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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020.]

ANTONIO G. NGO, petitioner, vs. VISITACION GABELO,


ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ, EDUARDO TRAQUENA,
ERLINDA TRAQUENA, ULISYS * MATEO, ALFONSO PLACIDO,
LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSANA ** RENDON, and MATEO
TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J : p

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by herein


petitioner Antonio G. Ngo (Ngo) assailing the January 8, 2013 Decision 2 and
June 19, 2013 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
117120 which nullified and set aside the April 5, 2010 4 and October 15,
2010 5 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 45 and
dismissed Ngo's complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land for
his failure to refer the case to prior barangay conciliation.
Factual Antecedents
On September 24, 2008, Ngo filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 45,
a complainant 6 for recovery of possession of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 250439 (subject property) against
herein respondents Visitation Gabelo, Erlinda Abella, Petra Perez, Eduardo
Traquena, Erlinda Traquena, Ulysis Mateo, Alfonso Placido, Leonardo
Traquena, Susana Rendon and Mateo Trinidad (Gabelo, et al.). 7
In his complaint, Ngo alleged that he is the lawful and absolute owner
of the subject property by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
himself and Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) and pursuant to this Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 111743. He averred that despite several demands, Gabelo,
et al., refused to vacate the subject property.
On the other hand, Gabelo, et al., in their Answer with special
Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaims 8 maintained that Ngo
has no legal personality to sue. Moreover, the Court did not declare him in
G.R. No. 111743 as the absolute owner of the subject property but merely
identified him as one of those who could buy the lot from PRC. They insisted
that Ngo failed to comply with the condition precedent for filing the action
since he failed to bring the matter to the barangay for conciliation.
Additionally, they averred that the validity of the alleged TCT No. 250439
under the name of Ngo is already being assailed before RTC of Manila
Branch 37 and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98807. 9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
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After pre-trial, the RTC issued an Order 10 dated April 17, 2009
directing the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered: the subject Answer with
Special/Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaims of the
defendants shall not be expunged from the records and shall remain
as validly filed; the Pre-Trial Brief of the said defendants is hereby
ordered EXPUNGED from the records of this case for its failure to
comply with the MCLE requirement; and the Complaint is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of cause of action for the plaintiff's failure to
comply with the barangay law requirements.
SO ORDERED. 11

The trial court held that, considering that Ngo admitted that the case
did not undergo the required barangay conciliation proceedings before it was
filed with the court, the complaint should be dismissed accordingly for lack
of cause of action. Necessarily, the trial court was empowered to motu
proprio dismiss the complaint for Ngo's failure to comply with the rules. 12
Ngo filed his Motion for Reconsideration 13 and alleged that while the
trial court indeed had the power to dismiss the complaint due to his failure to
refer the case to barangay conciliation, the RTC also had the discretion to
simply suspend the proceedings and to refer the case to barangay
conciliation instead of dismissing outright the complaint. 14
Persuaded by Ngo's arguments, the RTC in its Order 15 dated April 5,
2010 granted the supplication of Ngo. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff's subject
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby GRANTED and the Order of
this Court dated April 17, 2009 in so far as it ordered the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of cause of action for the plaintiff's failure to
comply with the Barangay law requirements is hereby reconsidered
and set aside.
Accordingly, the Complaint in this case is hereby reinstated and
this case is hereby referred to the Barangay Court/authorities
concerned where the herein parties are directed to undergo the
proper Barangay conciliation proceedings.
In the meanwhile, the proceedings in this Court are hereby
suspended pending the submission of this Court of the corresponding
Barangay Certification/Report with regard to the result of said
Barangay proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 16

Gabelo, et al., thus filed their Motion to Set Aside/Reconsider Order


dated April 5, 2010, 17 arguing that reinstating the complaint of Ngo was a
miscarriage of justice because any complaint that failed to comply with the
barangay conciliation requirement does not deserve to be given due course
or be entertained. 18
The trial court in its Order 19 dated October 15, 2010 denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Gabelo, et al. Thus, the latter filed a
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Petition for Certiorari 20 before the CA assailing the April 5, 2010 and
October 15, 2010 Orders of the RTC sustaining the reinstatement of the
complaint and the referral of the case to barangay conciliation. 21
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court granted Gabelo, et al.'s Petition. It found that
indeed, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders.
The CA ratiocinated that the barangay justice system was established
primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in judicial courts
and for it to be truly effective it should be made compulsory. Moreover, the
Local Government Code expressly mandated resort to that barangay
conciliation proceedings is a precondition to the filing of complaints for
disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
and non-compliance therewith could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action. Even after Gabelo, et al., filed their Answer and raised as an
affirmative defense Ngo's failure to comply with the condition precedent of
barangay conciliation, the RTC did not dismiss the complaint but merely
suspended the proceedings and referred the case to barangay conciliation,
which amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
The dispositive portion of the assailed January 8, 2013 Decision of the
CA states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The orders dated April 5, 2010 and October 15, 2010, both issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45 of Manila are NULLIFIED
a n d SET ASIDE. The complaint for recovery of possession is
dismissed for failure to comply with the Barangay Justice Law.
SO ORDERED. 22

Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Ngo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration 23 but it was denied by the appellate court. 24 Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court.
Our Ruling
The petition is denied.
Ngo asserts that the CA erred in nullifying the Orders of the RTC and in
dismissing the complaint for recovery and possession of property because of
his failure to comply with the barangay conciliation requirement. He argues
that the CA failed to apply this Court's ruling in Sps. Santos v. Sps. Lumbao
25 which provided that failing to file a Motion to Dismiss on account of failure

to comply with a condition precedent constitutes waiver on the part of the


defendant. Finally, he asserts that considering his subsequent compliance
with the barangay conciliation requirement during the pendency of the case
in the CA, the petition in the appellate court was rendered moot and
academic. 26
The arguments of Ngo deserve scant consideration.
We emphasize at the outset that procedural rules are essential in the
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administration of justice. They do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants and they were established primarily to provide order to, and
enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system. 27 These rules exist for a
reason and were not merely invented out of whims. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 28 this Court held that:
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities
that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of
justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation but, indeed, to provide for a system under which suitors
may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed
time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement of their conflict
through the barrel of a gun. 29
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), or the Local Government Code of
1991, provides that barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to
filing a complaint in court between persons actually residing in the same
barangay to explore possible amicable settlement. The relevant provisions of
RA 7160 in the conduct of barangay conciliation are as follows:
Section 409. Venue. — (a) Disputes between persons
actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where
the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the
election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties
are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation
proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall
be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the
punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to
may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. [Emphasis
Ours]
Section 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of
Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman
or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
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secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless
the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. [Emphasis
Ours]
Administrative Circular No. 14-93 30 enumerated the cases which are
not covered by the mandatory barangay conciliation, to wit:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
3. Where the dispute involves real properties located in different
cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit
their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
4. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnership or
juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay
conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents (Sec.
1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
5. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
6. Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00);
7. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
8. Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent
injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the
following:
a. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or
detention (see Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law);
b. Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived
of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived or
on acting in his behalf;
c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and
support during the pendency of the action; and
d. Actions which may be barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
9. Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice;
10. Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) (Secs. 46 & 47, R.A. 6657);
11. Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-
employee relations (Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art.
226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive
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jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or
problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment);
12. Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be
filed directly in court (See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459).
Subject to the above exemptions, a party's failure to comply with the
requirement of prior barangay conciliation before filing a case in court would
render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent, 31 pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court viz.:
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds
that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a complaint, to wit:
Section 1. Grounds . — Within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has
not been complied with. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, as a general rule, grounds for dismissal must be invoked by
the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. 32
Notably however, such non-compliance of the condition precedent is
not jurisdictional. In Uy v. Judge Contreras, 33 We held:
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the
conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-
observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue
before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of
the action is proper.
xxx xxx xxx
The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same
effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss. 34 [Emphasis Ours]
Here, it is undisputed that Ngo failed to submit the matter to prior
barangay conciliation before the filing of his complaint in court. Moreover,
the case is not among those exempted from the requirement of prior
conciliation. Gabelo, et al., timely and consistently raised such omission and
vigorously invoked the dismissal of the complaint. All these circumstances
justified the dismissal of Ngo's complaint.
We thus quote with approval the findings of the CA, to wit:
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Based on the aforecited provisions, all disputes between parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality are subject to
barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition
before filing a complaint in court or any government office. Non-
compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction.
In the instant case, while no motion to dismiss was filed,
the petitioners had been constantly pleading for dismissal of
the case in their answer and their subsequent pleadings
submitted to the lower court. This is allowed under Section 6,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides that if no motion to
dismiss has been filed, any grounds for dismissal provided for in the
Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in
the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon
as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
It is undisputed that the case was never referred to the
Lupong Tagapayapa for conciliation. The petitioners
successfully prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by timely invoking the ground in
their answer as an affirmative defense. Thus, the complaint is
dismissible for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
barangay conciliation as a condition precedent before filing an action.
35 [Emphasis and underscoring Ours]

Finally, petitioner, at this juncture, argues that the issue was rendered
moot due to the referral of the case to barangay conciliation proceedings and
issuance of Certificate to File Action. 36 However, a careful review of the said
undated Certificate to File Action 37 reveals that the same was irregularly
issued as the same merely certified that:
1) There has been a personal confrontation between the parties
before the punong Barangay/Pangkat Tagapagkasundo;
2) A settlement was reached;
3) The settlement has been repudiated in a statement sworn to
before the Punong barangay by __________ on ground on ________.
Therefore the corresponding complaint (sic) for the dispute may
now be filed in Court/government office.
Verily, Ngo's admission that none of the respondents appeared is
materially inconsistent with the statement in the Certification that there has
been personal confrontation between the parties. Moreover, based on the
copy of the summons attached, only respondents Spouses Gabelo and
Erlinda Abella were able to receive the same. The foregoing clearly does not
satisfy the requirement of the law. Moreover, the Certification mentioned
that a settlement has been reached by the parties. If this is so, then there
would have been no need for referral of the matter to the court/government
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office, contrary to the statement in the Certification.
Finally, petitioner cites the case of Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo 38
where this Court allegedly pronounced that suspending a case and referring
the same to the barangay for conciliation was not an abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court. Hence, the RTC was correct in doing so in the case
at bar. 39 This argument fails to persuade. In the instant case, there is a
complete failure on the part of Ngo to refer the case to the barangay for prior
conciliation. The cited case is not on all fours with the case at bar because
there was a prior barangay conciliation therein but the trial court merely
referred it back for completion. The relevant findings of the Court in said
case held that:
Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required
by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before
it. Hence, respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case
to it for completion of the mandated proceedings. We cannot fault
him for seeking to promote the objectives of barangay conciliation
and for taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No.
14-93. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot be
equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it constitute
grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality. 40
All told, this Court finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the CA as to
its finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in remanding the case
for barangay conciliation and for revoking the dismissal of the complaint. All
the substantive and procedural issues raised in this Petition were squarely
addressed in the assailed judgment of the appellate court in accordance with
law and existing jurisprudence and with due regard to extant facts and
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED,
there being no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
January 8, 2013 Decision and June 19, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 117120 are AFFIRMED. Costs on petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Inting and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Baltazar-Padilla, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
* Also spelled as Ulysis in some parts of the records.
** Also spelled as Susan in some parts of the records.
1. Rollo , pp. 3-14.
2. Id. at 19-25; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in
by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser.
3. Id. at 26-27.
4. Id. at 109-110; penned by Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr.

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5. Id. at 114.
6. Id. at 28-31.
7. Id. at 28.
8. Id. at 95-103.
9. Id. at 97-98.
10. Id. at 105-106; penned by Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr.
11. Id. at 106.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 107-108.
14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. at 109-110.
16. Id. at 110.
17. Id. at 111-113.
18. Id. at 112.
19. Id. at 114.
20. CA rollo, pp. 3-10.
21. Id. at 5-6.
22. Rollo , p. 24.
23. CA rollo, pp. 135-139.
24. Rollo , pp. 26-27.
25. 548 Phil. 332, 345-346 (2007).
26. Rollo , pp. 7-11.
27. See Malixi v. Baltazar , G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 214,
256-258.
28. 275 Phil. 894 (1991).
29. Id. at 898.
30. Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to
Prevent Circumvention of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
[Sections 399-342, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991] issued by the Supreme
Court on 15 July 1993.
31. Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, August 6, 2018.
32. Id.
33. 307 Phil. 176 (1994).
34. Id. at 189-190.
35. Rollo , p. 24.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 120.
38. 442 Phil. 257 (2002).
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39. Rollo , p. 11.
40. Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo, supra at 266.

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