KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al.

, Petitioners, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 221318       December 16, 2015

PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe

TOPIC: Biometrics validation

FACTS:

                RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory

biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.

                RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not
been captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes
of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x  x x.”

                COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863
and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of
voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections shall be deactivated.

                Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under
RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional

requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October
31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:
 

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise
of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the
State has the right to reasonably regulate.

                The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the

exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process
of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

                Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless

still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

                Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a

literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of
the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is
bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this
case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

                In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

                Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the
conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the
perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The
foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-
said interest

                Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office
of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his
photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

                Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered
voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only
required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain
effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.

                Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from
exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they
could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be

conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

                The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the
prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The
subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such
time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended
depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.

Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11,

2009 & November 25, 2009 Premature Campaigning
NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the
Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayanwho belonged to her
political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity
prior to the commencement of the campaign period.

Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11

September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution
dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of
the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office
of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.

ISSUE:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be committed by a
person who is not a candidate?

RULING:

No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be liable
for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start
of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for
acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who
files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the
law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one
who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress
inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:

x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This
clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense
that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the
start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for
partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear
and express provision of the law.

JOSEPH C. DIMAPILIS v. COMELEC, GR No. 227158, 2017-04-18

Facts:
petition for certiorari[1] with urgent prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
a Status Quo Ante Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the Resolutions... which
cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) filed by petitioner Joseph C. Dimapilis (petitioner) for
the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Pulung Maragul, Angeles City... annulled his
proclamation as the winner, and directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
proclaim the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes as the duly-elected
official for the said post.
Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay
Elections. He ran for re-election for the same position in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and filed his
CoC... declaring under oath that he is "eligible for the office [he seeks] to be elected to." Ultimately,
he won in the said elections and was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay
COMELEC Law Department filed a Petition for Disqualification[6] against petitioner pursuant to
Section 40 (b)[7] of Republic Act No. 7160,[8] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991"... petitioner was barred from running in an election[9] since he was suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office as a consequence... being found 
guilty,... of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct
In his Verified Answer cum Memorandum... petitioner averred that the petition should be dismissed,
considering that: (a) while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes the nature of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel CoC under Section 78[16] of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (OEC),[17] and combining these two distinct and separate actions in one petition is a
ground for the dismissal of the petition[18] pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
COMELEC Law Department countered petitioner's averments, maintaining that it has the authority
to file motu proprio cases, and reiterating its earlier arguments.[23]
COMELEC Second Division granted the petition, and cancelled petitioner's CoC, annulled his
proclamation as the winner, and directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
proclaim the qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of votes as the duly-elected
Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul.[27]
It treated the petition as one for cancellation of CoC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC,
notwithstanding that it was captioned as a "Petition for Disqualification" under Section 40 (b) of the
LGC, holding that the nature of the petition is not determined by the caption given to it by the parties,
but is based on the allegations it presented.[
COMELEC Second Division likewise upheld its Law Department's authority to initiate motu proprio
the Petition for Disqualifcation as being subsumed under the COMELEC's Constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer laws relating to the conduct of elections.[30]
Finally, it rejected petitioner's invocation of the condonation doctrine... since the same had already
been abandoned in the 2015 case of Carpio Morales v. Binay, Jr. (Carpio Morales).[32]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirmed the ruling of its
Second Division.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling petitioner's CoC.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
I. Petitioner's perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility.
In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished
with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from
holding public office.[50] Verily, perpetual disqualification to bold public office is a material fact
involving eligibility[51] which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible
to run for any public office at the time he filed the same.
II. The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering
from perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." The
Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising
from a criminal conviction.[52]... ven without a petition under either x x x Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal
duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict
from running for public office.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all
laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.[53]
Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013 Barangay Elections
cannot operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct.
In Carpio Morales, the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[e]lection is not
a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.[58]
IV. With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a candidate in the 2013
Barangay Elections, and all his votes are to be considered stray votes.
A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because his
CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to
valid votes.[68] The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray
votes,[69] and are not considered in determining the winner of an election.[70] This would
necessarily invalidate his proclamation[71] and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest
number of votes to the position.[72]
When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
Principles:
the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction... ction
40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election."

 
Pangkat Laguna vs. COMELEC and Teresita Lazaro
G.r. 148075Feb 4, 2002
Buena, J.
Facts:
On Jan 2001 Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed  
by succession the office of the Governor, when then Governor was appointed
Secretary of Interior and Local G o v e r n m e n t   b y   P r e s .   G M A .  
O n   F e b   2 0 0 1 ,   L a z a r o   t h e n   f i l e d   a   C e r t .   o f   C a n d i d a c y   f o r   gubernatorial
position. Petitioner 
Pangkat Laguna  sought to disqualify Lazaro because upon assuming the office
of Gove, Lazaro publicly declared her intention to run for governor. Petitioner also
alleged thatLazaro purchased 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, andt-
shirts (worth P4.5mil) and distributed  1,760 medals  (worth P1mil) that have no public
purposebut only to increase her popularity. These acts allegedly violated Section 80 (Election
campaignor partisan political activity outside the campaign period).Petitioner also complained
that the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001
v i o l a t e d   Section 261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure o
f publicfunds) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).Comelec second division granted the petition to
disqualify respondent. Lazaro filed a MR withComelec en banc. Lazaro then won the elections.
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimedrespondent Lazaro as the duly elected Governor.
Thereafter, Comelec en banc granted the MRof Lazaro. Petitioner assails the resolution of Comelec en
banc through the expediency of Rule 65.

Issue:
 W/N Lazaro violated Sec 80 of the OEC that prohibited premature campaigning
Ruling: The
 court ruled in the
n e g a t i v e .   I t   i s   a   d o c t r i n a l l y   e n t r e n c h e d   r u l e   t h a t   f i n d i n g s   o f   f a c t   o f   administr
ative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC, based on its own assessments and dulysupported by evidence
are final unless there’s grave abuse of discretion. COMELEC is entitledto the presumption of
regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.
Issue on premature campaigning:
Section 80 of the OEC provides that it is unlawful for any person, whether or not a
voter or candidate, to engage in an election campaign except during the campaign period. However, the
Court finds that the act of respondent Lazaro in purchasing the aforesaid items in line with the
local government units sports and education program is not an act of election
campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated in Sec 80. The act of Lazaro
did not directly or indirectly solicit votes. She was merely performing the duties imposed to her by
law. Also, Respondent satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of
programs. The items purchased were within the regular purchases of provincial government

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION VS. COMELEC GR 133486

Facts: 
          COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys.  The Resolution was issued
by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President,
results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.”  The  electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the
exit survey.

          Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The  Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

Issue: WON the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls

Ratio:  

ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the press

COMELEC:           

1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot."

2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that
the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the
winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."

3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the
"voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution
and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.  It submits that the constitutionally protected
freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of
its police power," such as in the present case.

4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the
community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow
confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll
highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official
count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present
danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to
replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group
as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from
polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the
results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If
at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad

The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion
in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive
or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos
in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll
reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.  Moreover, the
prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The
valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.

3)  Violation of Ban Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of
the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters.
The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification.
Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from
making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also
proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of
disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters
with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with
the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters'
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of
whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal
their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to
minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.##

Ruling: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

NOTE:

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for
the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of
the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of
how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral
history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

G.R. No. 195649 : July 2, 2013 CASAN MACODE MACQUILING,

Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. Respondents.
SERENO, J.:

FACTS: This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed

by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in
the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado,
therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for
reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of
Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public
office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the
reversal of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he
presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and
not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the
question before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective
position?

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act

of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed
his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen,
the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his
Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be

presented as public documentsof a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof."Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a
case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign
law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any
local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)requires those who
have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public
office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when

read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Codewhich
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective
local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public
office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former
Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign
passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the
individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a

situation of doubt.

POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government

Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local
elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive

declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport,
or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that

he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt
that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American
citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados

renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his
U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete
and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the
person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man
without a country".On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado
to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado
is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he
also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will

not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.They are accorded not
only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court,
unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to
compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly
appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division

found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he
renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the
COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S.
passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only
used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado
was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on
the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010,
16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines
using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that
his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the
travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that
Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on
14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July
2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to
six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts.
Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009.
The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show
that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21
January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by
Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a

misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was
discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados
continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts
contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle

that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to
run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run
for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are
creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby
effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.