrieved party.
7. Republic Act.
8. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official actions
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Midland Insurance
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71905, 13 August
1986, 143 SCRA 458.) A quasi-judicial adjudication would mean the
determination of rights, privileges, and duties resulting in a decision or order
which applies to a specific situation. (Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77372, 29 April 1988, 160 SCRA 180)
Under Section 9 of RA 6732, the power of the LRA Administrator to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or
Register of Deeds is quasi-judicial in nature. He is given the authority to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature to investigate facts and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for his official action. His adjudication is
quasi-judicial as it is a determination of the right of the applicant or petitioner
to have his certificate of title reconstituted as well as of the correlative duty
of the Registrar of Deeds to reconstitute the said certificate of title.
9. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980), as amended, it is the RTC which has sole jurisdiction to nullify
or declare as void a Torrens certificate of title.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property or any interest therein . . . (emphasis supplied)
10. In his separate opinion, Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing stated:
While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial Court
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would have been in order, remand of this case for trial at this late stage
would only be a time-consuming and pointless exercise. Prompt resolution of
this controversy is in order to avoid further delay. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Justice Azcuna noted the following in his separate
opinion:
. . . It is, therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go through the exercise of
proving this matter again in the regular courts, as would ordinarily be
required, since the point is indubitable.
I thus find applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership v. Veloso, as it would be unjust to require respondents to
undergo a time-consuming and pointless exercise to cancel an evidently
sham and spurious title. (emphasis supplied)
11. Urbano v. Chavez, G.R. No. 87977, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 347.
12. SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. EICSDT
29. See Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120138, September 5, 1997,
278 SCRA 793, 809.
30. AN ACT ALLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL COPIES
OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLES LOST OR DESTROYED DUE TO FIRE, FLOOD AND
OTHER FORCE MAJEURE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION ONE
HUNDRED TEN OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED FIFTEEN TWENTY-NINE
AND SECTION FIVE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED TWENTY-SIX.
31. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr.,
supra note 17.
32. G.R. No. 154993, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 258, 268.
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33. G.R. No. 128412, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 306.
34. Id. at 320.
35. Id. at 319, 320.
36. 364 Phil. 591 (1999).
37. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-46626-27, December 27,
1979, 94 SCRA 865.
38. 201 Phil. 727, 744 (1982).
39. G.R. No. 132250, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 632, 652-653.
40. Id. at 654.
41. Comment, Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 21-22; Temporary rollo, no. 3.
42. Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA
283, 287.
43. Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation, G.R. No. 79622, September 29,
1989, 178 SCRA 164, 168.
44. G.R. No. 153155, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 542.
45. Id. at 554-555.
46. G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 875-876.
47. G.R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 454, 472-473.
48. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589, 607.
49. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36.
50. 38 Phil. 29 (1918).
9. See Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 450.
10. Relevant provisions of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Order No. 1-
95 read —
1 . Scope. — These rules shall apply from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission,
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the
President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board
of Investments and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
11. Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil. 794, 801 (1975).
12. Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1410 (1963).