Tenggara Backgrounder 2023 Jun 09 1 sPNFol6R
Tenggara Backgrounder 2023 Jun 09 1 sPNFol6R
Jokowi is good as kingmaker, but for RI lifts ban on sea sand exports,
how long? raises environmental concerns
After failing to win sufficient political support to get his The Joko “Jokowi” Widodo administration has decided to
term extended beyond 2024, President Joko “Jokowi” lift the government’s ban on exports of sea sand, which
Widodo is maneuvering to make sure that whoever had stood for 20 years, amid the threat of environmental
succeeds him will protect the legacy that he has built since degradation to the country’s coastal environment. The sea
taking power in 2014. Without a political party as his sand export reinstatement came about while the
support base, however, he may find limitations to this role government attempts to prohibit exports of more of the
as kingmaker. country’s critical minerals.
POLITICS
Jokowi is good as kingmaker, but for how long?
Overview
After failing to win sufficient political support to get his term extended beyond 2024, President Joko
“Jokowi” Widodo is maneuvering to make sure that whoever succeeds him will protect the legacy that
he has built since taking power in 2014. Without a political party as his support base, however, he may
find limitations to this role as kingmaker.
Critics, including his former vice president Jusuf Kalla, have called this cawe-cawe (Javanese for
meddling) unethical, saying that as President, he should stay above the fray. In his response, Jokowi
justified his actions as being for the good of the nation, to ensure continuity in the national political
leadership.
Jokowi is not the lame-duck president many had predicted he would become in the twilight years of his
presidency. He still has some political clout to influence the outcome of the presidential and legislative
elections in February next year, and he is using it.
For one, he commands the loyalty of millions of nonpartisan supporters who will give their votes to the
candidate and the party of his choice. Second, he retains some control over the seven political parties
that are part of his coalition government. Although political parties have the sole power to nominate the
president and vice-presidential candidates, Jokowi has used his power to try to influence the choices of
the parties in his coalition.
The NasDem party, a member of the coalition, learned this when it lost a strategic Cabinet seat
apparently for defying the president’s wishes. Former communications and information minister
Johnny G. Plate, a senior NasDem official, was named a corruption suspect last month that led to his
dismissal. Jokowi is not likely to replace him with another NasDem official and rumors are now
circulating that the party could lose its two remaining Cabinet seats.
Being cut out of the coalition would deprive NasDem of access to power, money and various state
facilities. NasDem’s sin in Jokowi’s eyes is nominating former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan,
Jokowi’s political nemesis, as presidential candidate. Anies is campaigning for change, hoping to
capture voters who have grown tired of Jokowi’s presidency and want a new direction for Indonesia.
Jokowi has publicly endorsed two other presumptive presidential candidates, Defense Minister
Prabowo Subianto and Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, while trying to undermine Anies’
electoral standing. He may have overplayed his hand though as all opinion polls put Ganjar and
Prabowo as the two most popular figures, with Anies trailing in third.
Jokowi had earlier tried to get Prabowo and Ganjar to run on the same ticket, but with both men
fancying their chances of winning, neither would accept the role of running mate. He has since sent
conflicting messages to confuse supporters about who to support.
Both Prabowo and Ganjar have openly stated that they would protect Jokowi’s legacy if elected. This
includes continuing the construction of Nusantara, an area of East Kalimantan that has been designated
as Indonesia’s new capital city.
For now, Jokowi can afford to remain vague about which candidate he prefers. But closer to the
election on Feb. 14, his supporters would demand a clearer direction. And if the run-up in July, an
almost certain occurrence in the unlikelihood of a clear winner, pits Prabowo against Ganjar, the
president will have to make a clear stand.
What's more
The covert campaign to undermine Anies’ electoral chances continue even though he has consistently been
trailing in all opinion polls. Besides the attack on NasDem, the Democratic Party is also coming under
pressures to abandon its support for Anies’ nomination. NasDem needs to sustain the support of the Democratic
Party and the Islamist Justice Party (PKS) to meet the threshold necessary for nominating Anies.
Just how much longer can Jokowi play the role of kingmaker?
Theoretically, his power to influence the election results will end once the nominations by political parties have
closed in November. Beyond that, the elections will be entirely in the hands of the political parties. And without
a political party to control, Jokowi could be completely shut out of the elections. In practice, he is still the
President with much power at his disposal. He will also have full control over all the regions, since provincial
governors, regency chiefs and city mayors will have to step down by September and be replaced by his
appointees as caretakers until local elections take place in November next year. He will be in full control of the
state apparatus – the bureaucracy, the police and the military. The law requires them to remain neutral in the
elections. Can Jokowi resist the temptation to deploy them to influence the elections?
And Jokowi may just win control of the Democratic Party in time. The Supreme Court is currently hearing a
petition by Gen. (ret.) Moeldoko, the chief of staff of the presidential office, who is contesting the party’s
chairmanship. The party of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is being rocked by internal
power struggles, and Moeldoko, with support from disgruntled party members, has stepped in to claim the
chairmanship.
Moeldoko is clearly acting on his boss’ order. Should he succeed in his campaign and the Supreme Court rules
in his favor, Jokowi will have a political party to build his power base to further influence the 2024 elections
and beyond.
Speculations about the President’s involvement in the 2024 election process have been circulating for some
time. On various occasions, he has given endorsements to Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, and
Gerindra Party chairman Prabowo Subianto. However, sources within the Palace have claimed that Jokowi has
been leaning more toward supporting Prabowo than Ganjar.
This shift in support is reportedly due to a political agreement between Ganjar and the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI-P) before his nomination at Batutulis Palace in Bogor on April 21. Part of the agreement
says the PDI-P would have the authority to determine the vice presidential candidate for Ganjar and Cabinet
ministers if Ganjar is elected as president. "This agreement has diminished Jokowi's role in Ganjar's
candidacy," said a source from Jokowi’s inner circle.
Another factor that has disappointed Jokowi, according to this source, is Megawati’s refusal to accept Jokowi’s
recommendation on vice presidential candidate. Jokowi proposed Erick Thohir and Sandiaga Uno, only to
receive cold shoulders from Megawati. "PDI-P considers that the two persons do not have an ideology that
aligns with the party," said the source.
Jokowi's support for Prabowo is evident through the maneuvers of his children, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the
mayor of Surakarta, and Kaesang Pangarep. Gibran attended a gathering of the Jokowi-Gibran Volunteers in
the Central Java city Solo to support Prabowo’s nomination. Jokowi also revealed his preferred candidate
during a meeting with senior officials of one of his supporting parties at the State Palace. "The party was
informed because it was one of those who staunchly opposed Prabowo," said a source who knew about the
meeting.
Overview
The Golkar Party has yet to cement its grip on the ever-dynamic political landscape, but during its
national meeting last weekend it at least reaffirmed that the party would continue to support chairman
Airlangga Hartarto either as a presidential or vice presidential candidate. His low electability ratings
aside, observers believe this is a sensible move from Golkar if it plans to win big at the legislative
elections.
At the June 4 meeting, Golkar also gave Airlangga the authority to pick the party’s candidate for the
president as well as its coalition partners.1 Despite Golkar’s insistence that the United Indonesia
Coalition (KIB), an electoral alliance with the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the United
Development Party (PPP), stands firm, many have already written the alliance off. The PPP, for one,
intends to support Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) presidential pick Ganjar Pranowo.
Apart from supporting one of the three frontrunners, namely Ganjar, Prabowo Subianto and Anies
Baswedan, Golkar also has the potential to turn the 2024 election into a four-horse race. In a possible
KIB spin-off, Golkar and PAN are considering teaming up to nominate their respective leaders,
Airlangga and Zulkifli Hasan, since the two parties still meet the presidential threshold together.
Although such a pair would stand a slim chance of winning the presidential election in February 2024,
Golkar deputy chairman Dave Akbarshah Fikarno Laksono pointed out that having the two chairmen
compete in the presidential race was still a strategy that could boost the party’s overall electability for
the legislative elections later in November.2
Populi Center senior researcher Usep Saepul Achyar explained that should the presidential race turn
into a four-way tie, the election would run in two rounds. Even if they did not win, both Airlangga and
Zulkifli could earn enough exposure to allow their party’s legislative candidates to enjoy the coattail
effect later. Meanwhile, though Indonesia Political Review director Ujang Komarudin concurred, he
did not rule out the possibility that talks of forming an alliance with PAN could simply be a maneuver
on Golkar’s part to remain relevant in the political sphere.3
Airlangga University politics lecturer Haryadi, however, is of the view that the coattail effect of having
Airlangga and Zulkifli participate in the presidential election would not be very significant. He
suspected that Golkar was being held back by its mandate for Airlangga to run for president at the
party’s 2019 national congress (Munas) and that it is keeping the party from establishing its political
direction.4
On the flipside, Aksara Research Institute executive director Hendri Kurniawan maintained that
through their maneuver, Golkar and PAN only intended to pressure Prabowo into announcing his
running mate.5 Previously, PAN also explored an alliance with Gerindra and sought to pair Prabowo
with State-Owned Enterprises. (SOE) Minister Erick Thohir. Prabowo may stand a better chance with
Erick as his running mate, considering that the latter is a member of the Cabinet, has been lauded for
his performance as minister and enjoys an electability rating that is higher than Airlangga and
Muhaimin Iskandar, chairman of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Gerindra’s current ally.
Presidential pair candidate registrations officially open on Oct. 19, and while it is still a few months
away, the clock is ticking. The question that remains is whether Golkar’s decision to continue
supporting Airlangga despite his low electability is a sign of its resilience and determination, or instead
a deepening internal rift within the country’s oldest political party.
What's more
Airlangga’s consistently low electability is likely one of the reasons Golkar has not been able to position itself
accordingly for the upcoming elections. According to a survey conducted between April 29 and May 10 by
Litbang Kompas, the research arm of Kompas daily, Airlangga had an electability rating of below 1 percent.
Similar results were obtained in surveys conducted in January, June and October 2022 as well as January
2023.6
Another survey conducted by Indikator Politik Indonesia on May 26-20 also found that Airlangga’s electability
reached 0.5 percent in a simulation involving 18 presidential candidates and 0.7 percent in a simulation of 10
names. According to Golkar deputy chairman Ahmad Doli Kurnia, the party is perfectly aware of these
unfavorable results, however, they also have a separate mechanism to evaluate the party’s performance. Ahmad
is confident that Golkar’s internal infrastructure is intact and will be able to do well for the legislative elections.
Apart from turning the 2024 presidential election into a four-horse race, Golkar also has the option of joining
any one of the existing alliances to support one of the three frontrunners. Of the three, Andalas University
political observer Najmuddin Rasul pointed out that Golkar was flexible enough to support either Anies or
Prabowo. This is because Airlangga has maintained communications with the three-party Coalition of Change
for Unity (KPP) backing the former Jakarta governor, namely the NasDem Party, the Democratic Party and the
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). With Gerindra, apart from maintaining relations with the party, Golkar also
supported Prabowo’s presidential bid in 2014.7
It would not be impossible for Golkar to instead join hands with the ruling party and back Ganjar’s presidential
bid. In mid-May, PDI-P central executive chairwoman Puan Maharani teased that a “yellow” political party
may rally behind Ganjar, with the PPP pinning its hopes on Golkar.8 However, Golkar executive Nusron Wahid
previously hinted that the party would not be supporting Ganjar.9
Plans to form a fourth axis made up of Golkar and PAN began when Airlangga and Zulkifli met in the United
States at the end of May. Both attended a ministerial forum at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting.
Several sources from Golkar and PAN said that this matter arose because no political alliance has endorsed
Airlangga’s presidential bid or even the candidacy of Erick Thohir. The source suspects it is due to Airlangga’s
low electability. Airlangga explored the option of serving as Anies’ running mate, however the alliance backing
Anies turned down the idea.
PAN has long been trying to secure a ticket for Erick as he is close to Zulkifli, since the two are from Lampung.
Another source added that Erick, along with Tourism and Creative Economy Minister Sandiaga Uno, had both
been mentioned by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to the PDI-P as prospective running mates for Ganjar.
However, PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri was not thrilled. “It seems that Erick’s ideology does
not align with the party’s,” said this source. Additionally, internal PDI-P sources believe that Jokowi has
already returned the favor of Erick and his family for helping fund his presidential campaign in 2019 by
appointing him state-owned enterprises minister.
Based on these refusals, the idea of a four-horse race has been raised. Sources from both Golkar and PAN said
this would be done to increase each party’s votes in the legislative election. If Erick is still not nominated, the
source added, “the last option would be to pair Airlangga with Zulkifli.”
Both parties are calculating the chances of forming a fourth axis. This pair will likely lose in the first round of
voting. However, with the party’s votes likely to increase due to the coattail effect, the presidential-vice
presidential candidate pairs competing in the runoff will certainly invite these two parties to join forces.
Overview
A functioning democracy depends on the checks and balances mechanism among the executive,
legislative and judiciary powers. If the decline of Indonesian democracy as a result of the executive’s
control of the legislative was not enough, the judiciary could add insult to injury if the Constitutional
Court decides to reinstate the closed-list electoral system.
The court is now hearing a judicial review filed against the Election Law, which maintains the open-list
mechanism to elect members of the legislatures at the national and regional levels. Spokesman for the
court, Fajar Laksono, said the nine justices would soon convene to read the decision after delving into
1
the arguments of both petitioners and lawmakers.
Fajar said the court could not make a decision without any preparations or following a standard
procedure. He was responding to a statement by former deputy law and human rights minister Denny
Indrayana, who claimed to have received credible information from an anonymous source who said the
2
court had granted the judicial review motion to reinstate the closed-list electoral system. Denny said
his source did not come from inside the court.
Denny said he deliberately spread the information to keep the public vigilant of attempts to undermine
democracy. He argued that without virality there would be no justice.
The “leak” has sparked not only a debate over the gloomy future of Indonesian democracy, but also the
government’s discontentment with Denny’s move. Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs
Minister Mahfud MD has ordered an investigation into Denny, whose action could be classified as
leaking a state secret according to Mahfud. The National Police’s Criminal Investigation Department
3
(Bareskrim) has followed Mahfud’s request.
National Police spokesperson Insp. Gen. Sandi Nugroho said on Friday the police had received
complaints about the alleged leak and the possible involvement Denny, and will summon him upon
arrival from Melbourne, Australia, where he has a law firm.
Political parties contesting the Feb. 14, 2024 elections have been at loggerheads regarding the electoral
system. The ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), with support from Islamic-based
minority Crescent Start Party (PBB), has openly asked for the reinstatement of the closed-list in place
4
of the open-list mechanism. The other eight parties represented in the House of Representatives –the
Golkar Party, Gerindra Party, National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP),
National Mandate Party (PAN), Democratic Party, NasDem Party and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
– oppose the change in the electoral system.
Democratic Party politician Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, the youngest son of former president Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), insisted that the court had no authority to review an open legal policy
5
like the electoral system, which he said falls under the House’s auspices.
Golkar politician Ahmad Doli Kurnia concurred, saying the court could not alter the electoral system
unless it violated the Constitution. He added that such a change could only be made through revision of
the law by the House.
Similarly, Habiburokhman of Gerindra Party expressed his opposition to a move to reinstate the closed-
list system. He warned the Constitutional Court against changing the electoral system, or else the
House would stall deliberation of the Court’s budget.
What's more
In fact, the 1945 Constitution does not specifically stipulate whether elections should be conducted in
a closed or open manner. Therefore, this matter is referred to as an open legal policy, which is for the
legislative and executive powers to decide.
The electoral system has become a recurring debate during election seasons.6 Most notably, in an
open-list electoral system, voters can directly choose legislative candidates. However, in a closed-list
electoral system, voters are only given the option to choose political parties.
In principle, the closed-list system gives the absolute power to select legislative candidates to the
party elite, if not bosses. In practice they will place their loyalists on top of the legislative candidates
list. The open-list system provides a level playing field to all legislative candidates where the more
popular a candidate, the greater their chance to win.
Additionally, the differences also impact on the degree of representation. Generally, an open-list
system has a high chance of representation because voters can directly choose the legislative
candidates. A closed-list system is considered less democratic because it dates back to the New Order
era when people could not directly vote for legislative candidates of their own choice, and political
parties lacked transparency and were not obligated to disclose their list of candidates. Therefore, the
choices made by political parties may not necessarily reflect that of the people.
Several politicians who are aware of the progress of the judicial review state the Constitutional Court
is likely to reinstate the closed-list system. Among the justices, six are in favor of while the other
three are against the closed system.
In anticipation of the Court’s ruling, eight political parties in the House of Representatives that
oppose the closed-list system have met at the Parliament Building to formulate a statement to resist
the reinstatement of the old electoral system.
A source familiar with the meeting said the parties are preparing a scenario to revise the
Constitutional Court Law to retaliate the Court’s ruling. Among the amendments, the political parties
would annul the Constitutional Court's authority to review laws that are classified as open legal
policies like the electoral system. Additionally, the parties will shorten the term of office of
Constitutional Court justices.
In addition to the scenario of revising the law, the eight parties plan to slow the deliberation of the
Constitutional Court’s budget.
Overview
Leaders of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) are looking to hold office for five years after
the Constitutional Court recently granted a petition to extend their tenure from previously four years.
This change will undoubtedly affect the institution, more so its chairman Firli Bahuri, whose time in
office has been riddled with controversies.
The court ruled in favor of KPK deputy chairman Nurul Ghufron, who had asked for equality in the
term of service between KPK leaders and their peers in 12 non-ministerial institutions who already
served for five years. In its considerations, the court asserted that the KPK leaders’ four-year term was
1
not only discriminatory but also unfair compared with such institutions of constitutional importance.
According to the court, extending the term to five years is necessary “to protect the independence of the
KPK” and would yield greater benefits and efficiency to the commission’s work. Additionally, Nurul
challenged the KPK leaders’ age limit provision, which, in the 2019 KPK Law, requires a KPK leader
to be at least 50 years old and maximum 65 years old. Nurul, who is not yet 50 years old and had joined
the KPK before the law replaced the old law enacted in 2002, argued that the ruling deprives him of the
constitutional right to contest a second term.
The court once again ruled in favor of Nurul, releasing a verdict that allowed former KPK leaders to be
reelected without having to be the required minimum age of 50. This ruling, however, does not
explicitly state whether it will apply to the current KPK leaders who are set to end their tenure on Dec.
2
20 this year, which includes Firli. Responding to the court’s ruling on the KPK leadership tenure, Firli
stated that extending his term for another year would strengthen the fight against corruption. He added
that the commission was ready to implement the tenure extension of its leaders with a principle that
3
remains committed to ridding Indonesia of corruption and capturing fraudsters.
It is interesting to note that the extension of the KPK leaders’ term comes on the heels of the
commission’s waning public trust, many of which see Firli front and center. Though it was Nurul who
proposed the term extension, it is Firli who will ultimately profit from it. With his controversial track
record, questions loom over any other underlying motives or agendas involved in the court’s ruling on
the KPK leadership tenure.
Since stepping into his role as the KPK chairman in 2019, Firli has been embroiled in allegations of
ethics violations and has multiple times been reported to the KPK supervisory board. Earlier this year,
for example, Firli was ensnared in a case involving former KPK investigations director Brig. Gen.
Endar Priantoro, who accused Firli of committing an ethics violation by relieving him of his duties
against the wishes of National Police Chief Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo. Word on the street, however, is
that Endar was actually shown the door for refusing to launch a full-blown investigation into a
4
corruption case involving former Jakarta governor and presidential aspirant Anies Baswedan.
In a separate case in 2020, the KPK supervisory board found Firli guilty of breaking the code of ethics
for displaying a “hedonistic lifestyle” that involved Firli chartering a helicopter for a private trip. The
chairman was handed a light sentence in the form of a written reprimand. Adding insult to injury,
Firli’s controversies go back to before he was elected the KPK boss. In 2018, during his tenure as the
commission’s deputy for enforcement, Firli was found guilty of an ethics violation for holding a
meeting twice with then-West Nusa Tenggara governor Zainul Majdi, who at that time was under the
KPK’s scrutiny in connection with a corruption case.
What's more
The court’s ruling was a close decision with five justices in favor and four against the KPK leaders’
term extension. The dissenting justices were Suhartoyo, Wahiduddin Adams, Enny Nurbaningsih and
newly elected deputy chief justice Saldi Isra. Those in support of the ruling were chief justice Anwar
Usman and justices Arief Hidayat, Daniel P Yusmic, Manahan Sitompul and Guntur Hamzah.
The dissented justices argued that Nurul failed to provide arguments demonstrating the connection
between the KPK leadership tenure with the independence of the institution, instead placing
excessive focus on the violation of his right to be reelected.
Moreover, they were concerned about the implication of this ruling on subsequent petitions. They
warned of the domino effect of granting Nurul’s petition, as similar motions challenging the
leadership tenures of other institutions. Such circumstances, they said, would force the court to
address matters that fall within the purview of policymakers.5
Little word has been said from the government except for Coordinating Political, Legal and Security
Affairs Minister Mahfud MD, who said the government would accept the court’s decision. However,
due to the various interpretations of the court’s decision, the government will first consult its
substance, including with the court.6
Overview
The Joko “Jokowi” Widodo administration has decided to lift the government’s ban on exports of sea
sand, which had stood for 20 years, amid the threat of environmental degradation to the country’s
coastal environment. The sea sand export reinstatement came about while the government attempts to
prohibit exports of more of the country’s critical minerals.1
The end of the sea sand export ban came by way of Government Regulation No. 26/2023 on the
management of marine sedimentation, which was effective as of May 15. Article 9(2d) of the
regulation stipulates that marine sediment could be exploited for export, provided that domestic needs
had been fulfilled and the export was done in accordance with statutory provisions. Article 15(5)
stipulates that the level of domestic need is to be decided through a ministerial regulation.2
The ban was initiated in 2003 by the administration of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who is ironically the
incumbent leader of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which Jokowi is a member of,
due to major damage to Riau Island’s coastal ecosystems to satiate Singapore’s sea sand demand for its
land reclamation projects. Indonesia also lost US$330 million annually from 1970 until 2003 because
only 900,000 cubic meters (cbm) of exported sea sand was sold legally out of the total 45 million cbm
that was mined.3
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Sakti Wahyu Trenggono said the regulation was mainly for
fulfilling the domestic demands of sea sand for reclamation projects and that if it was not regulated
well then small islands could be exploited for reclamation projects or the bottom of the sea being
mined, which would cause further environmental damage.
The minstry’s special staffer Wahyu Muryadi added the ministry would ensure the extraction of marine
sediment was done with much safer tools for the environment than under the pre-ban regulatory regime
and that the policy would bring in revenue for the country. Meanwhile, Riau Islands’ Sea Sand Miners
Association (APPL) chairman Heri Tosa believed the government had concluded its border dispute
with Singapore, which was thought to be part of the motivation behind the previous ban.4
However, Greenpeace Indonesia refused to be a part of the research team to implement the regulation,
saying the government’s justification of the decision was a “greenwashing” attempt. Furthermore, the
Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) warned that the regulation would threaten the
livelihoods of fishermen and coastal communities. The NGO also said it would hasten the loss of small
islands, which could displace around 23 million people by 2050.5
Although the government regulation could reopen a revenue stream for Indonesia amid its
infrastructure development, including for the development of its new capital city, it has a steep
environmental cost that would lead to future financial losses for the country. The policy gives more
benefit to polities looking to import sea sand for land reclamation projects, such as Singapore and Hong
Kong, than to Indonesia. Exported sea sand to Singapore contributed to the expansion of the city-state’s
land area by 25 percent from 1976 to 2001.
What's more
Thirty-three out of 59 mining permits for sea sand went unused due to a lack of buyers caused by the now-lifted
ban, even with 2 billion cbm in domestic need for sea sand in 2020. But domestic land reclamation projects
using said sea sand displaced 107,361 Indonesian fishermen in 2016 alone, thus adversely impacting the
livelihood of many Indonesians in the name of infrastructure development.6
The Indonesian government does not have a good track record in punishing domestic violations of marine
sediment excavation. For example, sand mining firm Logomas Utama excavated sand only 3.15 kilometers
away from Babi Island in Riau Islands, far closer than the 37-kilometer boundary. The government ordered
Logomas to cease its sea sand mining operation in neighboring Rupat Island, Riau, following local fishermen
groups’ direct action against the firm and its appeal to President Jokowi with Walhi’s assistance. However, the
government did not revoke the firm’s mining permit, which the groups worry could allow the company to
restart operations.7
According to multiple government sources, there have been extensive lobbying efforts to convince
the Indonesian government to resume sea sand exports, dating back to the administration of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. These lobbying activities began gaining even more traction during
President Joko Widodo's first term in office.
At that time, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti faced persistent lobbying from
sea sand exporters who urged her to reopen the export channels. However, despite these lobbying
attempts, Susi remained unwavering in her refusal to allow sea sand exports.
The call to reconsider sea sand exports resurfaced during Jokowi's second term, particularly
following the transition from Susi to Wahyu Trenggono as the new Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
Minister. Since 2021, the government started to expedite the development of government regulations
(PP) concerning the reopening of sea sand exports.
Initially, there was a lack of consensus among several ministries regarding these government
regulations, notably between the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry and the Transportation
Ministry. Nevertheless, the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry made concerted efforts to
persuade other ministries that the material extracted and exported was marine sediment rather than
sea sand.
Prior to the widespread news about the reopening of sea sand exports, the Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries Ministry officials held meetings with prominent companies entrusted with the task of
dredging marine sediment. After the reopening, notable figures such as Tomy Winata and several
local companies who have long sought to profit from this industry, expressed their support for this
policy.
Furthermore, another source reveals that Singapore has long been struggling to find a reliable supply
of sea sand to meet its needs, which has prompted them to continue searching for sources.
Meanwhile, Malaysia has already imposed a moratorium on sea sand exports.
This opportunity has been seized by various Indonesian entrepreneurs, as well as authorities
suspected of involvement in illegal sea sand export activities. The formulation of sea sand export
tariffs reportedly preceded the drafting of the government regulations that serve as the foundation for
reopening the export channels. The Maritime Affairs and Investment Coordinating Ministry has taken
the lead in formulating these export tariffs.
Overview
The open selection process for the position of the minerals and coal director general has been
cancelled following further escalation of the directorate general’s bonus pay embezzlement
case. A search into an apartment owned by one of the director general candidates, M. Idris
Froyote Sihite, found Rp 1.3 billion (US$87,270) in cash suspected to be related to the case,
along with classified corruption eradication commission (KPK) documents.1
Although the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry initially considered continuing the
selection process without Idris, public sentiment soured after reports came out that energy
ministry and KPK executives may have been involved with the leaking of the documents.
According to a confession by Idris, he received the documents from Energy and Mineral
Resources Minister Arifin Tasrif, who previously received them from an insider at the KPK.2
KPK chairman Firli Bahuri would later be accused as being the document leaker. One of the
pieces of evidence behind this accusation was a video that circulated on social media. In the
video, two men are heard discussing the leaked documents to the energy ministry, with one
saying that the minister may have obtained the documents from KPK chairman Firli.3
Civil society organizations along with several former KPK chairpersons reported this incident
as another ethics violation by Firli to the KPK supervisory board. However the KPK
responded to the report by arguing that leaking the documents had no impact on its
investigation into the pay bonus corruption case because the documents were public record
anyway.4 On the other hand, the leaking of the KPK documents is believed to be the reason
why Idris ignored his first summons as a witness to the case and attempted to go off-grid,
which could have jeopardized the investigation.5
The decision on whether Firli is guilty of an ethics violation ultimately falls to the KPK
supervisory board. The board was supposed to deliver their verdict on May 11, however, it
had to be delayed as new witnesses for the investigation came forth. The supervisory board
has actually finished processing its investigation on Firli’s ethic violation, however, it has yet
to deliver the verdict.6 Firli is no stranger to allegations of ethic violations, having been twice
found guilty of committing such an offense during his career at the KPK.
A rough estimate of Rp 28 billion in public funds was lost due to manipulation of the minerals
and coal directorate general’s books. Around 10 people in the directorate general’s financial
department were named as suspects, and they were believed to have pocketed the funds by
writing off discrepancies in the books as pay bonuses for each other.
In the meantime, Minister Arifin Tasrif has appointed environment and spatial planning
expert staff Muhammad Wafid as the minerals and coal acting director general. It is currently
not yet known when the selection process will resume, however Wafid will relinquish the
position once a new director general is officially appointed. Additionally, the capacity of the
acting director general is restricted and lacks the authority to enact strategic decisions that
would impact the legal status, employment,or finances of the directorate general.7
What's more
Candidates for the position of minerals and coal director general before the cancellation:8
According to insider sources at the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM Ministry), the cancellation
of the auction for the director general of minerals and coal position can be attributed to the intricate legal issues
currently plaguing the ministry.
One of the candidates who successfully passed the initial administrative selection, Idris F. Sihite, is rumored to
be on the verge of being declared a suspect by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the near
future. Not only in the alleged bonus-pay embezzlement case, Sihite is also implicated in another matter
concerning suspected bribery between 2020 and 2022 in return for mining processing recommendations, which
are necessary for export permits.
The aforementioned source expresses confidence Idris Sihite would be formally designated a suspect once the
legal case entangling the ESDM Ministry progresses from an investigation to a criminal inquiry.
While manipulation of export permit approvals for mining goods has been ongoing since the tenure of former
director general of minerals and coal Ridwan Djamaluddin, the KPK firmly believes Sihite played a significant
role in that case as well because a substantial sum of money was discovered at his apartment. The funds are
suspected to be illicit bribes from companies granted export permits for processed mining products, distinct
from the inflated bonus pay issue.
Another source revealed the KPK's investigation into the manipulation of export permit approvals for mining
goods within the ESDM Ministry encountered a temporary impasse. This occurred due to the suspects altering
their phone numbers and daily routines, including the time of their departure from home to the workplace.
The search conducted in Idris Sihite's office regarding the inflated bonus pay shed light on an additional aspect.
During the search, the KPK team unearthed a document entitled "Closed Investigation Order". This document
stems from the KPK's probe into bribery allegations related to the granting of export permits for mining goods.
It contains comprehensive details about the case, including chronology, suspected perpetrators and
recommended legal provisions to be invoked.
When questioned about the document, Idris Sihite acknowledged receiving it from ESDM Minister Arifin
Tasrif. This has sparked speculation that KPK chairman Firli Bahuri leaked the document to Arifin,
accompanied by a cautionary message to the implicated suspects named in the report, urging them to exercise
caution as the KPK had them in its sights regarding the bribery case involving export permits for mining goods.
The KPK is convinced the leakage of the document is linked to the observable changes in Idris Sihite's daily
behavior, including frequent alterations of phone numbers and vehicles. These modifications occurred shortly
after the KPK initiated investigations into alleged acceptance of gifts tied to export permits for processed
mining goods.
In addition to Idris Sihite, the KPK was also targeting several other officials from the ESDM Ministry, such as
the child of a minister, several mining companies and surveyor institutions active during that period.
Overview
The new capital city (IKN) has raised many concerns, its funding and its future should the
opposition win the election are among others. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, speaking at
the Ecosperity Week in Singapore on Wednesday, soothed investors by promising that the
IKN project would keep going no matter who wins the election.
Only few weeks before, two opposition parties during a plenary session demanded stopping
IKN relocation. A Democratic Party faction member argued that the IKN budget should not
take priority over stabilizing the prices of essential goods for the public while the PKS faction
member called for a suspension of the IKN development, stressing that the development
budget should be directed towards restoring the purchasing power of the people, improving
welfare, and enhancing agricultural infrastructure.1
However, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati did not budge. During a plenary session on
macroeconomic framework and key fiscal policy aspects for the 2024 State Budget held on
Tuesday, she reaffirmed that the budget for the IKN development program will continue
uninterrupted until next year, as the IKN development is critical to drive economic growth in
East Kalimantan and has already been designated as a state priority.
PKS and Democratic Party, as opposition parties, have always rejected the capital city
relocation since the beginning. They have consistently taken positions contrary to the
government's efforts to accelerate development and the relocation of the capital to East
Kalimantan since President Jokowi announced this initiative in 2019, culminating in the
enactment of Law Number 3 of 2022 and its inclusion as a priority national legislative
program (Prolegnas Prioritas) for 2023.2
Although the aspirations of the opposition factions have had little impact on the current
development of IKN, this could change should the presidential election next year give them
more power in the government. Investors have long had concerns over the continuity of the
IKN project if the elected president next year is not from the same coalition as Jokowi.
To address the concerns of investors, the Deputy for Funding and Investment of the IKN
Authority, Agung Wicaksono, emphasized that the development of IKN is a long-term project
and should not be disrupted by a change in presidency next year.3
President Jokowi also reiterated to potential investors that whoever leads Indonesia after the
President Election in 2024, will continue to focus on bringing Indonesia to become a
powerhouse in Asia and continue the construction of IKN.4
Previously, President Jokowi had also emphasized that the development of IKN is guaranteed
by the IKN Law, indicating the need for the project to continue even though his
administration will end in 2023.5 Furthermore, Anies Baswedan, the Coalition for Unity and
Change (KPP) presidential candidate, asserted that the IKN project had been implemented
through legislation. He assured that he would fulfill the law's mandate if elected president.6
What's more
The finance minister highlighted the government’s commitment for economic growth in the
Framework and the Main Points of Fiscal Policy (KEM PPKF) for 2024. She reaffirmed that that the
priority program in 2024 will focus on expediting economic transformation through accelerated
infrastructure development, including ensuring the continuity of the IKN and other National Strategic
Projects (PSN). The government's target for Indonesia's economic growth in 2024 is set at 5.3% to
5.7%.7
According to Public Works and Housing (PUPR) Minister Basuki Hadimuljono, the construction of
official residences for ministers, with a total budget allocation of Rp 493 billion from the state budget
(APBN), has already commenced8 and slated to complete in June 2024, coinciding with the first
phase of the national capital's relocation from Jakarta to the IKN, while the construction of apartment
buildings for civil servants is currently in the bidding process. He added that his ministry has
absorbed Rp 24,16 trillion of its budget to work on 39 project packages out of 76 other project work
packages in total worth RP 62.27 trillion.9 In addition, the IKN Authority announced that they have
received 220 letters of intent (LoI) for investments by May 2023.
Overview
The Finance Ministry is scrambling to explain the sustainability of the government’s rising
debt under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo following a salvo attack by former vice president
Jusuf Kalla, who has crossed into the opposition camp and supports Anies Baswedan as a
presidential candidate.
Speaking during the recent anniversary of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Jusuf Kalla
warned about rising government debt under President Jokowi who has had to spend over Rp
1,000 trilion (US$64.5 billion) a year to service the debt, the highest in history. He
acknowledged, though, that he was part of Jokowi’s first-term administration.1
The opposition camp, which comprises of the PKS, the Democratic Party and now the
NasDem Party, has been using the rising government debt as one of its campaign to boost the
parties’ electability in next year’s elections. They often compare the massive accummulation
of debt by Jokowi with that of his predecessor President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)
of the Democratic Party.
At the end of SBY presidency in 2014, the government’s debt totalled Rp 2,608.78 trillion or
24.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic products (GDP). Under president Jokowi, the
government debt totalled Rp 7,879.07 in the end of March, or 39.2 percent of GDP. In other
words, Jokowi has thus far borrowed a total Rp 5,270.3 trillion.
That mounting debt, according to the opposition parties, does not include ballooning debts of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which reached Rp 1,640 trillion at the end of 2022, much of
them belongs to debt-ridden infrastructure SOEs. Legislator M. Misbakhun of the PKS argued
that although SOEs debts are not booked as government debt, when the a SOE faces financial
problems, it affects the government budget as the government often injects money into
problematic SOEs in the form of a state capital injection (PMN). 2
The Finance Ministry came out to argue that although President Jokowi borrowed a lot, he
spent much more than what he borrowed for the people totalling Rp 8,921 trillion from 2015
until 2022, in the forms of social assistance Rp 1,528.47 trillion, healthcare asistance
especially during the pandemic Rp 1,138.35 trillion, education assistance Rp 3,485.1 trillion
and infrastructure development Rp 2,769.99 trillion.3
The Finance Ministy also acknowledged the high budget to pay out the debt, but not reaching
Rp 1,000 trillion a year yet. The highest debt service was Rp 902 trillion in 2021, or about 32
percent of total government spending, rising from Rp 770.57 trillion a year earlier.
Finance Minister Sri Mulyani assurred the public that the government’s rising debt was
managable, and still below the 60 percent of GDP ceiling set by the law. By any standard, Sri
Mulyani said, Indonsia’s debt was safe. She promised that the government’s debt to GDP
ratio would fall further to 38 percent next year.4 Whoever the president, the government
would continue to use debt to finance development to bring Indonesia into a target of high
income country by 2045.
What's more
https://tinyurl.com/mry7uk5t
4
The Jakarta Post, “Return of sea sand exports sparks controversy in Indonesia”, May 29, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/nmhck9ns
5
The Jakarta Post, “Calls mount for sea sand export be dropped”, Jun. 4, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/49xc4mmn
6
Tempo.co, “Pasir Laut dalam Angka”, Jun. 4, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/58tz66ze
7
Tempo.co, “Bagaimana Penambangan Pasir Menenggelamkan Pulau Kecil”, Apr. 30, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/45xwzx9f
KPK leaks delays selection of new minerals and coal director general
1
Kompas.com “Dilaporkan Lagi, Dugaan Kebocoran Dokumen Penyelidikan Korupsi di Kementerian ESDM”
April 14, 2023 https://tinyurl.com/yc4d56be
2
See footnote 1
3
TheJakartaPost.com “Foul Play at the KPK” April 13, 2023 https://tinyurl.com/yt5ct2ts
4
Kompas.com “Firli Bahuri Kembali Dilaporkan Langgar Etik” April 11, 2023 https://tinyurl.com/44vfn6k8
5
See footnote 1
6
Liputan6.com “Dewas KPK Rampungkan Laporan Dugaan Etik Firli Bahuri Terkait Kebocoran Penyelidikan
Korupsi” June 5, 2023 https://tinyurl.com/54yp7h45
7
RuangEnergi.com “Ini Perintah Arifin Tasrif kepada M Wafid sebagai PLT Dirjen Minerba” June 6, 2023
https://tinyurl.com/3jsuyskn
8
CNBCIndonesia.com “Lelang Jabatan Dirjen Minerba Dibatalkan, Ini Alasannya..” June 5, 2023
https://tinyurl.com/3ztz3947
Jokowi: IKN project keeps going no matter who wins the election
1
CNBCIndonesia.com, “Parpol Minta Proyek IKN Disetop, Ini Pernyataan Sri Mulyani,” June 05, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/4j9bumpu
2
Kompas.com, “Perjalanan UU IKN, Aturan Seumur Jagung yang Kini Hendak Direvisi atas Instruksi Jokowi,”
November 24, 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3ffnanjt
3
Liputan 6, “Indonesia Ganti Presiden di 2024, Nasib Investasi di IKN Nusantara Terancam?” May 23, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/2rdsecxu
4
TheJakartaPost.com, “Election won’t affect IKN, Jokowi tells potential investors,” June 8, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/32xcm52m
5
Kompas.com, “Ada yang Tanya, 2024 IKN Dilanjutkan Apa Tidak, Lho UU-nya Sudah Ada,” June 22, 2022.
https://tinyurl.com/4re3w99w
6
CNNIndonesia.com, “Anies: IKN Sudah Jadi UU, Siapapun Presiden Kelak Harus Laksanakan Itu,” March 2,
2023, https://tinyurl.com/7vk2jmk7
7
CNBC Indonesia.com, “Sri Mulyani: Dana IKN Gab=k Bisa Ditunda! Ini Alasannya,” June 1, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/yex3knsm
8
Kompas.com, “12 Unit Rumah Menteri di IKN Mulai Dibangun, Siap Huni Tahun 2024,” June 07, 2023,
https://tinyurl.com/43a7htpc
9
CNNIndonesia.com, “PUPR Kucurkan Rp62,27 T untuk Pembangunan IKN hingga 2024,” June 7, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/3ep3dy4d
2
Bisnis.com, “Tembus Rp7.800 Triliun, Benarkah Ada Utang yang Tak Dicatat Pemerintah?” June 7, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/2n462c8z
3
Detik.com, “Ribuan Triliun Utang RI Dipakai buat Infrastruktur-Bansos, Ini Rinciannya,” June 6, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/4b85h42t
4
Republika.co.id, “Sri Mulyani Prediksi Rasio Utang Negara Turun pada Tahun Depan,” June 5, 2023.
https://tinyurl.com/msazfamw
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