Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
BOOK TWO
Title 1
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
TREASON is a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it. It
is a violation by the subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or to the supreme authority of the State.
E.O. 44 amended Art.114 in that prior to this order, only Filipino citizens are held liable for treason.
Under E.O. 44, resident aliens may now be held liable for Treason.
Allegiance is the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individuals owe to the government
under which they live or to their sovereign, in return for the protection they receive.
Allegiance referred to in the crime of Treason may be permanent or temporary.
Treason cannot be committed in time of peace; it is a war crime.
Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has
started.
Treason is punished by the State as a measure of self defense and self preservation. The law of Treason
is an emergency measure.
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** The two-witness rule does not apply to this crime because this is a separate and distinct offense from
treason.
** Although the general rule is that conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony is not punishable (Art. 8),
under Art. 115 the mere conspiracy to commit treason is a felony. The mere proposal to commit treason is
also a felony. Both are punishable under Art. 115.
** The reason is that in treason the very existence of the state is endangered.
** This crime is an exception to the rule that mere silence does not make a person criminally liable.
** Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already committed by someone and the accused
does not report its commission to the proper authority because it speaks of “knowledge of any conspiracy
against” the Government of the Philippines, not knowledge of treason actually committed by another.
** Since the offender in misprision of treason is a principal on that crime, Art. 20 does not apply, even if
the offender is related to the persons in conspiracy against the government, because Art. 20 applies only to
accessory.
ESPIONAGE is the offense of gathering, transmitting, or losing information respecting the national
defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the Republic of
the Philippines or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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ELEMENTS:
a. that the offender enters any of the places mentioned therein
b. that he has no authority therefore
c. that has purpose is to obtain information, plans, photos etc. of a confidential nature relative to
the defense of the Philippines
** Intent to obtain information by the offender is critical. It is not necessary that information, etc.
is obtained.
2. By disclosing to the representative of a foreign nation the contents of the articles, data or
information referred to in par. 1 (Art. 117) which he had in his possession by reason of the public
office he holds.
ELEMENTS:
a. that the offender is a public officer
b. that he has in his possession the articles, data or information by reason of the public office he
holds
c. That he discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation.
COMMONWEALTH ACT 616: AN ACT TO PUNISH ESPIONAGE AND OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST
NATIONAL SECURITY
ACTS PUNISHABLE UNDER CA 616:
a. unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting national defense
b. unlawful disclosing of information affecting national defense
c. disloyal acts or words in time of peace
d. disloyal acts or words in time of war
e. conspiracy to violate preceding sections
f. harboring or concealing violators of the law
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts
2. That such act provokes or gives occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the Philippines
or expose Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or property.
** The crime of inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals is committed IN TIME OF PEACE.
** The intention of the offender is immaterial because the law considers the effects produced by the acts of
the accused and such acts might disturb the friendly relation that we have with a foreign country, and they
are penalized even if they constitute a mere imprudence.
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ELEMENTS:
1. that there is a war in which the Philippines is NOT involved
2. that there is a regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of enforcing
neutrality
3. that the offender violates such regulation
** NEUTRALITY: A nation or power which takes no part in a contest of arms going on between others is
referred to as NEUTRAL.
** There must b e regulation issued by competent authority for the enforcement of neutrality and it is the
violation of such regulation which constitutes the crime.
CORRESPONDENCE is the communication by means of letters; or it may refer to the letters which pass
between those who have friendly or business relations.
** Even if correspondence contains innocent matters, if the correspondence has been prohibited by the
government, it is punishable.
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES:
The following must concur:
a. that the notice or information might be useful to the enemy
b. that the offender intended to aid the enemy
** If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such information, the crime amounts to treason;
hence, both have the same penalty
** An alien resident may be guilty of flight to enemy country because the allegiance contemplated under
this article may be temporary or permanent.
** Mere attempt to flee or go to enemy country consummates the crime
** Fleeing or going to enemy country must be prohibited by competent authority, otherwise no crime is
committed.
PIRACY DEFINED: it is the robbery or forcible depredation in the high seas or in Philippine Water
without lawful authority and done with animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
ELEMENTS:
1. that a vessel is on high seas
2. that the offenders are strangers to the vessel; meaning, they are not members of the complement
or passengers of the vessel
3. that the offenders: (a) attack that vessel, OR (b) seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers
** If the offenders who seized the vessel by “violence or intimidation”, or “force upon things” are members
of the crew or passengers, piracy is NOT committed but robbery on the high seas.
** Both in piracy and in common robbery on the high seas, there is intent to gain and the manner of
committing the crime is the same.
Distinguished from piracy, offenders in piracy are strangers to the vessels and with intent to gain thus,
mutiny is usually committed by the other members of the complement and may be committed by the passengers of
the vessel and the offenders may only intend to ignore the ship’s officers or they may be prompted by a desire to
commit plunder.
HIGH SEAS- refer to any waters on the seacoasts, which are without the boundaries of the low-water
mark, although such waters may be the jurisdictional limits of a foreign government; the UNCLOS defines such as
parts of the seas that are not included in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in the territorial seas, or in the internal
waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.
** Qualified Piracy is a special complex crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, regardless of the number
of victims.
** Any of said crimes that accompany the commission of piracy becomes an element of qualified piracy.
RA 6235:
ANTI-AIRCRAFT PIRACY OR HIJACKING LAW OF 1971
ACTS PUNISHED:
1. Usurping or seizing control of aircraft of Philippine registry, while it is in flight, compelling the pilots
thereof to change the course or destination.
2. Usurping or seizing control of an aircraft of foreign registry, while within Philippine territory,
compelling the pilots thereof to land in any part of Philippines territory.
3. Carrying or loading on board an aircraft operating as a public utility passenger aircraft in the
Philippines, flammable, corrosive, explosive or poisonous substances; and
4. Loading, shipping, or transporting on board a cargo aircraft operating as a public utility in the
Philippines, flammable, corrosive, or poisonous substances, IF not done in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the Air Transportation Office.
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AIRCRAFT IS “IN FLIGHT” – from the moment all exterior doors are closed following embarkation, until such
time when any of such doors are again opened for embarkation.
The act of the accused in People vs. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475, who compelled the pilot to change the
course of the airplane from Laoag to Amoy instead of directing it to Aparri and, in not complying with such illegal
requirement, the accused discharged various revolver shots, killing him, could have been punished under Section 2
of Republic Act No. 6235, had this law been already in effect.
In People vs. Aranas, G.R. No. 123101, Nov. 22, 2000, the Court held that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the pirates who committed the crime charged. Prosecution
witness Uy identified the two armed men, who initially pointed a gun at him as Aranas and Paracueles. On the other
hand, prosecution witness Magalona who saw Uy and the two armed men, identified one of those two as appellant
Elmer Manalili. Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital question, such as the identity of the offender,
the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. The identity of the offender, like the
crime itself must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no positive identification of the appellant inasmuch
as prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona contradicted themselves on the identity of the alleged offender.
Moreover, although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy stated that one of the pirates who opened the locker of
Ernesto Magalona had a tattoo on his left hand with the initials “GV,” the trial court did not see any tattoo mark on
the appellant’s left hand. Further, witness Uy declared that he saw appellant for the first time during the
investigation before the municipal judge of Ubay. He told the municipal judge that appellant’s face was “familiar
among the eight seajackers,” but Magalona identified appellant as one of the pirates. Compared with the
identification made by Magalona, Uy’s statement that appellant’s face was familiar among the pirates is
characterized by uncertainty. His identification of appellant in the trial court based on the aforementioned statement
retained its doubtful tenor. Appellant was acquitted.
Title 2
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
(ARTS. 124-133)
ART. 124: ARBITRARY DETENTION
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he detains a person
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
** The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a person they have no legal grounds
therefore.
** Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
** If the detention is perpetrated by other public officers, the crime committed may be illegal detention,
because they are acting in their private capacity.
** If the offender is a private individual, the act of detaining another is illegal detention under Article
267 or Article 268.
** But private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain policemen are guilty of
arbitrary detention.
Arrest without warrant is the usual cause of arbitrary detention. Arrest without warrant – when lawful. (Sec.
5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
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** Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the actual commission of a crime by the person detained
is not necessary to justify his detention because the legality of the detention of a person does not depend
upon the actual commission of a crime by him, but upon the nature of his deed when its characterization
as crime may reasonably be inferred by the officer to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for
the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of that person.
** The crime of arbitrary detention can be committed through imprudence.
Art. 125: DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he has detained a person for some legal ground (n.b. warrantless arrest)
3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
prescribed period:
12 hours – light penalties or their equivalent.
18 hours – correctional penalties or their equivalent
36 hours – afflictive penalties or their equivalent
“Shall fail to deliver to proper authorities” does NOT mean physical delivery, but the making of an
accusation or charge, or filing of an information against the person arrested, with the corresponding court
or judge.
REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION: The person so arrested without a warrant may
request for a preliminary investigation, but he must sign a waiver of Art. 126. To avail of this, the penalty
must be higher than 4 years and 2 months
WARRANT OF ARREST: Art. 125 is NOT applicable when the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest,
in which case he can be detained indefinitely. An inquest proceeding is done to determine the validity of
the arrest
ILLEGAL DETENTION:
1. If the offender is a private individual, then the crime is Illegal detention
2. In illegal detention, the detention is legal from the beginning, but becomes illegal after a certain
period of time because the offended party is not delivered to the proper judicial authority within
the period specified.
In the case of Agbas vs.Hon. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R.No. 134503, July 2, 1999. “Judicial Authority” as
contemplated by Article 125 means “the courts of justice or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order
the temporary detention of a person charged with having committed a public offense – the Supreme Court and other
inferior courts as may be established by law.” A municipal court judge even in the performance of his function to
conduct preliminary investigation retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment.
Furthermore, upon filing of the complaint with the MCTC, the intent behind Article 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his
application with the court; he may be released on bail.
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** Wardens and jailers are the public officers most likely to violate Article 126 because they are the ones
who are temporarily in charge of the custody of prisoners or detained persons.
AUTHORIZED BY LAW:
1. TO DEPORT:
Only President of the Philippines is authorized to deport aliens under the RAC, Sec. 69 with (1)
investigation by the Deportation Board and (2) recommendation of such Board to the President
2. TO COMPEL CHANGE OF RESIDENCE:
Only the Court by a final judgment can order a person to change his residence. This is illustrated in
ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and in the penalty pf destierro.
The Court ruled in Villavicencio, et al. vs. Lukban, et al. 39 Phil. 778 that the Mayor and the Chief of
Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing in that City to go and live in Davao against their will, there
being no law that authorizes them to do so. These women, despite their being in a sense, lepers of society, are
nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other
citizens.
COMMON ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. And that he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling, and/or to make a search
for papers and for other effects.
** The offender who enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof must be a public officer or
employee in order for this Article to be violated. Otherwise, if it is committed by a private individual, the crime
committed is trespass to dwelling under Article 280.
** The public officer or employee is authorized by judicial order when he is armed with a search warrant duly
issued by the court.
** To constitute a violation of domicile, the entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the will
of the owner of the dwelling, which presupposes opposition or prohibition by said owner, whether express or
implied. If the entrance by the public officer or employee is only without the consent of the owner of the
dwelling, the crime is not committed. Neither is the crime committed if the owner of the dwelling consented to
such entrance.
** An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in
Section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed
to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (Sec. 11, Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
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ART. 129: SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF
THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED
PUNISHABLE ACTS:
1. By procuring a search warrant without just cause; or
2. Though having procured the same with just cause:
a. by exceeding his authority or,
b. by using unnecessary severity in executing this search warrant legally procured
SEARCH WARRANT is an order in writing, issued in the name of the people of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before
the court. (Sec. 1, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
** Personal Property to be seized. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
Subject of the offense;
Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
** Requisites for issuing search warrant. (Sec. 4, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
A search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
** Validity of search warrant. (Sec. 10, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure): 10 days from its date.
** Probable cause defined: It is such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man
in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper.
** Test of lack of just cause. The true test of lack of just cause is whether the affidavit filed in support of the
application for search warrant has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the applicant for search warrant or his witnesses.
Sec. 12, Rule 126, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
In Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that in addition to the cases mentioned in Rule 113,
Sec. 5, of the Rules of Court, valid warrantless searches are limited to 1) customs searches; 2) searches of moving
vehicles; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view; 4) consent searches; 5) searches incidental to lawful arrest; and 6)
“stop and frisk.”
In the case of Robin Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997. Petitioner Robin
Padilla was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866 when found with high-
powered firearms with live ammunitions on October 3, 1992. Consequently, he was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum. During the investigation, Padilla claimed that the firearms were used for shooting. He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the firearms.
** Article 130 does not apply to searches of vehicles or other means of transportation, because the searches
are not made in dwelling.
** Search without warrant under the Tariff and Customs Code does not include a dwelling house.
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** The offender must be a stranger and not a participant thereto otherwise the crime committed would be
unjust vexation.
** The interruption of a peaceful meeting of a municipal council by a public officer is a crime against a
legislative body and not punished under this Article.
** The construction of a fence in front of the chapel, even though irritating and vexatious to those present in
the “pabasa,” is not “notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” The crime committed is only unjust
vexation defined and penalized in Article 287. (People vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369)
** Religious ceremonies: are those religious acts performed outside of a church, such as processions and
special prayers for burying dead persons.
Title 3
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
CHAPTER I
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Rebellion v. Treason: Rebellion always involves taking up arms against the government, giving aid
and comfort is not criminal in rebellion; Treason may be committed by mere adherence to the enemy
giving them aid or comfort.
Rebellion v. Subversion: Subversion is a crime against national security; Rebellion is a crime against
public order.
Levying war against the government during peacetime for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. 134
(Coup d’etat) is Rebellion.
B. The participants:
1. Any person who
(a) participates or
(b) executes the commands of others in rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat;
2. Any person not in the government service who (a) participates, (b) supports, (c) finances, (d)
abets or (e) aids in undertaking a coup d’etat.
Public officer must take active part, to be liable; mere silence or omission is not punishable in
rebellion.
Being a mere assistant to a principal, guilty of the crime of rebellion, the accused is guilty only as a
participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion.
When the rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any
person who in fact directed the others spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issue in
their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels, shall be deemed a leader of such
rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat.
Rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes on the occasion thereof, either as a means
to its commission or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
In both proposal and inciting to commit rebellion, the crime of rebellion should not be actually committed
by the persons to whom it is proposed or who are incited. Otherwise, the proponent or the one inciting becomes
a principal by inducement in the crime of rebellion.
ART.139: SEDITION
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offenders rise (a) publicly and (b) tumultuously;
2. That they employ force, intimidation or other means outside of the legal methods;
3. That the offenders employ any of those means to attain any of the following objects:
a. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election;
b. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government, or any public
officer therefrom from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any
administrative order;
c. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or
employee;
d. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or
any social class; and
e. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National
Government of all its property or any part thereof.
TREASON V. SEDITION: Treason is the violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign; while
Sedition is the raising of commotion or disturbances in the state.
SEDITION V. REBELLION:
1. In both rebellion and sedition, there must be public uprising.
2. While in rebellion there must be taking up of arms against the government, in sedition, it is
sufficient that the public uprising is tumultuous.
3. While in sedition, the purpose of the offenders may be political or social; in rebellion, it is always
political.
1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts of sedition, by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.
The essence is the inciting of the people to rise publicly and tumultuously. It is the use of words,
emblems…etc. and not the performance of the act of sedition, which is punished in inciting to
sedition.
Elements:
a) That the offender does NOT take direct part in the crime of sedition.
b) That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the act which constitutes sedition.
c) That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end.
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace. It is punishable
when:
a) They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office.
b) They tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes.
c) They suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots.
d) They lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities; or disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government.
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the government or any of the duly
constituted authorities, which tend to disturb the public peace.
CHAPTER II
CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION
ART. 143: ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY AND SIMILAR
BODIES
ELEMENTS:
1. That there be:
a. A projected meeting or actual meeting,
b. Of the National Assembly or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions
or committees or divisions, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board.
2. That the offender who may be any person PREVENTS such meeting by force or fraud.
One, who disturbs the proceedings of the Congress, may also be punished for contempt by the
Congress.
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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2. Arresting or searching any member while the Congress is in regular session or special session,
except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty of
Prision Mayor or higher.
Chapter III
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
Persons merely present at the meeting must have a common intent to commit the felony of illegal assembly.
It is necessary that the audience is actually incited. If in the meeting the audience is incited the commission of
rebellion or sedition, the crimes committed are ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY as regards to the organizers or leaders
or persons merely present; INCITING TO REBELLION or SEDITION insofar as the one inciting them in
concerned.
If any person carries an unlicensed firearm, it is presumed that the purpose of the meeting insofar as he is
concerned is to commit acts punishable under the RPC and he is considered a leader or organizer of the
meeting.
PERSONS LIABLE:
1. Founders, directors and president of the association.
2. Members of the association
CHAPTER IV
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCES AND DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
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Offended party need not be a person in authority or his agent; they may be a private
individual.
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2. Refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation while before such legislative or constitutional body
or official.
3. Refusing to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his
possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions.
4. Restraining another from attending as a witness in such legislative or constitutional body.
5. Inducing disobedience to summons or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official.
The crime consists of the failure to comply with the direct orders issued by the authorities in the
exercise of official duties.
AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY is any person who by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security
of life and property, such as barangay councilman, barangay policeman, barangay leader officers and members of
the Barangay Community Brigades, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority are also deemed as
persons in authority (Article 152, as amended).
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC ORDER
ART. 153: TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER
Punishable acts:
1. Causing any serious disturbance in public place, office or establishment.
2. Interrupting or disturbing public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful
meetings, if the act is not included in 131-132
3. Making an outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association, or
public place.
4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place.
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.
Actual public disorder or actual damage to the credit of the State is not necessary.
Offender must know that the news is false
If there is no possibility of danger to the public order or of causing damage to the interest or credit of
the State by the publication of the false news, Art. 154 is not applicable.
CHAPTER VI
EVASION OF SENTENCE
ART. 156: DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL
ELEMENTS:
1. That there is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment (detention included)
2. That the offender removes such person, or helps the escape of such person.
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
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Violation of Conditional Pardon is a distinct crime; Conditional Pardon is a contract between the
convict and the Chief Executive.
Conditions extend to special laws
Offender must be found guilty of subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under Art. 159
Offender can be arrested and reincarcerated without trial – in accordance with Sec. 64 (1) of the RAC
Duration of the conditions subsequent is limited to the remaining period of the sentence.
CHAPTER VII
COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED
FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
ART. 160: COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING THE SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED
FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE (QUASI-RECIDIVISM)
QUASI-RECIDIVISM is a special aggravating circumstance where a person after having been convicted
by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgment
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the
same.
The first crime which the offender is serving sentence need not be a felony; new offense need not be of
different character from that of the former offense. (the second crime must be a felony)
Does not require that the two offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code.
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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As distinguished from REITERACION, which requires that the offender against whom it is considered
shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses, the special aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances.
The second paragraph of Art.160 provides that a quasi-recidist who is not a habitual criminal shall be
pardoned when he has reached the age of 70 years and has already served out his original sentence, or
when he shall complete it after reaching after reaching said age. Otherwise, by reason of his conduct or
other circumstances, he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
Title 4
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
The following are crimes against public interest:
1. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippines (Art. 161);
2. Using forged signature or counterfeiting seal or stamp (Art. 162);
3. Making and importing and uttering false coins (Art. 163);
4. Mutilation of coins, importation and uttering of mutilated coins (Art. 164);
5. Selling of false or mutilated coins, without connivance (Art. 165);
6. Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer, importing and uttering of such false
or forged notes and documents (Art. 166);
7. Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer (Art. 167);
8. Illegal possession and use of forged treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit (Art. 168);
9. Falsification of legislative documents (Art. 170);
10. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary (Art. 171);
11. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents (Art. 172);
12. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph and telephone messages and use of said falsified messages (Art.
173);
13. False medical certificates, false certificates of merit or service (Art. 174);
14. Using false certificates (Art. 175);
15. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification (Art. 176);
16. Usurpation of authority or official functions (Art. 177);
17. Using fictitious name and concealing true name (Art. 178);
18. Illegal use of uniforms or insignia (Art. 179);
19. False testimony against a defendant (Art. 180);
20. False testimony favorable to the defendant (Art. 181);
21. False testimony in civil cases (Art. 182);
22. False testimony in other cases and perjury (Art. 183);
23. Offering false testimony in evidence (Art. 184);
24. Machinations in public auction (Art. 185);
25. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade (Art. 186);
26. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of gold, silver, or other
precious metals or their alloys (Art. 187);
27. Substituting and altering trade marks and trade names or service marks (Art. 188);
28. Unfair competition and fraudulent registration of trade mark or trade name, or service mark; fraudulent
designation of origin, and false description (Art. 189).
The crimes in this title are in the nature of fraud or falsity to the public. The essence of the crime under this title
is that which defraud the public in general. There is deceit perpetrated upon the public. This is the act that is being
punished under this title.
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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In so far as coins in circulation are concerned, there are two crimes that may be committed:
1. Counterfeiting coins -- This is the crime of remaking or manufacturing without any authority to do so.
In the crime of counterfeiting, the law is not concerned with the fraud upon the public such that
even though the coin is no longer legal tender, the act of imitating or manufacturing the coin of the
government is penalized. In punishing the crime of counterfeiting, the law wants to prevent people from
trying their ingenuity in their imitation of the manufacture of money.
It is not necessary that the coin counterfeited be legal tender. So that even if the coin counterfeited
is of vintage, the crime of counterfeiting is committed. The reason is to bar the counterfeiter from
perfecting his craft of counterfeiting. The law punishes the act in order to discourage people from ever
attempting to gain expertise in gaining money. This is because if people could counterfeit money with
impunity just because it is no longer legal tender, people would try to counterfeit non-legal tender coins.
Soon, if they develop the expertise to make the counterfeiting more or less no longer discernible or no
longer noticeable, they could make use of their ingenuity to counterfeit coins of legal tender. From that
time on, the government shall have difficulty determining which coins are counterfeited and those which
are not. It may happen that the counterfeited coins may look better than the real ones. So, counterfeiting is
penalized right at the very start whether the coin is legal tender or otherwise.
2. Mutilation of coins -- This refers to the deliberate act of diminishing the proper metal contents of the coin
either by scraping, scratching or filling the edges of the coin and the offender gathers the metal dust that
has been scraped from the coin.
Mutilation is being regarded as a crime because the coin, being of legal tender, it is still in circulation
and which would necessarily prejudice other people who may come across the coin. For example, X mutilated a P
2.00 coin, the octagonal one, by converting it into a round one and extracting 1/10 of the precious metal dust from
it. The coin here is no longer P2.00 but only P 1.80, therefore, prejudice to the public has resulted.
There is no expertise involved here. In mutilation of coins under the Revised Penal Code, the offender
does nothing but to scrape, pile or cut the coin and collect the dust and, thus, diminishing the intrinsic value of the
coin.
Mutilation of coins is a crime only if the coin mutilated is legal tender. If the coin whose metal content
has been depreciated through scraping, scratching, or filing the coin and the offender collecting the precious metal
dust, even if he would use the coin after its intrinsic value had been reduced, nobody will accept the same. If it is
not legal tender anymore, no one will accept it, so nobody will be defrauded. But if the coin is of legal tender, and
the offender minimizes or decreases the precious metal dust content of the coin, the crime of mutilation is
committed.
In the example, if the offender has collected 1/10 of the P 2.00 coin, the coin is actually worth only P
1.80. He is paying only P1.80 in effect defrauding the seller of P .20. Punishment for mutilation is brought about
by the fact that the intrinsic value of the coin is reduced.
The offender must deliberately reduce the precious metal in the coin. Deliberate intent arises only when
the offender collects the precious metal dust from the mutilated coin. If the offender does not collect such dust,
intent to mutilate is absent, but Presidential Decree No. 247 will apply.
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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QUESTION: X has in his possession a coin which was legal tender at the time of Magellan and is considered a collector’s item. He manufactured several
pieces of that coin. What is the crime committed?
QUESTION: The people playing cara y cruz, before they throw the coin in the air would rub the money to the sidewalk thereby diminishing the intrinsic
value of the coin. Is the crime of mutilation committed?
QUESTION: When the image of Jose Rizal on a five-peso bill is transformed into that of Randy Santiago, is there a violation of Presidential Decree No.
247?
QUESTION: Sometime before martial law was imposed, the people lost confidence in banks that they preferred hoarding their money than depositing it in
banks. Former President Ferdinand Marcos declared upon declaration of martial law that all bills without the Bagong Lipunan sign on them will no longer
be recognized. Because of this, the people had no choice but to surrender their money to banks and exchange them with those with the Bagong Lipunan
sign on them. However, people who came up with a lot of money were also being charged with hoarding for which reason certain printing presses did the
stamping of the Bagong Lipunan sign themselves to avoid prosecution. Was there a violation of Presidential Decree No. 247?
QUESTION: An old woman who was a cigarette vendor in Quiapo refused to accept one-centavo coins for payment of the vendee of cigarettes he
ARTICLE 165.came
purchased. Then SELLING
the police whoOF FALSE
advised the old OR
womanMUTILATED
that she has no rightCOIN, WITHOUT
to refuse since the coins areCONNIVANCE
legal tender. On this, the old woman
acceptedACTS PUNISHED:
in her hands the one-centavo coin and then threw it to the face of the vendee and the police. Was the old woman guilty of violating Presidential
1. Possession of coin, counterfeited or mutilated by another person, with intent to utter the
Decree No. 247?
same, knowing that it is false or mutilated;
QUESTION: A certain customer inElements:
a restaurant wanted to show off and used a P 20.00 bill to light his cigarette. Was he guilty of violating Presidential
Decree No. 247? a) Possession
- Ortega Notes
b) With intent to utter; and
c) Knowledge.
2. Actually uttering such false or mutilated coin, knowing the same to be false or mutilated.
Elements:
a) Actually uttering; and
b) Knowledge.
ARTICLE 168. ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND
OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT
ELEMENTS:
1. Any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer,
or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is
forged or falsified by another person;
2. Offender knows that any of those instruments is forged or falsified;
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3. He either –
a) uses any of such forged or falsified instruments; or
b) possesses with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.
Forgery under the Revised Penal Code applies to papers, which are in the form of obligations and securities
issued by the Philippine government as its own obligations, which is given the same status as legal tender.
Generally, the word “counterfeiting” is not used when it comes to notes; what is used is “forgery.” Counterfeiting
refers to money, whether coins or bills.
The Revised Penal Code defines forgery under Article 169. Notice that mere change on a document does
not amount to this crime. The essence of forgery is giving a document the appearance of a true and genuine
document. Not any alteration of a letter, number, figure or design would amount to forgery. At most, it would only
be frustrated forgery.
When what is being counterfeited is obligation or securities, which under the Revised Penal Code is given a
status of money or legal tender, the crime committed is forgery.
QUESTION: Instead of the peso sign (P), somebody replaced it with a dollar sign ($). Was the crime of forgery committed?
QUESTION: 1. An old man, in his desire to earn something, scraped a digit in a losing sweepstakes ticket, cut out a digit from another ticket and pasted it
there to match the series of digits corresponding to the winning sweepstakes ticket. He presented this ticket to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
But the alteration is so crude that even a child can notice that the supposed digit is merely superimposed on the digit that was scraped. Was the old man
guilty of forgery?
QUESTION: A person has a twenty-peso bill. He applied toothache drops on one side of the bill. He has a mimeograph paper similar in texture to that of
the currency note and placed it on top of the twenty-peso bill and put some weight on top of the paper. After sometime, he removed it and the printing on
the twenty-peso
ARTICLE 170.bill was reproduced on the mimeo
FALSIFICATION OFpaper. He took the reverse
LEGISLATIVE side of the P20 bill, applied toothache drops and reversed the mimeo
DOCUMENTS
paper and pressed it to the paper. After sometime, he removed it and it was reproduced. He cut it out, scraped it a little and went to a sari-sari store
ELEMENTS:
trying to buy a cigarette with that bill. What he overlooked was that, when he placed the bill, the printing was inverted. He was apprehended and was
prosecuted and1. There
convicted is a Was
of forgery. bill,theresolution orcommitted?
crime of forgery ordinance enacted or approved or pending approval by either
House of the Legislature or any provincial board or municipal council; - Ortega Notes
The words "municipal council" should include the city council or municipal board – Reyes.
The crime of falsification must involve a writing that is a document in the legal sense. The writing must be
complete in itself and capable of extinguishing an obligation or creating rights or capable of becoming evidence of
the facts stated therein. Until and unless the writing has attained this quality, it will not be considered as document
in the legal sense and, therefore, the crime of falsification cannot be committed in respect thereto.
The term forgery as used in Article 169 refers to the falsification and counterfeiting of treasury or bank
notes or any instruments payable to bearer or to order.
For example, a customer in a hotel did not write his name on the registry book, which was intended to be a
memorial of those who got in and out of that hotel. There is no complete document to speak of. The
document may not extinguish or create rights but it can be an evidence of the facts stated therein.
Note that a check is not yet a document when it is not completed yet. If somebody writes on it, he makes a
document out of it.
The document where a crime was committed or the document subject of the prosecution may be totally false
in the sense that it is entirely spurious. This notwithstanding, the crime of falsification is committed.
It does not require that the writing be genuine. Even if the writing was through and through false, if it
appears to be genuine, the crime of falsification is nevertheless committed.
In the case of Enemecio vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 146731, January 13, 2004, Petitioner Agustina
Enemecio is a utility worker at Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology who
file a criminal complaint against private respondent Servando Bernante, an Assistant professor IV of the said state
college. The complaint was grounded on the fact that private respondent allegedly falsified his requests and
application for a force and vacation leave for a vacation, thus resulting to the approval of the leave, when in fact he
is in jail serving his 20-day imprisonment for slight physical injuries. The main issue is whether or not the act
committed by private respondent will qualify for the crime of falsification of public document. The Court ruled that
there is no falsification. There is no doubt that the leave forms signed by the respondent are public documents and
that he is a public servant. But there is no provision in the law which gives him or anyone who wants to avail of
their leave credit a legal obligation to specifically identify the purpose. To sum it up, there is no falsification of
leave forms where there is no requirement for he indication of reasons for going on leave. Regardless of such
requirement, the need to indicate the whereabouts of a vacationing employee is not a necessity for its approval.
In the case of Dizon vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 144026, June 15, 2006, the First United
Construction Corporation is a new corporation in the construction industry; hence it needs to show that it has
already performed various projects so that it can qualify to participate in the government-project buildings. The
Public Estate Authorty conducted bidding in relation for a government project, Bahay Pangarap. Because of the
willingness to participate and be qualified for the said project, Fernando Dizon, officer of the FUCC and herein
petitioner asked his father Felipe Dizon, who is the vice president and project manager of the Titan Construction
Corporation (TCC), to give him a certification showing that FUCC has undertaken building construction, sewage,
water, and other civil works, for some of the project of TCC. Due to the request of his son, Felipe Dizon approached
Jose Caneo, vice president for special projects of the TCC and conveyed his son’s request. The latter asked the
former to prepare the certification for he will be the one to make the same be signed by the president. Jose Caneo
gave the certification to Felipe Dizon two weeks after. Because of this, FUCC became qualified and later the
contract was awarded to FUCC which severely caused profit loss for TCC, one of the defeated bidders. Atty. Jaime
Linsangan, counsel for TCC, presented the certification which was presented by FUCC during the bidding
conducted of the Bahay Pangarap Project, and testified that said certification is false, and that the signature of the
president was forged. Fernando Dizon argues that he did not falsify the said document, that he idi not participate in
its construction, and that he just requested for a certification to his father so that FUCC may be qualified for the
bidding, and that such certifications is widely used by many in the construction industry to help and support small
and starting companies. But Jose Caneo, witness of the prosecution, alleges that the professor of the falsified
document is presumed to be the author thereof as laid down in several jurisprudences. The Court ruled that there is
no falsification. In order that petitioner may be convicted of falsification under par. 2 of Art. 171, it is essential that
it be proved beyond reasonable doubt that he caused it to appear that the TCC president authorized the issuance of
said certification, when in truth, the president did not partake in said issuance of the certificate. The Court is not
convinced on speculation and presumptions of the witnesses.
In the case of Bernardino vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 170453, October 30, 2006, petitioner
Bernardino was a former municipal mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and the chairman of the Prequalification Bid
and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the construction of the extension of the public market of Guimba while Barawid,
a municipal treasurer was a member of the PBAC. Petitioner Tomas was the municipal secretary.Mayor Dizon, the
elected mayor in 1998, thereafter conducted a public bidding for the construction of the same extension and
awarded the project to KYRO Builder as the lowest bidder. Consequently, the MLASCOM filed before the office of
the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid for violation of the Anti-Graft
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Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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and Corrupt Practices Act. On the basis of the admission of the said affiants, the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the case against Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid and instead filed the instant case for the
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC against all the members including the herein
petitioners.The decision of the Sandiganbayan was reversed and set aside with respect to the petitioners Bernardino
and Barawid who were acquitted of the crime falsification under Art 171 of the RPC. Insofar as petitioner Tomas is
concerned, her conviction was affirmed.
In the case of Siquian vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 82197, March 13, 1989, Manuel Siquian,
then the municipal mayor of Angandanan, Isabela was charged of the crime of falsification of public document when
he put into office and appointed Jesusa Carreon as the municipal clerk. Carreon was never paid of the monthly
salary of 120 Php for the months of July through December 1975. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to ask regarding her unpaid salaries. It appeared from the evidence that in the Plantilla of Personnel
for 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the office of the Municipal
Secretary of Angandanan. It was undisputed that since the Municipal Council failed to enact the annual budget of
the municipality in the year 1975-1976, the annual budget for the last Fiscal Year of 1975-1976 was deemed re-
enacted. Siquian was found guilty.The Court ruled that petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing
the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act
QUESTION: A is onecriminal
of those since
sellingitresidence
amounts certificates in Quiapo.
to an untruthful He wasinbrought
statement to theofpolice
a narration factsprecinct on suspicion
in a public that the certificates he was
document.
selling to the public proceed from spurious sources and not from the Bureau of Treasury. Upon verification, it was found out that the certificates were
indeed printed with a booklet of supposed residence certificates. What crime was committed?
QUESTION: Public officers found traffic violation receipts from a certain person. The receipts were not issued by the Motor Vehicle Office. For what
crime should he be prosecuted for?
QUESTION: In a case where a lawyer tried to extract money from a spinster by typing on a bond paper a subpoena for estafa. The spinster agreed to
pay. The spinster went to the prosecutor’s office to verify the exact amount and found out that there was no charge against her. The lawyer was
prosecuted for falsification. He contended that only a genuine document could be falsified. Rule.
-Ortega Notes
THERE ARE FOUR KINDS OF DOCUMENTS:
1. Public document in the execution of which, a person in authority or notary public has taken part
2. Official document in the execution of which a public official takes part
3. Commercial document or any document recognized by the Code of Commerce or any commercial law, and
4. Private document in the execution of which only private individuals take part.
Public document is broader than the term official document. Before a document may be considered official,
it must first be a public document. But not all public documents are official documents. To become an official
document, there must be a law which requires a public officer to issue or to render such document. Example: A
cashier is required to issue an official receipt for the amount he receives. The official receipt is a public document
which is an official document.
although not to Guillas but to Ernesto Hernandez. Thus, AFPSLAI suffered no damage because it really owed the
P21,000.00 finder’s fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guillas and only later turned over to
Hernandez.
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In the case of Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals and People, GR No. 112170, April 10, 1996, A
complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits has been filed against
petitioner and other officials of the DENR. The complaint alleged the involvement of petitioner and others in the
illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. The counsel for petitioner requested
for a copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked Ursua to take the request to the Office of
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Ursua told
Perez that he was reluctant to ask for the document since he was one of the respondents. The latter told him to just
sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. And indeed, that was
what Ursua did when he was asked to acknowledge receipt of the document. Before petitioner could leave the
premise, he was greeted by an acquaintance, who also worked in the same office. When the person who gave the
document to Ursua learned and reported that the person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was actually
Cesario Ursua, the Deputy Ombudsman recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. The Court ruled that
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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he is not guilty of the crime charged. The enactment of CA No 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. CA No 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. The use of fictitious name or a different
name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by his name in addition to his real name from the day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in
CA No 142 as amended. “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had
used or was intending to use the name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of “Oscar Perez”
was made in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.
ARTICLE 183. FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN AFFIRMATION
ACTS PUNISHED:
1. By falsely testifying under oath;
2. By making a false affidavit.
ELEMENTS OF PERJURY:
1. Offender makes a statement under oath or executes an affidavit upon a material matter;
2. The statement or affidavit is made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oaths;
3. Offender makes a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement or
affidavit;
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law, that is, it is made
for a legal purpose.
CASE on PERJURY:
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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Facts: An agreement was entered into between Refactories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) as
represented by Villanueva and Borgonia and Humburg Trading Corporation (HTC) as represented by the Horst-
Kessler Von Springesner. The agreement was a result of the amicable settlement of the same parties. However, the
conflict arose when a phrase was inserted by RCP in the said agreement to the prejudice of HTC because of their
lack of knowledge and consent. HTC filed an Urgent Motion to vacate the agreement because of the false testimony
particularly by accusing Villanueva to be the one who prepared and inserted the said phrase. Upon determination of
probable cause, the perjury case was filed against HTC in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. On appeal,
Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor for failure to establish the materiality of false
assertions and the said assertion were willful and deliberate. RCP filed a petition for certiorari in the CA but the
same court affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Held: The Court held that perjury is an obstruction of Justice. Its perpetration may affect the earnest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made.
In perjury, a mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood is root enough. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is avoiding the belief or conviction
as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest
mistake is not perjury.
In the said case, the testimony of HTC in its urgent motion to vacate honestly believed that it
was Villanueva who prepared and inserted the said phrase in the agreement.
Thus, the assertion was an honest mistake.
2. Attempting to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises or any
other artifice.
Elements:
a) There is a public auction;
b) Offender attempts to cause the bidders to stay away from that public auction;
c) It is done by threats, gifts, promises or any other artifice;
d) Offender has the intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned.
Facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, President and General Manager of
Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO) Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of
Investigation filed an application for search warrant with the RTC of Cebu City. The application sought the
authorization to search the premise of wrought iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the object of
unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the RPC as amended. The assailed search
warrant was issued by respondent Judge on October 16, 1997and executed in the afternoon of the following day by
NBI agents. Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture , indicated in the inventory sheet attached to the
return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have remained in NBI custody up to the present. On October 30,
1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not exist;
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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(b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching
questions; and (d) the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized.
Held: The issue involving the existence of “unfair competition” as a felony involving design patents, referred to in
Art. 189 of the RPC, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article. The search warrant cannot
even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts specifically alleged were the
manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing and
license or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding MENDCO and the buying public.
There was no mention of any crime of “unfair competition” involving design patents in the controlling
provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA
8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the RPC. In the face of this ambiguity, the courts must strictly
construe the statute against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Title 6
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS (Arts. 195-202)
(2) Any person who knowingly permits any form of gambling, Nos. (1 to 9), to be carried on in an
inhabited or uninhabited place or in any building, vessel or other means of transportation
owned or controlled by him.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon:
(1) Any person who shall knowingly permit any form of gambling to be carried on in a place
which has a reputation of a gambling place or that prohibited gambling is frequently carried on
therein, or in a public or government building or barangay hall;
(2) The maintainer or conductor of the gambling schemes. (Note: Banker is not mentioned in the
decree.)
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period with temporary absolute disqualification or a fine of
P6,000 shall be imposed if the maintainer, conductor or banker of the gambling schemes is a
government official, or where such government official is the player, promoter, referee, umpire, judge
or coach in case of game fixing, point shaving and other machination.
(d) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period or a fine ranging from P400 to P2,000 shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly and without lawful purpose in any hour of any day possesses
any lottery list, paper, or other matter containing letters, figures, signs or symbols pertaining to or in any
manner used in the games of jueteng, jai-alai or horse racing bookies and similar games of lotteries and
numbers which have taken place or about to take place.
Gambling is a game or scheme the result of which depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard.
Playing of monte for money is not a necessary element (U.S. vs. Rafael, 23 Phil. 184).
A game or scheme is punishable even if the winning depends upon skill, "when wagers consisting of
money, articles or value or representative of value are at stake or made."
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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CHAPTER II
OFFENSES AGAINST DECENCY AND GOOD CUSTOMS
ART. 200: GRAVE SCANDAL
Consists of acts which are offensive to decency and good customs which, having been committed publicly,
have given rise to public scandal to persons who have accidentally witnessed the same.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender performs an act or acts.
2. That such act or acts be highly scandalous as offending against decency and good customs.
3. That the highly scandalous conduct is not expressly falling within any other article of this
Code.
4. That the act or acts complained of be committed in a public place within the public
knowledge or view.
If the act or acts of the offender are punished under another article of this Code, Art. 200 is not
applicable.
Distinction should be made as to the place where the offensive act was committed:
a.) If in public place, there is criminal liability irrespective of whether the immoral act was in open
public view;
b.) If in private place, public view is required.
Public view does not require numerous persons. Even if there was only one person who witnessed the
offensive act for as long as the third person was not an intruder, grave scandal is committed provided
the acts do not fall under any other crime in the RPC.
Other Possible Crime:
Alarms and Scandals (Art. 155) – if it results to disturbance of public tranquility.
ART. 201: IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS, AND INDECENT
SHOWS (AS AMENDED BY P.D. 969)
PERSONS LIABLE:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly and contrary to public morals;
2. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
3. Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are proscribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which:
a. Glorify criminals or condone crimes
b.Serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography
c. Offend any race or religion
d.Tend to abet traffic in the use of prohibited drugs and
e. Are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts;
4. Those who shall sell, give away, or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculptures, or literature,
which are offensive to morals.
TEST OF OBSCENITY: Whether or not the material charged as obscene has the tendency to deprave and
corrupt the minds of those open to the influence, or into whose hands such material may come to (Kottinger
Rule). Where such obscenity is made publicly, criminal liability arises.
It is more on the effect upon the viewer and not alone on the conduct of the performer.
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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review. The decision of the Secretary of the National Defense shall be final and unappealable.
(Sec. 2, P.D. 969)
Prostitution is a term applicable also to a man if he engages in the same conduct: sex for money does not
constitute prostitution but vagrancy.
The common concept of a vagrant is a person who loiters in public places without any visible means of
livelihood and without any lawful purpose.
The law punishes the act involved here as a stepping stone to the commission of other crimes. Without this
article, law enforcers would have no way of checking a person loitering in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Title 7
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
ART. 203: WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS
REQUISITES:
One must be-
1. Taking part in the performance of public functions in the Government or performing in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official
of any rank or class.
2. That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties
must be-
a. By direct provision of law
b. By popular election
c. By appointment by competent authority
Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (AGCPA), the term public officer is broader and more
comprehensive because it includes all persons whether an official or an employee, temporary or not, classified
or not, contractual or otherwise. Any person who receives compensation for services rendered is a public
officer.
Chapter II
CRIMES OF MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
MISFEASANCE- improper performance of some act which might lawfully be done
MALFEASANCE- the performance of some act which ought not to be done
NONFEASANCE- omission of some act which ought to be performed
Judgment is a final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
matters submitted to it, in an action or proceeding.
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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A mere fact that the judge promised to the other party that he would decide the case against the
complainant does not prove that the judgment is unjust. It is possible that such judgment is supported
by the facts and the law.
The rule requires that judgment should be rendered by the judge with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice.
The discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses, may be exercised only after there has
been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the
discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. It follows that any order issued in
the absence of the requisite evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness. (Nano v. Baylon; Layola v. Gabo, January 26, 2000 A.M. No. RTJ-
00-1524)
Interlocutory order – is one which is issued by the court but which the commencement and the end of
a suit or action in issue.
PERSONS LIABLE:
1. Public officer
2. An officer of the law
Prevaricacion used to be a crime under the Spanish Codigo Penal wherein a public officer, regardless
of his duty, violates the oath of his office by not carrying out the duties of his office for which he was
sworn to office thus amounting to dereliction of duty.
The thrust of prevaricacion is the breach of the oath of office by the public officer who does an act in
relation to his official duties.
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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The crime committed by the law violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the law-violator is not
proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under this article is not liable.
BIR officers, agents, or employees who, having knowledge or information of a violation of the
Internal Revenue Law, fail to report such knowledge or information to their superiors, shall be
punished under that law, not under this provision.
"With a view to engaging-" disclosure here is already confidential (Revised Rules on Evidence).
The nominal liability under this article may be constituted either from breach of professional duties in
the handling of the case or it may arise out of the confidential relation between the lawyer and the
client.
Breach of professional duty- tardiness in the prosecution or the case for which reason the case was
dismissed for being non-prosecuted; or tardiness on the part of the defense counsel leading to
declaration of default and adverse judgment.
Breach of confidential relation- revealing information obtained or taking advantage thereof by
accepting the engagement with the adverse party. There is no need to prove that the client suffered
damages. The mere breach of confidential relation is punishable
QUALIFIED BRIBERY – committed by public officers entrusted with the enforcement of law and whose duty is
to arrest and prosecute those who violate them where the penalty for the same is reclusion perpetua or higher.
For purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to
constitute a person a public officer.
The gift may be received by the public officer himself or through a third person.
The gift or present must be capable of pecuniary estimation.
The crime of direct bribery may be committed only in the attempted and consummated stages, because
in frustrated felony, the offender must have performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence.
The crime is applicable even to a temporary appointee or a de facto officer.
Bribery refers to the act of the receiver and the act of the giver is Corruption of Public Official.
In Direct bribery, consider whether the official act which the public officer agreed to do is a crime or not:
1. If it will amount to a crime, it is not necessary that the corruptor should deliver the consideration on the
doing of the act.
2. If it is not a crime, the consideration must be delivered by the corruptor before a public officer can be
prosecuted for bribery.
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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R.A. 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
As amended by R.A. 3047, P.D. 77 and B.P. 195
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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NOTE: It is enough to prove that the accused is a public officer. It is the commission of the act,
not the character or effect that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited
by the Constitution or by law from having any interest.
NOTE: Actual intervention in the transaction which one has financial or pecuniary interest is
required in order that liability may attach.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and
which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate
in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
NOTE: Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible
for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transactions or acts by the
board, panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege, or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on
account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of
its authorized date.
NOTE: The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in
subparagraphs (b) & (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned
in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information
referred to in subparagraph (k), together with the public officer, shall be punished under
Section 9 of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of
the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.
(a) Taking advantage of family or close personal relation with public official is punished.
NOTE: The offender is any person who has family or close personal relation with any public
official who has to intervene in some business, transaction, application, request or contract of
the Government with any person.
NOTE: The act constituting the crime: capitalizing or exploiting or taking advantage of such
family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present,
gift, or material or pecuniary advantage from the person having business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the Government.
(b) Knowingly inducing or causing any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3.
Section 5. Prohibition of certain relatives.
The spouse or any relative, by consanguinity, within the 3rd civil degree, of the President, the Vice-
President, Senate President, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives is prohibited to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government.
Exceptions to the provisions of Section 5:
1. Any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of those officials to whom he is related,
has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of
public office;
2. Any application filed by him, the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official/s
concerned but depends upon compliance with the requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations
issued pursuant to law;
3. Any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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Every public officer shall prepare and file a true and detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amount and sources of his income, the amount of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.
Section 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth.
A public official who has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in
the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and to his lawful income (R.A. 1379)- ground for dismissal or removal
Circumstances which may be taken into consideration to enforce this section:
1. Properties in the name of spouse and other dependents of the public official, when their
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
2. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive- expenditures incurred by the public official,
his spouse or any of their dependents including frequent travel abroad of a non-official character
by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate
income.
NOTE: these circumstances constitute a valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public
official for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.
Section 11. Prescription of offenses.
15 years- prescriptive period of all offenses under the Act.
Section 12. Termination of office.
No public officer is allowed to resign or retire:
1. Pending investigation, criminal or administrative or
2. Pending prosecution against him, or
3. For any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the RPC on bribery.
Section 14. Exception.
Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of
gratitude of friendship according to local custom or usage.
The practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer
who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency,
except where such practice involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of
the violations penalized in this Act.
R.A. 7080
ANTI-PLUNDER ACT
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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NOTE: Mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the courts in the imposition of
penalty.
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.
It is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done. A pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the over-all unlawful scheme or conspiracy shall be sufficient.
Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits.
Pending valid information in court for violation of this Act- Suspension of Public Officer
Conviction by final judgment- Loss of all retirement or gratuity benefits
Acquittal- Reinstatement and entitlement to salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension
Section 6. Prescription of Crimes: 20 years- prescription
CHAPTER III
FRAUD AND ILLEGAL EXECUTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
ART. 213: FRAUDS AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY AND SIMILAR OFFENSES
PUNISHABLE ACTS:
1. Entering into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or making use of any other
scheme, to defraud the Government, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing
supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public
property or funds.
2. Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger that those
authorized by law, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts.
3. Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him
officially, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts.
4. Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of
a nature different from that provided by law, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other
imposts.
Crime of frauds against public treasury is consummated by merely entering into an agreement with any
interested party or speculator or by merely making use of any other scheme to defraud the Government.
Mere demand for larger or different amount is sufficient to consummate the crime.
When there is deceit in demanding greater fees than those prescribed, the crime is ESTAFA and NOT
ILLEGAL EXACTION.
Officers or employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs not covered by this
article. The National Internal Revenue Code or the Administrative Code applies.
The essence of the crime is not misappropriation of any of the amounts but the improper making of the
collection which would prejudice the accounting of collected amounts by the Government.
First form: shall demand an amount different from what the law provides payable to the Government.
In this form, mere demand will consummate the crime, even if the taxpayer shall refuse to
come across with the amount being demanded. That will not affect the consummation of the
crime.
Second form: Shall collect payment due the government without issuing an official receipt or receipt
prescribed by law.
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
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The act of receiving payment due the government without issuing a receipt will give rise to
illegal exaction even though a provisional receipt has been issued. What the law requires is a
receipt in the form prescribed by law, which means official receipt.
Third form: shall accept by way of payment due to the government that which is not in the form
prescribed by law.
Under the rules and regulations of the government, payment of checks not belonging to the
taxpayer but that of checks of other persons, should not be accepted to settle the obligation of
that person.
It is sufficient under this article that the appointive officer has an interest in any transaction of
exchange or speculation, such as, buying and selling stocks, commodities, land, etc., hoping to take
advantage of an expected rise or fall in price.
CHAPTER IV
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY (Arts. 217-221)
ART. 217: MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
PUNISHABLE ACTS:
1. Appropriating public funds or property
2. Taking or misappropriating the same
3. Consenting or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take
such public funds or property
4. Being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property
COMMON ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer who has:
a. Official custody of public funds or property or the duty to collect or receive funds
due to the Government
b. The obligation to account for them to the Government.
2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
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The act of leaving the country must be unauthorized or not permitted by law.
MALVERSATION ILLEGAL USE
Offenders are accountable public officers Offenders are accountable public officers
Offenders in certain cases profit from the proceeds of the Offenders do not derive personal gain or profit
crime
The public fund is to be applied to the personal use and The public fund or property is applied to another public use
benefit of the offender or of another person
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When an accountable officer leaves the country without first settling his accountability or otherwise
securing a clearance from the COA regarding such accountability, the implication is that he left the
country because he has misappropriated the funds under his accountability.
CHAPTER V
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
ART. 223: CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he had in his custody or charge, a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by
final judgment.
3. That such prisoner escaped from his custody.
4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter's escape
The crime is infidelity in the custody of prisoners if the offender involved is the custodian of the
prisoner.
When a chief of police released a detention prisoner/s, because he could not file a complaint against
them within the time fixed in Art. 125, he is not guilty of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.
There is real and actual evasion of service of a sentence when the custodian permits the prisoner to
obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment and to escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty,
thus making the penalty ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled.
If the jail guard who allowed the prisoner to escape is already off-duty at that time and he is no longer
the custodian of the prisoner, the crime committed by him is delivering prisoners from jail.
The crime can be committed also by a private person if the custody of the prisoner has been confided
to a private person.
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What is punished under this is such a definite laxity as all but amounts to deliberate non-performance
of duty on the part of the guard.
The fact that the public officer recaptured the prisoner who had escaped from his custody does not
afford complete exculpation.
ART. 225: ESCAPE OF PRISONER UNDER THE CUSTODY OF A PERSON NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a private person.
2. That the conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest is confided to him.
3. That the prisoner or person under arrest escapes.
4. That the offender consents to the escape of the prisoner or person under arrest, or that the
escape takes place through his negligence.
This article does not apply the principle in conspiracy that "the act of one is the act of all." If the
offender is not the custodian of the prisoner, he is guilty of the crime of delivering prisoners from jail.
REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ILLICIT PURPOSE WITH THE INTENTION EITHER TO:
a. tamper with it
b. profit by it
c. Commit an act constituting a breach of trust in the official care thereof.
If the officer was placed in possession of the document but it is not his duty to be the custodian
thereof, this crime is not committed.
With respect to official documents, infidelity is committed by destroying the documents, or
removing the document or concealing the document.
Damage to public interest is necessary. However, material damage is not necessary.
The simple act of retaining the mail without forwarding the letters to their destination, even though
without opening them or taking the moneys they contained, already constitutes infidelity on the part
of the post office official.
Where documents are sealed by competent authorities, it is evident that the purpose thereof is to
ensure their preservation.
It is not required that there be damage caused or that there be intent to cause damage.
This article does not include the revelation of secrets of the State to belligerent nation, because such
acts are already defined and punished as espionage in Art. 117 or CA No. 616.
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CHAPTER VI
OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
ART. 231: OPEN DISOBEDIENCE
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a judicial or executive officer.
2. That there is a judgment, decision or order of a superior authority.
3. That such judgment, decision or order was made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the
superior authority and issued with all the legal formalities.
4. That the offender without any legal justification openly refuses to execute the said judgment,
decision or order, which he is duty bound to obey.
ART. 232: DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF SUPERIOR OFFICER WHEN SAID ORDER WAS
SUSPENDED BY INFERIOR OFFICER
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That an order is issued by his superior for execution.
3. That he has for any reason suspended the execution of such order.
4. That his superior disapproves the suspension of the execution of the order.
5. That the offender disobeys his superior despite the disapproval of the suspension.
The order of the superior must be legal; otherwise, this article is inapplicable.
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The maltreatment (1) must relate to the correction or handling of the prisoner, or (2) must be for the
purpose of extorting a confession or of obtaining some information from the prisoner.
If the public officer is not the custodian of the prisoner and he manhandled the latter, the crime is
physical injuries
If the maltreatment was done in order to extort confession thereof, the constitutional right of the
prisoner is further violated. The penalty is qualified to the next higher degree.
The purpose of this article is to maintain the separation and independence of the 3 departments of the
government and to keep the 3 branches within the legitimate confines of their respective jurisdictions and the
officers thereof within the scope of their lawful authority.
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
Title 8
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
CHAPTER I
DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
CASES WHEN A PERSON COMMITTED A PARRICIDE BUT NOT IMPOSED THE SEVERE
PENALTY (RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH).
a) When committed though negligence (Art. 365).
b) When committed by mistake (Art. 249).
c) When committed under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247).
In the killing of a spouse, there must be a valid subsisting marriage at the time of the killing. Also the
information should allege the fact of such marriage between accused and the victim. Marriage certificate is
the best evidence, in the absence oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court
if such proof is not objected to. (People v. Malabago Dec. 1196)
The fact of marriage is necessarily included in the information, failure to allege the same; the accused can
not be convicted of parricide as the accused was denied information of the nature of the charge against him.
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
ELEMENTS:
a) a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18
years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another;
b) he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical
injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and
c) He has not promoted of facilitated prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
ISSUES to be resolved:
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QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength , with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of fire, poison, explosion, etc.
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, or any other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Treachery and evident premeditation are inherent in murder by means of poison, and
as such they cannot be considered as aggravating.
Where the circumstances alleged in the information are not the circumstances proved
in the trial, it is not murder because any of the qualifying circumstances in Art. 248
is an ingredient of murder and not merely qualifying circumstances.
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH QUALIFY THE KILLING TO
MURDER:
1. That murder will exist with only one of circumstances described in Art. 248.
a. When more than one of said circumstances is present, the others must be considered as generic
aggravating.
2. That when the other circumstances are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance, they
cannot be considered as generic aggravating;
3. That any of the qualifying circumstance under Art. 248 must be alleged in the information.
Intent to kill, conclusively presumed when death resulted; when the victim does not die, intent to kill
becomes a specific criminal intent which must be established beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise the
crime shall fall under physical injuries.
Evidence of intent to kill is important only in attempted or frustrated homicide.
It is a hornbook doctrine that an accused cannot be charged of an offense unless it is clearly charged in
the complaint or information. A person charged with homicide by stabbing cannot be convicted when
the cause of death is drowning. (People v. Ortega, Jr., July 1997)
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NOTE: RA 8294 amended PD 1866, it now provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be considered as aggravating circumstance.
Injured party must be one or some of the participants in the tumultuous affray.
Only one who used violence is liable.
Penalty is one degree lower than that for physical injury inflicted.
Slight physical injuries excluded.
EUTHANASIA- MERCY KILLING or the practice of painlessly putting to death a person suffering from
some incurable disease. Not considered as lending assistance to suicide because the person killed does not
want to die. A doctor who resorts to mercy-killing of his patient may be liable for murder. It is but
noteworthy that the defense of euthanasia is not recognized in our jurisdiction.
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If there was no intent to kill and the person shot at was hit, the crime would be a complex crime of illegal
discharge of firearm with serious physical injuries. If the injury was slight, two crimes are committed,
illegal discharge of firearm and slight physical injury.
Concealing dishonor is not an element of infanticide but the same may mitigate liability only of the
mother or maternal grandparents.
The penalty is that for parricide or murder, but the name of the crime is always infanticide.
A stranger who cooperates in the perpetration of infanticide committed by the mother or grandparent
on the mother’s side, is liable for infanticide, but he must suffer the penalty prescribed for murder.
PARRICIDE INFANTICIDE
Based on relationship Based on age of the child
Committed only by relatives enumerated May be committed by strangers
Conspiracy cannot be applied because relationship is an Conspiracy is applicable but only one information shall be
element. Separate information must be filed for parricide the prepared for all the conspirators.
murder or homicide on the part of the non-relative conspirator
as the case may be.
To conceal dishonor of the mother is not a mitigating To conceal mothers dishonor is mitigating.
circumstance.
ART. 256: INTENTIONAL ABORTION
Abortion is the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus, or the violent expulsion of the fetus from the
maternal womb which results in the death of the fetus.
ABORTION INFANTICIDE
Fetus is still drawing life from its mother Victim is already a person
Umbilical cord is not yet cut Umbilical chord is cut and the infant is still alive
The baby had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months and is The baby had an intra-uterine life of less than 7 months
killed within 24 hours and it is killed after 24 hours
ACTS PUNISHABLE:
1. by using any violence upon a pregnant woman;
2. by acting but without using force, without the consent of the woman, ( by administering
drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her consent);
3. By acting, (by administering drugs or beverages) with the consent of pregnant.
ELEMENTS:
1. there is a pregnant woman;
2. violence is exerted, or by administering drugs and beverages, or accused otherwise acts
upon such pregnant woman; and
3. as a result of such violence or by administering drugs or beverages, or any acts of the
accused, fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
NOTE: If fetus could sustain an independent life and is killed, it is infanticide; otherwise it is abortion.
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Stranger knows of the pregnancy of the woman Stranger may not know the pregnancy
In both cases, the killing by the woman to conceal dishonor is an extenuating circumstance only in the case
of mother and grandparents.
The “intentional” or “unintentional” refer to the kind of abortion and not the ways of committing it whether
by dolo or culpa.
If when committing intentional abortion, the woman turned out to be not pregnant, it is an impossible crime
of abortion. If the non-pregnant woman suffered physical injuries, then the liability is for physical injuries
and not for impossible crime which is crime of last resort.
The woman cannot commit unintentional abortion against herself, it is always intentional.
NOTE: If the same is sought to conceal dishonor, same may mitigate liability of the mother only.
QUESTION: Is it necessary that the pharmacist knows that the abortive would be used to cause abortion?
ANSWER: No. This article does not require it. What is punished is the dispensing of abortive without the proper
prescription from a physician.
NOTE: RA # 4729 regulates sale dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devises.
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ACTS PUNISHABLE:
1. By killing one’s adversary in a duel;
2. By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries; and
3. By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted.
PERSON’S LIABLE:
1. Person who killed or inflicted physical injuries upon his adversary, or both combatants
any other case as principals;
2. Seconds and accomplices.
NOTE: A person who challenges another to a duel commits grave coercion. If killing occurs, it is homicide
or murder as the case may be.
CHAPTER II
PHYSICAL INJURIES
ART. 262: MUTILATION
KINDS:
1. Intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially of some
essential organ for reproduction;
ELEMENTS:
a) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation such as penis
and ovarium;
b) That mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ of reproduction.
2. Intentionally making other mutilation that is by looping or clipping off any part of the body
of the offended party other than the essential organ for reproduction to deprive him of that
part of the body.
The common mistake is to associate this with reproductive organs only. Mutilation includes any part of
the human body that is not susceptible to grow again (Mayhem).
The offender must have the intention to deprive the offended party of a part of his body.
CHAPTER III
RAPE
RAPE (R.A. 8353)
ART. 266-A: RAPE, WHEN AND HOW COMMITTED
RAPE IS COMMITTED-
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above is present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into genital or anal orifice of another person.
NOTE: The above stated circumstances must be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such.
THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT IMPOSE DEATH ON THE FOLLOWING:
1. age of the victim was not alleged in the information;
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FORCE IN RAPE
It does not mean violently, but with the description of force which must be exercised in order to accomplish
the act for there is no doubt that unlawful connection with a woman in a state of consciousness, produced by
profound sleep, stupor or otherwise amounts to rape.
Force may not be irresistible, all that is necessary that the force used by the accused is sufficient to
consummate his evil purpose, or that it was successfully used.
INTIMIDATION IN RAPE
This includes moral kind that is, threatening the victim with knife. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of
the victim and is, therefore subjective. Its presence cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule, but must be viewed in
the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the crime. The working of the human mind under
emotional state are unpredictable, people react differently in such situations.
STATUTORY RAPE
This is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. Force and intimidation need not be proved; the
birth certificate is the best evidence. Consent is immaterial, what is at stake is that the child is of tender age and does
not have a will of her own.
Title 9
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
CHAPTER I
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY
1. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Art. 267)
2. Slight illegal detention (Art. 268)
3. Unlawful arrest (Art. 269)
4. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor (Art. 270)
5. Inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271)
6. Slavery (Art. 272)
7. Exploitation of child labor (Art. 273)
8. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debts (Art. 274)
If there is any crime under Title IX which has no corresponding provision with crimes under Title II, then,
the offender may be a public officer or a private person. If there is a corresponding crime under Title II, the offender
under Title IX for such similar crime is a private person.
When a public officer conspires with a private person in the commission of any of the crimes under Title
IX, the crime is also one committed under this title and not under Title II.
Illustration:
If a private person commits the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, even though a public
officer conspires therein, the crime cannot be arbitrary detention. As far as that public officer is concerned, the crime
is also illegal detention.
In the actual essence of the crime, when one says kidnapping, this connotes the idea of transporting the
offended party from one place to another. When you think illegal detention, it connotes the idea that one is
restrained of his liberty without necessarily transporting him from one place to another.
The crime of kidnapping is committed if the purpose of the offender is to extort ransom either from the
victim or from any other person. But if a person is transported not for ransom, the crime can be illegal detention.
Usually, the offended party is brought to a place other than his own, to detain him there.
When one thinks of kidnapping, it is not only that of transporting one person from one place to another.
One also has to think of the criminal intent.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION -- If a woman is transported from one place to another by virtue of restraining her of
her liberty, and that act is coupled with lewd designs.
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION – If a woman is transported just to restrain her of her liberty. There is no
lewd design or lewd intent.
GRAVE COERCION – If a woman is carried away just to break her will, to compel her to agree to the demand or
request by the offender.
In a decided case, a suitor, who cannot get a favorable reply from a woman, invited the woman to ride with
him, purportedly to take home the woman from class. But while the woman is in his car, he drove the woman to a
far place and told the woman to marry him. On the way, the offender had repeatedly touched the private parts of the
woman. It was held that the act of the offender of touching the private parts of the woman could not be considered as
lewd designs because he was willing to marry the offended party. The Supreme Court ruled that when it is a suitor
who could possibly marry the woman, merely kissing the woman or touching her private parts to “compel” her to
agree to the marriage, such cannot be characterized as lewd design. It is considered merely as the “passion of a
lover”. But if the man is already married, you cannot consider that as legitimate but immoral and definitely amounts
to lewd design.
If a woman is carried against her will but without lewd design on the part of the offender, the crime is grave
coercion.
Illustration:
Tom Cruz invited Nicole Chizmacks for a snack. They drove along Roxas Boulevard, along the Coastal
Road and to Cavite. The woman was already crying and wanted to be brought home. Tom imposed the condition
that Nicole should first marry him. Nicole found this as, simply, a mission impossible. The crime committed in this
case is grave coercion. But if after they drove to Cavite, the suitor placed the woman in a house and would not let
her out until she agrees to marry him, the crime would be serious illegal detention.
If the victim is a woman or a public officer, the detention is always serious – no matter how short the
period of detention is.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAKE ILLEGAL DETENTION SERIOUS
1. When the illegal detention lasted for three days, regardless of who the offended party is
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2. When the offended party is a female, even if the detention lasted only for minutes
3. If the offended party is a minor or a public officer, no matter how long or how short the detention is
4. When threats to kill are made or serious physical injuries have been inflicted; and
5. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
The penalty for kidnapping is higher than for forcible abduction. This is wrong because if the offender
knew about this, he would perform lascivious acts upon the woman and be charged only for forcible abduction
instead of kidnapping or illegal detention. He thereby benefits from this absurdity, which arose when Congress
amended Article 267, increasing the penalty thereof, without amending Article 342 on forcible abduction.
ARTICLE 267 HAS BEEN MODIFIED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 IN THE FOLLOWING
RESPECTS:
1. Illegal detention becomes serious when it shall have lasted for more than three days, instead of five days as
originally provided;
2. In paragraph 4, if the person kidnapped or detained was a minor and the offender was anyone of the
parents, the latter has been expressly excluded from the provision. The liability of the parent is provided
for in the last paragraph of Article 271;
3. A paragraph was added to Article 267, which states:
This amendment brings about a composite crime of kidnapping with homicide when it is the victim of the
kidnapping who was killed, or dies as a consequence of the detention and, thus, only one penalty is
imposed which is death.
Article 48, on complex crimes, does not govern in this case. But Article 48 will govern if any other person
is killed aside, because the provision specifically refers to “victim”. Accordingly, the rulings in cases of People v.
Parulan, People v. Ging Sam, and other similar cases where the accused were convicted for the complex crimes of
kidnapping with murder have become academic.
In the composite crime of kidnapping with homicide, the term “homicide” is used in the generic sense and,
thus, covers all forms of killing whether in the nature of murder or otherwise. It does not matter whether the
purpose of the kidnapping was to kill the victim or not, as long as the victim was killed, or died as a consequence of
the kidnapping or detention. There is no more separate crime of kidnapping and murder if the victim was kidnapped
not for the purpose of killing her.
If the victim was raped, this brings about the composite crime of kidnapping with rape. Being a composite
crime, not a complex crime, the same is regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact the law punishes such acts
with only a single penalty. In a way, the amendment depreciated the seriousness of the rape because no matter how
many times the victim was raped, there will only be one kidnapping with rape. This would not be the consequence
if rape were a separate crime from kidnapping because each act of rape would be a distinct count.
However for the crime to be kidnapping with rape, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd
designs as otherwise the crime would be forcible abduction; and if the victim was raped, the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape would be committed. If the taking was forcible abduction, and the woman was raped
several times, there would only be one crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each of the other rapes would
constitute distinct counts of rape. This was the ruling in the case of People v. Bacalso.
In People v. Lactao, decided on October 29, 1993, the Supreme Court stressed that the crime is serious
illegal detention if the purpose was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. And if in the course of the illegal
detention, the offended party was raped, a separate crime of rape would be committed. This is so because there is
no complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape since the illegal detention was not a necessary means to the
commission of rape.
In People v. Bernal, 131 SCRA 1, the appellants were held guilty of separate crimes of serious illegal
detention and of multiple rapes. With the amendment by Republic Act No. 7659 making rape a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the jurisprudence is superseded to the effect
that the rape should be a distinct crime. Article 48 on complex crimes may not apply when serious illegal detention
and rape are committed by the same offender. The offender will be charged for the composite crime of serious
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illegal detention with rape as a single indivisible offense, regardless of the number of times that the victim was
raped.
Also, when the victim of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention was subjected to torture and sustained
physical injuries, a composite crime of kidnapping with physical injuries is committed.
This felony is committed if any of the five circumstances in the commission of kidnapping or detention
enumerated in Article 267 is not present.
One should know the nature of the illegal detention to know whether the voluntary release of the offended
party will affect the criminal liability of the offender. When the offender voluntarily releases the offended party
from detention within three days from the time the restraint of liberty began, as long as the offender has not
accomplished his purposes, and the release was made before the criminal prosecution was commenced, this would
serve to mitigate the criminal liability of the offender, provided that the kidnapping or illegal detention is not
serious.
If the illegal detention is serious, however, even if the offender voluntarily released the offended party, and
such release was within three days from the time the detention began, even if the offender has not accomplished his
purpose in detaining the offended party, and even if there is no criminal prosecution yet, such voluntary release will
not mitigate the criminal liability of the offender. One who furnishes the place where the offended party is being
held generally acts as an accomplice. But the criminal liability in connection with the kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, as well as the slight illegal detention, is that of the principal and not of the accomplice.
Before, in People v. Saliente, if the offended party subjected to serious illegal detention was voluntarily
released by the accused in accordance with the provisions of Article 268 (3), the crime, which would have been
serious illegal detention, became slight illegal detention only.
The prevailing rule now is Asistio v. Judge, which provides that voluntary release will only mitigate
criminal liability if crime was slight illegal detention. If serious, it has no effect.
In kidnapping for ransom, voluntary release will not mitigate the crime. This is because, with the
reimposition of the death penalty, this crime is penalized with the extreme penalty of death.
WHAT IS RANSOM?
It is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases a person from captivity.
The definition of ransom under the Lindberg law of the U.S. has been adopted in our jurisprudence in
People v. Akiran, 18 SCRA 239, 242, such that when a creditor detains a debtor and releases the latter only upon the
payment of the debt, such payment of the debt, which was made a condition for the release is ransom, under this
article.
In the case of People v. Roluna, decided March 29, 1994, witnesses saw a person being taken away with
hands tied behind his back and was not heard from for six years. Supreme Court reversed the trial court ruling that
the men accused were guilty of kidnapping with murder. The crime is only slight illegal detention under Article 268,
aggravated by a band, since none of the circumstances in Article 267 has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that the victim has been missing for six years raises a presumption of death, but from this disputable
presumption of death, it should not be further presumed that the persons who were last seen with the absentee is
responsible for his disappearance.
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender arrests or detains another person;
2. The purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities;
3. The arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable ground therefor.
This felony consists in making an arrest or detention without legal or reasonable ground for the purpose of
delivering the offended party to the proper authorities.
The offended party may also be detained but the crime is not illegal detention because the purpose is to
prosecute the person arrested. The detention is only incidental; the primary criminal intention of the
offender is to charge the offended party for a crime he did not actually commit.
Generally, this crime is committed by incriminating innocent persons by the offender’s planting evidence to
justify the arrest – a complex crime results, that is, unlawful arrest through incriminatory machinations
under Article 363.
If the arrest is made without a warrant and under circumstances not allowing a warrantless arrest, the crime
would be unlawful arrest
If the person arrested is not delivered to the authorities, the private individual making the arrest incurs
criminal liability for illegal detention under Article 267 or 268.
If the offender is a public officer, the crime is arbitrary detention under Article 124
If the detention or arrest is for a legal ground, but the public officer delays delivery of the person arrested to
the proper judicial authorities, then Article 125 will apply.
NOTE that this felony may also be committed by public officers.
If any of the foregoing elements is absent, the kidnapping of the minor will then fall under Article 267.
If the accused is any of the parents, Article 267 does not apply; Articles 270 and 271 apply.
If the taking is with the consent of the parents, the crime in Article 270 is committed.
In People v. Generosa, it was held that deliberate failure to return a minor under one’s custody
constitutes deprivation of liberty. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor is necessarily included in kidnapping
and serious illegal detention of a minor under Article 267(4).
In People v. Mendoza, where a minor child was taken by the accused without the knowledge and consent
of his parents, it was held that the crime is kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267, not
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270.
This is committed if anyone shall purchase, kidnap, or detain a human being for the purpose of
enslaving him. The penalty is increased if the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to
some immoral traffic.
This is distinguished from illegal detention by the purpose. If the purpose of the kidnapping or
detention is to enslave the offended party, slavery is committed.
The crime is slavery if the offender is not engaged in the business of prostitution. If he is, the crime is
white slave trade under Article 341.
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Q: Did you hear they just released a new Barbie doll called "Divorced Barbie"?
A: Yeah, it comes with half of Ken's things and alimony.
Q: What's the difference between a porcupine and a Mercedes Benz full of lawyers?
A: The porcupine has pricks on the outside
Elements:
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Under the first act, the offender is liable only when he can render such assistance without detriment to
himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense. Where the person is already
wounded and already in danger of dying, there is an obligation to render assistance only if he is found in an
uninhabited place. If the mortally wounded, dying person is found in a place not uninhabited in legal
contemplation, abandonment will not bring about this crime. An uninhabited place is determined by
possibility of person receiving assistance from another. Even if there are many houses around, the place
may still be uninhabited if possibility of receiving assistance is remote.
If what happened was an accident at first, there would be no liability pursuant to Article 12 (4) of the Civil
Code – damnum absque injuria. But if you abandon your victim, you will be liable under Article 275.
Here, the character of the place is immaterial. As long as the victim was injured because of the accident
caused by the offender, the offender would be liable for abandonment if he would not render assistance to
the victim.
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3. Employing any descendant under 12 years of age in dangerous exhibitions enumerated in the next
preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any of the said callings;
4. Delivering a child under 16 years of age gratuitously to any person following any of the callings
enumerated in paragraph 2, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being an ascendant,
guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of such child; and
5. Inducing any child under 16 years of age to abandon the home of its ascendants, guardians,
curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned in paragraph 2
or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being any person.
The offender is engaged in a kind of business that would place the life or limb of the minor in danger, even
though working for him is not against the will of the minor
NATURE OF THE BUSINESS – This involves circuses which generally attract children so they
themselves may enjoy working there unaware of the danger to their own lives and limbs.
AGE – Must be below 16 years. At this age, the minor is still growing.
If the employer is an ascendant, the crime is not committed, unless the minor is less than 12 years old.
Because if the employer is an ascendant, the law regards that he would look after the welfare and protection
of the child; hence, the age is lowered to 12 years. Below that age, the crime is committed.
But remember REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). It applies to minors below 18 years old, not 16 years old as in the
Revised Penal Code. As long as the employment is inimical – even though there is no physical risk – and
detrimental to the child’s interest – against moral, intellectual, physical, and mental development of the
minor – the establishment will be closed.
NOTE: Article 278 has no application if minor is 16 years old and above. But the exploitation will be
dealt with by Republic Act No. 7610
If the minor so employed would suffer some injuries as a result of a violation of Article 278, Article 279
provides that there would be additional criminal liability for the resulting felony.
Illustration:
The owner of a circus employed a child under 16 years of age to do a balancing act on the tightrope. The
crime committed is exploitation of minors (unless the employer is the ascendant of the minor who is not below 12
years of age). If the child fell and suffered physical injuries while working, the employer shall be liable for said
physical injuries in addition to his liability for exploitation of minors.
NOTE: See Presidential Decree No. 1227 regarding unlawful entry into any military base in the
Philippines.
Dwelling – This is the place that a person inhabits. It includes the dependencies which have interior
communication with the house. It is not necessary that it be the permanent dwelling of the person. So, a
person’s room in a hotel may be considered a dwelling. It also includes a room where one resides as a
boarder.
If the purpose in entering the dwelling is not shown, trespass is committed. If the purpose is shown, it may
be absorbed in the crime as in robbery with force upon things, the trespass yielding to the more serious
crime. But if the purpose is not shown and while inside the dwelling he was found by the occupants, one of
whom was injured by him, the crime committed will be trespass to dwelling and frustrated homicide,
physical injuries, or if there was no injury, unjust vexation.
If the entry is made by a way not intended for entry, that is presumed to be against the will of the occupant
(example, entry through a window). It is not necessary that there be a breaking.
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“Against the will” -- This means that the entrance is, either expressly or impliedly, prohibited or the
prohibition is presumed. Fraudulent entrance may constitute trespass. The prohibition to enter may be
made at any time and not necessarily at the time of the entrance. To prove that an entry is against the will of
the occupant, it is not necessary that the entry should be preceded by an express prohibition, provided that
the opposition of the occupant is clearly established by the circumstances under which the entry is made,
such as the existence of enmity or strained relations between the accused and the occupant.
On violence, Cuello Calon opines that violence may be committed not only against persons but also against
things. So, breaking the door or glass of a window or door constitutes acts of violence. Our Supreme
Court followed this view in People v. Tayag. Violence or intimidation must, however, be anterior or
coetaneous with the entrance and must not be posterior. But if the violence is employed immediately after
the entrance without the consent of the owner of the house, trespass is committed. If there is also violence
or intimidation, proof of prohibition to enter is no longer necessary.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person who believes that a crime has been
committed against him has every right to go after the culprit and arrest him without any warrant even if in
the process he enters the house of another against the latter’s will.
Threat is a declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the commission upon his person, honor
or property or upon that of his family of some wrong which may or may not amount to a crime:
1. Grave threats – when the wrong threatened to be inflicted amounts to a crime. The case falls
under Article 282.
2. Light threats – if it does not amount to a crime. The case falls under Article 283.
But even if the harm intended is in the nature of a crime, if made orally and in the heat of anger and after
the oral threat, the issuer of the threat did not pursue the act, the crime is only other light threats under Article 285.
To constitute grave threats, the threats must refer to a future wrong and is committed by acts or through
words of such efficiency to inspire terror or fear upon another. It is, therefore, characterized by moral pressure that
produces disquietude or alarm.
The greater perversity of the offender is manifested when the threats are made demanding money or
imposing any condition, whether lawful or not, and the offender shall have attained his purpose. So the law imposes
upon him the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the crime threatened to be committed. But if the
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purpose is not attained, the penalty lower by two degrees is imposed. The maximum period of the penalty is
imposed if the threats are made in writing or through a middleman as they manifest evident premeditation.
In order to convict a person of the crime of light threats, the harm threatened must not be in the nature of
crime and there is a demand for money or any other condition is imposed, even though lawful.
NOTE: Blackmailing is a crime of light threat under Article 283 if there is no threat to publish any libelous or
slanderous matter against the offended party. If there is such a threat to make a slanderous or libelous
publication against the offended party, the crime will be one of libel, which is penalized under Article
356. For example, a person threatens to expose the affairs of married man if the latter does not give
him money. There is intimidation done under a demand. The law imposes the penalty of bond for good
behavior only in case of grave and light threats. If the offender can not post the bond, he will be
banished by way of destierro to prevent him from carrying out his threat.
ELEMENTS:
1. A person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he
compelled him to do something against his will; be it right or wrong;
2. The prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. The person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of law or the
right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law
or in the exercise of any lawful right.
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Grave coercion arises only if the act which the offender prevented another to do is not prohibited by law or
ordinance. If the act prohibited was illegal, he is not liable for grave coercion.
If a person prohibits another to do an act because the act is a crime, even though some sort of violence or
intimidation is employed, it would not give rise to grave coercion. It may only give rise to threat or physical
injuries, if some injuries are inflicted. However, in case of grave coercion where the offended party is being
compelled to do something against his will, whether it be wrong or not, the crime of grave coercion is committed if
violence or intimidation is employed in order to compel him to do the act. No person shall take the law into his own
hands.
Illustration:
Compelling the debtor to deliver some of his properties to pay a creditor will amount to coercion although
the creditor may have a right to collect payment from the debtor, even if the obligation is long over due.
The violence employed in grave coercion must be immediate, actual, or imminent. In the absence of actual
or imminent force or violence, coercion is not committed. The essence of coercion is an attack on individual liberty.
The physical violence is exerted to (1) prevent a person from doing something he wants to do; or (2)
compel him to do something he does not want to do.
Illustration:
If a man compels another to show the contents of the latter’s pockets, and takes the wallet, this is robbery
and not grave coercion. The intimidation is a means of committing robbery with violence or intimidation of
persons. Violence is inherent in the crime of robbery with violence or intimidation upon persons and in usurpation
of real properties because it is the means of committing the crime.
Exception to the rule that physical violence must be exerted: where intimidation is so serious that it is not a
threat anymore – it approximates violence.
In Lee v. CA, 201 SCAR 405, it was held that neither the crime of threats nor coercion is committed
although the accused, a branch manager of a bank made the complainant sign a withdrawal slip for the amount
needed to pay the spurious dollar check she had encashed, and also made her execute an affidavit regarding the
return of the amount against her better sense and judgment. According to the court, the complainant may have
acted reluctantly and with hesitation, but still, it was voluntary. It is different when a complainant refuses
absolutely to act such an extent that she becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, not of her own will.
In this situation, the complainant ceases to exits as an independent personality and the person who employs force or
intimidation is, in the eyes of the law, the one acting; while the hand of the complainant sign, the will that moves it is
the hand of the offender.
The first paragraph deals with light coercions wherein violence is employed by the offender who is a
creditor in seizing anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of
the debt
In the other light coercions or unjust vexation embraced in the second paragraph, violence is absent.
In unjust vexation, any act committed without violence, but which unjustifiably annoys or vexes an
innocent person amounts to light coercion.
As a punishable act, unjust vexation should include any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm would, however, unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.
It is distinguished from grave coercion under the first paragraph by the absence of violence.
Illustration:
Persons stoning someone else’s house. So long as stoning is not serious and it is intended to annoy, it is
unjust vexation. It disturbs the peace of mind.
The main purpose of the statute penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle
that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of laws, not of men. The essence of
the crimes is the attack on individual liberty.
CHAPTER III
DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS
ARTICLE 290. DISCOVERING SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE OF CORRESPONDENCE
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the exercise of his official
function;
2. He seizes the papers or letters of another;
3. The purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person;
4. Offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.
This is a crime against the security of one’s papers and effects. The purpose must be to discover its
effects. The act violates the privacy of communication.
It is not necessary that the offender should actually discover the contents of the letter. Reyes, citing
People v. Singh, CA, 40 OG, Suppl. 5, 35, believes otherwise.
The last paragraph of Article 290 expressly makes the provision of the first and second paragraph thereof
inapplicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of minors placed under their care or
custody, and to the spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them. The teachers or other persons
entrusted with the care and education of minors are included in the exceptions.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, a spouse who rummaged and found love letters of husband to
mistress does not commit this crime, but the letters are inadmissible in evidence because of unreasonable search and
seizure. The ruling held that the wife should have applied for a search warrant.
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If the intention was merely to cause vexation preventing another to do something which the law does
not prohibit or compel him to execute what he does not want, the act should be considered as unjust
vexation.
Revelation of secrets discovered not an element of the crime but only increases the penalty.
ARTICLE 291. REVEALING SECRETS WITH ABUSE OF OFFICE
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender is a manager, employee or servant;
2. He learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity;
3. He reveals such secrets.
An employee, manager, or servant who came to know of the secret of his master or principal in such
capacity and reveals the same shall also be liable regardless of whether or not the principal or master suffered
damages.
The essence of this crime is that the offender learned of the secret in the course of his employment. He is
enjoying a confidential relation with the employer or master so he should respect the privacy of matters personal to
the latter.
If the matter pertains to the business of the employer or master, damage is necessary and the agent,
employee or servant shall always be liable. Reason: no one has a right to the personal privacy of another.
A business secret must not be known to other business entities or persons. It is a matter to be discovered,
known and used by and must belong to one person or entity exclusively. One who merely copies their machines
from those already existing and functioning cannot claim to have a business secret, much less, a discovery within the
contemplation of Article 292.
Title 10
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
1. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Art. 294)
2. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances (Art. 297);
3. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation (Art. 298);
4. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship (Art. 299);
5. Robbery in an inhabited place or in a private building (Art. 302);
6. Possession of picklocks or similar tools (Art. 304);
7. Brigandage (Art. 306);
8. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands (Art. 307);
9. Theft (Art. 308);
10. Qualified theft (Art. 310);
11. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum (Art. 311);
12. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property (Art. 312);
13. Altering boundaries or landmarks (Art. 313);
14. Fraudulent insolvency (Art. 314);
15. Swindling (Art. 315);
16. Other forms of swindling (Art. 316);
17. Swindling a minor (Art. 317);
18. Other deceits (Art. 318);
19. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property (Art. 319);
20. Destructive arson (Art. 320);
21. Other forms of arson (Art. 321);
22. Arson of property of small value (Art. 323);
23. Crimes involving destruction (Art. 324);
24. Burning one’s own property as means to commit arson (Art. 325);
25. Setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender (Art. 326);
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CHAPTER I
ROBBERY IN GENERAL
ARTICLE 293. WHO ARE GUILTY OF ROBBERY
ROBBERY is the taking or personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
Violence or intimidation upon persons may result in death or mutilation or rape or serious physical injuries.
If death results or even accompanies a robbery, the crime will be robbery with homicide provided that the
robbery is consummated.
This is a crime against property, and therefore, you contend not with the killing but with the robbery.
As long as there is only one (1) robbery, regardless of the persons killed, the crime will only be one (1)
count of robbery with homicide. The fact that there are multiple killings committed in the course of the
robbery will be considered only as aggravating so as to call for the imposition of the maximum penalty
prescribed by law.
If, on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, somebody is killed, and there are also physical injuries
inflicted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, don’t think that those who sustained physical injuries
may separately prosecute the offender for physical injuries. Those physical injuries are only considered
aggravating circumstances in the crime of robbery with homicide.
This is not a complex crime as understood under Article 48, but a single indivisible crime. This is a special
complex crime because the specific penalty is provided in the law.
In Napolis v. CA, it was held that when violence or intimidation and force upon things are both present in
the robbery, the crime is complex under Article 48.
In robbery with violence of intimidation, the taking is complete when the offender has already the
possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of it.
In robbery with force upon things, the things must be brought outside the building for consummated
robbery to be committed.
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Illustration:
The robbers enter the house. In entering through the window, one of the robbers stepped on a child less
than three days old. The crime is not robbery with infanticide because there is no such crime. The word homicide
as used in defining robbery with homicide is used in the generic sense. It refers to any kind of death.
Although it is a crime against property and treachery is an aggravating circumstance that applies only to
crimes against persons, if the killing in a robbery is committed with treachery, the treachery will be considered a
generic aggravating circumstance because of the homicide.
When two or more persons are killed during the robbery, such should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
As long as there is only one robbery, regardless of the persons killed, you only have one crime of robbery
with homicide. Note, however, that “one robbery” does not mean there is only one taking.
Illustration:
Robbers decided to commit robbery in a house, which turned out to be a boarding house. Thus, there were
different boarders who were offended parties in the robbery. There is only one count of robbery. If there were
killings done to different boarders during the robbery being committed in a boarder’s quarter, do not consider that as
separate counts of robbery with homicide because when robbers decide to commit robbery in a certain house, they
are only impelled by one criminal intent to rob and there will only be one case of robbery. If there were homicide or
death committed, that would only be part of a single robbery. That there were several killings done would only
aggravate the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.
In People v. Quiñones, 183 SCRA 747, it was held that there is no crime of robbery with multiple
homicides. The charge should be for robbery with homicide only because the number of persons killed is
immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294. All the killings are merged in the composite
integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings were by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
In another case, a band of robbers entered a compound, which is actually a sugar mill. Within the
compound, there were quarters of the laborers. They robbed each of the quarters. The Supreme Court held that
there was only one count of robbery because when they decided and determined to rob the compound, they were
only impelled by one criminal intent to rob.
With more reason, therefore, if in a robbery, the offender took away property belonging to different
owners, as long as the taking was done at one time, and in one place, impelled by the same criminal intent to gain,
there would only be one count of robbery.
In robbery with homicide as a single indivisible offense, it is immaterial who gets killed. Even though the
killing may have resulted from negligence, you will still designate the crime as robbery with homicide.
Illustration:
On the occasion of a robbery, one of the offenders placed his firearm on the table. While they were
ransacking the place, one of the robbers bumped the table. As a result, the firearm fell on the floor and discharged.
One of the robbers was the one killed. Even though the placing of the firearm on the table where there is no safety
precaution taken may be considered as one of negligence or imprudence, you do not separate the homicide as one of
the product of criminal negligence. It will still be robbery with homicide, whether the person killed is connected
with the robbery or not. He need not also be in the place of the robbery.
In one case, in the course of the struggle in a house where the robbery was being committed, the owner of
the place tried to wrest the arm of the robber. A person several meters away was the one who got killed. The crime
was held to be robbery with homicide.
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Note that the person killed need not be one who is identified with the owner of the place where the robbery
is committed or one who is a stranger to the robbers. It is enough that the homicide was committed by reason of the
robbery or on the occasion thereof.
Illustration:
There are two robbers who broke into a house and carried away some valuables. After they left such house
these two robbers decided to cut or divide the loot already so that they can go of them. So while they are dividing
the loot the other robber noticed that the one doing the division is trying to cheat him and so he immediately boxed
him. Now this robber who was boxed then pulled out his gun and fired at the other one killing the latter. Would
that bring about the crime of robbery with homicide? Yes. Even if the robbery was already consummated, the
killing was still by reason of the robbery because they quarreled in dividing the loot that is the subject of the
robbery.
In People v. Domingo, 184 SCRA 409, on the occasion of the robbery, the storeowner, a septuagenarian,
suffered a stroke due to the extreme fear which directly caused his death when the robbers pointed their guns at him.
It was held that the crime committed was robbery with homicide. It is immaterial that death supervened as a mere
accident as long as the homicide was produced by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, because it is only the
result which matters, without reference to the circumstances or causes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime which must be considered.
Remember also that intent to rob must be proved. But there must be an allegation as to the robbery not
only as to the intention to rob.
If the motive is to kill and the taking is committed thereafter, the crimes committed are homicide and theft.
If the primordial intent of the offender is to kill and not to rob but after the killing of the victims a robbery was
committed, then there are will be two separate crimes.
Illustration:
If a person had an enemy and killed him and after killing him, saw that he had a beautiful ring and took
this, the crime would be not robbery with homicide because the primary criminal intent is to kill. So, there will be
two crimes: one for the killing and one for the taking of the property after the victim was killed. Now this would
bring about the crime of theft and it could not be robbery anymore because the person is already dead.
For robbery with homicide to exist, homicide must be committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, that is, the homicide must be committed “in the course or because of the robbery.” Robbery and homicide
are separate offenses when the homicide is not committed “on the occasion” or “by reason” of the robbery.
Where the victims were killed, not for the purpose of committing robbery, and the idea of taking the money
and other personal property of the victims was conceived by the culprits only after the killing, it was held in People
v. Domingo, 184 SCRA 409, that the culprits committed two separate crimes of homicide or murder (qualified by
abuse of superior strength) and theft.
The victims were killed first then their money was taken the money from their dead bodies. This is robbery
with homicide. It is important here that the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life in
robbery with homicide. The offender must have the intent to take personal property before the killing.
It must be conclusively shown that the homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim. In
People v. Hernandez, appellants had not thought of robbery prior to the killing. The thought of taking the victim’s
wristwatch was conceived only after the killing and throwing of the victim in the canal. Appellants were convicted
of two separate crimes of homicide and theft as there is absent direct relation and intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing.
The rape committed on the occasion of the robbery is not considered a private crime because the crime is
robbery, which is a crime against property. So, even though the robber may have married the woman raped, the
crime remains robbery with rape. The rape is not erased. This is because the crime is against property which is a
single indivisible offense.
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If the woman, who was raped on the occasion of the robbery, pardoned the rapist who is one of the robbers,
that would not erase the crime of rape. The offender would still be prosecuted for the crime of robbery with rape, as
long as the rape is consummated.
If the rape is attempted, since it will be a separate charge and the offended woman pardoned the offender,
that would bring about a bar to the prosecution of the attempted rape. If the offender married the offended woman,
that would extinguish the criminal liability because the rape is the subject of a separate prosecution.
The intention must be to commit robbery and even if the rape is committed before the robbery, robbery
with rape is committed. But if the accused tried to rape the offended party and because of resistance, he failed to
consummate the act, and then he snatched the vanity case from her hands when she ran away, two crimes are
committed: attempted rape and theft.
There is no complex crime under Article 48 because a single act is not committed and attempted rape is not
a means necessary to commit theft and vice-versa. The Revised Penal Code does not differentiate whether rape was
committed before, during or after the robbery. It is enough that the robbery accompanied the rape. Robbery must
not be a mere accident or afterthought.
In People v. Flores, 195 SCRA 295, although the offenders plan was to get the victim’s money, rape her
and kill her, but in the actual execution of the crime, the thoughts of depriving the victim of her valuables was
relegated to the background and the offender’s prurient desires surfaced. They persisted in satisfying their lust.
They would have forgotten about their intent to rob if not for the accidental touching of the victim’s ring and
wristwatch. The taking of the victim’s valuables turned out to be an afterthought. It was held that two distinct
crimes were committed: rape with homicide and theft.
In People v. Dinola, 183 SCRA 493, it was held that if the original criminal design of the accused was to
commit rape and after committing the rape, the accused committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself,
two distinct crimes – rape and robbery were committed – not robbery with rape. In the latter, the criminal intent to
gain must precede the intent to rape.
Illustration:
After the robbery had been committed and the robbers were already fleeing from the house where the
robbery was committed, the owner of the house chased them and the robbers fought back. If only less serious
physical injuries were inflicted, there will be separate crimes: one for robbery and one for less serious physical
injuries.
But if after the robbery was committed and the robbers were already fleeing from the house where the
robbery was committed, the owner or members of the family of the owner chased them, and they fought back and
somebody was killed, the crime would still be robbery with homicide. But if serious physical injuries were inflicted
and the serious physical injuries rendered the victim impotent or insane or the victim lost the use of any of his senses
or lost a part of his body, the crime would still be robbery with serious physical injuries. The physical injuries
(serious) should not be separated regardless of whether they retorted in the course of the commission of the robbery
or even after the robbery was consummated.
In Article 299, it is only when the physical injuries resulted in the deformity or incapacitated the offended
party from labor for more than 30 days that the law requires such physical injuries to have been inflicted in the
course of the execution of the robbery, and only upon persons who are not responsible in the commission of the
robbery.
But if the physical injuries inflicted are those falling under subdivision 1 and 2 of Article 263, even though
the physical injuries were inflicted upon one of the robbers themselves, and even though it had been inflicted after
the robbery was already consummated, the crime will still be robbery with serious physical injuries. There will only
be one count of accusation.
Illustration:
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After the robbers fled from the place where the robbery was committed, they decided to divide the spoils
and in the course of the division of the spoils or the loot, they quarreled. They shot it out and one of the robbers was
killed. The crime is still robbery with homicide even though one of the robbers was the one killed by one of them.
If they quarreled and serious physical injuries rendered one of the robbers impotent, blind in both eyes, or got
insane, or he lost the use of any of his senses, lost the use of any part of his body, the crime will still be robbery with
serious physical injuries.
If the robbers quarreled over the loot and one of the robbers hacked the other robber causing a deformity in
his face, the crime will only be robbery and a separate charge for the serious physical injuries because when it is a
deformity that is caused, the law requires that the deformity must have been inflicted upon one who is not a
participant in the robbery. Moreover, the physical injuries which gave rise to the deformity or which incapacitated
the offended party from labor for more than 30 days, must have been inflicted in the course of the execution of the
robbery or while the robbery was taking place.
If it was inflicted when the thieves/robbers are already dividing the spoils, it cannot be considered as
inflicted in the course of execution of the robbery and hence, it will not give rise to the crime of robbery with serious
physical injuries. You only have one count of robbery and another count for the serious physical injuries inflicted.
If, during or on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, a killing, rape or serious physical injuries took
place, there will only be one crime of robbery with homicide because all of these – killing, rape, serious physical
injuries -- are contemplated by law as the violence or intimidation which characterizes the taking as on of robbery.
You charge the offenders of robbery with homicide. The rape or physical injuries will only be appreciated as
aggravating circumstance and is not the subject of a separate prosecution. They will only call for the imposition of
the penalty in the maximum period.
If on the occasion of the robbery with homicide, robbery with force upon things was also committed, you
will not have only one robbery but you will have a complex crime of robbery with homicide and robbery with force
upon things (see Napolis v. CA). This is because robbery with violence or intimidation upon persons is a separate
crime from robbery with force upon things.
Robbery with homicide, robbery with intentional mutilation and robbery with rape are not qualified by
band or uninhabited place. These aggravating circumstances only qualify robbery with physical injuries under
subdivision 2, 3, and 4 of Article 299.
When it is robbery with homicide, the band or uninhabited place is only a generic aggravating
circumstance. It will not qualify the crime to a higher degree of penalty.
In People v. Salvilla, it was held that if in a robbery with serious physical injuries, the offenders herded
the women and children into an office and detained them to compel the offended party to come out with the money,
the crime of serious illegal detention was a necessary means to facilitate the robbery; thus, the complex crimes of
robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention.
But if the victims were detained because of the timely arrival of the police, such that the offenders had no
choice but to detain the victims as hostages in exchange for their safe passage, the detention is absorbed by the crime
of robbery and is not a separate crime. This was the ruling in People v. Astor.
Moreover, it should be noted that arson has been made a component only of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons in said Article 294, but not of robbery by the use of force upon things in Articles 299 and
302.
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So, if the robbery was by the use of force upon things and therewith arson was committed, two distinct
crimes are committed.
"FORCE UPON THINGS" has a technical meaning in law. Not any kind of force upon things will characterize
the taking as one of robbery. The force upon things contemplated requires some element of trespass into the
establishment where the robbery was committed. In other words, the offender must have entered the premises where
the robbery was committed. If no entry was effected, even though force may have been employed actually in the
taking of the property from within the premises, the crime will only be theft.
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2. The entering will not give rise to robbery even if something is taken inside. It is the breaking of the
receptacle or closet or cabinet where the personal property is kept that will give rise to robbery, or the
taking of a sealed, locked receptacle to be broken outside the premises.
If by the mere entering, that would already qualify the taking of any personal property inside as robbery, it is
immaterial whether the offender stays inside the premises. The breaking of things inside the premises will only be
important to consider if the entering by itself will not characterize the crime as robbery with force upon things.
Modes of entering that would give rise to the crime of robbery with force upon things if something is taken
inside the premises: entering into an opening not intended for entrance or egress, under Article 299 (a).
Illustration:
The entry was made through a fire escape. The fire escape was intended for egress. The entry will not
characterize the taking as one of robbery because it is an opening intended for egress, although it may not be
intended for entrance. If the entering were done through the window, even if the window was not broken, that
would characterize the taking of personal property inside as robbery because the window is not an opening intended
for entrance.
Illustration:
On a sari-sari store, a vehicle bumped the wall. The wall collapsed. There was a small opening there. At
night, a man entered through that opening without breaking the same. The crime will already be robbery if he takes
property from within because that is not an opening intended for the purpose.
Even of there is a breaking of wall, roof, floor or window, but the offender did not enter, it would not give
rise to robbery with force upon things.
Breaking of the door under Article299 (b) – Originally, the interpretation was that in order that there be a
breaking of the door in contemplation of law, there must be some damage to the door.
Before, if the door was not damaged but only the lock attached to the door was broken, the taking from
within is only theft. But the ruling is now abandoned because the door is considered useless without the lock. Even
if it is not the door that was broken but only the lock, the breaking of the lock renders the door useless and it is
therefore tantamount to the breaking of the door. Hence, the taking inside is considered robbery with force upon
things.
If the entering does not characterize the taking inside as one of robbery with force upon things, it is the
conduct inside that would give rise to the robbery if there would be a breaking of sealed, locked or closed
receptacles or cabinet in order to get the personal belongings from within such receptacles, cabinet or place where it
is kept.
If in the course of committing the robbery within the premises some interior doors are broken, the taking
from inside the room where the door leads to will only give rise to theft. The breaking of doors contemplated in the
law refers to the main door of the house and not the interior door.
But if it is the door of a cabinet that is broken and the valuable inside the cabinet was taken, the breaking of
the cabinet door would characterize the taking as robbery. Although that particular door is not included as part of
the house, the cabinet keeps the contents thereof safe.
Use of picklocks or false keys refers to the entering into the premises – If the picklock or false key was
used not to enter the premises because the offender had already entered but was used to unlock an interior door or
even a receptacle where the valuable or personal belonging was taken, the use of false key or picklock will not give
rise to the robbery with force upon things because these are considered by law as only a means to gain entrance, and
not to extract personal belongings from the place where it is being kept.
THE LAW CLASSIFIES ROBBERY WITH FORCE UPON THINGS AS THOSE COMMITTED IN:
1. an inhabited place;
2. public buildings;
3. a place devoted to religious worship.
The law also considers robbery committed not in an inhabited house or in a private building.
Note that the manner of committing the robbery with force upon things is not the same.
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When the robbery is committed in a house which is inhabited, or in a public building or in a place devoted to
religious worship, the use of fictitious name or pretension to possess authority in order to gain entrance will
characterize the taking inside as robbery with force upon things.
QUESTION: Certain men pretended to be from the Price Control Commission and went to a warehouse owned by a
private person. They told the guard to open the warehouse purportedly to see if the private person is hoarding
essential commodities there. The guard obliged. They went inside and broke in. They loaded some of the
merchandise inside claiming that it is the product of hoarding and then drove away. What crime was committed?
ANSWER: It is only theft because the premises where the simulation of public authority was committed is not an
inhabited house, not a public building, and not a place devoted to religious worship. Where the house is a private
building or is uninhabited, even though there is simulation of public authority in committing the taking or even if he
used a fictitious name, the crime is only theft.
Note that in the crime of robbery with force upon things, what should be considered is the means of
entrance and means of taking the personal property from within. If those means do not come within the definition
under the Revised Penal Code, the taking will only give rise to theft.
Those means must be employed in entering. If the offender had already entered when these means were
employed, anything taken inside, without breaking of any sealed or closed receptacle, will not give rise to robbery.
Illustration:
A found B inside his (A’s) house. He asked B what the latter was doping there. B claimed he is an
inspector from the local city government to look after the electrical installations. At the time B was chanced upon
by A, he has already entered. So anything he took inside without breaking of any sealed or closed receptacle will
not give rise to robbery because the simulation of public authority was made not in order to enter but when he has
already entered.
ART. 300 AND 301: ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC BUILDING, OR BUILDING
DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND THEIR DEPENDENCIES, THUS:
INHABITED HOUSE – Any shelter, ship, or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though
the inhabitants thereof shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is committed.
PUBLIC BUILDING – Includes every building owned by the government or belonging to a private person but
used or rented by the government, although temporarily unoccupied by the same.
DEPENDENCIES of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship – All interior
courts, corrals, warehouses, granaries, barns, coachhouses, stables, or other departments, or enclosed interior
entrance connected therewith and which form part of the whole. Orchards and other lands used for cultivation or
production are not included, even if closed, contiguous to the building, and having direct connection therewith.
NOTE: Under Article 303, if the robbery under Article 299 and 302 consists in the taking of cereals, fruits, or
firewood, the penalty imposable is lower.
CHAPTER II
BRIGANDAGE
Brigandage – This is a crime committed by more than three armed persons who form a band of robbers for the
purpose of committing robbery in the highway or kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain
ransom, or for any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN BRIGANDAGE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND HIGHWAY
ROBBERY/BRIGANDAGE UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532:
1. Brigandage as a crime under the Revised Penal Code refers to the formation of a band of robbers by more
than three armed persons for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, kidnapping for purposes of
extortion or ransom, or for any other purpose to be attained by force and violence. The mere forming of a
band, which requires at least four armed persons, if for any of the criminal purposes stated in Article 306,
gives rise to brigandage.
2. Highway robbery/brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532 is the seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or for any other lawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things or other unlawful means committed by any
person on any Philippine highway.
Brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532 refers to the actual commission of the robbery on the highway
and can be committed by one person alone. It is this brigandage which deserves some attention because not any
robbery in a highway is brigandage or highway robbery. A distinction should be made between highway
robbery/brigandage under the decree and ordinary robbery committed on a highway under the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Puno, decided February 17, 1993, the trial court convicted the accused of highway robbery/
brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Supreme
Court set aside the judgment and found the accused guilty of simple robbery as punished in Article 294 (5), in
relation to Article 295, and sentenced them accordingly. The Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of
brigandage “is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. And that PD 532 punishes as highway robbery or
Brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on a
Philippine highway as defined therein, not acts committed against a predetermined or particular victim”. A single
act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the offender as his specific victim, even if committed on a
highway, is not highway robbery or brigandage.
In US v. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422, it was pointed out that highway robbery or brigandage is more than
ordinary robbery committed on a highway. The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate robbery in highways. If
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the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery or robbery in band, if there are at least four
armed participants.
Presidential Decree No. 532 introduced amendments to Article 306 and 307 by increasing the penalties. It
does not require at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers. It does not create a presumption that the
offender is a brigand when he an unlicensed firearm is used unlike the Revised Penal Code. But the essence of
brigandage under the Revised Penal Code is the same as that in the Presidential Decree, that is, crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any
and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whoever they may potentially be.
CHAPTER III
THEFT
ARTICLE 308. WHO ARE LIABLE FOR THEFT
PERSONS LIABLE:
1. Those who with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, take personal property of another without the latter’s consent;
2. Those who having found lost property, fails to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
3. Those who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, remove or make use of the
fruits or objects of the damage caused by them;
4. Those who enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and, without the consent of its owner, hunt or fish upon the same or gather fruits, cereals
or other forest or farm products.
ELEMENTS:
1. There is taking of personal property;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking was done with intent to gain;
4. The taking was done without the consent of the owner;
5. The taking is accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons of
force upon things.
Fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 is a distinct crime from theft and robbery. If the participant
who profited is being prosecuted with person who robbed, the person is prosecuted as an accessory. If he is being
prosecuted separately, the person who partook of the proceeds is liable for fencing.
In People v. Judge de Guzman, it was held that fencing is not a continuing offense. Jurisdiction is with
the court of the place where the personal property subject of the robbery or theft was possessed, bought, kept, or
dealt with. The place where the theft or robbery was committed was inconsequential.
Since Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 expressly provides that mere possession of anything of
value which has been subject of theft or robbery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing, it follows that a possessor
of stolen goods is presumed to have knowledge that the goods found in his possession after the fact of theft or
robbery has been established. The presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence in the fundamental
law. This was the ruling in Pamintuan v. People, decided on July 11, 1994.
Burden of proof is upon fence to overcome presumption; if explanation insufficient or unsatisfactory, court
will convict. This is a malum prohibitum so intent is not material. But if prosecution is under the Revised Penal
Code, as an accessory, the criminal intent is controlling.
When there is notice to person buying, there may be fencing such as when the price is way below ordinary
prices; this may serve as notice. He may be liable for fencing even if he paid the price because of the presumption.
Cattle Rustling and Qualified Theft of Large Cattle – The crime of cattle-rustling is defined and punished under
Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling law of 1974, as the taking by any means, method or scheme,
of any large cattle, with or without intent to gain and whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things, so long as the taking is without the consent of the owner/breed thereof.
The crime includes the killing or taking the meat or hide of large cattle without the consent of the owner.
Since the intent to gain is not essential, the killing or destruction of large cattle, even without taking any
part thereof, is not a crime of malicious mischief but cattle-rustling.
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The Presidential Decree, however, does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but merely modified the penalties provided for theft of large cattle and, to
that extent, amended Articles 309 and 310. Note that the overt act that gives rise to the crime of cattle-rustling is the
taking or killing of large cattle. Where the large cattle was not taken, but received by the offender from the
owner/overseer thereof, the crime is not cattle-rustling; it is qualified theft of large cattle.
Where the large cattle was received by the offender who thereafter misappropriated it, the crime is qualified
theft under Article 310 if only physical or material possession thereof was yielded to him. If both material and
juridical possession thereof was yielded to him who misappropriated the large cattle, the crime would be estafa
under Article 315 (1b).
Presidential Decree No. 533 is not a special law in the context of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code. It
merely modified the penalties provided for theft of large cattle under the Revised Penal Code and amended Article
309 and 310. This is explicit from Section 10 of the Presidential Decree. Consequently, the trial court should not
have convicted the accused of frustrated murder separately from cattle-rustling, since the former should have been
absorbed by cattle-rustling as killing was a result of or on the occasion of cattle-rustling. It should only be an
aggravating circumstance. But because the information did not allege the injury, the same can no longer be
appreciated; the crime should, therefore be only, simple cattle-rustling. (People v. Martinada, February 13, 1991)
THEFT CASES:
Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines
(GR No. 160188, June 21, 2007)
Facts: On May 19, 1994, Lorenzo Lago, a security guard, sighted petitioner and Calderon outside the
Super Sale Club within SM, Lago saw petitioner wearing an ID “Receiving Dispatching Unit” hauling a push cart
with cases of detergent “Tide” brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner emerged with more cartons of Tide and again unloaded the same. Petitioner haled a Taxi,
Calderon loaded the merchandise, the latter reacted by fleeing on foot. The accused were apprehended and the
stolen merchandise was recovered with an aggregate value of P12, 090.00.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should only be convicted of frustrated theft.
Held: In order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire
whether and how exactly the felony of theft was produced. Under Art. 368, theft is already produced upon the taking
of personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Hence, the petition was denied. The petitioner committed the crime of theft and that there is
no crime of frustrated theft.
If the property stolen is any property of the National Library or of the National Museum
CHAPTER IV
USURPATION
ARTICLE 312. OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN
PROPERTY
ACTS PUNISHED:
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1. Taking possession of any real property belonging to another by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons;
2. Usurping any real rights in property belonging to another by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons.
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real rights in property;
2. The real property or real rights belong to another;
3. Violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in occupying real
property or usurping real rights in property;
4. There is intent to gain.
Use the degree of intimidation to determine the degree of the penalty to be applied for the usurpation.
Usurpation under Article 312 is committed in the same way as robbery with violence or intimidation of
persons. The main difference is that in robbery, personal property is involved; while in usurpation of real rights, it is
real property. (People v. Judge Alfeche, July 23, 1992)
Usurpation of real rights and property should not be complexed using Article 48 when violence or
intimidation is committed. There is only a single crime, but a two-tiered penalty is prescribed to be determined on
whether the acts of violence used is akin to that in robbery in Article 294, grave threats or grave coercion and an
incremental penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the offender.
Therefore, it is not correct to state that the threat employed in usurping real property is absorbed in the
crime; otherwise, the additional penalty would be meaningless.
The complainant must be the person upon whom violence was employed. If a tenant was occupying the
property and he was threatened by the offender, but it was the owner who was not in possession of the property who
was named as the offended party, the same may be quashed as it does not charge an offense. The owner would, at
most, be entitled to civil recourse only.
ON SQUATTING
According to the Urban Development and Housing Act, the following are squatters:
1. Those who have the capacity or means to pay rent or for legitimate housing but are squatting
anyway;
2. Also the persons who were awarded lots but sold or lease them out;
3. Intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing, pre-empting possession by occupying the same.
CHAPTER V
CULPABLE INSOLVENCY
ARTICLE 314. FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY
ELEMENTS:
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CHAPTER VI
SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS
ARTICLE 315. SWINDLING (ESTAFA)
ELEMENTS IN GENERAL:
1. Accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and –
This covers the three different ways of committing estafa under Article 315; thus, estafa is
committed –
a) With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
b) By means of false pretenses or fraudulents acts; or
c) Through fraudulent means.
(The first form under subdivision 1 is known as estafa with abuse of confidence; and the
second and third forms under subdivisions 2 and 3 cover cover estafa by means of deceit.)
2. Damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.
Under Presidential Decree No. 115, the failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of the goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust receipt, to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster, or as appearing in the trust receipt; or the failure to return said goods,
documents, or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the
trust receipt constitute estafa.
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Remember that it is the check that is supposed to be the sole consideration for the other
party to have entered into the obligation. For example, Rose wants to purchase a bracelet
and draws a check without insufficient funds. The jeweler sells her the bracelet solely
because of the consideration in the check.
3. It does not cover checks where the purpose of drawing the check is to guarantee a loan as
this is not an obligation contemplated in this paragraph
The check must be genuine. If the check is falsified and is cashed with the bank or
exchanged for cash, the crime is estafa thru falsification of a commercial document.
The general rule is that the accused must be able to obtain something from the offended
party by means of the check he issued and delivered. Exception: when the check is
issued not in payment of an obligation.
It must not be promissory notes, or guaranties.
Good faith is a defense.
If the checks were issued by the defendant and he received money for them, then stopped
payment and did not return the money, and he had an intention to stop payment when he
issued the check, there is estafa.
Deceit is presumed if the drawer fails to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check
within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor or insufficiency of funds in the bank.
CASES ON ESTAFA:
IN PEREZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO. 150443, JANUARY 20, 2006, the
accused being then employed as Accounts Receivable and Recording Clerk of Storck Products, Inc. and such having
received in cash the amount of P148, 160.35 as collection from the company’s salesman, with the express obligation
on the part of the said accused to immediately turnover and remit said amount. However, she converted the same to
her own personal use and benefit and despite demands to turnover and remit the said amount, she failed and
refused.
Held: The testimonial evidence of Ventonilla, Santiago and Sincero coupled with Perez and her
husband’s affidavit of undertaking and the promissory note of Perez’ husband proved beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of estafa.
In BONIFACIO VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 153198, July 11, 2006, Complainant Ofelia Santos was
a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of jewelry. Petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio became an agent of Santos,
signed a document acknowledging receipt of jewelry and agreeing to sell jewelries on commission basis. On 3
separate dates of demand accused failed to return the amount of the jewelry sold and the unsold jewelries.
Petitioner issued 2 checks to complainant but said checks bounced for insufficient funds and closed account. Santos
was convicted for the crime of estafa.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
Held: In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent’s duty to return the jewelry on demand of the
owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it
are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Accused appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of estafa.
In ANG VS. LUCERO, GR No. 143619, January 21, 2005, Complainants claim that Ang took
advantage of the trust and confidence she reposed in him when he falsified two documents. She further claims that
the falsification was made possible when the respondent typed that the authority to transfer in a black sheet of paper
containing her signature which he previously requested for the purpose of securing permit from a government in
connection with her bus service business prior to her departure from Guam.
Issue: Whether there is probable cause in the instant case for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
Held: In this case, And admitted typing the Deed of Assignment over Lucero’s signature in blank.
Thereafter, Ang used the Deed of Assignment to transfer of ownership of the property from Lucero to him. Lucero
claims that she was prejudiced by virtue of the Deed of Assignment. However, whether Ang took advantage of
Lucero’s signature is a question that should be presented and resolved during the trial.
The Court also found probable cause in the case. The petition was denied.
Issue: Whether the accused was guilty of the crime charged as defined and punished by Art. 315 of the
RPC.
Held: Rosemarie cannot be held liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document under the information filed in this case, with all the more reason should it be for petitioner, as alleged co-
conspirator.
The accused should be acquitted but not prejudicial to the conviction of falsification under Art. 171 for
the falsification. Hence, the judgment was modified.
The accused was convicted for falsification only.
In RECUERDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 168217, June 27, 2006,
Petitioner was charged with 3 separate criminal informations for the crime of estafa, under Art. 315 2 (d), for
issuing a total 18 postdated and worthless checks on separate occasions as payment for jewelries she bought from
Yolanda Floro and to the prejudice of the latter.
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After the trial, she was convicted with only 2 counts of estafa. On appeal, the appellate court, affirmed
the trial court with modifications as to the penalty.
Held: The existence of all the elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution
through convinving evidence, warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of Estafa.
Further, it is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the
RPC, and not the non-payment of a debt.
In Velasco vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 149354, Jan 18, 2008, the accused executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, defrauded the Shangrila Restaurant located at West
Triangle, represented by Eva Anne Nannette Sto. Domingo by pretending that he has the money to pay ordered 5
tables be prepared for his guests with the total costs of P11,391.00, but said accused and his guests after consuming
the foods with intent to defraud, refused to pay for the bills despite demand.
Held: the Court agreed with the Solicitor General that petitioner employed fraud in ordering four
additional tables, partaking the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa
under Art. 315, 2 (d) of the RPC.
In Fukuzume vs. People of the Philippines, GR No. 143647, November 11, 2005, Yusuke
Fukusume defrauded Javier Yu and made false representation that he is duly authorized representative of Furukawa
Electric Co. Ltd. And was authorized to sell excess aluminum Conductor materials not being used by NAPOCOR
and Furukawa, knowing fully well that those representations were false and were only made to induce Javier to buy
said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount of P424,000.00
but accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum
conductor materials to herein complainant, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount.
The RTC found accused guilty of Estafa.
Held: The Court agreed with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Hence the judgment of the RTC must be set aside for want of jurisdiction.
In People vs. Dujua, GR Nos. 149014-16, February 5, 2004, Ramon, his mother Rose Dujua,
his aunt Edith Singh, and his uncle Guillermo Samson were charged in Criminal Case with separate counts of estafa
committed against Roberto Perlas and Jaime Cabus. The RTC convicted Ramon Dujua of illegal recruitment in
large scale, committed against Jaime Cabus, Beldon Caluten and Roberti Perlas, and two counts of Estafa,
committed against Cabus and Perlas.
Held: Appellant misrepresented himself to Jaime Cabus and Roberto Perlas as one who can make
arrangements for job placements in Taiwan and Japan and, by reason of such misrepresentations, the two
complainants were induced to part with their money, causing them damage.
In Soriquez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 153526, November 25, 2005, In his capacity as
Program Director of Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation Project Management Office (MPR-PMO), along with nine others,
the accused was charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) RA 3019. Specifically, petitioner and his co-accused were
indicted for having allegedly conspired, through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, in allowing the
contractor, Atlantic Erectors, Inc., to deviate from the plans and specifications of the contract in connection with the
construction of the Pasig-Potrero river Diking System (Megadike). This breach of contract allegedly resulted in the
collapse of the Megadike, thereby causing damage and undue injury to the government.
Held: Here, it is undisputed that the petitioner is a public officer as in fact he is an official of the DPWH
and Program Director of MPR-PMO. The second element is manifested by the fact that the petitioner was one of the
officials of the DPWH who recommended the defective design plan of the Megadike. It was upon his
recommendation that the design plan was eventually approved by the DPWH Secretary, such act of petitioner may
have constituted evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence inasmuch as this design plan proved to be defective.
The third element is satisfied when the prosecution’s evidence satisfactorily demonstrated that petitioner allowed
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. to collect and receive the net amount of P12, 697, 197.61 despite the breach of contract
committed by it. Indubitably, the government suffered undue losses.
In Preagido vs. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 52341-46, November 25, 2005, Several public
officials including the accused Bolotaulo have falsified public documents, whereby said accused made it appear that
an amount of P300,000.00 had been lawfully allocated for the City of Tagbiliran and made available “For the
maintenance of existing and unabandoned roads and bridges” in the City. Other papers in support of the eventual
release of the funds were also falsified. Subsequently, the said accused was able to demand, collect, and receive
from the government the money which they utilized for their personal use. Petitioner Bolotaulo was convicted for his
signature in the RSEs, in the abstract of sealed quotations and for signing the general voucher certifying that the
expenses are necessary. Lawful and incurred under hi direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable
and not in excess of the current rates in the locality. He, however, contends that he merely performed his duties and
responsibilities in affixing his signatures on those documents.
Held: Petitioner Bolotaulo signed three GVs certifying that the expenses are necessary, lawful and
incurred under his direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates
in the locality. There is no truth to petitioner Bolotaulo’s certification in the general voucher that the price of the
materials requisitioned is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality considering that it
was established that there was irregularity in the bidding held on May 24, 1978.
The Court is convinced that the conspiracy has been clearly established by the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
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HOW VIOLATED
FIRST FORM:
1. A person makes or draws and issues any check;
2. The check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value;
Thus, it can apply to pre-existing obligations, too.3
3. The person who makes or draws and issued the check knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment;
4. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
SECOND FORM:
1. A person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check;
2. He fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within 90 days from the date appearing;
3. The check is dishonored by the drawee bank.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 (2)(D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22:
1. Under both Article 315 (2) (d) and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, there is criminal liability if the check is drawn
for non-pre-existing obligation.
NOTE: If the check is drawn for a pre-existing obligation, there is criminal liability only under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
2. Estafa under Article 315 (2) (d) is a crime against property while Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is a crime
against public interest. The gravamen for the former is the deceit employed, while in the latter, it is the
issuance of the check. Hence, there is no double jeopardy.
3. In the estafa under Article 315 (2) (d), deceit and damage are material, while in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
they are immaterial.
4. In estafa under Article 315 (2) (d), knowledge by the drawer of insufficient funds is not required, while in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, knowledge by the drawer of insufficient funds is reqired.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. When the check was presented after 90 days from date;
2. When the maker or drawer –
a) Pays the holder of the check the amount due within five banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee;
b) Makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five banking
days after notice of non-payment
The drawee must cause to be written or stamped in plain language the reason for the dishonor.
If the drawee bank received an order of stop-payment from the drawer with no reason, it must be stated that
the funds are insufficient to be prosecuted here.
The unpaid or dishonored check with the stamped information re: refusal to pay is prima facie evidence of
(1) the making or issuance of the check; (2) the due presentment to the drawee for payment & the dishonor thereof;
and (3) the fact that the check was properly dishonored for the reason stamped on the check.
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The issuance of check with insufficient funds may be held liable for estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 expressly provides that prosecution under said law is without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision in the Revised Penal Code. Double Jeopardy may not be invoked because a violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is a malum prohibitum and is being punished as a crime against the public interest for
undermining the banking system of the country, while under the RevisedPenal Code, the crime is malum in se which
requires criminal intent and damage to the payee and is a crime against property.
In estafa, the check must have been issued as a reciprocal consideration for parting of goods (kaliwaan).
There must be concomitance. The deceit must be prior to or simultaneous with damage done, that is, seller relied on
check to part with goods. If it is issued after parting with goods as in credit accommodation only, there is no estafa.
If the check is issued for a pre-existing obligation, there is no estafa as damage had already been done. The drawer
is liable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
For criminal liability to attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is enough that the check was issued to
"apply on account or for value" and upon its presentment it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds, provided that the drawer had been notified of the dishonor and inspite of such notice fails to pay the holder of
the check the full amount due thereon within five days from notice.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, a drawer must be given notice of dishonor and given five banking days
from notice within which to deposit or pay the amount stated in the check to negate the presumtion that drawer knew
of the insufficiency. After this period, it is conclusive that drawer knew of the insufficiency, thus there is no more
defense to the prosecution under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The mere issuance of any kind of check regardless of the intent of the parties, whether the check is intended
to serve merely as a guarantee or as a deposit, makes the drawer liable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 if the check
bounces. As a matter of public policy, the issuance of a worthless check is a public nuisance and must be abated.
In De Villa v. CA, decided April 18, 1991, it was held that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, there is no
distinction as to the kind of check issued. As long as it is delivered within Philippine territory, the Philippine courts
have jurisdiction. Even if the check is only presented to and dishonored in a Philippine bank, Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 applies. This is true in the case of dollar or foreign currency checks. Where the law makes no distinction, none
should be made.
In People v. Nitafan, it was held that as long as instrument is a check under the negotiable instrument
law, it is covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. A memorandum check is not a promissory note, it is a check which
have the word “memo,” “mem”, “memorandum” written across the face of the check which signifies that if the
holder upon maturity of the check presents the same to the drawer, it will be paid absolutely. But there is no
prohibition against drawer from depositing memorandum check in a bank. Whatever be the agreement of the
parties in respect of the issuance of a check is inconsequential to a violation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the
check bounces.
But overdraft or credit arrangement may be allowed by banks as to their preferred clients and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 does not apply. If check bounces, it is because bank has been remiss in honoring agreement.
The check must be presented for payment within a 90-day period. If presented for payment beyond the 90
day period and the drawer’s funds are insufficient to cover it, there is no Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 violation.
Where check was issued prior to August 8, 1984, when Circular No. 12 of the Department of the Justice
took effect, and the drawer relied on the then prevailing Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice to the effect that
checks issued as part of an arrangement/agreement of the parties to guarantee or secure fulfillment of an obligation
are not covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, no criminal liability should be incurred by the drawer. Circular should
not be given retroactive effect. (Lazaro v. CA, November 11, 1993, citing People v. Alberto, October 28, 1993)
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Under paragraph 2 – by disposing of real property as free from encumbrance, although such
encumbrance be not recorded
Elements:
1. The thing disposed is a real property:
2. Offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or
not;
3. There must be express representation by offender that the real property is free from encumbrance;
4. The act of disposing of the real property is made to the damage of another.
Under paragraph 3 – by wrongfully taking by the owner of his personal property from its lawful
possessor
Elements:
1. Offender is the owner of personal property;
2. Said personal property is in the lawful possession of another;
3. Offender wrongfully takes it from its lawful possessor;
4. Prejudice is thereby caused to the possessor or third person.
Under paragraph 5 – by accepting any compensation for services not rendered or for labor not
performed
Under paragraph 6 – by selling, mortgaging or encumbering real property or properties with which
the offender guaranteed the fulfillment of his obligation as surety
Elements:
1. Offender is a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil action;
2. He guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation with his real property or properties;
3. He sells, mortgages, or in any manner encumbers said real property;
4. Such sale, mortgage or encumbrance is without express authority from the court, or made before
the cancellation of his bond, or before being relieved from the obligation contracted by him.
CHAPTER VII
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
ARTICLE 319. REMOVAL, SALE OR PLEDGE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY
ACTS PUNISHED:
1. Knowingly removing any personal property mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage law to
any province or city other than the one in which it was located at the time of execution of the
mortgage, without the written consent of the mortgagee or his executors, administrators or
assigns;
Elements:
a) Personal property is mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage Law;
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CHAPTER VIII
ARSON AND OTHER CRIMES INVOLVING DESTRUCTION
KINDS OF ARSON:
1. Arson, under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613;
2. Destructive arson, under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659;
3. Other cases of arson, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
FACTS: On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba and his family
were sleeping in their house. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw Ferigel set the roof of their house on
fire with a lighted match. Avelino's wife, who peeped through a hole in their wall, saw Ferigel burn the roof of their
house. One of the neighbors, Benjamin Estrellon, who responded to Avelino’s wife call of help, went to the nearby
river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by Ferigel at close range.
Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death.
Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's son, Noel, witnessed the shooting since they were only about five (5) to
six (6) meters away from Ferigel when the incident occurred. The place was brightly lit by the burning roof and
visibility was not a problem.
Subsequently, information for murder was filed against accused-appellant Ferigel Oliva and co-accused
Dominador Oliva, Marcos Paderan and Arnel Domingo. On the same day, the accused were also charged with
arson. The cases for arson and murder were tried jointly. The trial court acquitted accused Paderan, Domingo and
Domingo Oliva of the crime of Arson and Murder for lack of evidence, convicted the accused Ferigel Oliva guilty of
the crime of Arson penalized under par. 2, Sec. 3 of PD 1613 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, convicted the accused Ferigel Oliva guilty of the
crime of Murder penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, among others. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that when Ferigel burned Avelino's house, the law applicable was P.
D. No. 1613. Under Section 3 (2) of the law, the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is "any inhabited house or dwelling." Under the amendment, it is the fact that the
house burned is inhabited that qualifies the crime. There is no need to prove that the accused had actual knowledge
that the house was inhabited.
Under Section 3 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613, the elements of arson are: (1) that there is
intentional burning; and (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The records show
that when Ferigel willfully set fire to the roof of Avelino's house, Avelino's wife and children were asleep therein.
Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses. Corpus delicti is the
body or substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. Corpus delicti is the
fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of witnesses. In murder, the fact of death
is the corpus delicti. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its
having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough
to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Convicting Ferigel Oliva of arson, the trial court imposed the straight penalty of seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. This is an error. An indeterminate penalty must be imposed.
This is mandatory. Thus, the Supreme Court modified the penalty.
In People v. Omotoy, it was stated that in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven, the prescribed penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty is prision mayor, in any of its periods, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
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Avelino testified that the value of the portion of the house that was burned was two hundred pesos
(P200.00).] This was not rebutted by the defense and was even reiterated on cross examination when Avelino was
permitted to elaborate on the number of palma Brava pieces that were burned. This was the amount awarded by the
trial court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Since there is no evidence to award moral damages to Avelino's family, the Supreme Court declined to
grant such award.
CHAPTER IX
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ARTICLE 327. WHO ARE LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. Such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
3. The act of damaging another’s property was committed merely for the sake of damaging it;
There is destruction of the property of another but there is no misappropriation. Otherwise, it would be
theft if he gathers the effects of destruction.
CHAPTER X
EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ARTICLE 332. PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
CRIMES INVOLVED IN THE EXEMPTION:
1. Theft;
2. Estafa; and
3. Malicious mischief.
Only the relatives enumerated incur no liability if the crime relates to theft (not robbery), swindling, and
malicious mischief. Third parties who participate are not exempt. The relationship between the spouses is not
limited to legally married couples; the provision applies to live-in partners.
Estafa should not be complexed with any other crime in order for exemption to operate.
Title 11
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
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CHAPTER I:
ADULTERY AND CONCUBINAGE
ART. 333: ADULTERY
ELEMENTS:
1. That the woman is married
2. That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband
3.That as regard the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he must know her to be married.
In the Guinucud case where the husband agreed with the wife that they live separately and free to marry
other persons, the husband cannot file a complaint against his wife for having adulterous relationship. The concept
of pari delicto is not present in the Revised Penal Code but only in Art.1411 of the Civil Code.
Death of paramour will not bar the prosecution against the unfaithful wife, because the requirement
that both he the offenders should be included in the complaint is absolute only when the two offenders
are alive
Proceedings must continue despite death of the offended party
Effect of pardon: Art. 344 require that-
1. The pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution; and
2. Both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party.
ADULTERY CONCUBINAGE
- A single act of sexual intercourse by a married Prove the ff:
woman is enough. - husband keeping the mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or
- by having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances
with a woman who is not his wife;
- by cohabiting with her in any other place.
- Complaint from the offended spouse is necessary. - Complaint from the offended spouse is necessary.
- Each act of sexual intercourse is a single count of
adultery.
Adultery is more severely punished than concubinage because adultery makes possible the introduction of
another man’s blood into the family so that the offended husband may have another man’s son bearing his
(husband’s) name and receiving support from him.
CHAPTER II
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ART. 336: ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is another person of either sex
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CHAPTER III
SEDUCTION, CORRUPTION OF MINORS, AND WHITE SLAVE TRADE
ART. 337: QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
TWO CLASSES:
1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age by certain persons, such as, a
person in authority, priest, teacher, etc.; and
2. 2. Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant regardless of her age or reputation
RAPE SEDUCTION
- The age is less than 12 (statutory), or if 12 but less -the girl maybe more than 12 but less than 18 and the crime is by
than 18, there is force and intimidation, or the girl means of cajolery.
may or may not be a virgin.
- In qualified seduction: the girl must be a virgin.
Virginity- is not physical but moral, i.e., that the
woman does not have sexual experience.
Committed by one who promotes or facilitates the prostitution or corruption of minor in order to satisfy the
lust of another and not the corruptor’s own lust.
e. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
2. Those commit act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution;
3. Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom;
4. Attempt to commit child prostitution.
CHAPTER IV
ABDUCTION
ART. 342: FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
Abduction of any woman against her will with lewd designs.
LEWD DESIGN- obscene, lustful, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity, one carried in a wanton manner.
Where the girl is under 12, the crime is always forcible abduction with or without the consent of the
child. The law presumes that the abduction is against her will. Sexual intercourse is not an element of
abduction; it is enough that that the woman is taken against her will with lewd designs.
Only when the rape is consummated can the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape be
committed or if the taking of the woman amounts to forcible abduction and thereafter she was abused.
Sexual intercourse is not necessary in forcible abduction
NOTE: In rape cases the pardon must be granted not only by the parents of the offended but also the
offended herself.
Title XII
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATE OF PERSONS
CHAPTER I
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS
Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child.
1. Simulation of births
2. Substitution of one child for another
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose into civil
status.
Object of the crime under Art. 347 is the creation of false or causing of the loss of civil status.
Takes place when the women pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is not and on the day of the
supposed delivery takes the child of another as her own.
The simulation which is a crime is that which alters the civil status of a person.
Fact that the child will be benefited by the simulation of its birth is not a defense.
Abandonment of a child should be understood under Art. 347 as leaving the child a public place where
other people may find it, and causing the child lose it civil status.
Concealing a legitimate child before the purpose of causing it to lose its civil status.
CHAPTER II
ILLEGAL MARRIAGES
ART. 349: BIGAMY
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender has been legally married
2. That the marriage has not been dissolved or, in case of his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet presumed dead according to the civil code.
3. That he contracts a second marriage or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Qualifying Circumstance: Is either of the contracting parties obtains the consent of the other by means
violence, intimidation or fraud.
Priest, or ministers of any religious denomination or sect or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any legal marriage ceremony.
Offender must be authorized to solemnize marriages; otherwise he is liable under Art. 177 for usurpation
of authority.
Title XIII
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
1. Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art. 355);
2. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation (Art. 356);
3. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings (Art. 357);
4. Slander (Art. 358);
5. Slander by deed (Art. 359);
6. Incriminating innocent person (Art. 363);
7. Intriguing against honor (Art. 364).
CHAPTER I
LIBEL
ARTICLE 353. DEFINITION OF LIBEL
A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
ELEMENTS:
1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance;
2. The imputation must be made publicly;
3. It must be malicious;
4. The imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;
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5. The imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.
In the crime of libel, which includes oral defamation, there is no need for the prosecution to present
evidence of malice. It is enough that the alleged defamatory or libelous statement be presented to the court
verbatim. It is the court which will prove whether it is defamatory or not. If the tenor of the utterance or statement
is defamatory, the legal presumption of malice arises even without proof.
Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the malice in law has been rebutted. Otherwise, there is no need
to adduce evidence of malice in fact. So, while malice in law does not require evidence, malice in fact requires
evidence.
Malice in law can be negated by evidence that, in fact, the alleged libelous or defamatory utterance was
made with good motives and justifiable ends or by the fact that the utterance was privileged in character.
In law, however, the privileged character of a defamatory statement may be absolute or qualified.
When the privileged character is said to be absolute, the statement will not be actionable whether criminal
or civil because that means the law does not allow prosecution on an action based thereon.
Illustration:
As regards the statements made by Congressmen while they are deliberating or discussing in Congress,
when the privileged character is qualified, proof of malice in fact will be admitted to take the place of malice in law.
When the defamatory statement or utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice in law is negated. The utterance or
statement would not be actionable because malice in law does not exist. Therefore, for the complainant to prosecute
the accused for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has to prove that the accused was actuated with malice (malice
in fact) in making the statement.
When a libel is addressed to several persons, unless they are identified in the same libel, even if there are
several persons offended by the libelous utterance or statement, there will only be one count of libel.
If the offended parties in the libel were distinctly identified, even though the libel was committed at one
and the same time, there will be as many libels as there are persons dishonored.
Illustration:
If a person uttered that “All the Marcoses are thieves," there will only be one libel because these particular
Marcoses regarded as thieves are not specifically identified.
If the offender said, “All the Marcoses – the father, mother and daughter are thieves.” There will be three
counts of libel because each person libeled is distinctly dishonored.
If you do not know the particular persons libeled, you cannot consider one libel as giving rise to several
counts of libel. In order that one defamatory utterance or imputation may be considered as having dishonored more
than one person, those persons dishonored must be identified. Otherwise, there will only be one count of libel.
Note that in libel, the person defamed need not be expressly identified. It is enough that he could possibly
be identified because “innuendos may also be a basis for prosecution for libel. As a matter of fact, even a
compliment which is undeserved, has been held to be libelous.
The crime is libel is the defamation is in writing or printed media. The crime is slander or oral defamation
if it is not printed. Even if what was imputed is true, the crime of libel is committed unless one acted with good
motives or justifiable end. Poof of truth of a defamatory imputation is not even admissible in evidence, unless what
was imputed pertains to an act which constitutes a crime and when the person to whom the imputation was made is a
public officer and the imputation pertains to the performance of official duty. Other than these, the imputation is not
admissible.
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ARTICLE 356. THREATENING TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH PUBLICATION FOR
A COMPENSATION
ACTS PUNISHED:
1. Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child, or other
members of his family;
2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money consideration.
BLACKMAIL – In its metaphorical sense, blackmail may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by threats
of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime – hush money. (US v. Eguia, et al., 38 Phil. 857)
Blackmail is possible in (1) light threats under Article 283; and (2) threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the
publication of, a libel for compensation, under Article 356.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the
social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion,
etc.
CHAPTER TWO
INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS
ARTICLE 363. INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS
Elements:
1. Offender performs an act;
2. By such an act, he incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime;
3. Such act does not constitute perjury.
This crime cannot be committed through verbal incriminatory statements. It is defined as an act and,
therefore, to commit this crime, more than a mere utterance is required.
If the incriminating machination is made orally, the crime may be slander or oral defamation.
If the incriminatory machination was made in writing and under oath, the crime may be perjury if there
is a willful falsity of the statements made
If the statement in writing is not under oath, the crime may be falsification if the crime is a material
matter made in a written statement which is required by law to have been rendered.
As far as this crime is concerned, this has been interpreted to be possible only in the so-called planting
of evidence.
This crime is committed by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to
blemish the honor or reputation of another person.
Intriguing against honor is referred to as gossiping. The offender, without ascertaining the truth of a
defamatory utterance, repeats the same and pass it on to another, to the damage of the offended party. Who started
the defamatory news is unknown.
If the offender made the utterance, where the source of the defamatory nature of the utterance is known,
and offender makes a republication thereof, even though he repeats the libelous statement as coming from another,
as long as the source is identified, the crime committed by that offender is slander.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR AND INCRIMINATING AN INNOCENT
PERSON:
In intriguing against honor, the offender resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of blemishing the honor or
reputation of another person.
In incriminating an innocent person, the offender performs an act by which he directly incriminates or
imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime.
Title 14
QUASI-OFFENSES
Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence
Punishable Quasi-offenses:
1. Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave or less grave felony or light felony.
2. Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave or less serious felony.
3. Causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or negligence;
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4. Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
ELEMENTS:
1. offender does or fails to do an act;
2. the doing of or failure to do the act is voluntary;
3. that it be without malice;
4. that material damage results; and
5. there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration:
a. his employment or occupation;
b. degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
c. other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE
ELEMENTS:
1. lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
2. the damage impending to be cause used is not immediate or danger is not clearly
manifest.
Imprudence Negligence
1. deficiency of action 1. deficiency of perception
2. failure of precaution 2. failure in advertence
Since this is the mode of incurring criminal liability, if there is only one carelessness, even if there are
several results, the accused may only be prosecuted under one count for criminal negligence. So there
would only be one information to be filed, even if the negligence may bring about resulting injuries
which are slight.
NOTE: Do not separate the accusation from the slight physical injuries from the other material result of
the negligence.
Illustration:
If the criminal negligence resulted in homicide, serious physical injuries and slight physical injuries do not
join only the homicide, physical injuries in one information for the slight physical injuries. You are not complexing
slight when you join it in the same information. It is just that you are not splitting the criminal negligence because
the real basis of the criminal liability is the negligence. If you split the criminal negligence, then double jeopardy
will arise.
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Crime against National Crime against Public Crime against Public Special Law Crime against
Security Order Order Public Order
Arbitrary Detention (124) and Delay in the Illegal Detention (267 & 268)
delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities (125)
Maybe committed only by public officers and employees Committed by private individuals or public officers and
who are acting as such (BUT private individuals who employees acting in their private capacity
conspire with public officers are guilty of this crime)
That the meeting is attended by armed persons It doesn’t matter whether the audience is armed or not
That the purpose is to commit any of the crimes That the audience is incited to the commission of the crime
punishable under the RPC of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or direct assault.
In the 2nd form of Direct Assault, the The offended party The offended party is The offended
offended partyIllegal Assembly
is a person (146) or is a person who aIllegal
in authority personAssociation
in authority (147)
party is a
There is an actual meeting or assembly
his agent comes to the It is
aidnotofnecessary that there be an actual
or his agent meeting in
person
Meeting and attendance at such meeting is punished That there is a meeting, a gathering
a person in authority or group
authority of
or his
or his agent persons, whether in a fixed place or moving
agent.
That
Thethe purpose
force is toofcommit
employed anyofofa the crimes That the audience is incited to the commission of
the agent
punishable
person inunder the RPC
authority must be serious. It the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection,
need not be serious when the offended sedition or direct assault
party is a person in authority
The person in authority or his agent can The person in The person in
either be: authority must be in authority must
the actual be in the actual
a)engaged in the actual performance of performance of his performance of
official duties; or official duties his official
duties or gives
b) he is assaulted by reason of the past a lawful order
performance of official duties thereof
The resistance employed must be serious The resistance here is
not serious
The disobedience The
here must be serious disobedience is
not serious
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in the same title of must not be embraced falsification and not need to be embraced
the Code in the same title of the physical injuries are in the same title of the
Code taken into consideration Code
Serves to increase Serves to increase the An additional penalty is Punished by the
the penalty into its penalty into its also imposed maximum penalty
maximum maximum prescribed by law for
the new felony
No period of time No period of time Offender is found guilty Period of the
between the former between the former of any of the crimes commission must be
conviction and the conviction and the last specified within 10 before serving out the
last conviction is conviction is fixed by years from his last sentence or during the
fixed by law law release or last service of such sentence
conviction
Ordinary mitigating Ordinary mitigating Special aggravating Special aggravating
circumstance which circumstance which can circumstance which circumstance which
can be offset by a be offset by a cannot be offset by a cannot be offset by a
mitigating mitigating circumstance mitigating circumstance mitigating circumstance
circumstance
Making, importing and uttering false Mutilation of coins and Selling of false or mutilated
coins importation and utterance coins without connivance
(163) of mutilated coins (164) (165)
The coin uttered (passed) maybe currency of The coin must be of “legal The coin must be “legal tender”
a foreign country or that which has been tender” and does not include
withdrawn from circulation foreign coins
In case of uttering, the offender connived with There is connivance with the There is no connivance but there
the counterfeiters or importers mutilator or importer in case of is knowledge that the coin is
uttering false
Using fictitious name (178, par. 1) Concealing true name (178, Estafa
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
SLU BARCOM
2009
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
There is a criminal There is a criminal The testimony The testimony is There is a judicial
proceeding proceeding is given in a under oath but proceeding
civil case NOT in a judicial
proceeding
Defendant must be Conviction or
sentenced at last to acquittal of the
a correctional defendant is NOT
penalty, a fine or necessary, it is
must acquitted sufficient that the
defendant is
prosecuted for a
felony
Offender knows
the falsity of the
witness, presented
him and the latter
testified falsely
WITHOUT
INDUCEMENT.
If there is
inducement, Arts.
180 – 183 in
relation to Art. 7
par.2 will apply
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
SLU BARCOM
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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
Mutilation Serious Physical Injuries Less Serious Physical Slight Physical injuries
(262) (263) Injuries (265) and Maltreatment (266)
The mutilation of The purpose is to inflict injury The purpose is to inflict The purpose is to inflict injury
organs necessary for injury
generation or any other
part of the body must
be for the purpose of
depriving the victim of
the part of his body
Victim becomes insane, Victim is incapacitated Victim is incapacitated for
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
SLU BARCOM
2009
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
imbecile, impotent or blind for labor for 10 days or labor from 1 9 days, or required
more (but not more than medical attendance during the
Victim loses the use of speech 30 days), or needs same period
or the power to hear or to medical attendance for
smell, or loses an eye, a hand, a the same period of time Victim was not prevented form
foot, an arm, or a leg, or loses engaging in his habitual work
the use of any such member, or The physical injuries or did not require medical
becomes incapacitated for the must not be those attendance
work in which he was therefore described in the
habitually engaged preceding articles Victim was ill-treated by deed
without causing any injury
Victim becomes deformed, or Qualified less serious
loses any other member of his physical injuries (1) there
body, or loses the use thereof, is a manifest intent to
or becomes ill or incapacitated insult or offend the inured
for the performance of the person; (2) there are
work in which he was circumstance adding
habitually engaged for more ignominy to the offense;
than 90 days (3) victim is the parent,
ascendant, guardian,
Victim becomes ill or curator or teacher of the
incapacitated for labor for more offender; (4) offended
than 30 days (but must not be party is a person of rank
more than 90 days or a person in authority
provided the crime is
NOT direct assault
“By means of fire” “By means of “By means of derailment of “By means of poison”
explosion” a locomotive”
When the crime is Arson When a person uses a hand When property is damaged as a result
(320 and PD 613 as grenade to create an of the derailment of a locomotive, the
amended by RA 7659), explosion, the crime is one crime committed is damage to means
this is not an aggravating that involves destruction of communication (330)
circumstance, since it is (324)
inherent in the crime
When something is set on When an explosion is used When derailment of a locomotive is When poison is used for the
fire for the purpose of for the purpose of killing used for the purpose of killing another purpose of killing another
killing another, this another person, this person, this becomes a qualifying person, this becomes a
becomes a qualifying becomes a qualifying aggravating circumstance in qualifying aggravating
aggravating circumstance aggravating circumstance in accordance with Art. 248, par. 3 circumstance in accordance
in accordance with Art. accordance with Art. 248 with Art. 248, par. 3
248, par. 3 par. 3
When the crime When the crime committed When the crime committed is one
committed is Arson, and is one involving destruction, involving derailment of a locomotive,
someone is killed in the and someone is killed in the and someone is killed in the process,
process, but there was not process, but there was no but there was no intent to kill, there is
intent to kill, this is still intent to kill, the crime is a complex crime of damage to means
not considered an still destruction and this of communication with homicide (or
aggravating circumstance, circumstance is inherent in murder)
but the penalty would be that offense. However, the
reclusion perpetua to penalty would be death
death in accordance with
PD 1613
When someone is killed, When someone is killed, When someone is killed, and
and then the house is set and then an explosion is derailment of a locomotive is done
on fire, there are two done, there are two separate after the killing, there are two
separate crimes of arson crimes of destruction and separate crimes of derailment of
and murder (or homicide) murder (or homicide) locomotive and murder (or homicide)
This becomes an This becomes an This becomes an aggravating This becomes an aggravating
aggravating circumstance aggravating circumstance circumstance ONLY when there is circumstance ONLY when
ONLY when there is ONLY when there is another aggravating circumstance there is another aggravating
another aggravating another aggravating which already qualifies the crime circumstance which already
circumstance which circumstance which already qualifies the crime
already qualifies the qualifies the crime
crime
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Chief: Mykedox Knoel Cuchapin, V.Chairman: Maria Angelyn Lozano, Members: Xyrel Faith
Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
SLU BARCOM
2009
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor
SLU BARCOM
2009
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER BOOK I
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Andres, Warren Marc Lloren, Jodea Brendalyn Acay, Janice Santella, Jeffrey Exiomo, Rizza Joy
Santos, Gertrude Gay Manandeg, Nazariel Biado, Jose Oviedo, Meriam Montemayor